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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Jun 2025
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General Division of the High Court

The accused was convicted of most charges of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter

Public Prosecutor v CQW

[2025] SGHC 117Case no. Criminal Case No 48 of 2024

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The accused was convicted of most charges of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The accused in this case (the “Accused”) was charged with the rape and sexual assault of his stepdaughter (the “Complainant”) over a period of seven months, when she was between 13 and 14 years of age. He claimed trial to the following eight charges, which involved offences allegedly committed between March and September 2021:

  3. 1st Charge

  4. sometime between 4 September 2021 and 12 September 2021, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(l)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”).

  5. 2nd Charge

  6. sometime in March 2021, at [address redacted] did sexually penetrate, with your finger, the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 13 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), a person below 14 years of age, without her consent, when you were in a relationship that is exploitative of her, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 376(2)(a), and punishable under s 376(4)(c) of the Penal Code.

  7. 3rd Charge

  8. sometime between April and May 2021, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 13-14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(1)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code.

  9. 4th Charge

  10. sometime between June and July 2021, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(1)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code.

  11. 5th Charge

  12. sometime in August 2021, on a first occasion, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(1)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code.

  13. 6th Charge

  14. sometime in August 2021, on a second occasion, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(1)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code.

  15. 7th Charge

  16. sometime between 4 September 2021 and 12 September 2021, at [address redacted] did penetrate with your penis the mouth of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 375(1A)(a), and punishable under s 375(2) of the Penal Code.

  17. 8th Charge

  18. sometime between 4 September 2021 and 12 September 2021, at [address redacted] did sexually penetrate, with your finger, the vagina of [the Complainant] (female, then 14 years old, D.O.B: 14 April 2007), without her consent, and you have thereby committed an offence under s 376(2)(a), and punishable under s 376(3) of the Penal Code.

  19. [2] At the conclusion of the trial, I convicted the Accused of all the charges except for the 6th Charge. The seven charges on which I convicted the Accused consisted of four charges of penile-vaginal rape, one charge of penile-oral rape, one charge of exploitative sexual assault by digital vaginal penetration, and one charge of sexual assault by digital vaginal penetration. The Accused was sentenced to an aggregate imprisonment term of 25 years and a total of 24 strokes of the cane. As he has appealed against both conviction and sentence, I set out below the full grounds of my decision.

  20. The undisputed facts

  21. Background

  22. [3] The Accused is presently 31 years old. He got to know the Complainant’s mother, [W], in 2017. Shortly thereafter, he embarked on a romantic relationship with [W]. Sometime at the end of 2017 or in 2018, the Accused moved into [W]’s one-room rental flat (the “Flat”) to stay with [W] and the Complainant. The Complainant was one of [W]’s three children with her late husband, the other children being her two sons (collectively, the “brothers”). [W]’s late husband (ie, the Complainant’s biological father) passed away in 2006, prior to the Complainant being born in April 2007.

  23. [4] In the Flat, the Accused and [W] would sleep on a queen-sized bed, whilst the Complainant would sleep on the floor next to them. The Complainant’s brothers lived with their paternal grandmother at the latter’s residence.

  24. [5] The Accused married [W] in early 2020. It was not disputed that the Accused and the Complainant developed a close and affectionate relationship.

  25. The alleged incidents

  26. [6] As I describe in greater detail below (at [37]), the eight offences of sexual assault and rape were allegedly carried out by the Accused in six distinct incidents between March and September 2021, when the Complainant was between 13 and 14 years of age. According to the Prosecution’s case, the first incident took place sometime in March 2021, one month before the Complainant’s 14th birthday. At the material time, the Accused was working as a delivery driver and had a flexible work schedule. [W], on the other hand, was working as a nurse; and her schedule required her to work five-and-a-half days almost every week, including Saturday mornings. All six incidents of sexual assault allegedly took place on days when [W] was out for work – usually on Saturday mornings when only the Accused and the Complainant were in the Flat. All six incidents allegedly took place on the queen-sized bed in the Flat.

  27. [7] In September 2021, the Complainant heard a rumour in school about someone in her class having had sex. This caused her to become emotional and to cry. When her friend approached her to ask what was wrong, the Complainant wrote on a piece of paper, telling her friend that her stepfather, the Accused, had committed sexual assault. The Complainant’s friend encouraged her to inform the teachers about this matter. The following day (24 September 2021), the Complainant spoke to her then-form teacher and disclosed that she had been sexually assaulted by her stepfather. The matter was also escalated to other school personnel, who referred the matter to the police and the Ministry of Social and Family Development (“MSF”). The Complainant was brought to the MSF building at 512 Thomson Road that same day.

  28. [8] On the same day, the Accused and [W] – having learned that the Complainant was at the MSF – proceeded to the MSF building together. There, the Accused was arrested and taken to the Police Cantonment Complex. He has remained in remand since his arrest on 24 September 2021.

  29. The parties’ cases

  30. [9] The Prosecution’s case was based primarily on the Complainant’s oral testimony, which was said to be consistent with the accounts she had provided to the doctors who examined her on 29 September 2021 and 7 December 2021, as well as the accounts she gave to other individuals such as her friend and her then form teacher on 23 and 24 September 2021. Further, the Prosecution submitted that the Complainant’s account of the six incidents was corroborated by admissions which the Accused himself had made in his Video Recorded Interview (“VRI”) statements and cautioned statements on 24 and 29 September 2021.

  31. [10] The Accused’s defence was that he had never engaged in any sexual contact with the Complainant and that none of the sexual acts described in the charges had taken place. According to the Accused, the Complainant lied about being raped and sexually assaulted by him because she was angry with him for confiscating her handphone and the television (“TV”) remote to prevent her from watching shows featuring her favourite Korean boy band.

  32. The voluntariness of the VRI statements and the cautioned statements

  33. [11] It will be apparent from the above summary that the Accused’s admissions in his VRI and cautioned statements formed a key plank of the Prosecution’s case. In the course of the trial, the Accused disputed the voluntariness of these statements. However, this position only emerged midway through the trial. In fact, regrettably, the Accused’s position on the voluntariness of his statements shifted several times during the proceedings. At the pre-trial conference before me on 12 August 2024, defence counsel had stated that the Accused was not challenging the voluntariness of his VRI statements but instead, challenging the accuracy of certain portions of these statements. When the trial commenced, defence counsel informed that the Accused was not challenging the accuracy of the answers recorded in the statements per se, but instead, taking the position that certain answers in his VRI statements had been given only as a result of the Malay interpreter for the VRIs having “wrongfully exceeded her role” as an interpreter and “taken on the role of an investigator”. Even at that stage, defence counsel maintained that the voluntariness of the Accused’s VRI statements was not an issue. This continued to be the position adopted by defence counsel throughout his cross-examination of the Prosecution’s witnesses. It was on this basis that the Accused’s VRI statements of 24 and 29 September 2021 and his first two cautioned statements of 24 and 30 September 2021 were admitted in evidence at the close of the Prosecution’s case: the Prosecution relied on the Accused’s admissions in these statements as corroboration of the Complainant’s evidence about the various sexual acts he had carried out on her.

  34. [12] In the course of the Accused’s evidence-in-chief, however, he gave – for the first time − an entirely different version of how the admissions in these statements had come about. According to the Accused, these admissions were all untrue: he had made these admissions only because of certain things said to him by one “SI Faizal” (identified as Inspector Muhammad Faizal bin Mahmood of the Serious Sexual Crime Branch (“SSCB”)). The Accused claimed that SI Faizal had:

  35. (a) asked him repeatedly whether he had “[played] with his daughter” and “made her suck”;

  36. (b) told him to think about when his child would be able to go home if he kept “giving excuses or evading”;

  37. (c) subsequently informed him that his statement and his child’s statement did not tally; and

  38. (d) asked him whether there was any “upside-down” position, by which the accused understood him to mean the “69” sexual position.

  39. [13] The Accused claimed that as a result of what SI Faizal had said to him, he became fearful that the Complainant would be held in police custody for making a false report of sexual assault, and he therefore decided to falsely admit to having committed the various sexual acts alleged.

  40. [14] While the above allegations were put forward by the Accused only in his evidence-in-chief and after he had raised no objections to the statements during the Prosecution’s case, the nature of these allegations was such that I was obliged to treat the voluntariness – and thus the admissibility – of the statements as being in dispute at the close of the trial. To be fair to both sides, I had to conduct what was in effect an ancillary hearing in the midst of the Accused’s evidence-in-chief. The Accused was given the opportunity to elaborate on his allegations against SI Faizal and to offer a full explanation as to the contents of his statements. The Prosecution was permitted to recall those witnesses whose evidence it deemed relevant to the issue of voluntariness, and defence counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses and to put to them the Accused’s allegations about the circumstances in which his statements were recorded.

  41. [15] Somewhat confoundingly, in his written closing submissions, defence counsel insisted yet again that the Accused was not challenging the voluntariness of the statement “in a sense” , that the Accused “g[a]ve the statements on [sic] his own free will”, and that “there was no threat, inducement or promise offered to him”. At the same time, counsel also contended in the same set of submissions that the Accused “had lied in his various statements to the police … solely to protect [the Complainant] from getting in trouble for making a false report against him”. This latter contention really amounted to a repetition of the allegations made by the Accused about the circumstances leading to his “false” admissions. Given the Accused’s own evidence, I decided to disregard defence counsel’s submissions about the Accused having given the statements “on his own free will”; and I proceeded to evaluate the evidence at the close of the trial on the basis that the voluntariness of the statements was a matter in dispute.

  42. [16] For the avoidance of doubt, the Accused’s belated challenge to the voluntariness of the statements did not change the fact that there was in any event sufficient evidence for his defence to be called at the close of the Prosecution’s case – even without taking these statements into consideration. What the Prosecution is required to establish at the close of its case is that “there is some evidence, which is not inherently incredible and which, if accepted to be accurate, would prove every essential element in the charge brought against the accused” (Haw Tua Tau & another v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 49 (“Haw Tua Tau”), Kong See Chew v PP [2001] 1 SLR(R) 874). In the present case, even if the Accused’s statements were to be left out of consideration at the close of the Prosecution’s case, there was still the evidence given by the Complainant in her conditioned statement of each of the eight alleged offences, that evidence being amplified by her testimony at trial. In my view, this evidence would have been enough to satisfy the Haw Tua Tau test at the close of the Prosecution’s case.

  43. The Parties’ respective cases on the voluntariness of the statements

  44. The Accused’s case on the voluntariness of the statements

  45. [17] The Accused claimed that his VRI statement and cautioned statement of 24 September 2021were made as a result of the following circumstances:

  46. (a) When the Accused and [W] arrived at the MSF building on the afternoon of 24 September 2021, the Accused was told by SI Faizal that he had to follow the police officers to assist in investigations. He told SI Faizal that his car was still at the taxi stand and he had to park his car first. With SI Faizal seated next to him, he drove his car to the open-air carpark next to the MSF building, after which he and SI Faizal proceeded to smoke cigarettes beside the car. According to the Accused, while they were smoking, SI Faizal asked him repeatedly whether he had “ma’in” (a Malay term which the Accused understood to mean “having sex”) or “played with [his] daughter and whether [he] made her suck” whenever his wife was not around. The Accused denied having done any of these things, saying “[n]o, crazy or what?”. During this conversation, SI Faizal also told the Accused: “I had done my research about you, and I know that you had worked together with the police and you have assisted them and that is how I know how to approach you”.

  47. (b) On the way from MSF to the Police Cantonment Complex, the Accused sat in the rear of the police vehicle with SI Faizal next to him. According to the Accused, SI Faizal continued to press him about having “sexual relations with the Complainant ... until she made a report”. The Accused continued to deny these allegations.

  48. (c) Upon arrival at the Police Cantonment Complex, the Accused was taken to an interview room. There, SI Faizal told him “You better think. If you keep giving excuses or evading, when will your child come home? If you give the story to us, we don’t have to get angry with you”. The Accused understood this to mean that the Complainant was in police custody. At this point, the Accused remained silent, but when the investigation officer (IO Chew) entered the room, SI Faizal told IO Chew, “he PG”.

  49. (d) Having heard what SI Faizal said, the Accused felt that he had to save the Complainant from being punished by the police for making up false accusations of sexual assault. He decided that he would save the Complainant by making false admissions in the VRI statement and the cautioned statement recorded by the police on 24 September 2021.

  50. [18] The Accused claimed that he maintained these false admissions in his subsequent VRI statement of 29 September 2021 and his cautioned statement of 30 September 2021 because he continued to be affected by what SI Faizal had said to him on 24 September 2021. Additionally, SI Faizal was alleged to have said or done the following other things:

  51. (a) On 28 September 2021, SI Faizal and another officer brought the Accused to have his photograph taken at the Police Cantonment Complex. On this occasion, the Accused asked SI Faizal how the Complainant was, to which SI Faizal allegedly replied, “your child is okay except that your statement and her statement [doesn’t] tally”. SI Faizal then asked the Accused about this discrepancy, specifically, if there were any “upside-down” positions (which the Accused understood to mean the sexual position known as “69”). The Accused did not reply.

  52. (b) SI Faizal also asked the Accused if there was a password for his handphone. The Accused replied that he had already turned off the password feature on his handphone as instructed.

  53. The Prosecution’s case on the voluntariness of the statements

  54. [19] The Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s allegations about SI Faizal surfaced only towards the end of the trial, and that the court should thus draw an adverse inference that the allegations were simply belated afterthoughts.

  55. [20] To refute the Accused’s allegations, the Prosecution recalled SI Faizal, IO Chew, and Ms Maria, the Malay interpreter present at the VRIs, to give evidence on the matters brought up by the Accused.

  56. The law on voluntariness

  57. [21] There are two cumulative limbs to the test for voluntariness (Sulaiman bin Jumari v PP [2021] 1 SLR 557 (“Sulaiman”) at [39]):

  58. (a) an objective limb which is satisfied if, on an objective assessment, an inducement, threat, or promise was made to the accused; and

  59. (b) a subjective limb which is satisfied if the said inducement, threat, or promise operated on the mind of the accused such that it would be reasonable for the accused to think that he would gain some advantage or avoid some adverse consequences in relation to the proceedings against him.

  60. [22] The legal burden lies on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily (Sulaiman at [36]). However, the Prosecution only needs to remove reasonable doubt of the existence of threat, inducement or promise and not “every lurking shadow of influence or remnants of fear” (PP v Mohamed Ansari bin Mohamed Abdul Aziz and another [2019] SGHC 268 at [9]).

  61. My findings on the voluntariness of the statements

  62. There was no threat, inducement, or promise

  63. [23] On the facts, I found that SI Faizal did not in fact make any threat, inducement, or promise to the Accused. I explain.

  64. [24] First, the Accused’s claims about SI Faizal having tried to get him to admit to certain sexual acts flew in the face of logic and available evidence. According to the Accused’s version of events, upon meeting him for the first time at MSF on 24 September 2021, SI Faizal had almost immediately started making suggestions about the Accused having had sex with the Complainant, having “played” with her, and having “made [her] suck”. I found this quite unbelievable. It did not appear to me possible that SI Faizal would have had sufficient information about the details of the accusations against the Accused at that early stage to be able to make the kind of suggestions described by the Accused. SI Faizal’s evidence was that he only learned of the specific sexual acts committed by the Accused during the latter’s first VRI on 24 September 2021: prior to that first VRI, the only information SI Faizal had about the case was that it involved alleged statutory rape. This was corroborated by IO Chew, who gave evidence that when she and SI Faizal arrived at MSF together with their colleagues on the evening of 24 September 2021, the only thing she had been told about the case was that it involved “intra-familial” rape of “a 14 year-old female”. Given the paucity of information available to the SSCB team when they first met the Accused at MSF on 24 September 2024, it was inconceivable that SI Faizal should have been able to ask the Accused leading questions about any specific sexual acts such as making the Complainant “suck”. Indeed, given the paucity of information available to SSCB at that nascent stage of the investigation process, any suggestions by SI Faizal to the Accused about any specific sexual acts he might have committed would have been most injudicious – if not downright silly.

  65. [25] I also rejected the Accused’s allegation that during a photo-taking session prior to his second VRI on 29 September 2021, SI Faizal had told him that his statement did not tally with the Complainant’s statement and had asked him whether there was any “upside-down” position (which the Accused understood to mean the “69” sexual position). SI Faizal’s evidence was that at the time of the photo-taking session, he did not know about any allegations of a “69” position and therefore could not have asked such a question − let alone assert that there was a discrepancy between the accused’s and the Complainant’s statements in this respect. SI Faizal’s evidence was corroborated by IO Chew, who confirmed that the photo-taking was held on the morning of 27 September 2021, and that at the time of the photo-taking, she too had been unaware of any allegation of a “69” position.

  66. [26] Second, the Accused’s narrative at trial was completely inconsistent with his own conduct after giving the disputed statements. According to the Accused, he falsely confessed to the commission of sexual acts against the Complainant because he was frightened that the police would otherwise punish the Complainant for fabricating allegations of sexual assault. In particular, he claimed that SI Faizal had made it clear that the Complainant was being held by the police and that her release depended on his “giv[ing] the story to [the police]”.

  67. [27] If indeed the Accused had been acting out of a desperate wish to save the Complainant from being further detained and possibly punished by the police, one would have expected him to press the police to release her following his “false” confessions – or at least to check on her whereabouts and wellbeing. After all, he was expressly given the opportunity to raise any matters he wanted before the commencement and at the conclusion of the VRIs. Yet, despite his avowed intention to save the Complainant from police custody and punishment, the Accused made no effort to ask where she was and how she was doing. When he met with [W] on 28 September 2021, for example, he did not bother to ask her about the Complainant. When asked by IO Chew at the conclusion of his VRI on 29 September 2021 if he had “any other things to say”, he expressed inter alia hope for his own release on “a small amount of bail” and brought up the fact that his birthday was “coming in a month’s time” – but made no mention of the Complainant, nor sought to establish if she had been released from custody. This lack of concern for the Complainant was completely at odds with his claims about having been so desperate to “protect” her that he falsely confessed to the commission of various sexual acts.

  68. [28] Third, the Accused’s allegations about SI Faizal’s conduct and the effect it had on him came up at a very late stage in the proceedings, after the Prosecution had already closed its case. In fact, not only were these allegations brought up late in the day, they were also never mentioned in the Case for the Defence filed on 17 August 2023. If anything, the position taken in the Case for the Defence on the voluntariness of the Accused’s statements was equivocal, if not entirely confused – and confusing. On the one hand, the Case for the Defence referred to the Accused’s statement of 29 September 2021 (apparently a reference to his VRI statement of that date) and stated that the voluntariness of the statement “on the face value [sic] does not look disputable”. On the other hand, it was also stated that there were “inaccuracies and a pack of fabrications by the accused” in the 29 September 2021 statement, and that “[i]n that sense, factually the statement would be challenged as involuntary”. Nothing was said in the Case for the Defence about the Accused’s VRI statement of 24 September 2021 and/or his cautioned statements of 24 September and 30 September 2021. Even if I were to assume that the sentence “factually the statement would be challenged as involuntary” was intended to be a reference to all four statements, this did not explain the Accused’s failure to say anything in his Case for the Defence about SI Faizal’s conduct and its effect on him. Instead, what the Accused said in his Case for the Defence was that IO Chew might have “posed leading questions or suggestive answers”, and that the Malay interpreter Ms Maria had also conducted “most of the interview” by asking leading or suggestive questions. It was also alleged that in answering the questions posed during the statement-recording, the Accused “may not be being truthful and trying to satisfy the ego of the investigator and living a lie”.

  69. [29] In belatedly bringing up the allegations about SI Faizal in the course of the trial, the Accused failed to provide any explanation as to why these allegations were not made known in his Case for the Defence – or for that matter, at any other point prior to his evidence-in-chief. He also failed to provide any explanation as to why his counsel had – presumably on his instructions – repeatedly stated before and during the trial that he was not disputing the voluntariness of the statements relied on by the Prosecution. In the circumstances, I agreed with the Prosecution that pursuant to s 221(1)(c) Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), an adverse inference should be drawn against the Accused: it should be inferred that the allegations about SI Faizal were made up by the Accused only when he took the witness stand.

  70. [30] For the reasons set out above at [24]–[29], I found that the Accused’s VRI statements of 24 September and 29 September 2021 and his cautioned statements of 24 September and 29 September 2021 were voluntarily made and constituted admissible evidence in the trial.

  71. [31] In the next section of these written grounds, I set out my assessment of the evidence in respect of each of the eight Charges.

  72. The applicable principles

  73. [32] In the present case, the only witness to the offences described in the eight Charges was the Complainant. It was not disputed that as a matter of general principle, the “unusually convincing” standard would apply to the uncorroborated evidence of a witness in any offence, where such evidence formed the sole basis for a conviction; and that this standard would apply regardless of whether the witness was an alleged victim or an eyewitness (Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) at [104]).

  74. [33] The term “unusually convincing” is not a standard of proof, but rather describes the quality of testimony required when a conviction rests solely on one witness’s uncorroborated evidence. Its use stems from the recognition that while there is no formal legal requirement for corroboration under the law, it may be unsafe to convict an accused person on the basis of the uncorroborated evidence of a witness unless such evidence is unusually convincing. The abiding inquiry remains whether any reasonable doubt exists as to the accused person’s guilt (GII v PP [2025] 3 SLR 578 (“GII”) at [25]–[26]).

  75. [35] The existence of corroborative evidence notwithstanding, it should be noted that the burden remained on the Prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the elements of each of the charges. As Menon CJ recently explained in GII at [27]–[28], the matter is typically approached from two angles:

  76. (a) First, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt within the Prosecution’s own case. This requires an assessment of the internal and external consistency of the Prosecution’s own case. If there are weaknesses or inconsistencies in the Prosecution’s case that are sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt, weaknesses in the case for the defence cannot ordinarily be called in aid to shore up what is lacking in the Prosecution’s case.

  77. (b) Second, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence. This necessarily involves a comparative exercise between the narrative advanced by the Prosecution, and the narrative advanced by the defence. Conviction can only be secured if after considering the entirety of the evidence, there remains no reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.

  78. [36] I approached the evidence in respect of each of the eight alleged offences with the above principles in mind.

  79. An outline of the offences alleged

  80. [37] To recapitulate, the Prosecution’s case was that the offences alleged in the Charges involved six separate incidents of rape and sexual assault:

  81. (a) The first incident took place during the March school holidays in 2021. In this first incident, the Accused penetrated the Complainant’s vagina with his finger (2nd Charge).

  82. (b) The second incident took place on a Saturday morning in April or May 2021. The Accused asked the Complainant for a hug, after which they both lay on the bed watching a live-stream on his phone. The Accused then touched the Complainant’s breasts underneath her bra and guided the Complainant’s hand to masturbate his penis (skin-to-skin) before making her lie on top of him and inserting his penis into her vagina. After a while, he pushed the Complainant off and ejaculated (3rd Charge).

  83. (c) The third incident took place sometime in June and July 2021. The Accused touched and sucked the Complainant’s breast. He then pulled the Complainant to lie on top of him, removed his boxer shorts, and pulled the Complainant’s shorts and underwear to one side before inserting his penis into her vagina. After a while, he pushed the Complainant off and ejaculated (4th Charge).

  84. (d) The fourth incident took place on a Saturday morning in August 2021. The Accused touched the Complainant’s breast and licked her vagina (skin-to-skin). He then removed his boxer shorts, pulled the Complainant to lie on top of him and inserted his penis into her vagina. After a while, he withdrew his penis and ejaculated (5th Charge).

  85. (e) The fifth incident took place on a Saturday morning around 27 August 2021. The Accused touched the Complainant’s breast and licked her vagina before removing his boxer shorts and pulling her to lie on top of him. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. After a while, he withdrew his penis and ejaculated (6th Charge)

  86. (f) The sixth incident took place during the September school holidays (4–12 September 2021). The Accused first touched the Complainant’s breast and licked her vagina. He then inserted his penis into her vagina while she was on top of him. After a while, he pulled her off and ejaculated. Subsequently, he made the Complainant get into the sexual position colloquially known as “69”, whereby he and the Complainant had their heads positioned at each other’s crotch. In this position, he inserted his penis into her mouth and simultaneously licked her vagina before eventually ejaculating into her mouth (1st, 7th and 8th Charge).

  87. The first incident in March 2021 (2nd Charge)

  88. The Complainant’s evidence

  89. [39] In respect of the first incident in March 2021, the Complainant was able to provide a generally consistent account.

  90. [40] The Complainant’s conditioned statement described the first incident as having occurred during the March 2021 school holidays. The Complainant stated that after her mother ([W]) left for work, the Accused asked her for a hug. As they were hugging, the Accused touched her breast under her brassiere. He also touched her vagina before inserting his finger into her vagina. The Complainant felt shocked and did not know what to do. The Complainant recalled the entire incident as lasting for about half an hour. Thereafter, the Accused left the Flat. The Complainant cried after he left.

  91. [43] The Complainant’s apparent reluctance to dwell on certain specifics of the incident was consistent with the MSF psychologist’s assessment of her mental state. In the psychological therapy report prepared by Ms Isabel Yap (“Ms Yap”) from the MSF Clinical and Forensic Psychology Services, Ms Yap noted that the Complainant displayed an “avoidant style of coping with negative thoughts and feelings”. Ms Yap observed that in the 14 therapy sessions which the Complainant attended between July and November 2022 at the orphanage where she was placed, the Complainant often responded with “I don’t know” when asked about her thoughts and feelings in relation to stressors. Ms Yap also observed that the Complainant “tended to keep quiet when distressed, likely due to her desire to avoid thinking and talking about distressing thoughts and feelings”.

  92. [44] Clearly, therefore, the Complainant struggled to express herself when faced with stressors. Clearly too, the requirement that she recall each detail of the first incident of sexual assault would have been a significant stressor. In so far as she was unable (or unwilling) to recall certain details, it did not appear to me that this was due to a lack of probity. On the contrary, having had the opportunity to observe the Complainant in the witness stand and having reviewed her evidence, I found her to be on the whole an honest witness.

  93. The medical reports

  94. [45] In arguing against the Complainant’s credibility, the Accused pointed to her omission to tell the two doctors who examined her in September 2021 and December 2021 that digital-vaginal penetration had occurred during this first incident. These doctors were:

  95. (a) Dr Yash Bhanji Boricha (“Dr Yash”) of the KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (“KKH”) who examined the Complainant on 29 September 2021; and

  96. (b) Dr Parvathy Pathy (“Dr Parvathy”) of the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) who examined the Complainant on 7 December 2021.

  97. [46] Dr Yash’s report recorded the Complainant telling him that during the first incident in March 2021, the Accused had “touched her on the chest area”. While Dr Yash did also record the Complainant telling him about two incidents of digital-vaginal penetration, these were described in the report as “two subsequent similar incidents” [emphasis added] to the first incident. This appeared to imply that the two incidents of digital-vaginal penetration took place subsequent to the first incident in March 2021. I rejected the Prosecution’s suggestion that the first incident in March 2021 must have been one of these two incidents of digital-vaginal penetration as this suggestion appeared to me to be overreaching. As for Dr Parvathy, her report stated that the Complainant had described the Accused touching “her breasts and genital area outside her clothes” during the first incident in March 2021. A few paragraphs down in the same report, Dr Parvathy recorded the Complainant stating that “on a few occasions, her stepfather [the Accused] also put his finger inside her vagina” – but it was not clear whether the first incident was one of the “few occasions”.

  98. [47] In short, therefore, I accepted that the Complainant did not expressly tell Dr Yash and Dr Parvathy that digital-vaginal penetration occurred during the first incident in March 2021. However, I rejected the Accused’s argument that this omission showed the Complainant must have been lying in her conditioned statement and in her testimony at trial when she gave evidence about digital-vaginal penetration having taken place during the first incident. The Accused argued that since the Complainant’s accounts to Dr Yash and Dr Parvathy were given closer in time to the first incident than her conditioned statement, there was no reason for the Complainant to have omitted to mention to the doctors the digital-vaginal penetration if it had in fact happened. This argument failed to appreciate the context in which the two doctors’ medical reports were prepared and in which the Complainant recounted to them the instances of sexual assault.

  99. (b) As for Dr Parvathy, her report was prepared for the purpose of assessing whether the Complainant was fit to testify in court. This meant that she too would not have been concerned with determining the full details of each incident. In PP v BLV [2020] 3 SLR 166 at [42], the High Court explained the discrepancies in a similar medical report on the basis that “the primary purposes of the reports had been to determine the Victim’s physical and mental states and her fitness to give testimony, rather than to obtain a full and complete set of facts surrounding each of the offences. This would naturally render the focus and content of their reports different from that of the Victim’s statements and testimony.” The same reasoning applied in respect of Dr Parvathy’s report in the present case.

  100. [48] Given the narrowly defined object of each doctor’s report, neither doctor would have been seeking to extract from the Complainant a complete and chronologically accurate account of each incident of sexual assault. It was not surprising, in the circumstances, that there might have been some gaps and/or confusion in the accounts of the incidents which they obtained from the Complainant.

  101. [49] As for the Complainant herself, she testified that she could have forgotten specifically to mention to the doctors that digital penetration took place during the first incident. In cross-examination, she also explained that during the interview with Dr Yash on 29 September 2021, she had been pre-occupied with thoughts of other matters such as “family problems”, which she said included her parents’ “expectations” and her mother’s habit of comparing her with her brothers. Defence counsel suggested that the Complainant’s testimony was unbelievable. I did not find it to be so. It should be remembered that the Complainant was at the material time a 14-year-old adolescent who had been unable to reunite with her mother and to return to her family home after being brought to MSF on 24 September 2021. I did not find it surprising that she should have been in a distracted state of mind on 29 September 2021 and/or that she should have been fretting about her family situation. The fact that neither the medical examination on 29 September 2021 nor the psychiatric evaluation on 7 December 2021 was designed to extract from her a complete set of facts surrounding each sexual assault also meant that there was no reason for her to set aside her pre-occupation with family problems and to concentrate on recalling the exhaustive details of each assault.

  102. The Accused’s admissions

  103. [50] Importantly, the Complainant’s account of the first incident in March 2021 was consistent with and corroborated by the Accused’s admissions.

  104. [51] In his VRI statements, the Accused said he could not remember when exactly the first incident took place. He thought it could have been in April or May 2021, on a Saturday morning after his wife had left for work. According to the Accused, he did not have penile-vaginal intercourse with the Complainant on this occasion − which was consistent with the Complainant’s evidence. When IO Chew informed the Accused that their investigations showed he had inserted his finger into the Complainant’s vagina in March 2021, he admitted rubbing the Complainant’s vagina, although he claimed he could not remember whether he had also inserted his finger into her vagina. He also admitted that he had touched her vagina by putting his hand “under [her] shirt, from the bottom” through the waistband of her shorts and underneath her underwear, and also that he had touched her breast underneath her brassiere – all of which was, again, consistent with the Complainant’s evidence.

  105. [52] Subsequently, in his cautioned statement of 30 September 2021, the Accused admitted to digitally penetrating the Complainant’s vagina with his finger and expressed remorse for his actions. He stated that he was “sorry”, that he wanted to “beg for leniency, lighter sentence, lower amount of bail”, and that it would be his “first…and last offence”.

  106. [53] In sum, therefore, the Accused’s admissions in his VRI and cautioned statements corroborated the Complainant’s account of the first incident.

  107. The Complainant’s psychological trauma and her account of sexual assaults to various individuals

  108. [54] On the other hand, I did not accept the Prosecution’s argument that the psychological trauma demonstrated by the Complainant also corroborated her account of the first incident in March 2021.

  109. [55] It is well-established that a complainant’s distress in the immediate aftermath of an incident can be corroborative evidence (Haliffie bin Mamat v PP and other appeals [2016] 5 SLR 636 at [64]–[66]; GDC v PP [2020] 5 SLR 1130 at [14]). In this case, however, the demonstrations of distress which the Prosecution relied on – eg, the Complainant crying when recounting the sexual assaults to her teacher on 24 September 2021 – all occurred months after the first incident in March 2021. Given the length of time which had elapsed between the first incident and the distress observed on 24 September 2021, it was possible that such distress arose from other causes not associated with the alleged offence (see Goh Han Heng v PP [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374 at [30]).

  110. [56] The fact that the Complainant had told various individuals about being sexually assaulted by the Accused was also not in itself corroboration of the Complainant’s testimony about the first incident. By the time the Complainant spoke with individuals such as her friend, her then-form teacher, Dr Yash and Dr Parvathy, months had already passed since the first incident. Further, in so far as her friend and her teacher were concerned, the Complainant did not disclose very much beyond confiding that she had been sexually assaulted by her stepfather. As for Dr Yash and Dr Parvathy, there were gaps in the accounts they recorded from the Accused of the first incident − although, as I noted earlier (at [47]–[49] above), there were reasonable explanations for these gaps. In the final analysis, the Complainant’s accounts of sexual assault to these assorted individuals showed at best that she was consistent in maintaining she had been sexually assaulted by the Accused, but could not be regarded as corroboration of her evidence about the first incident.

  111. Summary of the evidence in respect of the first incident in March 2021 (2nd Charge)

  112. [57] In sum, I found the Complainant to be a truthful witness; and while there were some gaps and omissions in her evidence about the first incident, her account of events was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI and cautioned statements.

  113. Existence of an exploitative relationship

  114. [58] In so far as the existence of an exploitative relationship formed an element of the 2nd charge, s 377CA(2)(a) of the Penal Code presumes that an accused person’s relationship with a minor below 18 years of age is exploitative where “the accused person is the … step-parent … of the minor”. The defence did not dispute this.

  115. The second incident in April or May 2021 (3rd Charge)

  116. The Complainant’s evidence

  117. [59] In respect of the second incident in May or April 2021 (the 3rd Charge), I found that the Complainant was also able to provide a generally consistent account.

  118. [60] In both her conditioned statement and her evidence in chief, the Complainant described the second incident as having taken place on a Saturday morning in April or May 2021. After her mother left for work, the Accused – who was lying on the bed – asked her for a hug. When the Complainant obliged by giving the Accused a hug, he pulled her to lie down on the bed. They then watched a video on his phone as they lay on the bed, facing the same direction. While in this position, the Accused put his hand under the Complainant’s shirt and brassiere and touched her breast. Next, he took the Complainant’s hand, guided it to his penis under his boxer shorts, and made her masturbate him by using his hand to move her hand up and down his penis (skin-to-skin). Following this, he removed her shorts and underwear, before pulling her to lie on top of him. At this point, he had also removed his boxer shorts. He then inserted his penis into the Complainant’s vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After a while, he pulled the Complainant off and ejaculated on the bed. The Complainant felt shocked and did not know what to do.

  119. [61] The Complainant was unable to recall some of the details of this second incident: for example, while she could recall that the Accused had used his hand to insert his penis into her vagina, she could not recall whether he had used one hand or both hands. As I explained earlier at [44], however, having had the opportunity to observe the Complainant in the witness stand and having reviewed her evidence, I found her to be an honest witness. I was satisfied that her inability (or reluctance) to recall certain specifics of the sexual assaults was a reflection of the distress and angst caused by her circumstances – as opposed to being an indication of a lack of probity.

  120. The Accused’s admissions

  121. [62] The Complainant’s account of the incident of penile-vaginal penetration in April or May 2021 was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI statements. The Accused stated that he had penile-vaginal intercourse with the Complainant for the first time sometime in April or May 2021. According to the Accused, the Complainant was on top of him when he inserted his penis into her vagina, and he pulled her off before he ejaculated. This was consistent with the Complainant’s account (although the Accused’s recollection was that he had ejaculated on his underwear). The Accused also admitted to having touched the Complainant’s breast in the course of this second incident in April or May 2021 – which was, again, consistent with the Complainant’s account.

  122. Summary of the evidence in respect of the second incident in April or May 2021 (3rd Charge)

  123. [63] For the same reasons I explained earlier at [56], I did not find that the demonstrations of psychological trauma by the Complainant could amount to corroboration of her evidence about the second incident in April or May 2021. For the same reasons set out at [56], while the accounts of events she provided to persons such as her teacher showed that she had generally been consistent in maintaining that she was sexually assaulted by the Accused, they did not amount to corroboration of her evidence about the second incident.

  124. [64] In sum, while there were some gaps and omissions in the Complainant’s evidence about the second incident, her testimony was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI statements.

  125. The third incident in June or July 2021 (4th Charge)

  126. The Complainant’s evidence

  127. [65] In respect of the third incident in June or July 2021 (the 4th Charge), the Complainant’s account in her conditioned statement was consistent with her testimony at trial. According to the Complainant, on this occasion, the Accused was on the bed when he called her over to lie on the bed next to him. As the Complainant was lying next to him, the Accused put his hand under the Complainant’s shirt and brassiere and touched her breast. Next, while the Complainant was lying supine on the bed, the Accused lifted her shirt and brassiere and sucked on her nipples. He then pulled the Complainant on top of him, removed his boxer shorts, and pulled her shorts and underwear to one side before inserting his penis into her vagina. In her testimony at trial, the Complainant testified that she felt a bit of pain when the Accused inserted his penis into her vagina, although she did not experience any bleeding. The Accused moved his buttocks up and down in this position for a while, after which he pulled the Complainant off and ejaculated on the bed.

  128. [66] As with her account of the earlier incidents, there were some gaps in the Complainant’s recollection of the third incident. For example, she could not remember certain specific details such as the extent to which her shorts and underwear were pulled down. She also could not remember if there were stains on the bedsheet after the Accused ejaculated on the bed. However, as I explained earlier at [44], she struck me as being on the whole an honest witness. I was satisfied that her inability and/or reluctance to recall certain details of the sexual assaults was a reflection of the stress and anguish caused by her circumstances – and not an attempt at dissimulation.

  129. The Accused’s admission

  130. [67] As with the earlier incidents, the Complainant’s evidence about the third incident was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions. In his VRI statement of 24 September 2021, the Accused admitted to having engaged in penile-vaginal penetration of the Complainant on one occasion in June 2021, during the June school holidays. The Accused stated that on this occasion, his penis had “hardened” while the Complainant was lying on top of him, and that his erect penis had “slipped” into the Complainant’s vagina. He also claimed that he had inserted his penis into her vagina “just a little” and demonstrated this to the recording officer by indicating the first section of his finger.

  131. Summary of the evidence in respect of the third incident in June or July 2021 (4th Charge)

  132. [68] For the reasons I explained earlier at [56], I found that neither the demonstrations of psychological trauma by the Complainant nor her accounts of sexual assaults to her teacher and other persons could amount to corroboration of her evidence about the third incident.

  133. [69] To sum up the third incident, while the Complainant’s recollection of this incident was less than perfect, her testimony was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI statement.

  134. The fourth incident in August 2021 (5th Charge)

  135. The Complainant’s evidence

  136. [70] In respect of the fourth incident in August 2021 (the 5th Charge), the Complainant’s testimony was consistent with her conditioned statement and also elaborated on a number of the details of the sexual assault. The Complainant testified that this fourth incident took place on a Saturday morning. The Accused started by asking the Complainant to lie on the bed with him. When the Complainant obliged and lay down on the bed beside him, the Accused touched the Complainant’s breast under her shirt and brassiere. Next, he removed her shorts and underwear before proceeding to lick her vagina (skin-to-skin). As this was happening, the Complainant was lying supine on the bed while the Accused was positioned at the foot of the bed, facing the Complainant. The Accused subsequently removed his boxer shorts and pulled the Complainant to lie on top of him while he himself lay supine on the bed. He then inserted his penis into the Complainant’s vagina and moved his buttocks up and down for a while before pushing the Complainant off and ejaculating on the bed.

  137. [71] Although the Complainant could not remember certain details about the fourth incident when cross-examined, I did not consider these gaps in her recollection to be fatal to her credibility. For one, some of the details that she was asked to recall were in my view either irrelevant to the elements of the alleged offence or at best of peripheral relevance: for example, how the Accused had removed his boxer shorts and where he had placed the boxer shorts after removing them. Further, as I noted earlier (at [42]−[44]), there was a reasonable explanation for the Complainant’s inability (or reluctance) to recount certain details of the sexual assault; and I was satisfied that such inability (or reluctance) was not an indication of untruthfulness.

  138. The Accused’s admissions

  139. [72] The Complainant’s evidence of the fourth incident was moreover corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI statement. In his VRI statement of 24 September 2021, the Accused admitted that on one occasion in August 2021, he had engaged in penile-vaginal penetration of the Complainant. The Accused stated that on this occasion, he had inserted his penis into the Complainant’s vagina while she was lying on top of him. He added that he had not inserted his penis fully and demonstrated this to the recording officer by indicating two sections of his finger. According to the Accused, on this occasion he had also ejaculated outside of the Complainant – which was consistent with the Complainant’s account of the incident.

  140. Summary of the evidence in respect of the fourth incident in August 2021 (5th Charge)

  141. [73] For the reasons explained earlier at [56], I found that neither the demonstrations of psychological trauma by the Complainant nor her accounts of sexual assaults to her teacher and other persons amounted to corroboration of her evidence about the fourth incident.

  142. [74] In sum, while there were some gaps in C’s recollection of this fourth incident, her evidence was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions in his VRI statement.

  143. The fifth incident in August 2021 (6th Charge)

  144. [75] According to the Complainant, there was a second, separate occasion of penile-vaginal penetration by the Accused in August 2021.

  145. No admission by the Accused

  146. [76] Unlike the other incidents described in the 1st to the 5th (as well as the 7th and 8th) Charges, the Complainant’s account of the fifth incident (6th Charge) was not corroborated by any admissions from the Accused. In so far as penile-vaginal intercourse was concerned, the Accused’s evidence in his VRI statement of 24 September 2021 was that in the period between the first and the last time he had penile-vaginal sex with the Complainant, there were “four or five” other similar incidents. However, the Accused admitted in the same VRI statement to only one incident of penile-vaginal sex in the month of August 2021.

  147. No other corroborative evidence

  148. [77] For the reasons explained earlier at [56], I found that the demonstrations of psychological trauma by the Complainant and her accounts of sexual assaults to her teacher and other persons could not amount to corroboration of her evidence about the fifth incident. At best, the signs of psychological trauma noted from late September onwards, as well as the narrative she presented to various individuals in that period, showed that she was consistent in maintaining she had been sexually assaulted by her stepfather – but they did not corroborate her assertion that there was a second, separate occasion of penile-vaginal penetration by the Accused in August 2021.

  149. The application of the “unusually convincing” standard to the Complainant’s evidence on the fifth incident

  150. [78] As the Court of Appeal held in GCK –

  151. [89] …In the absence of any other corroborative evidence, the testimony of a witness, whether an eyewitness or an alleged victim, becomes the keystone upon which the Prosecution’s entire case will rest. Such evidence can sustain a conviction only if it is “unusually convincing” and thereby capable of overcoming any concerns arising from the lack of corroboration and the fact that such evidence will typically be controverted by that of the accused person: see the decision of this court in AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”) at [111].

  152. [90] Put simply, the “unusually convincing” standard entails that the witness’s testimony alone is sufficient to prove the Prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt: see Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890 at [73]…

  153. [emphasis in original]

  154. [80] I should emphasise that this finding in no way implied any dishonesty on the Complainant’s part. As I have repeatedly highlighted in these written grounds, I found the Complainant to be an honest witness: she showed no inclination towards embellishment or artifice, even when pressed in cross-examination. Nevertheless, even honest witnesses may have less than perfect recollection; and in the absence of any corroborative evidence, I did not find it safe to convict the Accused of the 6th Charge based solely on the Complainant’s testimony alone.

  155. The sixth incident in September 2021 (1st, 7th, and 8th Charges)

  156. The Complainant’s evidence

  157. [81] The sixth incident involved three separate charges of penile-vaginal penetration, penile-oral penetration, and digital-vaginal penetration (the 1st, 7th and 8th Charges). The Complainant’s evidence, per her conditioned statement and her testimony at trial, was that this incident had taken place on a morning sometime between 4 September and 12 September 2021. On this occasion, the Accused again asked her for a hug while he was lying on the bed. When the Complainant climbed onto the bed to give him a hug, the Accused removed the Complainant’s shorts and underwear and licked her vagina (skin-to-skin). At this point, the Complainant was lying supine on the bed while the Accused was positioned at the foot of the bed, facing her.

  158. [82] Next, the Accused removed his boxer shorts and pulled the Complainant to lie on top of him. He then inserted his penis into the Complainant’s vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After a while, he pushed the Complainant off and ejaculated on the bed.

  159. [83] Thereafter, the Accused moved to lie diagonally across the bed, with his head at the foot of the bed. At this point, the Complainant was lying on top of the Accused, with her legs at the foot of the bed. In this position, the Accused’s head was facing the Complainant’s vagina, while his penis was positioned near the Complainant’s face: ie, they were in the “69” sexual position. The Accused then used his hands to put his penis into the Complainant’s mouth and moved his buttocks up and down. At the same time, he licked her vagina (skin-to-skin). After a while, he ejaculated into the Complainant’s mouth.

  160. [84] The Complainant’s account of the penile-vaginal and penile-oral penetration on this occasion in September 2021 (the 1st and 7th Charges respectively) was more detailed than her account of the earlier incidents. She was able to describe, for example, how she and the Accused had both been lying diagonally across the bed just prior to the “69” sexual position; and she also recalled that after ejaculating into her mouth during the “69” sexual position, the Accused went to the bathroom to shower, while she went to the kitchen sink to spit out the semen in her mouth.

  161. [85] The main gap in the Complainant’s evidence about the sixth incident was her omission to mention the act of digital-vaginal penetration (the 8th Charge) in either her conditioned statement or her testimony at trial. There appeared to be an oblique partial reference to this act of digital-vaginal penetration in Dr Yash’s report: when examined by Dr Yash on 29 September 2021, the Complainant had alluded to two incidents of digital-vaginal penetration. It may be noted that of the eight charges against the Accused, two concerned digital-vaginal penetration. However, Dr Yash’s report did not mention the dates of these two incidents of digital-vaginal penetration. The Prosecution did not ask the Complainant to explain this reference in her evidence-in-chief; and when the Complainant was cross-examined about this portion of Dr Yash’s report, she stated that she could not remember telling him about the two incidents. Ultimately, however, the gap was not fatal to the Prosecution’s case on the 8th Charge, because it was the Accused himself who volunteered – in not inconsiderable detail – the evidence of this act of digital-vaginal penetration in his VRI statements, in addition to corroborating the Complainant’s account of the penile-vaginal and penile-oral penetration.

  162. The Accused’s admissions

  163. [86] In his VRI statement of 29 September 2021, the Accused claimed that while the Complainant was hugging him, she had “crossed her leg over [his] stomach” and “fiddle[d]” with his shorts. He went on to describe how he had pulled her to lie on top of him, “play[ed]” with her breast, and helped her remove her pants before removing his own shorts and inserting his penis into her vagina. He then moved his buttocks up and down. According to the Accused, as he was moving, the Complainant too moved her buttocks up and down. He “[took] out” his penis and “shift[ed]” the Complainant away before ejaculating. His recollection was that after shifting the Complainant away from him, he “immediately” put his boxer shorts and underwear back on before ejaculating into his underwear.

  164. [87] Next, the Accused described how he got himself and the Complainant into the “69” position. It was in this context that the Accused described how, in addition to licking the Complainant’s vagina, he had inserted a finger into her vagina. He was able to recall that it was his right index finger and that he had inserted the finger up to the depth of “two lines” on his finger.

  165. Summary of the evidence in respect of the sixth incident in September 2021 (1st, 7th & 8th Charges)

  166. [88] For the reasons explained at [56], I found that neither the demonstrations of psychological trauma by the Complainant nor her accounts of sexual assaults to her teacher and other persons amounted to corroboration of her evidence about the sixth incident.

  167. [89] To recapitulate: the Complainant’s evidence about the penile-vaginal penetration and penile-oral penetration was corroborated by the Accused’s admissions. While there was a gap in C’s account of this incident in that she did not mention the act of digital-vaginal penetration, the gap was filled by the Accused himself, who volunteered to IO Chew the details of this act during the VRI on 29 September 2021. Indeed, the Accused was asked by IO Chew to confirm that for the incident in September 2021, he had engaged in penile-vaginal penetration, penile-oral penetration, and digital-vaginal penetration. He affirmed that this was the case.

  168. [90] Leaving aside the 6th Charge (in respect of which I found it unsafe to convict on the basis of the Complainant’s uncorroborated testimony), all the other seven Charges alleged that the sexual acts described therein were committed without the Complainant’s consent. In both her conditioned statement and her evidence-in-chief, the Complainant stated that the sexual acts were carried out by the Accused without her consent. In her evidence-in-chief, the Complainant testified that when the Accused asked her for hugs, she had obliged by going over to the bed to hug him because it was “a regular routine” for her to give hugs to him, and she was concerned that if she refused to do so, it “might seem like a bit weird”. In the course of the sexual assaults carried out by the Accused, she had sought to resist the Accused during the various incidents by “[trying] to move away from him when [she] was on top of him” and trying to “push [herself] off and then lie down on [her] back”. However, she was unsuccessful in her attempts as the Accused was stronger and would just “pull [her] back up again”. She did not shout for help during these incidents as she did not think that anybody would hear her.

  169. [91] I accepted the Complainant’s assertion that she did not consent to any of the sexual acts carried out by the Accused. The fact that she did not adopt more aggressive tactics for resisting the sexual assaults – such as screaming and fighting off the Accused – did not, in my view, indicate any sort of consent on her part to the sexual acts. As the High Court astutely pointed out in GBR v PP and another appeal [2018] 3 SLR 1048 (at [20]), “victims of sexual crimes cannot be straitjacketed in the expectation that they must act or react in a certain manner”. In the present case, the Complainant’s reaction to the sexual assaults had to be seen in the context of her personal and family circumstances. Not only was she a sexually inexperienced adolescent at the time of these assaults, the perpetrator of these assaults was a man who had − in the several years prior – become the first and the only father figure in her life.

  170. [92] I also noted, in addition, that the Accused did not challenge the Prosecution’s case on the lack of consent: defence counsel did not ask the Complainant any questions about the issue of consent and did not deal with this issue in his written submissions.

  171. [93] In her conditioned statement, the Complainant stated that she “knew it was not right for [the Accused] to be doing these sexual acts to [her]”, and that she did not tell anyone – including her mother, [W] − about the incidents of sexual assaults because she was scared. I deal with the issue of the Complainant’s delay in reporting the sexual assaults at [96]–[98] below.

  172. The accused’s defence did not raise a reasonable doubt

  173. [94] Leaving aside the 6th Charge, I also found that the Accused’s defence did not raise a reasonable doubt in respect of the Prosecution’s case on the other seven Charges. I set out below my reasons for rejecting the arguments raised by the Accused.

  174. The Complainant’s delay in coming forth

  175. [95] First, the Accused argued that the Complainant’s delay in coming forward to report him for sexual abuse suggested that the sexual acts never took place.

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