Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 9 Apr 2025

General Division of the High Court

The court dismissed both claims that arose from the collapse of the company

Ren Xin Wu v Lee Kuan Fung and another and another matter

Feedback & support

[2025] SGHC 63Case no. Originating Claim No 468 of 2023

The decision, in one line

Not legal advice

The court dismissed both claims that arose from the collapse of the company

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [1], [153]

There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The two claims before me, namely, HC/OC 226/2024 (“OC 226”) and HC/OC 468/2023 (“OC 468”), have been consolidated and were heard together as they both stem from the demise of Homing Holdings Pte Ltd (“Homing”), which was liquidated in 2021.

  3. [2] OC 226 is a claim by the liquidators of Homing against Goldciti Pte Ltd (“Goldciti”), a company that was ostensibly hired to provide corporate restructuring advice to Homing when it was threatened with possible winding-up proceedings, as well as one of Homing’s directors, Mdm Lee Kuan Fung (“Mdm Lee”). The main issue in OC 226 is whether such transaction with Goldciti constituted a sham orchestrated by Goldciti and Mdm Lee that was set up with a view to siphon moneys out of Homing.

  4. [3] OC 468 is a claim by one of Homing’s creditors, Mr Ren Xin Wu (“Mr Ren”), against the other two founding shareholders of Homing, Mdm Lee and one Mr Chua Chim Kang (“Mr Chua”), relating to a loan which had been given to Homing. The main issue, broadly speaking, in OC 468 is whether the loan agreement between the three shareholders contained an implied term that sought to impose duties on Mdm Lee and Mr Chua to procure the return of such loan from Homing.

  5. [4] For the reasons set out in this judgment, both the questions I have posed in the preceding two paragraphs ought to be answered in the negative.

  6. The facts

  7. The lifetime of Homing

  8. [5] It would be useful to begin with a discussion of the origins of Homing. Sometime in or around August 2016, three individuals (collectively, the “parties”), namely Mdm Lee, Mr Chua and Mr Ren, began discussions with a view to entering into a joint venture. Such a joint venture was anticipated to be used as a business vehicle promoting the use of Mandarin via various modalities, including teaching and tutoring. On 2 June 2017, Mdm Lee incorporated Homing in preparation for the finalisation of such a joint venture.

  9. [6] The corporate structure of the joint venture, in essence, was to involve Homing serving as a holding company for two wholly-owned subsidiaries, namely Luminaries Holdings Pte Ltd (“Luminaries”) and Lulele Learning Space Pte Ltd (“Lulele”). Luminaries was a company that Mdm Lee had already incorporated previously on 24 May 2017. As part of the joint venture, on 27 July 2017, Mdm Lee transferred the shares of Luminaries into Homing for nominal consideration. As for Lulele, it was incorporated in June 2018 as part of the joint venture arrangements. The agreement between the parties was for Mdm Lee and one Ms Huang Mingjing (“Ms Huang”) to hold 65% and 35% of the shares of Lulele respectively as nominees of Homing for the first three years.

  10. [7] As for the shareholding structure of Homing, the agreement between the parties was for Mr Ren, Mr Chua and Mdm Lee to beneficially own 35%, 35% and 30% of the shares in Homing respectively. Nonetheless, both Mr Ren’s and Mr Chua’s shares were to be held by nominees, ie, Ms Huang and Mdm Lee respectively, on their behalf. Both subsidiaries were to be wholly owned by Homing.

  11. [8] As for the management of Homing, both Mdm Lee and Ms Huang were appointed as directors. It is not in dispute that Mdm Lee was the primary person overseeing the day-to-day affairs of Homing, and that Ms Huang played a significantly more diminished role, though the parties take divergent positions on the specifics of Ms Huang’s precise involvement, with Mdm Lee claiming that she “gave recognition to [Ms] Huang as [Mr] Ren’s nominee” and that Mr Ren consequently participated in management decisions via Ms Huang as his proxy on multiple occasions. Mr Ren alleges that Ms Huang was oppressed and treated as a subordinate by Mdm Lee, claiming, as examples, that Ms Huang was not able to gain access to the bank tokens for internet banking services and how she was not made a joint signatory of Homing’s bank accounts. As for the subsidiaries, namely Luminaries and Lulele, Mdm Lee was appointed the sole director. In essence, therefore, the primary person overseeing the day-to-day operations of both Homing and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries was Mdm Lee.

  12. [9] On 26 July 2017, the parties entered into a “Joint Co-operation Agreement” (the “Agreement”). The Agreement’s contents are in Mandarin, but the parties have agreed on an interpreted version for the purposes of these proceedings.

  13. [10] As the material terms of the Agreement which are relevant to the present proceedings are somewhat lengthy, I have attached them as Annex A to this judgment. For present purposes, however, I would highlight the broad contours of the especially significant clauses:

  14. (a) Clause 3.2 stipulates the investment mechanics, and initial funding, agreed upon by the parties. In essence, it was agreed that Mr Ren would invest $10,000 into Homing for a 35% share; while Mr Chua and Mdm Lee would “commit to management and intellectual property” in return for a 35% and 30% share of Homing respectively.

  15. (b) Clause 3.4 stipulates that above and beyond Mr Ren’s equity investment of $10,000, he would also extend a loan of $990,000 to Homing (the “Loan”) on a “no guarantee, interest-free basis for a duration of three years”.

  16. (c) While Clause 5.1 “entrusts” Mdm Lee to “perform the daily operations of [Homing]”, Clause 5.2 provides a gloss to that by requiring that “decisions related to the major affairs of [Homing]” be decided by way of majority vote amongst the three shareholders, with each of the parties holding one vote. In gist, therefore, major decisions were to be made by the shareholders, but day-to-day decisions could be taken by Mdm Lee.

  17. (d) Clause 8.1 states that the Agreement “shall be valid for three (3) years from the date of incorporation of [Homing]”. Interestingly, the Agreement does not stipulate what would happen if the parties did not, or could not, agree on whether to continue with their co-operation or to terminate it after three years.

  18. (e) Clause 9.3 states that the Agreement only comes “into effect when all [the parties] have signed and affixed their stamps”. It is not in dispute that no “stamps” were affixed onto the Agreement at any point of time, and all the parties merely appended their signatures to the Agreement.

  19. [11] On 27 July 2017, in furtherance of the terms of the Agreement, Mr Ren made the necessary payment of $1,000,000 to Homing comprising the payment for both his equity share and for the Loan. To facilitate working capital for the subsidiaries, which, as the corporate structure described earlier, would have been the primary active entities operating businesses and generating revenue, most of the Loan was transferred from Homing to the subsidiaries, with $700,000 being channelled to Luminaries and $100,000 transferred to Lulele.

  20. [12] The parties did not enter into any further agreement to extend the Loan subsequently. Whatever the implications of this more broadly to Homing, it is not disputed that, pursuant to Clause 3.4 of the Agreement, this would mean that the Loan would have fallen due on or about 27 July 2020, ie, three years after the Loan had been disbursed by Mr Ren.

  21. The liquidation of Homing

  22. [13] For the first few years, it would appear that Homing’s business was generally carried on without much incident or problems. However, starting from early 2020, Homing and its subsidiaries (collectively, the “Homing Group”) faced financial difficulties, ostensibly in large part due to the impact that COVID-19 had on their business operations. In view of the bleak financial outlook, Mr Ren decided to terminate the Agreement and to seek repayment of the Loan upon it falling due. Despite numerous discussions between the parties on arranging the repayment of the Loan, the Loan was never repaid to Mr Ren.

  23. [14] Consequently, Mr Ren proceeded to serve statutory demands on Mr Chua, Mdm Lee and Homing in the last quarter of 2020. On 22 September 2020, and subsequently on 17 November 2020, Mr Ren sent statutory demands to Mr Chua seeking the return of the sum of $990,000 from Mr Chua personally, on the premise that it was an implied term of the Agreement that “the parties would procure that the Loan be repaid to [Mr Ren]” once it was due, ie, on or around 27 July 2020. Mr Chua proceeded to file an application to set aside the two statutory demands in HC/OSB 79/2020 (“OSB 79”). OSB 79 was heard by an assistant registrar who eventually allowed Mr Chua’s application on the premise that “there are triable issues, such as whether there is an implied term that [Mr Chua] is to procure [Homing] to repay the loan”. Mr Ren appealed that decision but Chua Lee Ming J dismissed the appeal on the same premise in HC/RA 33/2021. In Chua J’s views, the issues of whether such a term can be implied, and if so, whether Mr Chua would be acting in breach of such term, were clearly triable issues of fact.

  24. [15] On the same dates that the statutory demands were sent to Mr Chua by Mr Ren (ie, 22 September 2020 and 17 November 2020), he sent similar statutory demands to Mdm Lee, alleging personal liability on the very same basis. Much like Mr Chua, Mdm Lee filed an application to set aside the statutory demands in HC/OSB 10/2021 (“OSB 10”). On 6 April 2021, a different assistant registrar allowed the application on the basis that “whether there was [an implied term that the parties to the Agreement would procure the repayment of the loan] is a triable issue” and, furthermore, “the issue of whether the corporate veil may be pierced such that [Mdm Lee] is liable for [Homing’s] debt is another triable issue”. No appeal was lodged by Mr Ren against this decision.

  25. [17] In the course of such winding-up proceedings, on or about 6 October 2020, G.N. Tang & Co (“GN Tang”) took over conduct of the winding-up proceedings as the solicitors of Homing.

  26. After the appointment of liquidators

  27. [18] After the liquidators were appointed, they undertook the necessary investigations into Homing’s affairs. During the course of these investigations, the liquidators discovered two bills which suggested that Homing had entered into an agreement on 30 September 2020 with Goldciti, a company which, according to the Statement of Claim and the affidavit of Ms Budiman, was ostensibly in the business of wholesale trade of a variety of goods. Mdm Lee claims to have hired Goldciti to provide corporate advisory services with a view to attempting to save Homing, and by extension, the Homing Group (the “Goldciti Transaction”). The two bills, involving a composite invoiced sum of $80,000, comprised the following:

  28. (a) Bill No 200901 (the “first bill”) dated 30 September 2020, issued by Goldciti for the sum of $40,000, ostensibly for “50% payment” pursuant to a proposal signed on 30 September 2020, in which Goldciti would review and advise Homing on its shareholdings, financials, and overall strategy (the “Goldciti Proposal”). Specifically, the Goldciti Proposal seeks to “[e]valuate the existing capital structure; [p]erform a financial review of [Homing]; and [a]dvise on the various options and steps to be performed to achieve the objective”. It is not in dispute that the first bill was paid by Homing; and

  29. (b) Bill No 201102 (the “second bill”) dated 30 November 2020, issued by Goldciti for the sum of $40,000, ostensibly for “final billing – 50% payment” pursuant to the Goldciti Proposal, and an additional $120 for disbursements. The parties agree the second bill was eventually not paid by Homing.

  30. [19] Over the course of their initial investigations, the liquidators were unable to find any documentary proof of the Goldciti Proposal, or of any work done by Goldciti pursuant to it. From October to December 2021, the liquidators sent various letters to Goldciti and Mdm Lee seeking more information on the nature of the transaction(s) between Homing and Goldciti, as well as the relevant supporting documents. However, this was unfortunately to little avail, and where answers to such queries did come, they largely came in the form of pro forma responses. In gist, Mdm Lee merely responded to indicate that Goldciti had been engaged to “provide review, and advice on the shareholdings, financial and strategy” for Homing, but did not provide any documentation for this as she no longer had any such documents in her possession. Goldciti, on the other hand, did not respond to the liquidators’ correspondences at all.

  31. [20] Mdm Lee’s and Goldciti’s failure to provide any substantive explanation for what Homing’s engagement of the latter entailed fortified the liquidators’ views that there was in fact no legitimate business relationship between Homing and Goldciti, and that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham. The liquidators thus commenced these proceedings in OC 226 on 9 September 2022, on behalf of Homing, to reclaim moneys they perceived Homing to have lost as a result of such a sham transaction and to declare the Goldciti Transaction null and void. Significantly, at the time the liquidators commenced proceedings, neither Goldciti nor Mdm Lee had provided the purported report drafted by Goldciti dated 23 November 2020 (the “Goldciti Report”) to the liquidators. Instead, the Goldciti Report was only extended to the liquidators for the first time some two months later, on or about 16 November 2022 – this was over a year from when the liquidators started seeking such documentation.

  32. OC 226

  33. Homing’s claim

  34. [21] In OC 226, the liquidators (on behalf of Homing) advance two main arguments against Goldciti and Mdm Lee. The first argument stems from allegations that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham orchestrated by Goldciti and Mdm Lee to siphon moneys from Homing. The second argument is that Goldciti and Mdm Lee were in a conspiracy to cause Homing to suffer loss through the alleged sham transaction. Consequently, the liquidators seek for the sum of $40,000 (that had been paid to Goldciti pursuant to the first bill) to be paid by Goldciti and Mdm Lee jointly and severally, and also for the first and second bills to be declared null and void. Additionally, for Mdm Lee, the liquidators allege that Mdm Lee breached her fiduciary duties owed to Homing by engaging in such a sham transaction. Consequently, the liquidators seek a declaration that Mdm Lee was in breach of her fiduciary duties and for Mdm Lee to account for all profits made from the Goldciti Transaction.

  35. [22] Starting with the allegation that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham transaction, the liquidators, broadly speaking, rely on six reasons to support this. I describe each of these in turn:

  36. (a) First, the liquidators point to the extremely belated production of two documents – the Goldciti Proposal entered into between Homing and Goldciti on 30 September 2020, and the Goldciti Report – to suggest that these documents were manufactured at a later date. It would be useful for me to expound on this argument in slightly greater detail. Despite having sought these documents from Mdm Lee and Goldciti on numerous occasions (ie, 25 October 2021, 9, 17, 18, 25 November 2021), as I have indicated earlier, the Goldciti Report was only produced on 16 November 2022, some two months after formal legal proceedings were commenced. To the liquidators’ minds, it was inexplicable that the Goldciti Report had not been handed over much earlier on if it did in fact exist from the outset. Further, the liquidators claim that this allegation is fortified by how Goldciti and Mdm Lee have been unable to produce an original soft copy of the Goldciti Report, which would allow for the liquidators to access, and scrutinise, its metadata with a view to determining whether the Goldciti Report had been prepared at a much later date than has been suggested by Mdm Lee and/or Goldciti, presumably as a means to set up a manufactured defence to this case. In this connection, the liquidators further note that Goldciti was not able to provide any timesheets to detail the work expended to prepare the Goldciti Report.

  37. (b) Second, the liquidators allege that it simply did not make sense for Mdm Lee to have engaged Goldciti as Homing’s corporate advisor. Not only was Goldciti “allegedly in the business of wholesale trade of a variety of goods” (as opposed to restructuring), but evidence emerged in the course of the proceedings before me that Mdm Lee was aware at the time that the main protagonist in Goldciti who worked with Mdm Lee, Mr Tan Hui Meng (“Mr Tan HM”), was assisting with criminal investigations at the time Goldciti had been engaged. The liquidators also claim that Mr Tan HM was unqualified and contend that if Mdm Lee had been “serious about seeking expert advice on restructuring strategies for [Homing]”, she “would have appointed an established expert with a track record and appropriate background”. At the very least, the liquidators assert, she would have attempted to obtain a few competing quotes before deciding on whether to engage Goldciti.

  38. (c) Third, the liquidators observe that if indeed the arrangements were bona fide, it was odd that Goldciti has not, to date, filed any proof of claim for the payment of the outstanding debt of $40,000, as set out in the second bill. In their view, a genuine service provider “would invariably issue repeated requests, reminders, or demands to recover such a significant outstanding amount or at the very list [sic] part thereof”.

  39. (d) Fourth, the liquidators allege that the nature and the quality of the services provided by Goldciti cannot, in substance, justify the cost of $80,000. In that sense, the liquidators contend that there is no evidence of the "professional advice" that Mr Tan HM purports to have provided. The liquidators claim that the Goldciti Report itself was woefully lacking, comprising of “suggestions and/or observations” that were “general and trite” and “comparable to what might be found in a textbook on restructuring”. The liquidators further contend that the Goldciti Report fails to provide recommendations that cater specifically to Homing’s circumstances, and instead likens the kind of generic advice “usually given in preliminary meetings” by liquidators. In the liquidators’ view, such services could not have justified the incurring of a sum of over $80,000, which, in context, would have comprised “over 42% of the entire cash and bank balance of [Homing] and wholly in excess of [Homing’s] net tangible assets”.

  40. (e) Fifth, the liquidators allege that Mdm Lee’s failure to follow up with any queries about the Goldciti Report and to implement any of the proposed options demonstrates that Goldciti was not “genuinely advising [Homing] on the claims that were made by [Mr] Ren”.

  41. (f) Sixth, the liquidators contend that “a personal relationship” exists between Mdm Lee and Mr Tan HM, which, in their view, lends credence to the allegation that the two had co-operated to execute the purported sham transaction. The liquidators made reference to an e-mail dated 5 October 2020 in which Mr Tan HM sent various documents to GN Tang for legal advice, without copying any of Homing’s personnel in the e-mail thread. The liquidators also rely on how Goldciti was copied in correspondences between GN Tang and Homing.

  42. [23] In essence, the liquidators take the view that the circumstances “point to the overwhelming inference” that Goldciti and Mdm Lee never had a genuine intention to form legal relations. Instead, from their perspective, the Goldciti Transaction was “a sham orchestrated by [Mdm] Lee and Goldciti” to extract moneys from Homing to put it out of reach of creditors.

  43. [24] On the matter of the argument on conspiracy, the liquidators submit that it can be inferred from the same reasons (at [22(a)]–[22(e)] above) that “there was an agreement between [Mdm] Lee and Goldciti to work together to cause [Homing] harm”. The predominant purpose of this agreement was to “inflict loss on [Homing] just as much as it was to profit themselves”, by siphoning the moneys from Homing.

  44. [25] The liquidators’ final argument pertains to Mdm Lee’s breach of fiduciary duties as a director of Homing. It would be important to note what precisely is being alleged, and, by extension, what is not being alleged. What the liquidators are alleging is not that Mdm Lee had breached her director’s duties by entering into a transaction which was, on hindsight, not commercially prudent. Instead, the liquidators allege that Mdm Lee had breached her duties by entering into a bad faith sham transaction, with the intent of dissipating Homing’s assets. The liquidators claim that Mdm Lee’s “actions can be inferred to be in furtherance of and/or for the purpose of facilitating the dissipation of [Homing’s] funds”. To support this inference, the liquidators cite two instances – how during the course of the Goldciti Transaction, Mdm Lee had failed to keep a proper record of documents relating to the transaction; and how after the Goldciti Transaction, Mdm Lee had failed to co-operate with the liquidators, as is required under s 243 of the IRDA, when they requested for documents. For instance, the documents Mdm Lee handed over appeared to be missing many documents, including the purported tender documents for Luminaries, which would have comprised the biggest projects for Luminaries.

  45. [26] The duties which have allegedly been breached are as follows:

  46. Goldciti’s and Mdm Lee’s defence

  47. [27] Goldciti contends that the Goldciti Transaction involved genuine and bona fide work done to review and advise Homing about its shareholdings, financials and overall strategy, and also liaising with the then-solicitors of Homing, GN Tang (the “corporate advisory role”). Mr Tan HM, who largely dealt with the matter on behalf of Goldciti, contends that the relationship between Goldciti and the Homing Group began sometime at the end of September 2020 when Mdm Lee approached him to assist the Homing Group as a corporate advisor. As part of the arrangements, Mr Koh Cher Chow (“Mr Koh”) was tasked with preparing the Goldciti Report. Although Mr Koh termed Mr Tan HM as a “colleague” in his affidavit, providing the perception that he was an employee of Goldciti, in reality, the two operate on a barter-trade arrangement where they pass each other work as and when either of them is engaged, and they do not bill each other for the services rendered. According to Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh, the Goldciti Report was completed in late November 2020, and was soon thereafter handed over to Mdm Lee.

  48. [28] Mdm Lee’s defence is that the Goldciti Transaction was not a sham, and that it was entered into in an urgent bid to attempt to save the Homing Group and its operations after Mr Ren had filed the first statutory demand against Homing (see [16] above). Mdm Lee states that she had gotten to know Mr Tan HM and Goldciti through Mr Chua. Having apparently been “impressed” with Mr Tan HM’s background and knowledge in commercial and company matters, Mdm Lee appointed Mr Tan HM as corporate advisor with a view to assessing what the options were to salvage Homing as an ongoing entity. It was in that context that the Goldciti Proposal was signed. Mdm Lee affirms that she eventually received the Goldciti Report, which she claims to have found “helpful” as it set out possible restructuring options and analysed the Homing Group’s financial situation.

  49. [29] Mr Tang Gee Ni (“Mr Tang”), the sole proprietor of GN Tang, broadly affirms the positions taken by both Mdm Lee and Goldciti (ie, the evidence of Mr Tan HM), albeit with some gaps in his evidence as a result of the constraints of solicitor-client privilege. While he could not provide positive evidence of what Goldciti had specifically done in the circumstances for Homing (being a third party to such a transaction), he nonetheless confirmed that Mr Tan HM did attend some meetings and was involved in discussions involving Homing during the period that Goldciti was purportedly engaged. Mr Tang also confirmed that he had liaised with Mr Tan HM and that it was clear from their interactions that Mr Tan HM was engaged by Homing. I would add that Mr Tang’s evidence was admitted by consent, and his attendance was dispensed with as counsel for the Claimants confirmed that they did not have any questions for him.

  50. Findings for OC 226

  51. The Goldciti Transaction was not a sham

  52. [30] The main issue that arises for determination in OC 226 is whether I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham in so far as it was a contrived arrangement set up between Mdm Lee and Goldciti to siphon funds from Homing, presumably to have such funds be out of reach from creditors, not least Mr Ren.

  53. [31] As noted by the Court of Appeal in Toh Eng Tiah v Jiang Angelina and another appeal [2021] 1 SLR 1176 (“Toh Eng Tiah”), “the essential element of a sham is that the parties did not intend to create the legal relations that the acts done or documents executed give the impression of creating” (at [74]). The inquiry focuses on the parties’ subjective intentions to mislead, which the court often infers from the circumstances surrounding the relevant events (Chng Bee Kheng and another (executrixes and trustees of the estate of Fock Poh Kum, deceased) v Chng Eng Chye [2013] 2 SLR 715 (“Chng Bee Kheng”), at [54], citing Hitch v Stone [2001] STC 214, at [66]). In coming to any such finding, the court observed that “there is a very strong presumption that parties intend to be bound by the provisions of agreements which they enter into” (Chng Bee Kheng, at [51]). I would also observe that given that an allegation that one is involved in a sham is, by its very nature, an assertion of dishonesty as it assumes a deliberate misrepresentation crafted to conceal the truth, a party making such an allegation would be required to bring more evidence than is conventionally required in an ordinary civil case (see Chua Kwee Chen and others (as Westlake Eating House) and another v Koh Choon Chin [2006] 3 SLR(R) 469, at [39]) to make good such a grave allegation.

  54. [32] In my judgment, the liquidators (on behalf of Homing) have not discharged their burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the Goldciti Transaction is a sham.

  55. [33] For one, it would seem that Ms Budiman herself, the very individual representing the liquidators in the proceedings before me, accepted, in substance during cross-examination, that the arrangements were not likely to be a sham as had been suggested by the contents of her affidavit. By the conclusion of her own cross-examination, Ms Budiman distanced herself almost entirely from the account advanced in her affidavit that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham transaction in the sense of being a contrived business arrangement primarily engineered to siphon funds from Homing (see [21]–[26] above). Her concessions were wide-ranging and, with respect, an all-but-fatal turn to the claim in OC 226. I state a few of the more obvious and critical concessions on the part of Ms Budiman while she was giving evidence on the stand:

  56. (a) In terms of timing, Ms Budiman accepted that the Goldciti Report was a genuine report prepared at the time Goldciti and Mdm Lee alleged (ie, 23 November 2020), as opposed to being prepared after the event purely for the purposes of these court proceedings.

  57. (b) Upon studying Mr Koh’s affidavit while on the stand, Ms Budiman accepted that based on his curriculum vitae, his professional background in the field meant he was qualified and competent to advise on corporate matters. She also broadly accepted that if she had known of the specifics of Mr Koh’s affidavit, she would have accepted the authenticity of the report as being prepared at the time alleged by Mdm Lee and Goldciti, ie, on or about 23 November 2020.

  58. (c) Ms Budiman further accepted that her characterisation of Goldciti’s nature of business was somewhat skewed. It would be reminded that Ms Budiman had, in her affidavit, observed that Goldciti was in the business of wholesale trade in a variety of goods. However, this was not complete, since, as Ms Budiman has admitted, the ACRA searches that her team had done suggested that the business activities of Goldciti was not just limited to wholesale trade, but that it had a secondary activity of being involved in management consultancy. I parenthetically note such a selective articulation of Goldciti’s business purposes in the affidavit is unfortunate, as it has the effect of shielding from the court’s view the part of Goldciti’s declared business activities that would specifically clothe with legitimacy its management consultancy work. It should be obvious that such an incomplete portrayal of Goldciti’s articulated purposes runs the risk of being misleading – indeed, to her credit, Ms Budiman herself conceded that such a portrayal would give the court, or any objective reader of her affidavit, a “skewed view as to the nature of Goldciti’s business”. In reality, the Goldciti Transaction was very much in line with one of Goldciti’s articulated business purposes.

  59. [34] To my mind, Ms Budiman’s candid concessions, along with her acceptance that the objective facts did not quite support the central assertion in OC 226 that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham, reflected her candidness with the court in her oral testimony. I thus find Ms Budiman’s oral testimony (in which she fundamentally departed squarely from the allegations advanced in her affidavit, as summarised at [33] above) to be cogent, honest and truthful and I give weight to it. To be clear, such concessions do not mean that Ms Budiman does not continue to harbour lingering reservations about the sensibility and reasonableness of the Goldciti Transaction. On the stand, Ms Budiman maintained that the Goldciti Report remained unsatisfactory as one could not be said to reasonably necessitate paying $80,000 for work resulting in such a lacklustre report. Put another way, using the parlance of the IRDA, Ms Budiman’s primary contention by the conclusion of the proceedings did not appear to be that Mdm Lee had knowingly entered into a fraudulent transaction with Goldciti, but that Mdm Lee had caused Homing to enter into a transaction at an undervalue. As Mdm Lee and Goldciti observed, by the conclusion of Ms Budiman’s evidence, it would appear that her “only concern about this transaction was price”. Such a pivot is critical in light of the fact that this concern did not comport to the pleaded parameters of OC 226.

  60. [35] Notwithstanding the near-fatal effects of Ms Budiman’s concessions to the case in OC 226 (being, in effect, the singular witness who was testifying in support of OC 226), it would still be necessary for me to consider the merits of the arguments broadly advanced by the liquidators. This is necessary since the claim curiously continues to be pursued in its original form characterising the deal with Goldciti as a “sham” transaction in the closing submissions for OC 226, with such submissions completely ignoring and bypassing all of Ms Budiman’s many concessions in cross-examination. In dealing with the arguments, I will address each of the six reasons that have been put forth by the liquidators (on behalf of Homing) in their affidavit (at [22(a)]–[22(f)] above). As can be seen below, none of the reasons advanced stand up to scrutiny.

  61. [36] The first reason that the liquidators proffer is that the Goldciti Proposal and/or the Goldciti Report are not genuine documents as they were manufactured at a later date to give legitimacy to the sham transaction (see [22(a)] above). This allegation holds little force in light of Ms Budiman’s acceptance, during cross-examination, that the Goldciti Report was likely prepared at the time Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh assert as the circumstances do not provide her much evidence to maintain the alternative position that the Goldciti Report was not genuine (see [33(a)] above). For what it is worth, I accept Mr Tan HM’s account regarding the delay in producing the Goldciti Proposal and the Goldciti Report – ie, that Mr Tan HM only searched for those documents sometime in April 2022 upon Mdm Lee’s request, which was prompted by the liquidators’ claims that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham. As for Goldciti’s non-responses to the liquidators requests for more documentation, to my mind, these non-responses were not admissions of liability as the history of the proceedings and the thrust of the correspondences could have led Goldciti to the understandable assumption that any reply would simply be used as leverage to initiate further action, however well-intentioned such reply may have been. All of this must also be seen against the broader observations and findings that I make about the rudimentary nature of the operations of Goldciti later on.

  62. [37] In relation to Goldciti’s and Mdm Lee’s failure to produce an original soft copy of the Goldciti Report, while I understand the point and appreciate why the liquidators opine that this is indicative of the Goldciti Report having been prepared at a much later date, with respect, I am unable to agree and to come to the conclusion they have arrived at. In the contemporary context, the misplacement of original soft copies of documents is a common, unintentional, and frustrating feature of our daily lives and such lack of an original soft copy cannot, in and of itself, be grounds for inferring malicious intentions. Indeed, if Mdm Lee and Goldciti were lying about Goldciti’s role, one would have imagined that a far simpler lie to peddle would be for Goldciti to claim to have been involved in giving corporate restructuring advice (for which the fees amounted to $80,000), without needing to develop a complicated narrative about having issued any report and then having to make good such a lie. In my view, the layered nature of the narrative mirrors the complexity of genuine experience, which in turn, makes it deeply unlikely that the Goldciti Report would have been fabricated from scratch. In the circumstances, I am of the view that there is no force underlying the first reason articulated by the liquidators.

  63. [38] The second reason that the liquidators raise is how Mdm Lee would not have engaged Goldciti if she was genuinely seeking restructuring advice (see [22(b)] above). There is, in my mind, little force underlying such an argument. Ms Budiman has conceded, contrary to what was written in her affidavit, that both Goldciti and Mr Tan HM appear to be competent to prepare the Goldciti Report (see [33(b)] above). If prima facie, Mr Tan HM appeared to be qualified, then it is not for the court to say what a director ought, or ought not to have done, before engaging Goldciti. The court “will be slow to interfere with commercial decisions of directors which have been made honestly even if they turn out, on hindsight, to be financially detrimental” (Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd (formerly known as TTL Holdings Ltd) [2014] 3 SLR 329, at [37]). For the liquidators’ contention that Mdm Lee could not have considered Mr Tan HM suitable in light of his ongoing criminal investigations at the time (see [22(b)] above), it is not clear to me why this would be the case – the mere fact that an accountant may be under investigation for criminal offences is, without more, of little consequence in assessing a director’s decision to engage the accountant’s services. It does not, in itself, imply any wrongdoing, particularly when the circumstances suggest that the criminal matter was only tangentially related to the accountant’s professional competence and expertise.

  64. [42] The fifth reason that the liquidators raise pertains to the absence of any follow-up by Mdm Lee after she had been sent the Goldciti Report (see [22(e)] above). It is not clear to me why an absence of any follow-up by Mdm Lee necessarily means that Goldciti’s advice was not genuine. It could very well have been that Mdm Lee simply did not have any questions arising from the Goldciti Report, or that she found the Goldciti Report to be of little value and did not bother following up. It may also be that, by the time the Goldciti Report was in her possession, it was obvious that the only real possibility was that of a winding up, and therefore, the issue of how Homing could be salvaged was moot.

  65. [43] The sixth reason that the liquidators raise pertains to the alleged personal relationship between Mdm Lee and Mr Tan HM (see [22(f)] above). This was, in my view, a scurrilous assertion that was entirely baseless. The liquidators rely on the e-mail dated 5 October 2020 between Mr Tan HM and Mr Tang to support this argument and it is plain and obvious that the e-mail does not even remotely support the mischievous claim of there having been any form of personal relationship. Indeed, in cross-examination, Ms Budiman conceded as much, accepting that she had no evidence that there was anything but a professional relationship between Mdm Lee and Mr Tan HM, and her only point was that she could not understand why Homing’s personnel had not been copied into that specific e-mail. The answer to that apparent conundrum is obvious: as Mr Tan HM explained, this was the result of nothing more than a simple prosaic mistake on his part in failing to copy Homing’s personnel for the purposes of that specific e-mail. Indeed, in my view, no other inference is even sensible or plausible on the facts.

  66. [44] As an aside, I do not accept the liquidators’ argument that “there was no reason for [Goldciti] to have been copied in the correspondence between GN Tang and [Homing]”. As counsel for the Defendants noted, by the point Ms Budiman affirmed her affidavit, she would have been aware that the Defendants’ version of events (ie, that Goldciti was copied as it was Homing’s corporate advisor at the time) essentially served as the only reason to explain the correspondence. There was no other reason that was viable. In cross-examination, Ms Budiman conceded she could not explain why Goldciti would have been copied in such correspondences involving counsel if the case theory she expounded on affidavit were correct (ie, that Goldciti was engaged in a co-ordinated arrangement to pilfer moneys from Homing). In closing submissions, the liquidators contend that such actions were an “attempt to create the false impression of an active adviser providing substantial services, and [Mr Tan HM] was copied only to bolster the façade of a genuine engagement”. It should be obvious that it would take a deeply conspiratorial mind to conclude that there was some form of grand plan involving GN Tang e-mailing Goldciti since October 2020 with a view to creating a paper trail for the purposes of court proceedings many years later. Indeed, it would seem that the liquidators are no longer actively advancing this argument since, as I explained earlier, they elected not to cross-examine Mr Tang on his evidence, despite how Mr Tang unequivocally asserts the involvement of Mr Tan HM during the time Goldciti was purportedly engaged by Homing and confirms Mr Tan HM’s presence in at least some of the meetings he had with Mdm Lee during that period.

  67. [45] In essence, given the preceding analysis, the parties’ cases can be crystallised into two dichotomous accounts.

  68. (a) On the first account, ie, the liquidators’ account on affidavit, numerous discrete individuals and entities (ie, Mdm Lee, Mr Chua, Goldciti, and GN Tang) perpetuated a complex scheme of fraud in which they all came together, lied about what happened, manufactured a multi-page restructuring report, numerous false correspondences, filed affidavits doubling down on these falsehoods, and committed to coming to court to rationalise a fabricated $40,000 expense – a sum which, in all likelihood, would be similar to, if not entirely eclipsed by, the costs of perpetrating, engineering and testifying as part of the somewhat elaborate and longstanding fraud. Under this highly implausible version of events, the Defendants in OC 226 (ie, Mdm Lee and Goldciti) were far-sighted enough to leave a paper trail from the get-go, with GN Tang copying Goldciti into correspondences since October 2020, even before the liquidators came into the picture. They even managed to get an unconnected individual, an advocate and solicitor at that (ie, Mr Tang), to agree to be involved in this complex arrangement, at the pain of disciplinary sanctions if he were ever found out to be complicit in such dishonest conduct. For some indiscernible reason, Goldciti and Mdm Lee then decided to stage the payment being siphoned off in two tranches, and to then frustrate the receipt of the second tranche of the payments, thus sabotaging even more payments to themselves. Indeed, such a narrative is so extreme in its implausibility that Ms Budiman, on the stand, did not appear to even be advocating such a position. On the contrary, by the end of cross-examination, Ms Budiman accepted (contrary to her evidence on affidavit) that the employees of Goldciti were qualified to serve as corporate advisers, that the Goldciti Report was, in all probability, prepared at the time the Defendants asserted, and that there was no reason to quibble with Mr Tang’s evidence that Goldciti was involved in discussions at the time it was appointed as Homing’s corporate advisor.

  69. (b) On the second account, ie, the Defendants’ account in OC 226, the parties entered into a genuine contract in September 2020, and quite explicably could no longer find soft copies of the Goldciti Report as the digital correspondence had been overlooked and deleted. It should be plain that this is clearly the preferable account. Indeed, the very fact that Ms Budiman herself appeared to accept large swathes of this account on the stand while serving as the main witness in support of the claim in OC 226 speaks volumes about the lack of credibility and logic underlying the claim in OC 226.

  70. [46] However, the conclusions that I have arrived at above unfortunately raise some uncomfortable questions. If indeed, even Ms Budiman accepted much of the explanations given by Goldciti and Mdm Lee for OC 226, how is it that the case was not ceased when these documents became available, or, at the very least, sometime after Ms Budiman seemingly jettisoned much of her own account on affidavit while on the stand? After all, liquidators are officers of the court – the liquidators themselves submit that liquidators “are required to investigate and, where appropriate, pursue claims that serve the best interests of the [c]ompany’s stakeholders”. Just as much as they have no mandate to commence litigation that has no real prospect of succeeding (SW Trustees Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another v Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma (also known as Tewodros Ashenafi) and others (Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma (also known as Tewodros Ashenafi), third party) [2024] SGHC 322, at [273]), they would necessarily be duty bound to cease such proceedings once it becomes plain that the case being pursued must, by their own account, invariably fail.

  71. [47] Seen in that context, it is also curious as to how various unsubstantiated allegations made on affidavit ended up being there, even if Ms Budiman’s candid concessions in court stand to her credit and reflect the fact that she, in all likelihood, did not intend to mislead the court. Indeed, it would seem from the evidence that emerged in these proceedings that Ms Budiman was not even briefed about the evidence touching on some parts of her affidavit. On the stand, she indicated that she was not made aware of specific pieces of evidence furnished by Goldciti and Mdm Lee that would have squarely contradicted her assertions on affidavit, despite these having seemingly been in the possession of counsel. Assuming this to be true, it then raises questions about the manner in which Ms Budiman’s affidavit was crafted, and whether the picture painted in her affidavit, when read as a whole, fairly reflects the evidence available to the liquidators at the time.

  72. [48] In this connection, if OC 226 was pursued merely as a means to provide collateral support to OC 468 (the merits of which I will turn to in due course), then, to the extent the claim in OC 226 cannot otherwise stand on its own, this would be impermissible as liquidators should be careful never to take sides or to adopt positions (or make claims in affidavits) informed by extraneous considerations that pertains to claims associated with third party creditors. It is trite that “the golden rule for the liquidator in the performance of his functions was and is his duty to be objective, impartial and independent in the discharge of his duties and the exercise of his powers” (Daniel Tan, “On the Sharp Edge of Public Duty and Private Interests – The Liquidator’s Duty to be Objective, Impartial and Independent”, Singapore Law Gazette, October 2009 <https://v1.lawgazette.com.sg/2009-10/feature2.htm> (accessed 8 March 2025)). As VK Rajah JC (as he then was) observed in Liquidator of W&P Piling Pte Ltd v Chew Yin What and others [2004] 3 SLR(R) 164 (at [27]):

  73. [50] All of this then begs the obvious question as to who is, in fact, driving the litigation in OC 226, even up till the time of closing submissions, and urging that the court find that the $80,000 Goldciti Transaction was a sham. On this front, it speaks volumes that despite this characterisation being at the heart of the liquidators’ claim, Mr Ren appears to be the only party maintaining that the Goldciti Transaction constitutes a sham designed to pilfer moneys out of Homing. When cross-examined on the stand, Mr Ren asserted to the end that Mdm Lee’s aim of consulting Goldciti was to “move the money away” from Homing “illegal[ly]”. Significantly, as I noted earlier, in their written closing submissions, counsel for the Claimants did not address a single one of Ms Budiman’s concessions in court, instead, electing to align to Mr Ren’s continued narrative of stridently characterising the Goldciti Transaction as a sham. This clearly leaves OC 226 in a very precarious position. I will come back to some of these concerns at the end of this judgment (at [148]–[151] below) to touch on how the lines in this case may potentially have been blurred as a result of one set of lawyers representing two discrete parties (the two claimants) in this case.

  74. [51] However, before turning to OC 468, for completeness, I will deal with the remaining allegations in OC 226, namely the contention that there was a conspiracy between Goldciti and Mdm Lee, and that Mdm Lee had breached her director’s duties. I deal with each of these very briefly in turn.

  75. No conspiracy between Goldciti and Mdm Lee

  76. [52] To succeed in a claim for lawful means conspiracy, a claimant must prove the following elements (Kapital Fund SPC v Lee Tze Wee Andrew and another [2024] SGHC 289, at [66]–[67]):

  77. (a) there was a combination of two or more persons to do certain acts;

  78. (b) the alleged conspirators had the predominant intention to cause damage or injury to the claimant;

  79. (c) the acts were performed in furtherance of the agreement; and

  80. (d) the claimant suffered loss as a result of the conspiracy.

  81. [53] Having found that there was in fact no sham transaction and that Mdm Lee and Goldciti had genuinely entered into the Goldciti Proposal as a contract for corporate restructuring services, it must invariably follow that the abovementioned elements cannot be made out. I note that this was also accepted by Ms Budiman in cross-examination.

  82. [54] Therefore, I find that there was no lawful means conspiracy between Mdm Lee and Goldciti to cause Homing to enter into a sham transaction with Goldciti.

  83. Mdm Lee did not breach her director’s duties

  84. [55] The liquidators are claiming against Mdm Lee for a breach of director’s duties by causing Homing to enter into the alleged sham transaction to its detriment (see [25]–[26] above). Such a claim is similarly predicated on the finding that the Goldciti Transaction was a sham transaction and must fail given my earlier findings. Additionally, the two instances cited by the liquidators of Mdm Lee’s conduct during and after the Goldciti Transaction are irrelevant as they simply do not speak at all to the question of whether the agreement with Homing represented a sham or otherwise.

  85. [56] For completeness, I also reject any suggestion (as was hinted at) that even if the Goldciti Transaction was not a sham transaction, Mdm Lee had breached her duties qua director since it could not have been “in the company’s interest from the perspective of a reasonable director” to enter into the Goldciti Transaction. The liquidators rely on similar reasons for this allegation – that a reasonably diligent director exercising reasonable care and skill would not have thought it prudent to incur an $80,000 debt on behalf of Homing when it was already struggling financially, and would not have appointed Goldciti without seeking alternative quotations or verifying that Goldciti possessed the requisite expertise. As I alluded to earlier, the liquidators further poured considerable scorn on the Goldciti Report, claiming that it contained “nothing substantial” and was “comparable to what might be found in a textbook on restructuring”.

  86. [57] With respect, in my view, much of what the liquidators assert reeks of ex post facto logic and is an unfair and uncharitable statement of the steps Mdm Lee had undertaken. Despite the sympathy I have for the liquidators after reviewing the Goldciti Report and the evidence of Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh on the stand (as I explain below at [58]–[61]), the pleaded case relates to a breach of director’s duties for the sham transaction Mdm Lee was involved in, and not an alternative hypothetical where the question before the court is whether she entered into an agreement bona fide but without doing the necessary checks on whether such an agreement would be in the company’s best interests and would represent good value. In any event, for completeness, I would not have found a breach of director’s duties (at least based on the evidence that has been presented before me) for reasons which I set out below.

  87. [58] I start first with stating my own reservations regarding the Goldciti Report. Having perused it, I do think Ms Budiman’s criticism of its (lack of) depth has much force to it, in so far as on my reading of the Goldciti Report, it does set out a “textbook” laundry list of proposals for restructuring which are self-evident, and not even remotely contextualised to the situation Homing was in. The 14-page report (excluding executive summary) mostly comprised of setting out basic matters (such as the company structure, and basic auditing work), and was couched or marketed essentially as corporate advisory work through the tacking on a pro forma section on restructuring options right at the end. To highlight the patent dearth of meaningful advice found in the Goldciti Report, I quote in full one of its recommendations. In suggesting that Homing could divest its subsidiaries as a means of restructuring, this was literally the entirety of what was said about what such an option entailed:

  88. [59] As can be seen above, the recommendation was so generic, and summarised, as to be of little value to Homing. It did not take into account Homing’s corporate structure, had nothing to do with its finances, and could have been stated by any corporate advisor in relation to any company facing financial difficulties. In the same way one does not need pricey or premium legal advice when facing a potential legal suit from a third party to be told in generic terms that they could choose to litigate the matter, negotiate a settlement, or hope for the best that they would not be sued, telling one that they can “restructure” by selling assets without telling them how they can go about doing it on these specific facts is telling them nothing at all. The fact that there were other recommendations that were even more scanty and bare-bones than the recommendation I have reproduced in full above on possible divestiture speaks volumes about the complete lack of depth of the Goldciti Report.

  89. [60] Indeed, the evidence given by Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh leaves me with little doubt that Goldciti overpromised and under-delivered. It is clear to me that both Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh knew that the lack of value they gave would become apparent in these court proceedings and, in court, sought to ex post facto rationalise why the skimpy 14-page report they produced represented good value for money. Much of the explanations they provided simply did not make much sense. I highlight a few key points on this:

  90. (b) Apart from the “financial review”, Mr Tan HM also claims that, as part of his services, he spent a fair amount of time reaching out to “potential investors” to invest in Homing. If this were true, to be fair, this could presumably justify the cost of $80,000, or at least some part thereof. Nonetheless, I had little reason to accept such an assertion. For one, interestingly, this was only suggested in court, and not found anywhere in the affidavit. For another, Mr Tan HM has failed to produce any evidence of his attempts to source for investors, despite alleging he had text conversations with at least some potential investors. I see no reason for this: if such evidence existed, it would have been obvious that Mr Tan HM would have produced it since it would be fatal to the entirety of the liquidators’ case in OC 226. Finally, the sourcing of such investors was not even the purpose of the engagement which, according to the Goldciti Report, was “to explore the various restructuring options to safeguard the interest of [Homing] from being wound-up”. The artificiality of the claim becomes further evident once one realises that Mr Tan HM never raised the fact he was speaking with potential investors to Mdm Lee at any time. The claim that he was seeking potential investors also has an obvious logical flaw that betrays its falsity – if Mr Tan HM contends, as he did on the stand, that his recommendations in the Goldciti Report had to be generic as he was not in possession of enough meaningful information about the Homing Group to provide any concrete recommendations (ie, he did not even have a clear understanding of how the business works), how was he ever going to source for investors to market the company to?

  91. (c) Nothing about the operations of Goldciti suggests a level of sophistication that warranted any sort of premium. On the contrary, it was clear that its operations were rudimentary. Goldciti does not keep time-sheets. It does not keep soft copies of its reports, indeed, there is no system for the retention of records or background documents. Its reports are apparently largely written by hand. As I noted earlier (see [27] above), work is apparently outsourced on a barter-trade basis, where Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh swap work assignments between each other for no money. There is no suggestion that either Mr Tan HM or Mr Koh even did any desk research in the preparation of the Goldciti Report – in any event, any suggestion that they did do so would be unbelievable given the very bare and non-substantive nature of the Goldciti Report, and how a computer did not even appear to have been used until the report was in its final version.

  92. [61] All in all, from a reading of the Goldciti Report, and from the testimonies of Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh, I had little doubt that their assertions of untenable hourly rates and contentions of trying to get investors in were belated attempts to artificially shore up the value Goldciti gave to Homing to defend the $80,000 that Goldciti charged, knowing full well that the services they had rendered, and the report that they had delivered, could never be objectively valued at such an amount.

  93. [62] Nonetheless, all of what I have stated at [58] to [61] above arises as a result of post hoc reasoning to ascertain Mdm Lee’s state of mind. At the time of entering into the Goldciti Proposal, much of these facts would have been unbeknown to Mdm Lee, who was, at that time, caught between a rock and a hard place – Homing’s shareholder and key creditor, Mr Ren, had issued a statutory demand to Homing, and Mdm Lee was concerned of the legal implications of this. Mdm Lee elected understandably to seek “professional help” to assist her to navigate the process. She would reasonably have been concerned about the possibility that she might face personal liability if she did not get sufficient assistance to navigate the process. This must especially be so given the backdrop of the consistent pressure Mr Ren was placing on Mr Chua and her to effectively be personally liable for the Loan in OC 468.

  94. [63] Based on the facts as she understood it at the time, Mdm Lee decided it was prudent to enter into the arrangements with Goldciti, and, subsequently, to hire GN Tang. In my mind, there was nothing to suggest that the decision on the part of Mdm Lee, at least based on the facts as she knew them at the time, was in any way inexplicable: the liquidators contend that there was no suggestion on the face of the Goldciti Report that Goldciti had the necessary expertise, but both Mr Tan HM and Mr Koh have in fact had years of experience being involved in accounting and corporate governance. Ms Budiman suggested that Mdm Lee could have undertaken a Google search for a “restructuring company” instead of hiring Goldciti – Mdm Lee admittedly could have, but who is to say that this would have been objectively better than referring to a word-of-mouth recommendation? Just as how one may prioritise positive reviews of services, especially from known acquaintances, over the outcomes of random Google searches, I see no reason why Mdm Lee could not have given some weight to Mr Chua’s referral of her to Goldciti. In this connection, it was suggested by counsel for the Claimants that perhaps Mdm Lee should have asked whether Mr Chua was in a position of conflict of interest in referring Goldciti. With respect, it is hard to conceive of why Mdm Lee would have asked such a question based on what appeared, at the time, to be an entirely plain-vanilla referral. In my mind, there was simply nothing on the evidence to suggest there would have been a vested interest on the part of Mr Chua to refer Goldciti, or anything for Mdm Lee to be wary about at the time. Indeed, such a suggestion seems even more perplexing as the liquidators have not, to date, even provided a semblance of a narrative of how or in what circumstances such conflict ostensibly arose.

  95. [64] As such, while I would agree with the liquidators that Homing ultimately did not get value for money in the Goldciti Transaction, the question before me is not whether their services were qualitatively worth $80,000. I accept the liquidators’ view that it would not. Nonetheless, there are obvious problems with using retrospection in this manner and in attempting to cast subjective hindsight-tinged assessments about how Mdm Lee should have considered whether the services provided would be worth $80,000 and, consequently, whether she should have entered into such an arrangement. Mdm Lee was especially concerned at the time with whether she could maintain Homing as a going entity and as noted in Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2024] 1 SLR 361 (“Foo Kian Beng”) (at [106(b)]), in this context, the court will “be slow to second-guess the honest, good faith commercial decisions made by a director to afford the company the best possible chances of revitalising its fortunes”.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.