General Division of the High Court · Decided 5 December 2024
A trustee who repeatedly breached the duty of care was removed from the trust
Devin Jethanand Bhojwani and others v Jethanand Harkishindas Bhojwani
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 310 · Case no. Suit No 521 of 2021
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A trustee who repeatedly breached the duty of care was removed from the trust
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiffs in HC/S 521/2021 (the “Suit”) are Mr Devin Jethanand Bhojwani (“Devin”), Mr Dilip Jethanand Bhojwani (“Dilip”), and Mr Sandeep Jethanand Bhojwani (“Sandeep”). They are suing the defendant, their father, Mr Jethanand Harkishindas Bhojwani (also known as “Sajan”). The plaintiffs’ mother is Mdm Lakshmi Prataprai Bhojwani (“Lakshmi”). While Lakshmi appeared as a witness during the trial, she is not a party to the Suit.
- [2]
[2] In essence, the plaintiffs allege that Sajan, the trustee, acted in breach of a testamentary trust (the “Trust”) created under the Last Will and Testament (the “Will”) of their late paternal grandfather, Mr Harkishindas Ghumanmal Bhojwani (“Harkishindas”). The plaintiffs are beneficiaries under the Trust. They therefore claim against Sajan for an account of the Trust on a wilful default basis, and for reliefs arising from Sajan’s alleged breaches of his duties as a trustee. Sajan’s main defence is that he had exercised his powers as trustee in utmost good faith at all material times, and that he had not intentionally made any decision to benefit himself personally out of the Trust.
- [3]
[3] After considering the matter, I allow the plaintiffs’ claim to the extent specified in this judgment. I now explain the reasons for my decision.
The undisputed facts
- [4]
[4] I begin with the undisputed facts. Harkishindas made the Will dated 20 October 2006. He passed away on 4 March 2007. The plaintiffs’ uncle and the defendant’s younger brother, Mr Moti Harkishindas Bhojwani (“Moti”), is the executor of the Will.
- [5]
[5] The Trust was created pursuant to cll 5 and 7(b) of the Will. It is discretionary in nature. Clause 5.2 of the Will (read with cl 5.1(iii)) provides that Sajan shall:
- [6]
[6] Moreover, pursuant to cl 5.1(i) of the Will, “the trust period” is to be 30 years from the date of Harkishindas’s death. The plaintiffs and Lakshmi are the only named beneficiaries of the Trust (collectively, the “Named Beneficiaries”) pursuant to cll 5.1(ii)(a)–5.1(ii)(d) of the Will.
- [7]
[7] Clause 5.1(iv) of the Will sets out the assets which the defendant holds on trust for the Named Beneficiaries. These assets, which I will refer to collectively as the “Trust Assets”, are:
- [8]
[8] Out of the eight private companies named in cl 5.1(iv) of the Will, five were struck off in 2010. These were: (a) Sharrods; (b) SPL; (c) Sovrein; (d) Lions; and (e) SIPL (collectively, the “Struck Off Companies”).
- [9]
[9] It is not disputed that the Trust did not have its own bank account for at least the period from 4 March 2007 to 23 February 2017. In purported exercise of his trust powers, Sajan, on or around 3 October 2019, irrevocably declared and determined in a Deed of Advancement that a piece of real property in Singapore situated at Questa @ Dunman (the “Questa Property”), which is not listed under the Will but which Sajan alleges to have formed part of the Trust Assets subsequently, would be allocated and distributed from the Trust, free from any and all encumbrances, to Dilip. Then, on 10 January 2020, Sajan executed a Deed dated that same date under which he irrevocably declared and determined that Lakshmi “shall receive no further distribution from any of the remaining Trust Property” and “has no further interest in any of the remaining Trust Property”, following his allocation and distribution of 32BR from the Trust to Lakshmi free from any and all encumbrances. Sajan also executed a Deed of Appointment dated 10 January 2020 under which he revocably appointed that he held all of the remaining Trust Assets for the benefit of the plaintiffs only.
- [10]
[10] In addition, on 23 February 2021, Sajan informed the plaintiffs that he had executed three Deeds on 16 February 2021 to sell the Trust Shares in the three remaining companies, namely: (a) MSSPL; (b) SEPL; and (c) LMPL (collectively, the “Live Companies”). These Deeds also provided that the proceeds of the sales shall be paid into the Trust and that Sajan revocably appointed that he held the proceeds of sales for the benefit of the plaintiffs only.
- [11]
[11] Finally, on 14 April 2021, Sajan executed two Deeds and one Deed of Appointment, which determined that: (a) Devin and Sandeep shall receive no further distribution from any of the remaining Trust Assets; (b) Devin and Sandeep shall have no further interest in any of the remaining Trust Assets; and (c) the remaining Trust Assets shall be held for the benefit of Dilip only. In this regard, it is undisputed that Devin and Sandeep have never received any distribution from the Trust Assets. Indeed, on 9 July 2019, Sajan informed the plaintiffs that he had decided to make a cash distribution of $150,000.00 from the proceeds of the Trust Assets to each of the three plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs did not accept this. Devin wrote an e-mail to Sajan on 10 July 2019, copying Dilip, Sandeep, and Lakshmi, to explain the plaintiffs’ reasons for not accepting the distribution. In the same correspondence, Devin also asked Sajan to keep the moneys in the special account that Sajan had set up for the Named Beneficiaries.
- [12]
[12] Throughout his time as trustee, Sajan, broadly speaking, produced three main sets of documents conveying information about the Trust to the plaintiffs. The first was a two-page “trust statement” for the period ending 31 December 2017 (the “December 2017 Trust Summary”), which Sajan e-mailed to the plaintiffs on 16 May 2018. The second was a trust statement disclosed in a 19 August 2020 affidavit in HC/OS 1339/2019 that set out expenditures and the Trust Assets for the period up to 31 December 2017 (the “August 2020 Trust Statement”). The third was a trust statement disclosed in Sajan’s affidavits verifying the 5th and 6th Supplementary Lists of Documents, updated as at 20 September 2023 and dated 16 November 2023, for the period up to 31 December 2021 (the “November 2023 Trust Statement”). The November 2023 Trust Statement included a Microsoft Excel document that recorded various purported Trust Assets and expenditures. I shall refer to these collectively as the “Trust Statements”.
The parties’ applications at the trial
- [13]
[13] With these undisputed facts in mind, I turn first to the parties’ applications that were made shortly before the first day of the trial. I decided these applications during the trial and provided brief reasons to the parties at the time. I now set out the fuller reasons for my decisions.
SUM 678 (Amendment of Pleadings)
- [14]
[14] HC/SUM 678/2024 (“SUM 678”) was the plaintiffs’ application to amend their Reply (Amendment No 2). The plaintiffs’ proposed amendments identified relevant provisions from SEPL’s M&A, as well as applicable clauses from a Shareholders’ Agreement dated 2 August 2002 (the “SHA”) that was also referred to at para 25(d) of Sajan’s Defence (Amendment No 2).
The applicable law
- [15]
[15] The law on amendments to pleadings is clear. I adopted the General Division of the High Court’s three-step framework in Wang Piao v Lee Wee Ching [2024] 4 SLR 540 (“Wang Piao”) on the issue, which provides (at [16]–[18]) that:
- [16]
[16] For completeness, as the General Division of the High Court had observed in Wang Piao (at [8]–[11]), the new Rules of Court 2021 (the “ROC 2021”) provides for a more restrictive approach in relation to applications to amend pleadings within less than 14 days before the commencement of the trial “except in a special case” (see O 9 r 14(3) of the ROC 2021). Here, however, while SUM 678 had been brought within that 14-day period (viz, on 13 March 2024, where the first day of trial was 19 March 2024), I did not have to consider how the three-step framework in Wang Piao at [16]–[18] should be recalibrated for such a scenario. That was because the Suit had been brought on 11 June 2021 and, consequently, is not governed by the ROC 2021 (see O 1 r 2(3)(a) of the ROC 2021). Moreover, O 20 r 5(1) of the old Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) does not prescribe a different approach where an application for the amendment of pleadings is brought at the doorstep of trial. Accordingly, I did not have to decide whether the present application amounted to a “special case” for the purposes of O 9 r 14(3) of the ROC 2021 (see Wang Piao at [10]–[11]). Instead, it sufficed for me to apply the ordinary three-step framework set out in Wang Piao at [16]–[18] to the facts of SUM 678. Thus, I also did not have to decide whether SUM 678 satisfied the threshold of being made under “very extenuating and unique circumstances” that rendered it “necessary and just in all the circumstances to permit the amendment”, thereby amounting to a “special case” within the meaning of O 9 r 14(3) of the ROC 2021 (see the General Division of the High Court decision in Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 248 at [111]).
My decision: SUM 678 was allowed
- [17]
[17] I allowed the proposed amendments mainly because they were responsive to para 25(h) of Sajan’s Defence (Amendment No 2), which stated that the conversion of the Founder’s Share into one ordinary share would have been effected by majority vote in any event and the defendant would have been powerless to stop that.
- [18]
[18] To begin with, Sajan accepted that the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments had been circulated to his counsel on 29 February 2024. This was around three weeks before the trial. Thus, I was satisfied that the proposed amendments were not sought near the doorstep of the trial to belatedly introduce new issues or claims. In any case, Sajan recognised that his objections to the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments were not based on any allegation of delay on their part.
- [19]
[19] Next, I was satisfied that the proposed amendments sought would enable the real question and/or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. In this regard, Sajan argued that the proposed amendments were not responsive to para 25(h) of the Defence (Amendment No 2) and hence should have been made to the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) instead. Sajan further argued that it was the plaintiffs who first raised the issue of the conversion of the Founder’s Share in their Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) when they pleaded that they discovered that Sajan had agreed to convert the Founder’s Share into an ordinary share in SEPL. As such, Sajan claimed that the proposed amendments to the plaintiffs’ Reply (Amendment No 2) did not arise out of para 25(h) of the Defence (Amendment No 2). For completeness, para 25(h) of the Defence (Amendment No 2) reads as follows:
Taking a step back, the crux of Sajan’s complaint was that the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their Reply (Amendment No 2) would take away his right to be heard on the proposed amendments.
- [20]
[20] I disagreed with Sajan’s argument. In my view, the proposed amendments were responsive to para 25(h) of the Defence (Amendment No 2) in that they were made in response to Sajan’s pleading that the conversion of the Founder’s Share into an ordinary share would have been effected by the majority vote of the other shareholders of SEPL, even if he had voted against it. In this regard, para 25(h) of the Defence (Amendment No 2) suggested that a majority vote in favour of the conversion was all that was needed to effect it, such that Sajan would have been powerless to stop the conversion, even if he had disagreed with the majority. As such, the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments, in so far as they responded to this pleading by saying that a simple majority vote is insufficient for a conversion to take place, were clearly responsive. Indeed, in the proposed amendments, the plaintiffs identified the relevant provisions from SEPL’s M&A, as well as the applicable clauses from an SHA referred to by Sajan at para 25(d) of the Defence (Amendment No 2). These provisions and clauses were said to show that the unanimous consent of SEPL’s directors and/or the shareholders party to the SHA was required for the conversion to take place.
- [22]
[22] For these reasons, based on the three-step framework in Wang Piao at [16]–[18], I allowed the proposed amendments and granted SUM 678.
- [23]
[23] As for Sajan’s request for a rejoinder, I rejected this because the premise of a rejoinder is that a defendant has something that he needs to plead in response to a plaintiff’s reply. Since I concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments in the Reply (Amendment No 2) were rightly responsive to the Defence (Amendment No 2), it followed that there was no basis for Sajan to file a rejoinder. Indeed, this was not a case where Sajan was applying for permission to plead any new factual particulars that were responsive to the amended pleadings in the Reply (Amendment No 3).
SUM 663 (Admission of new AEIC out of time)
- [24]
[24] Next, HC/SUM 663/2024 (“SUM 663”) was Sajan’s application to admit Mr Abdul Khader Mohamed Ismail’s (“Mr Ismail”) affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) into evidence for the Suit, or for Mr Ismail’s oral evidence-in-chief (“EIC”) to be adduced during the trial itself.
- [25]
[25] I disallowed Sajan’s application to admit Mr Ismail’s AEIC into evidence or for an oral EIC of Mr Ismail to be taken because Mr Ismail’s AEIC or EIC would have introduced new evidence on new points of fact that would have prejudiced the plaintiffs. In the paragraphs to follow, I shall address my decision to disallow the admission of Mr Ismail’s AEIC. I should also clarify that my reasons apply equally to my decision to disallow the taking of Mr Ismail’s oral EIC at the trial.
The applicable law
- [27]
[27] Relatedly, on the belated calling of witnesses, the Court of Appeal observed in Auto Clean (at [17]) that “the courts should not adopt an unduly rigid or restrictive approach in considering the directions to be given concerning matters pertaining to the trial or hearing”, and that “a balance should be struck between the need to comply with the rules and the parties’ right to call witnesses whom they deem necessary to establish their case”. However, where the balance is to be struck is dependent on the factual circumstances of each case. In Auto Clean, while the plaintiffs there were permitted to call additional witnesses, it is important that the action had not even been set down for trial (at [18]). The court observed that there would be no element of surprise in allowing the plaintiffs to call additional witnesses to give evidence and in granting an extension of time for the plaintiffs’ two witnesses to file their AEICs. This was because the parties were “still at a relatively early stage” of the proceedings; thus, on the facts there, “no prejudice would be caused to the defendants”, who “would have sufficient time and opportunity to consider, and, if necessary, to respond to the evidence” (at [18]).
- [28]
[28] In addition to Auto Clean, the plaintiffs pointed me to the English case of TC00544: Xentric Limited [2010] UKFTT 249 (TC) (“Xentric”). In that case, the First-Tier Tribunal (Tax) considered whether to admit eight new witness statements that were served around three weeks before the relevant hearing. In considering that matter, the Tribunal adopted a two-stage approach:
- [29]
[29] Applying this framework to the facts, the Tribunal in Xentric refused (at [51]) to admit all eight witness statements. The Tribunal observed that: (a) the appellant was prejudiced by the short time left to prepare before the hearing and ought to be given a fair opportunity to rebut or throw into question that evidence or any part of it; (b) the presence of prior witness statements covering similar ground reduced any prejudice to the respondent; and (c) the respondents did not provide any satisfactory evidence as to why the evidence had been adduced at such a late stage of the proceedings (see, eg, Xentric at [37], [41], [44]–[45] and [48]–[50]).
- [30]
[30] In my view, the two-stage approach adopted by the Tribunal in Xentric can be adopted in Singapore. While the present case is not governed by the ROC 2021, the two-stage approach has the benefit of being consistent with the Ideals in O 3 r 1(2) of the ROC 2021. In particular, it is consistent with the ends of according “fair access to justice”, “expeditious proceedings”, “efficient use of court resources”, and “fair and practical results suited to the needs of the parties”, which the court must seek to achieve in all its orders and directions (see O 3 rr 1(2)–1(3) of the ROC 2021). Leaving aside the Ideals, it also accords with prior principle and precedent, including the need to strike a proper balance between, on the one hand, instilling procedural discipline in civil litigation and, on the other hand, permitting parties to present the substantive merits of their respective cases to the court notwithstanding procedural irregularities (see the High Court decision of United Overseas Bank Ltd v Ng Huat Foundations Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 425 at [4]–[9] and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo [2011] 2 SLR 196 at [20]–[23]).
My decision: SUM 663 was dismissed
- [31]
[31] Applying the two-stage approach in Xentric outlined at [28] above, I dismissed SUM 663.
- [32]
[32] First, I observed that many aspects of Mr Ismail’s evidence were not relevant. As a preliminary point, some of it covered substantially the issues that Sajan already covered in his AEIC, including the object of the SHA and the reasons for which it was entered into (see paras 12–13 of the proposed AEIC of Mr Ismail). While that was not determinative of its probative value, much of Mr Ismail’s evidence was irrelevant to the issues at hand. For example, Mr Ismail’s AEIC goes on at length about his own interpretation of what the Will means, which is a question for the court to decide (see paras 18–20 of the proposed AEIC of Mr Ismail). Mr Ismail’s AEIC also discusses whether the plaintiffs had the option of becoming an active part of SEPL’s business, which is not material to whether Sajan had breached his duties to them as trustee (see paras 21–22 of the proposed AEIC of Mr Ismail). In any event, even in respect of the parts of Mr Ismail’s AEIC which could have some probative value to the Suit, I would have had to consider whether it was broadly fair to the plaintiffs to allow the evidence to be admitted at such a late stage of the proceedings.
- [33]
[33] In considering the broader fairness point, I observed preliminarily that the admission of Mr Ismail’s AEIC was not driven by the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their Reply (Amendment No 2) in SUM 678. Indeed, at para 12 of Sajan’s supporting affidavit, he listed several issues that Mr Ismail’s AEIC would attest to that had nothing to do with the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments. For example, the issue of whether Harkishindas had knowledge of the written agreement between Sajan and the other second-generation SEPL shareholders (ie, Moti, Mr Jaikirshin s/o H Bhojwani (“Jack”), Mr Hiro J Bhojwani (“Hiro”), and Mr Mohandas Jamnadas Bhojwani (“Manu”)), as stated in paras 5(b) and 16 of the proposed AEIC, had nothing to do with the plaintiffs’ amendments in SUM 678. Thus, the fact that I had allowed the plaintiffs’ amendments was not a good reason to allow Mr Ismail’s AEIC to be admitted into evidence.
- [34]
[34] Second, the new issues that Mr Ismail’s AEIC would introduce at the start of trial would clearly prejudice the plaintiffs and their conduct of the trial. The parties were directed to exchange their AEICs on 17 January 2024, just over two months before the start of the trial. It goes without saying that the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by not having had the chance to prepare their case at trial in response to Mr Ismail’s evidence. It was no answer that the plaintiffs’ solicitors would have seen the draft AEIC as early as 8 March 2024, which, in any event, was still very close to the first day of trial (viz, 19 March 2024) and later than the date fixed for parties to serve their AEICs on one another. The plaintiffs and their solicitors cannot be expected to spend time preparing to rebut a draft AEIC on the basis that it will be admitted, when that time can be better spent on other evidence already properly admitted for the trial.
- [35]
[35] Moreover, the plaintiffs were unable to address Mr Ismail’s evidence in their own AEICs or file supplementary AEICs timeously before the start of trial. This is thus not only similar to the factual matrix in Xentric but also similar to that in the English High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) decision of Otkritie Investment Ltd v Urumov [2013] EWHC 4799 (Comm) (“Otkritie Investment”). In Otkritie Investment, Eder J refused to admit witness statements that were furnished after the commencement of trial and after the parties had adjourned to prepare closing submissions (at [1]–[2]). Eder J observed that, even assuming that the evidence in the two witness statements were relevant, “[l]itigation has to be conducted according to some basic rules if it is to be conducted efficiently and is not to be made the subject of complete mockery” (at [14]). Hence, Eder J held that “this new evidence comes far too late in circumstances where to allow it to be adduced now would cause not only severe disruption to the management of the trial, but would also cause immense unfairness to the Claimants” (at [16]). In his view, the admission of evidence “at this very late stage would require very very [sic] exceptional circumstances indeed”, having due regard to “the importance of maintaining some kind of orderly way in which evidence is put before the court” (at [15]). These observations apply similarly here.
- [36]
[36] Third, Sajan did not give a good explanation for why he had waited until around a week before the start of trial to apply to introduce the new evidence, save that he recently reflected on and recalled the relevance of the new evidence. In fact, Sajan had close to one and a half years to consider the matter but chose to put forward the application to include Mr Ismail’s evidence only on the doorstep of trial. I did not accept that Sajan’s memory was jogged only when he considered the plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to the Reply (Amendment No 2) when they were circulated to his counsel on 29 February 2024. Moreover, even if I accepted Sajan’s account, it was inexplicable why he did not think carefully about his case when he had to put together his own AEIC by January 2024.
- [37]
[37] Fourth, as I have already alluded to at [32] above, some of the issues in Mr Ismail’s AEIC were already covered by Sajan in his own AEIC. Thus, any prejudice caused to Sajan by the supposed gaps in his evidence were addressed by his own evidence. In so far as there was a gap in the evidence, Sajan could not be allowed to belatedly include new evidence to patch up his case. This is especially so since he had seen the plaintiffs’ AEICs before desiring to introduce Mr Ismail’s evidence.
- [38]
[38] In the end, while each party should be allowed to bring its best evidence to trial, this must take place within the civil procedural framework, which has rules designed to ensure a procedurally and substantively fair trial. Hence, the Court of Appeal has held that, although “every litigant has a general right to bring all evidence relevant to his or her case to the attention of the court” [emphasis in original] (see Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110 (“Basil”) at [24]), this general right is subject to specific limits, “in accordance with the rules of procedure whose purpose is to ensure the fair, economical, swift and orderly resolution of a dispute” [emphasis in original] (see Basil at [25]). In my judgment, allowing Mr Ismail’s AEIC to be admitted into evidence (or allowing for the oral EIC of Mr Ismail to be taken) would have compromised the plaintiffs’ right to a fair trial more than it would, if at all, have impinged on Sajan’s right to bring his best defence to the trial.
- [39]
[39] For these reasons, I dismissed SUM 663.
The parties’ general cases for the Suit
- [40]
[40] Having explained my reasons for how I decided the parties’ applications at the start of the trial, I come now to the parties’ general cases for the Suit.
The plaintiffs’ general case
- [41]
[41] The plaintiffs allege that Sajan has breached his duties in respect of the Trust. They claim that Sajan concealed the existence of the Trust from them and Lakshmi for almost a decade. The plaintiffs explain that they would not have known about the Trust until they inadvertently discovered its existence around September 2016. Aside from this concealment, the plaintiffs also allege that Sajan has consistently failed to maintain and produce adequate and accurate accounts of the Trust, commingled personal funds with funds covered by the Trust, and mismanaged Trust Moneys and Trust Assets (for clarity, I use “Trust Moneys” to refer to any moneys, excluding the Trust Assets, which rightfully belong to the Trust). Further, the plaintiffs say that Sajan has also sought to wrongfully remove several of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the Trust. In my view, the plaintiffs’ case can be distilled into five main planks.
- [42]
[42] First, Sajan commingled the Trust Moneys and Trust Assets with other moneys and assets, and generally mismanaged the Trust. Sajan allegedly did so in the following ways:
- [43]
[43] Second, Sajan wrongfully converted the Founder’s Share. As mentioned at [7(a)(ix)] above, cl 5 of SEPL’s M&A provides the holder of the Founder’s Share with certain rights. These rights include the right to: (a) hold office as a director of SEPL; (b) appoint anyone else as a director; (c) exercise all powers, authorities, and discretions vested in the directors generally by the M&A of SEPL; (d) remove any director other than a founder shareholder; and (e) receive 10% of SEPL’s net profits annually. These rights are entrenched rights in the company’s constitution. However, on 15 September 2008, Sajan voted to convert the Founder’s Share into one out of 6,184,004 ordinary shares in SEPL (the “Conversion”). Sajan agreed to the Conversion despite the Founder’s Share being far more valuable than an ordinary share. In this regard, the plaintiffs’ expert has valued the Founder’s Share at $9,522,738.00 as of 15 September 2008, as compared to an ordinary share in SEPL at $6.08 as of the same date. Sajan’s decision to carry out the Conversion therefore caused the plaintiffs’ loss in the form of: (a) the loss of the rights associated with the Founder’s Share, including the right to 10% of SEPL’s annual net profits; and (b) the diminution in the market value of the Founder’s Share in SEPL.
- [44]
[44] Third, Sajan sold the Trust Shares in SEPL and LMPL (collectively, the “Two Live Companies”) without reasonable justification and, in any event, at an undervalue. In this regard, Sajan sold the Trust Shares in the Two Live Companies to his brothers with deeds dated 16 February 2021. According to the plaintiffs, Sajan had no pressing need to sell the Trust Shares in the Two Live Companies when he did. Sajan merely wanted to deplete the Trust Assets to reduce his accountability, and to punish the Named Beneficiaries for questioning him on his management of the Trust. Further, according to the plaintiffs’ expert, the fair value of the Trust Shares in the Two Live Companies was far higher than the value which the defendant obtained through the sales. Sajan therefore breached his trustee’s duties in selling these shares and accepting the sales of these shares at an undervalue. While the plaintiffs initially pleaded that the Trust Shares in all three Live Companies (including those of MSSPL) were sold at an undervalue, this claim was dropped by the plaintiffs in light of new information obtained in the interlocutory process. That leaves only the plaintiffs’ claims in respect of the Two Live Companies.
- [45]
[45] Fourth, Sajan realised the Trust Shares in Sharrods, SPL, and Sovrein (collectively, the “Three Struck Off Companies”) at an undervalue in 2010. In this regard, Sajan was the overall chairman of the Shankar’s Group, and a substantial shareholder of all these three companies. He should therefore have ensured that the Trust Shares in these companies were properly realised at fair market value. Sajan breached his trustee duties in realising these shares at a significant undervalue. While the plaintiffs had initially pleaded that the capital returned to the shareholders from the 2010 striking off of all five of the Struck Off Companies (including Lions and SIPL) were realisations at an undervalue, they have likewise dropped their claims in respect of Lions and SIPL, in light of new information obtained in various pre-trial applications. This therefore leaves only their claims in respect of the Three Struck Off Companies.
- [46]
[46] Fifth, Sajan had executed the various deeds to exclude Devin and Sandeep from the Trust out of spite, so as to punish Devin and Sandeep for challenging him and to reduce his accountability over the Trust. The deeds were also executed when Sajan had an all-encompassing power of attorney to act on behalf of Dilip, which Dilip revoked on 10 December 2021. Thus, Sajan’s execution of these deeds was in bad faith and with improper motives, and contrary to the purpose of the Trust. These deeds are therefore invalid.
- [47]
[47] For convenience, I will deal with the parties’ respective cases for the rest of this judgment along these five main planks that I have identified.
Sajan’s general case
- [48]
[48] Sajan rejects the plaintiffs’ accusations of wrongdoing, including the allegation that he has benefitted himself at their expense. Instead, Sajan believes that he has acted with utmost honesty and in good faith. Indeed, he has never deliberately or intentionally made any decision to benefit himself personally, and always intended to benefit the Named Beneficiaries. Even if he is found to have acted in excess of his powers as trustee, Sajan points out that his conduct will not be fraudulent if he had done so in good faith and in the honest belief that he was acting in the interests of the Named Beneficiaries. More broadly, Sajan contends that the plaintiffs commenced the Suit because they do not want to wait until the Trust Period expires in 2037 to obtain the Trust Assets. Sajan’s case can be broadly distilled into the following points, bearing in mind the five planks of the plaintiffs’ case at [42]–[46] above.
- [49]
[49] First, Sajan raises the preliminary issue of whether Devin and Sandeep, who have been excluded as beneficiaries of the Trust, have any standing to commence the Suit. While Devin and Sandeep argue that the executed deeds to this effect are invalid, Sajan argues that he is not compelled under the Trust to make dispositions to all the Named Beneficiaries. This therefore answers the plaintiffs’ point that Sajan executed the various deeds to exclude Devin and Sandeep from the Trust out of spite.
- [50]
[50] Second, regarding the plaintiffs’ allegation that he commingled and mismanaged the Trust Moneys and Trust Assets, Sajan makes the following points:
- [51]
[51] Third, it was necessary for Sajan to have effected the Conversion. In this regard, Sajan exercised his power and discretion as trustee, failing which the business would have been dissolved, and there would only have been a notional value to the said Founder’s Share. Again, Sajan acted in good faith and took a holistic approach given that his personal shareholdings would ultimately be bequeathed to the plaintiffs.
- [52]
[52] Fourth, Sajan exercised his power and discretion as trustee in making the decision to sell the Trust Shares in the Two Live Companies. Sajan was constrained by and duly observed the protocol set out in the various companies’ constitutions in respect of the sales of the shares. The Two Live Companies had appointed valuers, and the valuations were done at arm’s length. Sajan obtained purchase prices which were higher than those posited in the valuations. Indeed, the plaintiffs themselves were intent on selling the Trust Shares in 2017.
- [53]
[53] Fifth, the Trust Shares in the Three Struck Off Companies only formed a minority of the shares in those companies. Even when coupled with Sajan’s shares, Sajan would have been unable to prevent the resolutions for the striking off of those companies from being passed in the general meeting.
The relevant issues
- [54]
[54] With the parties’ general cases in mind, I asked the parties to address the following relevant issues in their closing submissions:
- [55]
[55] In addition to these issues, Sajan raises two overarching issues in his closing submissions:
- [56]
[56] Since Sajan has raised these overarching issues, I will deal with them first before turning to the five relevant issues I had asked the parties to focus on (see at [54] above). To provide the relevant legal context, I begin with a discussion of the relevant principles in relation to a trustee’s powers and duties, and whether Sajan was granted absolute power or discretion under the Trust, on account of the use of the phrase “absolute discretion” by Harkishindas in his Will, which constituted the Trust.
Whether Sajan was granted absolute power or discretion under the Trust
The relevance of the phrase “absolute discretion” in the Will on Sajan’s duties under the Trust
The applicable principles
- [57]
[57] The starting point is that a trust grants various, sometimes extensive, powers to a trustee. A trust power is “a legal authority conferred on a person to dispose of property which is not his own” (see Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin QC & James Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2020) (“Lewin on Trusts”) at para 28−001). Lewin on Trusts (at para 28–001) further explains that powers granted under a trust ordinarily include: (i) powers of appointment and other dispositive powers “which enable the creation of beneficial interests in property”, (ii) administrative powers, such as a trustee’s powers of investment and sale, and (iii) other powers not readily categorised as either dispositive or administrative, such as powers of appropriation and powers to appoint new trustees.
- [58]
[58] It is also relatively uncontroversial that a trustee’s exercise of these powers is constrained by various duties, which may include statutory, fiduciary, and stewardship duties. Some of these duties, at the stage when a trustee is considering the exercise of his powers, include: (a) a duty to act responsibly and in good faith; (b) a duty to take only relevant matters into account; (c) a duty to act impartially; and (d) a duty not to act for an ulterior purpose (see Lewin on Trusts at para 29−033 as well as the recent Court of Appeal decision of Credit Suisse Trust Limited v Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others [2024] 2 SLR 164 (“Credit Suisse”) at [39] and [41]). Furthermore, trustees are under duties of care when exercising their powers to administer the trust property and deal with it (see Lewin on Trusts at paras 34−002 and 34−007, as well as Credit Suisse at [49]). Conceptually, on a Hohfeldian analysis, it is these duties that are capable of being enforced by the beneficiaries. Where the trustee is conferred powers and liberties to deal in trust property, the corollary of this is that the beneficiary holds a corresponding right to claim against the trustee to enforce the constraints upon these liberties, inclusive of the trustees’ duties (leaving aside the question of the specific remedy available to the beneficiaries). Those constraints on the trustee’s exercise of his or her powers are thus reflected in the duties owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries in regard to such exercise, which serve to vindicate the contents of the beneficiary’s rights in respect of the trust and the trustee’s discharge of that trust (see, eg, Lewin on Trusts at paras 29–032 and 29–033).
- [59]
[59] As the extent of a trustee’s discretion is a matter of construction of the trust instrument that confers the trust powers in the first place, it is necessary to discern the intent and purpose behind the trust powers and determine their scope from that construction. As a starting point, the construction of the power-conferring clause itself may explain the extent of a trustee’s discretion. However, where such construction does not yield an answer, then it may be that the trust instrument contains other provisions which impose conditions that govern a trustee’s exercise of his or her discretion. Therefore, it may not be meaningful to speak abstractly of how “absolute” a trustee’s “discretion” is, even if premised on a construction of the trust instrument. Instead of asking how broad or narrow a trustee’s discretion is in general, it would be better to analyse whether, on a proper construction of the trust instrument, the trustee’s duties or liabilities have been excluded or exempted in some way. This can be done by way of express provisions to that effect (see Lewin on Trusts at para 41−127). Here, however, Sajan is, in effect, arguing that on a proper construction of the Will, considering inter alia its clauses regarding his “absolute discretion”, the effect of the Will, and its provisions, is to:
My decision: the phrase “absolute discretion” in the Will has no bearing on Sajan’s duties under the Trust
- [60]
[60] I begin with a construction of the power-conferring provisions of the trust instrument, ie, cll 3 and 5.2 of the Will. In this regard, Sajan argues that the powers granted under the Trust are “almost extra-terrestrial”, and relies on the use of the phrase “absolute discretion” in cll 3 and 5.2 of the Will to submit that the Trust should be construed differently from a “typical trust”. However, I agree with the plaintiffs that express trusts with “absolute discretion” clauses are not uncommon. More importantly, Sajan has cited no authority for the proposition that the phrase “absolute discretion” should affect the construction of the Trust. In fact, the Court of Appeal decision of Foo Jee Seng and others v Foo Jhee Tuang and another [2012] 4 SLR 339 (“Foo Jee Seng”) makes it clear that the phrase “absolute discretion” does not preclude the court’s intervention in the exercise of a trustee’s powers (at [55] and [64]), and by extension, does not preclude claims by beneficiaries against trustees for breach of trust (at [47]–[48], [52]–[53] and [77]–[78]).
- [61]
[61] Further, I do not find that the use of the phrase “absolute discretion” in the Will gives rise to any of the three situations described at [59(a)]–[59(c)] above.
- [62]
[62] First, the idea behind enlarged powers is that “[t]he terms of a trust may enlarge the powers of trustees so as to authorise some act in the administration of the trust which would not otherwise be authorised” (see Lewin on Trusts at para 41−128). However, enlarged powers do not, in themselves, rule out the operation of a trustee’s duties when exercising such powers. This is why, even if an act or transaction is “of a kind coming within an extended power”, but “is in the particular circumstances of the case one that a prudent trustee would have eschewed, the trustee will not be able to rely upon the extended power as authorising the act or transaction” (see Lewin on Trusts at para 41−128). Applying these principles to the Trust, I am unable to see how the phrase “absolute discretion”, or any other provision of the Will, extends or enlarges any of the powers granted to Sajan. For example, the powers granted under, among others, cll 3 and 5.2 of the Will, are not extended by the phrase “absolute discretion”. In this regard, while the acts and transactions which Sajan, as trustee, may enter into are spelled out in cl 3, the use of the phrase “absolute discretion” does not mean that Sajan, in entering into such acts or transactions, is excused from the ordinary duties of a trustee when exercising his discretion to enter into such acts or transactions, including the duty to act in good faith, the duty to act impartially, or the duty to take only relevant matters into account, among others (see at [58] above).
- [63]
[63] Second, I consider whether the phrase “absolute discretion”, or any other provision of the Will, abridges Sajan’s duties and/or excludes his liability for breaches of trust. The conceptual difference between the two is that the latter, unlike the former, “does not justify the acts or omissions of the trustees” such that there is “no unauthorised act or breach of duty”. Rather, the latter “saves trustees from the personal liability to pay compensation for breach of trust” (see Lewin on Trusts at para 41−131). In this regard, the general principle is that exemption clauses must be phrased with “clear and unambiguous words” (see the English Court of Appeal decision of Armitage v Nurse and others [1998] Ch 241 (“Armitage v Nurse”) at 255H) such that “[a]nything not clearly within it is treated as falling outside it” (see David Fox, “Breach of Trust” in Snell’s Equity (John McGhee QC and Steven Elliott QC eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) (“Snell’s Equity”) at para 30−025 and Lewin on Trusts at para 41−141; see also, eg, John Knox and others (Millar’s Trustees) v William MacKinnon (Millar’s Judicial Factor) (1888) SC 83 at 86–87 and Barnsley and others v Noble [2017] 2 WLR 1231 at [38]–[43] and [52]–[67]). Applying this principle to the Trust, I find that the phrase “absolute discretion” in cll 3 and 5.2 of the Will does not abridge Sajan’s duties or exclude his liability for breach of trust. Such general words fail to make clear which defaults of the trustee would – and, more importantly, which defaults would not – be covered by the purported exemption, so as to constitute a valid exclusion of a trustee’s liability. Similarly, the fact that the Will accorded “wide and unfettered powers” to the trustee is, contrary to Sajan’s submissions, insufficient for a court to find that the trustee’s duties have been abridged or that a breach thereof is exempted under the Trust. This is because the phrase “absolute discretion”, by itself, says nothing about the specific duties of a trustee that are said to be abridged or the liabilities for specific defaults which are excluded (see at [62] above).
- [64]
[64] Accordingly, I find that the phrase “absolute discretion”, along with the other alleged indicia that Sajan points to within the Will, does not affect any of Sajan’s duties under the Trust, nor does it excuse or limit his liability for breach of trust. This includes the exemption clause in cl 11.1 of the Deed of Declaration of Trust dated 1 August 2008 (the “Deed of Declaration”) executed by Sajan, which purports to exempt his liability for loss caused to the Trust Assets. That clause, even if effective, cannot override the scope and contours of the testamentary Trust created by the Will itself. As I have rejected the argument that the phrase “absolute discretion” in the Will has the effect of abridging Sajan’s duties as trustee or exempting him from liability for breaches of duty, it follows that cl 11.1 of the Deed of Declaration cannot validly effect a result that is contrary to that of the Trust. In any event, I find that Sajan cannot rely on cl 11.1 of that declaration because the terms of the Trust are to be found in the Will that created it and not in any subsequent unilateral declaration of the trustee (see at [144]–[146] below). I arrive at the same finding in respect of cl 11.2 of the Deed of Declaration, which purports to declare that Sajan’s discretion under the Trust is “absolute and uncontrolled”, and accordingly he “shall not be liable for any loss or damage” flowing from any exercise of such discretion. The Deed of Declaration cannot validly abrogate or negate a liability properly arising out of the trust instrument, viz, the Will, which, as I have found, does not abridge Sajan’s duties as trustee or exempt him from liability for his defaults by way of the phrase “absolute discretion” (see at [63] above).
There is no duty on a trustee to refrain from deciding to exercise his powers in a manner which falls below the standard of Wednesbury unreasonableness
- [65]
[65] The foregoing would have been the end of the matter had the plaintiffs’ submissions not suggested that the court is entitled to intervene to ensure that “decision-making affecting a beneficiary is not capricious, arbitrary, perverse or irrational”. They also cited Foo Jee Seng (at [59]–[61]), in which the Court of Appeal, in obiter dicta, did not foreclose the possibility of a court’s intervention on the basis of a trustee’s decision being unreasonable, by invoking analogous principles in the public law context, albeit expressing some reservations regarding the same.
- [66]
[66] With the plaintiffs’ arguments in mind, and drawing on the discussion in Foo Jee Seng, the question is whether a trustee should come under a general duty to refrain from exercising his or her power in a manner that “no reasonable body of trustees properly directing themselves could have” done (see the decision of the English High Court Chancery Division in Edge and others v Pensions Ombudsman and another [1998] 3 WLR 466 (“Edge”) at 487, cited in Foo Jee Seng at [59]). I shall term this duty the “Wednesbury duty” for convenience. For the reasons which follow, I find that the Wednesbury duty should not be recognised in the trusts context.
- [67]
[67] First, such a duty appears to be superfluous considering that trustees are already subject to a duty of care, arising from both common law (see In re Speight (1883) 22 Ch D 727 (“Speight v Gaunt”) at 739–740) and statute (see s 3A of the Trustees Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Trustees Act”)). The standard imposed by Speight v Gaunt is that “a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own” (at 739) (see also the Court of Appeal decision of Ng Eng Ghee and others v Mamata Kapildev Dave and others (Horizon Partners Pte Ltd, intervener) and another appeal [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 at [153], relying on the House of Lords reasoning in Ferdinand Longfield Speight and others v Isaac Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1 at 19). A further gloss is that, in the context of investments, Lindley LJ said in the English Court of Appeal decision of In re Whiteley (1886) 33 Ch D 347 at 355 that:
As for the statutory duty imposed by s 3A of the Trustees Act, it requires that a trustee, in exercising any power, carrying out any duty, or doing any act referred to in the First Schedule, “exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances”.
- [68]
[68] From the foregoing, the ordinary standard of care is a more stringent standard for the trustee to meet, with the consequence that it is easier for a beneficiary to prove a breach of the ordinary standard of care, as compared to the Wednesbury duty. This is because the ordinary standard of care imposed on a trustee can be broadly analogised to the standard of care under the tort of negligence, both of which hold the defendant to the general standard of a reasonable man. The trustee would thus be liable for breaching his duty of care if he falls below the standard of the ordinary prudent man of business (see Speight v Gaunt at 739). However, for the Wednesbury duty to be breached, the decision made by the trustee must be one “that no reasonable body of trustees properly directing themselves could have reached” [emphasis added] (see Edge at 487, cited in Foo Jee Seng at [59]). This is a significantly higher standard for a beneficiary to prove. Indeed, as Lord Diplock put it in the House of Lords decision of Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (at 410), a decision would only be in breach of the Wednesbury duty if it is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”. Given that it is generally easier for beneficiaries to prove a breach of the ordinary standard of care imposed on a trustee, as opposed to a breach of the Wednesbury duty, there is no good reason to impose a Wednesbury duty to further enhance the protection afforded to beneficiaries.
- [69]
[69] Second, I respectfully agree with the Court of Appeal’s cautious approach in Foo Jee Seng regarding the importation of public law concepts or principles into the area of trusts law (at [61]). After all, “[t]he considerations which are applicable in the area of public law are hardly the same as those which apply to the duties of trustees and how the trustees should exercise the discretion vested in [them]” (at [61]). While it appears that contractual discretions are subject to analogous restrictions in that they cannot be exercised so capriciously or arbitrarily as to be categorised as perverse (see the decision of the General Division of the High Court in Maybank Singapore Ltd v Synergy Global Resources Pte Ltd [2024] 3 SLR 1316 at [23]–[24]; see also the UK Supreme Court decision of Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd and another [2015] 1 WLR 1661 at [26]–[37] for the “Braganza rationality test”), the reason that courts have imposed such a constraint is because there are often few, if any, other constraints on a contracting party’s power to exercise such discretions. Without those constraints, a party’s exercise of discretion may deprive the counterparty of its contractual rights or warp the parties’ bargain (see the decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court in Dong Wei v Shell Eastern Trading (Pte) Ltd and another [2022] 1 SLR 1318 at [91]). In contrast, there is arguably less need for such an additional duty on trustees, given the existence of various other duties on trustees, including a general duty of care, as I have explained at [67]–[68] above.
- [70]
[70] For these reasons, I am not prepared to find that there is a Wednesbury duty owed by trustees in their discharge of a trust, ie, a general duty on a trustee to refrain from exercising his powers in a manner that no reasonable body of trustees properly directing themselves would have done. Concomitantly, I do not find that there is a general right for a beneficiary to claim against the trustee to enforce such an alleged duty (see at [58] above).
- [71]
[71] For present purposes, I reiterate my earlier conclusion that the phrase “absolute discretion”, along with the other alleged indicia that Sajan points to within the wording of the Will or other subsequent deeds (which cannot, in any event, amend the terms of the Will), does not affect any of Sajan’s duties under the Trust, nor does it excuse or limit his liability for breach of trust (see at [62]–[64] above). Having found this, the case now turns on whether any of Sajan’s acts as trustee violated any one or more of the foregoing duties restricting his use and exercise of his trust powers. Before I can proceed to consider this issue, I must, however, deal with the second anterior question raised by Sajan, that is, whether the plaintiffs come to this court with clean hands.
Whether the plaintiffs come with clean hands
The applicable principles
- [72]
[72] I begin with the applicable principles on the “clean hands” doctrine. In the High Court decision of Keppel Tatlee Bank Ltd v Teck Koon Investment Pte Ltd and others [2000] 1 SLR(R) 355 (“Keppel Tatlee”), Lai Siu Chiu J (as she then was) opined (at [29]) that “[i]t is well established that a person seeking equitable relief must come to a court of equity with ‘clean hands’; in other words, he must not have behaved unconscionably himself”. In Keppel Tatlee, the court did not allow equitable relief (in that case, proprietary estoppel) to be invoked as the second and third defendants “did not come to court with clean hands”, and their conduct was “reprehensible” ([33]–[36]).
- [73]
[73] However, whether a person comes with “clean hands” is a question of degree. As Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was) put it in the High Court decision of Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 292 (“Hong Leong”) at [225], the clean hands doctrine “does not mean [the plaintiff seeking relief in equity] must be blameless in all ways”. Menon JC set out the following principles relating to the doctrine of clean hands (at [225]−[226]):
- [74]
[74] The key question is therefore what qualifies as a “sufficiently close connection” for unclean hands to defeat a claim in equity. In this regard, McFarlane in Snell’s Equity suggests (at para 5–010) that there is a “close similarity” between the equitable maxim “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands” and the common law doctrine of illegality (ex turpi causa non oritur actio). He further suggests that the same public considerations and multi-factorial approach in the UK Supreme Court decision of Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399, which is the dominant approach in the UK governing common law illegality, could be relevant when determining if “unclean hands” should defeat a claim in equity (see Snell’s Equity at para 5–010).
- [75]
[75] In my view, the question of whether there is a “sufficiently close connection” between the undesirable behaviour in question and the equity being sued for is precisely the sort of question that admits a multi-factorial approach. After all, it is a question of degree that is dependent on all the relevant circumstances. Indeed, the General Division of the High Court had decided in Lau Sheng Jan Alistair v Lau Cheok Joo Richard and another [2023] 5 SLR 1703 at [67]–[69] that the Court of Appeal’s framework in Ochroid Trading Ltd and another v Chua Siok Lui (trading as VIE Import & Export) and another [2018] 1 SLR 363, encompassing the proportionality principle, can be applied, with suitable modifications, to the illegality defence in the trusts context. Likewise, given the close connection between the “clean hands” doctrine and the illegality defence in common law, the factors considered under the proportionality principle in the Court of Appeal decision of Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo and another [2014] 3 SLR 609 (“Ting Siew May”) at [66] and [70] could be relevant when considering whether the plaintiffs have come to equity with clean hands. These factors, with appropriate modifications, are: (a) whether allowing the claim would undermine the purpose of the prohibiting rule; (b) the seriousness of the offence or undesirable behaviour; (c) the causal connection between the claim and the illegal conduct or undesirable behaviour; (d) the conduct of the parties; and (e) the proportionality of denying the claim. The question guiding the proportionality inquiry should be, as Menon JC put it, “whether in all the circumstances it would be a travesty of justice to assist the plaintiff given his blameworthy participation or role in the transaction” (see Hong Leong at [226], quoting Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 9(2) (LexisNexis, 2003) at para 110.016 in reliance).
My decision: the plaintiffs’ conduct does not warrant the denial of equitable relief
- [76]
[76] Turning to the facts of the present case, Sajan raises numerous examples of the plaintiffs’ alleged bad conduct that he says should deny them equitable relief. These include that: (a) Lakshmi has likely been funding the plaintiffs’ litigation expenses in this Suit and is acting in cahoots with the plaintiffs; (b) Lakshmi had already taken out other proceedings against Moti as executor of the Will (for an account of Harkishindas’s estate) and Sajan (for an account of the Trust (“OS 1407”), and for divorce against Sajan); (c) the plaintiffs lied about only having discovered the existence of the Trust on 16 September 2016; (d) the Named Beneficiaries’ AEICs are strikingly similar; (e) the plaintiffs are allegedly lying about various other aspects of their claim; (f) Lakshmi allegedly committed perjury to the court in OS 1407; (g) the plaintiffs make allegations that are unsupported or contradicted by other judgments or court orders; (h) Lakshmi had prayed for many of the same reliefs in OS 1407 as the plaintiffs seek in the present case, which amounts to an abuse of process; and (i) Devin’s AEIC included opinion evidence when Devin was only a factual witness.
- [77]
[77] In my view, Sajan’s assertions are without merit. It is not necessary for me to respond to each of Sajan’s assertions. Instead, I will outline four reasons why I disagree with him.
- [78]
[78] First, as the plaintiffs correctly point out, Sajan’s allegations against Lakshmi are irrelevant. Because she is not a claimant here, the “cleanliness” of her hands does not matter.
- [79]
[79] Second, several accusations Sajan makes are speculative – for instance, the accusation that Lakshmi is funding the plaintiffs’ litigation expenses, or that she is in cahoots with the plaintiffs. Indeed, for many of the alleged “lies” of Lakshmi and the plaintiffs to be made out, Sajan must successfully prove his own case and disprove the plaintiffs’ case on their merits. For various reasons I will explain below, I find that the plaintiffs have proven their allegations, which means that the allegations do not amount to lies, at least on a balance of probabilities.
- [80]
[80] Third, the reliefs sought in the other proceedings are different from the reliefs in the instant suit, and there is therefore no question of vexatious litigation. In particular, in OS 1407, Lakshmi had prayed for an “independent corporate trustee” to be appointed over the Trust and to replace Sajan as the trustee thereof. In the Suit, however, the plaintiffs pray for Lakshmi and Devin to be appointed as the replacement co-trustees. There are certainly similarities in some reliefs prayed for between OS 1407 and the Suit. Nevertheless, they are distinct legal actions, involving different plaintiffs and discrete prayers. The plaintiffs’ filing of the Suit to vindicate their putative rights cannot be said to be an abuse of process merely because Lakshmi filed OS 1407 to vindicate her distinct putative rights. Legal actions may overlap without being duplicative or giving rise to improper vexation or oppression.
- [81]
[81] Fourth, similarities in the AEICs of key witnesses are to be expected if they share a common narrative of the facts. Moreover, the instant case is distinguishable from the case of Jasviderbir Sing Sethi and another v Sandeep Singh Bhatia and another [2021] SGHC 14 at [55]–[61], relied on by Sajan in his submissions, because the replication of the evidence in the relevant AEICs in that case was exact and extensive, going beyond what would ordinarily be expected from witnesses testifying about the same events. In the words of Vinodh Coomaraswamy J in that case (at [57]), 32 passages in the AEICs there “were replicated verbatim or almost verbatim right down to the punctuation and the turns of phrase”. That is not the case with the AEICs of the plaintiffs and Lakshmi here.
- [82]
[82] For the above reasons, I find that the allegations against the plaintiffs are not established or even if they were, those allegations do not evince any blameworthy behaviour on the part of the plaintiffs. This is sufficient to dispose of the allegation that the plaintiffs have come to equity with unclean hands. But if I had to consider whether there was a sufficiently close connection between the plaintiffs’ impugned conduct (had I found them to be made out) and the Suit, I would have answered that question in the negative. Applying the Ting Siew May factors at [75] above, the alleged misconduct (ie, ancillary litigation and disputed allegations of fact) is not sufficiently causally connected to the plaintiffs’ claims in the Suit, which are, at its core, that Sajan breached his duties to them as a trustee. It would therefore have been disproportionate to disallow the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they have come with unclean hands.
- [83]
[83] Therefore, the plaintiffs’ conduct does not warrant the denial of equitable relief based on the “clean hands” doctrine. Having dealt with the two overarching issues Sajan raised as to his alleged “absolute discretion” as a trustee (see at [55(a)] above) and the plaintiffs having failed to come to a court of equity with clean hands (see at [55(b)] above), I turn now to address the five issues that I asked the parties to focus on (see at [54] above).
Whether Devin and Sandeep have standing to bring the Suit
The parties’ arguments
- [84]
[84] I turn to consider if Devin and Sandeep have standing to bring the Suit. As will be recalled, Sajan executed two Deeds and one Deed of Appointment on 14 April 2021 (see at [11] above). These determined (or purported to determine) that: (a) Devin and Sandeep would receive no further distribution from, and would have no further interest in, any of the remaining Trust Assets; and (b) Sajan would hold the Trust Assets on trust only for Dilip’s benefit. The plaintiffs argue that, when considered against the chronology of events, Sajan’s execution of these Deeds was clearly to silence Devin and Sandeep and/or to retaliate against them for their seeking an explanation on several aspects of Sajan’s management of the Trust.
- [85]
[85] More specifically, the plaintiffs submit that Sajan reconfirmed, as late as 16 February 2021, that the plaintiffs were still beneficiaries. As such, it must have been Devin’s questioning of Sajan’s decisions as trustee, on 1 March 2021, that led to Sajan’s subsequent execution of the Deeds on 14 April 2021. The plaintiffs suggest that Sajan took umbrage at Devin’s questioning and decided that it was more convenient to silence the more vocal and less pliable of the plaintiffs, namely, Devin and Sandeep. As for Sajan’s contention that he still intends to leave everything to his sons through his will, the plaintiffs say that that does not assist him because Sajan’s will remains revocable. Indeed, if Sajan genuinely intends to leave everything to his sons, it does not make sense to cut Devin and Sandeep out of the Trust at this point. Accordingly, the most likely explanation for Sajan’s execution of the Deeds is that this was an act of petty spite on his part, designed to avoid being held accountable for his shortcomings in administering the Trust and/or to “punish” Devin and Sandeep.
- [86]
[86] I turn now to Sajan’s response. While Sajan had suggested in his opening statement that Devin and Sandeep “have no standing to bring [the Suit], and to seek any of the remedies therein” [emphasis added], he appears to have softened his position in his closing submissions. Sajan now maintains that Devin and Sandeep “only have the capacity … to seek an account of Trust assets or monies up to and until 14 April 2021” [emphasis added]. In any event, Sajan’s response on this issue is that he did not execute the Deeds in bad faith or with improper motives. Indeed, Sajan provided clear reasons and explanations for removing Devin and Sandeep as beneficiaries of the Trust, which is that he favoured Dilip over them. There is also no basis for suggesting that Devin and Sandeep were removed as they had asked questions about the December 2017 Trust Summary. This is because Dilip can still ask questions about that document and his management of the Trust in general.
My decision: Devin and Sandeep have standing to bring the Suit
- [87]
[87] In my judgment, Devin and Sandeep have standing (on which, see generally, Timothy Liau, Standing in Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2023)) to bring the Suit because I find that Sajan had executed the Deeds to exclude them from the Trust in bad faith. Accordingly, the Deeds are invalid, and Devin and Sandeep remain beneficiaries of the Trust.
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