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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Mar 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Victory International Holdings Pte Ltd v Borrelli, Cosimo and another and another matter

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[2024] SGHC 79Case no. Originating Application No 1214 of 2023 and Summons No 195 of 2024

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  1. [1] The claimant, Victory International Holdings Pte Ltd (“Victory”), has commenced this originating application, HC/OA 1214/2023 (“OA 1214”), against the first defendant, Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Mr Borrelli”) and the second defendant, Clifford Chance Pte Ltd (“CCPL”) (collectively, the “defendants”). In particular, Victory seeks the production of various documents and information from Mr Borrelli, and the assessment and taxation of the legal fees incurred by Mr Borrelli’s solicitors, CCPL.

  2. Introduction

  3. [2] I first set out, for broad context, how the parties came to be in dispute with each other. At the outset, Victory and OPV Pharma Holdings Ltd (“Navis”) were shareholders in OPV Pharmaceutical Holdings Pte Ltd (“OPV SG”). Victory was the minority shareholder, holding 3.5m shares in OPV SG, which represented a 35% shareholding (the “Victory Shares”). Navis held the remaining 6.5m shares.

  4. [3] Victory and Navis signed a shareholders’ agreement in relation to their shareholding in OPV SG. The shareholders’ agreement provided for Navis, as the majority shareholder, to have drag-along rights. In June 2021, Navis sold its shareholding to a third party and exercised its drag-along rights. This meant that Victory was compelled to sell the Victory Shares to that same third party on the same terms as Navis. As Victory refused to do so, Navis appointed Mr Borrelli as the receiver of the Victory Shares, to complete the drag-along sale of the Victory Shares. He was the receiver when I heard the parties.

  5. [4] Victory has brought OA 1214 against Mr Borrelli and CCPL to seek various orders, which I set out very broadly according to the following categories:

  6. (a) Production of the Minority SPA: that Mr Borrelli furnishes a copy of the executed drag-along sale and purchase agreement in respect of the Victory Shares, between Victory and the third party (the “Minority SPA”).

  7. (b) Account of sale proceeds: that Mr Borrelli furnishes a full account of the sale proceeds received under the Minority SPA.

  8. (c) Provision of a report: that Mr Borrelli furnishes a report setting out and explaining several matters concerning the circumstances in which the Minority SPA was executed.

  9. (d) Assessment of legal fees: that Mr Borrelli and/or CCPL file a bill of costs for legal fees incurred, pursuant to ss 120, 124, and 125 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”).

  10. For the avoidance of doubt, these are not exact quotations of the orders that Victory seeks. I will set out the orders that Victory seeks more comprehensively below.

  11. [5] In addition, Victory also sought, in HC/SUM 195/2024 (“SUM 195”), permission to cross-examine Mr Borrelli.

  12. [7] I now explain my reasons for my decisions in SUM 195 and OA 1214.

  13. The parties

  14. [8] I turn first to describe the parties. Victory is a company incorporated in Singapore. The party to whom the Victory Shares were sold is RV Healthcare Pte Ltd (“RV Healthcare”). The sale was executed on 5 October 2023 and completed on 26 October 2023. For completeness, Navis’s shares (in OPV SG) were sold to RV Healthcare on 8 June 2021.

  15. [9] Mr Borrelli and Mr Patrick Bance (collectively, the “Receivers”) were appointed as the receivers of the Victory Shares by Navis. This was done pursuant to a Deed of Appointment of Receivers dated 13 August 2021 (the “Deed of Appointment”). Mr Bance resigned as receiver on 5 October 2023. This leaves Mr Borrelli as the sole receiver of the Victory Shares.

  16. [10] Finally, CCPL are Mr Borrelli’s solicitors. CCPL have been instructed by the Receivers in respect of their duties as receivers of the Victory Shares.

  17. Background facts

  18. The Facility Agreement and the Share Pledge

  19. [11] I turn now to elaborate more fully on the relevant background facts. The dispute can be traced back to 13 June 2017, when Victory and Navis entered into a facility agreement (the “Facility Agreement”). Navis was to loan Victory the sum of US$2.5m under the Facility Agreement. To secure Victory’s repayment of this loan, Victory and Navis entered into a share pledge on the same day, by which Victory assigned and charged the Victory Shares to Navis (the “Share Pledge”). The loan under the Facility Agreement was to be repaid by Victory to Navis on 19 June 2020, being three years after the drawdown date of 19 June 2017. Victory did not repay the loan.

  20. Navis issues the Drag Notice and an event of default notice to Victory

  21. [12] On 6 July 2021, Navis exercised its drag-along rights provided for in OPV SG’s shareholders’ agreement and constitutional documents to compel Victory to sell the Victory Shares to RV Healthcare. Navis did so by issuing a drag-along notice (the “Drag Notice”) pursuant to cl 16.6 of OPV SG’s shareholders’ agreement and Art 24 of OPV SG’s memorandum and articles of association. This compelled Victory to transfer the Victory Shares to RV Healthcare on the same terms by which Navis sold its shares in OPV SG to RV Healthcare. These terms are listed in the schedule to the sale notice dated 8 June 2021. However, Victory did not comply with the Drag Notice.

  22. [13] On 8 July 2021, Navis issued an event of default notice to Victory, pursuant to the Facility Agreement. In this notice, Navis stated that an event of default had arisen under cl 12.1 of the Facility Agreement as Victory had not repaid “the Loan together with accrued interest when due on 19 June 2020 (the Final Repayment Date)”. Navis demanded that Victory repay the sum of US$3,724,455.03 by the next day, 9 July 2021.

  23. The Minority SPA

  24. [14] On 26 July 2021, Navis sent a letter to Victory’s solicitors to state that the sale of Navis’s shares in OPV SG to RV Healthcare had been completed. Navis therefore asked for Victory’s confirmation, by 27 July 2021, that it would comply with the Drag Notice. In this same letter, Navis also enclosed a draft Minority SPA for the sale of the Victory Shares to RV Healthcare. There are three matters about the draft Minority SPA that warrant some elaboration. These concern, loosely, additional sums that remain outstanding under the Minority SPA.

  25. [15] First, while Mr Borrelli had received the initial purchase price of US$3,237,500 at completion of the Minority SPA on 26 October 2023, there still remained an outstanding deferred purchase price of US$262,500 (the “Deferred Purchase Price”) that was to become due and payable under the terms of the draft Minority SPA. Cavenagh Law, who represent the defendants in this application, confirmed the existence of the Deferred Purchase Price, and the conditions upon which it would become due and payable, in a letter dated 14 November 2023. Pursuant to the relevant terms, the Deferred Purchase Price would become due and payable upon the earlier of: (a) OPV Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company (“OPV VN”) and Otsuka Pharmaceutical Vietnam Joint Stock Company (“Otsuka”) entering into a mutual agreement on the termination of the long-term sublease agreement dated 11 March 2003; or (b) Otsuka vacating or handing over the premises leased under, and the termination of, the said long-term sublease agreement.

  26. [16] Second, the draft Minority SPA provided that there was to be a loan adjustment amount (the “Loan Adjustment Amount”). The material details behind the Loan Adjustment Amount are as follows. The sum loaned under the Facility Agreement by Navis to Victory (as defined at [11] above) was itself an onward loan from OPV SG to Navis under a loan agreement between OPV SG and Navis (the “Navis Loan Agreement”). In this regard, cl 6.7 of the draft Minority SPA provided that “following the payment or repayment to [OPV SG] of any amounts under the [Navis] Loan Agreement … an amount equal to [Victory’s] Equity Proportion of such Loan Repayment shall be paid by [RV Healthcare] into [Victory’s] Account”. Under Schedule 3 of the draft Minority SPA, Victory’s “Equity Proportion” was stated to be 35%. This corresponded to its shareholding in OPV SG.

  27. [17] Third, the draft Minority SPA provided for a “price adjustment upon the completion of the sale of the Land” (the “Sale of the Surplus Land”). Cavenagh Law confirmed as such in its letter dated 14 November 2023. The “Land” refers to two parcels of surplus land owned by OPV VN that will eventually be disposed of. Under the draft Minority SPA, 65% of the proceeds of the Sale of the Surplus Land would be distributed to Navis and the remaining 35% would be distributed to Victory. This division is in accordance with Navis’s and Victory’s respective shareholdings in OPV SG. Victory asserts that, according to a valuation that it previously obtained, the Land is valued at US$6,595,177.

  28. The appointment of the Receivers

  29. [18] Having set out the pertinent details of the draft Minority SPA, I move on to discuss the events following its disclosure to Victory. On 8 September 2021, Navis confirmed, in a letter sent to Victory’s solicitors, that it had appointed the Receivers as joint receivers over the Victory Shares pursuant to the Deed of Appointment. Pursuant to cl 3 of the Deed of Appointment, Navis appointed the Receivers “jointly and severally to be receivers of all the Security Assets”. Further, cl 5 provided that “the Receivers shall be the joint and several agent of [Victory]”. According to Mr Borrelli, the Receivers were appointed to complete the drag-along sale in circumstances where: (a) Victory had defaulted on its repayment obligations to Navis; and (b) Victory had refused to comply with the Drag Notice.

  30. [19] Subsequently, Victory commenced an action in the High Court against Navis in relation to the Share Pledge. Victory also sought an injunction to restrain the Receivers and Navis from selling the Victory Shares. After the High Court proceedings were stayed in favour of arbitration, Victory commenced arbitration proceedings against Navis in relation to the Facility Agreement and sought a similar injunction to restrain the Receivers and Navis from selling the Victory Shares. On 25 July 2023, the arbitral tribunal declined to grant Victory’s application for an interim injunction. Given the arbitral tribunal’s decision, Victory accepted that the Receivers could proceed to sell the Victory Shares.

  31. [20] From 31 July 2023 to 28 September 2023, Victory’s solicitors and CCPL exchanged correspondence regarding, among other things, the progress of the negotiations with RV Healthcare on the sale of Victory Shares, the allegedly undue delay in the execution of the Minority SPA, communications with RV Healthcare, and the Loan Adjustment Amount. Victory alleges that it had pressed the Receivers four times on questions relating to the sale of the Victory Shares but that its queries went largely unanswered.

  32. [21] On 5 October 2023, CCPL informed Victory’s solicitors by letter that the Minority SPA had been signed on the same day, with the completion on 26 October 2023. It had therefore taken the Receivers over nine weeks from 25 July 2023 to sign the Minority SPA, which was when the arbitral tribunal dismissed Victory’s application for an interim injunction. The Receivers did not provide Victory with a copy of the signed Minority SPA. From 6 October 2023 to 14 November 2023, Victory’s solicitors and CCPL also exchanged correspondence regarding, among other things, the signed Minority SPA and the Loan Adjustment Amount.

  33. [22] In any event, Victory alleges that its requests for information went largely unanswered. This is despite CCPL having sent a letter to Victory’s solicitors on 31 October 2023 that enclosed a statement of account. This statement of account was summary in nature and lacked details and calculations. Indeed, Victory alleges that Mr Borrelli has still not provided any updates on the Loan Adjustment Amount, the Deferred Purchase Price, and the Sale of the Surplus Land. However, Mr Borrelli has explained that this statement of account sent on 31 October 2023 was an interim one. Indeed, he envisages that a further statement of account will eventually be provided following the receipt and application of any further payment, including the Loan Adjustment Amount to be received from RV Healthcare. But because there have been no further updates in relation to any further payment, Mr Borrelli has not provided a further statement of account.

  34. Victory’s prayers

  35. [23] Against this background, Victory commenced OA 1214 on 1 December 2024. At the risk of repetition, I elaborate further on the substantive orders which Victory seeks against Mr Borrelli and CCPL:

  36. (a) Production of the Minority SPA: that Mr Borrelli furnishes Victory with a copy of the executed drag-along sale and purchase agreement between Victory and RV Healthcare in respect of the Victory Shares, ie, the Minority SPA.

  37. (b) Account of sale proceeds: that Mr Borrelli furnishes Victory with a full account of the sale proceeds received from RV Healthcare under the Minority SPA (the “Sale Proceeds”), as well as the application of the Sale Proceeds against the secured liability under the Facility Agreement, with a detailed calculation of costs, expenses, and interest accrued.

  38. (c) Provision of a report: that Mr Borrelli furnishes Victory with a report stating, among other things: (a) when the Receivers were first made aware that they could proceed with the sale of the Victory Shares after Victory’s injunction application was dismissed by the arbitral tribunal on 25 July 2023; (b) the reasons why the Minority SPA was only signed on 5 October 2023; and (c) the steps that the Receivers had taken to sell the Victory shares in OPV SG under the Share Pledge. For convenience, I shall term this intended report as the “Report”.

  39. (d) Assessment of legal fees: that Mr Borrelli and/or CCPL file a bill of costs for legal fees incurred in connection with the Share Pledge, pursuant to ss 120, 124, and 125 of the LPA).

  40. [24] Additionally, Victory also asked, through prayer 4, that if this court finds Mr Borrelli and/or Mr Bance “negligent in carrying out their duties as receivers, that this [court] grant any consequential relief for losses incurred by [Victory] as a result”. For convenience, I shall term this as the “Consequential Relief Prayer”. For reasons I elaborate on below at [63]−[64], I eventually allowed Victory to withdraw the Consequential Relief Prayer.

  41. [25] Finally, in SUM 195, Victory sought permission (pursuant to O 15 r 7(6)(b) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”)) to cross-examine Mr Borrelli.

  42. Whether Victory should be allowed to either hold SUM 195 in abeyance or withdraw SUM 195

  43. Victory’s requests in relation to SUM 195

  44. [26] Before I consider the substantive merits of OA 1214, I turn first to SUM 195, for which the parties tendered extensive written submissions. One day before the hearing on 7 February 2024, Victory’s solicitors wrote into court to request that SUM 195 be held in abeyance or, in the event that the court refuses that request, that they be allowed to withdraw SUM 195 (collectively, the “Requests”). In its letter, Victory’s solicitors pointed out that Victory’s application to cross-examine Mr Borrelli is premised on three areas, namely:

  45. [28] As I said to Mr Yim, it was not possible that Victory did not know that SUM 195 was to be heard before OA 1214. In this regard, the Registrar’s Notice dated 17 January 2024 provided that the parties were to file, among others, “(ii) written submissions for OA 1214, limited to 35 pages (including the cover page and any tables of contents); these written submissions are to address the issues in OA 1214 assuming that cross-examination is not allowed” [emphasis in original]. This direction would only have made sense if SUM 195 was to be heard before OA 1214, because only then would it be sensible to provide for the contingency that cross-examination was not allowed.

  46. [29] In sum, I found Victory’s conduct and requests in relation to SUM 195 to be troubling. First of all, Victory was late in tendering its written submissions for SUM 195 (and OA 1214) despite being notified by the court of the deadlines well in advance. Second, Victory waited until one day before the hearing of SUM 195 to make its Requests. Indeed, this was after all parties, as well as the court, had spent time and effort preparing for the hearing. Third, the reasons offered by Victory in support of its Requests are essentially arguments that the defendants advanced in their written submissions.

  47. The applicable law

  48. [32] More specifically, the particular rationale for these provisions was explained by Chitty LJ in the English Court of Appeal decision of Fox v Star Newspaper Company [1898] 1 QB 636 (at 639):

  49. [33] In Singapore, the Court of Appeal in Rohde & Liesenfeld Pte Ltd v Jorg Geselle and others [1998] 3 SLR(R) 335 (“Rohde & Liesenfeld”) (at [13]), in interpreting O 21 r 3(1) of the ROC 2014, endorsed Graham J’s formulation of the relevant principles in the English High Court decision of Covell Matthews & Partners v French Wools Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 876 (“Covell Matthews”) (at 879):

  50. The Court of Appeal further added that in granting leave to withdraw a claim, the “public interest, where appropriate, should also be considered” (see Rohde & Liesenfeld at [13]).

  51. [34] As I have said above, the principles governing a court’s discretion whether to allow a party to withdraw a summons can be adapted from the existing case law and principles in relation to O 16 r 3 of the ROC 2021 and O 21 r 3 of the ROC 2014 (the latter being the predecessor provision to the former). They can be broadly summarised as follows. First, since no party should be compelled to proceed with a summons against its will, a court should generally give permission for a party who had brought the summons (the “applicant”) to withdraw it. Second, however, a court can depart from this general approach if such a withdrawal would cause injustice to the counterparty. This is especially crucial in the context of O 16 r 6 of the ROC 2021 because it appears that a court generally lacks the power to impose conditions on a party’s withdrawal of a summons, such as precluding the applicant from bringing a fresh summons at a later stage. After all, O 16 r 6 of the ROC 2021, unlike O 16 r 3(1) of the ROC 2021, does not expressly provide that a court can impose conditions if it allows a summons to be withdrawn.

  52. [35] As for what “injustice” to the counterparty could entail, Covell Matthews suggests (at 879) that such prejudice could include the deprivation of an “advantage” in the litigation that the counterparty had already enjoyed. In my view, such “advantage” includes, for example, the counterparty having a clearly superior case to the applicant as may be objectively ascertained. In some cases, the superiority may be marked to such an extent that the applicant effectively concedes that, if the summons were determined, it would not succeed in the summons. Concurrently, or in other cases, the superiority may arise from the fact that the applicant’s stated reasons for withdrawing the summons effectively mirror the reasons advanced by the counterparty for resisting the summons.

  53. [36] In such situations, where the counterparty is on the cusp of victory, it would be clearly prejudicial to allow the applicant to withdraw the summons. This is because the practical effect of a discontinuance or withdrawal is that the plaintiff remains free to bring another action for the same claim (see Rohde & Liesenfeld at [11]). Additionally, the counterparty would suffer further prejudice if the applicant indicated its desire to withdraw the summons close to the hearing date. This is because the counterparty would not only have tendered extensive submissions to resist the summons, but the party who brought the summons would have had the benefit of reading those submissions. Further, in so far as the public interest may be relevant (see Rohde & Liesenfeld at [13]), it is more likely that the court would have also made substantive preparations towards the hearing of the summons.

  54. My decision: Victory is not allowed to hold in abeyance or withdraw SUM 195

  55. [37] With these principles in mind, I decided, at the hearing before me, to reject Victory’s Requests. I now explain my reasons for doing so.

  56. [38] First, I rejected Victory’s request to hold SUM 195 in abeyance of OA 1214. In my view, given that Victory had chosen to bring SUM 195 before OA 1214 was decided on its substantive merits, Victory cannot be allowed to postpone the determination of SUM 195 until after OA 1214 was determined. Victory has to contend with the consequences of its decision to bring SUM 195 now.

  57. [39] Second, I also rejected Victory’s request to withdraw SUM 195. In my view, to allow Victory to do so now, after the parties have made extensive written submissions on the matter, would be clearly prejudicial to the defendants, who seek a clear ruling on whether Mr Borrelli should be cross-examined at this point. Also, Victory had proceeded with SUM 195 on the very basis that it wanted to cross-examine Mr Borrelli now in support of the consequential reliefs that it seeks. Yet, the fact that it is seeking consequential reliefs has now turned out to the very reason Victory subsequently advanced to withdraw SUM 195. A litigant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold with ill-considered applications, and then seek to withdraw the same based on the same reasons that it brought the application in the first place. Indeed, what is especially telling is that the reasons that Victory advanced to support its request to withdraw its summons are effectively the same as those that the defendants advanced to resist SUM 195. It cannot be right for Victory, despite effectively conceding that SUM 195 has no real merit (considering the defendants’ arguments), to be able to avoid a detrimental judgment (and its attendant consequences) by withdrawing SUM 195 at the last possible moment. In short, it would be prejudicial to allow Victory to escape defeat. Therefore, Victory has to contend with the consequences of its decision to bring SUM 195 now.

  58. [40] For all these reasons, I did not give Victory permission to withdraw or hold in abeyance SUM 195.

  59. Whether Victory should be allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli

  60. The parties’ arguments

  61. [41] After deciding on Victory’s Requests in relation to SUM 195, I proceeded to consider the merits of SUM 195, ie, whether Victory should be allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli. In this regard, Victory made four primary submissions.

  62. [42] First, Victory argued that the factual disputes in OA 1214 directly impact the remedies that Victory can obtain. In this regard, Victory made three sub-points. One, its prayer for consequential relief, which I have referred to as the “Consequential Relief Prayer” above, is premised on the Receivers’ alleged delay of over nine weeks in signing the Minority SPA. In this regard, Victory alleged that the Receivers ought to have taken no longer than one week to sign the Minority SPA. Victory therefore wanted to cross-examine Mr Borrelli as to what happened during those nine weeks. Two, in furtherance of its prayers for an account of sale proceeds and the assessment of legal fees, Victory needed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli as to how its moneys had been used. Three, in furtherance of its prayer for the Report, Victory needed further details from Mr Borrelli as to the status of the Loan Adjustment Amount, Deferred Purchase Price, and Sale of the Surplus Land. It asserted that Mr Borrelli’s account, that there simply had been no updates on these matters, was “sorely lacking”.

  63. [43] Second, Victory argued that the factual disputes have had a bearing on its financial health. In essence, Victory is an impecunious company and has taken out OA 1214 “as a last resort in the face of seemingly uncooperative Receivers”. As such, it should be “given the opportunity to test [Mr Borrelli] as receiver through cross-examination”.

  64. [44] Third, Victory did not expect cross-examination to delay the convenient and speedy resolution of OA 1214. In its solicitors’ view, the cross-examination of Mr Borrelli, if allowed to proceed, will not take more than one day. Arguments on the substantive merits of OA 1214 would take just another day. As such, given that counsel have kept dates in March in reserve, Victory pointed out that OA 1214 would be resolved within four months from when it was filed.

  65. [45] Fourth and finally, Victory argued that OA 1214 is intended to be a full and final resolution of the parties’ rights. Since there is no trial to follow, the High Court’s concern in Tan Sock Hian v Eng Liat Kiang [1995] 1 SLR(R) 730 (“Tan Sock Hian”), that cross-examination in an interlocutory matter might give the parties a rehearsal ahead of trial, would not apply in the present application.

  66. My decision: Victory was not allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli

  67. [47] For the reasons that I will now explain, I decided that Victory should not be allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli.

  68. The applicable law

  69. [48] I start with the applicable law, which the parties did not dispute. To begin with, the starting point is that originating applications must generally be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced by affidavits and on oral or written submissions, without oral evidence or cross-examination. This is made clear by O 15 r 7(5) of the ROC 2021, which provides as follows:

  70. (b) Second, the nature of the application at hand. There would be different considerations depending on the application concerned. For example, as was the case in Tan Sock Hian, a cross-examination in an interlocutory application may give the parties an unwarranted opportunity to rehearse for the coming trial.

  71. Victory was not allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli for three reasons

  72. [52] I decided that Victory should not be allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli for three reasons.

  73. (1) Victory chose to commence OA 1214 as an originating application

  74. [53] First, Victory had made a clear choice to commence OA 1214 as an originating application. This means that it took the view that there are no material facts in dispute. In this regard, O 6 r 1 of the ROC 2021 provides clearly as follows:

  75. [54] In my view, a plain reading of O 6 r 1 of the ROC 2021 clearly provides that a claimant who commences a proceeding by an originating application represents that the material facts are not in dispute. This is because O 6 r 1(2) of the ROC 2021 provides that a claimant must commence proceedings by an originating claim where the material facts are in dispute. Furthermore, this is contrasted with O 6 r 1(3) of the ROC 2021, which expressly provides in r 1(3)(c) that a claimant must commence proceedings by an originating application if, among other things, the material facts are not in dispute. Applied to the present application, Victory’s choice to commence OA 1214 as an originating application must therefore represent a view that, in the words of O 6 r 1(3)(c) of the ROC 2021, OA 1214 “concern[s] solely or primarily the construction of any written law, instrument or document or some question of law and the material facts are not in dispute”. In other words, regardless of whether OA 1214 concerns “the construction of any written law, instrument or document or some question of law”, Victory represents that the overriding condition in O 6 r 1(3)(c) of the ROC 2021 applies, that is, the material facts in OA 1214 are undisputed.

  76. [55] Furthermore, Victory has not suggested that it intends to convert OA 1214 into an originating claim. Indeed, at the last Registrar’s Case Conference held on 12 January 2024 before the learned Assistant Registrar Rajaram Vikram Raja, Mr Yim informed the court that they have considered whether to convert OA 1214 into an originating claim but decided against doing so. Importantly, Mr Yim reiterated that Victory had filed an originating application “because that is the correct route” since they are asking for documents from Mr Borrelli, a receiver, and this is a question of law. As such, in maintaining OA 1214 as an originating application, Victory has stuck to its position that OA 1214 does not involve disputes of material facts, even after having the chance to review Mr Borrelli’s reply affidavit.

  77. [56] Accordingly, given the position that Victory has taken, both in taking out OA 1214 as an originating application and maintaining it as such, I agreed with Mr Borrelli that Victory bore a heavy burden to establish why it should be granted permission to cross-examine him. For the reasons that I will explain later, I did not think that Victory discharged this burden.

  78. (2) Victory’s prayers for relief are premised on the court finding that it is legally entitled to the documents and information sought

  79. [57] Second, considering the nature of the present application, all of Victory’s prayers for relief, except for the Consequential Relief Prayer, are premised on the court finding that Victory is legally entitled to the documents and information sought. Whether the court will so find turns primarily on questions of law which relate to the duties that a receiver like Mr Borrelli owes to a mortgagor-chargor like Victory. Thus, it is only if the court finds that Mr Borrelli owes a duty to account to Victory that the alleged factual disputes become relevant.

  80. [58] This point can be demonstrated by referring to the three areas that Victory argued it needed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli on. These are, as Victory highlighted in its written submissions: (a) why there was an alleged delay of nine weeks for the Receivers in signing the Minority SPA; (b) how Victory’s moneys have been used in relation to the Sale Proceeds and assessment of legal fees; and (c) the present status of the Loan Adjustment Amount, Deferred Purchase Price, and Sale of the Surplus Land.

  81. [59] In relation to the reasons for the delay, this comes under Victory’s prayer for the Report, under which, if granted, Mr Borrelli should state “[t]he reasons for the delay in the execution of the Minority SPA”. Thus put, it is clear that any cross-examination on such reasons for the alleged delay is premised on the court ordering Mr Borrelli to produce the Report in the first place. Thus, if Mr Borrelli were to be cross-examined now at the hearing of OA 1214, Victory would gain access to information about the alleged delay (if there was such a delay) without the court having pronounced on its entitlement to the Report under which those reasons were to be furnished.

  82. [60] Similarly, in relation to how Victory’s moneys have been used in relation to the Sale Proceeds, this comes under Victory’s prayer for Mr Borrelli to provide a full account of such proceeds. This is necessarily predicated on the court ordering Mr Borrelli to provide such an account in the first place. Yet, if Victory were allowed to cross-examine Mr Borrelli so that he can “explain how [Victory’s] money has been used”, it would, again, gain access to information (here, a “fuller” account of the Sale Proceeds), without the court having pronounced on its entitlement to such information in the first place. This wrongly presupposes that the court would rule in Victory’s favour on the prior question of entitlement. The same might be said about Victory’s liability for the legal fees. Moreover, it would not be relevant to cross-examine Mr Borrelli on this issue because whether Victory is entitled to tax CCPL’s legal fees turns on the interpretation of the relevant provisions in the LPA.

  83. [61] Finally, in relation to the present status of the Loan Adjustment Amount, Deferred Purchase Price, and Sale of the Surplus Land, this comes under Victory’s prayer for the Report. In this prayer, Victory asks that Mr Borrelli state “[w]hat steps will be taken by [Mr Borrelli] to collect the outstanding consideration for the sale of [the Victory Shares] under the Minority SPA”. Again, similar to my reasons above, any cross-examination on these issues is premised on the court ordering Mr Borrelli to produce the Report in the first place. It is not necessary for me to repeat myself here, except to say that Victory confuses the conceptual distinction between entitlement and consequential relief following that entitlement.

  84. [62] For all these reasons, I found that Victory’s prayers for relief were premised on the court finding that it is legally entitled to the documents and information sought. Only if the court orders Mr Borrelli to produce the said documents and information, would the facts which Victory sought through cross-examination become relevant. As such, I did not allow Victory to cross-examine Mr Borrelli.

  85. [63] In so far as Victory argued that its Consequential Relief Prayer puts the issue of consequential relief before this court, I disagreed. In my view, the Consequential Relief Prayer was a non-starter and should not have been included in OA 1214. To recapitulate, Victory seeks through this Prayer that, if this court were to find Mr Borrelli and/or Mr Bance “negligent in carrying out their duties as receivers, that this [court] grant any consequential relief for losses incurred by [Victory] as a result”. This Prayer suffers from several conceptual and legal defects:

  86. (b) Second, it follows that I cannot make a finding of negligence in the absence of further argument as to, among other things, whether Mr Borrelli had breached any duty towards to Victory. Indeed, the parties’ arguments have all been focused on whether Victory is entitled to the said documents and information, as opposed to whether Mr Borrelli was careless. As such, I would have thought that the purpose of the documents and information is so that Victory can take out a further proceeding, if necessary, to properly make good its allegation of negligence.

  87. [64] Accordingly, I did not think that the issue of consequential relief was properly before this court in OA 1214. This was yet another reason why I did not allow Victory to cross-examine Mr Borrelli: its proposed purpose for cross-examination was really focused on the issue of consequential relief, as opposed to whether it was entitled to the documents and information sought from Mr Borrelli. After I broached these concerns with Mr Yim, he rightly applied to withdraw the Consequential Relief Prayer. I allowed this request despite the objection by counsel for the defendants, Mr Nish Shetty (“Mr Shetty”), because the parties had not spent as much time dealing with this prayer as compared to SUM 195.

  88. (3) There are no good reasons, beyond disputes of fact, to warrant cross-examination

  89. General principles on the agency and duties of a receiver

  90. [69] I turn now to consider OA 1214. Because OA 1214 turns on questions of law in relation to the agency and duties of a receiver, I will first deal with the general principles, before considering Victory’s entitlement to the various reliefs it seeks against the defendants.

  91. The nature of the relationship between a receiver and the mortgagor/chargor

  92. [70] To begin with, as the English Court of Appeal explained in Gomba Holdings UK Ltd and others v Minories Finance Ltd and others [1988] 1 WLR 1231 (“Gomba (CA)”) (at 1233), the agency relationship set up by a secured debt instrument (eg, a charge like in the present case) and the appointment of a receiver thereunder, is tripartite in nature. This relationship involves the mortgagor or chargor (as the case may be), the mortgagee or chargee (sometimes called the “debenture holder”), and the receiver. In a typical receivership situation, the receiver is appointed by the mortgagee/chargee upon the occurrence of certain events, and becomes the agent of the mortgagor/chargor without the mortgagor/chargor having any say in his appointment (see s 29(2) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (2020 Rev Ed)). The primary purpose of this relationship is to protect the mortgagee/chargee (see Gomba (CA) at 1233). Thus, the receiver acts as the agent of the mortgagor/chargor only to the extent that he has the power to affect the position of the mortgagor/chargor by acts which, while done for the benefit of the mortgagee/chargee, are treated as if they are that of the mortgagor/chargor (Gomba (CA) at 1233). I summarise broadly the tripartite nature of this relationship in the diagram below.

  93. [71] The next point, as the Singapore cases have made clear, is that while a privately appointed receiver is an “agent” of the mortgagor/chargor, the scope of this agency relationship is limited. Indeed, the reason for this is that the receiver’s primary duty is to the mortgagee/chargee who appointed him, and not to his principal (ie, the mortgagor/chargor). In this regard, the High Court in Jurong Aromatics Corp Pte Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) and others v BP Singapore Pte Ltd and another matter [2018] SGHC 215 (“Jurong Aromatics”) held as follows (at [69]):

  94. [72] The Court of Appeal, on appeal in BP Singapore Pte Ltd v Jurong Aromatics Corp Pte Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) and others and another appeal [2020] 1 SLR 627, affirmed the principle that the agency relationship between a receiver and a mortgagor/chargor is a limited one. Indeed, the Court held that receivers owe little by way of duties as an “agent” to the mortgagor company in that case (at [30]–[31]):

  95. [73] Indeed, Assistant Professor Rachel Leow, in her learned article on the definition of the term “agency”, goes so far as to suggest that a receivership is a “clear” example of an agency relationship where fiduciary duties are not owed to the principal (ie, the mortgagor/chargor), given that the receiver of a company typically acts in the interests of the mortgagee/chargee and not the mortgagor/chargor (see Rachel Leow, “Understanding Agency: A Proxy Power Definition” (2019) 78(1) CLJ 99 at 106−107). For the avoidance of doubt, I leave open the question of whether a receiver owes fiduciary duties to the mortgagor/chargor.

  96. [74] I now summarise, drawing on the previous discussion and the case of Silven Properties Ltd and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc and others [2004] 1 WLR 997 (“Silven Properties”), the “peculiar incidents” of a receiver’s agency that are relevant to the present discussion (at [27]):

  97. [75] Thus, as summarised in a practitioner’s textbook, the receiver’s agency for the mortgagor/chargor does not place him on the same footing as the mortgagor/chargor. Crucially, the receiver’s “ability to bind the company is for the primary purpose of acting in the debenture holder’s best interests by realising the security”. As such, in determining the scope of the private receiver’s duties and liabilities, the tension between his mandates to the mortgagee/chargee and the mortgagor/chargor should be kept in mind (see Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore – Insolvency (Volume 13) at para 150.093).

  98. The limited general duties that arise from the agency relationship between a receiver and the mortgagor/chargor

  99. [76] The more specific question in the present case is the content of the duties that arise by virtue of the “limited” agency relationship between a receiver and the mortgagor/chargor. At the outset, it should be pointed out that the duties that a receiver owes to a mortgagor/chargor are primarily equitable in nature. As the English Court of Appeal explained in Silven Properties (at [27]), there “is no contractual relationship or duty owed in tort by the receiver to the mortgagor: the relationship and duties owed by the receiver are equitable only”.

  100. [77] While there does not appear to be any authoritative judicial explanation in Singapore as to why this is the case, I surmise that this is because, in a legal mortgage, the mortgagor conveys legal title in the property to the mortgagee, only retaining the equity of redemption (see Tang Hang Wu & Kelvin F K Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2019) (“Tan Sook Yee”) at paras 18.3, 18.7, 18.20, and 18.39). Since the common law regards the mortgagee as the owner of the property, it follows that the common law does not impose any duties on the mortgagee in relation to the mortgagor. However, as equity regards the mortgagor as the owner of the property (see Tan Sook Yee at para 18.39), it imposes, and thus is the source of, various duties that the mortgagee owes to the mortgagor (see generally Tan Sook Yee at paras 18.20−18.38). Therefore, when the receiver exercises the powers it receives from the mortgagee, any duties it owes to the mortgagor in the exercise of those powers continue to be governed by equity. As for charges, they are creations of equity (see Jurong Aromatics at [43]) and thus it stands to reason that the relationship between the chargor and chargee, and the receiver by extension, is regulated by equity. In addition to equity, duties owed by the receiver may be provided by statute or even in the contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee (see the English High Court decision of Gomba Holdings UK and others v Homan and another [1986] 1 WLR 1301 (“Gomba (HC)”) at 1305–1306). Admittedly, there are cases, such as the Privy Council decision of Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295, which have explained that a receiver’s duties owed to a mortgagor/chargor are equitable in nature because the characterisation of such duties as tortious in nature would overwhelm any equitable duty. It suffices for me to observe that this explanation, so far as I have correctly understood it, does not answer the prior question of why a receiver’s duties should be equitable in nature. This is why I have advanced an explanation that rationalises the equitable nature of a receiver’s duties from first principles.

  101. [78] As to the local jurisprudence which has considered the content of the duties owed by a receiver to the mortgagor/chargor, both parties refer to the Court of Appeal decision of Roberto Building Material Pte Ltd and others v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp and another [2003] 3 SLR(R) 217 (“Roberto”) as the governing local authority. In that case, the company alleged, among other things, that the receiver had not diligently pursued the offers made by certain parties to purchase the mortgaged property. In dismissing the company’s allegations, Chao Hick Tin JA, delivering the decision of the court, set out the general duties owed by a receiver to a mortgagor/chargor (at [51]):

  102. This is consistent with the starting point that the scope of the receiver’s agency relationship with the mortgagor/chargor is a limited one. Thus, as Chao JA explained (at [51]), the receiver has no “general duty of care” to the mortgagor/chargor and that his primary duty is to the mortgagee/chargee.

  103. [79] More specifically, the receiver’s power of sale is, in effect, that of the mortgagee/chargee. As such, the receiver owes the same duties to the mortgagor/chargor, as the mortgagee/chargee owes to the mortgagor/chargor when exercising the power of sale (see Roberto at [52], citing the English Court of Appeal decision of In re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] Ch 634 at 662). Following from this, as Chao JA further explained, the receiver has no duty to exercise the power of sale (see Roberto at [51]). However, if the receiver does exercise the power of sale, he owes a duty to the mortgagor/chargor to “exercise reasonable care as to the manner in which the sale is carried out so as to obtain its true market value” (see Roberto at [53] and [63]). As such, the receiver commits no breach of duty to the mortgagor/chargor by a bona fide sale, even if he might have obtained a higher price or at more favourable terms from the mortgagor’s/chargor’s perspective. While not relevant to the present application, the English Court of Appeal in Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 86 extended this duty to the situation where, instead of selling a mortgaged property, the receiver carried on the business of the company concerned. Chao JA in Roberto appeared to have accepted this extension, albeit with certain clarifications (see Roberto at [56]).

  104. [80] In summary then, under Singapore law, it is possible to make the following points about the nature and content of the receiver’s duties to the mortgagor/chargor. First, the receiver owes little by way of duties to the mortgagor. Second, a receiver’s primary duty is owed to the mortgagee/chargee, and not to the mortgagor/chargor. Third, the receiver’s duties to the mortgagor/chargor are derived primarily in equity, although statute or contract can provide for additional duties. Fourth, when exercising its power of sale of a mortgaged property, a receiver owes, to the mortgagor/chargor, a duty of good faith and a duty to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price.

  105. While the receiver comes under a duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor, this is a limited duty

  106. The parties’ disagreement as to the existence of a receiver’s duty to account

  107. [81] It is appropriate at this point to address the issue of whether a receiver owes a duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor. In this regard, Victory makes three points. First, it relies on a reference in Silven Properties to the “core duty of the receiver to account to the mortgagor” as support for such a duty. Second, Victory analogises the receiver-mortgagor relationship to the trustee-beneficiary relationship. In this regard, Victory points out that a beneficiary is entitled to see the documents held by a trustee in his capacity as trustee as the beneficiary would otherwise be “robbed of the ability to bring proceedings against the trustees in the event of breach of trust because they cannot find out if there had been a breach of trust because they have no access to the appropriate information” (citing Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (Routledge, 8th Ed, 2015) at para 8.4.3). Third, Mr Yim made the argument, before me, that because the receiver is a fiduciary, it follows that he has a duty to give an account. Victory’s written submissions also seemed to imply such an argument at various points.

  108. [82] With respect, I found some of Victory’s points for establishing a receiver’s duty to account to the mortgagors to be unconvincing. First, I do not think that it is appropriate to analogise the receiver-mortgagor/chargor relationship to the trustee-beneficiary relationship. This is because unlike in the receiver-mortgagor/chargor relationship, the beneficiary stands, broadly speaking, as the ultimate recipient of the benefits under the trust. This is why the beneficiary principle expects that there must be some person in whose favour a court can decree performance. In contrast, in the receiver-mortgagor/chargor relationship, the receiver’s primary duty is not to the mortgagor/chargor but to another party, ie, the mortgagee/chargee.

  109. [83] Second, I do not agree with Mr Yim’s approach of beginning from the premise that a receiver is a “fiduciary”, and then proceeding onwards from that starting point to determine the scope and content of the receiver’s duties to the mortgagor/chargor. The Court of Appeal decision of Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654 makes clear that such an argument puts the cart before the horse. This is because the label “fiduciary” is “a conclusion which is reached only once it is determined that particular duties are owed” [emphasis in original] (at [193], citing James Edelman, “When do Fiduciary Duties Arise?” (2010) 126 LQR 302 at 316). In other words, “[i]t is not because a person is a ‘fiduciary’ or a ‘confidant’ that a rule applies to him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary or confidant for its purposes” [emphasis in original omitted] (at [193], citing Paul Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Company, 1977) at p 2). Therefore, it is incumbent on Victory to explain why it is owed a duty to account by the Receivers, and why this duty is fiduciary in nature, rather than simply asserting that a receiver is a fiduciary and expecting legal consequences to flow therefrom. Indeed, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, “[g]iven that a fiduciary obligation is a conclusion rather than a premise, the meaning of the term ‘fiduciary relationship’ is naturally thrown into doubt” [emphasis in original] (at [193]).

  110. [84] As for the defendants, they initially took the position in their written submissions that the receiver does not owe a duty to account under Singapore law. However, at the hearing before me, Mr Shetty conceded that, in light of Kristy Tan JC’s recent decision in Hang Huo Investment Pte Ltd v Wong Pheng Cheong Martin [2024] SGHC 32 (“Hang Huo”), the receiver does owe a duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor under Singapore law.

  111. A receiver has a duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor under Singapore law

  112. [85] Having considered the parties’ arguments, I find that a receiver does have a duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor under Singapore law. This is consistent with Tan JC’s decision in Hang Huo, where she reasoned as follows. The learned judge began by observing that in a curial receivership, receivers are officers of the court, and for this reason, owe a duty to account (at [116]). She then drew an analogy between curial receivers and private receivers, and concluded that private receivers, as agents of a company, owe a similar duty to account to that company (at [117]). However, she also caveated that the receiver’s agency, and the duties he owes to the principal thereunder, must be qualified by the fact that the purpose of his appointment is to realise the assets of the company primarily for the benefit of the mortgagee/chargee (at [117]).

  113. [86] I respectfully agree with and gratefully adopt Tan JC’s reasoning in Hang Huo. In addition to what she has said, I further observe that a duty on a receiver to account to the mortgagor is not inconsistent with his other duties that the Court of Appeal recognised in Roberto.

  114. [87] In fact, a duty to account can be said to give effect to some of those other recognised duties. For example, if the receiver must exercise reasonable care in the conduct of a sale of the mortgaged property, then it stands to reason that the receiver should account to the mortgagor/chargor so that the latter can determine whether such reasonable care had been taken. A duty to account might also be necessary to enable the mortgagor/chargor to have some information from which to investigate and interrupt any potential fraud or unreasonableness on the part of the receiver. Besides, a duty to account may be necessary to ensure that the mortgagor/chargor’s rights are effective. For instance, as Hoffmann J observed in Gomba (HC) (at 1308C), if a company has no way of finding out which assets have been sold and which remain to be redeemed, this could render nugatory the company’s right to redeem (at 1308C). As such, the right to redeem probably “gives rise to a right on the part of the company to ask for sufficient information to make it effective” (at 1308B).

  115. [88] Other English cases apart from Gomba (HC) appear to support the proposition that receivers owe the mortgagor/chargor a duty to account. For instance, in Silven Properties, a significant issue was the identification of the duties owed by a receiver to the mortgagor/chargor. Despite the court’s caution regarding the indiscriminate importation of “general agency principles” into the context of a receivership, it was still willing to find that “[t]he core duty of the receiver to account to the mortgagor subsists” (at [28]).

  116. The limitations on the receiver’s duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor

  117. [89] However, in light of the notion that a receiver’s relationship of agency to a mortgagor is a “limited” one, and that his primary duties are owed to the mortgagee/chargee, it follows that any duty to account to the mortgagor must correspondingly be limited. Hoffmann J in Gomba (HC) explained what these limitations are. In that case, the bank exercised its right as mortgagee to appoint receivers of the plaintiffs’ assets. The plaintiffs were a group of companies, of which Mr Abdulhamid Shamji (“S”) was the sole director. The receivers went on to realise the assets. This reduced the plaintiffs’ indebtedness to about £11m. S then entered into an agreement with an undisclosed third party. S claimed that this agreement would allow the plaintiffs to pay off its outstanding indebtedness to the bank and to redeem the remaining assets. The plaintiffs therefore sought information as to the current state of the receivership so as to conclude negotiations with the third party. The receivers supplied some information. However, the plaintiffs thought that the information was less than what they were legally entitled to. They therefore sued the receivers for the full disclosure of all disposals of assets made or proposed to be made by the receivers. Hoffmann J dismissed the motions for disclosure because, among other reasons, the receivers were justified in concluding that the plaintiffs did not need the relevant information sought.

  118. [90] In coming to his decision, Hoffmann J deduced the following principles in relation to what he found to be the receiver’s duty to account to the mortgagor (see Gomba (HC) at 1305–1306):

  119. (a) First, the receiver should have the power to carry on the process of realisation of the company’s property without interference from the board (see Gomba (HC) at 1306). This follows from the receiver’s displacement of the company in, among other things, the power to dispose of property put into his possession.

  120. (b) Second, any duty to provide information must be subordinated to the receiver’s primary duty not to do anything which may prejudice the interests of the mortgagee/chargee (see Gomba (HC) at 1307–1308).

  121. (c) Third, when weighing the interests of the mortgagee/chargee vis-à-vis the company (the mortgagor/chargor), the receiver has a discretion to decide how much information to disclose. If the company disputes the sufficiency of information provided by the receiver, the burden is on the company seeking information to show that the receiver had exercised this discretion in bad faith or had made a decision no reasonable receiver would have made (see Gomba (HC) at 1307).

  122. In my respectful view, these principles are equally applicable in Singapore.

  123. [91] Similar limitations on the receiver’s duty to account have also been applied in other jurisdictions. For example, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales decision of Boulos and another v Carter and another (as receivers and managers of Tarbs World TV Australia Pty Ltd) (2005) 220 ALR 572 (“Boulos”), the court considered Gomba (CA) and agreed that any right of access for documents would be “subject to the qualification that it may not be exercised in a way that would prejudice the due progress and completion of the receivership” (at [49]).

  124. [92] Likewise, in the Supreme Court of Western Australia decision of Re Geneva Finance; Quigley (Receiver and Manager appointed) v Cook and others (1992) 7 WAR 496 (“Re Geneva”), the court summarised (at 513–514) the principles with respect to the inspection by receivers and observed that “[t]he receiver would be justified in refusing to grant access to the documents where to do so would impede the receiver in the proper exercise of his functions or would impinge prejudicially upon the position of the [mortgagee/chargee] by threatening or imperilling the assets which are subject to the charge”. In short, a receiver’s duty to account is ultimately subject to the receiver’s primary duty to the mortgagee/chargee.

  125. [93] In summary, I do not agree with Mr Yim’s submission that the mortgagor/chargor is at all times entitled to ask, and the receiver is obliged to provide, any information that the former asks for as long as the information does not prejudice the interests of the receiver or the mortgagee/chargee. I find that to conceive of the duty to account in this manner would be too broad. In light of the receiver’s limited duties to the mortgagor/chargor, it would be inappropriate for the receiver to be subject to a general obligation to provide information to the mortgagor/chargor while the receivership is ongoing. The receiver should generally, as it were, be left alone. Otherwise, the receiver could be burdened by repeated applications for information during the course of the receivership, especially where such information is requested more to “appease fears”, as Mr Shetty put it, rather than to establish any specific wrongdoing. The position could, however, be different once the receivership ends (see Gomba (HC) at 1307G−H).

  126. The practical test to govern when a receiver needs to produce documents

  127. [94] So far, I have set out the limitations on the receiver’s duty to account to the mortgagor/chargor, as derived from the more general proposition that a receiver’s duty to so account is conditioned by the tripartite relationship between a receiver, the mortgagee/chargee, and the mortgagor/chargor. However, even though it is established that such limitations exist, another question remains: what is the practical test governing when a receiver needs to produce documents in furtherance of his (albeit limited) duty to account?

  128. [95] In this regard, the parties’ arguments before me reveal at least two possible tests: one premised on the mortgagor’s/chargor’s “ownership” of the documents, and another based on the mortgagor’s/chargor’s “need to know” the contents of the documents. It is necessary, in my view, not only to explain these two tests, but also decide how they interact with each other.

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