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Grounds publishedDecided 25 Mar 2024

General Division of the High Court

Hyflux Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and others v Lum Ooi Lin and another suit

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[2024] SGHC 84Case no. Suit No 267 of 2022 (Summons No 56 of 2024)34 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [2] The plaintiffs in the Suits oppose the Application. In this regard, the four plaintiffs in Suit 267 are: (a) Hyflux Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) (“Hyflux”); (b) Hydrochem (S) Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) (“Hydrochem”); (c) Tuaspring Pte Ltd (under receivership) (“Tuaspring”); and (d) Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Mr Borrelli”). Mr Borrelli is the sole liquidator of Hyflux and Hydrochem. In turn, the three plaintiffs in Suit 268 are: (a) Hyflux; (b) Hydrochem; and (c) Tuaspring. For convenience, I will refer to the plaintiffs in the Suits as the “plaintiffs”.

  2. Background facts

  3. [4] I begin with the background facts. Hyflux, Hydrochem, and Tuaspring belong to the same group of companies (the “Group”). Hyflux is the holding company of the Group. The Group was engaged in seawater desalination, water purification, wastewater cleaning, water recycling, and water reclamation for public and industrial clients, as well as filtration and purification products for home consumers. The Group’s business activities were focused on, among other things, project investments. In this regard, the Group incorporated special purpose companies which received a concession from a government or state-owned enterprise to finance, build, operate, and maintain a plant involved in water treatment, wastewater treatment, desalination, power, or waste-to-energy.

  4. [5] The plaintiffs’ claims in the Suits relate to one such project investment. This is the Group’s Tuaspring project (the “Project”), which comprised (a) a sea water desalination plant at Tuas (the “Desalination Plant”), which Tuaspring was to design, build, own, and operate; and (b) a 411-megawatt combined cycle gas turbine power plant to supply electricity to the Desalination Plant (the “Power Plant”).

  5. [6] The plaintiffs’ main allegation in the Suits is that Hyflux’s financial statements for the financial years ended 31 December 2011 to 2017 (the “Financial Statements”) were materially misstated. More specifically, the alleged misstatements differ in each of the Suits:

  6. (a) In Suit 267, the plaintiffs allege that the Financial Statements were misstated due to a failure to recognise provisions and/or impairment losses in relation to the Project, in accordance with the Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (“FRS”) 36 (Impairment of Assets), FRS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets), and/or FRS 38 (Intangible Assets).

  7. (b) In Suit 268, the plaintiffs allege, in addition to the above misstatements, that the Financial Statements were misstated due to the incorrect application of Interpretation of FRS 112 (Service Concession Arrangements) (“INT FRS 112”) to account for the Power Plant.

  8. [7] On 9 February 2023, Ms Lum’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiffs’ solicitors and KPMG’s solicitors. In her letter, Ms Lum asked the plaintiffs and KPMG whether they would agree to the Suits being heard or tried together at the same time before the same Judge. On 13 February 2023, the plaintiffs’ solicitors replied to say that the plaintiffs did not see sufficient basis for the Suits to be heard or tried at the same time.

  9. [8] In contrast, KPMG agreed with Ms Lum that the Suits should be so heard or tried. Additionally, KPMG also agreed with Ms Lum that they should seek the Ancillary Orders, which are primarily as follows:

  10. (a) Documents disclosed, filed and/or used in one Suit shall be treated as, and form part of, the documents in the other Suit.

  11. (b) All documents, including but not limited to pleadings, correspondence, lists of documents and/or affidavits verifying such lists filed by any party in one Suit are to be served on the other parties in the other Suit.

  12. (c) Copies of all documents specified in the lists of documents filed by any party in one Suit are to be provided to all the other parties in the other Suit.

  13. (d) All applications (together with any supporting affidavit(s)) in one Suit be served on the parties to the other Suit.

  14. (e) All hearings in either Suit for directions and/or case management be heard in the presence of the parties in both Suits.

  15. (f) Evidence filed in one Suit shall be served on the other parties in the other Suit and evidence in Suit 267 and Suit 268 be treated as evidence led in both Suits.

  16. (g) Any party in one Suit shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses in the other Suit.

  17. [9] Finally, KPMG posits that Suit 268 should be the “lead action” in the proceedings, should the Application be granted.

  18. [10] With the above background in mind, I turn now to the parties’ general positions, which I will elaborate at the appropriate junctures.

  19. The parties’ general positions

  20. [14] With the parties’ general positions in mind, I turn now to consider the relevant issues that are before me.

  21. The relevant issues

  22. [15] In my view, there are three relevant issues which I have to decide:

  23. (a) Whether, pursuant to O 4 r 1 of the ROC 2014, Suit 267 should be heard or tried at the same time as Suit 268.

  24. (b) If so, whether the Ancillary Orders sought should be granted.

  25. (c) If so, whether Suit 268 should be the lead action.

  26. [16] I now deal with each issue in turn.

  27. Whether, pursuant to O 4 r 1 of the ROC 2014, Suit 267 should be heard or tried at the same time as Suit 268

  28. The relevant principles

  29. The different orders under O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014

  30. [17] The starting point I took is O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014, which provides as follows:

  31. [19] In this regard, Boswell J in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision of Paterson v Stewart Title Guaranty Company [2020] ONSC 4609 (“Paterson”) observed (at [21]) that consolidation and a joint hearing essentially achieve the same goal but in slightly different ways. Although the learned judge was interpreting r 6.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 (O), his description of the essential features of consolidation and a joint hearing are broadly applicable here. Boswell J quoted Quinn J’s decision in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision of Wood v Farr Ford Ltd [2008] OJ No 4092 (at [24]–[26]) as follows:

  32. Coleman J put it even more succinctly in the Hong Kong Court of First Instance decision of Convoy Collateral Ltd v Cho Kwai Chee [2022] HKFCI 3406 (“Convoy Collateral”) (at [14]):

  33. The requirements under O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014

  34. (a) First, an applicant has to show that he or she satisfies one of the three alternative grounds in O 4 r 1(1). While the grounds in O 4 r 1(1)(a) and O 4 r 1(1)(b) are largely self-explanatory, it should be noted that the ground in O 4 r 1(1)(c) is a catch-all meant to cater for any other relevant circumstance. However, in the spirit of a harmonious interpretation of O 4 r 1(1), the ground advanced under O 4 r 1(1)(c) must obviously be of a similar grain to the grounds expressly provided for in O 4 r 1(1)(a) and O 4 r 1(1)(b).

  35. [26] Finally, as an overarching point, I reiterate the view in Yeo Su Lan that since O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014 is framed in substantively the same terms as O 9 r 11 of the Rules of Court 2021, there is no reason why the above principles in relation to O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014 should not, subject to the Ideals in O 3 r 1 of the ROC 2021, apply equally to O 9 r 11 of the ROC 2021.

  36. [27] With these principles in mind, I turn to the Application.

  37. My decision: the Application is allowed

  38. Ms Lum has satisfied one or more grounds provided in O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014

  39. [29] First, with regard to O 4 r 1(1)(a), there are common questions of law or fact in the Suits. As a preliminary point, while the plaintiffs have alluded to there being a substantial number of key non-overlapping issues between the Suits, that is not relevant in considering whether the ground in O 4 r 1(1)(a) is satisfied. Rather, as the plain words of O 4 r 1(1)(a) make clear, all that is needed is that “some common question of law or fact arises in both or all of [the causes or matters concerned]” [emphasis added]. To establish this, it is useful to consider the plaintiffs’ cases in the Suits. In Suit 267, the plaintiffs allege the following: that Ms Lum, (a) in breach of her common law, equitable, and statutory duties; (b) caused Hyflux, Hydrochem, and Tuaspring to be in breach of the prohibitions against wrongful trading in s 239 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”) and/or its equivalent provision in the Companies Act prior to the enactment of the IRDA (“CA”); and/or (c) wilfully paid and/or permitted Hyflux to pay dividends in contravention of s 403(1) of the CA. In turn, in Suit 268, the plaintiffs allege that KPMG breached its duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in carrying out its audit work in relation to its audit of the Financial Statements.

  40. [30] Crucially, the plaintiffs rely on the same pleaded facts in support of these causes of action. More specifically, the plaintiffs have pleaded that:

  41. (a) the Financial Statements portrayed a group that was in good health and growing strongly;

  42. (b) the Financial Statements were materially misstated as a result of a failure to recognise provisions and/or impairment losses in accordance with FRS 36, FRS 37, and/or FRS 38; and

  43. (c) these misstatements relate to the Project, and had these misstatements been recognised in the Financial Statements, Ms Lum should, and Hyflux would have, realised that Hyflux should not have prepared the Financial Statements for at least 2014 onwards on a going concern basis, or at least that there was material uncertainty whether Hyflux and the Group could continue as a going concern.

  44. [32] Leaving aside Ms Lum’s and KPMG’s pleadings, it is clear, based on the plaintiffs’ pleadings alone, that there are common questions of fact and law. One, due to the commonality of the facts pleaded by the plaintiffs across the Suits, it is likely that there will be common questions of fact. In this regard, the only difference in the factual matrix of the Suits may be the plaintiffs’ further allegation in Suit 268 against KPMG that it was allegedly inappropriate for Hyflux to account for the Power Plant using INT FRS 112. Two, there are common questions of fact and law in relation to factual causation given the manner that this issue has been pleaded in the Suits. For example, the plaintiffs allege that Ms Lum and KPMG ought to have appreciated that the significant misstatements and losses incurred meant that there was at least material uncertainty about the ability of Hyflux and the Group to continue as a going concern. Three, there are common questions of fact and law in relation to legal causation given the manner in which this issue has been pleaded in the Suits. This is because the plaintiffs have pleaded that all the losses claimed flow directly from Ms Lum’s and KPMG’s failure to discharge their respective duties. Four, there are common questions of fact and law in relation to the damages and losses claimed by the plaintiffs due to the almost identical manner in which the plaintiffs have pleaded these across the Suits.

  45. [34] Accordingly, I find that Ms Lum has satisfied one or more grounds in O 4 r 1(1) of the ROC 2014. I therefore move on to consider the second stage of the analytical framework.

  46. Ms Lum has shown that the joint hearing of the Suits would satisfy the purpose of O 4 r 1(1)

  47. (1) The nature of the order sought

  48. (2) The plaintiffs’ objections are not convincing

  49. [36] From this starting point, I turn to explain why I do not find the plaintiffs’ objections to the Application to be convincing.

  50. [37] First, the plaintiffs submit that there are a number of non-overlapping issues in both the Suits that are key and substantial. Before me, Mr Kenneth Tan SC (“Mr Tan”), who appeared as instructed counsel for the plaintiffs, confirmed that these issues are the ones detailed in Mr Borrelli’s affidavit filed on 31 January 2024 at paras 20 and 23. Thus, for Suit 267, the plaintiffs point to, among others, evidence from Ms Lum and other Hyflux team members as to what Ms Lum knew and did in relation to the Financial Statements and whether this involved a breach of her duties. For Suit 268, the plaintiffs point to, among others, evidence from KPMG audit team members, and the plaintiffs’ and KPMG’s respective audit experts as to what KPMG knew and did in the course of its audit and whether this involved a breach of its duties.

  51. [38] While there are a number of non-overlapping issues between the Suits, I find that the overlapping issues are key and substantial. To begin with, and the plaintiffs fairly do not argue this, the mere presence of some non-overlapping issues cannot mean that the Application must be dismissed. Rather, what is important is the nature and significance of these non-overlapping issues as compared to the overlapping issues. Considered this way, the supposed non-overlapping issues in the Suits flow from the common questions of fact and law, which in turn flow from the similar manner in which the plaintiffs have pleaded to the Suits. Indeed, given that both Ms Lum and KPMG are heavily referenced in both Suits, it is clear that the overlapping issues will be more substantial in number and key in significance as compared to the supposed non-overlapping issues identified by the plaintiffs.

  52. [39] In any event, I do not think that all of the supposed non-overlapping issues identified by the plaintiffs are really unique to either Suit 267 or Suit 268. In fact, as I will proceed to demonstrate, a majority of them are clearly overlapping issues across the Suits. In relation to Suit 267:

  53. [40] In relation to Suit 268:

  54. [41] Second, the plaintiffs submit that the contentions of Ms Lum and KPMG regarding the degree of commonality in the witnesses and documents across the Suits are lacking in specificity. However, it is possible for this court to determine on a preliminary basis, based on the plaintiffs’ highly similar pleadings across the Suits, who the witnesses might be. I find that Ms Lum and KPMG are well justified in concluding that their witnesses will likely be the same. This is due to how the plaintiffs’ cases in each of the Suits flow from the same set of facts as pleaded. It follows that the documents across the Suits will also be similar. Thus, it is no objection to say that Ms Lum and KPMG have not particularised the degree of commonality in the witnesses and documents. Instead, what matters is that there is sufficient material contained in the pleadings for this court to preliminarily determine that degree of commonality.

  55. [42] Third, the plaintiffs submit that a joint trial will result in a hearing of unwieldy complexity and length, due to the aggregation of the substantial number of non-overlapping issues into one trial. With respect, I think that the plaintiffs have overstated the complexity of a joint trial. Indeed, there are many complex commercial cases involving multiple parties before the courts. Given that each of the parties are represented by highly experienced counsel, who were certainly adept at dealing with this hearing efficiently and effectively, I do not think that a joint trial will result in such unwieldy complexity and length as would be unmanageable.

  56. [45] In the round, the plaintiffs’ overarching complaint is that the Application is premature because this court does not have sufficient material with which to assess the Application at this juncture. I now explain why I disagree that the Application is premature.

  57. (3) The Application is not premature

  58. [50] Accordingly, I do not think that the Application is premature.

  59. (4) The joint hearing of the Suits will save costs, time, and effort, as well as promote convenience

  60. It is not necessary for me to consider all of these factors in the present case, and I only focus on three salient factors that exemplify how the joint hearing of the Suits will save costs, time, and effort, as well as promote convenience.

  61. [53] Second, given the overlapping questions of fact and law across the Suits, a joint trial will ensure that there are consistent answers to these questions. As the High Court observed in DFI Engineering Pte Ltd v Mo Mei Jen [2018] 5 SLR 431 (at [13]), consolidation will prevent an outcome that gives rise to inconsistent results:

  62. Whether the Ancillary Orders should be granted

  63. [56] Further, I conclude that the Ancillary Orders should be granted.

  64. [57] I do not find the plaintiffs’ objections to the Ancillary Orders to be convincing:

  65. Whether Suit 268 should be the “lead action”

  66. [59] As to whether Suit 268 should be the “lead action”, Mr Thio Shen Yi SC (“Mr Thio”), who appeared for KPMG, helpfully clarified that what KPMG meant by this request is that KPMG’s evidence in the joint trial should be adduced before that of Ms Lum’s. KPMG did not mean that Suit 268 should be tried before Suit 267, in what would not be a joint trial but, rather, one trial being heard before the other.

  67. Conclusion

  68. [61] For all the reasons above, I allow the Application, including the Ancillary Orders sought. I, however, do not direct for Suit 268 to be the “lead action” in the joint trial.

  69. [63] In closing, I would like to thank Mr Shankar, Mr Thio, and Mr Tan for their most helpful submissions. While I may not have agreed with all of the submissions made to me, I am grateful to all counsel for making highly effective and efficient submissions. In this regard, while the Application was scheduled for a full day hearing, all counsel completed their submissions in less than two hours on the premise that the court had read all the relevant papers. Indeed, prolonged oral submissions are not necessarily better; they can, in fact, be worse because they divert attention away from salient points on which cases turn. Indeed, if the judge has made it clear that he or she has read the papers, counsel need to take the judge at his or her word and not, as in some other cases, still go through their written submissions paragraph by paragraph, or the factual matrix in exhaustive detail. What was especially helpful in this case was that Mr Shankar, Mr Thio, and Mr Tan all highlighted salient points on which their respective cases turned with only brief references to their written submissions. This enabled all parties to have an open and informed exchange with me on these pertinent points. Mr Shankar, Mr Thio, and Mr Tan were also very able to address my questions as soon as I had asked them instead of, as in some other cases, return to their prepared remarks as if the judge had not asked the questions concerned. Effective advocacy should not be a lecture to the judge, but rather, a true dialectic between counsel and the judge. I was therefore greatly assisted by Mr Shankar’s, Mr Thio’s, and Mr Tan’s oral submissions, which went to the crux of their respective cases, addressed my concerns immediately, and helped me better appreciate the finer details in their respective written submissions.