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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Jan 2025
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General Division of the High Court

The defendants were liable in deceit for false statements that led to an acquisition

Vibrant Group Ltd v Tong Chi Ho and others

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[2025] SGHC 14Case no. Suit No 1046 of 2020

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The defendants were liable in deceit for false statements that led to an acquisition

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff, Vibrant Group Limited (“Vibrant”), a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore and listed on the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”), acquired Blackgold International Holdings Pty Ltd (“Blackgold Australia”) and its group of companies under a scheme of arrangement on 13 July 2017 for a purchase price of A$ 37,635,863 (the “Acquisition”).

  3. [2] Blackgold Australia is the ultimate holding company of a group of companies (collectively, the “Blackgold Group”). Blackgold Australia is the sole shareholder of Blackgold Holdings Hong Kong Limited (“Blackgold HK”). In turn, Blackgold HK wholly owns Chongqing Heijin Industrial Co., Ltd (“Heijin”), a company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).

  4. [3] Heijin is itself the parent company of various companies incorporated in the PRC. These PRC subsidiary companies (the “PRC Subsidiaries”) were in the business of coal mining, coal trading and/or commodities logistics in Chongqing and include the following:

  5. [4] Caotang, Heiwan, Changhong and Baolong (collectively, the “Coal Mining Entities”) were part of the Blackgold Group’s coal mining arm, with each Coal Mining Entity owning one coal mine. Heijin was in the business of coal trading, while Blackgold Shipping was said to be in the business of commodities logistics and shipping.

  6. [5] In the course of its annual audit of Vibrant’s financial statements for the year ending on 30 April 2018, Vibrant’s auditors, KPMG LLP (“KPMG Singapore”) found irregularities and recommended to Vibrant’s Audit Committee that further investigations be carried out to ascertain the existence, accuracy, and completeness of the assets and liabilities acquired by Vibrant in its acquisition of Blackgold Australia.

  7. [7] At trial, neither Mr Tong nor Mr Peng gave evidence. After considering the evidence and arguments, I am of the view that Vibrant’s claim in deceit is made out. My reasons follow.

  8. Background

  9. [8] Blackgold Australia was incorporated on 8 July 2010 and was listed on the Australian Securities Exchange through an initial public offering (“IPO”) on 22 February 2011. At Blackgold Australia’s IPO, Vibrant subscribed for 38.5m shares for a price of A$ 10.1m, through a wholly owned subsidiary.

  10. Acquisition of Blackgold Australia

  11. [9] In early 2014, Mr Tong approached the CEO of Vibrant, Mr Khua Kian Keong (“Mr Khua”), regarding the prospect of Vibrant fully acquiring Blackgold Australia. Negotiations were also ongoing at the time with another party, Matex International Limited, which subsequently announced on 1 April 2016 that it was no longer pursuing its proposed acquisition of Vibrant (the “Proposed Matex Sale”).

  12. [10] Vibrant thereafter commenced its evaluation of the proposed acquisition of Blackgold Australia (the “Review Process”), which lasted from August to October 2016. Vibrant’s Finance Team (the “Finance Team”) which assisted this review comprised then-Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Vibrant, Mr Simon Sim (“Mr Sim”), Mr John Lim, and Mr Yong Kar Ming (“Mr Yong”).

  13. [11] On 9 September 2016, Mr Tong and Mr Tin visited Vibrant’s office in Singapore to give a presentation regarding the Blackgold Group to some of Vibrant’s executives (the material used is referred to in the Statement of Claim and here as the “Corporate Presentation”), including Mr Sim and the then-Chief Investment Officer of Vibrant, Mr Thomas Woo. The Corporate Presentation set out information on the Blackgold Group’s purported coal mining assets and business operations.

  14. [12] On 10, 15 and 21 September 2016, Mr Tin provided the Finance Team with various financial documents, by way of a thumb drive and emails. These financial documents comprised the following (referred to in para 21(f) of the Statement of Claim as the “Blackgold Financial Documents”):

  15. (a) the management accounts of the respective entities of the Blackgold Group up to July 2016 (including the ageing reports of the respective Blackgold Group entities for the half year ended on 30 April 2016), which were provided to Vibrant’s Finance Team on 21 September 2016;

  16. (b) the consolidated management accounts of the Blackgold Group for the financial years of 2015 and first half of 2016 (collectively with (a) above, the “Management Accounts”), which were provided to Vibrant’s Finance Team on 15 September 2016;

  17. (c) the audited financial reports of Blackgold Australia for the financial years ended in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (the “Audited Financial Reports”), which were provided to Vibrant’s Finance Team on 15 September 2016 through a thumb drive (the “15 September Thumb Drive”);

  18. (d) the Corporate Presentation, which was sent by email to Vibrant’s Finance Team on 10 September 2016; and

  19. (e) a business plan for Blackgold Shipping comprising, amongst others, an explanation of Blackgold Shipping’s business and operations, analysis of China’s inland shipping and freight industry and shipping policy, and Blackgold Shipping’s development plans (the “Shipping Business Plan”) provided to Vibrant’s Finance Team on 15 September 2016 via the 15 September 2016 Thumb Drive. A similar copy with formatting changes was sent on 26 September 2016.

  20. [13] The Finance Team then travelled to the Blackgold Group’s headquarters in Chongqing from 19 to 22 September 2016 to collect information and documents (the “Pre-Acquisition Chongqing Trip”), and also meet with Mr Tong, Mr Peng, and other key members of Blackgold Group’s management. During the Pre-Acquisition Chongqing Trip, Mr Peng and Mr Tong suggested that some members of the Finance Team visit the coal mines purportedly owned by Caotang and Heiwan (the “Mines Visit”). The Mines Visit was organised by Mr Peng’s personal assistant, Ms Tian Zongling (“Ms Tian”). Mr Sim, Mr John Lim, Yao Wenming (the Chief Geologist and Engineer of the Blackgold Group), Brian Varndell (an external geologist), and Mr Tin attended the Mines Visit. While Vibrant contends in this suit that these mines were closed at the time of the Mines Visit, those who attended were given the impression that the mines were operational at the time, with mine workers seen transporting coal out of the mines in wheelbarrows. Photographs were taken.

  21. [14] On the same trip, the Finance Team also met with and interviewed the management of the Blackgold Group, including Mr Tong, Mr Peng, Mr Tin, and one Chen Shaokui (“Mr Chen”). Mr Chen was Blackgold Group’s then-Head of Finance and Accounts. The delineation of roles between Mr Tin, as the CFO of the Blackgold Group, and Mr Chen, as the Head of Finance and Accounts, was that Mr Chen would manage the day-to-day accounting and book-keeping functions of the Blackgold Group, while Mr Tin’s focus, as the CFO, was on corporate transactions. A copy of the Blackgold Group’s ten largest suppliers and customers (“Top Customer List”) was also provided to Vibrant’s Finance Team during this trip.

  22. [15] On 22 September 2016, the Finance Team met Mr Tong, Mr Chen, Mr Peng, Mr Peng’s personal assistant, and Blackgold Group’s then-General Manager, Mr Ou Jun, who was also Mr Peng’s brother-in-law (the “22 September Meeting”). Further representations were allegedly made at the 22 September Meeting, and a copy of the minutes of the meeting (the “22 September Meeting Minutes”) were subsequently circulated by Mr Tin to the attendees.

  23. [16] Following the Review Process, the Finance Team reviewed and summarised the information and documents with which it had been provided with during the Review Process. Based on the said information and documents, it prepared and issued an internal report dated 10 October 2016 (the “Financial Review Report”). The Financial Review Report was provided to Vibrant’s Board of Directors.

  24. [17] In addition, in early 2017, Vibrant was informed that the audited interim financial report of Blackgold Australia for the half year ended on 30 April 2016 and the audited financial report of Blackgold Australia for the financial year ended on 31 October 2016, were publicly available for download via the Australian Stock Exchange website.

  25. [18] Vibrant completed the Acquisition on 13 July 2017. At the time of the Acquisition, Mr Tong owned around 5.7% of the shares of Blackgold Australia, while Mr Peng owned, through another entity, approximately 61.3% of the shares of Blackgold Australia.

  26. Events following the Acquisition

  27. [19] Sometime in May 2018, Vibrant’s auditors, KPMG Singapore commenced its annual audit of Vibrant’s financial statements for the year ending on 30 April 2018. KPMG Singapore informed Vibrant in June 2018 that it was unable to complete the audit as it had identified certain irregularities and discrepancies in respect of coal mining and coal trading receipts and sales invoices of some of the PRC Subsidiaries (the “Irregularities”). KPMG Singapore recommended that additional procedures be carried out to ascertain the existence, accuracy, and completeness of the assets and liabilities acquired by Vibrant in the Acquisition.

  28. [20] Following this, Mr Khua verbally instructed Mr Peng to retain and preserve all the files, records and documents in the Blackgold Group’s headquarters in Chongqing, to be reviewed and examined by Vibrant’s staff and appointed auditors.

  29. [21] Mr Tin travelled to Chongqing on 19 June 2018. On 20 June 2018, he met Mr Peng and Mr Chen at the Blackgold Group’s office in Chongqing to discuss the Irregularities (the “First Chongqing Meeting”). It is disputed whether Mr Tong was present at this meeting. The significance of this meeting is that Mr Peng and Mr Chen allegedly made some admissions. The attendees acknowledged the presence of fabrications in the financial information and concluded that the only way to ascertain the extent of the fabrication in the financial information was to revise the same by removing the fraudulent transactions (the “Clean-Up Exercise”).

  30. [22] On 22 June 2018, Mr Peng instructed Mr Chen to work on the Clean-Up Exercise. The finance staff of the Blackgold Group performed the Clean-Up Exercise over the next few weeks by manually keying in transaction information arising from hard copy supporting documents into the XinZhongDa accounting system used by Blackgold Group. While this was ongoing, Mr Chen periodically sent Mr Tin, in multiple tranches, revised financial information for various entities in the Blackgold Group arising from the Clean-Up Exercise. Eventually, Mr Tin compiled the revised financial information into a set of revised management accounts as of 30 June 2017 and 30 April 2018 (the “Revised Management Accounts”), which he sent to KPMG Huazhen.

  31. [23] On 20 July 2018, Mr Khua and a member of the Finance Team, Mr Yong, travelled to Chongqing. Mr Khua, Mr Sim, Mr Peng and Mr Tin met at Blackgold’s Chongqing office (the “Second Chongqing Meeting”). An audio recording of the meeting was (surreptitiously) made by Mr Tin. Mr Peng is alleged to have made various admissions in the Second Chongqing Meeting.

  32. [24] Later that same day, Mr Khua and Mr Tin met Mr Chen at the same office (“Third Chongqing Meeting”, and collectively with the Second Chongqing Meeting, the “Recorded Chongqing Meetings”). Mr Peng later joined the meeting. Like before, Mr Tin surreptitiously recorded this meeting and Mr Peng is alleged to have made various admissions at this meeting.

  33. [25] Finally, on 25 July 2018, Mr Peng, Mr Tong, Mr Chen, one Liu Haiming (“Mr Liu”), Mr Tin and Mr Yong met in Mr Peng’s office. During the course of this meeting (the “Extended Clean-Up Exercise Discussion”), Mr Peng suggested a new, total clean-up exercise of the accounts (the “Extended Clean-Up Exercise”). Mr Peng assigned Mr Liu to be in charge of the Extended Clean-Up Exercise. Mr Liu said that he would lead the Extended Clean-Up Exercise from Fengjie county, where Mr Peng was previously a government official, and that some of the financial documents in Chongqing would be moved to Fengjie county for this purpose. When Mr Liu asked for two weeks to complete the Extended Clean-Up Exercise, Mr Tin and Yong disclosed the fact that a Special Audit was imminent to explain why two weeks was too long.

  34. [26] Mr Khua had in the meantime returned to Singapore. When he discovered on 26 July 2018 that the documents were going to be moved to Fengjie county, he instructed that the documents should not be moved out of Chongqing city. Mr Tin tried to stop the movement of documents, but Mr Liu said that the documents were already on the way to Fengjie county. Mr Liu agreed to return the documents upon being pressed.

  35. [27] Despite various excuses and assurances by Mr Peng and Mr Chen, the documents were not returned. For more than a week, Mr Tin repeatedly sought but received no answers from various Blackgold personnel. Finally, on the morning of 9 August 2018, Mr Chen informed Mr Tin that he would arrange for the books and records to be transported to Chongqing City on the same day. At 1.11pm on the same day, Mr Chen sent Mr Tin a photo via WeChat, which showed that the books and records had been loaded onto a Honda Odyssey to be transported to Chongqing.

  36. [28] Later in the afternoon of the same day, Mr Tin was informed by Chen that the motor vehicle transporting the books and records had caught fire and had been destroyed (the “Fire Incident”). Mr Chen confirmed on 10 August 2018 that all the physical books and records of Blackgold Group for the past ten years up to April 2018 were destroyed in the fire. Mr Tin proceeded to make a police report in Fengjie county.

  37. [29] On 16 August 2018, the Fengjie County Public Security Bureau issued a report which stated that the fire could have been caused by a mechanical failure of the motor vehicle. However, on 5 December 2018, the Chongqing Fire Bureau (at the provincial level) issued a Decision on the Fire Re-investigation, revoking the decision previously made by the Fengjie County Public Security Bureau, and stating that “the cause of the fire is found to be incorrect”.

  38. [30] On 21 August 2018, Vibrant’s Audit Committee appointed a Special Auditor to conduct a Special Audit. The Special Audit Report was issued on 24 January 2019.

  39. Issues

  40. [31] As a preliminary matter, I first consider the implications of the Defendants’ failure to give evidence.

  41. Absence of evidence from defendants

  42. [32] Neither Mr Tong nor Mr Peng gave evidence. Mr Tong submitted that there was no case to answer at the end of the claimant’s case. Mr Peng did not testify nor call witnesses to testify on his behalf.

  43. [35] The parties did not dispute that the evidential rules set out in the Court of Appeal case of Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 304 (“Ma Hongjin”) apply in the present case. Therefore, it suffices for Vibrant to establish a prima facie case on each of the essential elements of the claim.

  44. (a) Under general law, the plaintiff bears the legal burden of proving its case against the defendant in a civil case on a balance of probabilities (at [24]). The legal burden is the burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence of any relevant fact necessary to make out its claim on a balance of probabilities (at [27]). The evidential burden is the responsibility to “contradict, weaken or explain away the evidence that has been led” (at [28]).

  45. (b) A party’s establishment of a prima facie case on a particular fact on which it bears the legal burden denotes the point at which the evidential burden will shift to the defendant (at [30]).

  46. (c) Where a defendant submits that there is no case to answer, the plaintiff fulfils its burden of proving its case on a balance of probabilities by establishing a prima facie case on each of the relevant facts in issue (at [31]−[32]).

  47. [36] Relevantly, a prima facie case entails the following:

  48. (a) The court assumes that any evidence led by the plaintiff is true, unless it was inherently incredible or out of common sense (Lena Leowardi v Yap Cheen Soo [2015] 1 SLR 581 (“Lena Leowardi”) at [24]).

  49. (b) If circumstantial evidence is relied on, it does not have to give rise to an irresistible inference as long as the desired inference is one of the possible inferences (Lena Leowardi at [24]).

  50. (c) The evidence is subjected to a minimal evaluation as opposed to a maximal evaluation. However, if there is no evidence in support of any fact in issue, or any evidence is manifestly unreliable and should be excluded from that score, a submission of no case to answer will succeed (Relfo Ltd v Bhimji Velji Jadava Varsani [2008] 4 SLR(R) 657 at [20]).

  51. [37] Furthermore, it is undisputed that, while the court would expect relatively stronger and more cogent evidence before reaching a conclusion of fraud, the standard of proof does not change merely because fraud is alleged: see Chua Kwee Chen and others (as Westlake Eating House) and another v Koh Choon Chin [2006] 3 SLR(R) 469 at [39]; Syed Ahmad Jamal Alsagoff (administrator of the estates of Shaikah Fitom bte Ghalib bin Omar Al-Bakri and others) and others v Harun bin Syed Hussain Aljunied and others and other suits [2017] 3 SLR 386 at [50].

  52. Issues for determination

  53. [38] The elements of the tort of deceit were set out in the recent Court of Appeal decision of UniCredit Bank AG v Glencore Singapore Pte Ltd [2023] 2 SLR 587 (“UniCredit”) at [53], citing its previous decision of Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (“Panatron”) at [14]. These are that:

  54. [39] The essence of the tort of deceit is fraud, and this tort vindicates the right not to be lied to (UniCredit at [53]). It is not a defence to the tort that the claimants acted incautiously and failed to take steps to verify the truth of the representations which a prudent man would take: see Panatron at [24].

  55. [40] At trial, the Defendants did not dispute that the representations asserted in the Statement of Claim had in fact been made prior to the acquisition. These representations, which are set out in full in Annex 1, fall into five broad categories.

  56. (a) First, the “Coal Trading Representations”, which included representations that the Blackgold Group’s coal trading business was profitable and contributed to a significant portion of the Blackgold Group’s total revenue.

  57. (b) Second, the “Mining Representations”, that the coal mines owned by Caotang and Heiwan were active and would remain so, while Baolong’s dormant coal mine was in a position to commence substantial production in due course.

  58. (c) Third, the “Shipping Transportation Representations”, that Blackgold Group had a well-established and profitable shipping transportation business operated by Blackgold Shipping.

  59. (d) Fourth, the “Receivables Representations”, that the Blackgold Group had no significant aged debts due and owing to it, and that the Blackgold Group faced no issues with collection of its receivables.

  60. (e) Fifth, the “Overall Value Representations”, that the Blackgold Group ran profitable business operations, had significant growth potential, and was worth significantly more than the Acquisition Price and represented a good investment.

  61. [41] The defendants dispute the following:

  62. [42] For the reasons below, I find on the requisite standard of proof that Vibrant succeeds in its claim for deceit and has proved its loss arising therefrom. It is therefore unnecessary for me to deal with the alternative claim in negligent misrepresentation and I do not do so.

  63. Were the Representations representations of fact?

  64. [43] An actionable representation for the purposes of an action in deceit must be a representation of fact (POA Recovery Pte Ltd v Yau Kwok Seng and others and another appeal [2022] 1 SLR 1165 (“POA Recovery”) at [102]) being “a statement of present fact and not one with any element of futurity” (POA Recovery at [103], citing Tan Chin Seng and others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 307 (“Raffles Town Club”) at [21]). This makes it vital to differentiate between an actionable representation and a future promise (Raffles Town Club at [21]). Furthermore, statements of opinion do not constitute actionable misrepresentations (POA Recovery at [103]).

  65. [44] The statements listed at paras 25(d)(i), 25(d)(ii), 26(a)(viii), 26(c)(iii), 26(c)(iv), 27(b)(v) and 27(c)(ii) of Annex 1 were statements of opinion and or broad non-specific ambitions for the future and I exclude them from the analysis. The remaining alleged representations are termed in this judgment as “Representations of Fact”.

  66. Were the Representations of Fact made by Mr Tong and Mr Peng?

  67. Parties’ positions

  68. [45] The Defendants argue that Vibrant cannot prove that the Defendants were the ones who made the Representations.

  69. [46] Mr Tong’s general case is that Vibrant’s evidence fails to prove that Mr Tong manipulated, or instructed the manipulation of, the affected financial documents and records. As for Mr Peng, his arguments on this issue can be condensed into the following points:

  70. (a) Mr Peng was not involved in preparing, presenting, reporting, declaring, affirming and/or providing the Blackgold Financial Documents. Mr Tin was the person who provided the Blackgold Financial Documents to Vibrant, and on Mr Tin’s own account, Mr Peng did not know exactly what documents Mr Tin had passed to Vibrant. Nor had Mr Peng expressly told the Finance Team that Mr Tin was providing the documents on his behalf. Neither did he prepare the Management Accounts, Top Customer List, the Audited Financial Reports, the Corporate Presentation, or the Shipping Business Plan.

  71. (b) Mr Peng did not make any representations at the 22 September Meeting. As for the 22 September Meeting Minutes, these were not representations from Mr Peng as he did not prepare the minutes, the minutes were sent to the Finance Team by Mr Tin who did not copy Mr Peng, and the 22 September Meeting Minutes do not record the identity of the party or parties who made the statements therein.

  72. [47] Vibrant rebuts these arguments by its response that the Blackgold Financial Documents were endorsed, affirmed and/or approved by the Defendants, and provided to Vibrant with their authorisation. It is not necessary for the Defendants to have personally uttered each and every representation, or personally communicated the same to Vibrant. All that is required is that each of Mr Peng and Mr Tong intended the misrepresentation to be communicated to Vibrant through a third party: United Overseas Bank Ltd v Lippo Marina Collection Pte Ltd and others [2023] 4 SLR 202 (“UOB v Lippo (HC)”) at [109].

  73. [48] The tort of deceit requires that the defendant make a false statement to the plaintiff. As a starting point, this generally requires that the defendant himself engage in some kind of a positive act or representation, with mere silence being insufficient (Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (Michael A Jones, Anthony M Dugdale, Mark Simpson gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 23rd Ed, 2020) (“Clerk & Lindsell”) at para 17−06). Various forms of active non-verbal conduct, nevertheless, may amount to a misrepresentation (Clerk & Lindsell at para 17−08), such as pledging goods knowing one has no title to them, or ordering goods on credit for someone known to be insolvent, or presenting company accounts to a buyer in the knowledge that they have been doctored (citing MAN Nützfahrzeuge AG v Freightliner Ltd [2005] EWHC 2347 (Comm) at [79] onwards). In some cases, the mere doing of business with another may in itself carry a representation that the business is bona fide and in accordance with established practice (Clerk &Lindsell at para 17−08, citing Lindsay v O’Loughnane [2012] BCC 153 at [100]−[119]). Furthermore, there is no need for the false representation to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff directly; it is sufficient that the defendant intended the misrepresentation to be communicated to the plaintiff through a third party: see UOB v Lippo (HC) at [109], referencing Gary Chan Kok Yew & Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016 at para 14.016). Finally, a person may be liable in deceit as a joint tortfeasor if he is a knowing and active party to a scheme to defraud, even if he has not himself said anything and the actual representation has been made by someone else (Clerk &Lindsell at para 17−10, citing Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 601 (“Dadourian”) at [72]−[94]).

  74. [49] I assess the dispute in this context.

  75. Analysis

  76. [50] Vibrant’s case is that the misrepresentations were made to it through the following means:

  77. (i) early discussions (the “Initial Discussions”); and/or

  78. (ii) subsequently during the 22 September Meeting and at other points of the Pre-Acquisition Chongqing Trip.

  79. [51] I deal with these various categories in turn.

  80. The Audited Financial Reports and Management Accounts

  81. [52] The Representations of Fact contained in the Audited Financial Reports may be attributed to the Defendants by virtue of the Directors’ Declaration in each report signed by Mr Tong. I reproduce the example from 2014; the others largely follow the same format, with at most minor changes in wording:

  82. [53] This declaration, signed by Mr Tong, is a representation that emanated from him. As for Mr Peng, while he did not sign the Directors’ Declaration himself, he has made representations to Mr Tong (see S/N 2 in the extract above) which Mr Tong then communicated to the world at large. In making these representations to Mr Tong, Mr Peng must have known that these representations would feature in the Audited Financial Reports. This leads to the further inference that Mr Peng intended for his representations to be communicated to a class of recipients (those relying on the Audited Financial Reports). Mr Peng has not adduced any evidence to show otherwise. I thus find that the representation originated from Mr Peng despite being made through Mr Tong.

  83. [54] Therefore, the Directors’ Declaration amounts to an express representation by Mr Peng and Mr Tong that the various representations in the Audited Financial Statements are true. In short, they adopted the representations in the Audited Financial Statements.

  84. [55] Regarding the Management Accounts, it was accepted that Mr Chen prepared these. The Defendants sought to distance themselves while Mr Tin’s understanding was that Mr Chen took instruction from either Mr Peng or Mr Tong. Pertinently, the Management Accounts were important documents, foundational to any buyer’s review. Mr Tong and Mr Peng both knew that they would be sent to Vibrant. It is logical to infer that Chen prepared them with Mr Tong and Mr Peng’s knowledge, under their authority and with their approval. Mr Khua’s evidence was also that Mr Tong, despite his title as a non-executive chairman, and Mr Peng were the controlling minds and business drivers of the Blackgold Group. As the Defendants furnished no evidence to the contrary, Vibrant has raised sufficient evidence to fulfil its burden of proof in relation to the Management Accounts.

  85. The Corporate Presentation

  86. [56] Mr Tong does not appear to dispute in his submissions that he was present at the Corporate Presentation, though he disputes his involvement therein. However, Mr Tin’s evidence, which he maintained under cross-examination, is that Mr Tong had personally prepared and/or updated the slides for the Corporate Presentation (“Corporate Presentation Slides”). Mr Tin’s evidence is not inherently incredible. Mr Tong would have spearheaded the presentation as Chairman of Blackgold Australia. I find that Mr Tong made the representations in the Corporate Presentation.

  87. [57] As for Mr Peng, since he was not at the Corporate Presentation, he is not responsible for the representations therein. Mr Tin conceded in cross-examination that he was not aware that Mr Peng prepared or provided the Corporate Presentation to Mr Tong. The evidence indicates that Mr Tong was familiar with operational details, and thus it cannot be inferred that Mr Peng must have assisted Mr Tong on this presentation.

  88. Shipping Business Plan and Top Customer List

  89. [58] For the Shipping Business Plan and Top Customer List, there is no evidence regarding whether Mr Tong or Mr Peng had any role in preparing these specific documents. On Mr Tin’s evidence, Mr Tong rarely discussed operational matters. Mr Tin also testified that Mr Peng did not prepare the Shipping Business Plan. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to find that the representations in the Shipping Business Plan or Top Customer List were made by Mr Tong or Mr Peng.

  90. The oral representations

  91. (1) Initial Discussions

  92. [59] Mr Khua’s evidence was that various statements were made by Mr Tong in early conversations when Mr Tong and him met for breakfast or tea, at the restaurants in the Marina Bay Sands hotel lobby or at the lounge on the 55th floor, to discuss the profitability and growth potential of the Blackgold Group. These would have been understood to be preliminary conversations to be followed by documentation and checks. Indeed the Review Process thereafter followed. An alternative frame would be to hold that there would be no reasonable reliance on these early conversations.

  93. (2) 22 September Meeting

  94. [60] Mr Yong’s evidence was that Mr Tong and Mr Peng made various statements to the Finance Team during the Pre-Acquisition Chongqing Trip, including during the 22 September Meeting. He also remembered that during the 22 September Meeting, the Finance Team queried Mr Tong and Mr Peng on certain issues, to which Mr Peng responded. Mr Tin’s testimony largely corroborated Mr Yong’s evidence. Their accounts are not inherently incredible and are further supported by contemporaneous evidence in the form of the 22 September Meeting Minutes. These had been prepared by Mr Peng’s personal assistant, and were circulated by Mr Tin on 26 September 2016. They show that the topics mentioned by Mr Yong and Mr Tin were indeed covered at the meeting.

  95. [61] I am not persuaded by Mr Peng’s submission that he did not make any representations at the 22 September Meeting. Mr Peng’s main argument in this regard is that Mr Tin could not recall whether Mr Peng had in fact made certain statements during the 22 September Meeting, and that Mr Yong also could not identify which statements were made specifically by Mr Peng. But that is not exactly what the witnesses said. Mr Tin and Mr Yong maintained thatMr Peng and Mr Tong had made the statements, but they could not remember, as between Mr Peng and Mr Tong, who had made certain statements. Given the passage of time since the 22 September Meeting, it is unsurprising that Mr Tin and Mr Yong could not remember who, as between Mr Peng and Mr Tong, had made certain statements; conversely, their straightforward answers reinforce their honesty as witnesses. In any event, the statements at the 22 September Meeting may be attributed to both Mr Peng and Mr Tong as they chaired and were the main players at the 22 September Meeting. It was a presentation by, or an interview of, the key members of Blackgold Australia’s management. Their chairing the meeting and affirming the presentation was a positive act amounting to an adoption of the other presenters’ or interviewees’ statements.

  96. [62] For the avoidance of doubt, I do not find that the 22 September Meeting Minutes themselves contain any representations. I agree with Vibrant that they are merely corroborative evidence of the representations made during the 22 September Meeting.

  97. Summary of which representations were made by the Defendants

  98. [63] To summarise, I find that:

  99. [64] The Representations of Fact which are not attributable to either Mr Tong or Mr Peng (see [63(a)] above) are at paras 25(c), 27(b)(i)−27(b)(iv), and 29(a) in Annex 1. All the Representations of Fact which are attributable to at least one of the Defendants are termed, at the next stage, as “Attributable Representations of Fact”. I next consider whether any of the Attributable Representations of Fact were false.

  100. Falsity

  101. Parties’ positions

  102. [65] Vibrant alleges that all the Representations were false. Mr Tong appears to take no position on the falsity of the Representations, save that if the Representations were false, Mr Tong had no part in making them. Mr Peng, however, argues that the Representations were not false for the following reasons:

  103. (a) Belinda Tan did not travel to Chongqing and thus could not testify as to the veracity of the documents obtained by the Special Auditor’s team.

  104. (b) The transactions or financial information of the Blackgold Group prior to 1 July 2017 were not within the temporal scope of the Special Audit Report. Consequently, the Special Auditor did not make any conclusions as to whether the Audited Financial Reports contained false or inaccurate information.

  105. (c) The Special Audit Report did not make conclusive findings on the Coal Trading Representations, Mining Representations, and the Shipping Transportation Representations, but made speculations that were mere conjecture.

  106. [66] I disagree with these objections. First, Mr Peng’s objection that Belinda Tan never travelled to Chongqing is spurious. The team worked under her direction, they reported to her regularly, and she would check in with the team face-to-face to observe the progress of the investigation. Given the extent of the investigation, it is understandable that she could not conduct every interview or personally verify each and every document that the team reviewed. This does not detract from the accuracy of the Special Audit Report, or the Special Auditor’s process of investigation. This is sufficient for the purposes of a prima facie case. Second, while the remit of the Special Audit may be limited to the Review Period, the court may draw appropriate inferences from any facts that the Special Audit may have uncovered, even if the inferences which I draw fall outside the Review Period. Third, the reason that the Special Audit did not make a conclusive finding on the Representations is that the time period of the Representations fell outside the Review Period of the Special Audit, which was defined as lasting from 1 July 2017 to 30 April 2018. The fact remains that the Special Audit uncovered various facts and pieces of evidence which allow me to infer that the statements made were false.

  107. [67] I therefore turn to examine whether each of the Attributable Representations of Fact was false.

  108. Were the Attributable Representations of Fact false?

  109. The Mining Representations

  110. [68] The Attributable Representations of Fact falling within the category of the Mining Representations are set out at paras 26(a)(i)−26(a)(ix), 26(a)(ix), 26(b), 26(c)(i), 26(c)(ii) and 26(d) of Annex 1.

  111. [69] There is insufficient evidence of the mine lives and coal reserves of the Caotang, Heiwan and Baolong Mines to conclude whether the representations at paras 26(a)(i), 26(a)(ii), 26(a)(v) and 26(a)(ix) of Annex 1 were false. The remainder of the Mining Representations were false because: (a) the Heiwan and Caotang Mines were closed and/or ceased operations prior to the Acquisition and remained so thereafter; and (b) the Baolong Mine was closed and was unlikely to have received significant investment. I elaborate.

  112. [70] The Special Audit uncovered several pieces of evidence pointing to the Heiwan Mine being closed prior to the Acquisition. First, a notice issued by the Chongqing Municipal People’s Government on 23 August 2016 stated that the Heiwan Mine was to be closed by 10 September 2016 (the “23 August 2016 Notice”). Second, Heiwan had received compensation of around RMB 8m from the government at the end of 2017 for the closure of the Heiwan Mine – this was verified by Heiwan’s original bank statements obtained directly from the banks, as well as through inquiries made by Vibrant’s legal counsel, Zhonghao Law Firm. Third, the monthly production reports show that the Heiwan Mine had no production from May 2017 to April 2018 (April 2018 being the latest date reflected on the production reports). In view of this evidence, I infer that the Heiwan Mine was indeed closed, at the latest, by early 2017, and probably as early as 10 September 2016. Thus the representations as to the Heiwan’s Mine’s output and Heiwan’s sales (at paras 26(a)(vi), 26(a)(vii), 26(b) and 26(c)(i) of Annex 1) were false.

  113. [71] Regarding the Caotang Mine, the main piece of evidence that points to it being closed arose from the Special Auditor’s inquiry with the Fengjie County Administration Bureau of Safety Working (a “confirmation request”). The bureau responded to this confirmation request that “Caotang had closed its mine and ceased operation since 22 January 2016 and only resumed operations on 26 July 2018”. However, even when the Special Auditor visited the premises of the Caotang Mine on 5 September 2018, after the stated period in the confirmation request, the Special Auditor observed that: (a) the coal mine was not in operation and there was no employee working at the site; (b) the main entrance to the coal mine was closed and locked; and (c) the majority of the infrastructure and property, plant and equipment were located in the coal mine wells and were not properly tagged. From the foregoing, I infer that the Caotang Mine had closed on 22 January 2016 at the latest. I also infer from the Special Auditor’s further verification via its visit on 5 September 2018 that the Caotang Mine had not in fact subsequently reopened. Thus the representations regarding the output and sales of the Caotang Mines (set out at paras 26(a)(iii), 26(a)(iv), 26(b) and 26(c)(i) of Annex 1) were false.

  114. [72] The most important implication of my finding that the Caotang Mine was closed since 22 January 2016 is that its sales figures must, as a matter of mathematical logic, have been false. I explain. For the period of 1 November 2015 to 30 April 2016, Caotang recorded sales of RMB 64.27m, and for the longer period of 1 November 2015 to 31 October 2016, it recorded sales of RMB 134.58m. Mathematically, this means that Caotang’s recorded sales from 1 May 2016 to 31 October 2016 must be RMB 134.58m less RMB 64.27m, which is RMB 70.31m. Having accepted that Caotang’s mine was closed from 22 January 2016 onwards (until 2018 at the earliest), Caotang cannot have generated any actual sales during the period of 1 May 2016 to 31 October 2016. Therefore, I infer that the RMB 70.31m of sales recorded for that period were false. Furthermore, since the sales figures of Caotang were a component of Heijin’s sales figures, the overstatement of Caotang’s sales also undermines the truth of any representations regarding the coal trading revenue of Heijin, as I discuss later.

  115. [73] As for the Baolong Mine, the evidence suggests that it was unlikely to have received significant investment. First, the Baolong Mine had been shut down prior to the Acquisition, with Baolong receiving RMB 5m in compensation from Wushan County Baolong Town Finance Bureau in December 2016 and June 2017 for the closure of the mine. The Special Auditor had reached this conclusion based on Baolong’s bank statements obtained directly from the banks. Second, there was a notice issued by the Chongqing Administration of Land Resources and Building dated 27 November 2017, stating that the mining permit of the Baolong Mine had been automatically cancelled upon expiry on 21 September 2017. This means that the Baolong Mine could only have been open until 21 September 2017 at the latest. Furthermore, I note that the list is titled “List of Automatic Abolition of the Mining License for Closed Mines”, which suggests that the Baolong Mine’s permit was cancelled as a result of it being already closed or non-operational prior to the date of expiry of the licence. This is prima facie evidence that the Baolong Mine was likely closed in or around early 2017, and its mining licence certainly expired on 21 September 2017. In view of this, and given that operations at the Baolong Mine were allowed to lapse, I am prepared to infer that there was little to no investment in the Baolong Mine (see para 26(c)(ii) of Annex 1).

  116. The Coal Trading Representations

  117. [74] The Attributable Representations of Fact falling within the category of the Coal Trading Representations are set out at paras 25(a)(i)−25(a)(iv), 25(b)(i) and 25(b)(ii) of Annex 1. They were false because the coal trading revenue purportedly earned by Heijin, the main contributor to the Blackgold Group’s coal trading business, was likely significantly inflated and/or entirely fabricated. There are several pieces of evidence pointing to this.

  118. [75] First, the entire sales of Heijin amounting to RMB 2bn during the Review Period was excluded in the revised Management Accounts, which had been prepared after excluding the falsified transactions. In other words, the truth is that Heijin had no sales during the Review Period. This is a significant overstatement of Heijin’s sales. I find it likely that, if Heijin had zero sales during the Review Period, it would have low or zero sales just prior to the Review Period. It is not likely in the ordinary course of events that Heijin would have, in line with the Representations, been generating significant sales volume just before the Review Period but suddenly recorded zero sales immediately once the Review Period commenced.

  119. [76] Second, Caotang’s sales figures were clearly overstated by around RMB 70.31m (see [72] above). As Caotang’s sales were a component of Heijin’s sales figures, the overstatement of the former would have contributed to the overstatement of the latter.

  120. [77] Therefore, I infer that the revenue figures for earnings by Heijin, and thus the Blackgold Group’s coal trading business prior to the Acquisition, were false. This renders the Attributable Representations of Fact at paras 25(a)(i)−25(a)(iv), 25(b)(i) and 25(b)(ii) of Annex 1 false.

  121. The Shipping Transportation Representations

  122. [78] The Attributable Representations of Fact falling within the category of the Shipping Representations are set out at paras 27(a) and 27(c)(i) of Annex 1. The Shipping Representations painted a picture that Blackgold Shipping was operating a well-established and profitable shipping transportation business. However, the Special Auditor uncovered evidence indicating that Blackgold Shipping’s vessels were time-chartered, contradicting the Shipping Representations.

  123. [79] Of the eight vessels, the Special Auditor managed to find a copy of the actual chartering contracts for two of them, Guoping #16 and Guoping #18, which spanned the period from 3 September 2015 to 2 September 2018 (for Guoping #16) and from 23 October 2015 to 22 October 2018 (for Guoping #18). These were signed by a manager of one of Blackgold’s subsidiaries, on behalf of Blackgold Shipping and the chartering customers. Therefore, there is objective evidence that at least Guoping #16 and Guoping #18 were time-chartered to customers starting from before the Acquisition.

  124. [80] As for the other vessels, the Special Auditor did not manage to find any direct evidence that they were time-chartered prior to the Acquisition. However, Mr Tin relayed information from one Mr Yao Qinping (“Qinping”), an employee of Blackgold Shipping, who had knowledge of the shipping business of Blackgold Shipping (Qinping refused to be interviewed by the Special Auditor due to concerns regarding his personal safety and reputation). Mr Tin stated that Qinping told him the following:

  125. [81] Furthermore, the Special Auditor discovered an outsourcing agreement dated 27 April 2018 (the “Outsourcing Agreement”), within an email titled “Blackgold Shipping operational outsourcing agreement (27 April 2018)” dated 2 May 2018. The Outsourcing Agreement entitled Guoxing, the counterparty to the Outsourcing Agreement, to take over the operations of Blackgold Shipping, including its eight vessels, from 28 April 2018 to 31 December 2021 for a fee of approximately RMB 17.8m.

  126. [82] The Outsourcing Agreement is significant because it contained the expiry dates of the then-existing chartering contracts for the eight shipping vessels and their respective annual charter fees (presumably to facilitate Guoxing’s taking over of the ships upon the expiry of the chartering contracts). These existing chartering contracts would have been the same ones that Blackgold Shipping had entered into at or around the time of the Acquisition, such that the Outsourcing Agreement provides evidence of their existence. These chartering contracts, signed individually for each ship, were due to expire around April to October 2018 (the expiry date for each ship being different). The total annual charter fees payable under these chartering contracts were stated as amounting to RMB 5.4m. Admittedly, it was not clear from the Outsourcing Agreement exactly when the chartering contracts commenced; however, I am prepared to infer that the chartering contracts likely lasted at least one year (given the reference to annual chartering fees). Given that their expiry dates were around one year after the Acquisition (April 2017), I am prepared to infer that the chartering contracts likely commenced prior to the Acquisition, and therefore, the eight vessels owned by Blackgold were time-chartered prior to the Acquisition.

  127. [83] I now turn to Blackgold Shipping’s revenue. First, the transaction descriptions in the sales ledger showed the recorded sales and accounts receivable to have been generated from freight sales. But, as I have explained above, it is likely that the eight vessels were all time-chartered, which means they could not have been used to provide freight services. Second, since the sum total of the maximum annual charter fees that could be earned under the chartering agreements set out in the Outsourcing Agreement was RMB 5.4m, this calls into question Blackgold Shipping’s recorded sales of RMB 42.46m from 1 November 2015 to 31 October 2016, which happens to be a period of one year. The inference is that the recorded sales of Blackgold Shipping for that period could be overstated by at least RMB 37.06m (being RMB 42.46m less RMB 5.4m). Third, based on an analysis of Blackgold Shipping’s ledgers and its original bank statements obtained from the banks, the Special Auditor found that moneys earned from chartering the vessels were not transferred to Blackgold Shipping’s accounts directly from the chartering customers, but were instead transferred to Blackgold Shipping via intermediaries. The lack of apparent logic in the routing of the money casts further doubt on the veracity of Blackgold Shipping’s sales for the Review Period.

  128. [84] Therefore, based on the evidence, I infer that all of the ships owned by Blackgold Shipping were time-chartered. The Attributable Representations of Fact specified at paras 27(a) and 27(c)(i) of Annex 1 were false.

  129. The Receivables Representations

  130. [85] The three Attributable Representations of Fact falling within the category of the Receivables Representations set out at paras 28(a), 28(b) and 28(c) of Annex 1 were false, for the following reasons.

  131. (1) Significantly aged debt due and owing from Liupanshui

  132. [86] First, the Special Auditor found a significantly aged debt from Liupanshui of approximately RMB 21.57m allegedly due to Heijin. This debt arose from a coal sales contract between Heijin and Liupanshui signed in July 2013. As of 30 June 2014, the outstanding payment for goods owed by Liupanshui amounted to RMB 21.57m. It bears mentioning that Heijin had commenced its claim against Liupanshui for this debt well prior to the Acquisition – in fact, the statement of claim was accepted by the intermediate court on 16 November 2016. The court judgment issued by the Second Intermediate Court of Chongqing, in respect of the action brought by Heijin against Liupanshui, was dated 29 August 2017. For completeness, the Special Auditors did not find any cash inflow to Heijin’s bank accounts from either Liupanshui or its guarantor (Guizhou Shengxin Minerals Group Investment Co Ltd) during the Review Period. As the debt was incurred latest on 30 June 2014, it was significantly aged as of the time of the Acquisition. The representation set out at para 28(a) of Annex 1 was false.

  133. (2) A major debtor was insolvent at the time of Acquisition

  134. [87] Second, Heijin recognised account receivables of approximately RMB 118.01m due from Changxing Southern Mechanical and Electrical Supplies Co Ltd (“Changxing Southern”). This debt arose from nine sales contracts for coal between Heijin and Changxing Southern since 2012. The outstanding payment was guaranteed by three companies and six individuals. Heijin submitted its statement of claim to the court in respect of its claims against Changxing Southern on 17 April 2017, and the Court of Changxing County in Zhejiang County issued a judgment dated 13 July 2017. Changxing Southern and two of its guarantors were declared insolvent by the court on 15 March 2017 and subsequently liquidated. This was prior to the Acquisition. Therefore, Changxing Southern owed significant trade receivables to Heijin and had defaulted prior to the Acquisition. The statement set out at para 28(b) of Annex 1 was false.

  135. (3) Receivables purportedly due and owing were not acknowledged by debtors

  136. [88] Third, approximately RMB 179.51m was due from Fengjie Xinyu Minerals Co Ltd (“Fengjjie Xinyu”). The Special Auditor attempted to verify this amount by sending a confirmation letter to Fengjie Xinyu on 12 September 2018 to confirm the balance and related transactions but received no response. The Special Auditor’s further efforts to contact Fengjie Xinyu on 7 November 2018 by way of telephone calls went unanswered. The Special Auditor also conducted a site visit to the registered address of Fengjie Xinyu on 6 September 2018 but found that the address belonged to another company called Fengjie Liucun Agricultural Development, which was unrelated to Mr Peng and his affiliates. Ultimately, the Special Auditor could not confirm if there was a debt due from Fengjie Xinyu, or whether Fengjie Xinyu itself even existed. The statement set out at para 28(c) of Annex 1 was false.

  137. The Overall Value Representations

  138. [89] The Attributable Representations of Fact falling within the Overall Value Representations are set out at paras 29(a) and 29(b)(i)−29(b)(iv) of Annex 1. In view of the falsity of the previous categories of representations, especially those relating to the financial state of the various entities in the Blackgold Group, it follows that the Overall Value Representations, to the extent that they relate to the value of the Blackgold Group, were also false.

  139. [90] In addition, the auditors discovered that the Blackgold Group had maintained multiple sets of accounting records for Caotang and Heiwan in the XinZhongDa accounting system, each of which differed significantly from the other sets. Some of these records were labelled “Listing” and “Tax”, among others. The “Listing” records appeared to correspond to the Management Accounts (before revision). On the other hand, the “Tax” records appeared to be for the purpose of reporting to the local tax authorities as the figures therein were consistent with the relevant records filed with the tax authorities in the PRC. Further, the “Tax” records showed the lowest amount of non-current assets for both Caotang and Heiwan, presumably to reduce the tax liabilities of those entities. Worse, the XinZhongDa accounting data appears to have been modified up until the date of 15 August 2018, which is after the Fire Incident on 9 August 2018. This is problematic because any modification of the XinZhongDa accounting data should have been done pursuant to the Clean-Up Exercise, which in turn was supposedly premised on hard copy supporting documents (see [22]). The fact that modifications to the XinZhongDa accounting data were still taking place after the physical records were destroyed suggests that the modifications were made without any basis.

  140. Conclusion on Falsity

  141. [91] In the next section, I exclude the statements that were not false, and refer to the remaining statements as the “Attributable False Representations of Fact”.

  142. Knowledge

  143. [92] For Mr Tong and Mr Peng to be liable in the tort of deceit, they must have made the Attributable False Representations of Fact with the knowledge that the Attributable False Representations of Fact were false, or alternatively, they must have made the Attributable False Representations of Fact recklessly.

  144. Parties’ positions

  145. [93] Vibrant submits that Mr Tong and Mr Peng made the representations knowing that they were false, or recklessly, for the following reasons:

  146. (a) First, given their positions in the Blackgold Group, the Defendants must have known that the Blackgold Financial Documents were false given their degree of involvement in the business.

  147. (b) Second, the Defendants’ decision to rapidly commence the Clean-Up Exercise after the discovery of the Irregularities indicates that they knew about the falsities at all material times.

  148. (c) Third, Mr Peng made key admissions on multiple occasions which show that he knew the Representations were false at the material time. Mr Peng also implicated Mr Tong.

  149. (d) Fourth, the Fire Incident suggests that Mr Tong and Mr Peng had an incentive to destroy evidence that was unfavourable to them.

  150. [94] Mr Tong distances himself from the fraud, although he does not appear to deny that the falsifications occurred. He makes the following points:

  151. (a) First, Mr Tong had no reason to suspect or know that the accounts were fabricated as they were audited, and reviewed by the CFO, the Audit Committee, and the Board of Blackgold Australia.

  152. (b) Second, upon discovering the fraud, Mr Khua did not demand that Mr Tong give up the proceeds that Mr Tong received from the Acquisition. In any case, Mr Khua had no good reason to suspect that Mr Tong had instructed the fabrication of the accounts just because Mr Tong was the Chairman of Blackgold Australia prior to the Acquisition.

  153. (c) Third, Mr Tin had no specific evidence that Mr Tong was aware of the falsification of the accounts. Just because Mr Peng implicated Mr Tong does not mean that Mr Tong was in fact aware of the falsification. There was also no reason for Mr Peng to have to explain to Mr Tong that he was conducting the Clean-Up Exercise if Mr Tong was responsible for the falsification.

  154. (d) Fourth, Mr Tong was not present at the First Chongqing Meeting. In any event, if Mr Tong had known that the accounts were fabricated, there would be no need for Mr Tong to have a serious talk with Mr Peng after Mr Peng confessed to the same.

  155. [95] Mr Peng’s overall submission on this point is that Vibrant has not adduced enough circumstantial or direct evidence to make out a prima facie case that he made the representations knowing that they were false, or recklessly.

  156. (a) First, it was Mr Chen, and not Mr Peng, who was in charge of preparing the financial accounts and/or records of the Blackgold Group. Therefore, he would not have known that the Blackgold Financial Documents contained false financial information.

  157. (b) Second, the audio recordings of the Recorded Chongqing Meetings shows that Mr Peng was not aware of any falsification of the financial information of the Blackgold Group prior to the Acquisition. In any case, he did not admit that he had personally created the falsifications.

  158. Hearsay objections

  159. [96] I first address Mr Tong’s submission that the parts of the testimonies of Mr Khua and Mr Tin implicating the Defendants constitute inadmissible hearsay. Counsel for Mr Tong does not appear to appreciate that the Evidence Act allows for hearsay statements to be admitted under certain conditions. This includes where a person is compellable but refuses to give evidence, and where a person cannot be produced as a witness. I reproduce the relevant portions of s 32 of the Evidence Act:

  160. [97] Section 32(1)(j)(iv) was applied in the Court of Appeal decision of Gimpex Ltd v Unity Business Holdings and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”). One of the parties had tried to admit a report which had been written by a surveyor, who was unwilling to come to court (Gimpex at [124]). The Court of Appeal held that the fact that the party had attempted to procure the attendance of the makers of the report, but the witnesses had refused, was sufficient for the report to be admitted under s 32(1)(j)(iv) of the Evidence Act (Gimpex at [127]). In the present case, the two Defendants are competent but have refused to give evidence. Vibrant cannot be reasonably expected to do more to secure their attendance. Therefore, I admit all the statements made by Vibrant’s witnesses regarding the statements of Mr Tong and Mr Peng pursuant to either s 32(j)(iii) or s 32(j)(iv) of the Evidence Act. For completeness, I also do not exercise my discretion under s 32(3) to exclude any of the same.

  161. Analysis

  162. [98] I now turn to consider the evidence giving rise to the inference that Mr Tong and Mr Peng knew that the Relevant Representations were false at the time they were made. In particular, I infer that Mr Peng was involved in the falsifications, and that Mr Tong knew about these falsifications due to his close working relationship with Mr Peng.

  163. Mr Peng was involved in the falsifications

  164. [99] As a starting point, Mr Peng admitted that the financial accounts and records of the Blackgold Group had been inflated and falsified. Vibrant alleges that these admissions were made on a number of occasions, which I now go through in chronological sequence.

  165. (1) The First Chongqing Meeting

  166. [100] The First Chongqing Meeting took place after KPMG Singapore identified the Irregularities, and Mr Tin came to Chongqing on 20 June 2018 (see [21] above). This was the month before the executives of Vibrant, including Mr Khua, came to Chongqing. Mr Tin convened this meeting between Mr Peng, Mr Tong, Mr Chen and himself to discuss the Irregularities. On Mr Tin’s evidence, Mr Peng and Mr Chen admitted that they had fabricated some of the transactions, and that some of the sales figures reflected in the financial information and management accounts were inflated. He maintained this position in cross-examination. Mr Tin’s account of the meeting is not inherently incredible, as it is plausible for the key personnel of Blackgold to have been more candid in an internal meeting without Vibrant’s executives. Therefore, I infer that Mr Peng made these admissions.

  167. (2) The meeting with Mr Tom Huang

  168. (3) The Second Chongqing Meeting

  169. [102] On 20 July 2018, Mr Khua and various employees of Vibrant arrived in Chongqing and convened the Second and Third Chongqing Meetings (see [23]−[24] above). They took place one after another on the same day. I term these two meetings the Recorded Chongqing Meetings as they were surreptitiously recorded in audio recordings by Mr Tin, with transcripts of the same and translations thereof subsequently being produced by Vibrant.

  170. [103] However, the transcripts were of poor quality, and were not vetted by Mr Tin initially. He admitted on the stand that parts of the translated transcript did not reflect the speakers’ meaning. There were also typographical errors such as an identification of Mr Khua as “Mr Huo”, when there was no such “Mr Huo”. Mr Tin then conceded that he had neither gone through the translated transcript “in detail” nor verified if all the speakers had been correctly identified. As I pointed out to the parties, it was not acceptable for the identification of the speakers to have been done by anyone other than Mr Tin, given that the transcripts formed part of his evidence. After I gave Mr Tin an opportunity to go through the audio recordings and check the translated transcripts, Vibrant presented a revised set of translated transcripts to the court. Nevertheless, a perusal of the revised translated transcripts did not aid Vibrant. There was no express admission by Mr Peng at this meeting that he fabricated the financial records of the Blackgold Group. Vibrant tries to rely on the fact that Mr Peng repeatedly apologised to Mr Khua and said that he felt guilty and sorry. These apologies do not necessarily lead to the inference that Mr Peng fabricated the accounts.

  171. [104] Furthermore, while Mr Khua claims that Mr Peng admitted to having manipulated or “dressed up” the accounts, there are a number of difficulties with this allegation. First, it is inconsistent with Mr Tin’s testimony that Mr Peng did not expressly admit to fabricating the accounts at the Second Chongqing Meeting. Second, Mr Khua claims that the term used by Mr Peng to refer to dressing up the accounts was “调账”, but in other parts of the transcript, the parties appear to use that same term to refer not to falsifying of the accounts, but to rectifying them based on the auditor’s requirements. Therefore, I find that Mr Peng did not make any express admissions that he had fabricated the accounts at the Second Chongqing Meeting.

  172. (4) The Third Chongqing Meeting

  173. [105] The Third Chongqing Meeting took place later on the same day (20 July 2018) as the Second Chongqing Meeting between Mr Khua, Mr Chen and Mr Tin. Mr Peng joined this meeting midway. A key exchange during the Third Chongqing Meeting occurred when Mr Khua raised the prospect of criminal liability at the meeting. He said that to avoid criminal liability, Vibrant management would need to know how the discrepancies in the financial documents and records had come about, what the extent of those problems were, and how they could be solved. In response, Mr Peng made some admissions. I reproduce the translated transcript of the exchange:

  174. This suggests that Mr Peng was involved in (having used the word “we”), and knew about, falsifications in the financial documents of the Blackgold Group. Furthermore, he also suggested that there could be some falsifications in the financial documents around the time of the Acquisition.

  175. [106] The translated transcript of the Third Chongqing Meeting corroborates Mr Tin’s testimony that Mr Peng admitted that he had made falsifications and that he took responsibility for the same.

  176. (5) The Extended Clean-Up Exercise Discussion

  177. [107] The Extended Clean-Up Exercise Discussion took place on 25 July 2018 between Mr Tin, Mr Yong, Mr Peng, Mr Tong, Mr Chen and Mr Liu. Mr Yong, who does not appear to have participated in the Recorded Chongqing Meetings, attended this meeting at the behest of Mr Tin, as Mr Khua had by this time returned to Singapore. While this meeting was not recorded unlike the Recorded Chongqing Meetings, there is an important documentary record of the meeting in the form of two contemporaneous logs kept by Mr Yong. The first was a daily log that he kept throughout this visit to Chongqing. More significantly, the second log was a specific “day log”, which Mr Yong kept for the day of 25 July 2018. The very fact that Mr Yong thought, at the time, to keep a specific day log for 25 July 2018 suggests that events of that day were indeed significant. Indeed, this was Mr Yong’s stated reason for keeping the day log.

  178. [108] Mr Yong’s daily log records the following under the entry for 25 July 2018:

  179. The day log for 25 July 2018 records the same comment as above, and more:

  180. [109] To be clear, what Mr Yong meant by “the falsified accounts dated before 2016 as previously claimed” is that the financial accounts and records of the Blackgold Group have been inflated and falsified prior to 2016, and possibly from 2011. This is a further admission following the revelations in the Third Chongqing Meeting, in which Mr Peng only admitted to making falsifications from 2017 onwards.

  181. [111] From Mr Peng’s various admissions during the First and Third Chongqing Meetings, the meeting with Mr Tom Huang, and the Extended-Clean Up Exercise Discussion, it is clear that Mr Peng was involved in the falsification of the financial documents of the Blackgold Group. I note at this juncture that this finding of knowledge disposes of Mr Peng’s argument, which I do not find credible in any event, that he is a “layperson” and had no idea that the Blackgold Financial Documents were false.

  182. Mr Tong was aware of the falsifications

  183. [112] I now explain the reasons why I find that Mr Tong was similarly aware that the Attributable False Representations of Fact were false.

  184. (1) Mr Tong and Mr Peng enjoyed a close working relationship

  185. [113] Mr Peng and Mr Tong had a close personal and working relationship. Mr Tin averred that Mr Tong and Mr Peng had an especially close relationship, in which Mr Peng would often invite Mr Tong to his home whenever Mr Tong was in Chongqing. Furthermore, Mr Peng’s only daughter addressed Mr Tong as godfather, and exchanged text messages with Mr Tong. Mr Tin’s description as to how Mr Peng and Mr Tong conducted the 22 September Meeting also suggests that they worked closely together:

  186. [114] Second, Mr Khua was also under the impression that Mr Peng and Mr Tong worked closely together to the extent that he regarded them as “one party”:

  187. [115] Third, Mr Peng himself alluded to his close working relationship with Mr Tong on a number of occasions during the Recorded Chongqing Meetings. From the Second Chongqing Meeting, where Mr Peng appears to be trying to appease Mr Khua by explaining the history of the Blackgold Group and why the various write-offs had to occur, Mr Peng gave an indication of the duration and depth of his working relationship with Mr Tong:

  188. And from the Third Chongqing Meeting:

  189. [116] Taken together, I find that Mr Peng’s description of his working relationship with Mr Tong, along with descriptions from Mr Tin and Mr Khua as to their observations of Mr Peng’s working relationship with Mr Tong, lead to the inference that Mr Peng and Mr Tong shared a close working relationship. In particular, the fact that all of Mr Peng’s “plans and strategies, from the date of listing”, were done with Mr Tong, makes it unlikely that Mr Tong would have been unaware of any fabrications that Mr Peng was involved in.

  190. (2) Mr Tong was not surprised by the revelation of the false records

  191. [117] Mr Tin’s evidence was that Mr Tong was not surprised by the revelation of the falsities in the First Chongqing Meeting of 20 June 2018. Preliminarily, while Mr Tong disputes his presence at this meeting, he did not give evidence. Mr Tin avers that Mr Tong was present, and Mr Tin has provided his sworn testimony at trial. Mr Tong has not. I accept Mr Tin’s sworn testimony.

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