Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 9 Jun 2025
Contents

General Division of the High Court

Only the helper who knew of another's share of rent had to account for it

Tia Oon Lai v Tia Sock Kiu Sally (personal representative of Su Ye Chu, deceased) and others

Feedback & support

[2025] SGHC 108Case no. Originating Claim No 316 of 2022

The decision, in one line

Not legal advice

Only the helper who knew of another's share of rent had to account for it

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [191], [194]

There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The late Mdm Su Ye Chu (the “Mother”) and her son, Mr Tia Oon Lai (“TOL”), are the registered proprietors, holding as tenants in common in equal shares, of a 30-year lease commencing from 1 August 1998 (the “30-Year Lease”) granted by the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) over the property at 747 Yishun Street 72 #01-108 which houses a coffeeshop (the “Coffeeshop”). The Mother passed away on 21 October 2021.

  3. [2] At the heart of HC/OC 316/2022 (“OC 316”) is a dispute over whether the Mother (and now, her estate (the “Estate”)) or TOL beneficially owns the half-share in the 30-Year Lease that is registered under TOL’s name.

  4. [3] TOL’s case is that his late father, Mr Tia Ee Tih (the “Father”), who passed away on 22 November 2004, had “gifted the Coffeeshop” in equal shares to the Mother and TOL in April 1998. TOL did not assert in his pleadings or Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) that he made any payment for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease. He only suggested belatedly in cross-examination that his alleged share of rental from renting out the Coffeeshop (the “Coffeeshop rental”) had been used to repay the loan taken to partially finance the purchase of the 30-Year Lease. From October 1998 to June 2018, all Coffeeshop rental (the “Previous Rental”) was paid by the tenant to the Mother. On 10 October 2022, TOL commenced OC 316 against, inter alia, the Estate, claiming that he was entitled to 50% of the Previous Rental as the 50% owner of the 30-Year Lease. TOL claims that his 50% share of the Previous Rental was held under a resulting trust by the Mother for his benefit.

  5. [4] The Estate denies the alleged gift by the Father, pointing out, inter alia, that there was no 30-Year Lease in existence as at April 1998 for the Father to gift to the Mother and TOL. The Estate claims that the Mother paid for the 30-Year Lease and that TOL holds a 50% share in the 30-Year Lease on trust for the Mother (and now, the Estate) pursuant to a presumed resulting trust or a common intention constructive trust. Consequently, the Estate denies that TOL is entitled to the Previous Rental.

  6. Facts

  7. The parties

  8. [5] The Father and Mother were both born in 1928. They were married in 1950 and had eight children:

  9. [6] TOL is the claimant in OC 316. The first defendant is Sally in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate. The second defendant is Sally in her personal capacity. The third defendant is Poh Kim. The Estate also has a counterclaim against TOL.

  10. The genesis of the Coffeeshop

  11. [7] The Father started and registered a sole proprietorship under the name of Hiap Hoe Eating House (“Hiap Hoe”) on 10 September 1961 and 18 December 1974 respectively.

  12. [8] According to TOL, Hiap Hoe started its coffeeshop business at the former “13 Mile” coffeeshop in Sembawang. According to TOH, the Father and Mother, with other partners, used to rent and run the “13 Mile” coffeeshop. Nothing turns on this difference in their respective accounts of events.

  13. [9] In the 1980s, the “13 Mile” coffeeshop was relocated (at least in part) to the site of the Coffeeshop. The Coffeeshop began operations in 1984. The first fixed-term tenancy for the Coffeeshop was granted by HDB to the Father as the registered tenant with effect from 1 April 1984; further fixed-term tenancies were granted in subsequent years with the last fixed-term tenancy being a three-year fixed-term tenancy commencing from 1 July 1997 (see [15] below).

  14. TOL’s divorce

  15. The 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage

  16. The Father’s withdrawal from Hiap Hoe

  17. [13] Sometime in or around May 1997 and prior to 16 May 1997, the Father suffered a stroke.

  18. [14] On 16 May 1997, the Father withdrew from Hiap Hoe, and the Mother and TOL were registered as the proprietors of Hiap Hoe.

  19. [15] On 27 June 1997, HDB granted Hiap Hoe a further three-year fixed-term tenancy for the Coffeeshop commencing from 1 July 1997.

  20. The 30-Year Lease

  21. [16] On 17 April 1998, HDB sent a letter to Hiap Hoe stating that the Coffeeshop premises had been “identified for sale” and that “[a]s the tenant of the premises, you may apply to HDB to purchase it for a lease term of 30 years”. The sale price was $1,392,000 before Goods and Services Tax (“GST”).

  22. [17] On 12 October 1998, HDB sent a letter to the Mother and TOL stating that “HDB has approved your application to purchase the [30-Year Lease]”, with the amounts payable for the purchase totalling $1,434,154.80 (the “Total Purchase Amount”).

  23. [18] On 15 December 1998, HDB entered into an agreement with the Mother and TOL to grant them, as tenants in common in equal shares, the 30-Year Lease (commencing from 1 August 1998). The 30-Year Lease was registered under the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “LTA”) on 8 February 2000.

  24. The 1998 HLF Loan

  25. [19] Sometime in 1998, HLF granted two term loans of $968,640 and $111,360, totalling $1,080,000, to the Mother and TOL for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease (the “1998 HLF Loan”). The 1998 HLF Loan was secured by, inter alia: (a) a mortgage over the 30-Year Lease executed by the Mother and TOL in HLF’s favour and registered under the LTA on 8 February 2000 (the “1998 Coffeeshop Mortgage”); and (b) a Deed of Guarantee dated 15 December 1998 executed by Mr Yong Zhou Chun John (formerly known as Yong Chow Choon ) (“John Yong”) in favour of HLF, guaranteeing payment of any due and unpaid sum under the 1998 Coffeeshop Mortgage (the “1998 Guarantee”). John Yong is Poh Kim’s husband; they were married in 1992. John Yong testified that sometime in 1998, the Mother told him, inter alia, that HLF required her to get a guarantor for the loan she sought for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease. The Mother asked John Yong to be the guarantor and he agreed.

  26. [20] The 1998 HLF Loan was repaid in full by, and the 1998 Coffeeshop Mortgage was discharged on, 30 January 2004. The source of funds used to repay the 1998 HLF Loan is in dispute.

  27. Renting out the whole of the Coffeeshop to a single coffeeshop operator

  28. [21] On 30 September 1998, (a) the Mother and TOL and (b) one Mr Pang Lim (“Mr Pang”) entered into a licence agreement for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Mr Pang from 1 October 1998 to 30 September 2003.

  29. [22] On 22 October 2002, (a) the Mother and TOL and (b) one Mdm Ng Hoon Tien (“Mdm Ng”) entered into a licence agreement for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Mdm Ng from 1 October 2003 to 30 September 2008.

  30. [23] On 14 February 2007, (a) the Mother and TOL and (b) Mdm Ng entered into a tenancy agreement for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Mdm Ng from 1 October 2008 to 30 September 2013.

  31. [24] On 20 April 2013, the Mother and Mdm Ng entered into a tenancy agreement for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Mdm Ng from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2018.

  32. [25] Mr Pang and Mdm Ng are a married couple who are behind Koufu Pte Ltd (“Koufu”).

  33. [26] On 12 February 2018, the Mother, Mdm Ng and Koufu entered into a Novation Agreement pursuant to which Koufu was substituted as the tenant under the tenancy agreement dated 20 April 2013 (see [24] above).

  34. [27] On 12 February 2018, the Mother and Koufu also entered into a tenancy agreement for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Koufu from 1 October 2018 to 30 September 2023.

  35. [28] All Coffeeshop rental from 1 October 1998 to 30 June 2018, ie, the Previous Rental (as defined at [3] above), was paid by Mr Pang, Mdm Ng and Koufu (as the case may be) directly to the Mother.

  36. HDB’s grant of the ORA Licence

  37. [29] On 13 August 2012, HDB entered into a Licence Agreement for Outdoor Refreshment Area with the Mother and TOL as licensees, pursuant to which HDB granted a licence to use and occupy the outdoor refreshment area (the “ORA”) located just outside the Coffeeshop premises (the “ORA Licence”) for a term of 36 months commencing from 1 July 2012 for a monthly licence fee of $1,015. This agreement was executed by an HDB representative and the Mother (but not TOL). It appears that the ORA Licence was renewed for another three years from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2018, and was due to expire on 30 June 2018.

  38. The Mother’s OCBC joint accounts involving TOH, Sally and Poh Kim

  39. [30] Following a surgery in 2015, the Mother decided to have Sally and Poh Kim assist her in handling her finances.

  40. [31] As at July 2015, the Mother and TOH had an OCBC joint savings account (account number ending 732) (the “Mother-TOH OCBC Joint Account”). On 8 July 2015, the Mother, Sally and Poh Kim opened a new OCBC joint account in their three names (account number ending 862) (the “Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account”). On the same day, a sum of $591,419.79 was transferred from the Mother-TOH OCBC Joint Account (leaving $100,000 in that account) to the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account. According to Sally and Poh Kim, all this was done on the Mother’s instructions to the bank.

  41. [32] On 19 August 2015, a sum of $591,419.79 was withdrawn from the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account and the same amount was deposited into the Mother-TOH OCBC Joint Account. On 28 August 2015, the entire balance in the Mother-TOH OCBC Joint Account of $691,445.32 was withdrawn (and that account closed) and the same amount was deposited into the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account.

  42. [33] Sally and Poh Kim began to assist the Mother with the handling of her finances after the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account was opened. Sally knew that the Coffeeshop rental was deposited into the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account after it was opened.

  43. The Rental Splitting Agreement and the Tenancy Addendum

  44. [34] On 13 August 2018, the Mother, TOL and Koufu entered into what the parties term a “Rental Splitting Agreement”, pursuant to which Koufu paid the monthly Coffeeshop rental to the Mother and TOL in equal shares with effect from 1 July 2018. The circumstances leading to the Rental Splitting Agreement are in dispute.

  45. [35] On 24 August 2018, the Mother and TOL also entered into an Addendum to Tenancy Agreements dated 20 April 2013 and 12 February 2018 (the “Tenancy Addendum”), confirming the new arrangement for Koufu’s payment of the Coffeeshop rental.

  46. Joint bank accounts in Sally and Poh Kim’s names

  47. [36] Sometime in September 2018, Sally and Poh Kim opened a separate OCBC joint account (the “Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account”) into which some moneys from the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account were transferred. According to Sally and Poh Kim, this was done to protect the Mother’s moneys because TOC had indicated that he wanted to claim a share of the moneys in any bank account bearing the Mother’s name. Sally and Poh Kim continued to handle the moneys in the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account and the Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account for and on behalf of the Mother.

  48. [37] According to Sally and Poh Kim, in early 2020, with the Mother’s concurrence, the Mother-Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account was closed and the moneys therein transferred to a Maybank joint account opened in Sally and Poh Kim’s joint names (the “Sally-Poh Kim Maybank Joint Account”). The change in bank accounts was due to Maybank offering higher interest rates at that time, and the Sally-Poh Kim Maybank Joint Account was opened in Sally and Poh Kim’s joint names for the same reason the Sally-Poh Kim OCBC Joint Account was in their joint names. However, they treated the moneys in the Sally-Poh Kim Maybank Joint Account as the Mother’s moneys and managed those moneys for the Mother.

  49. The parties’ cases

  50. [41] Sally (in her personal capacity as the second defendant) denies owing TOL any fiduciary duties and avers that TOL has no basis to demand an account of the Previous Rental against her personally.

  51. [42] Poh Kim denies being a “trustee over the [Previous Rental] vis-à-vis [TOL]” or owing TOL any fiduciary duties at any point in time. Further and/or alternatively, Poh Kim pleads that TOL is precluded by acquiescence and/or laches from seeking an account of the Previous Rental from her.

  52. [43] Arising from the parties’ cases, I will address in the following sequence:

  53. TOL’s case that the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother in half shares

  54. [44] It is apposite to begin by addressing TOL’s case that the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother in half shares, since, if established, it disposes of the Estate’s defence and counterclaim that TOL holds his 50% share in the 30-Year Lease on trust for the Mother. Indeed, TOL advanced this case in a bid to counter the Estate’s defence and counterclaim by explaining how he purportedly came to beneficially own a 50% share in the 30-Year Lease (and as such, be entitled to 50% of the Previous Rental). Pursuant to ss 103 and 105 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”), TOL bears the burden of proving his asserted positive factual case.

  55. [45] Having considered the evidence, I find that TOL has failed to prove his case that the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother in half shares (or even, leaving the Mother aside, that the Father gifted a half-share in the 30-Year Lease to TOL at all). I elaborate on the reasons for my decision.

  56. The alleged conversation between the Father, the Mother and TOL in early 1997

  57. [46] TOL alleged that “[i]n early 1997, [the] Father called [the] Mother and [TOL] to him” and “[they] met at the 2nd level shop house of the coffeeshop”. At this apparent meeting between the Father, the Mother and TOL:

  58. (a) The Father allegedly said that “HDB was going to offer a Tenant Ownership Scheme whereby existing tenants of HDB shops would be offered the opportunity to buy their shop from HDB at a discount”. The Father allegedly said that he would “sort out the [current] tenancy” in his personal name as the sole proprietor of Hiap Hoe and “pass [TOL]” “50% of the Coffeeshop and [the] Mother 50%”. TOL “understood from this conversation” that the Father would transfer 50% of his interest in Hiap Hoe to TOL and 50% to the Mother, and “when the HDB offered Hiap Hoe the fresh tenancy and offer to purchase, the offer would effectively be made to [the] Mother and [TOL]”.

  59. (b) The Father also allegedly indicated that he would “pay for the renewal of the lease”.

  60. (c) The Father and Mother allegedly told TOL that “to protect [his] half share interest from TAL[,] [the] Mother [would] receive all the rental and hold [TOL’s] share for [him]”. Further, they were “all equally concerned that as a[n] HDB officer, [TOL] could not be receiving income from the [C]offeeshop”. The Mother allegedly promised TOL that “[his] half share [would] be safe guarded by her and anytime [he] needed money, all [he] had to do was ask since it was [his] money”.

  61. [47] TOL’s evidence set out at [46(a)]–[46(b)] above was, in effect, that the Father had conveyed to the Mother and TOL in early 1997 that he (ie, the Father) would pay for a long-term lease to be granted by HDB over the Coffeeshop and gift that in half shares to TOL and the Mother. I disbelieve that the Father had conveyed this.

  62. [48] First, TOL’s recollection of the alleged meeting in early 1997 is unreliable:

  63. (a) Paragraph 46 of TOL’s AEIC contained the specific allegation that at a meeting between the Father, the Mother and TOL “[i]n early 1997”, “[the] Father said the HDB was going to offer a Tenant Ownership Scheme …” (see [46(a)] above). When asked in cross-examination for the month in which the Father had allegedly made that statement, TOL responded that the Father had said that in 1998. This flatly contradicts TOL’s AEIC evidence. Further, if the Father had mentioned HDB’s prospective offer only in 1998, TOL could not have “understood” that the Father’s transfer of his proprietorship of Hiap Hoe to TOL and the Mother (which took place in May 1997: see [14] above) was to facilitate TOL and the Mother owning a putative long-term lease over the Coffeeshop in the future (as TOL alleged: see [46(a)] above).

  64. (b) Compounding matters, TOL then purported in re-examination that he could not recall the parties to the conversation referred to in para 46 of TOL’s AEIC.

  65. [49] Second, it is inconsistent with the contemporaneous evidence that the Father would have discussed in early 1997 gifting or purchasing a (at that time, non-existent) long-term lease over the Coffeeshop:

  66. (a) On 27 June 1997, HDB and Hiap Hoe entered into a tenancy agreement for HDB to let the Coffeeshop to Hiap Hoe for a further three-year fixed term commencing from 1 July 1997 (the “3-Year Tenancy”) (see [15] above). Given that, as at 27 June 1997, HDB was only prepared to enter into the short-term 3-Year Tenancy with Hiap Hoe, I find it unlikely that the Father would have known in early 1997 that HDB would offer Hiap Hoe the opportunity to purchase a long-term lease over the Coffeeshop. If there had been any discussion between the Father and TOL in early 1997 about whether HDB would continue to let the Coffeeshop to Hiap Hoe, it would more likely have been the upcoming short-term 3-Year Tenancy that would have been discussed.

  67. (b) It was only on 17 April 1998, more than a year after “early 1997”, that HDB sent a letter to Hiap Hoe stating that the Coffeeshop premises had been “identified for sale” and offering Hiap Hoe the opportunity to apply to purchase the 30-Year Lease. There is no objective evidence that HDB had identified the Coffeeshop premises for sale prior to its 17 April 1998 letter. I find it unlikely that in early 1997, more than a year before April 1998 and in circumstances where only HDB’s renewal of the short-term tenancy of the Coffeeshop was on the table, the Father would have discussed purchasing and gifting to TOL and the Mother a non-existent long-term lease.

  68. (c) When the discrepancy in timing between the alleged meeting in early 1997 and HDB’s offer in April 1998 was pointed out to TOL in cross-examination, TOL purported that the Father had “gotten word a long time ago, much earlier than [April 1998], that HDB was intending to put the premise up for sale”. When asked for the basis of his contention, TOL then purported that (un-identified) “relatives and friends in Ang Mo Kio had already bought these kind of premises” and had told the Father that “[y]our area, Yishun, it would definitely be offered for sale”. I decline to accept TOL’s evidence. It is unclear who the apparent “relatives and friends” were; how TOL purportedly knew the content and timing of their supposed communications with the Father; and what the Father made of information (assuming, arguendo, there was any) from the apparent “relatives and friends”.

  69. [50] Third, TOL was prone to exaggeration on the topic of the Father gifting the Coffeeshop to him. TOL went so far as to allege that “[i]n 1984, [the Father] told [TOL] that he wanted to give the coffee shop to [TOL] and [TOL’s] son, Chester Tia”. However, TOL’s son, Mr Chester Tia, was only born in 1992.

  70. [51] I also find that TOL has failed to prove that the Father paid for the 30-Year Lease, for reasons I elaborate at [55]–[75] below. This further undermines TOL’s evidence that the Father had conveyed at the alleged meeting in early 1997 that he (ie, the Father) intended to pay for, and gift in half shares to TOL and the Mother, a putative long-term lease over the Coffeeshop.

  71. [52] I further disbelieve TOL’s evidence about the alleged rental holding agreement reached at the alleged meeting in early 1997 (see [46(c)] above), for reasons I elaborate at [76]–[78] below. This negatively affects the overall credibility of TOL’s account of the alleged meeting in early 1997.

  72. [53] In my view, if there was indeed a meeting between the Father, the Mother and TOL in early 1997, and if at such a meeting the Father had mentioned transferring his interest in the Coffeeshop, it is more likely that such mention was limited to and meant only the Father transferring his interest in Hiap Hoe (which then had a fixed-term tenancy of the Coffeeshop) as such interest stood at that time in 1997. Indeed, on or around 16 May 1997, the Father transferred his sole proprietorship of Hiap Hoe to the Mother and TOL (who became Hiap Hoe’s registered proprietors), reinforcing that, if any “gift” of the Coffeeshop had been discussed in early 1997, it was this transfer in May 1997 which the Father had in mind. It bears saying that the transfer by the Father of his interest in Hiap Hoe (and concomitantly, any interest that Hiap Hoe had as a tenant of the Coffeeshop) to the Mother and TOL as of 16 May 1997 could not and did not result in the Mother and TOL gaining any interest in the 30-Year Lease which did not exist at that time.

  73. [54] For completeness, no party took any position or led any evidence on who paid for, or received rental (if any) during, the 3-Year Tenancy which HDB granted to Hiap Hoe after the change in Hiap Hoe’s proprietorship. I am thus unable to conclude whether the 3-Year Tenancy was part of the alleged “gift” by the Father (much less consider how that might impact TOL’s allegation that the Father gifted him a half-share in the 30-Year Lease).

  74. The assertion that the Father paid for the 30-Year Lease

  75. [55] As part of his case that the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother in half shares, TOL also asserted that it was the Father who paid for the 30-Year Lease. Indeed, this had to be part of TOL’s case as there would be no basis for the Father to gift what he did not purchase and own.

  76. [56] The Total Purchase Amount for the 30-Year Lease was $1,434,154.80 (see [17] above). Of this amount, $354,154.80 was paid in cash (the “Cash Payment”) and the rest was paid utilising the 1998 HLF Loan totalling $1,080,000 (as explained in more detail at [95] below).

  77. [57] TOL alleged that in “around the middle of 1998”, the Father told the Mother and TOL that he (ie, the Father) “would mortgage [the Goodwill Mansions Apartment] to raise the required down payment [for the 30-Year Lease] together with his disposable cash”; “[t]he loans would be serviced from [the] Father’s cash surplus and from the rental income from the Coffeeshop which was very substantial”; and “[o]n this basis [the Father] arranged with [HLF] for [the] Mother and [TOL] to mortgage … the Coffeeshop to raise approximately $968,640.00 and $111,360.00 from [HLF]”. TOL also alleged that when the Goodwill Mansions Apartment was sold, the sale proceeds were applied towards the down payment for the 30-Year Lease and repayment of the 1998 HLF Loan.

  78. Cash Payment

  79. [58] I first address TOL’s contention that the Father made the down payment, by which TOL presumably meant the Cash Payment. I reject TOL’s contention. While there is no direct or documentary evidence of who made the Cash Payment, TOL’s assertions that the Father did so are speculative and do not withstand scrutiny.

  80. [59] First, TOL alleged that in “around the middle of 1998” [emphasis added], the Father told the Mother and TOL that “he would mortgage [the Goodwill Mansions Apartment] to raise the required down payment …” [emphasis added]. Notably, TOL’s claim was not that the Father said that he “had mortgaged” the Goodwill Mansions Apartment but that he “would mortgage” the Goodwill Mansions Apartment (which plainly means taking a prospective step to do so). However, there is no record of any application for or grant of a mortgage loan secured on the Goodwill Mansions Apartment in 1998. The accuracy and reliability of TOL’s evidence regarding what the Father allegedly said is again thrown into doubt.

  81. [60] The only record of the Father and Mother mortgaging the Goodwill Mansions Apartment is that of the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage (see [12] above). In his closing submissions, TOL argued that the Father took out the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage to “prepar[e] funds” to purchase the 30-Year Lease. I do not find this position credible. The 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage was made pursuant to HLF’s agreement on 28 October 1996 to grant the Father and Mother a housing loan of $540,000 and a Credit Plus Facility of $100,000 (see [12] above). This event took place 1.5 years before HDB had even offered Hiap Hoe the opportunity to purchase the 30-Year Lease (in April 1998). Indeed, HLF bank statements indicate that the Credit Plus Facility was fully drawn down and the loan thereunder repaid by March 1997; there can be no connection between this loan and the payment for the 30-Year Lease more than a year later. In the round, I find it unlikely that the Father would have taken out a mortgage loan in 1996 (viz, the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage) and/or kept loan moneys obtained from such a loan as cash in hand (incurring interest on the same) for the purpose of potentially purchasing a long-term lease over the Coffeeshop (a) which had not at that time been offered by HDB, (b) in respect of which there was no certainty an offer might be made, and (c) the purchase price and duration of which, assuming HDB would even make an offer, were wholly unknown. Such a purported course makes little commercial sense.

  82. [61] Instead, the timing of the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage coincides with the period during which the Father made payments of significant sums to TAL, TOL’s ex-wife, in respect of the couple’s divorce proceedings (see [10]–[11] above). The Estate took the position that the Father paid for (a) TAL’s interest in the Yishun Flat, (b) TOL and TAL’s legal fees, and (c) TAL’s monthly maintenance, totalling $630,000; and that the Father obtained the moneys for these payments “by mortgaging Goodwill Mansions to Hong Leong Finance”. This raises the question of whether the loan moneys from the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage had been applied towards TOL’s divorce.

  83. [62] In this connection, the Estate adduced a voice recording of the Mother talking about TOL, which Sally recorded in 2019 (the “2019 Recording”). Sally explained that she and three of her sisters were at the Mother’s flat during a weekend visit in 2019 when the Mother started talking about TOL. Sally used her mobile phone to record what the Mother said. The Estate relied on the Mother’s statements in the 2019 Recording that the Father gave TOL $630,000 for TOL’s divorce. TOL did not dispute the authenticity of the 2019 Recording but submitted that it is hearsay evidence which ought not to be admitted under s 32(3) of the EA or ought to be accorded no weight under s 32(5) of the EA because the context in which the Mother made her statements is unknown; her statements are allegedly misleading, contradicted by contemporaneous documentary evidence and/or not probative; and TOL is unable to cross-examine the Mother on them. The Estate did not explain why the 2019 Recording is admissible evidence and did not file a ‘s 32 notice’ under O 15 r 16(7) or O 15 r 16(9) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) (see s 32(4)(b) of the EA).

  84. [63] In my view, the Estate sought to rely on the Mother’s statements in the 2019 Recording to prove the facts to which the statements referred, and the statements thus constitute hearsay evidence (see Soon Peck Wah v Woon Che Chye [1997] 3 SLR(R) 430 at [26]). However, they fall within the exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence under s 32(1)(j)(i) of the EA, being statements made by a person who is dead (ie, the Mother). The death of the maker of a statement is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for admissibility of the statement under s 32(1)(j)(i): Goi Wang Firn v Chee Kow Ngee Sing (Pte) Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1049 at [66].

  85. [64] Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence under a statutory exception, the court has a discretion to exclude the evidence in the interests of justice under s 32(3) of the EA. As summarised by Kwek Mean Luck J in Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd v Argoglobal Underwriting Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2025] SGHC 82 at [52] (citing the principles set out in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”)), in deciding how to exercise its discretion:

  86. [65] As for a failure to provide a ‘s 32 notice’, the court has a discretion to waive such non-compliance under O 3 r 2(4)(a) of the ROC 2021. The guiding consideration is the extent to which such non-compliance caused prejudice to the opposing party, such that it would be unfair to waive the non-compliance: Lim Julian Frederick Yu v Lim Peng On (as executor and trustee of the estate of Lim Koon Yew (alias Lim Kuen Yew), deceased) and another [2024] SGHC 53 at [107], citing Gimpex at [137]–[139].

  87. [66] In the present case, I decline to exercise my discretion under s 32(3) of the EA to exclude the 2019 Recording. The Mother was prima facie in a position to know how the loan moneys from the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage were used. Having listened to the 2019 Recording in which the Mother expressed herself clearly and at length without interruption, and accepting Sally’s evidence that the Mother had started to talk about TOL before Sally decided to record the Mother, I do not think the circumstances in which the Mother’s statements were made are so concerning as to warrant their exclusion. TOL’s objection that he is unable to cross-examine the maker of the statement cannot logically warrant the exclusion of the statement when it is admissible (as an exception to the hearsay rule) precisely because the maker is dead. I also exercise my discretion under O 3 r 2(4)(a) of the ROC 2021 to waive the Estate’s non-compliance with the requirement to provide a ‘s 32 notice’ because I do not think there is prejudice to TOL: the Estate had already indicated in Sally’s interlocutory affidavit filed on 19 October 2023 that it intended to rely on the Mother’s statements in the 2019 Recording, and Sally’s explanation in her AEIC as to how the 2019 Recording was produced contained in substance the information required under the ‘s 32 notice’. However, I place little weight on the Mother’s statements in the 2019 Recording because they are conclusory assertions the basis for which is unclear.

  88. [67] Circling back to the question of whether the loan moneys from the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage had been applied towards TOL’s divorce (at [61] above), I find, in the light of concessions made by TOL (see [11] above), that the Father paid at least $300,000-plus to TAL on TOL’s behalf in connection with the divorce proceedings. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the global amount paid by the Father towards TOL’s divorce proceedings came up to $630,000. I am also prepared to infer that the Father had used loan moneys from the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage to pay TAL given the matching time periods of that loan and payments to TAL. I do not think this inference is inconsistent with HLF’s 28 October 1996 letter stating that the purpose of the housing loan was to “finance purchase of other properties” and the purpose of the Credit Plus Facility was “[i]nitially to finance purchase of other properties and subsequently for investment”. By paying TAL for her share of the Yishun Flat, the Father was effectively financing the purchase of TAL’s share of the Yishun Flat (ie, a property) for the benefit of TOL. There is no evidence of, and it would be speculative to say, what the remaining loan moneys (if any) from the 1996 Goodwill Mansions Mortgage were used for, after the payments towards TOL’s divorce were settled.

  89. [68] Second, TOL alleged that when the Goodwill Mansions Apartment was sold, the sale proceeds were applied towards the down payment for the 30-Year Lease. His evidence is plainly not credible. HDB executed the agreement to grant the 30-Year Lease on 15 December 1998 (see [18] above), which means that the down payment had to be made by around end-1998. However, the Goodwill Mansions Apartment was only sold in 2003 (see [12] above). The proceeds from the sale of the Goodwill Mansions Apartment could not possibly have been used by the Father to make the down payment for the 30-Year Lease as alleged by TOL.

  90. [69] Finally, as for TOL’s allegation that the Father said that he would “raise the required down payment” in part with “his disposable cash”, I doubt that the Father said this. According to TOL, the Father allegedly said this in the same conversation “around the middle of 1998” where the Father also allegedly said he “would mortgage” the Goodwill Mansions Apartment to “raise the required down payment” (see [57] above). As I explained at [59] above, it is not credible that the Father spoke of taking out a mortgage on the Goodwill Mansions Apartment in 1998. This casts doubt on the accuracy and reliability of TOL’s evidence about the rest of the alleged conversation (and on whether the alleged conversation even took place). In any event, TOL was unable to show that the Father had indeed made the down payment using “his disposable cash”.

  91. Repayment of the 1998 HLF Loan

  92. [70] I turn to the repayment of the 1998 HLF Loan.

  93. [71] First, TOL asserted that it was the Father who had arranged for the 1998 HLF Loan. I see no evidence of this. To the contrary, the unchallenged evidence of John Yong was that sometime in 1998, the Mother asked him to be the guarantor for the loan she intended to take for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease, citing HLF’s requirements, and John Yong agreed. The documentary evidence shows that John Yong did indeed execute the 1998 Guarantee (see [19] above). This supports the view that it was the Mother who was actively dealing with HLF and making the requisite arrangements for the 1998 HLF Loan.

  94. [72] Second, somewhat contradictorily, TOL asserted, on the one hand, that “[t]he loans would be serviced by [the] Father’s cash surplus and from the rental income from the Coffeeshop”, and on the other hand, that “[i]t was from [the] Father’s hard-earned savings and earnings all these years” that the whole of the 1998 HLF Loan was repaid (by January 2004). In any event, TOL’s claims that the 1998 HLF Loan was repaid out of the Father’s moneys are bare and unproven assertions. Based on my analysis of the documentary records (at [101] and [103]–[112] below), the 1998 HLF Loan repayments were made using the Coffeeshop rental. However, it does not follow that the Coffeeshop rental belonged to the Father. To the extent that TOL seeks to characterise the Coffeeshop rental as the Father’s contribution to the purchase price of the 30-Year Lease, this is fundamentally incompatible with and contradicted by TOL’s pleaded claim to be entitled to a half-share of the Previous Rental and to an account of the same. If the Father was entitled to and did use the Coffeeshop rental from October 1998 to January 2004 because that constituted the Father’s moneys, then, TOL cannot also be entitled to a half-share of that very same Coffeeshop rental for that same period. That TOL’s pleaded claim does cover that same period (ie, October 1998 to January 2004) belies any contention that the Father paid for (or should be treated as having paid for) the 30-Year Lease by using the Coffeeshop rental to pay for the 1998 HLF Loan.

  95. [74] Fourth, the fact that the 1998 HLF Loan happened to be fully repaid by 30 January 2004 before the Father passed away in November 2004 (see [3] and [20] above) has no determinative bearing on the source of the repayment of the 1998 HLF Loan.

  96. [75] In sum, TOL has failed to prove that the Father paid for the 30-Year Lease. In turn, this undermines TOL’s case that the Father (was in a position to have) gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother.

  97. The alleged rental holding agreement

  98. [76] As mentioned at [46(c)] above, TOL alleged that at the supposed meeting between the Father, the Mother and TOL in early 1997, the three of them agreed that the Mother would receive and hold TOL’s share of the Coffeeshop rental for him (a) to protect TOL’s interest in the Coffeeshop rental from TAL and (b) out of concern that TOL could not be receiving Coffeeshop rental income as an HDB officer (the “rental holding agreement”). I disbelieve that there was such an alleged rental holding agreement.

  99. [77] First, TOL was openly registered as (a) a proprietor of Hiap Hoe with effect from 16 May 1997 and (b) a tenant in common holding half a share in the 30-Year Lease. If there had truly been an intention to conceal TOL’s assets from TAL to stymie any claims by her in connection with their divorce, it made no sense for TOL’s name to appear as a registered owner of Hiap Hoe and the 30-Year Lease. It is thus inconsistent, and not credible, that the Father, the Mother and TOL would have come up with the alleged rental holding agreement to protect TOL’s apparent interest in the Coffeeshop rental from TAL.

  100. [78] Second, TOL failed to establish any genuine concern that he could not receive Coffeeshop rental income as an HDB officer. To begin with, TOL gave shifting evidence when purporting that he was not permitted to receive Coffeeshop rental income. When asked in cross-examination whether his position was that, as an HDB officer, he could own the Coffeeshop but not derive income from it, TOL proclaimed in absolute terms: “Cannot own property, cannot have outside income. Completely no.” When pressed if it was correct that, as an HDB officer, he could not own any kind of property, TOL gave the evasive response that “[t]here will be an issue if a property does not match your income”. When it was put to him that he had no evidence that, as an HDB officer, he could own an HDB shop but not receive rental income from that HDB shop, TOL declared: “The [HDB] secretary will issue me a letter at the end of every year. I have proof.” He agreed to try to produce the letter from the “secretary”. Two days later, when asked about his search for the letter from the “secretary”, TOL first alleged that HDB “did not have any records” as it was a long time ago. When it was pointed out that he had claimed that the letter was issued to him, TOL then back-pedalled and said he could not recall if he had received it “or it was just something said to me orally”. Further, this purported rationale for the alleged rental holding agreement is illogical: if TOL was genuinely concerned about the propriety about receiving Coffeeshop rental income as an HDB officer, the duplicity in having someone else hold “his” rental income would compound and not resolve any impropriety. I do not find it credible that TOL had concerns that he could not receive Coffeeshop rental income as an HDB officer, or that the Father, the Mother and TOL had come up with the alleged rental holding agreement out of such concern.

  101. [79] This in turn further undermines the overall credibility of TOL’s account of the alleged meeting in early 1997 and his position that the Father had indicated at that alleged meeting that the Father would gift a putative long-term lease over the Coffeeshop to TOL and the Mother in half shares.

  102. The Father’s involvement in renting out the Coffeeshop

  103. [80] TOL argued that it was the Father who had arranged for the Coffeeshop to be rented out to Mr Pang (from 1 October 1998) (see [21] above). TOH appeared to take a similar position. Even if correct, I consider this a neutral fact. The Father may have had a relationship with Mr Pang (as TOL claimed) and thus been in a position to facilitate the renting out of the Coffeeshop to Mr Pang. However, it does not follow that the Father did so because he was gifting the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother.

  104. [81] I add that the extent of the Father’s involvement in the Coffeeshop following his stroke and the divestment of his proprietorship of Hiap Hoe in May 1997 is unclear. Sometime in or around May 1997, the Father suffered a stroke (see [13] above). The Father divested himself of his proprietorship of Hiap Hoe (and, concomitantly, any interest Hiap Hoe held in the Coffeeshop at that time) on 16 May 1997, after his stroke. According to Sally and TOH, the Father was in poor physical and mental condition after his stroke. TOL initially purported in his AEIC that the Father’s stroke was “minor” and that the Father “remained lucid and mentally alert” after his stroke. However, in oral testimony, TOL volunteered that the Father was suffering from “several illnesses” and that “[the] Father’s condition wasn’t very stable” by 1997 “[s]o there were times when [TOL] wasn’t too clear what [the Father] was saying”.

  105. The Father’s dispositions to TOL’s brothers

  106. [82] TOL argued that, as part of the Father’s legacy planning, the Father arranged for each of his three sons “to have 50% of a coffeeshop contemporaneously in 1997”. In the case of TOH and TOC, this was the Father’s coffeeshop at 431/431A Sembawang Road (the “Sembawang Property”). The Sembawang Property was originally registered in the Father and TOH’s names as joint tenants, although it belonged solely to the Father. On or around 5 August 1997, the joint tenancy was severed so that the Father and TOH held the Sembawang Property as tenants in common in equal shares; and on 5 August 1997, the Father made his last will bequeathing “[his] half share” in the Sembawang Property to TOC. In TOL’s case, the Father “transferred a half share each in Hiap Hoe to the Mother and TOL and then transferred the Coffeeshop’s tenancy to Hiap Hoe”.

  107. [83] In my view, the foregoing only shows that the Father intended TOL to have a half-share in Hiap Hoe and the interest Hiap Hoe held in the Coffeeshop as at May 1997 when the Father transferred his proprietorship of Hiap Hoe to the Mother and TOL. It does not provide an answer to what the Father intended or did (if at all) when the 30-Year Lease came up for purchase almost a year later. Comparison with the Father’s dispositions to TOH and TOC also does not provide an answer. For example: (a) vis-à-vis the disposition to TOC, it is not TOL’s case that the Father left him a half-share in the 30-Year Lease only after the Father’s passing; (b) the Father had also spent several hundred thousand dollars on TOL’s divorce by 1997 (see [67] above), a factor which was absent in the case of TOL’s brothers; and (c) TOL’s counsel also put to TOH that the Father had nominated TOL to receive and TOL did receive the Father’s Central Provident Fund moneys (albeit there was no evidence from TOL on this). These factors suggest that the Father did not necessarily have uniform considerations for what dispositions to make to his three sons and/or when they should receive those dispositions.

  108. The inclusion of TOL as a co-borrower of the 1998 HLF Loan

  109. [84] The 1998 HLF Loan was taken out in the names of the Mother and TOL. TOL argued that this was part of “the Father’s plan for funding the Coffeeshop” and that it was “more probable” that “he [ie, TOL] agreed to it because he was the absolute owner of 50%” [emphasis in original omitted]. I disagree that these are the inferences to be drawn from the inclusion of TOL as a co-borrower of the 1998 HLF Loan.

  110. [85] For a start, I consider the registration of TOL as a co-owner of the 30-Year Lease to be a neutral factor which does not shed light on whether the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother, or whether the registered ownership necessarily reflects how the beneficial interest in the 30-Year Lease was held. Indeed, TOL’s counsel suggested in the course of the trial that (a) HDB’s invitation letter to apply to purchase the 30-Year Lease was addressed to Hiap Hoe because Hiap Hoe was the existing tenant of the Coffeeshop at the time, and (b) therefore, it was “impossible” for the Mother to have purchased the 30-Year Lease “in her sole name” because only the registered proprietors of Hiap Hoe at the time (being the Mother and TOL) could accept HDB’s invitation. I agree with proposition (a). While I do not think TOL has shown that proposition (b) was factually or legally a requirement of HDB, it is conceivable that the Mother thought that HDB’s invitation had to be accepted by both registered proprietors of Hiap Hoe and that is how the 30-Year Lease (when granted) ended up being registered in the Mother and TOL’s names (ie, to conform with the form of HDB’s invitation to Hiap Hoe). Given that the 30-Year Lease was registered in the Mother and TOL’s names, it is unsurprising that the 1998 HLF Loan, which was secured by a mortgage over the leasehold property (ie, the 1998 Coffeeshop Mortgage), came to be correspondingly taken out in the Mother and TOL’s names as well. Ultimately, the parties’ intentions in including TOL as a co-borrower of the 1998 HLF Loan remain unclear.

  111. The hearsay evidence given by TOL’s witnesses

  112. [86] Finally, TOL called various witnesses to testify that the Father had purportedly told them, decades ago, his intentions regarding the Coffeeshop. These witnesses were: (a) Mr Kho Wee Hong (“Mr Kho”), TOL’s former schoolmate; (b) Mr N Durai (“Mr Durai”), TOL’s former neighbour; and (c) Mdm Swee Nelly (“Mdm Swee”) and Mr Tan Kee Seng (“Mr KS Tan”), a married couple who were TOL’s former neighbours living in the flat opposite the Yishun Flat until 1998. The oral statements of relevant fact purportedly made by the Father would constitute hearsay evidence. TOL ultimately did not rely on these witnesses’ testimony in his closing submissions, and accordingly, I address their testimony summarily. In brief, I have doubts about the reliability and veracity of what these witnesses purported the Father had told them. Even if the purported oral statements by the Father were admissible under s 32(1)(j)(i) of the EA, I would exercise my discretion to exclude the evidence under s 32(3).

  113. [87] First, the following instance suggested that these witnesses were somewhat partisan in their stance. It was TOL’s case that the Mother was a housewife who did not work and thus did not have funds to purchase the 30-Year Lease. These witnesses averred in their AEICs that they never saw the Mother working at the Coffeeshop or the “13 Mile” coffeeshop. In my view, the only point of them saying this was to support TOL’s case that the Mother was a housewife who did not work. However, this was a disingenuous tack to take because, as these witnesses had to concede in cross-examination, they did not even know what the Mother looked like (at all, or in Mr Kho’s case, from 1984 (the year the Coffeeshop began operations) onwards) (see [118] below).

  114. [88] Second, I have doubts about the reliability and accuracy of their recollection of what the Father had purportedly told them about a matter that did not in any way concern them, almost three decades ago. In particular, Mdm Swee conceded in cross-examination that (a) the Father had not stated certain things set out in her AEIC account of her purported conversation with the Father, and (b) while she purported in her AEIC that “[i]t was agreed that [the Mother] would collect all the rental” and “safe guard” it for TOL, she did not know between whom this was supposedly “agreed”. As for Mr KS Tan, he stated in his AEIC that TAL and the Father moved out of the Yishun Flat before he and Mdm Swee sold their flat in 1998. However, on the stand, he stated that he did not know that TAL and the Father moved out of the Yishun Flat. This discrepancy in his AEIC and oral evidence is difficult to reconcile, and gives me pause when evaluating the reliability of his AEIC account of his purported conversation with the Father. While Mdm Swee and Mr KS Tan’s accounts might have seemed facially corroborative, I place no weight on this, being mindful that co-witnesses may “influence each other’s memories of an event, such that their accounts converge and become seemingly corroborative” but this is “dangerous where an aspect of that memory is in error”: Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others v Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd and others [2014] 3 SLR 562 at [55].

  115. [89] Third, in these witnesses’ accounts, the Father purportedly spoke using the general term the “Coffeeshop”, prior to 1998 (or, in Mr Durai’s case, at some unascertained time ). In my view, this is not probative of the Father’s intentions in respect of the 30-Year Lease, which only came into the picture after April 1998.

  116. Conclusion

  117. [90] To conclude, I find that TOL has failed to prove his case that the Father gifted the 30-Year Lease to TOL and the Mother in half shares (or even, leaving the Mother aside, that the Father gifted a half-share in the 30-Year Lease to TOL at all). TOL has also failed to prove that the Father paid for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease.

  118. The Estate’s defence and counterclaim that TOL held his registered interest in the 30-Year Lease on trust for the Mother

  119. [91] The Estate’s counterclaim, and the central plank of its defence, is that TOL held his registered interest (ie, a 50% share) in the 30-Year Lease on trust for the Mother (and now the Estate) pursuant to a presumed resulting trust (as the Mother had paid entirely for the purchase of the 30-Year Lease), or alternatively, a common intention constructive trust.

  120. [92] A resulting trust is presumed by operation of law to arise where a party (X) pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested in the joint names of X and another party (Y): there is a presumption that X did not intend to make a gift to Y and the property is held on trust for X (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by X and Y in shares proportionate to their contributions: Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 (“Lau Siew Kim”) at [34] and [46].

  121. [93] In the present case, while it is undisputed that TOL did not fork out any money to pay for the 30-Year Lease, he was a co-borrower of the 1998 HLF Loan taken to partially finance the purchase of the 30-Year Lease, and he further argued that the Coffeeshop rental (as opposed to the Mother’s funds) was used to make repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan. It is thus apposite to first determine the parties’ respective financial contributions to the purchase of the 30-Year Lease, which also engages the factual issue of how payment for the purchase was made.

  122. The respective financial contributions to the purchase of the 30-Year Lease

  123. [94] The Total Purchase Amount for the 30-Year Lease was $1,434,154.80. Payment to HDB was due in two tranches: (a) an upfront payment of $1,319,610; and (b) the balance sale price of $111,360 plus 3% GST on the same (ie, $3,184.80) upon legal completion.

  124. [95] The 1998 HLF Loan comprised two term loans in the respective amounts of $968,640 (“Term Loan 1”) and $111,360 (“Term Loan 2”), totalling $1,080,000. Term Loan 1 was disbursed on 14 December 1998. Term Loan 2 was disbursed on 8 February 2000. Given the matching amounts of the balance sale price and Term Loan 2, I infer that Term Loan 2 was applied to pay the balance sale price. This means that Term Loan 1 was applied towards the upfront payment, leaving a delta of $350,970 (being $1,319,610 less $968,640) that had to be paid upfront in cash. The 3% GST on the balance sale price (ie, $3,184.80) also had to be paid by cash. The cash payments total $354,154.80 (being $350,970 plus $3,184.80) (ie, the Cash Payment as defined at [56] above).

  125. [96] Repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan were made by monthly instalments and in nine lump sums of $100,000 or more each. Term Loan 2 was fully repaid by July 2000; Term Loan 1 was fully repaid by January 2004; and the 1998 Coffeeshop Mortgage was discharged on 30 January 2004.

  126. [97] I will examine how the following three sets of payments were made:

  127. Monthly instalment repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan

  128. [98] As at December 1998, the Father and Mother had an HLF joint savings account (account number ending 717) (the “Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1”). The Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1 was closed on 18 January 2001, and the balance of $87,216.95 then standing in that account appears to have been transferred to their new HLF joint savings account (account number ending 485) (the “Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2”).

  129. [99] The evidence bears out that, for most months in the period December 1998 to January 2004, the monthly Coffeeshop rental was deposited into the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1, and after its closure, the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2. The bank statements show a cheque deposit of $32,000 or $31,000 into the former and then the latter account for most months in this period, while the licence agreement documentation suggests that the monthly Coffeeshop rental was $32,000 from October 1998 to September 2003 and $33,000 from October 2003 to September 2008. The close match in the figures supports the inference I have drawn. There is also no other evidence which might explain these inflows into the said accounts.

  130. [100] Next, the evidence also bears out that, from January 1999 to December 2003, the monthly instalment repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan were made from moneys withdrawn from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1, and after its closure, the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2:

  131. (a) In this period, there are multiple matching (by date and quantum) entries between (i) the monthly instalment repayments recorded in the 1998 HLF Loan statements and (ii) cash withdrawals recorded in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 and 2 statements. These precisely matching entries provide good grounds for the inference I have drawn (see SCT Technologies Pte Ltd v Western Copper Co Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1471 at [39]).

  132. (b) There are a handful of monthly instalment repayments which do not correspond to an exactly matching cash withdrawal entry in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 or 2. However, there are other cash withdrawals from these accounts in the relevant months which, by time and amount, could have covered the relevant monthly instalment. In the light of the pattern seen at [100(a)] above, I think it is sound to infer that these monthly instalment repayments were also made from moneys withdrawn from these accounts.

  133. [101] Given that (a) the 1998 HLF Loan was taken to fund the purchase of the Coffeeshop, (b) the monthly Coffeeshop rental was deposited into the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 and 2, and (c) monthly instalment repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan were made from cash withdrawn from these same accounts, it is only reasonable and logical to conclude that it was the Coffeeshop rental which was used to make the monthly instalment repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan. While the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 and 2 statements show other inflows (apart from the Coffeeshop rental), these funds appear to broadly answer for other outflows (which are facially unrelated to the 1998 HLF Loan) from these accounts.

  134. [102] This, of course, does not indicate to whom the Coffeeshop rental belonged. It is also impossible and speculative to say to whom, as between the Father and Mother, the moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 and 2 belonged.

  135. Lump sum repayments of the 1998 HLF Loan

  136. [103] The first lump sum repayment of $110,000 was made on 8 June 2000 in respect of Term Loan 2. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental:

  137. (a) On 8 June 2000, a $35,000 cash withdrawal was made from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1. On 8 June 2000, an $80,425 cash withdrawal was also made from the Mother and Mr Tan Teck Kim’s HLF joint fixed deposit account (account number ending 397) (the “Mother-TTK Joint FD Account”). Mr Tan Teck Kim is Sally’s husband. His evidence, which I accept, was that he had no knowledge of the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account at the material time and that the moneys therein did not belong to him. Given that the date and amount of these withdrawals broadly match those of the first lump sum repayment, I infer that these withdrawals were applied towards the first lump sum repayment.

  138. (b) I also infer that the $35,000 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1 came from the Coffeeshop rental because (a) this withdrawal is of a fairly large amount and the Coffeeshop rental accounted for a majority (by dollar value) of the inflows into the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1, and (b) it is reasonable and logical to conclude that the Coffeeshop rental paid into the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 and 2 would have been tapped on for the purpose of repaying the 1998 HLF Loan.

  139. (c) As for the $80,425 cash withdrawal from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account, that comprised a principal sum of $80,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 8 March 2000 plus interest. I infer that this principal sum came from an $80,000 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1 on 8 March 2000, given the exact match in the date and quantum of the transactions. I thus conclude that the fixed deposit funds withdrawn from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account on 8 June 2000 originated from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1, which for similar reasons set out in [103(b)] above, comprised the Coffeeshop rental.

  140. [104] The second lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 December 2000 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental. On 14 December 2000, a $100,593.75 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account. I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the second lump sum repayment. The $100,593.75 cash withdrawal from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account comprised a principal sum of $100,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 2 September 2000 plus interest. There is no withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1 which exactly matches this fixed deposit placement. However, there are cash withdrawals from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 1 in August and September 2000 which could account for the $100,000 placed in fixed deposit on 2 September 2000. Given the pattern of loan repayments originating from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Accounts 1 or 2 and comprising the Coffeeshop rental (see, eg, [103] above and [105]–[108] and [111] below), I find it more likely than not that the moneys used for the second lump sum repayment shared similar origins.

  141. [105] The third lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 May 2001 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental. On 14 May 2001, a $100,468.75 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account. I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the third lump sum repayment. The $100,468.75 cash withdrawal from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account comprised a principal sum of $100,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 14 February 2001 plus interest. This fixed deposit placement corresponds to a $108,169.61 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2 on 14 February 2001. I thus conclude that the fixed deposit funds withdrawn from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account on 14 May 2001 originated from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2, which for similar reasons set out in [103(b)] above, comprised the Coffeeshop rental.

  142. [106] The fourth lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 December 2001 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental. On 14 December 2001, a $100,500 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account. I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the fourth lump sum repayment. The $100,500 cash withdrawal from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account comprised a principal sum of $100,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 14 September 2001 plus interest. This fixed deposit placement corresponds to a $110,000 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2 on 14 September 2001. I thus conclude that the fixed deposit funds withdrawn from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account on 14 December 2001 originated from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2, which for similar reasons set out in [103(b)] above, comprised the Coffeeshop rental.

  143. [107] The fifth lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 7 May 2002 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental. On 7 May 2002, a $100,281.25 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother’s HLF fixed deposit account (account number ending 585) (the “Mother’s FD Account”). I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the fifth lump sum repayment. The $100,281.25 cash withdrawal from the Mother’s FD Account comprised a principal sum of $100,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 6 February 2002 plus interest. This fixed deposit placement exactly matches a $100,000 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2 on 6 February 2002. I thus conclude that the fixed deposit funds withdrawn from the Mother’s FD Account on 7 May 2002 originated from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2, which for similar reasons set out in [103(b)] above, comprised the Coffeeshop rental.

  144. [108] The sixth lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 December 2002 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental. On 14 December 2002, a $100,218.75 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account. I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the sixth lump sum repayment. The $100,218.75 cash withdrawal from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account comprised a principal sum of $100,000 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 14 September 2002 plus interest. This fixed deposit placement exactly matches a $100,000 cash withdrawal from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2 on 14 September 2002. I thus conclude that the fixed deposit funds withdrawn from the Mother-TTK Joint FD Account on 14 December 2002 originated from moneys in the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2, which for similar reasons set out in [103(b)] above, comprised the Coffeeshop rental.

  145. [109] The seventh lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 June 2003 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental:

  146. (a) On 20 March 2003, HLF sent a letter addressed to the Mother and TOL referring to “your letter dated 15th March 2003 giving us notice of your intention to make a principal repayment of $100,000/- on 15th June 2003 towards reduction of [Term Loan 1]” and confirming that “we shall be uplifting your Fixed Deposits on 15th June 2003 towards reduction of [Term Loan 1]”. Given TOL’s admission that he knew nothing of the lump sum repayments at the time they were made, it is obvious that HLF’s letter was referring to the Mother’s notice of intention to make a principal repayment and the Mother’s instructions to lift her fixed deposit on 15 June 2003 to apply those funds towards the repayment of Term Loan 1.

  147. (b) On 14 June 2003, a $113,899.02 cash withdrawal was made from the Mother’s FD Account. I infer that this withdrawal was applied towards the seventh lump sum repayment. The $113,899.02 cash withdrawal from the Mother’s FD Account can be traced back to a principal sum of $113,689.25 which was placed in a 3-month fixed deposit on 13 February 2003, and on maturity on 13 May 2003, rolled over as a further 32-day fixed deposit, plus interest. I am unable to locate an exactly matching withdrawal made from the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2. Having said that, the Coffeeshop rental for December 2002 to February 2003 does not appear to have been deposited into the Father-Mother Joint Savings Account 2. Given the pattern of loan repayments originating from moneys comprising the Coffeeshop rental, I find it more likely than not that the moneys used for the seventh lump sum repayment shared similar origins.

  148. [110] The eighth lump sum repayment of $100,000 was made on 14 July 2003 in respect of Term Loan 1. I find it more probable than not that the moneys used for this repayment came from the Coffeeshop rental:

  149. (a) On 15 April 2003, HLF sent a letter addressed to the Mother and TOL referring to “your letter dated 15th March 2003 giving us notice of your intention to make a principal repayment of $100,000/- on 14th July 2003 towards reduction of [Term Loan 1]” and confirming that “we shall be uplifting your Fixed Deposits on 14th July 2003 towards reduction of [Term Loan 1]”. Again, HLF was obviously referring to the Mother’s notice of intention to make a principal repayment and the Mother’s instructions to lift her fixed deposit on 14 July 2003 to apply those funds towards repayment of Term Loan 1.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.