General Division of the High Court · Decided 15 August 2025
Contractual interest kept running after judgment, but only on the unpaid principal
Deutsche Bank AG Singapore Branch v ARJ Holding Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC 163 · Case no. Originating Claim No 300 of 2022
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Contractual interest kept running after judgment, but only on the unpaid principal
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [261], [262]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] The main issue at the heart of this dispute is whether the claimant, Deutsche Bank AG Singapore Branch (“DB”), was entitled to reduce the value of the collateral in the portfolio of its client, the first defendant, ARJ Holding Limited (“ARJ”). This reduction led to a shortfall in ARJ’s accounts. When the shortfall was not regularised, DB terminated ARJ’s loan facilities and demanded full repayment of ARJ’s loans. It is ARJ’s case that DB relied on conditions that were not communicated to ARJ, and that DB exercised its contractual discretion in breach of an implied term of good faith.
Agreed Facts
- [2]
[2] The following are the agreed facts. On 8 April 2020, ARJ entered into the Deutsche Bank Wealth Management Service Agreement (the “Service Agreement”) with DB. ARJ opened account number 6578595 with DB on 21 April 2020. This was followed by the second defendant, Mr Mohammad Ahmad Ramdhan Juma (“Mr Juma”), executing a personal guarantee with DB in favour of ARJ (the “Guarantee”), guaranteeing the due payment of all monies which may be owed by ARJ to DB. Mr Juma is a director and the sole shareholder of ARJ.
- [3]
[3] Sometime in May 2020, ARJ indicated that it would transfer seven securities, with a collective market value of approximately US$700m, to secure the loan facility to be obtained from DB. On 20 May 2020, ARJ and DB executed a facility letter for a loan facility of up to US$100m.
- [4]
[4] On 2 May 2021, Dr Dure Aden Haider Akhter Khan (“Dr Khan”), the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of ARJ, e-mailed DB to inquire about the potential lending value of the Nordrock Securities BV 4.5% Bonds (the “NR Bonds”). Dr Khan stated in his e-mail that the NR Bonds were “listed” with a “provisional rating of BBB”. Mr Khan attached the listing document for the NR Bonds. On 3 May 2021, DB informed ARJ that the approved lending value for the NR Bonds was 30% for a diversified portfolio. This was followed by ARJ transferring approximately CHF120m worth of NR Bonds to DB sometime in May 2021 as security.
- [5]
[5] Around May 2021, ARJ informed DB of its intention to transfer, from Société Generale to its accounts with DB, the following three securities (the “Additional Securities”), by end-May 2021: (a) €50m of European Financial Stability Facility; (b) €25m of Republic of France 0.75%-05/28; and (c) around US$46m of MetLife shares.
- [6]
[6] On 10 May 2021, ARJ signed an acknowledgment which provided that account number 7512338 would be governed by the same terms and conditions and agreements / contracts entered into with DB as account number 6578595. ARJ opened account number 7512338 with DB on 1 June 2021.
- [7]
[7] Around 28 June 2021, ARJ informed DB of its intention to transfer Landstone Securities BV 5.75% Bonds (“LS Bonds”) to its accounts with DB. DB informed ARJ that the lending value of the LS Bonds was 30%. €100m of LS Bonds were settled in ARJ’s accounts with DB sometime in June 2021.
- [8]
[8] In November 2021, ARJ transferred a portfolio of 16 securities with an aggregate value of around US$255m from the Bank of Singapore (the “BOS Transfer”). The BOS Transfer included a transfer of approximately an additional €100m in LS Bonds.
- [9]
[9] On 17 November 2021, DB, by way of a facility letter (the “Facility Letter”), granted ARJ loan facilities of up to an aggregate principal amount of US$400m (the “Loan Facilities”) in respect of account numbers 7512338 and 6578595 (the “Accounts”). On 23 November 2021, Mr Juma signed documents on behalf of ARJ confirming the facility agreement between ARJ and DB, whereby DB granted ARJ a loan facility of up to US$400m.
- [11]
[11] On 8 March 2022, DB issued a margin call letter to ARJ, requesting that ARJ rectify the shortfall by 9 March 2022. Around 9 and 11 March 2022, ARJ further remitted to DB US$400,000 from Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG and US$2m from Credit Suisse (the “CS Transfer”) respectively to partially remedy the shortfalls.
- [12]
[12] On 9 May 2022, DB determined that ARJ’s Accounts had entered into a US$6.2m shortfall and issued a margin call letter to ARJ. In response, ARJ represented that it would transfer funds from Mr Juma’s personal account with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (“ADCB”) as “an interim arrangement” (the “AED20m Transfer”). On 10 May 2022, ARJ provided DB with a text notification which indicated a confirmation by ADCB that a sum of AED20m had been debited from Mr Juma’s personal account and transferred to ARJ. On 12 May 2022, ARJ forwarded to DB Mr Juma’s bank account statement, which indicated that a sum of AED20m had been debited from Mr Juma’s account and transferred to ARJ. However, on 23 May 2022, ARJ informed DB that Mr Juma had cancelled the AED20m Transfer as the funds were required for other matters. DB determined that there was a shortfall of US$4.95m in ARJ’s Accounts and issued a margin call letter to ARJ.
- [13]
[13] On 15 June 2022, DB issued a margin call letter to ARJ, requesting for ARJ to restore the shortfall by 16 June 2022. DB assessed the shortfall in ARJ’s Accounts to be over US$3.48m. On 22 June 2022, Mr Achal Aroura (“Mr Aroura”), who was then a Managing Director and Group Head of Deutsche Bank AG, Filiale Dubai, highlighted to ARJ that due to changes in ARJ’s portfolio, a fall in value, and the sale of liquid securities, DB’s exposure to illiquid securities had “increased sharply, way beyond the permissible limits”. On 23 June 2022, Dr Khan responded on behalf of ARJ, informing DB that “we endeavour to restore [DB’s exposure] back to permissible limits and that is why we are moving good quality and rated bonds to [DB]”.
- [14]
[14] 30 June 2022 was the due date for coupon payments on the LS Bonds. However, DB did not receive any coupon payments.
- [15]
[15] On 13 July 2022, Mr Aroura, with his colleague Mr Alok Bansal (“Mr Bansal”), informed ARJ and Mr Juma that there would be cuts in the lending value of the NR and LS Bonds by 15 July 2022, if its portfolio was not diversified by then.
- [16]
[16] 31 July 2022 was the due date for coupon payments on the NR Bonds. DB did not receive any coupon payments.
- [17]
[17] On 5 August 2022, DB informed ARJ that it would progressively reduce the collateral value of the NR and LS Bonds by 5%, starting from 10 August 2022, and on the tenth day of every month, until the collateral value of these bonds reached nil.
- [18]
[18] On 10 August 2022, DB informed ARJ that in light of the 5% reduction in the LV percentage on the Bonds, a shortfall of approximately US$11.5m would arise on ARJ’s account with DB by the end of the day. DB requested that ARJ take immediate steps to proactively address the situation. On 14 August 2022, DB informed ARJ that the shortfall in ARJ’s Accounts would trigger a margin call on 15 August 2022.
- [19]
[19] On 15 August 2022, DB proceeded to reduce the collateral value of the NR and LS Bonds from 30% to 25%. DB issued a margin call letter to ARJ, giving notice to ARJ that the shortfall in ARJ’s Accounts stood at US$11,421,000. DB requested that ARJ regularise the shortfall by 16 August 2022.
- [20]
[20] On 16 August 2022, DB gave notice to ARJ that it was terminating the Loan Facilities and demanded repayment of the entire loan principal amount, together with the accrued interest, by 25 August 2022.
- [21]
[21] On 19 August 2022, DB wrote to ARJ informing that it had assigned nil collateral value to the NR and LS Bonds, resulting in an increased shortfall of over US$102.29m. DB informed ARJ that matters had come to DB’s attention regarding the fair value of as well as the veracity of representations regarding the NR and LS Bonds. DB requested information regarding ARJ’s financial accounts, ARJ’s ownership of the NR and LS Bonds and the payment arrangement between ARJ and the bond issuers. DB asked that ARJ respond by 24 August 2022.
- [22]
[22] On 25 August 2022, DB informed ARJ that any failure to make repayment on the outstanding sums constituted another “Event of Default”. DB also informed ARJ that it intended to take steps to liquidate the assets in ARJ’s Accounts, following ARJ’s failure to make repayment. DB invited ARJ to provide instructions to liquidate the same by 11.59pm, failing which DB would proceed without reference to ARJ.
- [23]
[23] On 26 August 2022, DB informed ARJ that it would proceed to liquidate the assets in ARJ’s portfolio. It also asked ARJ “if [it] would like to provide the instructions to sell [the securities]”. On 30 August 2022, DB notified ARJ that it had exercised its right to liquidate the assets in ARJ’s account.
- [24]
[24] On 30 September 2022, DB commenced HC/OC 300/2022. DB claims against ARJ:
(a) CHF25,458,565.64 being the outstanding principal amount and accrued interest in CHF denominated loans for account number 6578595 as of 29 September 2022;
(b) €60,342,169.85 being the outstanding principal amount and accrued interest in EUR(€) denominated loans for account number 6578595 and account number 7512338 as of 29 September 2022;
(c) US$70,489.95 and US$30,797.87, being the outstanding custody fees as of 30 September 2022 for account numbers 6578595 and 7512338 respectively, and any additional custody fees; and
(d) interest on the outstanding principal amounts in CHF and EUR(€) denominated loans from 1 October 2022 onwards until the date of full and final payment of the same.
- [25]
[25] DB also brings the same claims against Mr Juma, in his capacity as a personal guarantor for the monies owing by ARJ under the Accounts and the loan facilities.
DB’s case
- [26]
[26] DB’s case is that minimally, ARJ was aware that there was a general requirement for a diversified portfolio and that there were concentration issues with the NR Bonds and LS Bonds (collectively, “the Bonds”) that ARJ had placed with DB (the “General Diversification Requirement”). DB had requested ARJ to resolve such concentration issues over a lengthy period. ARJ had provided assurances that it would do so and take some steps to address this issue.
- [27]
[27] Not only was ARJ aware of the General Diversification Requirement, ARJ was also aware and agreed that the Loan Facilities would be made available by DB to ARJ on terms that, amongst others, included the following condition: ARJ must maintain a diversified portfolio of liquid securities with DB to enjoy standard Advance Ratio (the “AR”), or Lending Value (the “LV”), or Loan-to-Value ratio (the “LTV”) (as used interchangeably by parties for the purposes of these proceedings) on the securities. This means, among other requirements, that the lending value of each security in ARJ’s portfolio shall not exceed 30% of the total lending value of the securities in the portfolio (the “Diversification Condition”).
- [28]
[28] By around early August 2022, ARJ was in breach of the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition.
- [29]
[29] In DB’s e-mails dated 5 August 2022 (“5 August 2022 E-mail”) and dated 10 August 2022 (“10 August 2022 E-mail”), DB informed ARJ that the exposure of the illiquid securities in ARJ’s portfolio was beyond permissible limits, the NR and LS Bonds were granted a special LV of 30% on the basis that ARJ’s portfolio remain diversified, and certain steps requested by DB for ARJ to bring in additional securities had not materialised.
- [30]
[30] ARJ was instructed to restore the shortfall in “Collateral Value” by the deadline set out in the 5 August 2022 E-mail and the 10 August 2022 E-mail.
- [31]
[31] ARJ failed to restore the shortfall by the stated deadlines. This resulted in an “Event of Default” taking place under cll 18(d) and / or 19(a)(ii) of the Service Agreement. The clauses of the Service Agreement state:
Defendants’ case
- [32]
[32] The first and second defendant’s (collectively, the “Defendants”) case is that DB was not entitled to reduce the LV of the Bonds in early August 2022. The General Diversification Requirement lacked sufficient specificity. In addition, DB never communicated the Diversification Condition to the Defendants.
- [33]
[33] Further, the Defendants submit that even if there was a General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition, DB had to exercise its contractual discretion subject to the operation of an implied term of good faith (“Good Faith term”) in the Service Agreement. This required DB not to act in a manner that was irrational, perverse, capricious and arbitrary. DB failed to comply with the Good Faith Term. DB also liquidated ARJ’s security portfolio with haste without regard to the low prevailing market prices.
Issues arising
- [34]
[34] Following discussion at the end of trial, parties agreed that the following five issues arise for determination:
Issue 1: Whether DB communicated the General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition to ARJ
- [35]
[35] The first issue is whether DB communicated the General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition to ARJ. To recap, these are:
(a) General Diversification Requirement – there was a general requirement for a diversified portfolio and that there were concentration issues with the NR Bonds and LS Bonds that ARJ had placed with DB.
(b) Diversification Condition – the Loan Facilities would be subject to the condition that ARJ must maintain a diversified portfolio of liquid securities with DB to enjoy standard LV on the securities. This means, among other requirements, that the lending value of each security in ARJ’s portfolio shall not exceed 30% of the total lending value of the securities in the portfolio.
DB’s case
- [36]
[36] DB’s case is that ARJ agreed to both the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition.
- [37]
[37] Mr Juma, on ARJ’s behalf, agreed by e-mail on 10 May 2021 with the contents of Mr Aroura’s e-mail to Mr Juma (“10 May 2021 E-mail”), that the Loan Facilities would be made available on particular terms. Mr Aroura stated:
- [38]
[38] Mr Juma responded by e-mail to the 10 May 2021 E-mail on the same day, stating “I confirm the content of your e-mail”.
- [39]
[39] As set out in the 10 May 2021 E-mail, the standard LV of NR Bonds of 30% was offered to ARJ on the condition that the three Additional Securities be transferred to DB by 27 May 2021, with US$40m transferred as stop-gap measure until the transfer of the three Additional Securities is complete.
- [40]
[40] Ms Chuah Woei Woei (“Ms Chuah”), who was Team Head of Credit Risk (Wealth Management) in DB in 2017, explained that although the 10 May 2021 E-mail did not explicitly state that each security would be limited to 30% of the total lending value of the securities in the portfolio, this was because at this point of time, the Defendants had only provided one security and it was “very dire”. Mr Sudhir Murthy Nemali (“Mr Nemali”), who was previously Managing Director, Chief Operating Officer, IPB Wealth Management APC of DB, explained that at that time, the only other security in ARJ’s portfolio besides the NR Bonds, were the Titan Bonds, which were completely illiquid and hence not given any weight.
- [41]
[41] DB submits that on the Defendants’ own case, the Defendants minimally accept the General Diversification Requirement. The Defendants knew that the bonds were over-concentrated and that they had to take steps to diversify. They promised to take certain steps, some of which they did not carry out. In addition, ARJ had acknowledged that the NR Bonds and LS Bonds would be assigned an exceptional standard LV of 30% on several conditions, including that the General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition is met by the end of July 2021 and maintained by ARJ. This can be seen from the following.
- [42]
[42] On 3 May 2021, Mr Aroura informed ARJ by e-mail (“3 May 2021 E-mail”) that the “approved lending value for the [NR Bonds] is 30% for a diversified portfolio”.
- [43]
[43] In the 10 May 2021 E-mail, Mr Aroura informed Mr Juma of the various conditions attached to ARJ’s accounts, including that the account was to be maintained with a diversified portfolio of liquid security to enjoy standard AR. On the same day, Mr Juma responded to confirm the contents of Mr Aroura’s e-mail.
- [44]
[44] Mr Aroura informed ARJ by e-mail that the approved lending value for the LS Bonds was 30% for a diversified portfolio.
- [45]
[45] By the 10 May 2021 E-mail, ARJ was to ensure that the Diversification Condition was met by 27 May 2021. Ms June Wong (“Ms Wong”), the Asia-Pacific Head of Lending of Deutsche Bank AG, testified that following ARJ’s failure to do so, the deadline was extended multiple times, with DB informing ARJ that it was to ensure that the Diversification Condition was met by the end of July 2021, as a condition for the standard LV of 30% being granted to the NR and LS Bonds.
- [47]
[47] DB did not call Mr Aroura as a witness. He had since left DB. Mr Aroura informed DB’s solicitors that he was not willing to give evidence.
- [48]
[48] DB relied on an internal e-mail update from Mr Aroura dated 15 July 2021 to his DB colleagues (“15 July 2021 E-mail”). There, he stated:
- [49]
[49] DB continued to communicate the urgency of the transfers to the Defendants. On 22 June 2022, Mr Aroura e-mailed Dr Khan to summarise the action points following their call, including the transfer of additional securities into ARJ’s portfolio in DB (“22 June 2022 E-mail”). Dr Khan replied on 23 June 2022 (“23 June 2022 E-mail”), enclosing his comments. The points raised by Mr Aroura and Dr Khan’s response (in italics) are set out below:
- [50]
[50] As another example, Ms Deepti Seshadri (“Ms Seshadri”) of DB, in her e-mail dated 26 July 2022 (“26 July 2022 E-mail”), informed Dr Khan:
Defendants’ case
- [51]
[51] The Defendants’ case is that the only requirement was that ARJ’s portfolio be generally diversified. This lacked specificity. There was also no communication of the Diversification Condition to Mr Juma, ARJ, or its employees.
- [52]
[52] The requirement of the three Additional Securities and US$40m, which were raised in the 10 May 2021 E-mail, was in respect of ongoing discussions with DB for the provision of corporate and investment banking services. They were not intended to be collateral for the Loan Facilities, but as collateral held with DB for an anticipated corporate finance facility. The requirement for the transfer of the three Additional Securities was subsequently dropped. To support this, the Defendants rely on an e-mail from Mr Aroura to Mr Juma dated 28 May 2021 (“28 May 2021 E-mail”), where Mr Aroura said:
- [53]
[53] DB subsequently informed ARJ that DB was not willing to offer ARJ corporate banking services.
- [54]
[54] Dr Khan testified that Mr Aroura’s statement in the 3 May 2021 E-mail – that DB had approved the “standard AR” of 30% for a diversified portfolio – was understood to mean a general requirement that ARJ’s portfolio was to be diversified after the loan facilities were granted.
- [55]
[55] Mr Juma and Dr Khan testified that they did not meet with Mr Aroura on 11 July 2021. Neither did any other members of ARJ. In fact, on 11 July 2021, Dr Khan had sent DB an e-mail wherein Dr Khan had instructed DB’s Mr Bansal on the placement of certain securities (“11 July 2021 E-mail”). Mr Aroura was copied. The Defendants submit that one would expect the 11 July 2021 meeting to be mentioned in the 11 July 2021 E-mail if there had been one, but there was no mention of such a meeting.
- [56]
[56] An adverse inference ought to be drawn against DB for its failure to call Mr Aroura to testify, which, if given, would be adverse or prejudicial to DB’s case.
- [57]
[57] In addition, the Defendants submit that the pleaded case of DB is that there was a further agreement between the parties outside the Service Agreement on the alleged Diversification Condition. As cl 37(g) of the Service Agreement contains a standard “Entire Agreement” provision, such further agreement is against cl 37(g), which states that “[t]his Service Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to its subject matter”.
Decision
- [58]
[58] This issue largely revolves around the evidence over DB’s communication to the Defendants of the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition.
- [59]
[59] Before I delve further into the evidence, I will address the Defendant’s submission that the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition are further agreements and hence contrary to the “Entire Agreement” provision found in cl 37(g) of the Service Agreement.
- [60]
[60] In my view, the Defendants’ argument is misplaced. DB is correct in pointing out that an entire agreement clause, entered into at the time the account was opened, applies to the agreement or understanding between the parties at that point in time. It does not seek to prohibit the forming of understandings or agreements in the future, after the date the agreement was entered into. Clause 18(a) of the Service Agreement makes it clear that DB may grant “[f]acilities in accordance with the terms of this Service Agreement or other terms as may be agreed”. Thus, even if there are further agreements between the parties, they are not precluded by the entire agreement clause.
- [61]
[61] In any event, DB’s pleaded case is not premised on ARJ’s subsequent agreement, but that ARJ “acknowledged and / or agreed” that the Loan Facilities would be made available subject to terms including the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition. This brings to fore two points of distinction. First, these terms were imposed pursuant to cl 18 of the Service Agreement, not a subsequent agreement. Second, DB’s case was not only premised on ARJ’s agreement to these terms, but also that ARJ was informed and was aware of them. Indeed, the substantive evidence of the parties throughout the course of trial was in relation to whether the Defendants were informed of these terms. Notably, at the close of trial, parties also agreed to frame the first issue for closing submissions as whether DB communicated the General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition to ARJ, and not whether ARJ agreed to them.
- [62]
[62] I will next turn to the evidence regarding DB’s communication on the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition. I begin by examining the 10 May 2021 E-mail sent by Mr Aroura to Mr Juma. This clearly states that “[a]ccount to be maintained with a diversified portfolio of liquid securities to enjoy standard Advance Ratios. This is an ongoing requirement”. Pursuant to this requirement, the 10 May 2021 E-mail sets out various steps to be taken to ensure diversification, through the provision of additional securities.
- [63]
[63] Mr Juma replied by e-mail to say “I confirm the content of [the 10 May 2021 E-mail]”. He sought to distance himself from it by saying that this did not mean that he agreed with the terms of the transaction set out in the 10 May 2021 E-mail. According to Mr Juma, there is a difference between him saying he confirmed the content and him confirming the e-mail. During re-examination, he added that he was simply saying that he acknowledged receipt of the e-mail.
- [64]
[64] I find Mr Juma’s explanation to be highly unpersuasive. When he said “I confirm the contents”, that is plainly understood as him confirming the content of the 10 May 2021 E-mail, which contained the terms of transaction as set out by Mr Aroura. If Mr Juma had intended to simply acknowledge receipt of the e-mail, he could easily have said so. Moreover, Mr Juma accepted during cross-examination that by confirming the contents, it meant that he received the contents of the 10 May 2021 E-mail from DB and that the Defendants would try to achieve the terms set out therein. He also agreed that if he disagreed with the contents of the 10 May 2021 E-mail, he would have said so in his reply.
- [65]
[65] I thus find that by Mr Juma’s reply to the 10 May 2021 E-mail, he had confirmed the terms of transaction as set out by Mr Aroura in the 10 May 2021 E-mail.
- [66]
[66] Mr Juma also sought to distance himself from the 10 May 2021 E-mail by claiming that the requirement in the 10 May 2021 E-mail to transfer in the three Additional Securities by 27 May 2021 was not in relation to the Loan Facilities and the Diversification Condition, but in relation to the anticipated provision of corporate and investment banking services by DB, which would include corporate and trade finance facilities.
- [67]
[67] I do not find Mr Juma’s claim to be credible. The 10 May 2021 E-mail states that the three Additional Securities were to be provided by 27 May 2021. This timing is consistent with the preceding bullet point in the e-mail, that the LV of 30% for the NR Bonds was only until 27 May 2021. In addition, the bullet point on the three Additional Securities was followed by a bullet point stating that ARJ “[would] be transferring around USD 40mil cash as a stop-gap measure”. There is no reason why there would be a need for cash transfers to be made as a stop-gap measure for an anticipated corporate finance facility, nor did any of the Defendants’ witness provide any such reason.
- [68]
[68] The 28 May 2021 E-mail, which Mr Juma relies on, does not support the Defendants’ case. The e-mail does not, on its face, relate to either the contents of the 10 May 2021 E-mail or any anticipated corporate finance facility. Pertinently, Dr Khan accepted, when he was taken through the relevant correspondence leading up to the 28 May 2021 E-mail, that the issue there was that DB had certain requirements for transferring in securities from third parties (which MARJ Holding Limited (“MARJ”) was). Dr Khan also accepted that the line from Mr Aroura in the 28 May 2021 E-mail that “you will not be troubled for the transfer” arose from the requirements for transfer of securities from third parties. It would follow from Dr Khan’s explanation of the context to the 28 May 2021 E-mail, that there is no basis for the Defendants to say that this line shows that DB agreed to drop the need for the three Additional Securities or for the US$40m to be transferred to DB.
- [69]
[69] I note that when this was put to Dr Khan, he disagreed, stating that this was DB’s interpretation. However, given Dr Khan’s explanation of the circumstances surrounding the 28 May 2021 E-mail, what was put to him by DB is the only logical interpretation. Dr Khan did not provide any other plausible interpretation. In addition, Mr Juma himself also accepted that the 28 May 2021 E-mail was about the resolution of DB’s issues with the third-party transfer of assets from MARJ.
- [70]
[70] The 10 May 2021 E-mail itself does not explicitly contain the Diversification Condition, ie, that the lending value of each security in ARJ’s portfolio shall not exceed 30% of the total lending value of the securities in the portfolio. At the same time, the e-mail does state that for NR Bonds “standard AR 30% [was] being approved despite concentration; for a limited period i.e. until 27 May 2021”. In the 10 May 2021 E-mail, DB conveyed that there were concentration issues with the NR Bonds.
- [71]
[71] I thus find that on the basis of the 10 May 2021 E-mail, the Defendants were, minimally, aware of the General Diversification Requirement. This finding is also consistent with the subsequent correspondence between the parties.
- [72]
[72] Indeed, the Defendants accepted in their submissions and evidence that ARJ was aware of DB’s requirement that ARJ’s portfolio of securities be generally diversified and that pursuant to this requirement, DB requested ARJ to take certain actions to bring in additional securities into its portfolio by specific timelines. Mr Juma confirmed on the stand that he was aware of subsequent correspondence from DB regarding the need for a diversified portfolio of securities, including the need for each security’s lending value to be below 30%, and that the Defendants had in return made various promises to do so.
- [73]
[73] Dr Khan also testified that there was a diversification issue to address, and ARJ knew of the concentration issues with the NR Bonds and were taking steps to “comply” with that.
- [74]
[74] In so far as the Defendants seek to defend against the General Diversification Requirement by alleging that there was insufficient specificity about what a diversified portfolio was, I find that their case is undermined by:
- [75]
[75] The above points will be evident from my more detailed examination below of the other evidence on DB’s communication to ARJ of the Diversification Condition.
- [76]
[76] The LS Bonds were only settled in ARJ’s accounts with DB sometime in June 2021. Even after the transfer of the LS Bonds, DB conveyed its concerns with the high concentration on the NR Bonds and LS Bonds and stressed the need for liquid securities. Documentary evidence of such a communication exists from as early as July 2021. On 15 July 2021, Mr Aroura sent a detailed internal update to his DB colleagues. The 15 July 2021 E-mail states that the lending value exposure of the NR Bonds at that point was 42.85%, while the lending value exposure of the LS Bond then was 38.31%. This would have placed both bonds above the 30% limit in the Diversification Condition. Mr Aroura also stated that he had conveyed concerns with this to ARJ and informed them that they needed to diversify their portfolio of securities.
- [77]
[77] The contents of the 15 July 2021 E-mail are consistent with the subsequent correspondence and conduct between the parties. For example, in early August 2021, due to ARJ’s non-compliance with the Diversification Condition, DB had lowered the LV of the LS and NR Bonds by 10%. This was not met with protest by ARJ, but rather with attempts at rectification. On 22 April 2022, Mr Aroura sent an e-mail to ARJ reminding them that the concentration of LS and NR Bonds were too high. Mr Aroura also stated in the e-mail that “if the concentration is not sorted … there would be a reduction in AR on these two papers”. Further, in the 26 July 2022 E-mail, Ms Seshadri of DB wrote to Dr Khan and requested “prompt action in solving the illiquid exposure situation and the non-receipt of coupon. Any further delay will lead to LV cuts on the Landstone and Nordrock”.
- [78]
[78] The exchange between ARJ and DB on 22 June 2022 and 23 June 2022 is particularly telling. In Mr Aroura’s 22 June 2022 E-mail to ARJ, he informed ARJ that “with the changes in portfolio, fall in value, and sale of liquid portfolio the exposure to illiquid securities has increased sharply, way beyond the permissible limits”. Notably, Dr Khan replied to this point in his 23 June 2022 E-mail, stating that “we endeavour to restore it back to permissible limits and that is why we are moving good quality and rated bonds to you”. The use of the phrase “permissible limits” by both Mr Aroura and Dr Khan suggests that there were certain specific limits, albeit they were not expressly identified in the 22 June E-mail.
- [79]
[79] Dr Khan sought to distance himself from this by claiming that while he mentioned “permissible limits” in his 23 June E-mail, he was not referring to any specific limits. He testified that in making this statement, he was simply seeking to assure DB that ARJ was taking steps to meet DB’s request for a portfolio with more liquid collaterals to diversify the ARJ portfolio to a level that DB would be satisfied with, even though ARJ was not obliged to do so.
- [80]
[80] I do not find Dr Khan’s explanation to be credible. There is no reason for both Mr Aroura and Dr Khan to refer to “permissible limits” if there were no specific limits. It is also highly questionable why Dr Khan would, as CFO of ARJ, commit to restoring the portfolio “back to permissible limits” if there were no specific limits. If indeed Dr Khan did not know what the “permissible limits” referred to, it would have made more sense for him to clarify with Mr Aroura what such limits were, so that ARJ could assess if they were viable and, if they were, for ARJ to work towards it. However, Dr Khan did not disagree with Mr Aroura or seek to clarify the limits. Instead, Dr Khan sought to assure DB that ARJ was moving towards the steps set out by Mr Aroura for the Defendants in the 22 June E-mail. Such steps are consistent with the General Diversification Requirement and the Diversification Condition.
- [81]
[81] I therefore find that the contents of the 15 July 2021 E-mail are consistent with the correspondence and conduct between the parties.
- [82]
[82] One of the disputed issues arising from the 15 July 2021 E-mail is whether Mr Aroura met with ARJ on 11 July 2021, as he claimed in said e-mail, and conveyed the points stated therein.
- [83]
[83] The Defendants point to the absence of mention of such a meeting in Dr Khan’s e-mail on 11 July 2021 to Mr Bansal, to support their case that such a meeting did not take place. However, this e-mail from Dr Khan was made in response to Mr Bansal’s earlier e-mail dated 5 July 2021, about a separate investment opportunity with the Commercial Bank of Qatar. The correspondence is not related to ARJ’s Loan Facilities with DB. Moreover, Dr Khan’s e-mail simply instructs Mr Bansal to place US$20m in the captioned note. Contrary to the Defendants’ submission, there is nothing unexpected about such an e-mail making no mention of Mr Aroura’s meeting with Dr Khan about a separate matter, namely ARJ’s Loan Facilities.
- [84]
[84] The Defendants also point to the absence of Mr Aroura as a witness in court to testify to whether he did indeed meet with ARJ on 11 July 2021. For completeness, I note that DB gave Notice to Admit Documentary Hearsay dated 26 December 2024 in respect of Mr Aroura’s e-mails, pursuant to ss 32(1)(b) and 32(1)(j) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”). I find that Mr Aroura’s e-mails are admissible pursuant to these provisions.
- [85]
[85] The Defendants do not submit that DB was not entitled to rely on these EA provisions to admit Mr Aroura’s e-mails, including the 15 July 2021 E-mail. Instead, the Defendants submit that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against DB for its failure to call Mr Aroura to testify, which if given, would be adverse or prejudicial to DB’s case. They rely on Cheong Ghim Fah v Murugian s/o Rangasamy [2004] 1 SLR(R) 628 at [42]–[45], which held that the court may draw an adverse inference from a party’s failure to call a material witness where the reason for the witness’ absence is not satisfactory.
- [86]
[86] I find that DB has given a credible explanation for Mr Aroura’s absence. Ms Wong testified that Mr Aroura had left DB and declined to appear as a witness when DB’s solicitors contacted him. Contrary to the Defendants’ submission, there is no suggestion on the evidence before the court that Mr Aroura’s e-mail was false, or that his evidence, if he testified, would be prejudicial to DB’s case. If anything, it falls to DB to prove its case in the absence of Mr Aroura’s personal testimony. In this respect, I find that Mr Aroura’s absence does not affect DB’s case. As I have set out above, the veracity of Mr Aroura’s content in his 15 July 2021 E-mail can be examined with reference to its consistency with the correspondence and conduct between the parties. It is also consistent with the other evidence before the court. There is hence no basis to draw an adverse inference against DB.
- [87]
[87] While Dr Khan and Mr Juma provided personal testimony, this did not strengthen the Defendants’ case. Their position was a simple denial that such a meeting took place with ARJ.
- [88]
[88] In fact, the credibility of Dr Khan’s denial was undermined by his testimony on the stand. He claimed that this meeting on 11 July 2021 could not have taken place, as 11 July 2021 was a Sunday, a day of rest, and thus they tended to give some time to family on Sundays. However, it was then pointed out to him that in Dubai, Saturday / Sunday only moved to become the weekend in January 2022. When he was queried as to why he did not inform the court that Sunday was actually a weekday at the material time on 11 July 2021, Dr Khan replied “When was I required to say that that it was a weekday?” Given that this information would have materially affected the weight of Dr Khan’s testimony about Sunday being a day of rest, his lack of care about withholding relevant information when testifying raises concerns about his credibility as a witness. In addition, Dr Khan himself had adduced the 11 July 2021 E-mail, which is an e-mail sent by Dr Khan on 11 July 2021 to a DB officer giving instructions on the placement of certain securities. When this was pointed out to him by counsel, he agreed that 11 July 2021 was a working day and he could be working as per usual.
- [89]
[89] While in isolation, it could be said from the above exchange that Dr Khan was merely a careless witness, there were other aspects of his testimony on other evidence which seriously affected his credibility as a witness. For example, during cross-examination, he changed his evidence several times on when a waiver to the first coupon payment for the Bonds was agreed on, adjusting them to a later date on each production of an e-mail by counsel for DB that contradicted his earlier position. Dr Khan appeared to be making up evidence as he went along. I will elaborate on this below in the section assessing the evidence on whether the Bonds were fully paid up when ARJ transferred them to DB as securities.
- [90]
[90] Mr Juma’s testimony also did not add to the Defendants’ case, since he simply testified that he did not meet Mr Aroura and he did not know who Mr Aroura met. It was also his testimony that as the owner, he was more into the “general thing[s]” and he left the details of operations to Dr Khan as the CFO.
- [91]
[91] Having assessed the evidence as a whole, I find that the Loan Facilities contained the General Diversification Requirement / Diversification Condition. In relation to this condition, DB had informed ARJ that they were to provide the three Additional Securities by 27 May 2021, and as events transpired, to provide other forms of securities within further timelines. ARJ also sought to reassure DB that it was doing so, and took steps in that direction.
Issue 2: Whether DB was entitled to reduce the LV of the Bonds in early August 2022
- [92]
[92] The second issue is whether DB was entitled to reduce the LV of the Bonds in early August 2022. DB implemented a progressive reduction of 5% to the LV of the Bonds starting from 10 August 2022 and reduced the LV of the Bonds to nil on 19 August 2022.
DB’s case
- [93]
[93] DB’s case is that it was entitled to reduce the LV of the Bonds in early August 2022. In the 5 August 2022 E-mail, Mr Aroura informed ARJ and Mr Juma that DB would be implementing a reduction in the LV of the LS and NR Bonds by 5%, starting from 10 August 2022, and on the tenth day of every month, until the LV of these two bonds reached nil. DB explained that the reduction in the LV was due to the following:
(a) The standard LV on the LS Bonds and NR Bonds was nil, but an exception was granted for the LV to be 30%, on the basis that ARJ’s portfolio would be and remain diversified.
(b) DB’s exposure to illiquid securities had increased sharply due to the concentration of LS Bonds and NR Bonds, and such exposure was beyond permissible limits.
(c) DB’s intention to reduce the LV on the LS Bonds and NR Bonds was communicated to ARJ on 15 July 2022 and an extension was granted by DB on the basis that the NatWest Transfer and CS Transfer would be completed. However, both transfers had not been initiated.
(d) DB had not received the coupon payments for the LS Bonds, which was due on 30 June 2022, and the NR Bonds, which was due on 2 August 2022.
- [94]
[94] In the 10 August 2022 E-mail, DB informed ARJ and Mr Juma that DB would be implementing a reduction of 5% to the LV of the LS Bonds and NR Bonds, which would result in a shortfall of about US$11.5m, which ARJ was to take immediate steps to address.
- [95]
[95] On 15 August 2022, DB issued a margin call letter to inform ARJ that, following the 5% reduction in the LV of the LS Bonds and NR Bonds, ARJ’s accounts were in a shortfall of US$11.421m. DB gave notice to ARJ through its letter dated 16 August 2022 (“16 August 2022 Letter”) that it was terminating the Loan Facilities and demanded repayment of the entire loan principal amount, together with the accrued interest, by 25 August 2022.
- [96]
[96] DB asserts that they had validly determined that there was a shortfall in the Collateral Value. DB adduced a Collateral Sheet produced by a Mr Alok Rathi on or around 10 August 2022. This shows that the concentration of LS Bonds stood at 37.9%, while collectively, the concentration of the Bonds stood at 59.5%. Ms Wong gave unchallenged evidence as to its contemporaneity.
- [97]
[97] Ms Wong also exhibited a Collateral Sheet which showed the concentration levels of the securities in ARJ’s portfolio on or around 11 August 2022 and 15 August 2022. The concentration of the LS Bonds and NR Bonds as at 11 August 2022 was at 38% and 22%, respectively. After the reduction of the LV of the LS and NR Bonds by 5% on 15 August 2022, the concentration of the LS Bonds and NR Bonds as at 15 August 2022 was at 32% and 15% respectively. Hence, even after the reduction in the LV of the LS Bonds from 30% to 25% on 15 August 2022, the LS Bonds remained in breach of the Diversification Condition, which is that the lending value of each security in ARJ’s portfolio shall not exceed 30% of the total lending value of the securities in the portfolio.
- [98]
[98] DB submits that it had complied with cll 18(c) and (d) of the Service Agreement. There is no confusion amongst parties between the phrases “Lending Value”, “advance rates” and “Collateral Value”. From the evidence, it is clear that these terms have been used and understood interchangeably. Prior to the 5 August 2022 E-mail, DB had on multiple occasions used the phrase “Lending Value” in its correspondence with the Defendants and this was used interchangeably with the term “Collateral Value”. Furthermore, nothing in the plain wording of these clauses obliges DB to inform the Defendants of the collateral value of the Bonds or DB’s reasons for determining that there is insufficient collateral. Clause 18(c) of the Service Agreement simply provides that DB is to give the Defendants one business days’ notice to deliver additional acceptable collateral in an amount as required by DB. Clause 18(d) of the Service Agreement provides that an event of default arises if the Defendants failed to deliver the collateral when required.
- [99]
[99] DB submits that in addition, it was also entitled to lower the Collateral Value of the Bonds to nil pursuant to cl 18(b) of the Service Agreement, on the basis of their discovery that ARJ had not fully paid up for the Bonds.
- [100]
[100] On or around 15 August 2022, DB received information from Mr Lars Magnusson (“Mr Magnusson”), the Chief Executive Officer of the Larmag Group, that the NR and LS Bonds which ARJ had pledged as security to DB had not been fully paid for.
- [101]
[101] In light of this discovery, DB sent a letter to ARJ on 19 August 2022 (“19 August 2022 Letter”) stating that “matters [had] come to [DB’s] attention regarding the fair value and veracity of representations regarding the [NR and LR Bonds]”. Given these concerns, DB assigned nil Collateral Value to the Bonds in the Accounts. This led to an increased shortfall of US$102,297,356. DB reiterated that DB was entitled to exercise such rights in respect of ARJ’s Event of Default under the Service Agreement, and gave notice that unless DB received full repayment of the sums demanded in its 16 August 2022 Letter by the stated deadline of 25 August 2022, DB would take further recourse.
- [102]
[102] In relation to the Defendants’ argument that DB is estopped from relying on the illiquidity of the Bonds to reduce the collateral value of the Bonds, DB submits that this was not pleaded and should fall in limine. In any event, the Defendants’ case on estoppel is unsustainable. First, there is no evidence that DB represented to the Defendants that it would not alter the collateral value of the Bonds for reasons related to the illiquidity of the Bonds. Clauses 18(b) and (c) of the Service Agreement provide DB with sole discretion to prescribe or alter the collateral value of any collateral at any time. Second, the Defendants have not shown that they suffered detrimental reliance. The Defendants in fact benefited from significant loan facilities extended on the security of the Bonds. Third, DB did not reduce the collateral value of the Bonds solely because of illiquidity. DB’s pleaded case is that it did so for various reasons, including the overconcentration of the Bonds, the lack of coupon payments on the Bonds and the failure of the Defendants to make good on their promise to transfer out the Bonds to NatWest.
Defendants’ case
- [103]
[103] The Defendants submit that DB was not entitled to cut the LV of the Bonds progressively for the following reasons.
- [104]
[104] First, the Loan Facilities did not contain the Diversification Condition. The reference in DB’s 5 August 2022 E-mail to a breach of “permissible limits” was in relation to this condition.
- [105]
[105] Second, DB’s 5 August 2022 E-mail was unclear as to its reliance on cl 18(c) of the Service Agreement. While cl 18(c) states that DB shall have absolute discretion to prescribe the amount of Collateral that the Defendants are to provide, the 5 August 2022 E-mail does not use the phrase “Collateral Value” but “Lending Value” and does not define what this means. Although DB stated in its 15 August 2022 Letter that there was insufficient collateral, this was premised on the 5 August 2022 E-mail. As the 5 August 2022 E-mail did not prescribe the amount of collateral required to secure the customer’s liabilities or the type of collateral required, cl 18(c) was not complied with and DB was precluded from relying on it.
- [106]
[106] Third, even if the Diversification Condition existed, DB has not proven that ARJ was in breach on 5 August 2022. Contrary to its own pleaded case, there was in fact no “excessive concentration” on both the LS Bonds and NR Bonds.
- [107]
[107] Fourth, DB has not satisfied its burden of proving that the Bonds were not fully paid up. Ms Wong gave evidence of her exchanges with Mr Magnusson. He was not called, and his statements are inadmissible hearsay evidence. Mr Magnusson was prepared to testify on behalf of DB, but they did not call him. This warrants the drawing of an adverse inference. DB did not carry out independent due diligence on the Bonds before accepting them as collateral. It has only itself to blame for the situation it found itself in. Ultimately, the undisputed fact remains that the Bonds had been registered in ARJ’s name, and ARJ had good title to them. This, in and of itself, ought to be taken as conclusive that the Bonds have been fully paid for.
- [108]
[108] Fifth, DB is estopped from relying on the fact that the Bonds were illiquid as a reason for reducing the collateral value of the Bonds, as DB was allegedly aware of the same from the outset.
Decision
- [109]
[109] I find that DB was entitled to cut the LV of the Bonds progressively starting 10 August 2022.
- [110]
[110] I have held above that the Loan Facilities contained the Diversification Condition, and that DB communicated this to ARJ. There was a series of correspondence between parties where DB informed ARJ of the concentration issues with the Bonds and asked ARJ to take steps to address this. ARJ made various assurances to DB and also took certain steps to seek to do so. I therefore find no merit to the Defendants’ first submission that DB was not entitled to cut the LV of the Bonds progressively because the Loan Facilities did not contain the Diversification Condition.
- [111]
[111] At the trial, the Defendants questioned the authenticity of the Collateral Sheets adduced by DB, but did not take this up in their closing submissions. For completeness, I am satisfied with Ms Wong’s explanation of how DB prepared the Collateral Sheets. They drew on data feed that was available to DB, including from Bloomberg. Ms Wong testified that she prepared this contemporaneously, drawing on data as stated in the dates in the Collateral Sheet.
- [112]
[112] I also find no merit to the Defendants’ second submission that the 5 August 2022 E-mail should not be construed as relying on cl 18(c) of the Service Agreement, because it did not explicitly mention the phrase “Collateral Value”. This argument was only raised by the Defendants in their Closing Submissions. It was not taken up earlier, and they did not question nor put this to any of DB’s witnesses. The Defendants would be precluded from raising this on this ground alone.
- [113]
[113] Even if I were to allow this to be raised at this late stage, I would find that there is no substance to the submission.
- [114]
[114] It is apparent from the face of the 5 August 2022 E-mail that DB was referring in substance to the “Collateral Value” when it referred to the “Lending Value”. It made reference to previous correspondence and communications which stated that a lending value of 30% would be offered on the NR and LS Bonds on the basis of a diversified portfolio and that this was beyond the permissible limits. As set out above, and as pointed out by DB, there is abundant written communication on this very issue between the parties regarding the “Collateral Value”, where the phrase “Lending Value” was used and understood interchangeably , leading up to the points described in the 5 August 2022 E-mail about the “Lending Value”. It would have been clear to the parties that the “Lending Value” referred to in the 5 August 2022 E-mail is the same as the “Collateral Value” in the Service Agreement.
- [115]
[115] In any event, cl 18(c) gives DB the absolute discretion to prescribe the amount of required collateral, and if DB deems the collateral to be insufficient, cl 18(c) only requires that DB give one business days’ notice to deliver additional collateral of a type acceptable to DB in their sole discretion. There is no stated requirement in cl 18(c) for DB to prescribe the required collateral in the notice. Despite the absence of such contractual requirements, the 5 August 2022 E-mail nevertheless ends off with a list of steps for ARJ to take to reduce exposure on the Bonds before the reduction scheduled on 10 August 2022. I hence find no merit to the Defendants’ submission that cl 18(c) of the Service Agreement was not complied with in the 5 August 2022 E-mail.
- [116]
[116] The Defendants’ third submission is that it is DB’s own pleaded case, that there was “excessive concentration” on both the LS Bonds and NR Bonds and DB has not proven that ARJ was in breach of this on 5 August 2022. However, this misconstrues DB’s case. The Defendants had initially submitted at the close of trial that DB had stated this point in their 5 August 2022 E-mail. There is nothing in the 5 August 2022 E-mail that states this and the Defendants have not reiterated this position in their Closing Submissions. They have instead reframed it to submit that it is DB’s pleaded case that there was excessive concentration in both the LS and NR Bonds. However, the Defendants do not identify where in DB’s pleading they make this their case. Neither do I find it in DB’s pleading. I hence find no merit to the Defendants’ third submission.
- [117]
[117] The Defendants’ fourth submission is that DB has not satisfied its burden of proving that the Bonds were not fully paid up. First and foremost, DB did not rely on the Bonds not being fully paid up as a reason for reducing the LV of the Bonds, when DB informed ARJ and Mr Juma in its 5 August 2022 E-mail that DB would be reducing the LV of the LS Bonds and NR Bonds. Instead, DB referred to other reasons, namely, the 30% LV for the Bonds being offered on the basis of a diversified portfolio, the current exposure being beyond permissible limits and that the coupons on the Bonds had not been received. Thus, this submission of the Defendants does not affect DB’s case for reducing the LV of the Bonds, pursuant to these reasons.
- [118]
[118] Nevertheless, DB did submit that it was also entitled to lower the Collateral Value of the Bonds to nil pursuant to cl 18(b) of the Service Agreement, on the basis of their discovery that ARJ had not fully paid up for the Bonds. This was conveyed by DB to the Defendants in their 19 August 2022 Letter. It is in respect of this that the Defendants assert that DB have not satisfied their burden of proof of showing that the Bonds were not fully paid up.
- [119]
[119] There is however some inconsistency in the Defendants’ position on this. The Defendants had earlier applied to amend their Defence and Counterclaim (“D&CC”) dated 7 August 2023 in their Single Application Pending Trial. They had originally pleaded in their D&CC, that DB acted in breach of the alleged good faith obligation by assigning nil value to the Bonds on or around 19 August 2022. In this context, the Defendants’ position was that the Bonds had been “fully paid”. After DB requested the Defendants to produce documents relating to the payment of the Bonds, the Defendants proposed to delete references in the D&CC relating to DB’s concerns with the payment for the Bonds and the decision to assign nil lending value to the Bonds. Mr Juma testified that the Defendants no longer alleged that DB’s exercise of discretion to reduce the lending value of the Bonds from 25% to nil was in breach of an implied term of good faith and that the Defendants’ defence is centred on DB’s exercise of its discretion to reduce the LV from 30% to 25%. The Defendants argued that following from this, the documents sought by DB relating to the payment of the Bonds were “irrelevant”.
- [120]
[120] Given that the Defendants had resisted production of documents relating to the payment of the Bonds on the basis that they no longer contested DB’s discretion to reduce the LV of the Bonds from 25% to nil, it is highly inconsistent for them to now argue that DB is not entitled to such reduction of the LV of the Bonds, on the grounds that DB has not proven that the Bonds were not fully paid up.
- [122]
[122] In any event, I find no merit to the Defendants’ submission that the burden of proof of showing that the Bonds were fully paid up is on DB.
- [123]
[123] First, what DB relies on is cl 19 of the Service Agreement. Pursuant to this, an event of default occurs where any event arises that may adversely affect the ability of any of the parties to perform their obligations, or where an event arises that DB determines may be prejudicial to its interests. This could include an event that raises doubts about whether the Bonds were fully paid up. DB did not assert that they had proof that the Bonds were not fully paid up. Instead, in the 19 August 2022 Letter, they informed ARJ that matters had come to their attention regarding the fair value of as well as the veracity of representations made about the Bonds and asked ARJ to provide information that would allow DB to evaluate the appropriate value of the Bonds by 24 August 2022. However, ARJ did not provide such information. DB continued to seek such information through its request that the Defendants produce documents relating to the payment of the Bonds. It was the Defendants who resisted such production.
- [124]
[124] Second, the Defendants themselves had pleaded that the Bonds were at all material times “performing assets and were not distressed” . They also asserted through their witness, Dr Khan, that the bonds were fully paid up.
- [125]
[125] Third, s 108 of the EA provides that when “any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him”. Whether the Bonds were fully paid up is especially within the Defendants’ knowledge.
- [126]
[126] I am therefore of the view that the burden of proof of showing that the Bonds were fully paid up is on the Defendants.
- [127]
[127] I find that on the evidence before the court, the Defendants have not shown that the NR Bonds and LS Bonds were fully paid up when ARJ transferred them to DB. This means that contrary to ARJ’s claims, it did not provide DB with adequate collateral. DB was consequently also entitled to reduce the LV of the Bonds to nil, starting 19 August 2022. I examine this in more detail below.
- [128]
[128] Ms Wong testified that Mr Magnusson informed her in mid-August 2022 that the Bonds were not fully paid up. Mr Nemali corroborated Ms Wong’s evidence, stating that he was on the call. DB subsequently wrote to the Defendants in the 19 August 2022 Letter, where they stated:
…
[emphasis in original omitted]
- [129]
[129] The Defendants submit that an adverse inference should be drawn against DB for Mr Magnusson’s absence at trial. I decline to do so. I find that DB has given a credible explanation for his absence, which I elaborate on below. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Magnusson’s testimony would be contrary to what he stated in his e-mails and would instead corroborate the Defendants’ case that the Bonds were fully paid up for.
- [130]
[130] The Defendants also submit that Mr Magnusson’s e-mails are documentary hearsay evidence. DB had given Notice to Admit Hearsay dated 26 December 2024 to admit Mr Magnusson’s e-mails pursuant to ss 32(1)(b) and 32(1)(j) of the EA. I find that DB is entitled to admit the e-mails even if they were hearsay, pursuant to ss 32(1)(b), 32(1)(j)(iii) and 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA.
(a) The e-mails are record statements made in the ordinary course of business and hence satisfy s 32(1)(b) of the EA.
(b) Unlike the situation in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686, where s 32(1)(j)(iii) of the EA was not met because there was no evidence of efforts made to contact the surveyors who prepared the report, DB did reach out to Mr Magnusson. His solicitors requested that DB share their procedural strategy in the litigation before he would consider DB’s request to testify. Given that such strategy is confidential to DB and privileged, and Mr Magnusson had a longer history of interaction with the Defendants than DB, it would have been unreasonable to expect DB to agree to this condition to secure Mr Magnusson as a witness. I agree with DB that it would not be practicable to secure Mr Magnusson’s attendance for the purposes of s 32(1)(j)(iii) of the EA.
(c) For similar reasons, it can also be construed that Mr Magnusson is competent but not compellable and refused to give evidence on behalf of DB for the purposes of s 32(1)(j)(iv) of the EA.
- [131]
[131] Turning to Dr Khan’s evidence on whether the Bonds were fully paid up, I find a significant number of inconsistencies and flaws in his evidence.
- [132]
[132] First, Dr Khan testified in his supplementary AEIC at para 33 that partial coupon payments were received for the NR Bonds on 31 January 2022 and LS Bonds on 30 June 2022. However, his evidence does not support this claim:
(a) The credit advice that Dr Khan exhibited to show such payments, were for payment made to Mr Juma, not ARJ, which is the holder of the Bonds. Dr Khan said that this was because Mr Juma was the ultimate beneficial owner of the bonds. When asked for evidence or documentation to show that an issuer of the Bonds can ignore the bondholder to make payment to the ultimate beneficial owner, Dr Khan said the evidence of this was the credit advice. However, there is nothing of such on the credit advice.
(b) Dr Khan admitted that the invoice was just a credit advice showing monies reaching Mr Juma’s account. It does not show payment for specific bonds. On the face of the credit advice, there is no indication that the amount transferred was made as partial coupon payment for the Bonds.
(c) Dr Khan could not clearly identify who the payor was. He claimed that there was a call between Mr Magnusson and Mr Juma about this transfer, but he was not present at the call nor did he have any documentary evidence of such a discussion. His understanding was that the payment came from Mr Magnusson, but when asked who the payor was, Dr Khan said it is not mentioned in the credit advice and he could not assume something which is not written there. He did not have information on which entity made the transfer.
(d) Dr Khan confirmed he did not have any documents to show where the transfers came from. Mr Juma also confirmed that he did not have proof that the transfers were made for the purpose of the coupon payments nor any proof as to who the monies stated in the credit advice came from.
- [133]
[133] Second, Dr Khan changed his evidence on the stand several times when testifying that there was a waiver of the first coupon payment. His testimony on this matter was highly inconsistent.
- [134]
[134] Dr Khan made this claim for the first time on the stand, stating that Mr Magnusson requested for the waiver and Mr Juma agreed. Dr Khan initially testified that he knew of the waiver of coupon payment for the LS Bonds by end June 2022, that the waiver of the coupon payment for the LS Bonds was on 30 June 2022 and the waiver of the coupon payment for the NR Bonds was close to the end of July 2022. Notably, Dr Khan was unable to provide information on the date which the issuer of the Bonds made such a request, which entity agreed to the waiver, or supporting documents to show that such a waiver was agreed to.
- [135]
[135] When counsel for DB suggested to Dr Khan that he had never informed DB of such a waiver, Dr Khan disagreed. Dr Khan was then shown an e-mail from him to Mr Aroura dated 7 July 2022. There, Dr Khan informed Mr Aroura that Mr Magnusson had, on 30 June 2022, informed ARJ of an upcoming part coupon payment, but Dr Khan did not inform Mr Aroura in the e-mail that there was a waiver. When counsel pointed out to Dr Khan that he could have but did not inform DB in his e-mail dated 7 July 2022 that the first coupon payment for the LS Bonds (which was due on 30 June 2022) had already been waived, Dr Khan said that he did not do so as Mr Magnusson was still trying to pay. This was not part of his initial evidence on the stand.
- [136]
[136] When it was pointed out that Dr Khan had not informed DB of the waiver even in his e-mail update to DB dated 21 July 2022, Dr Khan then changed his evidence to say that the 30 June 2022 date in his supplementary AEIC was only the due date for coupon payment and that consent of waiver took place at the end of July. After counsel pointed out that this was different from his earlier evidence, Dr Khan said that he would make a slight change to his evidence and that it was not waiver “on 30 June” but “for 30 June”. He effectively took a different position from his earlier evidence.
- [137]
[137] When Dr Khan was later shown another e-mail from a DB officer to him dated 3 August 2022 about the lack of coupon payment, Dr Khan changed his evidence yet again. He said that he was not sure whether they had given the exemption or not and that this must have happened during the earlier dates and 3 August 2022. This is different from his initial evidence that the waiver for the LS Bonds was on 30 June 2022, and also different from his modified evidence that consent of waiver took place at the end of July.
- [138]
[138] Dr Khan’s evidence regarding the alleged waiver of coupon payment for the Bonds is also incongruent with the representations made then by the Defendants to DB. There were consistent assurances from the Defendants to DB that the coupon payments on the LS Bonds, which were due on 30 June 2022, would be paid soon. As at 7 July 2022, Dr Khan informed DB that the coupons “shall be paid in the first week of July due to a pending transaction”. On 21 July 2022, Dr Khan informed DB that the coupons would reach the bondholder’s account in a day or two. On or around 12 August 2022, Dr Khan claimed that the coupon payments were “deferred”. Minimally, Dr Khan’s representations conveyed that the coupon payments on the LS Bonds would eventually be paid, and not that they would be waived.
- [139]
[139] Third, Dr Khan testified that he agreed with the DB witnesses that bonds should have been paid up before they were released into the banking system. Without payment, the bond cannot be in the payment system or in the banking system. He maintained that the Bonds were fully paid up when they were transferred to DB, and thus DB was entitled to rely on them as security.
- [140]
[140] Dr Khan affirmed that when ARJ transferred the NR Bonds to DB on 12 May 2021, they were fully paid up. However, in Dr Khan’s supplementary AEIC at para 9, he said that there was a partial payment for the NR Bonds on 20 May 2021. This was described in a table by Dr Khan as a “SWIFT transfer from ARJ Holding Limited to Larmag Real Estate 2 B.V” for “EUR 13,657,000” in relation “120 million NR Bonds”. This raises questions about whether the NR Bonds could have been fully paid up by 12 May 2021. I will turn to this shortly.
- [141]
[141] I would first highlight that even on this, the evidence does not support the claim that there was a partial payment. Nothing on the face of the SWIFT transfer receipt shows that the transfer of €13,657,000 was intended as payment for the NR Bonds. It did not contain any reference to the NR Bonds, but only contained a generic phrase “PURCHASE OF BONDS”, which could refer to any other bonds. There is also no explanation why the payment of the NR Bonds purportedly took place on 20 May 2021 (the date of the SWIFT transfer), when the CHF120m of NR Bonds were already transferred to DB a week earlier on or around 12 May 2021. I note that there are similar evidential issues with the SWIFT receipt for the €7,471,325.11 that Dr Khan alleges was made for the €100m of LS Bonds on or around 3 November 2021. The SWIFT transfer receipt merely states the purpose of the transfer as for “INVESTMENT”.
- [142]
[142] Returning to the partial payment made on 20 May 2021, counsel suggested that on Dr Khan’s own evidence, the NR Bonds were not fully paid up before they were transferred to DB.
- [144]
[144] The above exchanges raise grave doubts about Dr Khan’s credibility as a witness. Dr Khan came across as a witness who is willing to make up evidence and has no qualms changing his testimony to the court as he goes along, particularly when he finds himself faced with contradictions in his earlier evidence.
- [145]
[145] Fourth, when counsel for DB pointed out to Dr Khan that he had not produced evidence of full payment of the NR Bonds and the LS Bonds, Dr Khan claimed that the LS Bonds and NS Bonds were acquired at a discount. The NR Bonds were acquired for €114m and the LS Bonds were acquired for the same price. The payments indicated in his supplementary AEIC did not add up to the discounted price of €114m. Dr Khan said that the rest of the payments were made by other entities. This was one of many instances where Dr Khan sought to address evidential gaps by referring to material evidence not found in his AEICs.
- [146]
[146] Dr Khan said that he had not disclosed this previously and was not able to provide any supporting documents evidencing these alleged other payments, because ARJ encountered an IT crash a couple of times, which took most of the documents lying with them. This was not in his supplementary AEIC.
- [147]
[147] When it was suggested to Dr Khan that while ARJ may not have the documents due to the alleged IT crashes, it would have ledgers and records showing how much payment was made by the other entities, Dr Khan again introduced a new element to his evidence, which is not found in his AEICs. He made the fresh claim that ARJ did not have such records because the payments were made by other entities, which were not under his control or under Mr Juma’s control.
- [148]
[148] Leaving aside that this appeared to be yet another instance of evidence being made up, I find it hard to believe that as the holder of the NR and LS Bonds, ARJ would not have a single document evidencing such payment from the other entities, even if ARJ and Mr Juma did not exercise control over them. As the bond holder, it would have been in ARJ’s interest to have records that payments, even from other sources, had been made to the bond seller.
- [149]
[149] Fifth, Dr Khan’s evidence in his supplementary AEIC, that there was a set off of the first coupon payment against the NR Bonds purchase price, also indicates that the NR Bonds were not fully paid when transferred to DB.
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