General Division of the High Court · Decided 26 November 2025
Design work that could improve space or looks was paid work, at the liability stage
Arki-Tech International Pte Ltd v Rentak Tebrau Sdn Bhd
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC 233 · Case no. Suit No 277 of 2019
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Design work that could improve space or looks was paid work, at the liability stage
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [3], [197]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [3]
[3] This trial is bifurcated with the issues of liability to be determined first. This judgment is therefore limited only to the liability of the defendant. The second phase of the trial will deal with the assessment of the quantum of the claim that I have allowed.
Facts
The parties
- [4]
[4] The plaintiff, Arki-Tech International Pte Ltd (“Arki-Tech”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of providing development and project management services. Mr Loo King Keong (“Loo”) is the managing director of Arki-Tech.
- [5]
[5] The defendant, Rentak Tebrau Sdn Bhd (“Rentak”), is a company incorporated in Malaysia to facilitate property development in the Iskandar area in Johor. Mr Richard Tan Poh Choon (“Richard”) and Mr Jerome Tan Tor Teng (“Jerome”) are directors of Rentak. Rentak had engaged Arkitek Shilpa (“Shilpa”) as the architect for the project. The consultant architect from Shilpa is Mr Lim Take Bane (“Take Bane”).
Background to the dispute
- [6]
[6] In October 2016, Rentak approached Arki-Tech with a business proposal regarding the provision of development and project management services for a project to be built on Lot 1510 Mk Tanjung Kupang in Iskandar, Johor, Malaysia (the “Project”). The Project initially comprised the following phases:
- [7]
[7] Following various discussions between Rentak and Arki-Tech, Rentak agreed to engage Arki-Tech as a Development Manager (“DM”) (until the commencement of construction works) and separately as a Project Manager (“PM”) (upon the commencement of construction works) for Phase 1 of the Project. The other phases of the Project were subject to the parties entering into a further agreement on the same terms and conditions upon reaching practical completion of Phase 1. The parties’ agreement was first set out in November 2016 in a Points of Agreement (the “POA”), before being more formally concretised in a Consultancy Agreement for Development Management dated 16 January 2017 (the “DM Agreement”).
- [8]
[8] The following are the salient terms of the DM Agreement:
(a) Clause 2 provides that Rentak has engaged Arki-Tech as the DM Consultant to provide “the Services set out in Item [5] of Schedule 2 (and Annexed Term Sheet) ” (the “VE Services”) to Rentak upon the terms and conditions set out in the DM Agreement. In Schedule 1, “Services” has been defined to mean “the services specified in Item [5] of Schedule 2”.
(b) Clause 3.1 provides that Arki-Tech shall complete the requisite “scope of works in the [VE] Services” in accordance with the annexed Term Sheet “up to and until the commencement of construction works”.
(c) Clause 4.1 provides that Arki-Tech shall invoice Rentak at the end of every monthly cycle for the VE Services rendered and Rentak “shall pay the Fees [(“Fees”)] within seven (7) days of receiving the invoice”. Arki-Tech’s Fees are to be calculated according to Item 2 of Schedule 3 to the DM Agreement and pro-rated to the agreed preconstruction time period spent by Arki-Tech in providing the VE Services.
(i) “Fees” is defined in Schedule 1 to mean the fees payable by Rentak to Arki-Tech for “the [VE] Services rendered” and is to be calculated based on the “Hourly Rate” as set out in Item 2 of Schedule 3 and the time taken by Arki-Tech to render such VE Services.
(ii) Item 2 of Schedule 3 provides for an “Hourly Rate” of $350 and includes the following additional words in brackets “if and when [Arki-Tech’s] services are needed which [is] not [in] accordance to agreed VE Works [ie, value engineering works] (“VE Works”)” and “up to a maximum of 160 hours … per calendar month…”.
(iii) Item 5 of Schedule 3 separately provides that Arki-Tech is entitled to “Fees to manage and execute value engineering to Project” of 20% of all cost savings from value engineering (“VE”) “measured against a formal quantity surveyor QS detailed cost estimates; prepared in accordance to PDF drawings and planning data that had been tabled in Annex B [(“Option 1”)]. Or whenever factually ascertained to be based on the construction rate of RM 250 per square feet (Budgetary Construction estimate/GFA [(“Gross Floor Area”)] [(“Option 2”)]” (collectively, the “VE Fee Option Clause”).
(d) Item 5 of Schedule 2 to the DM Agreement sets out Arki-Tech’s “Services - Scope of Work” in relation to Phase 1 of the Project in the following terms (the “Scope of Services Clause”):
(e) Item 3 of the annexed Term Sheet to the DM Agreement reiterates that the parties had specifically agreed that the “Role of [the DM] in Value Engineering Aspect to Phase 1” is to include all the services set out in the above Scope of Services Clause.
(f) Item 6 of Schedule 2 (the “Implementation Clause”) to the DM Agreement defines “Implementation of VE Works” to mean that the “DM shall proceed to implement the project development model based on the approved VEs (the “Board-approved VEs” or “Board-approved VE proposals”)” upon obtaining the written agreement of the board of directors of Rentak (the “Board”).
- [10]
[10] After the parties entered into the DM Agreement, it became apparent that the Project should be rephased, with the Multi-Storey Carpark phase and the Convention Centre phase of the Project being completed at an earlier point in time. This meant that the phases of the Project were adjusted as follows:
(a) Phase 1: Innside Hotel.
(b) Phase 2: Multi-Storey Carpark (Phase 2A) and Convention Centre (Phase 2B).
(c) Phase 3: Melia Hotel.
(d) Phase 4: Office Tower.
- [11]
[11] Following this revision of the phases in the Project, Arki-Tech claims to have begun work on Phase 1 of the Project, notably with respect to the width of the corridors; the air-conditioning design; the lift layout and the hotel room layout in Innside Hotel. Arki-Tech also claims to have been instructed by Rentak to develop various other aspects of the Project, including providing VE Services in respect of the Multi-Storey Carpark and Melia Hotel, securing a plot ratio enhancement of the Project and amending the sketch design of the whole Project.
- [13]
[13] The total claim therefore amounted to $26,021,083.65, which was subsequently issued as a revised Payment Claim No. 17-225/PC 22 (Rev1) dated 23 January 2019 reflecting the correct claim amounts.
- [14]
[14] Rentak did not pay any of the payment claims submitted by Arki-Tech.
The parties’ arguments
- [16]
[16] Arki-Tech filed a Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) for the sums of $1,062,665.10 and $24,958,418.55 (totalling $26,021,083.65) inclusive of GST along with 12% interest per annum on those sums.
- [17]
[17] Arki-Tech’s arguments can be canvassed in these broad strokes:
(a) The VE Services performed by Arki-Tech for Phase 1 of the Project generates both costs savings and value enhancements, and therefore constitute VE. Rentak accepted the VE proposals made by Arki-Tech such that the latter should now be allowed to claim for VE Works under the DM Agreement.
(b) Rentak had agreed for Arki-Tech to expand the scope of its VE Services beyond Phase 1 of the Project. The VE Services performed with respect to Phase 2A, Phase 3 and the plot ratio enhancements were valid VE Works. Arki-Tech is entitled to be paid for the VE Services performed in respect of Phase 2A, Phase 3 and the plot ratio enhancements.
(c) There was an oral contract between the parties for Arki-Tech to provide sketch design amendments. Rentak is obliged to pay Arki-Tech for the work done in relation to these sketch design amendments.
(d) In the alternative, Arki-Tech seeks payment for its VE Services rendered on the basis of quantum meruit.
- [18]
[18] Rentak makes the following arguments in its defence against Arki-Tech’s claims:
(a) Arki-Tech is not entitled to claim damages in respect of Phase 1 of the Project as the DM Agreement is unenforceable. In this regard, Rentak submits that the VE Fee Option Clause is vague, uncertain and incomprehensible such that it renders the whole DM Agreement unworkable and unenforceable. Rentak also argues that the VE Fee Option Clause is unenforceable as it is an agreement to agree.
(b) Even if the DM Agreement is enforceable, Rentak argues that Arki-Tech is precluded from claiming damages for Phase 1 of the Project as it failed to complete the required VE Services under the DM Agreement. Moreover, the VE proposals by Arki-Tech are neither adoptable nor implementable as VE.
(c) For the other phases of the Project, Rentak argues that there is no agreement as alleged by Arki-Tech because the parties did not exercise the option in the DM Agreement to extend it to cover the later phases of the Project. Rentak also argues that the option to extend in the DM Agreement is void for uncertainty. In any event, Arki-Tech failed to perform any VE that is adoptable or implementable.
(d) For the same reasons as those enumerated in (c) above, Arki-Tech is not entitled to damages in respect of work done in relation to the plot ratio of the Project as well as any sketch design amendments.
(e) Arki-Tech is also not entitled to claim for damages under the restitutionary head of quantum meruit because this specific head of claim is not pleaded.
(f) Finally, Rentak argues that Arki-Tech is not entitled to late payment interest because the clause prescribing the payment of such interest is void for being a penalty clause.
- [19]
[19] Arki-Tech responds by making the following arguments:
(a) The DM Agreement is enforceable. In this regard, the VE Fee Option Clause is not void for uncertainty.
(b) Arki-Tech is entitled to be paid in respect of its VE Services for Phase 1 of the Project as its VE proposals are adoptable or implementable as VE.
(c) As for the VE Services performed in respect of the other phases of the Project, Arki-Tech argues that there was, in fact, an agreement between the parties to extend the DM Agreement to encompass other phases of the Project (including plot ratio enhancements and sketch design amendments). The payment terms in respect of this agreement are not void for uncertainty and Arki-Tech is entitled to be paid for its VE proposals which are adoptable or implementable as VE.
(d) Arki-Tech is entitled to claim under the head of quantum meruit as this has been particularised in its statement of claim.
- [20]
[20] Rentak, in its reply submissions, repeats its arguments made in its closing submissions.
Issues to be determined
- [21]
[21] The parties’ cases broadly give rise to the following issues for my determination:
(a) Is the DM Agreement enforceable?
(b) Is Arki-Tech entitled to any payment under the DM Agreement?
(c) Did the parties agree to extend the DM Agreement to cover the other phases of the Project?
(d) Is Arki-Tech entitled to any payments in respect of quantum meruit?
(e) Is Arki-Tech entitled to any late payment interest?
- [22]
[22] Having set out the pertinent issues, I begin with the first issue, ie, whether the DM Agreement is enforceable.
Whether the DM Agreement is enforceable
The applicable legal principles
- [23]
[23] For a contract to be validly formed and enforceable, its terms must be certain (see Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter and another appeal [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 at [50]). But this does not mean that the law is overly astute or subtle in finding defects in terms. Instead, the law construes documents fairly and broadly (see Hillas (WN) & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd [1932] All ER Rep 494 (“Hillas”) at 503–504). The law will endeavour to uphold an agreement instead of striking it down (see Gardner Smith (SE Asia) Pte Ltd v Jee Woo Trading Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 950 at [10]). This suggests a presumption that contracts are valid (The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2022) at para 03.208). Indeed, in specifically considering whether a term is void for uncertainty, the court may have regard to the more general principle of reasonableness (Hillas at 506).
The VE Fee Option Clause and Term Sheet Fee Clause are not so vague and uncertain that the DM Agreement is rendered unworkable and unenforceable
- [24]
[24] In my view, the VE Fee Option Clause and Term Sheet Fee Clause are not so vague and uncertain that the DM Agreement is rendered unworkable and unenforceable.
- [25]
[25] In coming to this conclusion, I note the operation of the contra proferentem rule against Arki-Tech. The contra proferentem rule states that a person who puts forward the wording of an agreement can be assumed to have looked after his own interests, such that any ambiguity in the agreement is to be construed against that party. This means that where there is ambiguity about whether the person who drafted the wording of the agreement was intended to have a particular benefit, the contra proferentem rule indicates that he did not so intend (see Tay Eng Chuan v Ace Insurance Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 95 at [34]).
- [26]
[26] Here, the evidence indicates that Loo drafted the DM Agreement, such that the contra proferentem rule operates against Arki-Tech. In an email dated 3 January 2017 to Rentak (“3 January 2017 Email”), Loo stated the following:
The tenor of this email to Rentak clearly indicates that Loo drafted the DM Agreement along with the Term Sheet, in accordance with Rentak’s suggestion for Loo to draft the agreement. I find as a fact that it was Loo who drafted the DM Agreement and Term Sheet and that he had based it on the POA. Further, it appears from the WhatsApp messages between Loo and Jerome dated 23 November 2016 that Loo was also the person who had been drafting the POA for the parties as Loo messaged at 14.58 pm that he had just sent the POA to Jerome and also to Tan Yang Po and Richard. Consequently, the contra proferentem rule should operate against Arki-Tech.
- [27]
[27] I am fortified in my conclusion by several clauses of the DM Agreement which are highly advantageous to Arki-Tech and strongly suggest that Loo drafted the DM Agreement and the Term Sheet. The first clause is cl 7.2 of the DM Agreement, which provides:
- [28]
[28] It can be seen that cl 7.2 gives Arki-Tech a very wide latitude to immediately terminate the DM Agreement (eg, failure on the part of Rentak to make payment within seven days) without any prejudice to Arki-Tech’s rights to bring a claim against Rentak for unpaid Fees. This overly favourable termination clause in favour of Arki-Tech suggests that Loo drafted the DM Agreement and Term Sheet.
- [29]
[29] The second clause is cl 8 of the DM Agreement, specifically, sub-cll 8.2.2, 8.2.4 and 8.2.5, which provide:
- [30]
[30] It can be seen that sub-cll 8.2.2, 8.2.4 and 8.2.5 exclude Arki-Tech’s liability for damages of any kind stemming from Rentak’s use of Arki-Tech’s intellectual property rights (“IPR”). This limitation of liability clause is unduly onerous towards Rentak, which again suggests that Loo drafted the DM Agreement and Term Sheet.
- [32]
[32] None of these communications assist Arki-Tech because they pre-dated the 3 January 2017 Email from Loo to Rentak. Indeed, the emails that Arki-Tech relies on only show that the parties had initially considered engaging lawyers to draft the DM Agreement, before eventually doing away with this idea. Even though Jerome had suggested that the parties draft the agreement themselves, the reality of the 3 January 2017 Email is that Loo eventually drafted the DM Agreement and Term Sheet himself. Indeed, the objective nature of the 3 January 2017 Email contradicts his self-serving statement under cross-examination that the drafting of the agreement was a joint effort. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Loo drafted the DM Agreement and the Term Sheet. Hence, the contra proferentem rule operates against Arki-Tech such that any ambiguity in the DM Agreement is to be resolved in favour of Rentak.
There is no uncertainty regarding the identification or selection of a “formal quantity surveyor”
- [34]
[34] The starting point when undertaking the exercise of contractual interpretation is the language of the relevant terms of the contract (see CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 (“CIFG”) at [19(a)]). In this regard, it is notable that Item 2 of the Term Sheet stipulates clearly that the QS is to be employed by Rentak:
- [37]
[37] Indeed, Jerome testified during the trial that Rentak had stipulated for the appointment of another QS to provide the “Construction Budgetary Estimate for Phase 1” as the estimated amount previously provided to them by their own QS, Ms Alice Jurukur (“Alice”) of “MYR 97,000,000” , had been too high:
- [38]
[38] Furthermore, the POA indicates that Rentak was to appoint the QS for the Project. Given that the POA is a form of pre-contractual negotiations between the parties, there is an anterior legal question of whether evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is admissible for the purpose of interpreting a contract. The admissibility of evidence of prior negotiations is a legal issue that remains open in Singapore (see Xia Zhengyan v Geng Changqing [2015] 3 SLR 732 at [69]). Parties who rely on extrinsic evidence (including that of pre-contractual negotiations) to aid in the construction of a contract must comply with certain pleading requirements as set out in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (at [73]). Moreover, the evidence of pre-contractual negotiations must, if admissible, be relevant, reasonably available to all the contracting parties and relate to a clear and obvious context (see Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [125] and [128]–[129]).
- [39]
[39] Since this legal issue was not directly addressed by the parties, I leave this question to be decided on a more suitable occasion when the court has the benefit of full arguments. Nonetheless, I observe that the situation here is extremely clear since the DM Agreement and Term Sheet were based off the POA. Moreover, the POA serves a confirmatory (ie, complementary and subsidiary) function as opposed to a pivotal one. Here, that the QS is to be employed by Rentak is made clear at Item 5 of the POA (which is almost identical to Item 2 of the Term Sheet):
- [40]
[40] Indeed, the POA appears to have similarly defined the acronym “QS” to be the “formal quantity surveyor” as can be seen at Item 3 in the POA under “Parties JV Structure & Options”, where the sixth bullet point states that:
- [41]
[41] It is also clear to me that the evidence of the POA would have fulfilled the requirements set out in Zurich Insurance. The POA is relevant since the Term Sheet annexed to the DM Agreement was based on the POA. The POA was also available to both Arki-Tech and Rentak. The POA set the background against which the parties entered into the DM Agreement. In fact in Loo’s 3 January 2017 Email to Rentak, Loo said that the draft DM Agreement he had prepared was based on the POA but he had edited out “the financing, DM and PM term sheets”.
- [42]
[42] In sum, the POA confirms my interpretation that the QS referred to in the VE Fee Option Clause and the Term Sheet Fee Clause was to be appointed by Rentak.
- [43]
[43] The DM Agreement and Term Sheet (as well as the POA) all indicate that the parties had agreed that the QS being the “formal quantity surveyor” was to be appointed solely by Rentak. Thus, at all times, it was understood and agreed by the parties that Rentak would employ and therefore appoint the QS. Clearly, it is not that either Arki-Tech or Rentak can appoint the QS. Neither is there a requirement for Arki-Tech and Rentak to agree on and jointly appoint the QS.
- [45]
[45] Finally, Rentak’s reliance on Rudhra Minerals Pte Ltd v MRI Trading Pte Ltd (formerly known as CWT Integrated Services Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 1023 (“Rudhra”) is misplaced. In Rudhra, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the appointment of a load port surveyor under a contract to purchase coal as well as the mechanism by which the load port surveyor was to be appointed. Holding that the contract was void for uncertainty (or more precisely, for being incomplete), Andrew Ang J reasoned that this was because the term relating to the choice of the load port surveyor was essential to the contract but not agreed upon (at [40]).
The meaning of “20% of all cost savings from VE” is not unclear
The parties did agree on an Annex B containing “PDF drawings and planning data”
- [59]
[59] Section 97 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”) steps in to resolve this ambiguity. Section 97 provides:
Thus, where the original language is plain by itself but meaningless when applied to the existing facts, evidence is admissible to demonstrate that the original language was used in a peculiar sense (see Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 8th Ed, 2024) at para 11.034).
- [60]
[60] In my judgment, the parties in the present case had agreed on the PDF drawings and planning data that the QS was to use in her calculations before the DM Agreement was executed. Specifically, the parties had agreed for the QS to use the drawings provided earlier on 16 November 2016 (which was prior to the DM Agreement dated 16 January 2017). Indeed, Richard agreed that this was the case:
Jerome similarly conceded this as well:
- [61]
[61] Hence, there is no uncertainty as to the drawings that the QS was meant to use. I therefore accept Arki-Tech’s submission that the “PDF drawings and planning data” in Annex B is intended to refer to the drawings provided to Loo on 16 November 2016.
- [62]
[62] Rentak contends that if the parties had intended to refer to the drawings provided on 16 November 2016, they would have explicitly referred to this in the DM Agreement. Any force in this submission is dissipated given Rentak’s own concession that the “PDF drawings and planning data” as referred to in the VE Fee Option Clause referred to the drawings provided to Loo on 16 November 2016. Likewise, Rentak’s submission that the “PDF drawings” that were “tabled for the Parties discussion” (as stipulated in the Term Sheet) is unclear lacks merit, in the light of Rentak’s own acknowledgment as to what the “PDF drawings and planning data” as mentioned in the DM Agreement were referring to. These “PDF drawings tabled for the Parties discussion” again is intended to refer to the same PDF drawings that were provided to Loo on 16 November 2016 obviously to study first and for discussion with Rentak later when Loo makes his VE proposals.
- [64]
[64] For these reasons, the cases relied on by Rentak also do not assist it. In T2 Networks Pte Ltd v Nasioncom Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 1 (“T2 Networks”), Judith Prakash J (as she then was) held that the settlement agreement was unenforceable not just because there was no consideration, but also because there was no payment schedule provided (with the need for a payment schedule being vital to the agreement) (at [44]). In Lal Hiranand v Kamla Lal Hiranand [2007] 2 SLR(R) 165 (“Lal Hiranand”), the Court of Appeal held that the deed in question was unenforceable because the term “Hiranand family companies” as used in the deed was not defined. Indeed, although the companies were supposed to be named in a schedule to the deed, there was no such schedule furnished. While the Court of Appeal was prepared to give meaning to a term that was on its face uncertain, it found on the facts that there was simply no certainty on the evidence as to the companies that constituted the “Hiranand family companies” (at [32], [35] and [41]–[42]). Indeed, the Court of Appeal went on to conclude that the other provisions of the deed were so uncertain that no order could be made as to how they were to be performed (at [45]). In contrast to the fact patterns in T2 Networks and Lal Hiranand, the evidence in the present case clearly indicates the parties’ agreement that the “PDF drawings and planning data” referred to the drawings that were given to Loo on 16 November 2016. In this regard, there is no factual dispute as to exactly which of Shilpa’s drawings were given to Loo on 16 November 2016 to work on in order to propose various VE options and designs for the eventual consideration of the Board for their selection and written approval.
Option 2 is comprehensible
- [70]
[70] In any event, as will be explained later (see [105] below), this discussion on the two options in the VE Fee Option Clause is ultimately academic as the Term Sheet Fee Clause supersedes the whole of the VE Fee Option Clause.
The VE Fee Option Clause is not an agreement to agree
- [71]
[71] Rentak then argues that the VE Fee Option Clause is unenforceable as an agreement to agree, and that the contract is subsequently void for uncertainty, relying on Items 5 and 6 of Schedule 3 to the DM Agreement. I reject this submission.
- [72]
[72] At the outset, Rentak is misconceived in arguing that a contract that is subject to further agreement is unenforceable for lack of certainty. The law is clear that parties can conclude a binding contract notwithstanding that certain terms have yet to be agreed between them. What is critical is whether the parties have demonstrated an intention to be bound by the essential terms, notwithstanding the unsettled terms (Rudhra at [27]; Law of Contract at para 03.233).
- [73]
[73] In this regard, it is true that in May and Butcher, Limited v The King [1934] 2 KB 17, Viscount Dunedin held that a good contract is “one which settles everything that is necessary to be settled and leaves nothing to be settled by agreement between the parties” (at 21, cited with approval in G Scammell at 269). But read in its proper context, Viscount Dunedin was referring to the elementary principle that necessary terms (ie, essential terms) have to be agreed between the parties and no necessary term can be settled by future agreement between the parties. Thus, there is no basis for Rentak’s assertion that a contract that is subject to further agreement is unenforceable.
- [76]
[76] Turning to Item 6 of Schedule 3, titled “Payment default event when payment terms cannot be ascertained”, this clause provides as follows:
- [77]
[77] When construed objectively, Item 6 of Schedule 3 does not suggest that payment terms were subject to further negotiation or subsequent agreement between the parties. Instead, these clauses provide for a default payment mechanism that Arki-Tech could invoke, if Rentak failed to pay the “Fees” as defined in Schedule 1 and as stipulated in cl 4.1 of the DM Agreement. Hence, Item 6 of Schedule 3 does not assist Rentak’s argument that the DM Agreement is an agreement to agree.
Whether Arki-Tech is entitled to any payments in respect of Phase 1 of the Project
Applicable legal principles
- [78]
[78] Having determined that the DM Agreement is enforceable, the next question that arises pertains to how I should interpret the DM Agreement with respect to the payment of fees.
- [79]
[79] The principles pertaining to the interpretation of a contract are well-settled. As mentioned earlier (see [34] above), in construing a contract, the starting point is the text that the parties have used. The court is simultaneously permitted to consider the relevant context provided the relevant contextual points are clear, obvious and known to both parties. The court can consider the relevant context because the court is thereby placed in the best position to ascertain the parties’ objective intentions by situating their expressions in the proper context. Finally, the court must ascribe to the terms of the contract a meaning which the parties’ expressions can reasonably bear (CIFG at [19]).
Arki-Tech is entitled to remuneration at the hourly rate of $350 with the award of 20% of cost savings in Phase 1 of the Project being a bonus
- [81]
[81] At the outset, it is important to note that “Fees” and “Services” have been defined in Schedule 1 of the DM Agreement specifically as follows:
It is common ground between the parties that the definition of “Services” should refer to Item 5 of Schedule 2, instead of Item 2 of Schedule 2. Clearly these “Fees” payable under the DM Agreement are to be based on the number of hours actually rendered by the DM Consultant in providing all the “Services” specified in the DM Agreement and multiplied by the agreed hourly rate of $350 per hour (see [8(c)] above). This has been expressly and clearly set out in cl 4.1 of the DM Agreement, which also specifically refers to Item 2 of Schedule 3 that sets out the agreed and fixed hourly rate of $350 (hereinafter referred to as the “Time-based Fee Clause”) (see [85] below, which sets out cl 4.1 of the DM Agreement in full). This is essentially a time-based fee to be paid by Rentak to Arki-Tech (hereinafter referred to as the “Time-based Fee Arrangement”).
- [83]
[83] The Time-based Fee Clause and the VE Fee Option Clause thus set out both the Time-based Fee Arrangement and the 20% Fee Arrangement respectively:
2
As there are two types of fee arrangements, the question is how these two fee mechanisms can be reconciled in determining how the parties intended Arki-Tech to be paid under the DM Agreement.
- [85]
[85] Indeed, cl 4.1 of the DM Agreement sets out the time-based fee structure as follows:
- [88]
[88] My conclusion that the hourly rate of $350 forms an integral part of the time-based fee structure under the DM Agreement is strengthened by cll 5.4 and 5.5 of the DM Agreement, which provide:
- [89]
[89] Thus, it can be seen that until the “Fees” (which are defined to be payable at the $350 hourly rate) for each monthly billing cycle are paid in full to Arki-Tech, the IPR created by Arki-Tech remain its own sole property. It is only once the “Fees” for each monthly billing cycle have been paid in full that Arki-Tech fully assigns to Rentak all rights, interest, title and benefit in the IPR. The references to the monthly billing cycle in cll 5.4 and 5.5 of the DM Agreement further reinforces the view that computation of the “Fees” payable at the hourly rate of $350 (ie, the Time-based Fee Arrangement) is an integral part of the fee structure under the DM Agreement and is not dependant on whether the Board approves or rejects any of the various VE proposals that are the result of Arki-Tech’s work done and time spent in providing VE Services under the DM Agreement.
- [90]
[90] Finally, I would be remiss in not mentioning cl 7.3 of the DM Agreement, which provides:
- [91]
[91] The reference again to “Fees”, which is defined to be calculated based on the $350 hourly rate, indicates that this hourly rate together with the number of hours actually worked proven with time sheets generated form an integral part of the time-based payment structure under the DM Agreement and Term Sheet.
When Arki-Tech would be entitled to the hourly rate of $350 for work done
- [94]
[94] The next question then is the type of work Arki-Tech needs to do to be entitled to the hourly rate of $350. The issue in this case arises from the fact that, under the Time-based Fee Clause, the words “if and when DM Consultant’s services are needed which in not accordance to agreed VE Works” is placed in parentheses after the words “Hourly Rate”. Moreover, the words “up to a maximum of 160 hours per DM Consultant per calendar month and in accordance to time sheet generated to support this hourly rate charges” appear also in parentheses after the figure of “SGD$ 350”. The structure of the Time-based Fee Clause therefore may appear to suggest that the hourly rate of $350 applies only when Arki-Tech’s services are needed for works that are outside the scope of the agreed works that constitute VE. If this interpretation is correct, then, taken to its logical conclusion, there will be no standard hourly rate in the DM Agreement stipulating the amount that Arki-Tech is to be paid for work done that is within the scope of the DM Agreement.
- [95]
[95] In my judgment, this cannot be the proper interpretation of the Time-based Fee Clause of the DM Agreement. In my view, the hourly rate of $350 is meant to compensate Arki-Tech for work done that is both within and beyond the scope of the DM Agreement. I come to this view for the following reasons.
- [96]
[96] First, in my view, the proper interpretation is that the hourly rate of $350 covers all the work performed by Arki-Tech that falls within the scope of the DM Agreement. Clause 4.1 of the DM Agreement stipulates that Arki-Tech is to be paid the “Fees” (calculated based on the hourly rate of $350) for “Services” rendered. The word “Services” is, in turn, defined in the Scope of Services Clause of the DM Agreement as follows:
- [98]
[98] Second, it is also clear to me that Arki-Tech is entitled to be compensated for any services that do not fall within the Scope of Services Clause of the DM Agreement provided these services are needed. This is the purpose of the words in parentheses “if and when DM Consultant’s services are needed which in not accordance to agreed VE Works”. Whereas cl 4.1 of the DM Agreement stipulates that Arki-Tech is to be compensated at an hourly rate of $350 for all the Services (which obviously cover “agreed VE Works”) to be rendered under the DM Agreement, the words in parentheses extend the same hourly rate of compensation to services that fall outside of the scope of the Services of the DM Agreement provided that the “Consultant’s services are needed”.
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