General Division of the High Court · Decided 30 March 2023
Salmizan bin Abdullah v Crapper, Ian Anthony
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 75 · Case no. Suit No 377 of 2022 (Summons No 3827 of 2022)
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Grounds of decision
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- [1]
[1] This is the defendant’s application pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”) for the preliminary determination of the following three questions of law (“the Questions”) prior to the assessment of damages (“AD”) for the underlying matter. The defendant has framed the Questions as follows:
(a) whether causation can be reserved in toto to the AD Stage (“Question 1”);
(b) if the answer to (a) is no, whether causation can be reserved to the AD Stage, if parties accept that the claimant suffered one or more types of special damages causally connected to the defendant’s breach of duty (“Question 2”); and
(c) if the answer to (b) is no, whether causation can be reserved to the AD Stage, if parties accept that the claimant suffered one or more types of general damages causally connected to the defendant’s breach of duty (“Question 3”).
- [2]
[2] Having considered the parties’ submissions, including those of the learned young independent counsel, Ms Leo Zhi Wei (“Ms Leo”), I answer Question 1 in the negative. Further, I consider that Question 2 and Question 3 should be reframed, and that the gist of those questions is whether causation can be reserved to some extent to the AD Stage. I also answer this reframed question in the negative but with some qualifications. I provide the detailed reasons for my answers below.
Background context to the Questions
The general context in which the Questions have arisen: PIMA cases
- [4]
[4] In Singapore, the Protocol can be found in Appendix B of the State Courts Practice Directions 2021 (“PD 2021”). Pursuant to para 39(2) of the PD 2021, claimants in all PIMA cases must comply with the Protocol before commencing court proceedings. The Protocol was previously found in Appendix E of the State Courts Practice Directions 2014 (“PD 2014”). While the present case concerns an accident which occurred prior to the application of the PD 2021, I will deal primarily with the PD 2021 in as much as the material parts of the Protocol remain unchanged across the two Practice Directions.
The specific context in which the Questions have arisen: MC/MC 8815 of 2020
- [7]
[7] Against this general context, the Questions have arisen in the scenario where the parties have agreed on liability and entered into a consent interlocutory judgment on such. The present case arose from MC/MC 8815 of 2020 (“MC 8815”). This is the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for personal injury, loss, and expenses arising out of an accident on 29 March 2019. The defendant was driving a motorcycle which was insured with Direct Asia Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd when it collided with the plaintiff’s motor car along Loyang Lane. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff allegedly suffered neck pain and back pain. Presumably after going through the Protocol (albeit under the PD 2014), the plaintiff filed his Statement of Claim on 21 August 2020. Pursuant to O 18 r 12(1A) of the ROC 2014, the plaintiff also annexed to his claim a medical report and statement of the special damages claimed. The plaintiff claimed for general damages and special damages. The special damages claimed included loss of income amounting to $434.00, medical expenses amounting to $66.65, and transport expenses amounting to $30.00. In his Defence filed on 24 September 2020, the defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of, among other grounds, the lack of causation of the plaintiff’s losses.
It is noteworthy that despite the terms of the consent interlocutory judgment making no mention of issues of causation, in the completed Form 9I dated 8 January 2021 (which is the equivalent of Form 7 under the PD 2014), the parties had ticked the box which indicated that by consent, interlocutory judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the defendant at 90%, “leaving the issues of damages and causation to be assessed and costs reserved to the Registrar assessing the damages” [emphasis added]. The current version of Form 9I no longer contain the words “and causation” in the equivalent sentence. Neither does Form 7 in the PD 2021 contain those words. I understand that the prevailing practice at one time in the State Courts was to allow the defendant to challenge the causation of injuries in toto at the AD Stage despite the entering of interlocutory judgment by consent in relation to liability.
- [10]
[10] At the AD hearing for MC 8815 before the learned Deputy Registrar Lewis Tan (“DR Tan”), the parties confirmed that they were willing to proceed with the AD despite the defendant disputing the causation of the plaintiff’s general damages. However, DR Tan was reluctant to proceed with the AD hearing on this basis in light of the Court of Appeal decision of Tan Woo Thian v PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 1166 (“Tan Woo Thian”). In that case, the Court of Appeal held ex tempore that (at [8]), in a bifurcated trial, the plaintiff at the liability stage would need “to show that he did, in fact, suffer one or more types of loss that was causally connected to the alleged breach” [emphasis in original]. DR Tan expressed the view that “there does not seem to be any decision whereby assessment went ahead when parties only consented to [special damages]”.
- [11]
[11] As a result, the defendant filed HC/OA 301 of 2022 (“OA 301”) for MC 8815 to be transferred to the General Division of the High Court (“the High Court”) under s 54B(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCA”) for the determination of the Questions. According to the defendant, the rationale for OA 301 was to seek a High Court pronouncement to settle the extent to which causation might be contested at the AD Stage after the entering of interlocutory judgment against a defendant. The defendant says that this would affect more than the immediate interest of the parties in MC 8815 and would benefit future litigants, insurance companies, and their legal advisors in planning their litigation roadmap and strategies in relation to causation. On 5 August 2022, an Assistant Registrar (“AR”) allowed the transfer of MC 8815 to the High Court for the Questions to be answered.
The problem raised by the Questions summarised
- [12]
[12] Reduced to its core, the problem raised by the Questions concerns the extent to which causation may be challenged at the AD Stage after the entering of a judgment on liability by consent. Specifically, the “causation” that the Questions refer to is the causal connection between a defendant’s breach of duty and a claimant’s damage or injuries. Also, the nature of the judgment is not usually material: it may be by consent or not, and it may be interlocutory or final. This problem arises because Tan Woo Thian has reminded us of the fundamental principle that causation is an element of liability in the tort of negligence which PIMA cases are based on. Parenthetically, I should say that while Tan Woo Thian was not a PIMA case, its statements on the relevant principles of the tort of negligence are clearly universal and apply to PIMA cases as well. However, the effect of Tan Woo Thian in practice has not been determinatively settled, especially in relation to the process by which PIMA cases are dealt with. Yet, it would appear that the profession has always had sight of this problem. Thus, as the learned authors of “What to do in a motor accident” anticipated several years ago (at footnote 43):
- [13]
[13] The problem can be illustrated more clearly by a hypothetical example concerning a matter that has been bifurcated along liability and AD. Suppose that a claimant claims to have suffered injuries A, B, and C in an accident in which a defendant breached his duty of care owed to the claimant. However, the claimant can only establish that injury A was caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. Despite this, the parties enter into a consent interlocutory judgment for the claimant in the tort of negligence. At the AD Stage, the defendant wishes to challenge the issue of causation. Specifically, the defendant wishes to challenge whether injuries B and C were caused by his breach of duty. Can the defendant do this?
- [14]
[14] According to the defendant, in a scenario where a claimant suffers injuries A, B, and C in an accident that was indisputably caused by a defendant, the parties can enter into a consent interlocutory judgment in favour of the claimant, without the claimant even proving that any injury was caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. By this approach, since the claimant has not established causation at the liability stage, the defendant would be able to challenge causation in toto at the AD Stage. For convenience, I will term this as the “Total Causation at AD Stage Approach”.
- [15]
[15] In contrast to the defendant’s approach, the approach taken in some cases is slightly different. Suppose again that a claimant suffers injuries A, B, and C in an accident that was indisputably caused by a defendant. The claimant can only establish that injury A was caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. By the approach advanced in some cases, if consent interlocutory judgment is entered in favour of the claimant, the defendant retains the right to challenge causation with respect to injuries B and C at the AD Stage. This is because the claimant can justify the consent interlocutory judgment for liability, having made out a cause of action in the tort of negligence on the basis of injury A alone. However, because the claimant has not established causation for injuries B and C, the defendant retains the right to challenge causation with respect to those injuries at the AD Stage. For convenience, I will term this as the “Partial Causation at AD Stage Approach”.
- [16]
[16] In my respectful view, neither of these approaches is correct. In the scenario that I have set out above, the correct solution is that the claimant can make out a cause of action in the tort of negligence so long as he can establish, among others, causation in relation to one of the injuries he has suffered. The claimant needs to do this to obtain an interlocutory judgment on liability so as to proceed to the AD Stage. This is because causation and damage are necessary elements to make out liability in the tort of negligence. At this point, that there is liability is not in doubt. The question is: liability for what? In this aspect, if the claimant manages to establish causation only in respect of, say, injury A, his cause of action and any resulting judgment for liability is limited to that injury. As such, the claimant would only be able to claim damages for injury A. It follows that the defendant would not be able to challenge causation at the AD Stage in respect of injuries B and C because it is not necessary for him to do so: the claimant has not even established liability with respect to those other injuries. For convenience, I will term this as the “No Causation at AD Stage Approach”. However, the defendant cannot challenge causation in respect of injury A at the AD Stage because the claimant has already established liability with respect to that injury and interlocutory judgment had been entered on that basis. The claimant also cannot bring a subsequent claim in respect of injuries B and C because all three injuries emanate from the same cause of action and the claimant must bring his action once and for all.
- [17]
[17] I will explain the reasons for my broad conclusions above. I will organise the discussion below along the following broad segments for ease of explanation: (a) the conceptual points in the tort of negligence, (b) why the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach and the Partial Causation at AD Stage Approach are wrong, whereas the No Causation at AD Approach Stage is correct, (c) a summary of my answers to the Questions posed, and (d) some consequential outcomes as a result of the answers. In discussing these broad points, I will also canvass the effect of a consent interlocutory judgment on liability at the appropriate points. This is because the effect of such a judgment is to restrict the issues that the defendant can challenge at the AD Stage, and this has a direct bearing on the correctness of the Approaches described above. I also take the opportunity to comment on some procedural aspects of an application made under O 33 r 2 of the ROC 2014 which, for brevity, I will hereafter refer to as “O 33 r 2”.
- [18]
[18] Because of the potential consequences of my answers to the Questions, as well as the fact that the plaintiff and defendant have advanced a unified view on what the answers should be, I invited Ms Leo to provide an independent (and potentially competing) opinion as a young independent counsel. I wish to state at the outset that Ms Leo’s oral and written submissions have been exceptional and greatly assisted me in the present case. I am most grateful for her able assistance. I shall have occasion to refer to her submissions in due course.
Procedural aspects of an application made under O 33 r 2
The interaction between s 54B(1) of the State Courts Act and O 33 r 2 of the ROC 2014
- [19]
[19] Before I turn to the Questions, I first address some procedural issues that have arisen from the manner in which the Questions have come to me. I begin with the interaction between s 54B(1) of the SCA (“s 54B(1)”) and O 33 r 2. The basis for the defendant’s application to transfer MC 8815 to the High Court under OA 301 was s 54B(1), which provides as follows:
- [21]
[21] While what the defendant has done is not impermissible, it does bring into question how s 54B(1) interacts with O 33 r 2 when the High Court is being asked to preliminarily determine questions that form the basis for the transfer in the first place. This question arises because the very reason for the transfer under s 54B(1) is that there are important questions of law for the High Court to decide. Yet, when the defendant invokes O 33 r 2 of the ROC 2014 to ask the High Court to preliminarily determine those questions, it would appear that the High Court is left with little choice but to determine those questions since the transfer was premised on the High Court having to answer those questions in the first place.
- [22]
[22] In my view, as the learned AR pointed out in OA 301, this issue has arisen because there is no express procedure for the High Court to determine such questions of law whilst still retaining the rest of the proceedings in the State Courts. So long as such a statutory lacuna persists, it may be preferable for the same judge to hear the transfer application under s 54B(1), as well as to decide whether to allow for the preliminary determination of questions under O 33 r 2. This would avoid a situation where the judge who eventually hears the transferred matter disagrees that there is an important question of law to be determined. In that instance, the judge may transfer the case back to the State Courts, returning to square one, so to speak. However, this is likely to be a rare case as in most cases, such as the High Court decision of Lee Chye Chong and others v SBS Transit Ltd [2021] 5 SLR 821, the important questions of law would be answered in the course of the trial of the matter being transferred.
The manner in which an application under O 33 r 2 should be made
- [23]
[23] In the present case, no such problem arises because I respectfully agree with the learned AR that there are indeed important questions of law to be determined. Put in the terms of the application before me, I am of the view that the Questions should be preliminarily determined pursuant to O 33 r 2. While the parties do not address me on this, I take this opportunity to make some observations on the manner in which an application under O 33 r 2 for the preliminary determination of questions should be made.
- [24]
[24] In my view, an application for a question to be preliminarily determined under O 33 r 2 should proceed in two stages. First, before any question which is the subject of the application can be preliminarily determined, the logically prior question is whether the court should grant permission for the question to be determined in the first place. Second, if the court grants permission, it will proceed to the second stage to consider the merits of the question submitted for preliminary determination. Whether the two stages should proceed in one hearing, or in separate hearings, would depend on the directions given by the court. Therefore, to enable the court to properly manage such applications, it would be helpful for the applicant to make it clear in its application whether it is seeking only the court’s permission for a question to be preliminarily determined, or if it is seeking the determination of that question as well in the same hearing. Indeed, all too often, applications for the preliminary determination of a question under O 33 r 2 are framed ambiguously and it is not clear if the applicant is seeking permission only or the further determination of the question at the same hearing.
- [25]
[25] I turn then to the first stage of the application of O 33 r 2, which is whether I should grant permission for the Questions to be determined. In this regard, O 33 r 2 provides as follows:
- [28]
[28] It is clear from the above extract from ACB that the court was ultimately concerned about whether the preliminary determination of the questions there would achieve a just outcome in the case. In my view, this suggests that the overarching inquiry in deciding an application under O 33 r 2 is whether a preliminary determination would be in the interests of justice. To this, I would add that considerations of justice need not be limited to those concerning the parties in the dispute. Indeed, there is nothing in the wording of O 33 r 2 which limits the considerations that the court may take into account. In some cases, it may be in the interests of justice to make a preliminary determination where it would benefit third parties. This is likely to be so if questions of law of public importance are involved or if the dispute in question is a “test case” that would provide guidance to other similarly situated litigants.
- [29]
[29] Applying these principles to the present case, I am of the view that a preliminary determination of the Questions would be in the interests of justice. I agree with the defendant that the determination of the Questions would affect more than the immediate interest of the parties here and would benefit future litigants, insurance companies, and their legal advisors in planning their litigation roadmap and strategies in relation to causation. And significantly, the plaintiff in the present case does not object to the application. Thus, in my judgment, it is appropriate for the Questions to be preliminary determined pursuant to O 33 r 2.
Conceptual points in the tort of negligence
- [30]
[30] I turn now to the Questions. But before I answer them, it would be helpful for me to go through some conceptual points on the tort of negligence.
A “cause of action”
- [31]
[31] I begin with the definition of a “cause of action”. This is a useful starting point as the material holding in Tan Woo Thian (at [6]) is that “[a] cause of action in negligence is inchoate absent evidence of actual loss” [emphasis added]. In my view, the fulfilment of the constituent elements of the tort of negligence being framed as establishing a “cause of action” is simply another way of saying that “liability” in the tort has been established. This gives effect to the trite principle that before a defendant can be held liable for the claimant’s damage, the claimant would have to establish a cause of action in the tort of negligence against him. In this regard, Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A Garner ed) (Thomson Reuters, 11th Ed, 2019) defines a cause of action in the following terms (at p 275):
- [32]
[32] Similarly, in Andrew McGee, Limitation Periods (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2018) (“Limitation Periods”), the learned author notes (at para 5.008) that, in relation to single torts that require proof of damage (of which the tort of negligence is an example), the basic rule is that the cause of action accrues when damage is suffered. This basic rule flows from the principle that the cause of action is complete only when there is a claimant who can sue and a defendant who can be sued, and when the ingredients of duty, breach, and damage are all satisfied (see the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702).
- [33]
[33] Most of the difficulties that have arisen in relation to this definition of a “cause of action” concern whether the necessary elements have been fulfilled. These difficulties are exacerbated by the rule that generally only one action may be brought in respect of any cause of action (see, eg, Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100). Thus, in the English Court of Appeal cases on economic loss, such as Forster v Outred & Co [1982] 1 WLR 86 (“Forster”) and D W Moore & Co Ltd v Ferrier [1988] 1 WLR 267 (“D W Moore”), where the same breach of duty gave rise to an immediate diminution of the plaintiff’s estate, and the risk of further diminution (which later materialised), the courts have consistently held that there is only one cause of action. However, these cases may be contrasted with the first instance decision of Post Office v Official Solicitor [1951] 1 All ER 522 (“Post Office”). In Post Office, a postman was injured by the defendant’s negligent driving. The Post Office sued the driver successfully for the loss of the postman’s services. The Post Office also gave the postman a disability pension, which it later sought to sue the defendant’s estate for (at least in respect of the amounts that were paid out). Barry J held that this latter claim was a separate cause of action, distinct from the claim relating to the loss of the postman’s services. As such, the Post Office was not precluded from bringing the latter action to recover the disability pension.
- [34]
[34] In Limitation Periods (at para 1.017), McGee has opined that Post Office was incorrectly decided. In his view, there was only one breach of duty on the facts of Post Office even if the damage had occurred in stages rather than all at once. He argues that “cause of action” must be regarded as covering all the relief that can be claimed by any one claimant in respect of any one breach of duty by the defendant. However, where a case involved a continuing breach of duty, it may be possible to accept that a fresh cause of action accrued every day. I respectfully agree with McGee’s view. Indeed, such a view is more consistent with the appellate decisions of Forster and D W Moore. Practically, when transposed to the tort of negligence, this means that all the elements of the tort, including damage, must be established so as to constitute the cause of action. I will return to this point subsequently.
The elements of a cause of action in the tort of negligence
- [36]
[36] In contrast to these points above, counsel for the defendant, Mr Tan Seng Chew Richard (“Mr Tan”), argued before me that questions of damage, causation, and remoteness only go towards the assessment of damages and not liability. In support of his position, he relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Ngiam Kong Seng and another v Lim Chiew Hock [2008] 3 SLR(R) 674 (“Ngiam Kong Seng”) (at [146]), where the court commented that “[i]n so far as the issue of liability is concerned, the plaintiff is only required to establish that a duty of care was owed and that a breach of such duty occurred. The other requirements listed above are, strictly speaking, concerned with the assessment of damages and not with liability…” [emphasis in original]. In other words, Mr Tan’s position is that, based on the authority of Ngiam Kong Seng, it is sufficient to establish the first two elements of duty and breach and leave questions of causation between the defendant’s breach and the claimant’s damage, as well as questions of remoteness, to the AD Stage.
- [37]
[37] I disagree with Mr Tan’s submission. In my view, it is clear that proof of damage, subject to the rules of causation and remoteness, is a necessary element to establish liability for the tort of negligence. This is clear in light of the authorities discussed above (see [35] above). More crucially, I do not think that the Court of Appeal in Ngiam Kong Seng intended to make a definitive pronouncement on whether such elements went towards liability, given that the court there was primarily concerned with how the presence of liability for negligence in cases of psychiatric harm should be analysed. In any event, any uncertainty in Ngiam Kong Seng is now resolved by the express pronouncement in Tan Woo Thian reiterating that causation and damage are necessary elements to establish liability in the tort of negligence. For these reasons, it is clear that the elements for establishing liability in the tort of negligence follow those which were set out in Spandeck and reiterated in Tan Woo Thian.
The element of causation
- [38]
[38] Having established that a cause of action in the tort of negligence comprises the four elements set out above, I come then to the element of causation, which is central in the Questions posed to me. At the outset, the defendant attempts to draw a distinction between “responsibility for an accident and responsibility for personal injuries”. As I understand it, the defendant’s argument is that a defendant may admit “responsibility” (ie, liability) for having caused the accident, enter interlocutory judgment on that basis, but challenge his liability for the claimant’s injuries resulting from the accident at the AD Stage.
- [39]
[39] I disagree with the defendant’s argument because he has misconstrued the causation element in the tort of negligence to be whether the defendant caused the accident, rather than whether the defendant’s breach caused the claimant’s injuries. Indeed, as Viscount Simonds put it in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd, The Wagon Mound [1961] 2 WLR 126 (at 141), it is not the negligent act itself but the consequences of the negligent act on which tortious liability is founded. As such, in CXN, in the context of discussing the elements of the tort of negligence in a PIMA case, Teh Hwee Hwee JC referred to the “causal connection between the collision and the plaintiff’s injuries” (at [13]). The learned judge was clearly concerned with whether the accident caused the claimant’s injuries, rather than merely whether the defendant caused the accident. Thus, in so far as the court in Arunachalam Balasubramanian v Lion City Rentals Pte Ltd and another [2020] SGMC 33 (“Arunachalam”) suggested (at [23]) that the relevant causal connection is that “between the negligent act and the accident”, I would respectfully disagree.
- [40]
[40] In my view, it is more accurate to say that the relevant causal connection to establish liability is that between the negligent act and the alleged damage. Fundamentally, this follows from causation being an essential element of liability in negligence. As the learned authors of Clerk & Lindsell explain (at para 1-15), in a system of corrective justice, a sufficient causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the claimant’s damage is required to justify compensation. Being an action on the case, negligence is consummated only upon the occurrence of damage. Indeed, without damage, there can be no claim against a person whose conduct may well be deficient in some significant manner (see Christian Witting, “Physical Damage in Negligence” (2002) 61(1) CLJ 189). To prove causation, the claimant would have to adduce factual evidence to show that there was a physical connection between the defendant’s breach and his damage (factual causation) and that the defendant’s breach was an operative or effective cause of his damage (legal causation) (see Clerk & Lindsell at paras 2-01 to 2-05).
The distinction between damage, loss, and damages
- [42]
[42] As such, it is clear from the foregoing that damage and causation are essential elements of the tort of negligence. However, I pause to observe that, when speaking of the elements of negligence, the terms “damage”, “loss”, and “damages” are often used interchangeably. Therefore, at this juncture and as a preliminary point, it is important to distinguish between the different terms carefully so that a consistent set of terminology can be used in the future.
The concept of “damage”
- [43]
[43] In explaining the concept of “damage”, I begin with the concept of a “wrong”. A wrong is a breach of legal duty (see Peter Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (David G Owen ed) (Oxford University Press, 1997) at p 37). This legal duty, in the context of the tort of negligence, is not a duty to act carefully but a duty not to inflict damage carelessly on someone else. As a corollary to the idea that a wrong is committed against someone, “intrinsic to the notion of damage in negligence is the idea that the damage is suffered by someone” [emphasis in original] (see Donal Nolan, “Rights, Damage and Loss” (2017) 37 OJLS 255 at 260). Therefore, it has been said that damage involves the intangible notion that there has been an interference with a legally protected interest of the plaintiff (see ACB at [44], citing the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cattanach and another v Melchior and another (2003) 199 ALR 131 at [23]). By way of example, if a claimant’s car is dented as a result of the defendant’s negligent conduct, it is not the fact of the car being worse off that establishes “damage”; rather, it is the fact that the claimant had, for instance, legal ownership of or a possessory title to the car at the time the defendant dented it (see Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (James Goudkamp and Donal Nolan gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2020) (“Winfield & Jolowicz”) at para 7-006).
- [44]
[44] However, this understanding of damage has not made the task of formulating a test for damage any easier. Indeed, to attempt to exhaustively define damage would be a difficult task (see ACB at [45]). For instance, Lord Hoffmann sought to define damage as “an abstract concept of being worse off, physically or economically” in the House of Lords decision of Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2008] 1 AC 281 at [7]. One problem with this definition, as observed by the Court of Appeal in ACB at [45], is that it restricts harms to the physical or economic, leaving out categories of damage such as psychiatric harm. Yet, even if one removes these restrictions, it is also not accurate to simply define damage as an abstract concept of being “worse off”. On the one hand, it would be over-inclusive because not all forms of being worse off would amount to damage, such as where a claimant suffers from mental distress that falls short of a recognised psychiatric illness. On the other hand, such a definition would be under-inclusive as there are instances where a claimant is able to establish damage and complete his cause of action even where he was not worse off. One common example given by academic commentators is as follows (see Donal Nolan, “Rights, Damage and Loss” at 271):
- [45]
[45] Rather than formulate an exhaustive definition of damage, I agree with the authors of Winfield & Jolowicz (at para 7-008) that the prevailing approach is to consider whether the particular harm suffered by a claimant is actionable or not actionable in negligence. This refers to the requirement of actionable damage, which the Court of Appeal accepted in ACB at [47]. As Professor Jane Stapleton explained in “The Gist of Negligence: Part 1 Minimal Actionable Damage” (1988) 104 LQR 213, actionable damage forms the “gist of the action” which gives rise to a cause of action in the tort of negligence. This means that the harm suffered by the claimant must be one that the law recognises as being capable of compensation. Accordingly, by this analysis, the characterisation of the harm suffered by the claimant as “damage” expresses a conclusion that liability should attach in respect of the harm (see Donal Nolan, “Damage in the English Law of Negligence” (2013) 4 JETL 259 at 267).
The concept of “loss”
- [46]
[46] Having considered the concept of “damage”, I now come to the related concept of “loss”. In this regard, to suffer a “loss” is to be factually worse off (see Donal Nolan, “Rights, Damage and Loss” at 256; Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 43). In cases of personal injury, it is not difficult to see how damage and loss will usually co-exist. For instance, if the claimant’s leg is broken as a result of the defendant’s negligent driving, he has suffered damage because his interest in bodily integrity has been interfered with, and he has also suffered loss because he is now worse off with a broken leg. It bears emphasis, however, that damage and loss are distinct concepts. As I explained earlier (see [44] above), it is possible for a claimant to have suffered damage and complete his cause of action even though he has suffered no loss in the sense of being worse off. Therefore, it is conceptually inaccurate to speak of “loss”, instead of “damage”, as being an element of the tort of negligence.
- [48]
[48] Finally, the law also recognises that an award of damages does not necessarily have to be tied to “loss”. This is because torts are civil wrongs which “themselves dictate no fixed measure of response” (see Peter Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” at p 51; Clerk & Lindsell at para 1-02). In this regard, I would respectfully set out the view in James Edelman, McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2021) (“McGregor on Damages”) at para 1-023:
Indeed, similar sentiments were expressed by the Court of Appeal in ACB where it recognised that “punitive damages may be awarded in tort where the totality of the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous that it warrants punishment, deterrence, and condemnation” (at [176]). This shows that, in Singapore, compensation for loss would not always be the sole aim of an award of damages in tort. Nevertheless, I would caveat that it is only in exceptional situations that damages in tort are awarded for purposes apart from compensation and that, generally, compensation for loss remains the usual aim in an award of damages.
The relationship between “damages” and “damage/loss”
- [49]
[49] Related to but distinct from the concepts of “damage” and “loss” is the concept of “damages”, which refers to a monetary award for a civil wrong (see McGregor on Damages at para 1-001). The concept of “damages” is related to the concept of “damage” because no damages can be awarded in the absence of a wrong (see the House of Lords decision of Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 at 106). And since the wrongfulness of negligence is tied to the existence of damage, it follows that no damages can be awarded without proof of damage.
- [50]
[50] However, while these concepts are related, they must not be conflated. Indeed, Menon CJ alluded to the difference between the concepts of “damage” and “damages” in Tan Woo Thian (at [7]) when he said that the appellant had wrongly conflated “the separate questions of whether the appellant is able to establish the respondent’s breach has caused loss, with the quantum of that loss” [emphasis in original]. The importance of this distinction has also been clearly expressed by the Court of Appeal in ACB (at [44]):
The concept of damages is also related to the concept of loss because the usual aim of damages is to eradicate, through a monetary award, the consequences that fall within the scope of duty breached (see McGregor on Damages at para 1-001). Indeed, the court would usually award “that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered loss, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation” (see the decision of the Court of Appeal decision in Minichit Bunhom v Jazali bin Kastari and another [2018] 1 SLR 1037 at [30] and the House of Lords decision of Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39). In other words, damages are generally aimed at compensating the loss suffered by the claimant in so far as it can be quantified in monetary terms.
Summary of terminology
- [51]
[51] At this stage, it is helpful to summarise the terminology that should be used. Without intending to be exhaustive, the following describe the relationship between the concepts of damage, loss, and damages in the context of the tort of negligence:
(a) damage is an essential element of the tort of negligence;
(b) however, damage that is capable of fulfilling the elements of the tort of negligence needs to be of a type that is actionable or recognised in law. For most cases, this is not an issue because the claimant would have suffered clearly observable physical damage to his person (ie, injuries, which I will use interchangeably with “damage” in this judgment) or property;
(c) a claimant who has suffered damage is able to claim damages, which is the monetary sum payable that is usually aimed at compensating the claimant for being made worse off by the defendant’s negligence;
(e) accordingly, it is possible for a claimant to have suffered damage caused by the defendant’s negligence, but for the defendant not to pay the claimant any damages because the claimant has suffered no loss due to the damage.
- [52]
[52] With these conceptual points on the tort of negligence in mind, I turn to explain the correct approach to take in relation to causation at the AD Stage.
Why the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach is wrong
- [53]
[53] I turn first to the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach, which is the approach argued for by the defendant. By this approach, even though the claimant may not have proved causation in relation to the injuries (or damage) he has suffered, the parties can enter interlocutory judgment by consent and reserve causation in toto to the AD Stage.
The Total Causation at AD Stage Approach in practice
- [55]
[55] Similarly, in the Magistrate’s Court decision of Eliora Yow (an infant suing by her father and litigation representative, Yow Tuck Meng Jerry) v Kwa Kian Peng [2020] SGMC 44 (“Eliora Yow”), the learned Deputy Registrar (“the DR”) agreed with the defendant’s submission that the causation of the claimant’s injuries in that case remained a live issue at the AD Stage (at [10]). The DR cited Muhammad Shaun Eric bin Abdullah alias De Silva Shaun Eric v Ng Ah Tee (Chua Seng Thye, Third Party) [2004] SGHC 268 (“Muhammad Shaun Eric”) in support of his conclusion.
- [56]
[56] In Muhammad Shaun Eric, the claimant was involved in a road traffic accident with the defendant and the third party. By consent, interlocutory judgment was entered against the defendant with the claimant agreeing to bear 10% of the liability and the third party agreeing to indemnify the defendant for 15% of the damages that the defendant had to pay the claimant. The parties did not reserve the issue of causation of injuries to the assessing registrar in the interlocutory judgment. When the matter went for assessment, the learned Assistant Registrar found that save for one injury, the claimant had failed to discharge his burden of proving that his injuries were caused by the accident. The High Court affirmed the decision of the Assistant Registrar in Muhammad Shaun Eric bin Abdullah alias De Silva Shaun Eric v Ng Ah Tee (Chua Seng Thye, Third Party) [2005] SGHC 180 (“Muhammad Shaun Eric (on appeal)”). Crucially for present purposes, the High Court regarded that causation remained a live issue at the AD Stage when it said (at [5]) that “[t]he main issue in the appeal, as it was in the assessment hearing, was that of causation” [emphasis added]. As such, it may be that there has been a High Court decision on how to deal with causation, which is binding on practitioners and the lower courts.
The Total Causation at AD Stage Approach is wrong
- [57]
[57] In my view, the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach is wrong as this approach is conceptually unsound and goes against the key principles of law reiterated in Tan Woo Thian.
An interlocutory judgment prevents the reservation of causation in toto to the AD Stage
- [58]
[58] To begin with, in a bifurcated trial, parties would be required to enter interlocutory judgment for liability before proceeding to the AD Stage. While such interlocutory judgments in the context of PIMA cases would usually be by consent, it is not material whether this is the case. Since causation is an essential element in establishing liability (or a cause of action) in the tort of negligence, then, as Ms Leo points out, once interlocutory judgment is entered, the defendant would not be entitled to challenge liability (and hence causation) in toto during the AD Stage.
- [59]
[59] In this regard, the court’s power to enter interlocutory judgment is governed by, among others, O 13 r 2 of the ROC 2014, which provides:
In this context, an interlocutory judgment is defined as a judgment that is “interlocutory only as to the amount” but is “final as to the right of the plaintiff to recover damages and costs” [emphasis added] (see White Book at para 13/2/1). Ordinarily, as the court in Arunachalam held (at [25]), the ambit of an interlocutory judgment would have to be construed together with the underlying Statement of Claim. However, in the context of an interlocutory judgment entered so that the parties can proceed to the AD Stage, it must be the case that the interlocutory judgment has fully determined the defendant’s liability. This is because the entire premise of damages being assessed is that liability for those damages has already been established by the interlocutory judgment.
- [60]
[60] Thus, in the Privy Council decision of Strachan v The Gleaner Co Ltd and another [2005] 1 WLR 3204, Lord Millett had said this (at 3209):
I would only repeat the final sentence, which is that the claimant obtains his right to claim damages from the judgment on liability. It must therefore follow that that judgment has determined liability fully between the parties.
- [61]
[61] As such, I agree with Ms Leo that the final nature of the claimant’s right to recover damages pursuant to the interlocutory judgment on liability means that liability cannot be challenged in its entirety at the AD Stage. Indeed, the Court of Appeal held in U Myo Nyunt (alias Michael Nyunt) v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 816 (“U Myo Nyunt”) that after a judgment in default under O 13 r 2 of the ROC 2014 is entered with damages to be assessed, the defendant is not entitled to dispute liability at the AD hearing (at [47]). It would follow that after interlocutory judgment is entered pursuant to the same O 13 r 2, the defendant should similarly not be allowed to challenge liability at the AD Stage. Consequently, causation cannot be challenged or re-opened in toto at the AD Stage after interlocutory judgment is entered, as doing so would potentially lead to the inconsistent consequence that the defendant was never liable in the first place.
- [62]
[62] I also agree with Ms Leo’s submission that the approach taken in U Myo Nyunt serves an important policy objective of guarding against the risk of inconsistent judgments. If both an interlocutory judgment and final judgment make different pronouncements on the extent of a defendant’s liability, this would give rise to significant difficulties for a party wishing to appeal the outcome of either judgment. As such, it is important that the distinct issues of liability and damages be kept separate to avoid the possibility of liability being dealt with twice over in the interlocutory judgment and the final judgment.
- [63]
[63] Quite apart from the effect of an interlocutory judgment in preventing a defendant from reopening issues of liability (including causation) at the AD Stage, the purpose of the AD Stage is not to determine issues of liability. This is simply looking at the situation from the perspective of the AD Stage. In this regard, the AD Stage, as its name suggests, is meant for damages to be assessed. Thus, as the Court of Appeal in ACB pointed out (at [44]), when the issue of quantum of damages is engaged, it must mean that prior questions of liability, including causation, would already have been settled. Thus, the very premise of the AD Stage makes it clear that issues of liability, including causation, cannot be “reserved” in toto to the AD Stage.
The court has no power to “reserve” causation in toto to the AD Stage under O 33 of the ROC 2014
- [65]
[65] I disagree with the defendant’s argument. In the first place, it is conceptually unsound for the reasons I have given above for issues of liability, including causation, to remain open to challenge at the AD Stage. I do not think that the provisions of the ROC 2014 should be construed in such a way as to result in conceptual incoherence.
- [66]
[66] Second, I agree with Ms Leo that the defendant’s argument rests on an incorrect interpretation of O 33 of the ROC 2014, which I set out as follows:
- [67]
[67] In my view, the defendant is not correct in describing “assessment of damages” as a “mode of trial” under O 33 of the ROC 2014. Instead, I agree with Ms Leo that the different “modes of trial”, based on a plain reading of O 33 r 1, refers to the manner in which the trial is conducted, whether by a presiding judge or registrar and with or without the assistance of assessors. By this interpretation, the different “modes of trial” do not refer to the difference between the questions of “liability” and questions of “assessment of damages”. Therefore, the correct interpretation of O 33 is that questions of “liability” or “assessment of damages” are merely “issues” that can be tried by different “modes of trial”. Thus, there is nothing in O 33 that would permit the court to reserve issues of causation in toto to the AD Stage.
Reconsideration of prior cases adopting the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach
- [68]
[68] I would therefore respectfully suggest that authorities which suggested that it was possible to reserve causation in toto to the AD Stage (ie, the Total Causation at AD Stage Approach) be reconsidered. For example, I respectfully disagree with the learned DR’s view in Eliora Yow (at [9]–[10]) that interlocutory judgment on liability deals only “with the defendant’s liability in respect of causing the accident and does not deal conclusively with the causation of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff” [emphasis in original]. This, with respect, mistakes the causation element in the tort of negligence to be concerned with the defendant’s act as opposed to whether that act caused any actionable damage. Instead, I agree with Ms Leo that an interlocutory judgment on liability cannot stand if the defendant did not cause the claimant any damage. Simply causing an accident, without causing any injury or damage, would not be sufficient to render a defendant liable in the tort of negligence.
- [69]
[69] Further, while a number of High Court decisions such as Muhammad Shaun Eric (on appeal), Lee Mui Yeng v Ng Tong Yoo [2016] SGHC 46 (“Lee Mui Yeng”) and Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2021] SGHC 10 (“Noor Azlin”) seem to suggest that causation can still be challenged in toto at the AD Stage, I would respectfully point out that these cases were decided before Tan Woo Thian. As such, it may well be that, just like in the State Courts, the High Court was not presented with arguments as to the effect of Tan Woo Thian and therefore continued to regard causation as a live issue at the AD Stage. In my view, for the reasons I have explained above, a plain application of Tan Woo Thian would preclude the consideration of causation in toto at the AD Stage.
Why the Partial Causation at AD Stage Approach is wrong
The Partial Causation at AD Stage Approach in practice
- [70]
[70] After Tan Woo Thian was decided, one approach taken by some judges seems to recognise that Tan Woo Thian has made it impossible to challenge causation in toto at the AD Stage, but that prior authorities still make it possible to dispute causation as to certain parts of the alleged damage at the AD Stage. This approach, which I have termed the “Partial Causation at AD Stage Approach”, can be found in DR Tan’s comprehensive and clearly reasoned decision of Lim Mei Choo (Lin Meizhu) v Muhammad Azham bin Razak (Direct Asia Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd, intervener) [2021] SGMC 74 (“Lim Mei Choo”). Having surveyed the authorities extensively, DR Tan concluded as follows (at [20]):
- [71]
[71] Thus, DR Tan accepted that the fundamental proposition laid down in Tan Woo Thian (ie, it is only after a claimant has successfully established liability by, among others, establishing causation, that the assessment of damages come into consideration) means that it is no longer possible for a defendant to dispute causation entirely at the AD Stage. However, in view of a number of binding High Court decisions which show that “causation can reasonably be disputed at the assessment of damages phase as long as at least some damage or loss was caused by the defendant’s negligence” [emphasis in original], DR Tan held that a defendant may continue to dispute causation “as to certain (but not all) heads of claims at the AD Stage” (see Lim Mei Choo at [20]–[21]). This therefore leaves open the possibility of challenging causation to some extent at the AD Stage.
- [72]
[72] A similar approach was taken by the learned Deputy Registrar Hairul Hakkim (“DR Hakkim”) in Krishnamoorthy s/o Chellappan v Ramasamy Arivazhagan [2021] SGDC 283. After agreeing with the approach taken by DR Tan in Lim Mei Choo, DR Hakkim proceeded to observe as follows (at [12]–[13]):
- [73]
[73] Like DR Tan in Lim Mei Choo, DR Hakkim also relied on prior authority that seemingly allowed causation to be disputed to some extent at the AD Stage. In particular, DR Hakkim closely interpreted one paragraph in Tan Woo Thian as standing for the proposition that a plaintiff need not prove causation for all the heads of losses claimed; it suffices that he is able to prove causation for some of those heads. The relevant paragraph from Tan Woo Thian is [11], which I reproduce for ease of explication:
As such, DR Hakkim relied on Menon CJ’s use of the word “any” in this paragraph to infer that if the appellant in Tan Woo Thian had been able to prove causation in respect to some of his losses, then he would have crossed the causation hurdle and been able to proceed to the AD Stage.
- [74]
[74] In summary, the approach taken by DR Tan and DR Hakkim preserves the ability to challenge causation to some extent at the AD Stage provided that the claimant is able to prove causation in respect of some of his damage at the liability stage. According to the learned judges, this approach is permissible (and indeed, binding on them) because of: (a) the Court of Appeal decision of Tan Woo Thian at [11], and (b) a number of High Court decisions such as Muhammad Shaun Eric (on appeal), Lee Mui Yeng, as well as Noor Azlin. This approach is also in line with that taken by the English authorities. Thus, Martin Spencer J in the English High Court decision of Justyna Zeromska-Smith v United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2019] EWHC 630 (QB) said this (at [33]):
- [75]
[75] What appears on its face to be a differing approach, which focuses on the quantum of damages as opposed to causation, can be seen in at least two decisions from the learned District Judge Sheik Umar Bin Mohamed Bagushair (“DJ Sheik Umar”). In Fobrogo Loreen Vera Mrs Sandosham Fobrogo Loreen Vera v MCST Plan No 1614 [2021] SGMC 75 (“Fobrogo”), the plaintiff sued the defendant for the injury and losses she suffered when she fell while on an escalator at the Adelphi Shopping Centre. The defendant was the manager of the premises. Among others, the defendant argued that the accident did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries (at [57]). In particular, the defendant argued that the subsequent injuries recorded in a medical report (such as a fracture) were only diagnosed when the plaintiff went for further appointments, and it could not be said that these subsequent injuries were caused by the accident (at [63]).
- [77]
[77] Accordingly, while framed in terms of damages, DJ Sheik Umar’s approach is tied to causation as it was concerned with the existence of actionable damage, namely, the fracture. His approach is therefore the same as the approach taken by DR Tan and DR Hakkim. This is because while the learned DJ said that a defendant cannot argue that the plaintiff’s damages should be zero, I understand that to refer to the global quantum of damages potentially due to the claimant. I do not think that the learned DJ meant to say that a defendant cannot argue, to take the example of the fracture in Fobrogo, that the damages with respect to a particular injury should be zero. Indeed, the entire premise of DJ Sheik Umar’s approach is that the claimant had to prove that he had suffered some damage. Once the claimant has done this, it should follow that the global amount of damages would not ordinarily be zero. But the learned DJ seemed to suggest that a defendant can still challenge the causal relationship between the defendant’s breach of duty and the particular injury at the AD Stage. If the defendant succeeds in doing that, it must follow that the damages claimable in respect of that injury must be zero. This must therefore mean that, even at the AD Stage, a defendant can still challenge causation to some extent so long as the claimant has established liability by proving causation of some of his losses.
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