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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Jun 2025

General Division of the High Court

Someone who failed to return company money had to pay returns on it at Treasury Bill rates

Tarun Hotchand Chainani v Avinderpal Singh s/o Ranjit Singh and others

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[2025] SGHC 110Case no. Suit No 703 of 2020

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Someone who failed to return company money had to pay returns on it at Treasury Bill rates

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] In Tarun Hotchand Chainani v Avinderpal Singh s/o Ranjit Singh and others [2024] SGHC 117 (“Tarun (Liability)”), I rendered my decision in respect of the liability phase of HC/S 703/2020 (“S 703”). I adopt in the present judgment the same defined terms used in Tarun (Liability).

  3. [3] On behalf of the Company, the Liquidators took an active part in the proceedings for the taking of the Account (the “TAI Proceedings”). Mr Chainani advanced no positive case. Mr Singh and the Liquidators set out their respective positions on the principal sum and the amount of profit due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of each of the Properties in a Scott Schedule filed on 13 February 2025 (the “Scott Schedule”). In the course of the TAI Proceedings, they revised some of their positions, and an updated Scott Schedule reflecting their latest positions was filed on 4 April 2025 (the “Final Scott Schedule”).

  4. [4] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed on the following formula for the computation of profit in respect of the 20 real properties (the “Profit Computation Formula”):

  5. I adopt the abbreviations used in the Profit Computation Formula. It will be noted that items (C), (D), (E), (G) and (I) in the Profit Computation Formula are composite (or derivative) items, each representing a sum of other items.

  6. [5] In respect of the profit computation for each real property, the dispute between Mr Singh and the Liquidators was narrowed down to specific items within the Profit Computation Formula, as reflected (by the items highlighted in yellow) in the Final Scott Schedule. The parties agreed that I should focus my decision on the disputed non-derivative (as opposed to composite) items, leaving them to calculate (as a matter of arithmetic and based on the Profit Computation Formula) the profit payment due for each real property based on the agreed items and my decision on the disputed non-derivative items.

  7. The law

  8. [6] I begin with a brief summary of the main legal principles which are relevant to the taking of the Account.

  9. [7] First, when a trustee provides an account that discloses what the beneficiary considers to be discrepancies, the beneficiary may (a) falsify disbursements wrongfully charged to the account, ie, ask for the disbursements to be disallowed, in which case the burden lies on the trustee to prove that they were properly incurred, or (b) surcharge the account, ie, assert that the trustee has received more than what the account records, in which case the burden lies on the beneficiary to show this is so: Baker, Michael A (executor of the estate of Chantal Burnison, deceased) v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd and others [2022] 3 SLR 252 at [20]–[21]. In the context of an account taken on a wilful default basis (as here), the beneficiary may also surcharge the account by asking for the benefit which the trustee failed to obtain for the trust in breach of his duties to be added to the account: UVJ and others v UVH and others and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 336 at [28].

  10. [8] Second, in providing an account, a trustee must provide an explanation for the payments claimed to have been made by him and substantiate the same with sufficient supporting evidence of the fact and quantum of payment: Baker, Michael A (executor of the estate of Chantal Burnison, deceased) v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd and others [2023] 1 SLR 35 (“Baker (CA)”) at [29] and [30]. In my view, substantiating the fact of payment would entail substantiating not just that a transfer of funds was made but also the asserted nature and purpose of such transfer. The requisite supporting evidence may be oral or documentary depending on the nature and quantum of the payments, whether they would typically be reflected in some documentation, and whether documentary evidence can be obtained: Baker (CA) at [30] and [33]. Where documentary evidence is not available, oral evidence may suffice but the quality of that oral evidence will be subject to the court’s scrutiny and it would be helpful for the trustee to have other cogent evidence to corroborate his oral account: Baker (CA) at [33].

  11. The 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger

  12. [9] I next address the admissibility of the 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger. The 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger are Mr Singh’s ledger accounts with the Company from 30 June 2008 to, respectively, 14 December 2015 and 12 April 2019 (Tarun (Liability) (at [65])). Mr Singh relied significantly on entries in these ledgers as supporting evidence in his rendering of the Account. The Liquidators accepted the authenticity of these ledgers, but argued that they comprise “hearsay evidence” and that “[n]o evidentiary weight should be placed” on them. Mr Chainani made a similar submission.

  13. [10] I accept Mr Singh’s evidence that the 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger were prepared by the Company’s accountants with reference to the Company’s documents such as bank statements and payment vouchers. Further, as I noted in Tarun (Liability), Mr Chainani himself had drawn funds from the Company and had his own ledger accounts with the Company (at [70]). This indicates that there was a practice by the Company to maintain ledgers of its respective directors’ accounts with the Company. In my view, the 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger constitute business records of the Company falling within and admissible under s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”).

  14. [11] I decline to exercise my discretion under s 32(3) of the EA to exclude the ledgers from evidence bearing in mind that:

  15. (a) In the liability phase of S 703, it was Mr Chainani who had annexed the 14 December 2015 Ledger and 12 April 2019 Ledger to his Statement of Claim and pursued claims based on the ledgers (see Tarun (Liability) at [65]). This indicates that he did not think the ledgers were wholly unreliable. To the extent that Mr Chainani now argues for the wholesale evidentiary exclusion of the ledgers, I do not think he (or the Liquidators, in the light of the positions taken by the Company’s two directors) can credibly or fairly do so.

  16. (b) The court should not normally exercise its discretion to exclude evidence that is declared to be admissible by the EA: Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”) at [109].

  17. [12] No party raised the issue of the ‘s 32 notice’ provided for under s 32(4)(b) of the EA read with O 38 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2014 (the “ROC 2014”). The court may exercise its discretion under O 2 to cure non-compliance with O 38 r 4 of the ROC 2014 (Gimpex at [141]), and I do so in this case. The guiding consideration is the extent to which such non-compliance caused prejudice to the opposing party, such that it would be unfair to waive the non-compliance: Lim Julian Frederick Yu v Lim Peng On (as executor and trustee of the estate of Lim Koon Yew (alias Lim Kuen Yew), deceased) and another [2024] SGHC 53 at [107], citing Gimpex at [137]–[139]. Here, neither Mr Chainani nor the Liquidators submitted that they were prejudiced by Mr Singh not serving a ‘s 32’ notice. They knew well in advance that Mr Singh was relying on the ledgers in rendering the Account, and had adequate time to consider their position on the same.

  18. [13] However, as will be seen, I ultimately placed little weight on the ledgers (see s 32(5) of the EA), primarily because the entries relied on by Mr Singh did not bear out the narrative he gave in rendering the Account. I will elaborate on the specific entries cited by Mr Singh at the relevant juncture. Further, Mr Singh could have called the accounting staff who had prepared the ledgers to explain the preparation of, and the nature of the transactions in, the specific entries on which he relied, but chose not to do so. Finally, the Liquidators demonstrated that (a) in respect of one entry, the stated USD and SGD balances did not tally; and (b) there was an instance where moneys transferred to Mr Singh from the Company were erroneously recorded in Mr Chainani’s instead of Mr Singh’s ledger. While I did not think these instances sufficed to warrant excluding the ledgers from evidence altogether, they gave me pause when deciding the weight to place on the ledgers.

  19. [14] I now move to substantively address the parties’ disputes over the Account rendered by Mr Singh.

  20. 20 real properties: principal sums due

  21. Mandarin Gardens

  22. [15] Mandarin Gardens is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in late 2007 and sold sometime in 2012 with a net profit made on the investment.

  23. [16] It is undisputed that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Mandarin Gardens was S$368,301.09. While Mr Singh purported (as he did in the liability phase of S 703) to characterise this sum as a “loan” he took from the Company, it is not open to him to do so as he is bound by my findings in Tarun (Liability) to the contrary (at [39]). This position applies to all instances in the TAI Proceedings where Mr Singh purported to characterise his use of the Company’s funds for an acquisition as a “loan” from the Company to him.

  24. [17] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the principal sum of S$368,301.09 to the Company as purportedly evidenced by (a) the Company’s financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2009 (“AEPL’s 2009 FS”) showing no outstandings from the Company’s directors, and (b) the 14 December 2015 Ledger at row 19 showing that as at 31 December 2009, no balance amount was owed by him to the Company.

  25. [18] I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned the principal sum for Mandarin Gardens.

  26. [19] First, Mr Singh’s ledger balance at any single point in time simply provides a snapshot of the net ledger position at that time, without necessarily reflecting whether the principal sum had been returned to the Company. To illustrate, as Mr Singh admitted in cross-examination, the entries in the 14 December 2015 Ledger preceding row 19 do not indicate any payment by Mr Singh to the Company of the sum of S$368,301.09. While Mr Singh suggested that the payment might be reflected in an earlier ledger, this suggestion goes nowhere because Mr Singh admitted that he had not produced and “[didn’t] have” any such earlier ledger.

  27. [20] Second, on the face of row 19 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger (which is described as “TRANSFER OF AMOUNT DUE FR DIRECT TO AVITAR HOLDGS”), it appears that Mr Singh’s ledger balance became zero-rised as at 31 December 2009 because of an audit entry by which his liabilities to the Company were transferred to the Holding Company. This does not evidence that Mr Singh had repaid all sums owed by him to the Company as at 31 December 2009. In a similar vein, Mr Singh’s reliance on the dash beside the line item “Due to directors” under Note 15 (“Other payables”) of AEPL’s 2009 FS does not assist him because it is unclear how that item was derived.

  28. [21] Third, Mr Singh adduced no objective evidence of payment (such as bank records) of the principal sum prior to 31 December 2009.

  29. [22] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$368,301.09 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Mandarin Gardens.

  30. Evelyn Road

  31. [23] Evelyn Road is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in 2007 and sold in November 2014. It is disputed whether a net profit or net loss was made on this investment.

  32. [24] It is undisputed that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Evelyn Road was S$1,255,313.93.

  33. [25] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the sum of S$1,255,313.93 to the Company, citing the same purported evidence he relied on for claiming that he had returned the principal amount taken from the Company for the acquisition of Mandarin Gardens (see [17] above). I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove this, for similar reasons and given similar concessions made by Mr Singh in cross-examination to those set out at [19]–[21] above. I therefore find that the principal sum of S$1,255,313.93 has not been returned to the Company in respect of Evelyn Road.

  34. [26] However, the result of my findings at [157] below is that a net loss (hitherto personally borne by Mr Singh) was made on the Evelyn Road investment. As the investment was the Company’s, it is only consistent and right that the net loss be attributed to and borne by the Company, as Mr Kim fairly accepted at trial. I note that, despite Mr Kim’s position, the Liquidators submitted in their closing submissions that Mr Singh should “personally bear any losses made on the Properties”, citing alleged confirmations by Mr Singh in the liability phase of S 703 that “under the Understanding, parties who used the Company’s funds pursuant to the Understanding would bear any resulting losses”. I disagree with this submission.

  35. [27] First, Mr Chainani (being the plaintiff in S 703) did not plead that under the Understanding, parties who used the Company’s funds to make investments for the Company would have to personally bear any resulting losses.

  36. [28] Second, I found in Tarun (Liability) that the Understanding operated in the following manner (at [27(c)]):

  37. In the same way that profits made on the Company’s investments legally belong to the Company, losses made on the Company’s investments must likewise be treated as the Company’s losses. This is simply an extension of the principle inherent in my finding in Tarun (Liability) (at [27(c)]), which was not challenged.

  38. [29] Third, the evidence given by Mr Singh in the liability phase of S 703 cannot and would not supersede the findings I made in Tarun (Liability). In any event, Mr Singh’s position was that any loss “ha[d] to be shared equally” between Mr Chainani and himself as the ultimate shareholders of the Company. In my view, in line with how the profits of the Company could not be directly appropriated by and split between Mr Chainani and Mr Singh, the losses of the Company on its investments had to be similarly borne by the Company with Mr Chainani and Mr Singh indirectly experiencing that loss, for example, through a reduction in dividends.

  39. [30] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$1,255,313.93 less the net loss figure under item (G) is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Evelyn Road.

  40. Spring Grove

  41. [31] Spring Grove is a Singapore residential property which was purchased in November 2009 and sold sometime in 2016 with a net profit made on the investment.

  42. [32] It is undisputed that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Spring Grove was S$420,595.

  43. [33] Mr Singh claimed that the principal amount had been returned to the Company by virtue of (a) him purportedly having returned the sum of S$340,649 to the Company by 31 December 2009, and (b) the amounts of S$50,100 and S$74,000 having been originally recorded under Mr Chainani’s loan ledger with the Company and then “offset” and “relocated” to his (ie, Mr Singh’s) ledger “with the benefit of hindsight (after the trial on liability of this matter)”.

  44. [34] Mr Singh’s claim that he had returned the sum of S$340,649 to the Company is based on the same purported evidence he relied on for claiming that he had returned the principal amounts taken from the Company for the acquisition of Mandarin Gardens and Evelyn Road (see [17] and [25] above). I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove this, for similar reasons to those set out at [19]–[21] above. I add that Spring Grove was purchased only in November 2009. If, as Mr Singh purported, the nil balance in row 19 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger is an accurate reflection that Mr Singh had returned S$340,649 taken for the Spring Grove purchase by 31 December 2009, it must mean that Mr Singh had made repayment of majority of the principal sum very shortly after the purchase of the property. This is not credible for two reasons. First, it is commercially unrealistic that, having taken the principal sum of S$420,595 from the Company to make the purchase, Mr Singh would have almost immediately repaid S$340,649 of the principal sum to the Company before 31 December 2009. Second, none of the 2009 entries in the 14 December 2015 Ledger (which starts from 30 June 2008) shows Mr Singh paying S$340,649 to the Company.

  45. [35] As for Mr Singh’s claim regarding the amounts of S$50,100 and S$74,000, he provided no objective evidence of the alleged “offset” and “relocat[ion]” of these amounts, much less any cogent explanation why he should be considered to have repaid these amounts in connection with the principal sum taken from the Company to purchase Spring Grove.

  46. [36] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$420,595 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Spring Grove.

  47. Meadows

  48. [37] Meadows is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in 2009 and sold sometime in 2015 with a net profit made on the investment.

  49. [38] It is undisputed that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Meadows was S$327,743.

  50. [39] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the principal sum of S$327,743 to the Company as purportedly evidenced by the Company’s financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2010 (“AEPL’s 2010 FS”) not specifying any amount due from him to the Company as at 31 December 2010. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned the principal sum used for the Meadows investment to Company, for similar reasons to those set out at [19]–[21] above. I add that, as Mr Singh himself conceded, the reason his loan balance with the Company became zero-rised as at 31 December 2010 was that his debt to the Company of US$1,119,099.44 was transferred to the Holding Company (see also Tarun (Liability) at [84(b)]). In a similar vein, AEPL’s 2010 FS would not indicate on its face whether Mr Singh had paid down his debt to the Company or merely transferred that debt. For completeness, in the liability phase of S 703, Mr Singh also asserted that the Holding Company had declared dividends in 2009 and 2010 which were applied towards setting off the amounts owing by Mr Chainani and Mr Singh to the Holding Company. I did not make any finding in Tarun (Liability) that this was factually the case. In my view, Mr Singh has not proved his assertions, much less shown how these alleged arrangements mean that Mr Singh had returned S$327,743 to the Company in respect of the purchase of Meadows.

  51. [40] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$327,743 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Meadows.

  52. Spottiswoode

  53. [41] Spottiswoode is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in late 2010 and sold sometime in 2019 with a net profit made on the investment.

  54. [42] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Spottiswoode as S$660,157.22. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that S$394,207.22 comprised the Company’s funds. In other words, he asserted that S$265,950 of his personal funds was used for the purchase of Spottiswoode. In Mr Singh’s account for Spottiswoode, he indicated that two cheques were issued by him in connection with the purchase of Spottiswoode: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 12 November 2010 in the amount of S$88,650 for “5% DEPOSIT”; and (b) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 7 December 2011 in the amount of S$177,300 for “UOL DEVELOPMENT PTE LTD – SPOTTISWOODE PROJECT” (totalling S$265,950). However, only a copy of the latter, an HSBC cheque dated 7 December 2011 in the amount of S$177,300 issued by Mr Singh and made payable to “UOL DEVELOPMENT PTE LTD – SPOTTISWOODE PROJECT ACCOUNT NO. [REDACTED] SGD”, was adduced in evidence.

  55. [43] There is no evidence that, as at 2011, Mr Singh had commingled the Company’s funds with his personal funds in his HSBC SGD current account (from which his SGD cheques were drawn). I thus accept that the 7 December 2011 HSBC cheque shows that Mr Singh personally paid S$177,300 towards the purchase price of Spottiswoode. However, as Mr Singh did not adduce a copy of the other apparent HSBC cheque dated 12 November 2010, with no good reason for not doing so when he was able to produce a copy of the 7 December 2011 HSBC cheque, I do not accept that a further sum of S$88,650 came from him personally. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Spottiswoode investment was S$482,857.22 (being the agreed outlay of S$660,157.22 less Mr Singh’s personal contribution of S$177,300).

  56. [44] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the sum of S$313,740 to the Company, citing the same purported evidence he relied on for claiming that he had returned the principal amount taken from the Company for the acquisition of Meadows (see [39] above). I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove this, for similar reasons to those set out at [39] above.

  57. [45] I also find that the principal sum due from Mr Singh is not reduced by any part of an apparent “loan to AEPL” of S$180,000 which he made to the Company purportedly out of the sale proceeds of Spottiswoode (as I explain at [165] below).

  58. [46] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$482,857.22 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Spottiswoode.

  59. Archipelago

  60. [47] Archipelago is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in late 2011 and sold sometime in December 2017 with a net profit made on the investment.

  61. [48] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Archipelago as S$341,210. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that S$250,000 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance S$91,210 comprised his personal funds. In Mr Singh’s account for Archipelago, he indicated that three cheques were issued by him in connection with the purchase of Archipelago: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER POSB” dated 4 December 2011 in the amount of S$75,350 for “UOB PROJECT ACCOUNT NO.: [REDACTED]”; (b) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 10 January 2012 in the amount of S$39,810 for “COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES”; and (c) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 20 January 2012 in the amount of S$226,050 for “UOB PROJECT ACCOUNT NO.: [REDACTED]” (totalling S$341,210). Copies of all three cheques issued by Mr Singh were adduced in evidence. On the basis that row 180 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger recorded an entry dated 25 January 2012 of a loan by the Company to Mr Singh in the amount of S$250,000, Mr Singh took the position that S$250,000 out of the three cheques he issued came from the Company’s funds.

  62. [49] In the light of Mr Singh’s position, I have to proceed on the basis that the Company’s funds were commingled with any personal funds Mr Singh held in his POSB SGD current account (as at December 2011) and in his HSBC SGD current account (as at January 2012). Ordinarily, when a trustee mixes trust funds with his own funds, the law assumes that the whole is subject to the trust, except so far as the trustee may be able to distinguish what is his own; the burden is on the trustee to show which portion of the funds come from his own sources: Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd (formerly known as Tong Tien See Holding (Australia) Pty Ltd) and another v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and another appeal [2002] 2 SLR(R) 94 at [44]–[45]. In the present case, I find that Mr Singh has not discharged his burden of showing that, out of the three cheques, S$91,210 came from his personal funds. In relying on row 180 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger as showing that he took S$250,000 from the Company, he appears to be contending that because there is an absence of other entries which, in his view, would show that he took the balance S$91,210 from the Company, he did not in fact take the balance S$91,210 from the Company. However, I place little weight on the ledger (as explained at [13] above) and do not think it is sufficiently reliable for such a conclusion to be drawn. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Archipelago investment was S$341,210.

  63. [50] Mr Singh claimed that, after Archipelago was sold, he paid S$398,800 from the sale proceeds into the Company, and that this should be treated as a repayment of the principal sum and profit due from him to the Company. He relied in this regard on rows 549, 550, 551 and 552 of the 12 April 2019 Ledger, which comprise respectively: (a) an entry dated 15 December 2017 described as “PART PAYMENT” in the amount of US$14,844.60; (b) an entry dated 15 December 2017 described as “Loan received from Mr. avinder” in the amount of US$222,669; (c) an entry dated 18 December 2017 described as “LOAN RECEIVED” in the amount of US$37,111.50; and (d) an entry dated 18 December 2017 described as “CASH DEPOSIT” in the amount of US$21,376.22. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that these were repayments by him to the Company of the principal sum and profit due in respect of the Archipelago investment. Mr Singh did not call the accounting staff who had prepared the ledger to explain the entries, which, even on their face, do not indicate that they were for the purpose of repayment or in connection with Archipelago. Further, Mr Singh had also contradictorily labelled these payments as a “loan to AEPL” in other parts of his evidence, undermining his contention that they were made for the purpose of returning the principal sum and profit in respect of the Archipelago investment. The recovery of any outstanding loans made by Mr Singh to the Company is a matter for him to separately take up with the Liquidators (see also [145] below).

  64. [51] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$341,210 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Archipelago.

  65. Parc Olympia

  66. [52] Parc Olympia is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in 2013 and sold sometime in late 2016 or early 2017 with a net profit made on the investment.

  67. [53] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Parc Olympia as S$220,000. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that S$73,000 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance S$147,000 comprised his own funds. In Mr Singh’s account for Parc Olympia, he indicated that three cheques were issued by him in connection with the purchase of Parc Olympia: (a) a cheque “PAID BY AVINDER / HSBC 403369” (no date indicated) in the amount of S$49,000 for “5% DEPOSIT”; (b) a cheque “PAID BY AVINDER / HSBC 403375” dated 16 July 2013 in the amount of S$24,000 for “STAMP DUTY”; and (c) a cheque “PAID BY AVINDER / HSBC 403376” dated 31 July 2013 in the amount of S$147,000 for “UOB FOR PROJECT ACCOUNT NO.: [REDACTED]”. Copies of the second and third cheques issued by Mr Singh, but not the first cheque, were adduced in evidence. Mr Singh conceded that the funds for the first and second cheques (totalling S$73,000) came from the Company (comprising the proceeds from the sale of some of the Shares in 2013: see [184] below).

  68. [54] Again, by Mr Singh’s own admission, the Company’s funds were commingled with any personal funds he held in his HSBC SGD current account. I find that he has not proved that the cheque for S$147,000 comprised his personal funds. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Parc Olympia investment was S$220,000.

  69. [55] Mr Singh did not claim that any part of the principal sum had been returned by him to the Company or that he had paid any Parc Olympia sale proceeds into the Company. To avoid doubt, I disregard what appeared to be an attempt by Mr Singh’s counsel to give an account from the bar through his cross-examination of Mr Kim. In any event, the matters raised during that attempt were not pursued in Mr Singh’s closing submissions.

  70. [56] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$220,000 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Parc Olympia.

  71. Marina 19

  72. [57] Marina 19 is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in 2014 and has not been sold.

  73. [58] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Marina 19 as S$1,027,673.57. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that S$559,012.97 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance S$468,660.60 comprised his personal funds. On the witness stand, Mr Singh explained that he had deducted S$559,012.97 (which he conceded came from the Company’s funds) from the outlay of S$1,027,673.57 and assumed that the balance of S$468,660.60 came from his personal funds. This did not illumine. In Mr Singh’s account for Marina 19, he listed several cheques issued for the purchase of Marina 19. Three cheques issued by him were in amounts adding up to S$468,660.60: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 24 November 2014 in the amount of S$152,280 for “THE COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES”; (b) a cheque stated to be “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 20 April 2015 in the amount of S$157,680 for “PROJECT ACCT NO. [REDACTED]” (although the copy of the cheque shows it was issued from Mr Singh’s POSB account); and (c) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 26 August 2015 in the amount of S$158,700.60 for “PROJECT ACCT NO. [REDACTED]”. However, as the Liquidators’ counsel pointed out, Mr Singh’s account for Marina 19 had identified the funds for the latter two cheques as originating from the Evelyn and Meadows sale proceeds respectively, and had also listed two other SGD cheques drawn “FROM AVINDER HSBC” as comprising moneys taken from the Company. In other words, the Company’s funds remained commingled with any personal funds he held in his HSBC and POSB SGD current accounts. I find that Mr Singh has not proved what, if any, amounts used for the purchase of Marina 19 came from his personal funds. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Marina 19 investment was S$1,027,673.57.

  74. [59] Mr Singh did not claim that any part of the principal sum had been returned by him to the Company.

  75. [60] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$1,027,673.57 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Marina 19.

  76. Marina 20

  77. [61] Marina 20 is a Singapore residential property which was purchased sometime in 2014 and has not been sold.

  78. [62] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Marina 20 as S$996,363.30. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that S$681,343.02 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance S$315,020.28 comprised his own funds. Mr Singh gave a similar explanation as that he gave for Marina 19 regarding how he ascertained that S$681,343.02 came from the Company’s funds and S$315,020.28 came from him. In Mr Singh’s account for Marina 20, he listed several cheques issued for the purchase of Marina 20. Two cheques issued by him were in amounts adding up to S$315,020.28: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 24 November 2014 in the amount of S$149,760 for “THE COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES”; and (b) a cheque “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 16 August 2016 in the amount of S$165,260.28 for “PROJECT ACCT NO.: [REDACTED]”. However, Mr Singh’s account for Marina 20 had identified the funds for these two cheques as originating from the Evelyn and Spring Grove sale proceeds respectively, and had also listed three other SGD cheques drawn “FROM AVINDER HSBC” as comprising moneys taken from the Company. Again, the Company’s funds remained commingled with any personal funds he held in his HSBC SGD current account. I find that Mr Singh has not proved what, if any, amounts used for the purchase of Marina 20 came from his personal funds. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Marina 20 investment was S$996,363.30.

  79. [63] Mr Singh did not claim that any part of the principal sum had been returned by him to the Company.

  80. [64] I therefore hold that the principal sum of S$996,363.30 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Marina 20.

  81. Oxley Diamond 15

  82. [65] Oxley Diamond 15 is a residential property in Cambodia which was purchased sometime in 2014 and has not been sold.

  83. [66] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Oxley Diamond 15 as US$166,120. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that US$116,284 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance US$49,836 comprised his own funds. In Mr Singh’s account for Oxley Diamond 15, he listed three payments made from the Company’s bank account totalling US$116,284, and the following four payments made by him: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER POSB” dated 17 April 2014 in the amount of US$1,260 for “OXLEY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PTE LTD-SGD”; (b) a transfer “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 12 May 2014 in the amount of US$15,612 for “OXLEY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PTE LTD-SGD”; (c) a transfer “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 30 September 2014 in the amount of US$16,612 for “OXLEY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PTE LTD-USD”; and (d) a transfer “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 5 May 2017 in the amount of US$16,640 for “OXLEY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PTE LTD-USD”. Copies of the US$1,260 cheque and telegraphic transfer confirmations for the US$16,612 and US$16,640 transfers from Mr Singh’s HSBC USD current account, showing that Mr Singh had made those payments, were adduced in evidence. In respect of the US$15,612 transfer, Mr Singh pointed to a telegraphic transfer form of 12 May 2014, but that shows the transfer was rejected. However, Mr Singh also adduced his HSBC USD current account statement which records a withdrawal of US$15,612 on 14 May 2014 for payment for Oxley Diamond 15, and a receipt from the developer dated 16 May 2014 acknowledging the payment of US$15,612.

  84. [67] It has not been established that Mr Singh’s moneys in his POSB and/or HSBC USD current accounts (cf, his SGD current accounts) were commingled with the Company’s moneys. Accordingly, and given the proof of payment, I accept that these four payments were made from Mr Singh’s personal funds. They total US$50,124, and I will thus proceed on the basis of this figure as Mr Singh’s contribution to the purchase price of Oxley Diamond 15 (albeit the figure is marginally more than the US$49,836 claimed by Mr Singh). I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Oxley Diamond 15 investment was US$115,996.

  85. [68] Mr Singh did not claim that any part of the principal sum had been returned by him to the Company.

  86. [69] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$115,996 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Oxley Diamond 15.

  87. Oxley Diamond 16

  88. [70] Oxley Diamond 16 is a residential property in Cambodia which was purchased sometime in 2014 and has not been sold.

  89. [71] Mr Singh and the Liquidators agreed to treat the outlay for the purchase of Oxley Diamond 15 as US$166,120. Of this sum, Mr Singh claimed that US$122,335.28 comprised the Company’s funds, and the balance US$43,784.72 comprised his own funds.

  90. [72] To explain his contribution, Mr Singh first pointed to: (a) a cheque “FROM AVINDER POSB” dated 17 April 2014 in the amount of US$1,260 for “OXLEY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PTE LTD-SGD”; and (b) a transfer “FROM AVINDER HSBC” dated 12 May 2014 in the amount of US$15,612 for “OXLEY DIAMOND CAMBODIA CO LTD”. Copies of the cheque and telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that Mr Singh made these two payments were adduced in evidence; these two payments total US$16,872. For similar reasons to those set out at [67] above, I accept that these two payments were made from Mr Singh’s personal funds.

  91. [73] Mr Singh also claimed that of a US$16,622 payment made by the Company on 2 October 2014, US$10,612 came from his personal funds which he paid into the Company on 1 October 2014. The Company’s SCB bank statement showed that a US$10,612 deposit was made by Mr Singh into the Company’s bank account on 1 October 2014, before the sum of US$16,612 was withdrawn on 2 October 2014 (with that withdrawal described as for “OXLEY DIAMOND”). In my view, the coincidence of dates and amounts as reflected in objective bank records corroborates Mr Singh’s account that he had transferred personal funds of US$10,612 to the Company on 1 October 2014 for the Company to in turn make a US$16,622 payment for the property on 2 October 2014. I thus accept that the sum of US$10,612 came from Mr Singh’s personal funds.

  92. [74] Lastly, Mr Singh claimed to have made a transfer of US$16,622.72 to the developer on 30 April 2015. I do not accept this claim as there is no proof of payment from him to the developer.

  93. [75] The sums which I accept as having come from Mr Singh’s personal funds total US$27,484. I thus find that the principal sum taken from the Company in respect of the Oxley Diamond 16 investment was US$138,636.

  94. [76] Mr Singh did not claim that any part of the principal sum had been returned by him to the Company.

  95. [77] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$138,636 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Oxley Diamond 16.

  96. Mira

  97. [78] Mira is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased and sold sometime in January 2014 with a net profit made on the investment.

  98. [79] It is undisputed that Mira was purchased and sold before its construction was completed, and no bank loan was taken for the purchase of Mira as only progress payments had to be made to the developer. This appears to be the same position for the other Dubai residential properties which are the subject of the Account.

  99. [80] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Mira was AED238,933. They based their position on a copy of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 December 2014 between the seller and buyer in the subsequent sale of Mira, which states that the amount that had been paid by the seller to the developer was AED238,933.20. At an exchange rate of US$1:AED3.67, the sum of AED238,933 is approximately US$65,104. In contrast, Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of Mira was US$103,600.

  100. [81] I prefer Mr Singh’s position that the principal sum was US$103,600. First, I decline to place weight on the Memorandum of Understanding relied on by the Liquidators in so far as the amount of progress payments made to the developer is concerned. I note that there is in evidence another version of the Memorandum of Understanding bearing the same date but stating that the amount paid by the seller hitherto was AED477,867. It is unclear which (if either) version is accurate on this point. Second, there are telegraphic transfer confirmations showing that payments described as being for Mira in the amounts of US$65,200 and US$38,400 were made to the developer on 17 December 2013 and 15 January 2014 respectively. These payment records cohere with Mr Singh’s position that the principal sum was US$103,600.

  101. [82] Next, Mr Singh claimed that of the principal sum of US$103,600:

  102. such that only US$35,017.54 came from the Company’s funds.

  103. [83] For the alleged contribution made by “Ram” (see [82(a)] above), Mr Singh relied on row 246 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 26 December 2013 in the amount of US$21,962.46 described as “LOAN RECEIVED FROM MR. AVINDER (RAMA KRISHNA)”. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Ram” towards the purchase of Mira. First, as Mr Singh conceded in cross-examination, the ledger entry does not refer to Mira. The purpose of the entry is not evident on its face and “Ram” was not called to testify to the alleged transaction. Second, the ledger entry referred to “Rama Krishna” and no alleged co-investor bearing that exact name had hitherto been identified by Mr Singh. When this was pointed out to Mr Singh in cross-examination, he purported that “Rama Krishna” was the same person as “Ram Seethepalli”, whom he had previously mentioned. However, there is no objective basis for me to draw this conclusion when two different names were used at different points in Mr Singh’s own ledger.

  104. [84] For the alleged contribution made by “Aman” (see [82(b)] above), Mr Singh relied on row 236 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 17 December 2013 in the amount of US$59,114.90 described as “SCB SGD – CASH; LOAN FROM MR. AVINDER”, and row 243 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 19 December 2013 in the amount of US$15,178.15 described as “SCB SGD – CASH; LOAN FROM MR. AVINDER”; and further asserted that “Aman” took a 30% share in the Mira, The Hills 1204 and The Hills 1401 investments. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Aman” towards the purchase of Mira. First, as Mr Singh conceded in cross-examination, the ledger entries do not even refer to “Aman” (and, what is more, do not refer to Mira). “Aman” was not called to testify to the alleged transactions. Second, Mr Singh’s suggestion was that a portion of the amounts stated in the ledger entries constituted “Aman’s” contribution to the purchase of Mira. However, apart from Mr Singh’s unsubstantiated say-so, there is no evidence of how the alleged apportionment was derived.

  105. [85] For the alleged contribution made by “Kashminder” (see [82(c)] above), Mr Singh relied on row 235 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 17 December 2013 in the amount of US$36,913.26 described as “SCB SGD – CASH; LOAN FROM MR. AVINDER”; and further asserted that “Kash” took a 15% share in the Mira, The Hills 1204 and The Hills 1401 investments. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Kashminder” towards the purchase of Mira, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [84] above.

  106. [86] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$35,017.54 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the Mira investment.

  107. [87] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$103,600 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Mira.

  108. The Hills 702

  109. [88] The Hills 702 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in December 2013 and has been sold with a net profit made on the investment.

  110. [89] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of The Hills 702 was AED713,030.89 (approximately US$194,286). They based their position on receipts issued by the developer to “Avinderpal Singh S/O Ranjit Singh” dated 19 December 2013 and 9 January 2014 for AED676,180.89 and AED36,850 respectively and stated to be for the first and second instalment payments. Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase was US$184,100.

  111. [90] There is evidence of a telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that the Company transferred US$184,100 to the developer for The Hills 702 on 17 December 2013. This payment approximately matches, by timing and amount, the first receipt issued by the developer. There is also evidence of a cash cheque made out to the developer for AED36,850 dated 15 December 2013 (with handwritten notations “B2-702” and “Avinderpal” (among others) on a copy thereof). This payment approximately matches, by timing and amount, the second receipt issued by the developer. I thus find that the principal sum was US$184,100 plus AED36,850.

  112. [91] Mr Singh claimed that “T Singh” contributed US$85,960 to the principal sum, citing as purported evidence row 244 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 19 December 2013 in the amount of US$85,960 described as “SCB USD TT; LOAN FROM MR. AVINDER – TSINGH”. His counsel also pointed to the Company’s SCB bank statement showing a deposit in the same amount on 19 December 2013 from “T SINGH TRADING L.L.C., (GOVT”. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “T Singh” towards the purchase of The Hills 702. Even if “T Singh” had made a payment to the Company, the purpose of the payment is unclear. As Mr Singh conceded in cross-examination, the ledger entry does not refer to The Hills 702 and it is not possible to tell on its face what the entry was for. “T Singh” was not called to testify to the alleged transaction.

  113. [92] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$98,140 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the The Hills 702 investment.

  114. [93] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$184,100 plus AED36,850 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of The Hills 702.

  115. The Hills 1204

  116. [94] The Hills 1204 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in December 2013 and has been sold with a net profit made on the investment.

  117. [95] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of The Hills 1204 was AED329,781 (approximately US$89,859). They based their position on: (a) the Offer to Purchase dated 14 December 2013 stating that the first instalment payment was AED220,333; (b) a receipt issued by the developer to “Davinderpal Singh s/o Ranjit Singh” dated 25 June 2014 for AED76,613, apparently for part payment of the second instalment; and (c) another receipt issued by the developer to “Davinderpal Singh s/o Ranjit Singh” dated 25 June 2014 for AED32,835, apparently for the balance payment of the second instalment. In contrast, Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of The Hills 1204 was US$60,150. He explained that only the first instalment payment of AED220,333 (which approximates to his figure of US$60,150) was made.

  118. [96] I prefer Mr Singh’s position that the principal sum was US$60,150. First, Mr Singh was not challenged in cross-examination on his evidence that only the first instalment payment was made. While the 25 June 2014 receipts issued by the developer are curious, I note that they were issued to “Davinderpal Singh s/o Ranjit Singh”, and Mr Singh (ie, the first defendant) was not questioned on them. Second, there is a telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that the Company transferred US$60,150 to the developer for The Hills 1204 on 17 December 2013. Third, the only other evidence of payment is a cash cheque made out to the developer for AED36,850 dated 15 December 2013, with handwritten notations “B2-1204” and “Davinderpal” (among others) on a copy thereof. Mr Singh was not questioned on this cheque. The date and amount of this cheque do not match the apparent receipts from the developer, and it is unclear where this cheque fits in. For these reasons, I decline to place weight on it. In these circumstances, I do not think it would be right to assume that the second instalment payment(s) was made by the Company.

  119. [97] Next, Mr Singh claimed that of the principal sum of US$60,150:

  120. such that only US$33,082.50 came from the Company’s funds.

  121. [98] For the alleged contribution made by “Aman” (see [97(a)] above), Mr Singh relied on the same purported evidence set out at [84] above. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Aman” towards the purchase of The Hills 1204, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [84] above.

  122. [99] For the alleged contribution made by “Kashminder” (see [97(b)] above), Mr Singh relied on the same purported evidence set out at [85] above. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Kashminder” towards the purchase of The Hills 1204, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [85] above.

  123. [100] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$33,082.50 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the The Hills 1204 investment.

  124. [101] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$60,150 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of The Hills 1204.

  125. FV-21-2105

  126. [102] FV-21-2105 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in December 2013 and has been sold with a net profit made on the investment.

  127. [103] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of FV-21-2105 was AED333,683 (approximately US$90,922). Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of FV-21-2105 was US$90,850. There is no material difference between their respective positions. As there is a telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that the Company transferred US$90,850 to the developer as an instalment payment for FV-21-2105, I find that the principal sum was US$90,850.

  128. [104] Next, Mr Singh claimed that of the principal sum of US$90,850:

  129. [105] For the alleged contribution made by “Ram” (see [104(a)] above), Mr Singh relied on row 232 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 19 November 2013 in the amount of US$33,299.92 described as “REPAYMENT OF LOAN BY MR. AVINDER (RAM SEETHEPALLI)”; and further asserted that “Ram” shared 20% of the FV-21-2105 and The Hills 505 investments. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Ram” towards the purchase of FV-21-2105. First, Mr Singh provided no direct evidence of payment. “Ram” also did not testify. Second, as Mr Singh conceded in cross-examination, the ledger entry does not refer to FV-21-2105. Third, Mr Singh’s suggestion was that a portion of the amount stated in the ledger entry constituted “Ram’s” contribution to the purchase of FV-21-2105. However, apart from Mr Singh’s unsubstantiated say-so, there is no evidence of how the alleged apportionment was derived.

  130. [106] For the alleged contribution made by “Kashminder” (see [104(b)] above), Mr Singh relied on row 231 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 15 November 2013 in the amount of US$33,302 described as “UOB USD TT; REPAYMENT OF AVINDER LOAN (KASHMINDER)”; and further asserted that “Kash” shared 20% of the FV-21-2105 and The Hills 505 investments. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Kashminder” towards the purchase of FV-21-2105, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [105] above.

  131. [107] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$63,595 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the FV-21-2105 investment.

  132. [108] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$90,850 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of FV-21-2105.

  133. BD Blvd 44

  134. [109] BD Blvd 44 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in January 2014 and has been sold with a net profit made on the investment.

  135. [110] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of BD Blvd 44 was AED890,166.73 (approximately US$242,552). They based their position on receipts issued by the developer dated 1 February 2014 and 8 July 2014 for AED463,711.73 and AED426,455 respectively and stated to be for the first and second instalments. However, they did not press this point in cross-examination when Mr Singh explained that only two payments totalling US$160,732.57 had been made. There are also two telegraphic transfer confirmations showing that the Company transferred US$126,248.77 and US$34,483.80 (totalling US$160,732.57) to the developer. Accordingly, I find that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of BD Blvd 44 (Mr Singh did not contend that anyone else contributed ) was US$160,732.57.

  136. [111] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the sum of US$160,732.57 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the BD Blvd 44 investment.

  137. [112] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$160,732.57 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of BD Blvd 44.

  138. Burj Vista

  139. [113] Burj Vista is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in May 2013 and sold sometime in July 2013 with a net profit made on the investment.

  140. [114] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of Burj Vista was AED693,433 (approximately US$188,946), being the stated quantum of the first instalment of 15% of the purchase price in certain sale and purchase contractual documentation. Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of Burj Vista was US$180,854. There is a telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that the Company transferred US$180,804 to the developer on 26 April 2013 with the payment details of the transaction stated as “15 PERCENT PMT INCLUDING REG FEE AED 3K AND AFTER ADJ USD10K ADV PMT” [emphasis added]. There is also a receipt issued by the developer to “Davinderpal Singh” dated 23 April 2013 for a “deposit” on Burj Vista in the amount of US$10,000. Mr Singh explained that Burj Vista had been purchased in the name of his brother, Mr Davinderpal Singh. Mr Singh also accepted that the first instalment was paid. I therefore infer that US$190,804 had been paid to the developer for the first instalment (which approximately matches the first instalment amount of AED693,433 stated in the contractual documentation). I thus find that the principal sum was US$190,804.

  141. [115] It was not Mr Singh’s case that either he or Mr Davinderpal Singh contributed any personal funds to the purchase of Burj Vista. Instead, he claimed that of the principal sum, US$85,000 was contributed by “T Singh”, citing as purported evidence row 215 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 26 April 2013 in the amount of US$85,000 described as “T SINGH TRADING – AVINDER LOAN REFUNDED”. He also relied on the Company’s SCB foreign currency current account statement which shows that on 26 April 2013, a deposit of “84,960” referenced to “T SIN” was received. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “T Singh” towards the purchase of Burj Vista. “T Singh” was not called to testify. As Mr Singh conceded in cross-examination, neither the ledger entry nor the bank statement entry refers to Burj Vista or what the payment into the Company was for. While, as Mr Singh suggested, there was a coincidence in the timing of the apparent payment by “T Singh” to the Company and the Company’s payment to the developer, I do not think that this suffices to infer that “T Singh” contributed to the principal sum for Burj Vista.

  142. [116] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$95,854 to the Company. He pointed to row 226 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 8 October 2013 in the amount of US$54,441 described as “UOB USD TT FROM TMS AED PART OF USD 480,671.19”, and row 227 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger, which is an entry dated 8 October 2013 in the amount of US$49,814 also described as “UOB USD TT FROM TMS AED PART OF USD 480,671.19”; and further asserted that TMS (or The Mobile Store), which he described as “our company in Dubai”, had remitted moneys to the Company, part of which was credited to his account as evidenced by the aforesaid ledger entries. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the Burj Vista investment. It is unclear to me why the ledger entries he cited should be interpreted as him returning any part of the Company’s funds used for Burj Vista; there is no objective evidence to corroborate this claim.

  143. [117] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$190,804 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of Burj Vista.

  144. The Hills 1401

  145. [118] The Hills 1401 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in December 2013 and sold sometime in February 2014 with a net profit made on the investment.

  146. [119] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of The Hills 1401 was AED325,183.20 (approximately US$88,606). Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of The Hills 1401 was US$88,700. There is no material difference between their respective positions. As there is a telegraphic transfer confirmation showing that the Company transferred US$88,700 to the developer as an instalment payment for The Hills 1401, I find that the principal sum was US$88,700.

  147. [120] Next, Mr Singh claimed that of the principal sum of US$88,700:

  148. [121] For the alleged contribution made by “Aman” (see [120(a)] above), Mr Singh relied on similar evidence as that set out at [84] above. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Aman” towards the purchase of The Hills 1401, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [84] above.

  149. [122] For the alleged contribution by “Kashminder” (see [120(b)] above), Mr Singh relied on the same purported evidence set out at [85] above. He initially also made reference to certain purchase documentation showing that “Kashminder” had been named as the purchaser of the property, but readily conceded that those documents did not show that “Kashminder” contributed anything towards the purchase price. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that any contribution was made by “Kashminder” towards the purchase of The Hills 1401, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [85] above.

  150. [123] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$48,785 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. In Mr Singh’s counsel’s cross-examination of Mr Kim, Mr Singh’s counsel then put that Mr Singh had returned US$80,000 as purportedly evidenced by (a) row 245 of the 12 April 2019 Ledger which is an entry dated 24 December 2013 for US$80,000 described as “SCB USD TT FROM TMS AED PART OF USD 319,542”, and (b) the Company’s SCB bank account showing a deposit of US$319,542 from “THE MOBILE STORE FZ-LLC” on 24 December 2013. However, this was not the explanation given by Mr Singh when he had the opportunity to do so. In any event, it is unclear why Mr Singh was purportedly entitled to appropriate any part of the payment made by “TMS” or “The Mobile Store” to the Company and/or that ledger row 245 had anything to do with The Hills 1401. Mr Singh also did not adopt in his closing submissions the aforesaid position advanced by his counsel, and I thus disregard it. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the The Hills 1401 investment.

  151. [124] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$88,700 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of The Hills 1401.

  152. The Hills 505

  153. [125] The Hills 505 is a residential property in Dubai which was purchased sometime in November 2013 and sold sometime in early 2014 with a net profit made on the investment.

  154. [126] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of The Hills 505 was AED450,272 (approximately US$122,690). Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of The Hills 505 was US$122,900. There is no material difference between their respective positions. As there are two telegraphic transfer confirmations showing that the Company transferred US$74,100 and US$48,800 (totalling US$122,900) to the developer for The Hills 505, I find that the principal sum was US$122,900.

  155. [127] Next, Mr Singh claimed that of the principal sum of US$122,900:

  156. [128] For the alleged contribution made by “Rama” (see [127(a)] above), Mr Singh relied on the same purported evidence set out at [105] above. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Rama” towards the purchase of The Hills 505, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [105] above.

  157. [129] For the alleged contribution made by “Kashminder” (see [127(b)] above), Mr Singh relied on the same purported evidence set out at [85] and [106] above. I find that Mr Singh has not proved that such a contribution was made by “Kashminder” towards the purchase of The Hills 505, for similar reasons and given similar concessions by Mr Singh to those set out at [85] and [106] above.

  158. [130] Mr Singh also claimed that he had returned the sum of US$86,030 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the The Hills 505 investment.

  159. [131] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$122,900 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of The Hills 505.

  160. BD Blvd 39

  161. [132] BD Blvd 39 is a residential property in Dubai which has been sold with a net profit made on the investment.

  162. [133] The Liquidators’ position was that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of BD Blvd 39 was AED252,479.20 (approximately US$68,795), apparently on the basis that this constituted the first instalment payment to the developer. Mr Singh claimed that the principal sum used for the purchase of BD Blvd 39 was US$85,664.47, comprising payment of the first instalment and registration fees. There are two telegraphic transfer confirmations showing that the Company transferred US$66,984.47 and US$18,680 (totalling US$85,664.47) to the developer for BD Blvd 39. Accordingly, I find that the principal amount of the Company’s funds utilised for the purchase of BD Blvd 39 (Mr Singh did not contend that anyone else contributed ) was US$85,664.47.

  163. [134] Mr Singh claimed that he had returned the sum of US$85,664.47 to the Company. However, he was unable to demonstrate how he arrived at that figure and did not provide proof of payment. I find that Mr Singh has failed to prove that he returned any part of the principal sum (or profit) due from him to the Company in respect of the BD Blvd 39 investment.

  164. [135] I therefore hold that the principal sum of US$85,664.47 is due from Mr Singh to the Company in respect of BD Blvd 39.

  165. 20 real properties: disputed items in profit calculations

  166. Mandarin Gardens

  167. Item (D(iii))

  168. [136] Item (D(iii)) is the expense of bank interest and charges. Mr Singh put the amount at S$75,016.58. The Liquidators put the amount at S$66,722.62. The difference is S$8,293.96, and it arises because the Liquidators disagreed that Mr Singh could deduct interest in that amount paid in 2011 and 2012 on a S$450,000 OCBC term loan (secured by a mortgage over Mandarin Gardens) which Mr Singh took out in May 2011. The term loan was taken out in Mr Singh’s name as the property was purchased in his name. Mr Singh explained that the term loan was applied for the Company’s benefit: (a) he injected S$400,000 into the Company on 10 May 2011, as purportedly evidenced by the entry at row 110 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger dated 10 May 2011 in the amount of S$400,000 described as “LOAN FROM MR AVINDER”; (b) S$3,975.83 was applied towards reimbursement by the Company of various Company-related expenses which Mr Singh had incurred; and (c) he injected S$46,024.17 into the Company on 8 June 2011, as purportedly evidenced by the entry at row 116 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger dated 8 June 2011 in the amount of S$46,024.17 described as “OFFSET AGAINST PAYMENTS MADE TO AVINDER”.

  169. [137] I disallow, on principle, Mr Singh’s deduction for interest on the OCBC term loan. The Account is in respect of the profit made on the property investment, which is derived from the capital gain and income earned less expenses incurred in respect of the property investment. The OCBC term loan was not taken out for the purpose of the property investment and the interest thereon cannot properly be considered an expense incurred in respect of the property investment. If Mr Singh wishes to pursue a claim for the term loan interest, he should take that up separately with the Liquidators: he would have to establish, inter alia, that he was authorised by the Company to apply for the term loan for the Company’s benefit and to charge the interest thereon to the Company. I add, for completeness, that the description of the entry at row 116 of the 14 December 2015 Ledger does not on its face suggest any application of the term loan for the Company’s benefit. I therefore hold that item (D(iii)) should stand at S$66,722.62.

  170. Item (D(iv))

  171. [138] Item (D(iv)) is the expense of repair and maintenance. Mr Singh put the amount at S$1,817.56. The Liquidators put the amount at S$924. The difference is S$893.56. The figure of S$893.56 appears to be the amount claimed by Mr Singh for repair and maintenance for 2010. Mr Singh purported that his Notice of Assessment (“NOA”) from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) bears this out, but it does not. I therefore disallow Mr Singh’s deduction of S$893.56 for purported repair and maintenance for 2010. I hold that item (D(iv)) should stand at S$924.

  172. Item (F)

  173. [139] Item (F) is rental income. Mr Singh put the amount at S$194,061.32. The Liquidators put the amount at S$228,585.99.

  174. [140] Mr Singh’s calculations were as follows:

  175. (a) He explained that Mandarin Gardens was not immediately rented out following its acquisition (on 1 October 2007 ) as it was an old property that had to be spruced up and because it took time to get the property rented out due to the global financial crisis in 2008. He “put [the property] out” with a few agents and it was rented out from 1 August 2008.

  176. (b) He applied a monthly rent of S$3,300 for the period from August 2008 to December 2009. He explained that “owing to the absence of any available documents for the years 2008 to 2009, [he] derived a rental sum from the year 2010 and applied the figure retrospectively for a 2-year period”.

  177. (c) It is unclear how he derived the rental income for 2010. There is no NOA in evidence in respect of 2010. He asserted that the rental income for 2010 was S$41,550.

  178. (d) The NOAs in evidence bear out that gross rent of S$49,650 for 2011 and gross rent of S$43,461 for 2012 were earned.

  179. [141] The Liquidators’ figure was calculated on the following basis:

  180. (a) They projected that (i) S$3,500 monthly rental from October to December 2007; (ii) S$3,500 monthly rental for 2008; (iii) S$3,500 monthly rental for January to September 2009 and S$3,308.33 monthly rental for October to December 2009; and (d) S$3,308.33 monthly rental for 2010, should have been earned. They derived these figures based on “the average rental records for properties in the same development, with similar floor sizes in the same month [that the Liquidators assumed the lease would have commenced], on the URA portal”.

  181. (b) They accepted that gross rent of S$49,650 for 2011 and gross rent of S$43,461 for 2012 were earned.

  182. [142] I accept Mr Singh’s evidence that Mandarin Gardens was rented out from 1 August 2008. That would have been a fairly milestone event, such that his recollection is likely to be accurate. I also do not think he was dishonest in this evidence since, if his intent was to deceive, he could have stated that the renting out of Mandarin Gardens commenced at a later time in 2008 or even 2009. I further accept Mr Singh’s reasons for why Mandarin Gardens had not been and could not be immediately rented out after its acquisition, and find that he had acted prudently and reasonably in this regard. This leaves the quantum of the rental income from August 2008 to December 2010, of which there is no objective documentary evidence, to be determined. Here, I accept and apply on a broadbrush basis the Liquidators’ estimates (notwithstanding that their assumptions regarding the commencement of the leases do not map exactly onto the relevant rental period I have found) as I consider their general approach to be reasonable. I hold that item (F) should be computed on the following basis: (a) gross rent of S$17,500 from August to December 2008 (in line with the Liquidators’ estimate); (b) gross rent of S$41,424.99 for 2009 (per the Liquidators’ estimate); (c) gross rent of S$39,699.96 for 2010 (per the Liquidators’ estimate); (d) gross rent of S$49,650 for 2011 (per the applicable NOA); and (e) gross rent of S$43,461 for 2012 (per the applicable NOA). On this basis, item (F) totals S$191,735.95.

  183. Item (H)

  184. [143] There is a dispute over item (H) (ie, the returns on the profit). The Liquidators contended that returns are due as part of surcharging the Account on a wilful default basis. Mr Singh did not appear to dispute the principle but argued that he had already paid the profit to the Company and there were thus no returns to be obtained on profit. I will address this recurring dispute in respect of item (H) for Mandarin Gardens, Spring Grove, Meadows, Spottiswoode, Archipelago and Parc Olympia globally at [185]–[186] below.

  185. Purported payment of sale proceeds to the Company

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