General Division of the High Court · Decided 6 August 2025
A director who moved a failing company's assets to himself was found in breach of duty
Park Hotel Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Law Ching Hung and others
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC 149 · Case no. Suit No 364 of 2022
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
A director who moved a failing company's assets to himself was found in breach of duty
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [2], [372]
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The law imposes on directors a duty to act in the best interests of the company, such interests encompassing those of its different stakeholders. However, when the company is in a parlous financial state, the interests of the company’s creditors come to the fore: see Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation) 2024 1 SLR 361 (“Foo Kian Beng”). In that scenario, directors often face difficult, and sometimes conflicting, choices – to try to manage the company out of its financial difficulties or accept its fate and protect or preserve the value of its assets for its stakeholders, especially its creditors.
- [2]
[2] Whatever dilemmas a director may face, one rule is sacrosanct – a director must always act in good faith and never place his or her personal interests above those of the company or its stakeholders. This case was an egregious instance of a director who did the opposite of what the law demands. When his company was in financial peril, he transferred its viable assets and businesses (effectively) to himself at a gross undervalue and manipulated the books of the company to eliminate receivables owed by him and his entities, leaving the creditors with nothing.
Parties
- [3]
[3] Park Hotel Management Pte Ltd (“PHMPL”), a company incorporated in Singapore, was placed in liquidation on 2 July 2021. The second and third plaintiffs are the liquidators of PHMPL.
- [4]
[4] The first defendant, Mr Law Ching Hung (“Mr Law”) was at all material times the sole shareholder and director of PHMPL.
- [5]
[5] The second defendant, Park Hotel Group Management Pte Ltd (“PHGM”), was incorporated in Singapore in 2017. It was formerly known as “Park Baobab Pte Ltd”. PHGM’s sole director is Ms Tan Shin Hui (“Ms Tan”), Mr Law’s wife. It is owned by the third defendant, Good Movement Holdings Limited (“GMHL”).
- [6]
[6] GMHL is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Mr Law is the sole shareholder and director of GMHL.
- [7]
[7] The fourth defendant, SG Inst. Of Hospitality Pte Ltd (“SIOHPL”), was incorporated in Singapore on 4 March 2021. It is also owned by GMHL, and its sole director is Ms Juliana Soh (“Ms Soh”).
- [8]
[8] In short, PHGM, GMHL and SIOHPL, which I will collectively refer to as the “Defendant Companies”, are directly or indirectly owned and controlled by Mr Law.
- [9]
[9] Although not a party, one of the central actors in this dispute was Ms Tang Buck Kiaw (“Ms Tang”), the Financial Controller of PHMPL and, later, PHGM.
Facts
The Park Hotel Group
- [10]
[10] PHMPL was an international hotel operator headquartered in Singapore. Prior to March 2021, it owned, inter alia:
(a) hotel brands “Grand Park”, “Park Hotel” and “Destination”, amongst others;
(b) at least seven sole proprietorships or trading names and 135 registered trademarks across 16 jurisdictions; and
(c) various hotel management agreements (“HMAs”), license agreements (“LAs”) and technical service agreements (“TSAs”) in respect of its hotel management business for hotels in Singapore and the Asia-Pacific region.
- [11]
[11] PHMPL had two wholly owned subsidiaries, Park Hotel CQ Pte Ltd (“PHCQ”) and Grand Park OR Pte Ltd (“GPOR”):
(a) PHCQ was the operator of the Park Hotel Clarke Quay in Singapore, which was leased (“PHCQ Lease”) from the Trustee of Ascendas Hospitality Real Estate Investment Trust (“ART”).
(b) GPOR was the operator of the Grand Park Orchard hotel in Singapore, which was leased (“GPOR Lease”) from New Park Property Limited (“NPP”).
- [12]
[12] PHMPL furnished ART and NPP each a guarantee and indemnity to secure the liabilities of PHCQ and GPOR under their respective leases (“Corporate Guarantees”).
- [13]
[13] Apart from its hotel management business, PHMPL:
(a) owned Yan Pte Ltd, which operated a restaurant known as “YAN” and a bar known as “Smoke & Mirrors”, both formerly located at the National Gallery in Singapore; and
(b) operated a business training hospitality staff under the trade name “Singapore Institute of Hospitality” (“SIH”).
- [14]
[14] I refer to the entire business of PHMPL as the “Park Hotel Group” hereinafter.
The events leading up to February 2021
- [15]
[15] As a result of the COVID-19 outbreak, Singapore shut its borders on 23 March 2020. In 2020, visitor arrivals fell sharply and dining-in was prohibited during the implementation of the Circuit Breaker measures in Singapore. The tourism, hospitality and F&B industries suffered greatly. The Park Hotel Group was no exception. Crucially, PHCQ and GPOR failed to make payments due under their respective leases.
- [17]
[17] NPP rejected Mr Law’s requests. PHCQ and ART arrived at a tentative compromise to defer half of PHCQ’s monthly rent for three months, but no agreement eventually materialised.
- [18]
[18] On 21 April 2020, PHCQ and GPOR applied under the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020 (“COVID-19 Act”) for temporary relief from their contractual obligations under their respective leases. In the applications, Mr Law stated that PHCQ and GPOR were unable to pay rent from March and April 2020 respectively and that they had experienced a “huge negative cash-flow” since February 2020.
- [19]
[19] Both applications were successful – relief was granted to PHCQ and GPOR but only until 19 November 2020. GPOR and PHCQ were required to resume full payment of rent and other charges from 1 December 2020, as well as pay monthly instalments for the arrears up to 19 November 2020 under the Statutory Repayment Scheme (“SRS”). They were also required to top up their security deposits in accordance with the terms of the leases.
- [20]
[20] PHCQ and GPOR neither paid the rent due nor the arrears. On 9 December 2020, PHCQ and GPOR again applied for temporary relief under the COVID-19 Act on the basis that their respective leases were “tourism-related contract(s)”. This was despite the advice from their lawyers, Tan Kok Quan Partnership (“TKQP”), that these applications were unlikely to succeed (which proved to be the case as these applications were rejected on 2 March 2021).
- [21]
[21] PHCQ and GPOR were therefore in default of their obligations. In fact:
(a) GPOR ceased to pay rent and other charges to NPP from April 2020, causing NPP to draw down a total of S$6,985,726.62 from the security deposit between April 2020 and January 2021; and
(b) PHCQ ceased to pay rent and other charges to ART from March 2020 – although it paid the SRS instalments to ART from December 2020 to March 2021, even those payments ceased in April 2021 and the rental arrears from September to November 2020 remained outstanding.
- [22]
[22] According to PHCQ’s and GPOR’s draft financial statements for the financial year ending 31 December 2020, they were both in a net liability position: (a) PHCQ had net current liabilities of S$18,964,276 and net total liabilities of S$4,654,826; and (b) GPOR had net current liabilities of S$15,666,721 and net total liabilities of S$11,569,730.
- [23]
[23] On 20 February 2021, NPP issued a letter of demand to GPOR for the sum of S$1,431,042.56 (“20 February Demand”). This triggered immediate action from Mr Law. Two days later, he wrote to Ms Tang: “Sounds like we have to proceed with the restructuring” (“22 February E-mail”). That “restructuring” was the genesis of these proceedings.
The “restructuring”
- [24]
[24] The restructuring (as Mr Law called it) was in essence a plan to:
(a) move PHMPL’s revenue generating assets to the Defendant Companies, ie, to himself;
(b) eliminate all liabilities owed to PHMPL by him and entities owned by him; and
(c) leave PHMPL a shell carrying only substantial liabilities.
- [25]
[25] Mr Law embarked on the restructuring knowing that PHMPL was facing financial extinction with no hope of relief or rehabilitation. The evidence established that Mr Law orchestrated the restructuring with Ms Tang as his trusted aide.
The Agreements
- [27]
[27] The first part of the restructuring was PHMPL’s disposal of its assets by way of four written agreements, namely (a) the Asset and Share Transfer Agreement (“ASTA”) with PHGM; (b) the Framework Agreement with GMHL, (c) the Business Transfer Agreement (“BTA”) with SIOHPL (all dated 8 March 2021); and (d) the Trademark Assignment Agreement with PHGM (“TMAA”) dated 23 March 2021 (collectively, “Agreements”).
- [28]
[28] Under the ASTA, PHMPL agreed to transfer to PHGM:
(a) for the consideration of S$2,700,000, the “Transferring Assets”:
(i) 12 HMAs, three TMAs and two LAs (collectively, “Contracts”);
(ii) records, business names, business information, intellectual property (“IP”) rights, information and technology (“IT”) systems, and the benefit of insurance policies and business claims;
(b) the entire issued share capital of Park Hotel Affiliates Pte Ltd (“PHA”) for S$1; and
(c) 990 ordinary shares (99% of the issued share capital) of Park Hotel Management (Maldives) Pvt Ltd (“Park Hotel Maldives”), the hotel manager of the Grand Park Kodhipparu hotel, for US$39,600.
- [29]
[29] Under the Framework Agreement, PHMPL agreed to transfer to GMHL:
(a) 500,000 ordinary shares (the entire issued share capital) of Yan Pte Ltd, for S$500,000; and
(b) 10 ordinary shares (the remaining 1% of the issued share capital) of Park Hotel Maldives, for US$400.
- [30]
[30] Under the BTA, PHMPL agreed to transfer to SIOHPL, for the consideration of S$200,000:
(a) all businesses carried on by PHMPL under SIH; and
(b) all of the fixed and current assets owned by PHMPL for the purposes of SIH’s business.
- [31]
[31] Under the TMAA, PHMPL agreed to assign to PHGM 135 trademarks for the consideration of S$1.
- [32]
[32] The effect of the Agreements was that PHMPL’s assets, save for PCHQ and GPOR, were transferred to the Defendant Companies for a total sum of S$3,400,002 and US$40,000. However, as will be explained, Mr Law and Ms Tang arranged it such that PHMPL did not even receive these sums.
- [33]
[33] The second part of the plan was to cause PHMPL to declare and back-date substantial dividends in Mr Law’s favour and to effect a series of transfers and set-offs in PHMPL’s books, most of which were also back-dated, to eliminate his and his entities’ liabilities to PHMPL. This is discussed below at [56]–[70].
- [34]
[34] I first elaborate on the restructuring.
Disposal of PHMPL’s assets and businesses to the Defendant Companies
- [35]
[35] In carrying out the restructuring, it is evident that (a) Mr Law and Ms Tang acted with urgency; and (b) Mr Law was intimately involved in, and driving, the process.
- [37]
[37] The next day, ie, 23 February 2021, Mr Law appointed lawyers from Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP (“BCLP”) to prepare the relevant agreements to dispose of PHMPL’s assets. He informed BCLP of the Corporate Guarantees and the “need to ensure the restructuring exercise will shield [the new] setup from any [third-party] claims on [PHMPL]”. Mr Law instructed BCLP to “target [1 March 2021] as the effective date”.
- [38]
[38] On 1 March 2021, even before the Framework Agreement had been signed, Mr Law procured PHMPL to transfer its shares in Yan Pte Ltd to GMHL. Mr Law’s evidence was that he signed the transfer form and left it to his team to insert the date. Ms Tang’s explanation that the early transfer of Yan Pte Ltd was for “accounting” reasons was hollow, and certainly did not explain why it could not wait the execution of the Framework Agreement. Mr Law and Ms Tang evidently did not require the Framework Agreement to be signed, or even its terms finalised, before effecting the transfer.
- [39]
[39] Mr Law discussed potential options for the group structure with Ms Tang, eg, to set up a separate company to hold PHMPL’s trademarks and IP. He ultimately decided on the companies that would be part of the new group structure, and the name changes for the companies.
- [40]
[40] Importantly, Mr Law decided on the assets to be transferred to the Defendant Companies. On 2 March 2021, Ms Tang furnished a list of PHMPL’s assets and businesses from which Mr Law selected for transfer. In particular, Mr Law emphasised that PHMPL’s trademarks and the Contracts must be transferred.
- [41]
[41] Mr Law also decided on the directors for the companies in the new group structure. Significantly, Mr Law did not want to be on record as managing the Defendant Companies:
(a) Mr Law did not want to be a director of SIOHPL, although he wanted to retain “some level of control”. He appointed Ms Soh – an employee of PHMPL and the person managing the training business under SIH – to be the director instead.
(b) Mr Law instructed that Ms Tan replace him as director of PHGM, and Ms Tang responded that she would “get that effective 1 March”. Mr Law accepted that he wanted Ms Tan appointed quickly so that she would be the one signing the ASTA on behalf of PHGM.
- [42]
[42] At the same time, Mr Law ensured that he retained sole and absolute control of the assets and business through GMHL:
(a) Mr Law instructed for the ownership of PHGM to be transferred to GMHL – in effect, he continued to own PHGM through GMHL;
(b) he instructed for the ownership of Yan Pte Ltd to be transferred to GMHL, such that he remained its ultimate owner; and
(c) he instructed for the SIH business to be transferred to SIOHPL, which was wholly owned by GMHL, and therefore ultimately owned by him.
- [43]
[43] Mr Law also decided the consideration for the Agreements on behalf of PHMPL as well as the Defendant Companies. On 26 February 2021, Ms Tang wrote to Mr Law that: “We need to think of what is the purchase/sale consideration. Meanwhile, i (sic) will work out dividend out for Yan”. The consideration was decided by Mr Law within a few days without any independent valuation. Mr Law’s denial that he was directing matters on both sides of the transactions was plainly false.
- [44]
[44] First, with respect to the ASTA, Mr Law claimed that he had only provided input on the consideration on behalf of PHMPL, and not on behalf of PHGM. He also insisted that the consideration of S$2,700,000 was arrived at with Ms Tan’s input and that he had discussed the terms of the ASTA with Ms Tan. I reject those claims:
(a) As is evident from the e-mail thread between Mr Law and Ms Tang on 2 to 3 March 2021, it was Ms Tang who prepared the computation for the S$2,700,000 consideration under the ASTA (“ASTA Computation”), which was accepted by Mr Law. There is no evidence, from this e-mail thread or otherwise, that Ms Tan was involved in the preparation or approval of the ASTA Computation.
(b) In her affidavit, Ms Tan claimed to know the assumptions in the ASTA Computation. However, she conceded under cross-examination that she did not even receive the ASTA Computation before the ASTA was signed. She then claimed (for the first time) that Ms Tang had informed her of the assumptions before the ASTA was signed but could not remember what these were. I do not believe her evidence.
(c) There is no evidence (including in any of Ms Tan’s affidavits) of any draft of the ASTA being sent to Ms Tan before the final version was sent to her, which she signed and returned within minutes and without comments. Ms Tan claimed at trial (again, for the first time) that she and Mr Law “could have discussed the contents of the ASTA” in the call with BCLP on 2 March 2021. But this is untrue as Mr Law was still asking BCLP for the first draft of the ASTA on 5 March 2021. In fact, Ms Tan did not even know of Park Baobab (as PHGM was known at the time) until on or shortly before 8 March 2021.
- [45]
[45] Second, Mr Law determined the consideration under the Framework Agreement. In this regard, Mr Law instructed Ms Tang to use Yan Pte Ltd’s net asset value (“NAV”) to value Yan Pte Ltd’s purchase price and to arrange Yan Pte Ltd to declare dividends prior to the sale to reduce its NAV. On 3 March 2021, Yan Pte Ltd declared a dividend of S$904,362.49, which was back-dated to 31 January 2021. This was subsequently changed to S$891,165.60, which had the effect of reducing the NAV and therefore the consideration under the Framework Agreement to exactly S$500,000. Mr Law claimed declaring dividends was a “best practice” to reduce stamp duty.
- [46]
[46] Ms Tan was also not involved in the terms of the Framework Agreement. As was the case for the ASTA, there was no evidence of any draft of the Framework Agreement being sent to Ms Tan before the final version was sent to her, which she also signed and returned within minutes and without comments.
- [47]
[47] Third, Mr Law determined the consideration under the BTA. Ms Soh did not negotiate the terms of the BTA with Mr Law, nor did she provide any input on its terms:
(a) It was Ms Tang who prepared and sent the computation for the S$200,000 consideration under BTA (“BTA Computation”) to Mr Law on 4 March 2021, which he approved within minutes after receipt.
(b) While Ms Soh claimed that Mr Law approved the consideration based on the computation exhibited in her AEIC at “SKMJ-7”, “SKMJ-7” was not the BTA Computation Ms Tang sent to Mr Law on 4 March 2021. More importantly, Ms Soh accepted that she left the issue of consideration entirely to Mr Law and Ms Tang.
(c) There was no evidence of any negotiations between PHMPL and Ms Soh (on behalf of SIOHPL). Ms Soh conceded that she did not discuss with Mr Law the terms of the BTA. While she claimed to have had some discussions with Ms Tang, this was not mentioned in her affidavit. The only evidence of her involvement was that she provided information regarding a possible ACRA classification for SIOHPL’s business and some external contracts, which were requested by Ms Tang. In fact, Ms Soh only had sight of the final version of the BTA, which she signed and returned the BTA without any comments.
- [48]
[48] Mr Law also procured the transfer PHMPL’s staff to PHGM. Mr Ng Yoon Heng (“Mr Ng”) – PHMPL’s (then) finance manager – testified that Mr Law announced to PHMPL’s employees sometime in March 2021 that “there will be [a] restructuring and new entities will be formed, [and] all employees will be transferred to the new entity accordingly effectively in April”, and save that there would be a new legal entity as their employer, there would be no change in the employment arrangements. Mr Ng’s employment with PHMPL officially ceased on 31 March 2021 and his employment with PHGM began on 1 April 2021 on identical terms. However, Mr Ng testified that his letter of cessation of employment with PHMPL and letter of employment with PHGM were only prepared and signed in May 2021. These letters were therefore back-dated as well.
- [49]
[49] Mr Law denied that PHMPL’s employees were transferred to PHGM – he insisted that they stopped working for PHMPL and began their employment with PHGM, and he did not consider this a transfer. He added to this contrived explanation that PHMPL was “unable to avoid people resigning”. However, he did not challenge Mr Ng’s evidence as to what he (Mr Law) had announced to the employees or the transfer arrangements detailed above. Clearly, PHMPL’s employees were transferred to PHGM as part of the restructuring, and their change of employers was simply a paper exercise.
- [50]
[50] To this end, Mr Law ensured, pursuant to the ASTA, that the IT and equipment necessary for the running of PHMPL’s businesses were transferred to PHGM (see above at [28(a)(ii)]). At trial, Mr Law claimed that these made the running of these businesses “easier but [it] was not a must”. Again, I find his answer contrived.
- [51]
[51] The clear picture that emerged was that the restructuring was orchestrated entirely by Mr Law, with Ms Tang providing inputs and advice but ultimately acting on his instructions. There is no evidence that Ms Tan, despite being part of the senior management of PHMPL and subsequently, the sole director of PHGM, had any say in the Agreements. In fact, Mr Law expressly told her in writing to let him handle the restructuring. As conceded by Ms Tan, Mr Law and Ms Tang were the only ones giving instructions to BCLP on the Agreements. She also conceded that she left it to Mr Law as to how the consideration of S$2,700,000 under the ASTA would be paid.
Extraction of cash by Mr Law from PHMPL, PHCQ and GPOR
- [52]
[52] The transfer of assets and businesses from PHMPL to the Defendant Companies was only one part of Mr Law’s plan. In the period when PHCQ and GPOR were failing to meet their obligations under their respective leases, Mr Law extracted substantial amounts of cash from all three companies.
- [53]
[53] On several occasions, when there was cash available in PHCQ and GPOR, instead of paying ART and NPP, it was transferred (via PHMPL) to a UBS account in the names of Mr Law and Ms Tan (“Laws’ UBS Account”):
(a) On 11 September 2020, GPOR transferred S$1,000,000 to PHMPL’s HSBC account, from which S$3,419,682.46 was transferred to the Laws’ UBS Account on the same day. This sum was recorded in PHMPL’s books as a loan from PHMPL to GMHL – see below at [62(a)].
(b) Between 9 December 2020 and 4 January 2021, PHCQ transferred a total of $4,000,000 to PHMPL’s UOB account, which resulted in a sum of $4,413,505.21 in that account. On 8 January 2021, that entire amount was transferred out of PHMPL’s UOB account to the Laws’ UBS Account.
(c) On 21 December 2020, Ms Tang instructed Ms Sock Pei Teyo (who oversaw GPOR’s finances) to “transfer the excess fund of $2[m] to PHMPL before the end of the month”. On 24 December 2020, GPOR transferred $1,998,681.69 to PHMPL’s HSBC account. On 9 January 2021, S$1,968,604.46 was transferred from PHMPL’s HSBC account to the Laws’ UBS Account.
- [54]
[54] In fact, after rendering PHMPL effectively a shell because of the Agreements, Mr Law continued to cause PHMPL to incur liabilities for his personal benefit. On 12 March 2021, Mr Law caused PHMPL to draw down S$5,000,000 from its UOB loan facility (“UOB Facility”) which sum was paid into PHMPL’s UOB account, such that it had a credit of S$6,700,984.09. On the same day, S$6,698,130.81 was transferred from PHMPL’s UOB account to the Laws’ UBS Account, leaving PHMPL’s UOB account with only $2,853.28.
- [55]
[55] Further, on 6 April 2021, Mr Law approved the transfer of S$1,054,089.06 (comprising two separate payments of S$307,734.77 and S$746.354.29) from PHMPL’s HSBC account to his personal UOB account.
Dividends and set-offs
- [56]
[56] The above cash transfers from PHMPL to Mr Law meant that he was personally liable to PHMPL for substantial amounts. In addition, various entities he owned also owed PHMPL substantial liabilities. These would obviously be the subject of claims by the creditors of PHMPL in the event of its (inevitable) liquidation.
- [57]
[57] In the final part of the “restructuring”, these liabilities were eliminated by a series of accounting entries, most of which were back-dated.
- [58]
[58] First, the amounts owed to PHMPL by Mr Law’s entities (including the consideration payable by the Defendant Companies under the Agreements) were “transferred” to Mr Law’s director’s accounts with PHMPL. No agreements were entered, nor resolutions passed, by PHMPL to explain the nature or circumstances of these transfers. They were simply entries recorded in PHMPL’s books. In other words, the amounts owed by Mr Law’s entities to PHMPL were eliminated while the amount owed by Mr Law to PHMPL was correspondingly increased.
- [59]
[59] Second, the amount owed by PHMPL to Mr Law was increased and set off against Mr Law’s (increased) liabilities to PHMPL. In short, by several strokes of the pen, Mr Law and his entities’ substantial liabilities to PHMPL were eliminated.
- [60]
[60] Key to this were the entries in PHMPL’s books which increased the amounts owed by PHMPL to Mr Law. These were:
(a) a declaration of a S$22m interim dividend for the financial year ending 2020 (“S$22m Dividend”);
(b) a declaration of a S$5.9m interim dividend for the financial year ending 2021 (“S$5.9m Dividend”); and
(c) accounting entries to transfer to PHMPL (i) S$6,100,000 owing by PHCQ to Mr Law; and (ii) S$650,000 owing by GPOR to Mr Law, such that PHMPL owed Mr Law S$6,750,000 instead (collectively, “Journal Entries”).
I elaborate on each below.
(1) S$22m Dividend
- [61]
[61] On or around 3 March 2021, Mr Law procured PHMPL to declare the S$22m Dividend but back-dated this to 1 September 2020. It was recorded in the “Loan from Director” ledger as a $22,000,000 loan from Mr Law to PHMPL, and used to eliminate various debts owed to PHMPL, as reflected in the said ledger:
- [62]
[62] To briefly explain the entries in the ledger:
(a) First, GMHL’s liability of S$3,419,682.46 to PHMPL was eliminated. This was the cash transferred from PHMPL to the Laws’ UBS Account on 11 September 2020 (see above at [53(a)]). It was recorded as a loan from PHMPL to Mr Law, and subsequently re-recorded as a loan from PHMPL to GMHL with the description “Investment in Kyoto Oike JPY266m (Good Movement)”. Mr Law explained that “Kyoto Oike” referred to company that owned a trust beneficiary interest for which the primary asset was land and the hotel situated on the land, ie, the eventual Park Hotel Kyoto (discussed below at [347]–[359]). Although Mr Law claimed that he did not know whether the sum was invested in Kyoto Oike, this investment is evidenced by an invoice issued by PHMPL to GMHL dated 30 September 2020.
(b) Second, the liability of Grand Park Maldives Pte Ltd (“Grand Park Maldives”) – of which Mr Law was the sole shareholder and director – of S$14,106,077.11 to PHMPL was eliminated. This comprised of two separate loans made from PHMPL to Grand Park Maldives in 2018, as evidenced by various invoices. Mr Ng, who prepared the corresponding journal voucher, testified that these entries were back-dated to 30 November 2020 on Ms Tang’s instructions. Although the posting date of the journal voucher was 30 November 2020, the printing date was on 3 July 2021. Mr Ng explained that the printing date reflected the date the entries were made. His evidence was not seriously challenged.
(c) Third, Mr Law’s personal liability of S$1,057,481.15 to PHMPL was eliminated. For the same reason above, I find that the set-off was back-dated – the printing date of the journal voucher of 3 March 2021 reflected the date of the entry, instead of the posting date of 31 December 2020.
- [63]
[63] This left a balance of negative S$3,916,759.28 in Mr Law’s “Loan from Director” account as of 31 December 2020. That sum (with some minor adjustments) was credited to Mr Law’s “Loan to Director” account, and used to eliminate the liabilities of the Defendant Companies to PHMPL under the Agreements. For the same reason above, I find that those set-offs were back-dated and the printing date of 5 April 2021 reflected the true date of the entries.
- [64]
[64] Mr Law claimed at trial that he could not recall if the Defendant Companies paid him the consideration due under the Agreements. I do not believe him. Not only did he plead that these debts were discharged, (a) Ms Tan confirmed that PHGM had paid the sums of S$2,700,000 and US$39,600 to Mr Law; and (b) Ms Tang also testified that the sum of S$2,700,000 was paid to Mr Law.
- [65]
[65] The purpose of declaring the $22m Dividend was clearly to eliminate the debts owed by Mr Law and his entities to PHMPL. On 3 March 2021, after Mr Law had signed the director’s resolution declaring the S$22m Dividend, Ms Tang wrote to Mr Ng, “Please do the necessary and re run Navision. Discussion on how your proposal to clear the balances” (emphasis added). Mr Ng testified that, following this e-mail, he spoke to Ms Tang, who instructed him to “reduce or remove the account balances” and to “look into accounts and see which are the ones that can be fully knocked off”, ie, to “identify certain other entities that having a balance receivables to PHMPL” which can be “net off the balance against the 22 million payable to Mr Law”. This aspect of Mr Ng’s evidence was not challenged.
(2) S$5.9m Dividend
- [66]
[66] On 5 April 2021, after PHMPL’s assets and businesses had been disposed and PHMPL had no ability to earn revenue, Mr Law procured PHMPL to declare the S$5.9m Dividend but back-dated this to 23 March 2021. Mr Law instructed Ms Tang to (a) clear his director’s account with PHMPL; (b) pay the balance sum to him; and (c) pay UOB any cash that PHMPL, GPOR or PHCQ may have left. The S$5.9m Dividend was used to eliminate various liabilities of Mr Law to PHMPL, which included the cash payments of S$307,734.77 and S$746,354.29 from PHMPL to Mr Law on 6 April 2021 (see above at [55]).
- [67]
[67] Significantly, Ms Tang expressly warned Mr Law that declaring the $5.9m Dividend “[would] be viewed as preference over creditors as loans were taken up to lend to companies related to the directors”. When asked at trial about her use of the word “preference”, Ms Tang accepted that she was aware that “preference takes effect in an insolvency context”. Clearly, Ms Tang was aware that PHMPL was insolvent and was concerned about the legality of the $5.9m Dividend. Mr Law’s instructions were nonetheless carried out, without regard to Ms Tang’s concerns about their impropriety.
(3) Journal Entries
- [68]
[68] On or around 8 January 2021, PHMPL transferred to Mr Law the sums of S$4,413,505.21 and S$1,968,604.46 (see above at [53(b)] and [53(c)]).
- [69]
[69] Mr Ng testified that he was instructed by Ms Tang to create the Journal Entries (see above at [60(c)]), the effect of which was to increase PHMPL’s liability to Mr Law by a further sum of S$6,750,000. This was then set off against the said cash payments to Mr Law and eliminated Mr Law’s liability for them in PHMPL’s books.
- [70]
[70] Although the Journal Entries were dated 30 November 2020, Mr Ng’s evidence was that they were prepared on 29 June 2021 and back-dated on Ms Tang’s instructions. Importantly, the winding up application against PHMPL had already been filed on 7 June 2021 and was to be heard on 2 July 2021. The outcome of the application was virtually certain as Mr Law had written to court to say that PHMPL would not contest it. PHMPL was therefore indisputably insolvent at the point these entries and set-offs were made – this much was accepted by Ms Tang at trial. The timing of the Journal Entries underscored the brazenness with which Mr Law and Ms Tang acted.
Diversion of opportunities to PHGM
- [71]
[71] While the restructuring was ongoing, Mr Law also diverted a business opportunity to manage a boutique hotel in Kyoto, Japan from PHMPL to PHGM. This hotel was eventually named “Park Hotel Kyoto”. I discuss this below (at [347]–[359]).
Events after the Agreements
- [72]
[72] By the middle of March 2021, Mr Law had reduced PHMPL to a shell. Tellingly, he continued to delay creditor action.
- [73]
[73] On 19 March 2021, TKQP informed Mr Law that they had received a letter from NPP’s lawyers, Allen & Gledhill, demanding, inter alia, that GPOR provide a banker’s guarantee equivalent to nine months of fixed rent by 26 March 2021. On 23 March 2021, Mr Law replied to TKQP that they would only provide the banker’s guarantee on 1 July 2021. Significantly, Mr Law instructed TKQP that “[f]or this round [of negotiations], please push back and buy as much time as possible”.
- [74]
[74] In March 2021, Mr Law was in talks with ART. ART, which was unaware of the transfer of PHMPL’s assets and businesses, was prepared to consider Mr Law’s proposal that PHCQ’s arrears be paid by drawing down from an account from which PHCQ was required to make contributions to fund the purchase or lease of new items of furniture, fixtures, fittings and equipment (“FF&E Account”). In other words, the monies in the FF&E Account was not supposed to be used to repay the arrears but ART was willing to make a concession to assist PHCQ. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement for various reasons. Notwithstanding this, Mr Law (without ART’s consent) withdrew S$2,000,000 from the FF&E Account, which was further evidence of his acting in bad faith. More egregiously, instead of using that sum to pay down the arrears to ART, he repaid UOB part of the S$5,000,000 he had earlier drawn down from PHMPL’s UOB Facility for his personal use (see above at [54]). While this reduced PHMPL’s liabilities, Mr Law was acting entirely in his own interests as PHMPL’s liability under the UOB Facility was personally guaranteed by him. At trial, he claimed to not recall drawing down from the FF&E Account to pay UOB. I find this unbelievable.
- [75]
[75] On 5 April 2021, Mr Law procured PHMPL to declare the $5.9m Dividend (but back-dated to 23 March 2021) to set off against his liabilities to PHMPL (see above at [66]).
- [76]
[76] On 7 June 2021, NPP filed an application to wind up PHMPL. On 29 June 2021, the Journal Entries were made to eliminate most of Mr Law’s remaining liabilities (see above at [69]).
- [77]
[77] On 2 July 2021, PHMPL was wound up.
Mr Law’s true intentions
- [78]
[78] I find that the real purpose behind the “restructuring” was to move all revenue-generating or viable assets out of PHMPL to the Defendant Companies in anticipation of PHMPL’s liquidation.
- [79]
[79] There was in fact no real or practical change as to how the Park Hotel Group operated. All PHMPL employees became employees of PHGM, save for a few who remained to meet PHMPL’s service obligations. Although Ms Tan and Ms Soh became directors of PHGM and SIOHPL respectively, Mr Law continued to manage the business and Ms Tang continued to oversee its finances. In short, the Park Hotel Group continued the same business with the same assets, under the same brands and with the same management and staff, but now under the Defendant Companies.
- [80]
[80] This intention is evident not only from the timing of the restructuring and the urgency with which Mr Law acted (see above at [35]–[38]), but also from the manner the restructuring was carried out, Mr Law and Ms Tang’s private discussions on the same, as well as Mr Law’s dishonest attempts to offer benign reasons for his conduct. I elaborate below.
Mr Law knew that the Corporate Guarantees would be called on
- [81]
[81] An important plank of Mr Law’s defence was his insistence that at the time of the restructuring, PHMPL had no, or was not under any threat of, financial difficulties as the Corporate Guarantees had not been called on. In his affidavit, he claimed that “as at February 2021, PHMPL had no reason to believe that demands [would] be made on the [Corporate Guarantees], and did not have to structure its affairs on the basis that demands will be made on the [Corporate Guarantees]”.
- [82]
[82] This was a lie. The objective evidence, including Mr Law’s communications with Ms Tang, clearly show that the restructuring was prompted by Mr Law’s belief that ART and NPP would soon call on the Corporate Guarantees, PHMPL would not, or would not be able to, meet those demands and legal action against PHMPL was inevitable.
- [83]
[83] To briefly recap the events in 2020:
(a) PHCQ’s and GPOR’s business suffered greatly due to COVID-19 and they were in arrears as early as March/April 2020 (see above at [15]–[18]).
(b) On 6 March 2020, Mr Law informed TKQP that “there is a Corporate Guarantee by [PHMPL] … we cannot afford to go into default” (emphasis added).
(c) On 16 April 2020, TKQP advised that, “What we want to avoid is for the security deposit to be run down, and for the landlord to the look to the corporate guarantee for any damages springing from termination at a later date” (emphasis added).
(d) On 27 April 2020, TKQP advised that, “After the 6-month moratorium imposed by the Act, we would expect that [NPP] will ask GPOR to top up the security deposit amount, and to call upon the corporate guarantee issued by PHMPL” (emphasis added).
(e) By the end of the moratorium in November 2020, PHCQ and GPOR’s respective positions had deteriorated further. No solution was in sight. This prompted Mr Law to apply for further COVID-19 relief (despite being advised it would not likely succeed) and which ultimately failed (see above at [20]). He also instructed TKQP to assert that the leases had been frustrated, even though TKQP had advised this was a weak legal argument. He was clearly playing for time.
(f) By December 2020, (i) PHCQ and GPOR had defaulted on their payment obligations (and continued to default on subsequent obligations); and (ii) NPP had already drawn down on a substantial portion of GPOR’s security deposit in respect of the rental arrears from April 2020 to December 2020, which deposit would have to be topped-up.
- [84]
[84] Mr Law knew that PHCQ and GPOR were doomed. NPP had consistently rejected his requests to revise the terms of the GPOR Lease. While there were some negotiations with ART to adjust the rent and security deposit under the PHCQ Lease, nothing materialised. According to calculations provided by Ms Tang to Mr Law and Ms Tan on 17 February 2021, PHCQ and GPOR were expected to be in a net loss position of S$932,000 and S$830,000 respectively in 2021 if their second applications for COVID-19 relief were denied, which TKQP had advised would likely be the case (see above at [20]).
- [85]
[85] Significantly, Mr Law conceded that he knew by February 2021 of “the potential” that the creditors would look to the Corporate Guarantees if PHCQ and GPOR did not pay and that he was “very concerned about this”.
- [86]
[86] The 20 February Demand signalled that time had run out. Mr Law’s decision to move immediately and to complete the “restructuring” quickly confirmed his awareness of the parlous state of PHMPL’s finances and his belief that it was only a matter of time before the Corporate Guarantees would be called on.
- [87]
[87] In fact, Mr Law was in such a rush to complete the restructuring that he transferred the HMAs – which were PHMPL’s main business and source of revenue – to GMHL before obtaining the consent of the hotel owners, which was contractually required for some of the HMAs. He explained that he could only obtain the owners’ consent after the Agreements had been signed. But this was contrived – there was nothing stopping him from approaching the owners first; indeed, it would have been prudent and sensible for him to have done so. Mr Law obviously wanted to transfer the HMAs quickly and deal with the issue of consent later.
The plan to shield PHMPL’s assets from its creditors
- [88]
[88] It is evident that the purpose of the restructuring was to protect PHMPL’s assets from its creditors. Mr Law’s plan was in fact summarised in Ms Tang’s e-mail to him of 22 February 2021, where she wrote: “[w]e have to do it such that [NPP and ART] has no chance to unwind”. Ms Tang admitted under cross-examination that she meant that she wanted to complete the transfer of assets and businesses to the Defendant Companies so that NPP and ART could not unwind them. She also admitted that “[t]here was a sense of urgency” because it was only a matter of time before creditors would be at the door. When confronted with his instructions to BCLP to “shield” the new structure (see above at [37]), Mr Law admitted that he was concerned about the risk of claims against PHMPL.
- [89]
[89] On 26 February 2021, Mr Law had a discussion with Ms Tang over e-mail on how to “minimise the risk of challenge” by NPP. Mr Law claimed that he did not know what “risk of challenge” Ms Tang was referring to. I find that evidence remarkable and utterly dishonest. Mr Law did not, and did not have to, ask her what she meant because he clearly knew what those risks were.
Mr Law’s decision to exclude PHCQ and GPOR
- [90]
[90] Ms Tang also recommended to Mr Law that everything other than PHCQ and GPOR should be transferred out of PHMPL – she admitted at trial that this was pursuant to their plan:
- [91]
[91] This confirmed Mr Law’s plan to take only PHMPL’s good assets and his belief that PHCQ and GPOR were lost causes. In fact, Mr Law also took steps to distance himself (on record) from the management of PHCQ and GPOR. By 2 March 2021, Mr Law had decided to step down as a director of both PHCQ and GPOR. On 16 March 2021, he appointed in his place Mr Lim Kang-ling (“Mr Lim”) – the general manager of both Park Hotel Clarke Quay and Grand Park Orchard hotels. When asked why he did so at a time of crisis for PHCQ and GPOR, he claimed that “it [was] in conjunction with all the various restructuring exercise and documents, so we took it as a suitable time to make that change together”. But this did not explain why he needed to step down as a director. Further, it was a change in name only – it was Mr Lim’s unchallenged evidence that Mr Law continued to manage both companies. In fact, (a) Mr Law’s approval was still required on human resources matters, for instance, the payment of the salaries of Mr Lim and the respective department heads; (b) Mr Law continued to be in charge of, and conducted, monthly performance meetings of both PHCQ and GPOR; and (c) Mr Law appointed (and continued to deal with) TKQP, the lawyers for PHCQ and GPOR and Mr Lim did not deal with the lawyers at all.
Discussions on delaying enforcement action
- [92]
[92] On 2 March 2021, Mr Law received an e-mail from TKQP, which informed him that they “[expected] a letter of demand for arrears to come very soon” and that he needed to “move very fast” with the restructuring. It is evident that Mr Law had discussed with TKQP his concerns with respect to the Corporate Guarantees.
- [93]
[93] When the restructuring could not be completed by 1 March 2021 as Mr Law instructed, Mr Law and Ms Tang explored ways to buy more time. On 4 March 2021, they had the following exchange over e-mail:
Ms Tang initially claimed that she could not remember what she meant by “[j]ust do that”, but later admitted she was referring to entering an agreement with ART to amend PHCQ’s lease and that Mr Law was to do “that” to “buy time”. With respect to her reference to GPOR, she explained that they needed to complete the restructuring and did not want to have to explain the same to NPP, which would “distract … the whole negotiation” with NPP. But this was false – there was no evidence of any negotiations with NPP ongoing at the time. Eventually, she accepted that they needed to “buy time” to stall the creditors. In contrast, despite the clear messages, Mr Law steadfastly denied any intention of buying time. I find this patently dishonest, especially given his reply to Ms Tang that GPOR’s “[l]andlord will act soon”. Ms Tang accepted that she understood Mr Law to mean that the restructuring must be completed quickly as GPOR’s landlord would commence legal proceedings soon.
Mr Law did not want to alert the creditors
- [94]
[94] Mr Law also took steps to reduce the risk of PHMPL’s creditors discovering he was moving assets out of PHMPL and to give the impression that the disposal of assets was done at arm’s length when, in truth, he was the decision maker on both sides.
- [95]
[95] Ms Tang admitted that Mr Law did not want creditors finding out about the restructuring before it was completed. On 1 March 2021, she informed Mr Law that PHMPL’s disposal of Yan Pte Ltd was a substantial disposal which was required to be lodged with ACRA – this meant that NPP or ART might discover the disposal if they conducted a search (“1 March E-mail”). Ms Tang admitted that she raised this matter to Mr Law because she was worried that NPP or ART might query why assets were being transferred out of PHMPL despite the Corporate Guarantees. In response to the 1 March E-mail, Mr Law wrote “[l]ater the better”. At trial, Mr Law claimed he could not recall why he said this. I find that he was dishonest – clearly, he shared Ms Tang’s concerns, which explained why he instructed Ms Tang to delay the lodgement with ACRA.
- [96]
[96] On 2 March 2021, Mr Law instructed Ms Tang to lodge the change of directors of PHCQ and GPOR (see above at [91]) only after all the Contracts had been transferred out of PHMPL. At trial, he claimed that this was Ms Tang’s idea and that he had no idea why she suggested it. I find this unbelievable – it is clear that he agreed with Ms Tang’s suggestion because he did not want to risk alerting PHMPL’s creditors and have them stop the disposal of PHMPL’s assets.
- [97]
[97] Further, Mr Law was anxious to portray the disposals as being done at “arm’s length” in the restructuring documentation to disguise their true nature:
(a) In his e-mail response of 5 March 2021 to Ms Tang’s e-mail containing the draft board and shareholder resolutions for the restructuring, he asked, “any benefits in calling it [a] restructuring exercise? Why not just arm’s length [sale] and purchase?” (emphasis added). On the same day, he also questioned Ms Tang’s use of the word “reorganisation” in the draft of the BTA. Subsequently, Ms Tang removed references to the “restructuring” exercise in both the resolutions and the BTA.
(b) On 6 March 2021, BCLP wrote to Mr Law, asking him about the removal of the references to the “internal restructuring”, which appeared to be contrary to their earlier instructions that this was an internal reorganisation. In his response, Mr Law inform BCLP that this was “more like a Sale and Purchase between the various entities”.
(c) But Mr Law changed his position when it suited him. In his letter to the owner of the Destination Singapore Beach Road hotel seeking its consent for PHMPL to novate the right to the HMA with the hotel to GMHL, he stated that this was “part of … restructuring activities to achieve higher focus in functional reporting”.
- [98]
[98] At trial, and with respect to [97(a)] above, Mr Law explained that he was only posing a question to Ms Tang. But he was clearly instructing that the documents be amended to remove references to “restructuring exercise”, which Ms Tang duly complied with. To explain his inconsistent positions, he claimed that the exercise was both a restructuring as well as an arm’s length transaction. This was contrived and only underscored Mr Law’s attempts to disguise the true nature of the “restructuring”.
- [99]
[99] Mr Law also ensured that his name was removed from the transaction documents:
(a) The original draft of the Framework Agreement named him as a party to the transaction. On 5 March 2021, Mr Law commented on the draft, asking whether his name could be removed. On 6 March 2021, BCLP explained that one of the reasons that Mr Law was named was because he was transferring Park Hotel Management (HK) Ltd (“PHM (HK)”), a company incorporated and registered in Hong Kong which he owned, to GMHL. This transfer was then removed from the Framework Agreement. At trial, Mr Law explained that he was only posing a question as to whether he should be named and that he saw no reason why a personal name ought to be part of the transaction. He also claimed that he could not recall why the transfer of PHM (HK) was removed from the Framework Agreement. I do not accept his evidence – clearly, he instructed the transfer of PHM (HK) removed so that his name would not appear in the Framework Agreement.
(b) In this regard, Ms Soh signed the Framework Agreement on behalf of GMHL despite not being involved with GMHL in any capacity. At trial, she could not explain why she did so. I find that Mr Law likely caused or instructed her to sign the Framework Agreement as he did not want to be named as GMHL’s representative.
(c) Mr Law ensured that any references to himself in the BTA were removed. In the original draft of the BTA, it was stated that PHMPL and SIOHPL were both beneficially owned by the same “Ultimate Beneficial Owner”. Mr Law commented, “Is this necessary?” on the draft. In a subsequent e-mail to Ms Tang, he again asked whether the reference to the “Ultimate Beneficial Owner” could be removed. At trial, Mr Law (again) explained that he was only posing questions He also claimed that there was no reason to hide his interests as anyone could find out from ACRA who the ultimate beneficial owner of GMHL was. But this is false – GMHL was incorporated in the BVI and the identity of its ultimate beneficial owner would not be publicly disclosed. When confronted, Mr Law was forced to concede this.
(d) Mr Law also deleted from the original draft of the ASTA a line that stated, “Ultimate Beneficial Owner … means Mr Law Ching Hung”.
Mr Law’s concern was with advancing his and the Defendant Companies’ interests
- [100]
[100] The Agreements were calculated to benefit Mr Law and the Defendant Companies at the expense of PHMPL and its creditors.
- [101]
[101] First, the terms of the ASTA favoured PHGM:
(a) In an earlier draft of the ASTA dated 5 March 2021, Ms Tang commented that PHMPL’s liabilities – meaning “all debts, liabilities, fines, penalties and obligations of any nature relating to the Transferring Assets” – were not to be transferred to PHGM. At trial, Mr Law admitted that he agreed with Ms Tang’s comments.
(b) Mr Law deliberately depressed the values of the HMAs sold to GMHL under the ASTA. In calculating the value of the HMAs, Mr Law instructed Ms Tang to use the expense ratios of international chains such as Accor Group, Intercontinental Hotel Group and Marriot International, which Ms Tang derived from public sources to be 90%, instead of relying on the lower expense ratios based on PHMPL’s actual operating expenses. In his affidavit, he explained that this was because PHGM was not provided with PHMPL’s operating expenses. This was an absurd and dishonest position – Mr Law and Ms Tang were acting on both sides of the transaction and had access to PHMPL’s financial information. Importantly, Ms Tang had prepared a budget for the year 2021 which reflected PHMPL’s net profit as S$3,451,572 and its profit margin as 31.3% (ie, an expense ratio of 68.7%). Mr Law admitted that he could have looked at either the budget prepared by Ms Tang, or the actual operating expenses for the hotels that PHMPL was managing. Nonetheless, he disagreed that he should have referred to the budget as the stated profit margin of 31.3% was not realistic. But Ms Tang would not have prepared a budget which was unrealistic – Mr Law admitted that the budget would have reflected Ms Tang’s “best guess”. In any event, it does not explain how using figures published by hotel chains which were not comparable to the Park Hotel Group would be more accurate than using PHMPL’s own numbers. Plainly, Mr Law used a 90% expense ratio to suppress the value of the HMAs. Significantly, the defendants’ own expert did not adopt an expense ratio of 90% in valuing the HMAs but accepted 69% as reasonable (see below at [259]).
(c) Despite knowing that PHMPL was in a parlous financial state, Mr Law caused PHMPL to make a series of payments on PHA’s behalf for no apparent benefit to PHMPL. As at 22 February 2021, PHA owed PHMPL S$201,084.02. By 31 May 2021, this amount had increased to S$250,268.04. Mr Law then procured PHMPL to waive this debt upon the completion of the ASTA, which was effected on 31 May 2021. In other words, not only did PHMPL make payments on behalf of PHA when PHMPL was in financial difficulties, Mr Law then caused the transfer of PHA to PHGM free of PHA’s liabilities to PHMPL. Notably, this waiver was not included in the version of the ASTA signed by Ms Tan on or around 9 March 2021. The ASTA was eventually re-signed by Ms Tan with the waiver included. Mr Law admitted that the plan was to have PHA transferred to PHGM free of liability. This was plainly done to benefit PHGM.
- [102]
[102] Second, the transfer of Yan Pte Ltd under the Framework Agreement favoured GMHL. As stated above (at [45]), Mr Law depressed the consideration for Yan Pte Ltd by instructing Ms Tang to first declare a dividend to lower Yan Pte Ltd’s NAV. Mr Law’s claim that PHMPL would receive the declared dividends was hollow – the dividend was not paid as it was eliminated by set-offs (see below at Annex 3). Further, as discussed below (at [267]–[268]), the use of the Yan Pte Ltd’s NAV depressed its true value.
- [103]
[103] Mr Law and Ms Tang had also valued Yan Pte Ltd on the basis that the leases of YAN and Smoke & Mirrors with National Gallery Singapore (“NGS”) would expire, and their respective businesses would cease, in September 2021. This was despite Mr Law’s clear intention in January 2021 to secure a renewal of the leases. In fact, Mr Law only engaged NGS after Yan Pte Ltd was transferred to GMHL, and secured the renewals. In truth, Mr Law transferred Yan Pte Ltd to GMHL at par value because he believed that it was beneficial to GMHL, and therefore, himself.
- [104]
[104] The issue of the valuation of Yan Pte Ltd also uncovered an attempt on the part of Mr Law and Ms Tang to mislead the court. Mr Law claimed that Ms Tang had prepared a valuation of Yan Pte Ltd based on a forecast (“Yan Forecast”) but that he decided to use the NAV figure as “the [Yan Forecast] was in negative figures and not the suitable way to decide on the consideration”. When cross-examined, Ms Tang could not recall whether she had provided the Yan Forecast to Mr Law before he made the decision to use Yan Pte Ltd’s NAV. When the plaintiffs’ solicitors wrote to the defendants in late 2024 asking for the native format of the Yan Forecast, the defendants’ solicitors replied that the defendants no longer had it. On 2 October 2024, Ms Tan filed an affidavit explaining that Ms Tang had recreated the Yan Forecast in December 2021 in the form of an excel spreadsheet. But that document contained a link “L:\CorporateFinance\Finance\A-PHMPL\364-Yan\Forecast March …” (emphasis added). Ms Tang conceded that “364” referred to the present proceedings, which were commenced after December 2021. I find that the Yan Forecast produced by the defendants was created after this action had commenced, which suggested that the assertion that Mr Law and Ms Tang had done a financial analysis of Yan Pte Ltd prior to its sale to GMHL was likely false.
- [105]
[105] Third, the terms of the BTA favoured SIOHPL:
(a) Mr Law instructed that the clause in the draft of the BTA transferring liabilities from PHMPL to SIOHPL should be excluded. This clause was absent in the executed BTA. Mr Law accepted that he decided this.
(b) Ms Soh alleged that the valuation of SIH provided in Ms Tang’s e-mail dated 4 March 2021 to Mr Law was based on a computation (“SIH Computation”) prepared by Ms Tang with inputs from Ms Soh. However, there were no written communications between Ms Tang to Ms Soh relating to the SIH Computation. Instead, Ms Soh had provided Ms Tang with higher revenue numbers as part of her budget forecast and gave a more bullish view of SIH’s business. In this regard, Ms Soh’s attempts to explain the difference between the SIH Computation and her budget forecast were contrived and dishonest. At first, she claimed that her numbers were realistic but then said that they were unrealistic and inflated. She also said that her numbers were given to Ms Tang in late 2020 but business outlook had changed by March 2021. However, no evidence was given of these changes. In valuing SIH, Ms Tang ignored Ms Soh’s forecasts and developed a highly skewed computation premised on SIH only earning revenues from its existing contracts and without projecting any new contracts or growth. I find she did this to artificially depress the value of SIH. The valuation of SIH is discussed in detail later (at [283]–[291]).
- [106]
[106] Fourth, Mr Law caused PHMPL to declare the S$22m and S$5.9m Dividends and to make the Journal Entries for the sole purpose of clearing his and his entities’ debts to PHMPL to advance his interests at the expense of PHMPL and its creditors (see above at [56]–[70]).
- [107]
[107] If Mr Law and Ms Tang truly believed these transactions were proper, there would be no reason to back-date them. Mr Law and Ms Tang were unable to explain this:
(a) Ms Tang claimed that the backdating of the $22m Dividend to 1 September 2020, ie, to the previous financial year was because there was “some transfer of funds” to Mr Law in September 2020 and “the intention then was always for the company to dividend out to him to support his investment”. Not only was this vague, it was not stated in either her affidavit or Mr Law’s. It is also not supported by their conversation over Microsoft Teams in the morning of 3 March 2021 (where they agreed to declare and back-date the dividends) which did not refer to, and much less suggest, an intention to declare a dividend in September 2020 – to the contrary, it showed that Ms Tang had suggested backdating the S$22m Dividend to August 2020.
(b) No explanation was given by either Mr Law or Ms Tang as to why the S$5.9m Dividend declared on 5 April 2021 was back-dated to 23 March 2021.
(c) As stated above (at [70]), the Journal Entries were prepared on or around 29 June 2021 but back-dated to 30 November 2020. Ms Tang claimed that the backdating of accounting entries to the previous financial year was a “common practice” when private companies review their ledgers at the conclusion of a financial year, and that it has been PHMPL’s practice since she joined PHMPL. But there was no evidence that there was any such practice in PHMPL, let alone one in private companies generally.
(d) Significantly, Mr Ng testified that Ms Tang instructed him to “[tidy] up and just clean up the books to hand over to the liquidator”. The task was to “eliminate the number of accounts … to offset against certain receivables and payables if the ultimate owner are the same”, ie, Mr Law. Ms Tang conceded that she gave such instructions, but asserted (without evidence or basis) that “we actually do this kind of clearing up intercompany balances all the time”. I reject Ms Tang’s explanation. Crucially, the Journal Entries were made when PHMPL was indisputably insolvent – the situation would have been anything but routine.
- [108]
[108] I find that Mr Law and Ms Tang knew or were concerned that the various cash payments to Mr Law and the elimination of PHMPL’s receivables were impermissible or would look suspicious given their timing, and therefore back-dated the S$22m and S$5.9m Dividends and the Journal Entries to give them an appearance of legitimacy or to make it more difficult for PHMPL’s creditors to challenge them. They were clearly alive to the risk of challenge – the object of the restructuring was to insulate PHMPL’s assets from enforcement action by its creditors (see above at [88]–[89]) and as mentioned above (at [67]), Ms Tang had expressly warned Mr Law about preferential payments given PHMPL’s financial situation.
- [109]
[109] Mr Law clearly had no concern about the interests of PHMPL or its creditors. He caused PHMPL’s assets to be transferred away and the books and finances of PHMPL to be manipulated to ensure that his and his entities’ liabilities to PHMPL were cleared, and that there would be nothing left for PHMPL’s creditors.
- [110]
[110] The lengths to which Mr Law was prepared to go to advance his own interests at the expense of PHMPL is exemplified by the following incident. On 10 June 2021, after the winding up application against PHMPL had been filed, Ms Tang wrote to the owner of Destination Singapore Beach Road hotel (copying Mr Law) seeking consent for PHMPL to novate the right to the HMA entered with the hotel. To incentivise the landlord, she proposed, as a “gesture of goodwill”, to waive the management fees due to PHMPL in March 2021. By this time, Ms Tang was employed by PHGM and not PHMPL. There was no basis for Ms Tang to have made such an offer. Mr Law and Ms Tang simply did not care about PHMPL’s interests and were seeking only to advance the Defendant Companies’ and Mr Law’s interests.
Mr Law’s other arguments
- [111]
[111] Mr Law maintained that the restructuring had nothing to do with PHCQ and GPOR’s liabilities or PHMPL’s exposure under the Corporate Guarantee but was the implementation of a restructuring proposal in 2017 evidenced by an e-mail of 10 August 2017 from Ms Tang (“2017 Proposal”) and that “[t]here was no reason to delay that any further”. I reject that evidence:
(a) The 2017 Proposal was clearly different from the “restructuring” in March 2021. The former envisaged that (i) there would be one ultimate holding company for all business lines, including the hotel operator business line; (ii) PHMPL would remain part of the group as the intermediate holding company for the hotel management business line; and (iii) GPOR and PHCQ would be part of the group under the hotel operator business line. Under the restructuring in March 2021, PHMPL, GPOR and PHCQ were left out from the new group post-restructuring, and PHMPL would no longer hold any hotel management business.
(b) There was no mention of the 2017 Proposal in any of the documents discussing or relating to the restructuring in March 2021. Nor was it explained why nothing was done about the 2017 Proposal for years, in contrast with the sudden urgency to complete the 2021 restructuring within a couple of weeks.
(c) The written exchanges between Mr Law and Ms Tang made it abundantly clear that the 2021 restructuring was entirely motivated by the failure of PCHQ and GPOR, and PHMPL’s exposure under the Corporate Guarantee (see above at [23], [88]–[89]).
- [112]
[112] Mr Law also insisted that even after PHMPL’s assets and businesses had been transferred and all the cash drained from PHMPL, PHMPL remained viable. His explanation was that, although he no longer anticipated revenue to be generated “at [the] PHMPL level”, PHMPL had become “a streamlined business” focused on the hotel operation business with two business lines – PHCQ and GPOR. He also claimed that negotiations with landlords were ongoing and PHMPL was “working towards a viable business model and turning into a profit”.
- [113]
[113] Mr Law was not delusional, just dishonest. There were no plans or proposals to address PHCQ and GPOR’s, and therefore, PHMPL’s, substantial liabilities. On 5 April 2021, in response to letters of demand from NPP to GPOR and PHMPL dated 31 March 2021, Mr Law (on behalf of PHMPL) stated that PHMPL “will not be making payment of the sums claimed by [NPP] in respect of [the GPOR Lease]” on the grounds of frustration . GPOR took the same position and even offered to surrender the Grand Park Orchard property to NPP. Mr Law’s explanation – that these were part of negotiations – was incredible. On 25 May 2021, he wrote to TKQP informing them that “PHCQ has a negative asset value, [and] no one would want to buy it”. It is also worth highlighting that PHMPL could not then even derive any benefit from the HMAs for PHCQ and GPOR as Mr Law had already procured their novation to PHGM. PHMPL no longer had any, or any meaningful, streams of revenue or businesses left. Mr Law gave no evidence of what “viable business model” it had or was working towards.
- [114]
[114] Mr Law pointed to his negotiations with ART and NPP to keep PHCQ and GPOR in business. But that was also false. First, there were no negotiations with NPP at all. Second, I agree with the evidence of Ms Beh Siew Kim (“Ms Beh”), the Chief Executive Officer of Capitaland Ascott Trust Management Limited who gave evidence on behalf of ART, that Mr Law’s negotiations with ART were conducted “in serious bad faith”. On 9 April 2021, Ms Beh reached out to Mr Law to negotiate a repayment plan, only to find out that Mr Law had (without ART’s consent) withdrawn S$2,000,000 from the FF&E Account (see above at [74]). Mr Law continued to engage ART in negotiations even up until the end of May 2021, even though both PHCQ and PHMPL no longer had any means to make repayments and Mr Law had stripped PHMPL of its assets. Mr Law was stringing ART along to delay it from commencing legal action against PHMPL. This was confirmed by Mr Law’s exchanges with Ms Tang which made clear that the point of the negotiations was simply to “buy time” (see above at [93]). Ms Beh’s evidence was that ART would not have continued negotiations if it had known that Mr Law was disposing of PHMPL’s assets and businesses to the Defendant Companies.
- [115]
[115] Finally, Mr Law claimed that the set-offs referred to above were performed by PHMPL’s finance department without his knowledge. I do not accept that evidence. Ms Tang confirmed that Mr Law was aware that the finance department would carry out the off-setting of inter-company balances, which she described as “common practice” (see above at [107(c)]). As I had noted, there was no evidence that such set-offs had been done previously. The evidence also showed that Mr Law was heavily involved in the “restructuring” of which the set-offs were an integral part. Further, and as seen from Mr Law’s e-mail to Ms Tang dated 5 April 2021 where he instructed her to declare the $5.9m Dividend to clear his loan account (see above at [66]), Mr Law clearly knew about, and was directing, the set-offs.
The plaintiffs’ claims
- [116]
[116] Against the above backdrop and findings, I now deal with the various causes of action pleaded by the plaintiffs.
- [117]
[117] As against Mr Law, the plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duties in that Mr Law:
(a) caused PHMPL to dispose assets and businesses under the Agreements to the Defendant Companies, which were also transactions at an undervalue in breach of ss 224 and 438 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”) and unfair preferences in breach of s 225 of the IRDA;
(b) caused PHMPL to declare the S$22m and S$5.9m Dividends, which were transactions at an undervalue in breach of s 224 of the IRDA and s 403 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”);
(c) caused PHMPL to owe him a sum of S$6,750,000 by procuring the Journal Entries to be made;
(d) caused PHMPL to make substantial cash payments to himself and set off receivables in favour of Mr Law and his related companies, which were also transactions at an undervalue in breach of ss 224 and/or unfair preferences in breach of s 225 of the IRDA;
(e) caused PHMPL to waive the debt owed by PHA;
(f) caused the transfer of various employees of PHMPL to PHGM; and SIOHPL; and
(g) diverted the opportunity to manage Park Hotel Kyoto away from PHMPL to PHGM.
- [118]
[118] As against the Defendant Companies, the plaintiffs claim for:
(a) dishonest assistance and/or knowing receipt in respect of Mr Law’s breaches; and
(b) conspiracy with Mr Law to injure PHMPL.
PHMPL’s financial position
- [119]
[119] I first deal with the preliminary issue of when PHMPL became insolvent as that affects various claims made, and defences raised, by the parties – see ss 224, 225 and 226 of the IRDA:
- [120]
[120] Mr Law’s evidence in his affidavit was that PHMPL:
(a) was solvent “till early March 2021” (emphasis added); and
(b) “had reason to believe no demands will be made on the [Corporate Guarantees]” and, “until 31 March 2021” (emphasis added), did not have to structure its affairs.
- [121]
[121] Ms Tang’s evidence in her affidavit was that:
(a) PHMPL was solvent “until its assets were disposed of on or around 8 March 2021” (emphasis added); and
(b) “until 31 March 2021” (emphasis added), when it received a letter of demand from NPP, it did not have to restructure its affairs on the basis that demands will be made on the [Corporate Guarantees]”.
- [122]
[122] On 20 January 2025, when I heard parties in chambers, counsel for the defendants accepted that PHMPL was insolvent by end March 2021. They departed from that position in their closing submissions and adopted Mr Law’s evidence at trial where he maintained that PHMPL still had a viable business even after the completion of the Agreements (see above at [112]). Ms Tang also aligned her position with Mr Law’s, explaining that “until” did not mean that PHMPL was no longer solvent thereafter, but instead that PHMPL was still solvent “as at the time when the assets [were] disposed of”.
- [123]
[123] The applicable test for insolvency is the cash flow test, which assesses whether the company’s current assets exceed its current liabilities, ie, within a 12-month timeframe, such that it is able to meet all debts as and when they fall due: Sun Electric Power Pte Ltd v RCMA Asia Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 478 (“Sun Electric”) at [65].
- [124]
[124] I find that PHMPL was insolvent by 31 December 2020.
- [125]
[125] Given my findings above (at [15]–[22]) there is no doubt that PHCQ and GPOR were insolvent or financially parlous as at December 2020, if not earlier. I accept the plaintiffs’ argument that this has significant implications on the financial position of PHMPL. The second plaintiff, Mr Aw, a licensed liquidator and chartered accountant, gave evidence that:
(a) PHMPL’s current assets in December 2020, as reflected in its balance sheet, were overstated since the amounts due and recoverable from PHCQ and GPOR should be fully impaired; and
(b) PHMPL’s current liabilities in December 2020, as reflected in its balance sheet, were understated since PHMPL did not provide for its liabilities under the Corporate Guarantees.
- [126]
[126] Once the appropriate adjustments are made to PHMPL’s balance sheet, it is patently clear that PHMPL was unable to pay its debts as they fell due by December 2020.
- [127]
[127] In any event, PHMPL was insolvent at the latest by 20 February 2021 when NPP issued the 20 February Demand, as it is indisputable that the Corporate Guarantees would shortly be called on given that GPOR had neither the means nor the intention of meeting that demand. In that regard, I refer to my findings above (at [35]–[38] and [83]–[99]), including that Mr Law (a) immediately initiated the “restructuring” to remove all PHMPL assets and businesses to leave PHMPL a shell; and (b) took steps to stall or delay action against PCHQ and GPOR to enable the restructuring to be completed. In fact, TKQP reminded Mr Law that the Corporate Guarantees would likely being called on and highlighted the need to complete the restructuring quickly (see above at [92]).
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