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Grounds publishedDecided 18 Jul 2025

General Division of the High Court

The claim and counterclaim over a warehouse fire were dismissed, save for stamp duty

Feida Bus Consortium Pte Ltd v Royal Autoz Exporter Pte Ltd

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[2025] SGHC 141Case no. Suit No 122 of 2022

The decision, in one line

Not legal advice

The claim and counterclaim over a warehouse fire were dismissed, save for stamp duty

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [2], [3], [176]

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Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff in this action, Feida Bus Consortium Pte Ltd (“Plaintiff”), is the lessee of a property at No 6 Sungei Kadut Way (“Property”). Sited within the Property are several adjoining buildings, including a warehouse (“Warehouse”) which the Plaintiff rented to the defendant in this action, Royal Autoz Exporter Pte Ltd (“Defendant”).

  3. [2] This case arose from a fire that broke out at the Warehouse while it was tenanted by the Defendant. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant breached its duties in both contract and tort by, inter alia, (a) causing the fire and (b) failing to prevent its spread. The Plaintiff thus commenced the present action against the Defendant seeking damages for the destruction caused by the fire. The Defendant counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for the losses that it suffered from the fire, alleging that the Plaintiff breached its duty in both contract and tort by failing to properly maintain a hose reel in the Warehouse. It was the Defendant’s case that no water came out from the hose reel, resulting in the inability to extinguish the blaze.

  4. [3] After having heard the evidence at trial, I dismissed both the Plaintiff’s claim (save for an amount of $814, in respect of which the claim was allowed) and the Defendant’s counterclaim. My reasons for doing so are set out below.

  5. Facts

  6. [4] The Plaintiff is in the business of providing chartered bus services and conducting repair and maintenance of motor vehicles. At all material times, its sole director was one Goh Bock Sin (“Goh”). Goh was also the sole director of two other companies, E K Ang Trading and Transportation Pte Ltd (“E K Ang”) and Goh Transport Services Company Pte Ltd (“Goh Transport”), both of which also occupied the Property. The Defendant is in the business of purchasing deregistered vehicles, with a view to either exporting them or scrapping them for parts which it then sells. Since 2017, the Defendant’s operations were overseen by one Gabir Nabil Abdel Moaty Ahmed (“Gabir”).

  7. Layout of the Property

  8. [5] The Property’s built area was divided into four sections: A, B, C and D. A simplified plan of the sections is set out below:

  9. (a) Section A was a two-level compound occupied by the Plaintiff, with the lower level used for the Plaintiff’s vehicle maintenance and repair business and the upper level used as offices by the Plaintiff and Goh’s other companies.

  10. (b) Section B was the Warehouse that was tenanted to the Defendant – the red circle denotes the spot where the fire started.

  11. (c) Section C was another warehouse which, at the time of the fire, had been rented by the Plaintiff to another company.

  12. (d) Section D was a dormitory which, according to the Plaintiff, housed workers of the Plaintiff, E K Ang and Goh Transport.

  13. [6] The Warehouse was rented by the Defendant from the Plaintiff pursuant to a Tenancy Agreement dated 24 March 2020 (“Tenancy Agreement”) which was signed by Goh (on behalf of the Plaintiff) and Gabir (on behalf of the Defendant). The Tenancy Agreement stipulated a monthly rent of $15,000. It also specified that the tenancy would commence on 1 April 2020, but omitted to specify the exact duration of the tenancy. The Plaintiff contended that it was implied that the Tenancy Agreement was either for a 12-month duration or was a monthly tenancy, although this was not material to the key issues in dispute.

  14. [8] On 23 May 2020, the fire broke out. It is not in dispute that the fire originated from the Chery Car. That evening, the Defendant’s employees, including one Ganapathy Vaithiyanathan (“Ganapathy”) and one Mani, were present at the Warehouse. Also present was another resident of the dormitory, Mayavel Asaithambi (“Mayavel”). A key point of dispute in this case centred on what these men were doing in the Warehouse that evening:

  15. (a) The Plaintiff alleged that at the time the fire started, the Defendant’s employees (it was the Plaintiff’s case that Mayavel, like Ganapathy and Mani, was also an employee of the Defendant) were working either on the Chery Car or near it. The Plaintiff claimed that this had escalated the risk of, and ultimately started, the fire.

  16. (b) The Defendant maintained that its employees were there that evening merely to take possession of deregistered vehicles delivered to the Property and bring the same into the Warehouse for storage. The Defendant also clarified that Mayavel was not its employee.

  17. [9] At about 6.30pm, Ganapathy spotted flames underneath the Chery Car’s engine. He responded by using a forklift to elevate the Chery Car. Mayavel pulled a fire hose from a reel sited within the Warehouse, with a view to spraying the fire burning beneath the Chery Car which had been hoisted off the ground. The hose reel was yet another focal point of contention:

  18. (a) The Defendant claimed that no water came out of the hose when Mayavel tried to turn it on.

  19. (b) The Plaintiff claimed that the hose was working and that Mayavel was jetting the fire with water from the hose.

  20. [10] When the Chery Car was lifted, flammable liquid started leaking out of it. The liquid ignited as it leaked, causing the fire to spread. Ganapathy ultimately had to abandon the forklift. Various workers on the Property came running out with fire extinguishers to join the fight against the fire. They included one Zhang Jinhai, a mechanic working for E K Ang. According to the Defendant, Mani also came running out with a fire extinguisher to fight the fire. Despite everyone’s efforts, the fire engulfed the entire Chery Car and continued to spread, forcing those present to flee the Warehouse.

  21. [11] Eventually, a crew from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (“SCDF”) arrived at the scene and put the fire out.

  22. Aftermath of the fire

  23. [12] The diagram below, which has been expanded from section B of the plan at [5] above, illustrates the layout (albeit not to scale) of the Warehouse and its contents as at the point of the fire:

  24. The red circle denotes the Chery Car, with the forklift to its left. Although some of the vehicles have been portrayed as a single vehicle in the diagram, they may have comprised multiple vehicles, with one stacked on top of the other, while some of the other vehicles (including the Chery Car) stood alone without any vehicles stacked on top.

  25. [13] The Chery Car, which had toppled off the forklift and landed on its side during the fire, was badly burnt, while the forklift suffered severe thermal damage. The fire also caused damage to the Defendant’s stock of deregistered vehicles and spare parts stored within the Warehouse. As for the losses sustained by the Plaintiff, the Statement of Claim alleged that the fire damaged various parts of the Property’s structure, including: (a) the Warehouse’s roof, structure and fittings as well as its electrical wirings, (b) the roof of the other warehouse at section C in the plan at [5] above and (c) the Property’s water piping system. A photograph of the aftermath of the fire is attached below:

  26. [14] After the fire was put out, a site inspection revealed the following:

  27. (a) Several spent fire extinguishers which had been used to fight the fire were found near the forklift – these can be seen in the photograph above.

  28. (b) Some tools were found next to the forklift and the Chery Car. From the photographs taken at the site, these tools included what appeared to be a drill powered either by batteries or compressed air, a windy wrench with attachments, what looked possibly like an electrical drill with a drill bit, as well as an aerosol cannister which possibly contained lubricant. A photograph of the tools is attached below:

  29. Expert reports on the fire

  30. [16] In the wake of the fire, SCDF conducted investigations in which it interviewed Gabir, Ganapathy and Mayavel. Their responses were captured in a fire investigation report dated 14 September 2023 that SCDF issued (“SCDF’s Report”).

  31. [17] The Plaintiff’s fire insurance company, Etiqa Insurance Pte Ltd, engaged a forensic firm, Envista Forensics Pte Ltd (“Envista”), to determine the origin and cause of the fire. The technical consultant from Envista fielding the inquiry was one Kirk Cheam Tat Chuan (“Mr Cheam”). Mr Cheam’s inspections of the Property, which commenced about five days after the fire and lasted until the middle of June 2020, culminated in a fire investigation report dated 23 September 2020 (“Mr Cheam’s 1st Report”). Thereafter, the Plaintiff approached Envista to act as its expert in this trial. Envista agreed and commissioned Mr Cheam to prepare an expert report for purposes of trial. To that end, Mr Cheam prepared a second report dated 13 March 2024 (“Mr Cheam’s 2nd Report”).

  32. [18] The Defendant, on its part, engaged fire investigation consultant Adrian Brown (“Mr Brown”) from Andrew Moore & Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd as the defence expert. Unlike Mr Cheam, who conducted a site inspection of the Property shortly after the fire, Mr Brown based his analysis on the photographs in the reports issued by SCDF and Mr Cheam. Mr Brown prepared an expert report dated 25 March 2024 (“Mr Brown’s Report”).

  33. The parties’ cases

  34. [19] On 11 February 2022, the Plaintiff commenced the present action against the Defendant. Broadly, the Plaintiff’s claims fell under two prongs: (a) contractually, the Defendant breached various express and implied terms of the Tenancy Agreement; and (b) in tort, the Defendant was negligent, having breached its duty of care to prevent both the start and the spread of the fire. Underlying these claims was the Plaintiff’s position that the Defendant:

  35. (a) caused the fire when its employees performed works either on the Chery Car or near it (see [8] above); and

  36. (b) failed to curb the spread of the fire.

  37. [20] The Defendant denied that its employees were working in the Warehouse at the time of the fire. Rather, it claimed that they were at the Warehouse merely to take possession of deregistered vehicles being delivered to the Property that evening and bring them into the Warehouse for storage (see [8] above). The Defendant maintained that its employees could not have been performing any works on the vehicles in the Warehouse at the time as the Circuit Breaker measures were still in force – any such works, being easily detectable, would have ended in severe penalties. As regards the failure to prevent the spread of the fire, the Defendant maintained that it did have the appropriate fire extinguishers to fight the fire and suggested that efforts to put out the fire failed only because no water came out of the hose when Mayavel attempted to turn it on (see [9] above).

  38. [21] The allegedly faulty hose, which was sited within the compounds of the Warehouse, in turn formed the basis of the Defendant’s counterclaim. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff (as the landlord) was under a duty in both contract and tort to properly maintain the hose reel and ensure that it worked. The Defendant alleged that the hose malfunctioned because of the Plaintiff’s breach of this duty. The Defendant thus counterclaimed for losses which it suffered from the fire, alleging that the fire – and consequently the losses caused by the fire – could have been ameliorated if the hose reel had worked. The Plaintiff, on its part, denied the counterclaim, insisting that the hose did discharge water during the fire (see [9] above). The Plaintiff also suggested that efforts to fight the fire failed because this was a fire fuelled by petrol, such that hosing the fire with water had the counterproductive effect of spreading the flames.

  39. [22] These grounds will first deal with the Plaintiff’s claim in contract, followed by its claim in tort, before finally addressing the Defendant’s counterclaim.

  40. Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract

  41. [23] The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant breached both the express and implied terms of the Tenancy Agreement.

  42. (a) As regards the express terms, the relevant clauses of the Tenancy Agreement alleged to have been breached by the Defendant are set out below:

  43. (b) The Plaintiff also contended that the following terms ought to be implied into the Tenancy Agreement:

  44. (i) The Defendant shall not permit or allow any combustible or flammable liquids at the Warehouse.

  45. (ii) The Defendant must not carry out activities, or store/keep any liquids, chemicals or other materials that would cause a fire hazard.

  46. (iii) The Defendant must have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times during the tenancy term.

  47. (iv) During the tenancy term, the Defendant must insure the Warehouse against fire and any other risks for its own goods and property in the Warehouse.

  48. (v) The Defendant must have insurance coverage for all risks and/or public liability insurance to indemnify the Plaintiff and other tenants or persons at the property for all damages and losses arising from any acts of negligence of the Defendant’s servants, agent, licensees or invitees.

  49. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant breached these implied terms.

  50. [24] The Plaintiff’s submissions on breach of contract were difficult to follow, in that the Plaintiff failed to link each term within the hodgepodge of express and implied terms above with the specific act or omission of the Defendant which allegedly breached that term. To facilitate the mapping of the relevant express or implied term with the allegedly infringing behaviour, it was necessary to first categorise the contractual terms (both express and implied) alleged to have been breached. To that end, I have divided the terms listed at [23] above under three broad headings:

  51. (a) Terms on the permitted uses of the Warehouse.

  52. (b) Terms on the implementation of adequate fire safety measures.

  53. (c) Other terms (such as procurement of insurance and payment of stamp duty).

  54. The assessment of the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, laid out in the following sections, will follow the sequence of the three headings above.

  55. Contractual terms on permitted uses of the Warehouse

  56. [25] The permitted uses of the Warehouse were encapsulated in cll 2, 11 and 13 of the Tenancy Agreement (above at [13]). For ease of reading, these clauses are reproduced below:

  57. [26] Over and above these express terms, the Plaintiff contended that the Tenancy Agreement contained implied terms on the permitted uses of the Warehouse, specifically those set out at [23(b)(i)] and [23(b)(ii)] above prohibiting the Defendant from having any fire-hazardous materials or conducting any fire-hazardous activities within the Warehouse.

  58. [27] These grounds first deal with each of the express terms which the Plaintiff alleged to have been breached, followed by the purported implied terms governing the permitted uses of the Warehouse.

  59. Clause 2

  60. [28] Clause 2 of the Tenancy Agreement stated that the Warehouse “shall be used for purpose of vehicle spare parts and bodv kit” [emphasis added]. In claiming that the Defendant breached this clause, the Plaintiff pleaded:

  61. It was undisputed that the Defendant did use the Warehouse to store the three categories of items listed in the Plaintiff’s pleadings extracted above, ie, (a) deregistered vehicles; (b) the forklift; and (c) engines and accessories. Since these categories of items were not explicitly mentioned in cl 2 (which referred only to “vehicle spare parts and bodv kit”), the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant’s act of storing them in the Warehouse breached the clause.

  62. [29] I noted upfront that a reading of cl 2’s reference to “vehicular spare parts” would very comfortably encompass “engines and accessories”. Absent any elaboration from the Plaintiff as to why the term “vehicular spare parts” in cl 2 should be construed in a manner other than what its words naturally conveyed, I took the view that the storage of “engines and accessories” could not be construed as a breach of cl 2.

  63. [30] Having dealt with that, I moved on to consider whether the Defendant’s act of storing the other two categories of items pleaded by the Plaintiff, ie, (a) deregistered vehicles and (b) the forklift, was indeed prohibited by cl 2 as claimed by the Plaintiff. Implicit in the Plaintiff’s claim was the premise that cl 2 should be construed as exhaustive in nature – ie, items not captured by the clause’s reference to “vehicle spare parts and body kits” could not be stored in the Warehouse. However, a plain reading of cl 2 showed that the stipulated use of the Warehouse (“shall be used for purpose of vehicle spare parts and bodv kit”) was not expressed as the sole use. In fact, the permitted use as stipulated in cl 2 did not even employ the word “storage”. Thus, the Plaintiff’s contention that cl 2 should be construed as permitting storage of vehicle spare parts and body kits and nothing else added a gloss which narrowed the scope of the clause beyond what a plain reading would suggest.

  64. [31] In assessing the viability of the Plaintiff’s construction, I noted the trite proposition that the court may look at the context when interpreting contractual clauses. In Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 (“Zurich Insurance”), the Court of Appeal endorsed (at [131]) a series of principles set out in Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification (Oxford University Press, 2007) governing the interpretation of contracts. These included the principle that the court may take the context underlying the contract into account, including the legal, regulatory and factual matrix:

  65. Another principle of construction endorsed in Zurich Insurance was that the court could take account of the business purpose underlying the contract:

  66. [32] The Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance also noted how the admission of extrinsic evidence via proviso (f) to s 94 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) could facilitate the contextual approach to the interpretation of contracts (at [132]):

  67. [33] Bearing these principles in mind, I concluded that the context underlying the Tenancy Agreement as at the point of its signing did not lend itself to the construction which the Plaintiff purported to give cl 2. The Defendant expressly pleaded that at the time the Tenancy Agreement was entered into, the Plaintiff knew that:

  68. (a) the Defendant was leasing the Warehouse for the purpose of storing not just vehicle spare parts and body kits but deregistered vehicles as well,

  69. (b) cutting/scrapping of deregistered vehicles would take place in the Warehouse; and

  70. (c) for the above purposes, a forklift was required to move the vehicles.

  71. The Defendant further contended that this knowledge was possessed by Goh, who signed the Tenancy Agreement on the Plaintiff’s behalf. In contrast, Goh had in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) denied having such knowledge and instead affirmed that the Defendant stored deregistered vehicles in the Warehouse without the Plaintiff’s knowledge and consent. The relevant portion of Goh’s AEIC reads:

  72. [34] Critically, Goh recanted this denial while under cross-examination. He explained that just prior to entering into the Tenancy Agreement, he had visited the premises which the Defendant was operating from, at No. 74 Sungei Kadut. By the time he signed the Tenancy Agreement on the Plaintiff’s behalf, he knew that the Defendant was in the business of scrapping and exporting vehicles. Under cross-examination, Goh admitted that he knew that the Defendant would be renting the Warehouse for the purpose of carrying out the same business as it had been carrying out at No. 74 Sungei Kadut, ie, scrapping vehicles. He also agreed that such a business necessarily involved storing deregistered vehicles at the premises. Most importantly, Goh conceded that the Defendant’s use of the Warehouse for that purpose was with the Plaintiff’s consent. I set out the relevant exchange in the cross examination of Goh:

  73. [35] Given Goh’s recantation, the only conclusion I could arrive at was that the Plaintiff’s construction of cl 2 was plainly at odds with the factual context when the Tenancy Agreement was signed, including the commercial purpose of the Defendant renting the Warehouse. As at that point in time, the Plaintiff (through Goh) knew that the Defendant’s business involved scrapping and exporting vehicles, as well as storing the same. The Plaintiff had further consented to the Defendant renting the Warehouse for conducting that business. As regards the forklift, this was plainly an integral part of the business (to stack the vehicles and move them around). As such, while cl 2 may have operated to allow the Defendant to store vehicle spare parts and body kits, I took the view that it did not (as the Plaintiff contended) restrict the Defendant to using the Warehouse exclusively for that purpose. There was nothing in the evidence allowing me to construe cl 2 as prohibiting the Defendant from storing deregistered vehicles and the forklift within the Warehouse.

  74. [36] My conclusion was fortified by cl 22 of the Tenancy Agreement, extracted below, which allowed the Defendant to conduct its trade/business in the Warehouse:

  75. Given that the Defendant’s trade involved the storing, scrapping and exporting of vehicles, and the Plaintiff knew this as at the point of contracting, cl 22 must be construed as allowing the Defendant to store deregistered vehicles and scrap them within the Warehouse. I saw no reason to construe cl 2 in a manner that would conflict with cl 22 in that regard.

  76. [37] The Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant breached cl 2 thus failed.

  77. Clause 11

  78. [38] Clause 11 of the Tenancy Agreement, extracted at [25] above, prohibited the Defendant from storing “the diesel tank” in the Warehouse. While the word “the” preceding the words “diesel tank” in cl 11 might have implied that parties had a particular diesel tank in mind, parties did not proceed on that basis and appeared to take the position that cl 11 referred to diesel tanks in general.

  79. [39] The Plaintiff argued that the reference in cl 11 to diesel tanks should be interpreted as encompassing not only external receptacles used for storing diesel but vehicle fuel tanks as well. This interpretation meant that for vehicles running on diesel, the entire fuel tank would have been caught by the prohibition in cl 11 and would consequently have to be removed before the vehicles could be stored in the Warehouse. As the Defendant failed to perform such removal prior to storing vehicles in the Warehouse, the Plaintiff claimed that cl 11 was breached.

  80. [40] While the word “tank” in cl 11 would have comfortably captured external receptacles that were primarily purposed for storage, I was not prepared to endorse the Plaintiff’s attempt to extend that word (as it was used in cl 11) to encompass fuel tanks still forming part of the vehicle. My hesitation stemmed from the following reasons:

  81. (a) Under cross-examination, Goh testified that there was “no problem” so long as the oil remained within the vehicle. He also voiced the view that cl 11 prohibited only the “big tanks” used to store oil:

  82. Given the above, construing cl 11 in a manner that would introduce an obligation on the Defendant to remove fuel tanks from vehicles prior to storage, especially when the Tenancy Agreement made no express mention of any such obligation, would simply did not cohere with the contracting parties’ intentions.

  83. (b) Secondly, the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant failed to remove the fuel tanks from vehicles stored in the Warehouse was not pleaded. The Statement of Claim only asserted that the Defendant failed to remove the petrol from the vehicles’ fuel tanks prior to storage, without any mention of the Defendant being obliged to remove the vehicles’ fuel tanks.

  84. [41] My conclusion on how the word “tank” in cl 11 should be construed was itself sufficient to warrant dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant breached cl 11. However, even if I were wrong and that word could be construed as including fuel tanks still attached to vehicles stored in the Warehouse, that would still not salvage the Plaintiff’s attempt to establish a breach of cl 11. This was because cl 11 did not prohibit just any tank – it specifically prohibited diesel tanks. Yet, the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to show if any of the deregistered vehicles stored within the Warehouse had fuel tanks containing diesel, as opposed to some other type of fuel. It was evident that this failure arose because the Plaintiff had erroneously conflated the term “diesel” with “petrol”, to the point that it regarded the petrol tanks of vehicles stored in the Warehouse as being caught by cl 11’s prohibition against diesel tanks. For example, Goh’s AEIC had, in alleging a breach of cl 11, affirmed that “[t]he Defendant stored de-registered cars with fuel (including petrol) tanks at the tenanted premises”. Similarly, The Plaintiff’s closing submissions referenced “petrol tanks” (as opposed to “diesel tanks”) when alleging that cl 11 had been breached:

  85. [42] To loosely construe the term “diesel tank” in cl 11 as being synonymous with “petrol tank” would broaden the scope of the clause well beyond what its plain meaning conveyed. This was unwarranted, especially given the markedly prohibitive language of cl 11, which employed the term “strictly not allowed”. This prohibition was unambiguously expressed to target diesel tanks – I saw no basis to extend it to tanks containing other types of fuel (eg, petrol).

  86. [43] As there was no evidence that the fuel tanks of any of the vehicles stored in the Warehouse contained diesel, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that cl 11 had been breached.

  87. Clause 13

  88. [44] Clause 13 of the Tenancy Agreement, extracted at [25] above, imposed two obligations on the Defendant:

  89. (a) Not to carry out of any burning within the Warehouse.

  90. (b) To store any thinner or chemical that is fire hazardous in a safe corner.

  91. As regards the obligation in (a), there was no evidence, nor any suggestion by the Plaintiff, that this had been breached by the Defendant.

  92. [45] As regards the obligation in (b) of the preceding paragraph, there was similarly no evidence of any thinner or fire-hazardous chemicals in the Warehouse, much less the failure to store such items in a safe corner. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff contended that the fuel within the tanks of deregistered vehicles stored in the Warehouse constituted a “fire hazardous” chemical within the meaning of cl 13. The Plaintiff’s construction of cl 13 meant that to avoid falling foul of this clause, the Defendant had to siphon out the fuel and store the same in a “safe corner”, before stowing the vehicle in the Warehouse. In this respect, the Defendant’s practice was to extract fuel from vehicles only when they were being dismantled, upon which the extracted fuel would then be taken out of the Warehouse.74 However, prior to dismantling, deregistered vehicles would be stored in the Warehouse with fuel still in their tanks, sometimes for up to three or four days.74 The Plaintiff thus contended that the presence of fuel within such vehicles stored at the Warehouse breached cl 13, as per its construction of the clause set out in this paragraph.

  93. [46] In my view, it would be wrong to construe cl 13 as obliging the Defendant to remove the fuel from the vehicle’s fuel tank (with a view to storing the fuel in a “safe corner”) before stowing the vehicle in the Warehouse:

  94. (a) Firstly, there was nothing to show that parties regarded fuel as a “fire hazardous” chemical within the meaning of cl 13 where that fuel still resided within the vehicle’s fuel tank. Critically, as alluded to at [40(a)] above, Goh himself admitted that there would be “no problem” if the fuel was left in the vehicle’s fuel tank.

  95. (b) Secondly, the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence of any fire safety practice within the storage industry requiring warehouse owners to empty vehicles of their fuel before storing them.

  96. As such, the evidence simply did not warrant me construing cl 13 in a manner that would introduce an obligation on the part of the Defendant to remove the fuel from the vehicle’s fuel tank, prior to storage of the vehicle, when the Tenancy Agreement made no express mention of any such obligation.

  97. [47] Consequently, the fact that there was fuel within the fuel tanks of vehicles stored in the Warehouse did not constitute a breach of cl 13.

  98. Implied terms governing permitted uses of the Warehouse

  99. [48] To recapitulate, the Plaintiff contended that the following terms, governing the permitted uses of the Warehouse, should be implied in the Tenancy Agreement:

  100. (a) Firstly, the Defendant was prohibited from the following:

  101. (i) Permitting any combustible or flammable liquids or materials in the Warehouse – see [23(b)(i)] above.

  102. (ii) Keeping any liquids or chemicals or materials that would cause a fire hazard within the Warehouse – see [23(b)(ii)] above.

  103. I refer to both (i) and (ii) collectively as the implied term prohibiting “fire-hazardous materials”.

  104. (b) Secondly, the Defendant was prohibited from carrying out activities that would cause a fire hazard – see [23(b)(ii)] above. I refer to this as the implied term prohibiting “fire-hazardous activities”.

  105. At the outset, I should highlight that it was not clear to me what the Plaintiff was seeking to attain by implying the two prohibitions above. I could only assume that implying the prohibition in (a) – ie, against fire-hazardous materials – allowed the Plaintiff to say that the Defendant’s act of allowing fuel to remain in the vehicles stored at the Warehouse was a breach of contract. As regards the implied prohibition in (b) – ie, against fire-hazardous activities – the Plaintiff did not elaborate as to what activities it hoped to catch with this implied term. Presumably, the Plaintiff was hoping to say that the implied term prohibited the Defendant’s activity of scrapping vehicles – the heat from the implements used to cut metal could potentially trigger a fire, if not used with precaution.

  106. [49] In evaluating the Plaintiff’s submissions on implied terms, I bore in mind the guidance prescribed in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”), where the Court of Appeal set out a three-step test for when a term may be implied into a contract (at [101]):

  107. [50] Returning to the present case, I had considerable difficulty in assessing the Plaintiff’s case on implied terms. Despite asking the court to imply a slew of terms into the Tenancy Agreement, including those at [23(b)] above, the Plaintiff’s closing submissions failed to explain how the facts justified the implication of any of these terms, as per the test in Sembcorp Marine. Indeed, neither the test nor the case of Sembcorp Marine itself was cited in the Plaintiff’s closing submissions, nor any legal authorities governing implied terms in contract. It was only after the defence highlighted the test in its closing submissions that the Plaintiff sought to address the same in its reply submissions. Even after having done this, the Plaintiff still failed to sufficiently demonstrate why the facts of this case justified the implication of any of the terms proposed by the Plaintiff at [48] above.

  108. [51] Firstly, the evidence did not disclose any gap in the Tenancy Agreement, as required by step (a) of the three-step test encapsulated in the Court of Appeal’s decision extracted at [49] above, that might justify implying the prohibitions against fire-hazardous materials and activities. In Sembcorp Marine, the Court of Appeal explained when such a gap might be found to exist (at [94]-[95]):

  109. [52] The Plaintiff claimed that a gap existed here because cl 13 of the Tenancy Agreement was “vague” and “ambiguous” in scope, in that it prohibited burning at the Warehouse and yet allowed storage of fire-hazardous materials at a safe corner. To remediate this, it was necessary to imply a clear term prohibiting the Defendant from permitting fire-hazardous materials within the Warehouse. I rejected this argument for the following reasons.

  110. [53] Firstly, cl 13 struck me as neither vague nor ambiguous. Its two prongs were clear: (a) no burning; and (b) all fire-hazardous materials were to be safely stored. Contrary to the Plaintiff’s contention, both prongs did not conflict with each other.

  111. [54] Secondly, even if cl 13 was considered deficient, in that it failed to capture what the Plaintiff truly wanted to address, the extract from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sembcorp Marine at [51] above (particularly sub-paragraph (b) of the extract) is clear that if the contracting parties consciously chose not to incorporate a term on an issue because they mistakenly believed that the issue was already addressed by an existing express term, this would not constitute a true gap warranting the implication of a term. As such, even if the Plaintiff had at the time of contracting mistakenly believed that cl 13 was unambiguous enough to target the activity which it had in mind (ie, storing fire-hazardous materials), only to now realise that the clause was too vague to achieve that purpose, this would not constitute a “true” gap that would justify implying the prohibition against fire-hazardous materials.

  112. [55] Thirdly, even if there had been a gap, I was not convinced that it would be necessary – as contemplated by step (b) of the three-step test encapsulated in the Court of Appeal’s decision extracted at [49] above – to imply the terms propounded by the Plaintiff at [48] above. I took this view for the following reasons:

  113. (a) As regards implying a prohibition against fire-hazardous materials (referred to at [48(a)] above):

  114. (i) I did not see why it was necessary to imply such a term, particularly if the Plaintiff’s objective was to prohibit the presence of fuel within the vehicles stored in the Warehouse. I have already explained (at [44(b)] above) that Goh saw no problems with the vehicles stored in the Warehouse still having fuel in their tanks. Moreover, as alluded to above (at [46(b)]) there was no evidence of any industry practice mandating that fuel be siphoned out from vehicles prior to storage.

  115. (ii) Furthermore, the words of cl 13 showed that at the point of contracting, parties evidently applied their minds to the issue of “fire hazardous” chemicals and decided that these chemicals could be stored in the Warehouse – so long as they were stored in a “safe corner”. Implying a flat prohibition against fire-hazardous materials would, far from being necessary, introduce conflicting obligations into the Tenancy Agreement.

  116. (b) As regards implying a prohibition against fire-hazardous activities (referred to at [48(b)] above), I was similarly not minded to imply such a term, particularly if the objective was to bar the Defendant’s scrapping activities. Rather than being necessary, implying such a term would run counter to the context facing the parties as at the time of contracting. It could not have been the intention of parties for the Tenancy Agreement to prohibit vehicle scrapping within the Warehouse, given that the Plaintiff knew at the time of contracting that the Defendant was going to use the Warehouse for its scrapping activities and had consented to the same: see [35] above. The following observation by the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine (at [73]) is apposite: “Indeed, it is trite that the court must have regard to the context at the time of contracting when considering the issue of implication” [emphasis added].

  117. [56] Finally, even if I were to imply a prohibition against fire-hazardous activities and rule that the Defendant’s scrapping activities would have breached this, that would still not advance the Plaintiff’s claim. As explained in the analysis below on the Plaintiff’s claim in tort, the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Defendant had been conducting any scrapping works at the time of the fire. Any breach of the implied prohibition by virtue of scrapping activities conducted at some earlier point in time prior to the fire would have borne no causal link to the fire. As explained in Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd and other appeals [2023] 1 SLR 536 (“Crescendas Bionics”), a plaintiff claiming damages for a breach of contract must prove that causal link, by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he would not have suffered the damage sustained but for the breach (at [38]).

  118. [57] Given the above considerations, the Plaintiff’s attempt to imply the terms pertaining to the permitted uses of the Warehouse, as set out at [48] above, lacked merit and was rejected.

  119. Contractual terms on fire safety measures

  120. [58] The Plaintiff also contended that the Defendant breached various terms in the Tenancy Agreement pertaining to fire safety measures. According to the Plaintiff, the relevant terms were both express and implied:

  121. (a) Firstly, the Plaintiff relied on the express term in cl 6 of the Tenancy Agreement, which provided that:

  122. (b) Secondly, the Plaintiff contended that there was an implied term in the Tenancy Agreement obliging the Defendant to have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times: see [23(b)(iii)] above.

  123. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant breached both the express and implied term set out above, by failing to have proper firefighting equipment (such as the appropriate type of fire extinguishers) on site at the Warehouse.

  124. [59] I rejected this submission. I did not think that cl 6 had been breached, nor did I think that a term should be implied to oblige the Defendant to have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse.

  125. [60] As regards cl 6 of the Tenancy Agreement, this housed two obligations, neither of which were shown to have been breached.

  126. (a) The first obligation under cl 6 was to keep the Warehouse clean. In asserting that this had been breached, the Plaintiff’s closing submissions contended that Goh “saw oil” and also saw that the Defendant’s employees “anyhow threw things around”. However, there was little by way of elaboration, whether in the Plaintiff’s submissions or AEICs, or even in Goh’s oral testimony, as to where the oil was found and what “things” had been thrown around. I should add that even if I were to accept that cl 6 had been breached by the presence of oil on the premises and “things” having been thrown around, this would still not assist the Plaintiff’s case as the Plaintiff would have failed to demonstrate how these alleged breaches caused the fire (and thereby caused damage to the Plaintiff): Crescendas Bionics at [38].

  127. (b) The second obligation under cl 6 was that “fire safety measure [sic] must be observed at all times”. The Plaintiff pointed out that the term “fire safety measure” in cl 6 was “imprecise and vague in that it did not specify what amounts to fire safety measure”. Yet, the Plaintiff failed to explain, despite attesting to the vagueness of cl 6, why the term “fire safety measure” in that clause should be construed in a manner as to disclose a breach by the Defendant. Without such substantiation, it was not possible to conclude one way or another whether this obligation in cl 6 had indeed been breached.

  128. [61] As regards the implied term which the Plaintiff proposed, ie, that the Defendant must have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times, this failed to pass muster under the test propounded by the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine, extracted at [49] above:

  129. (a) Firstly, I did not think that there was a gap, as required by step (a) of the three-step test encapsulated in Sembcorp Marine, which would justify implying the term advocated by the Plaintiff. Parties had expressly applied their mind to the fire safety issue at the time of contracting and, to that end, incorporated cl 6, which mandated the observance of “fire safety measure” [sic]. Nevertheless, as alluded to in the preceding paragraph, the Plaintiff highlighted that the term “fire safety measure” in cl 6 was vague and imprecise and argued that this was a reason to imply a more specific term which obliged the Defendant to have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times. This submission was misconceived. The reasoning set out at [52] and [54] above applied equally here: Even if the Plaintiff had, as at the time of contracting, mistakenly believed that the term “fire safety measure” in cl 6 was specific enough to impose the obligation which the Plaintiff intended (ie, that Defendant must have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times), only to now realise that the clause was too imprecise to do so, that would not constitute a “true” gap which would justify implying a term to address that obligation: Sembcorp Marine at [94(b)].

  130. (b) Secondly, even if there was a gap, I still did not think it was necessary to imply a term that the Defendant must have proper firefighting equipment and materials at the Warehouse at all material times. It is perfectly conceivable to have a tenancy arrangement where the landlord is the party who provides the firefighting equipment (such as fire extinguishers and hoses), while the tenant observes related fire safety measures (such as ensuring that its employees follow the relevant safety protocols). In fact, the Plaintiff’s evidence suggested an understanding that it was the Plaintiff which would provide the Defendant with firefighting equipment and, pursuant to that understanding, the Plaintiff did provide the Defendant with the necessary firefighting equipment. This was evident from the following extract of the cross-examination of Goh:

  131. [62] In any case, even if I were to imply a term that the Defendant was obliged to have proper firefighting equipment and materials in the Warehouse at all material times, the Plaintiff failed to prove that the term (if implied) had been breached on the facts. In particular, the evidence did not sufficiently establish the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant failed to have the appropriate fire extinguishers on site:

  132. (a) The Plaintiff’s director at the time, Namperumal Paulraj (“Paulraj”), testified that the Defendant always had fire extinguishers on the premises. Gabir provided further details, testifying that the Defendant had at least six fire extinguishers at the Warehouse. Further, both Gabir and Ganapathy were consistent in their oral testimonies that the Warehouse had type B fire extinguishers – being the type used to fight fires caused by flammable liquids.

  133. (b) Ganapathy also testified that at the time of the fire, one of the Defendant’s employees – Mani – had come running out with a fire extinguisher to fight the fire (see [10] above). This fact was at the very least consistent with the Defendant having fire extinguishers on site.

  134. (c) In the aftermath of the fire, SCDF found several spent fire extinguishers next to the Chery Car (see [14(a)] above). There was no suggestion from the Plaintiff that all these fire extinguishers came from its firefighting arsenal, meaning that there was nothing to rule out the prospect of one or more of these spent fire extinguishers having come from the Defendant.

  135. Viewing the evidence in the round, it was simply not possible to infer that the inability to put out the fire arose from any want of firefighting equipment on the Defendant’s part.

  136. [63] Accordingly, the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Defendant had breached the express and (purported) implied terms on fire safety measures in the Tenancy Agreement.

  137. Other contractual terms

  138. [64] The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant breached various other miscellaneous terms in the Tenancy Agreement. Broadly, these pertained to:

  139. (a) the procurement of insurance to cover the damage from the fire; and

  140. (b) the payment of stamp duty on the Tenancy Agreement.

  141. Procurement of insurance

  142. [65] Clause 15 of the Tenancy Agreement, which required the Defendant to procure insurance coverage for its own goods, provided:

  143. It was undisputed that the Defendant failed to abide by cl 15, in that it failed to procure the fire insurance required by this clause.

  144. [66] Nevertheless, cl 15 pertained to procuring insurance against fire damage suffered by the Defendant. There being no explanation as to how cl 15 was relevant to fire damage suffered by the Plaintiff, I concluded that the breach of this clause did not entitle the Plaintiff to claim for any losses. These grounds will nevertheless return to cl 15 below, when analysing the counterclaim by the Defendant.

  145. [67] The Plaintiff also contended that a term should be implied into the Tenancy Agreement obliging the Defendant to insure the Warehouse against fire and any other risks for the Defendant’s goods and property at the Warehouse: see [23(b)(iv)] above. It was unclear why the Plaintiff was seeking to imply such a term, when the ambit of the purported term appeared to be squarely covered by cl 15. Consequently, I rejected this submission.

  146. [68] The Plaintiff further claimed that a term should be implied to oblige the Defendant to procure insurance coverage for all risks to indemnify the Plaintiff and other persons at the Property, for all losses arising from any negligence by the Defendant and its servants, agents, licensees or invitees: see [23(b)(v)] above. However, I failed to see why it was necessary in the business or commercial sense – see Sembcorp Marine at [101] (extracted at [49] above) – to imply such a term. I agreed with the Defendant’s submission that a tenancy agreement can be perfectly operative and functional without such an allocation of risk via insurance coverage. Accordingly, I rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that such a term be implied.

  147. Payment of stamp duty

  148. [69] On the issue of stamp duty, cl 24 of the Tenancy Agreement stated:

  149. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant failed to pay the stamp duty fee, with the result that it was the Plaintiff which had to pay the fee on 22 November 2022, plus a penalty, with the payments collectively amounting to $814.

  150. Conclusion on the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract

  151. [71] To summarise:

  152. (a) The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Defendant had breached any express terms of the Tenancy Agreement (save for the clause on payment of stamp duty).

  153. (b) The Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant breached the Tenancy Agreement’s implied terms also failed, as the Plaintiff failed to establish why any of the purported terms which it had put forward ought to be implied in the first place.

  154. Plaintiff’s claims in tort

  155. [72] I now move to the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant was negligent, having breached its duty of care owed to the Plaintiff in tort.

  156. [73] The starting point would be to first assess if the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care. The test for determining whether such a duty exists was laid out in the seminal case of Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck Engineering”). Applying the framework for analysis expounded by the Court of Appeal in that case, I agreed with the Plaintiff that the Defendant did owe the Plaintiff a duty to take reasonable care to prevent fires from starting or spreading in the Warehouse.

  157. [74] Firstly, the threshold question was whether it was factually foreseeable that the Plaintiff was going to suffer damage from the Defendant’s negligence: Spandeck Engineering at [76]. On the present facts, that threshold question had to be answered in the Plaintiff’s favour. It was eminently foreseeable that any fire resulting from the Defendant’s failure to take proper care would likely damage the Plaintiff’s assets, being the buildings within the Property and the Plaintiff’s belongings therein.

  158. [75] Secondly, having crossed that threshold, the court would have to consider if the relationship between the parties bore sufficient proximity as to justify the imposition of a duty of care: Spandeck Engineering (at [77]). In Spandeck Engineering, the Court of Appeal expressed (at [78]) its endorsement of the views of Deane J in the Australian High Court decision of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1 that an assessment of whether there was sufficient proximity as to found a duty of care would involve assessing if there was physical, circumstantial and causal proximity. The Court of Appeal further explained that when assessing if proximity exists, analogies may be drawn with the case precedents, albeit that the court need not shy away from imposing a duty of care just because the factual matrix at hand (against which a duty of care is sought to be imposed) is a novel one. The relevant section of the Court of Appeal’s judgment (at [82]) is instructive:

  159. In the present case, the relationship between the Defendant (as the tenant) and the Plaintiff (as the landlord who continued to occupy the Property) was clearly proximate enough for me to find that the Defendant owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Defendant owed a duty to take reasonable care in observing appropriate safety measures, to prevent the start and spread of fires. Any fire which started or spread as a result of the Defendant’s failure to do so would have an immediate and significant impact on the interests of the Plaintiff, as well as that of the Plaintiff’s other tenants. I also noted that analogies can be drawn with past precedents where a duty of care was imposed on occupiers to take appropriate fire safety measures: see, eg, the decisions of Chao Hick Tin J (as he then was) in Virco Metal Industries Pte Ltd and another v Carltech Trading and Industries Pte Ltd and others [1999] 2 SLR(R) 503 (at [14] and [17]) and the decisions of Belinda Ang J (as she then was) in Saatchi & Saatchi Pte Ltd and others v Tan Hun Ling (Clarke Quay Pte Ltd, third party) [2006] 1 SLR(R) 670 (at [12] and [40]) and Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd v Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 232 (at [116]).

  160. [76] Thirdly, the court must assess if any policy considerations might militate against imposing a duty of care – this would include determining whether there is an existing contractual matrix which clearly defines the rights and liabilities of the parties: Spandeck Engineering at [83] and [114]. In the present case, there was a contract between the parties (ie, the Tenancy Agreement) defining their respective rights and liabilities. However, that contract did not rule out the imposition of a corresponding duty of care. Rather, cl 14 of the Tenancy Agreement appeared to recognise the existence of a general liability on the part of the Defendant for negligence:

  161. [77] Accordingly, I found that the Plaintiff did owe a duty to take reasonable care to prevent fires from starting or spreading in the Warehouse. The Defendant’s submissions did not attempt to deny the existence of such a duty.

  162. [78] Having arrived at that conclusion, the next step would then be to assess if that duty had been breached by the Defendant. It was at this juncture of the analysis that I encountered material difficulties in the Plaintiff’s submissions on its tortious claim. In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff adopted a blunderbuss approach, firing off a plume of some 18 breaches. These were reproduced in the Plaintiff’s submissions, which are extracted below:

  163. It was evident that little discretion had been exercised in lining up the laundry list of purported breaches extracted above. Many of the items overlapped heavily, to the point of being repetitious, with no attempt on the Plaintiff’s part to properly sort them out. Additionally, it was baffling how some of these breaches found their way into the list, given that they bore no causal link to the fire whatsoever.

  164. [79] To facilitate the ease of navigating the Plaintiff’s claims in tort, I categorised the alleged breaches of duty listed above under the following three headings:

  165. (a) Causing the fire to start – the Plaintiff’s position on this issue hinged principally on the evidential rule of res ipsa loquitur.

  166. (b) Allowing the fire to spread.

  167. (c) Breaches of other miscellaneous tortious duties alleged by the Plaintiff.

  168. Whether the Defendant breached its duty of care by causing the fire to start – Res ipsa loquitur

  169. [80] Of the list of breaches pleaded by the Plaintiff and extracted at [78] above, items (i), (vii) and (xvii) in the extract related to the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant breached its duty of care by starting the fire. Specifically:

  170. (a) item (i) alleged that the Defendant failed to take all reasonable and effective measures whether by inspection, examination or otherwise, to ensure that there was or would be no risk of a fire arising from the Chery Car;

  171. (b) item (viii) alleged that the Defendant’s employees had been working on or near the Chery Car; and

  172. (c) item (xvii) alleged that the Defendant failed to take effective steps to ensure fire safety measures were observed while working in the Warehouse.

  173. [81] The Plaintiff’s pleadings nevertheless stopped short of specifying how these breaches led to the start of the fire. Instead, the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim sought to invoke the evidential rule of res ipsa loquitor to support the inference that the Defendant must have started the fire, while working in the Warehouse. The Plaintiff contended that this evidential rule was available because the cause of the fire’s ignition could not be precisely ascertained.

  174. [82] Res ipsa loquitur, being Latin for “the thing speaks for itself”, is an evidential rule that plaintiffs can invoke in situations where the cause of an incident is unknown and this engenders evidential challenges which may otherwise impede the plaintiff’s attempts to discharge the legal burden of proving the defendant’s negligence. Under such circumstances, if the defendant had been in control of the situation in which the incident occurred and that incident would not have happened in the ordinary course of things had the defendant exercised proper care, res ipsa loquitur may apply. A plaintiff who invokes this evidential rule would in essence be asking the court to infer that the defendant must have breached his duty of care, on the basis that the very occurrence of the incident speaks for itself. Successful invocation of res ipsa loquitur allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence, notwithstanding the difficulties in proving the cause of the incident, thereby shifting the evidential burden to the defendant to rebut the inference that the incident must have arisen from him breaching his duty of care. The mechanics underlying the operation of res ipsa loquitur were canvassed in Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76 (“Grace Electrical Engineering”), where the Court of Appeal explained (at [39]):

  175. [83] The Court of Appeal then set out three requirements which must be met by a plaintiff seeking to invoke res ipsa loquitur (at [39]–[40]):

  176. (a) Firstly, was the cause of the fire unknown?

  177. (b) Secondly, was the Defendant in control of the situation which resulted in the fire?

  178. (c) Thirdly, was the fire one that would not have happened in the ordinary course of things, if the Defendant took proper care?

  179. As will be seen below, parties devoted the bulk of their submissions to addressing requirement (c).

  180. Was the cause of the fire unknown?

  181. [85] The third requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur is that the cause of the incident must have been unknown. Where the cause is known, the evidential rule will no longer apply. The rationale for this was explained in Grace Electrical Engineering (at [76]):

  182. Based on the evidence, I concluded that the cause of the fire in this case was unknown – meaning that the third requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur was satisfied. The following sets out my analysis on this issue.

  183. [86] Both experts, as well as SCDF, were unanimous in their view that the fire likely originated from the Chery Car. The evidence also largely suggested that the origin of the fire was likely electrical in nature. Everyone was also unanimous in the view that an electrical fault within a vehicle can trigger a fire even when the vehicle’s ignition key is in the “Off” position:

  184. (a) SCDF’s Report explained how electricity could continue running through a vehicle’s circuitry, so long as the circuits remained connected to the battery. The relevant section of SCDF’s Report is extracted below:

  185. During the trial, the Plaintiff called SCDF’s Major Muhammad Faizal Bin Mazlan (“Maj Faizal”) as a witness – he reaffirmed in his oral evidence under cross-examination that an electrical fault can still occur, even when the vehicle’s ignition key is in the “Off” position.

  186. (b) Mr Cheam similarly confirmed in his oral evidence that an electrical current fault can happen even if the vehicle’s ignition is in the “Off” position, given that there would still be electricity flowing through devices such as the vehicle’s clock, radio, alarm system and the Electronic Control Unit memory.

  187. (c) Mr Brown, like SCDF and Mr Cheam, also agreed that the vehicle’s “circuits are still alive” even when the ignition key is switched off completely.

  188. [87] Having said that, there was some divergence in views between parties as to whether an electrical fault (from within the Chery Car) did in fact cause the fire. Both SCDF and Mr Cheam took the view that this was likely the case. SCDF’s Report stated that “[t]he ignition source was believed to be of an electrical origin from the deregistered Chery [Car]”. Similarly, Mr Cheam took the view that the cause of the ignition was “electrical in nature”, on account of how electrical arcing had been observed at the Chery Car’s dashboard area. By “arcing” Mr Cheam meant that electricity had been flowing through the wires at the time of the fire, which resulted in signs of fusion, melting and bleeding on the electrical cables. In contrast, Mr Brown harboured some uncertainty about whether the source of the fire in this case could have been electrical in nature. Mr Brown explained that although electricity may continue to run through a vehicle’s circuits while the ignition key is switched off, this phenomenon also meant that the vehicle’s battery continues to drain over time.98 He then highlighted that if the Chery Car had been left idle over the 19-day period leading up to the fire, while it was stored within the Warehouse (see [7] above), its battery might have drained to the point of going flat by the time of the fire. Mr Brown explained that if that happened, an electrical fault would no longer be a competent source of ignition (there being no longer any charge in the battery to generate the fault). In canvassing this alternative view, Mr Brown sought to cast doubts on Mr Cheam’s observations that the Chery Car’s wires showed signs of arcing (thereby suggesting that electricity was running through the circuitry at the time of the fire) – Mr Brown opined that what Mr Cheam saw may have been no more than “flame impingement” or “radiant heat damage”.

  189. [88] I accepted the unanimous view of all parties that the fire did originate from the Chery Car. Furthermore, I accepted the views of both SCDF and Mr Cheam that the cause of the fire was likely an electrical fault originating from the Chery Car. In so deciding, I was unpersuaded by Mr Brown’s reservations that the Chery Car’s battery may have run flat by the time of the fire (as a result of being left idle in the Warehouse for 19 days) such that an electrical fault was no longer a competent trigger:

  190. (a) As regards the doubts which Mr Brown sought to cast on Mr Cheam’s observations of electrical arcing, it had to be borne in mind that while Mr Brown based his expert conclusions on photographs taken by SCDF and Envista, Mr Cheam was physically present at the aftermath of the fire, during which the photographs were taken. Clearly, Mr Cheam would have had a better visual perspective of the wires, which he said bore the signs of arcing – Mr Brown conceded this.

  191. (b) Plaintiff’s counsel had also put to Mr Brown that people do park their cars and go off on holiday for two to three weeks at a time and it is plainly uncommon for them to return home to a flat car battery. Mr Brown offered no convincing riposte, save to say that it was still “possible” for the battery to be flat upon one’s return from holiday.

  192. (c) I also note that despite Mr Brown’s reservations about whether electricity could still have been running within the Chery Car’s circuits, he was not able to offer a sufficiently viable alternative explanation. Ultimately, he still concluded that an “unknown and undeterminable electrical fault” [emphasis added] was the “most likely cause” of the fire, subject to the caveat that he could not dismiss the prospect of the Chery Car’s battery having gone flat.

  193. [89] While I concluded that the fire likely started from an electrical fault within the Chery Car, I still took the view that the cause of the fire remains unknown. I arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons.

  194. [90] Firstly, while the cause of the fire (using that term very broadly) was electrical in origin, there was no information as to how the electrical fault arose. SCDF’s report canvassed a wide swathe of possibilities, including (i) overloaded wiring, (ii) high resistance connections due to poor or ineffective electrical connections, and (iii) electrical short circuits and arcing from damaged wiring conductor insultation: Given the wide and open-ended range of possibilities, SCDF’s Report concluded that “[th]e circumstances surrounding the fire of electrical origin cannot be conclusively determined due to the extensive damage to the car.”112 Mr Cheam’s 1st Report similarly expressed an open-ended conclusion, stating that “the cause of the fire incident is considered undetermined”. As for Mr Brown, while he came to the qualified conclusion that an electrical fault was the most likely cause of the fire, he too described the putative electrical cause as “unknown and undeterminable” (see [88(c)] above).

  195. [91] Secondly, while the blaze may have been triggered by an electrical fault within the Chery Car, the more important question was how that electrical fault translated into a fire. This question lay at the very heart of the present dispute. One of the key planks undergirding the Plaintiff’s case was the suggestion that the Defendant’s employees were performing works either on the Chery Car or near it and, while doing so, triggered the fire. In advancing that suggestion, the Plaintiff relied on Mr Cheam’s 2nd Report, in which he opined that he “cannot not rule out” that the Defendant was working on the Chery Car and this may have led to (amongst other things) petrol leakage – the electrical fault may then have ignited the leaked petrol. In contrast, SCDF contemplated that the electrical fault may have ignited a variety of materials, and not just petrol. SCDF’s Report canvassed the following list of possible items:

  196. [92] Accordingly, given the question marks over how the electrical fault arose, as well as how that electrical fault translated into flames, I took the view that the cause of the fire remained unknown. My conclusion was also fortified by the fact that the Defendant, despite contending that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in the present case, ultimately conceded in its submissions that the cause of the fire was unknown.

  197. [93] This meant that the third requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur was satisfied.

  198. Was the Defendant in control of the situation?

  199. [94] The first requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur is that the situation was under the Defendant’s control at the time of the fire (see the extract from the decision in Grace Electrical Engineering, at [83] above). It was clear that this requirement was also satisfied on the facts of this case. Gabir testified that the Defendant had exclusive control over the Warehouse and the things stored in it, as well as control of all the people going into and out of the Warehouse.

  200. Whether the fire would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if proper care had been taken

  201. [95] The second requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur is that the incident (in this case being the fire) is one that would not have happened in the ordinary course of things, if the defendant had taken proper care. In Grace Electrical Engineering, the Court of Appeal couched this requirement in another way: “the fire was in the ordinary course of things more likely than not to have been caused by the [defendant’s] negligence” (at [72]). To that end, the Court of Appeal explained (at [67]) that res ipsa loquitur does not apply if the evidence is equally consistent with negligent as with non-negligent causes:

  202. [96] This specific requirement for invoking res ipsa loquitur is important in the context of accidents by fire. In Grace Electrical Engineering, the Court of Appeal observed that the mere fact that a fire occurred does not in and of itself mean that negligence must have been involved, given that fires can be triggered by many causes (at [41]):

  203. The above observation is particularly apposite in the present case where (as explained at [88] above) the fire was likely triggered by an electrical fault and all parties were unanimous in the view that such an electrical fault can arise in a vehicle even when its ignition key is switched to the “Off” position (see [86] above). In short, the present factual matrix was arguably a manifestation of an instance where (to use the Court of Appeal’s words quoted immediately above), “the mere occurrence of the fire does not in itself give rise to an inference of negligence”. An electrical fault could have been triggered within the Chery Car even as it lay dormant, with no one having turned its engine on. Without more, the state of the evidence could arguably be regarded as “equally consistent with negligence as with no negligence” (per the Court of Appeal in Grace Electrical Engineering at [67]), in which case res ipsa loquitur would not apply.

  204. [97] Under such circumstances the Plaintiff must at least identify some act or omission by the Defendant which could have caused the fire. As the Court of Appeal in Grace Electrical Engineering observed (at [47]):

  205. If the act or omission concerned was a negligent one which increased the risk of a fire, the court is more likely to invoke res ipsa loquitur: Grace Electrical Engineering at [50].

  206. [98] To this end, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was indeed guilty of acts or omissions which increased the risk of a fire:

  207. (a) Firstly, the Plaintiff claimed (per item (i) of the list of breaches extracted at [78] above) that the Defendant omitted to:

  208. (b) Secondly, the Plaintiff claimed (per items (viii) and (xvii) of the list of breaches extracted at [78] above) that the Defendant’s employees were working on or near the Chery Car at the time of the fire and had failed to take effective steps to ensure the observance of fire safety measures while working in the Warehouse.

  209. I rejected the claim in (a) above as it was bereft of particulars. The Plaintiff failed to offer any elaboration as to the nature of the inspections or examinations that it had in mind, as well as how these would have ameliorated the risk of an electrical fault. Without such particulars, the court could not even begin to consider if such inspections or examinations had in fact been omitted by the Defendant, whether the omission was negligent and whether the omission ultimately had any causal link to the fire which ensued.

  210. [99] As for the act alleged in (b) of the preceding paragraph, ie, working on or near the Chery Car without observing safety measures, this was the central focus of parties’ submissions on res ipsa loquitur. At the outset, I noted that the Plaintiff’s case was highly murky when it came to identifying just what “works” the Defendant’s employees were allegedly performing in the Warehouse at the time of the fire.

  211. (a) Firstly, as regards the works performed near the Chery Car, the Plaintiff failed to particularise just what “works” it had in mind. Given that these works would not have been performed on the Chery Car (but “near” it), it was unclear if the Plaintiff was referring to works on other vehicles, or perhaps some other type of non-vehicle-related works. In the absence of any particularisation, this aspect of the Plaintiff’s claim could not be meaningfully ruled upon.

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