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Grounds publishedDecided 22 May 2025
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General Division of the High Court

The court kept the freezing order in place but required the claimants to put up security

Xu Xiangrong and another v Fu Xianwei and others

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[2025] SGHC 95Case no. Originating Claim No 623 of 2024 (Summonses Nos 3555 and 3645 of 2024)

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The court kept the freezing order in place but required the claimants to put up security

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [188], [190]

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  1. Introduction

  2. (b) In HC/SUM 3645/2024 (“SUM 3645”), the defendants apply to set aside HC/ORC 5678/2024 which granted the claimants the dispensation of personal service of the originating process on the first defendant, Mr Fu Xianwei (“Mr Fu”). The defendants also seek a declaration that the Singapore courts have no jurisdiction over Mr Fu and, in the alternative, a forum non conveniens stay for the action against Mr Fu. Further, the defendants also apply for a stay of proceedings against the second to ninth defendants on the ground of forum non conveniens.

  3. [2] After considering the parties’ submissions, I partially allow SUM 3555 to the extent of setting aside some ancillary disclosure orders, but otherwise dismiss both SUM 3555 and SUM 3645.

  4. Background

  5. The parties

  6. [3] The first claimant, Mr Xu Xiangrong (“Mr Xu”), and Mr Fu are both Chinese nationals. Mr Fu travelled regularly between China and Singapore.

  7. [4] The second claimant, Shanghai Changzhou International Freight Transport Agency Co Ltd (“Changzhou”) is a company incorporated in Shanghai, China. Mr Xu is the Legal Representative and Executive Director of Changzhou.

  8. [5] The second to eighth defendants are companies incorporated in Singapore. The ninth defendant is a company incorporated in Hong Kong.

  9. The parties’ cases in OC 623

  10. The claimants’ case

  11. [6] Mr Fu and Mr Xu entered into a Shareholders’ Cooperation Agreement, dated 1 April 2014 (the “Shareholders’ Agreement”). Mr Xu was a Deputy General Manager who conducted ship operations and logistics transportation operations in Pacific Glory Shipping Pte Ltd (“PGS PL”), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”), and other “associated companies”. Mr Xu considers the group of companies as the “Pacific Glory Group”. This group is in the business of ship operations, chartering, management, and investment. Mr Fu and Mr Xu respectively contributed US$4.25 million and US$750,000 to the Pacific Glory Group in return for an 85% interest and 15% interest in the group, respectively. Mr Fu is the Chairman and CEO of the Pacific Glory Group and he has full control over the group’s financial affairs, while Mr Xu oversaw the group’s operations and represented the group in signing all agreements and contracts. The consolidated financial accounts of the Pacific Glory Group were to be provided to Mr Fu and Mr Xu at least every half a year in a timely manner.

  12. [7] The duration of the Shareholders’ Agreement was for 10 years, from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2023, unless terminated. Upon the termination of the joint venture, the parties are to liquidate the joint venture in accordance with the agreed proportions, seal the financial accounts and distribute book surpluses or losses according to the proportions of the parties’ interests.

  13. [8] On 1 January 2016, Mr Fu and Mr Xu entered into a Supplementary Agreement (the “Supplementary Agreement”), which revised certain terms in the Shareholders’ Agreement. Mr Xu’s interest was revised to 10% in 2014, but was increased to 15% from 2015 onwards. Mr Xu was further entitled, from 2016 onwards, to a 10% incentive from the Pacific Glory Group’s profits before dividends were paid out under the Shareholders’ Agreement. The 10% incentive would replace payment of bonuses but would be cumulative with the dividends. Therefore, Mr Xu was entitled to 23.5% of the net profits of the Pacific Glory Group, being the sum of 10% of the net profit as an incentive, plus an additional 13.5% of the net profit, being 15% of the remaining 90% of the net profit, as dividends.

  14. [9] Mr Fu and Mr Xu incorporated other companies which were treated as part of the Pacific Glory Group, even though these other companies were not subsidiaries of PGS PL. Mr Fu and Mr Xu had an understanding that the Shareholders’ Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement (collectively referred to as the “Agreements”) would apply to these associated companies. Even though some of the companies are legally held by other individuals, these companies are ultimately beneficially owned by Mr Fu and Mr Xu. These companies include, among others, the second claimant and the second to ninth defendants.

  15. [11] In 2022, Mr Xu had a dispute with Mr Fu over the distribution of profits made by the Pacific Glory Group and under the vessel purchase arrangements for the Trust Vessels. Mr Xu conducted his own investigations and discovered that Mr Fu might have used the Pacific Glory Group’s money as part of his personal contributions in the purchase of the Trust Vessels. Mr Fu and Mr Xu had heated discussions in early 2024 on this matter. Mr Fu then called Mr Xu into his office on 24 May 2024 and terminated Mr Xu’s positions and functions in the Pacific Glory Group.

  16. [12] The claims in OC 623 can be classified into four broad categories: (a) breach of the Shareholders’ Agreement and Supplementary Agreement (the “Shareholders’ Agreement Claims”); (b) failure to distribute the sales proceeds and/or profits generated by the Trust Vessels (the “Trust Vessels Claims”); (c) unauthorised transfers from Changzhou (the “Unauthorised Transfer Claims”) and (d) application for a Mareva injunction in support of foreign proceedings under s 4(10A) of the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Civil Law Act”) (the “s 4(10A) Claim”). I shall now elaborate on each of the claims.

  17. (1) Shareholders’ Agreement Claims

  18. [13] Mr Xu alleges that he did not receive his dividends, bonuses and incentives for the financial years 2021 to 2023 as Mr Fu refused, neglected and/or failed to cause the Pacific Glory Group to distribute incentives and dividends pursuant to the Agreements. Further, Mr Xu alleges that Mr Fu had misappropriated funds belonging to the Pacific Glory Group and used them as his personal contributions to the purchase price of the Trust Vessels.

  19. [14] In the premises, Mr Xu’s claims against Mr Fu for breach of the express terms in the Agreements are as follows: (a) for his failure to discharge his duties as Chairman and General Manager; (b) for damaging the interests of the Pacific Glory Group; (c) for failing to provide truthful and accurate financial information of the Pacific Glory Group; (d) for failing to distribute the Pacific Glory Group’s profits to Mr Xu; and (e) for failing to liquidate the Pacific Glory Group’s assets for distribution upon termination of the Agreements. Mr Xu also claims against Mr Fu for breaches of fiduciary duty stemming from a relationship of trust and confidence under the Agreements and breach of an implied term to act honestly and in good faith.

  20. (2) Trust Vessels Claims

  21. [15] Mr Xu alleges that he did not receive the distributions he was entitled to as a Vessel Investor. Further, Mr Xu alleges that he did not receive the sales proceeds from the sale of two Trust Vessels owned by the third defendant, Acrux Shipping Pte Ltd (“Acrux”), and the fourth defendant, Fuxing Shipping Pte Ltd (“Fuxing”), respectively.

  22. [16] In the premises, Mr Xu claims against Acrux and Fuxing for breach of trust, seeking a declaration that the beneficial interest in the two Trust Vessels is held for Mr Xu and an account and payment of profits. Mr Xu is also claiming against Mr Fu for dishonest assistance in the third to ninth defendants’ breach of trust in failing to distribute profits and sales proceeds generated by the Trust Vessels to Mr Xu. Mr Xu also claims that, in failing to direct or cause the third to ninth defendants to distribute profits and sales proceeds, Mr Fu had breached his fiduciary duty and/or the implied terms of the Agreements to act honestly and in good faith.

  23. (3) Unauthorised Transfer Claims

  24. [17] Mr Xu alleges that Changzhou had entered into a series of sham transfers to the second defendant, Quan An International Pte Ltd (“Quan An”) and to third parties, which Mr Xu was not aware of and did not approve of, without legitimate commercial purpose. Mr Xu claims that as Legal Representative and Executive Director of Changzhou, transfers of funds out of Changzhou’s bank account had to be approved by him. However, Ms Fu Fen, the cousin of Mr Fu, controlled Changzhou’s bank account and effected the transfers without his approval as she had the log-in password to the Internet banking account, the company stamp and the financial department stamp as well as Mr Xu’s personal stamp, which were entrusted to her to process documents and contracts approved by Mr Xu.

  25. [18] In the premises, Changzhou claims against Quan An for the return of sums based on legal title in relation to the unauthorised transfers from Changzhou’s bank account to Quan An’s bank account. Further, or alternatively, Changzhou also seeks restitution in respect of the unauthorised transactions, and damages from Mr Fu and Quan An for conspiracy in relation to the unauthorised transfers from Changzhou to Quan An and from Changzhou to third parties.

  26. (4) Section 4(10A) Claim

  27. The defendants’ case

  28. [20] The defendants are contesting the proceedings on the basis that the Singapore courts lack jurisdiction or should not exercise jurisdiction. Thus, they have only filed a defence contesting jurisdiction (a “Defence (Jurisdiction)”), and a substantive defence on the merits of the case has yet to be filed. However, from Mr Fu’s affidavits filed in support of the applications to stay the proceedings and to set aside the Worldwide Mareva, the broad contours of the defendants’ case on the merits can be ascertained.

  29. [21] Mr Fu contests the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims on two discernible grounds. First, he casts some doubts on the Agreements’ validity. He claims that the parties had agreed orally in 2014 for Mr Xu to invest RMB 3 million in PGS PL in exchange for 10% of the shares in PGS PL. It was later agreed that Mr Xu’s shareholding would be increased to 15% and that Mr Xu’s total capital contribution would be increased to US$750,000, by converting the future bonuses Mr Xu would receive into capital contribution. The Shareholders’ Agreement and Supplementary Agreement were drafted by Mr Xu in 2016 and only signed in the same year. Mr Xu requested Mr Fu to sign the Agreements, who did so without reading the Agreements in detail because he trusted Mr Xu.

  30. [22] Second, Mr Fu asserts that the Agreements were meant only to confer an interest in PGS PL itself and not the other companies. The existence of the “Pacific Glory Group” as a legal entity is contested, as Mr Fu says that it is merely a trade name for his other companies. The Agreements came to an end in 2020 upon PGS PL’s liquidation. Mr Xu, losing confidence in the company’s profitability, proposed the dissolution and liquidation of PGS PL. Mr Fu agreed to Mr Xu’s request to refund his investments and to exit PGS PL as an investor. On 24 January 2020, PGS PL was liquidated by Mr Xu and his investment of US$750,000 was returned. Mr Xu thereafter remained in Changzhou as Deputy General Manager only as an employee and assisted in the operation of the other companies in the same capacity.

  31. [23] Mr Fu contests Mr Xu’s claim of beneficial interest in respect of all the Trust Vessels. Mr Fu accepts Mr Xu’s general description of the investment scheme. However, Mr Fu asserts that Mr Xu did not contribute to the purchase price of the Trust Vessels and therefore does not have an interest.

  32. [24] Mr Fu denies that the money transactions from Changzhou to Quan An and to third parties were unauthorised. Mr Fu alleges that Changzhou’s business model required it to source for shippers with cargo to be shipped out of China, while Quan An sourced for suitable vessels. Changzhou would contract with shippers and collect freight and other charges, and in turn, contract with Quan An and pay freight and other charges to Quan An. The money transfers out to Quan An and to third parties were pursuant to legitimate business operations.

  33. The Chinese proceedings

  34. [26] On 27 September 2024, the Shanghai Maritime Court rejected the Jurisdictional Objection, affirming its jurisdiction over the dispute. On appeal, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on 22 November 2024 affirmed the Shanghai Maritime Court’s decision. However, in the appeal, Mr Xu dropped many of the reliefs prayed for, such as the claims relating to the bonuses, dividends and distribution of surplus reserves, and restricted his application only to the liquidation of the Trust Vessels and the distribution of monies according to the agreed proportions. This may be because the Shanghai Maritime Court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims.

  35. Procedural history

  36. [28] I shall now deal with the procedural history of the case, which is relevant as Mr Fu has sought to set aside service of the originating process.

  37. [29] On 15 August 2024, the claimants took out an originating claim and an ex parte summons for the Worldwide Mareva. On the same day, the claimants sought an urgent hearing before the duty judge to hear the ex parte application for the Worldwide Mareva. The court heard the claimants’ applications the next day on 16 August 2024. The court was satisfied that the requirements for granting a Mareva injunction were met. Therefore, the Worldwide Mareva injunction was granted to the claimants, and permission was also granted for the Worldwide Mareva to be served via WeChat on the defendants.

  38. [30] The defendants entered a notice of intention to contest via their solicitors, JLex LLC (“JLex”), on 23 August 2024. On 28 August 2024, the defendants took out a summons for extension of time, HC/SUM 2451/2024, for more time to comply with the ancillary disclosure orders made in conjunction with the Worldwide Mareva. This application was heard on 29 August 2024 and the court granted the defendants two more weeks to comply with the ancillary disclosure orders.

  39. [31] On 13 September 2024, the claimants took out the Statement of Claim and served it on the second to ninth defendants. In response, on 10 October 2024, the second to ninth defendants entered a Defence (Jurisdiction), pleading that the action should be stayed vis-à-vis the second to ninth defendants on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Notably, Mr Fu did not enter a Defence (Jurisdiction) at that time as he had yet to be personally served with the originating processes.

  40. [33] The present applications, SUM 3555 and SUM 3645, were then taken out on 6 December 2024 and 13 December 2024 respectively (see [1] above).

  41. The parties’ cases in SUM 3555 and SUM 3645

  42. The defendants’ case

  43. [34] The defendants’ case in these applications can be broadly summarised as follows.

  44. (c) Third, the Worldwide Mareva should be set aside. If the court has no in personam jurisdiction over Mr Fu, the Worldwide Mareva cannot be premised on s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act. Further, an injunction in support of foreign proceedings under s 4(10A) of the Civil Law Act should not be granted. In any event, there is no good arguable case on the merits or real risk of dissipation, and Mr Xu failed to provide full and frank disclosure.

  45. The claimants’ case

  46. [35] The claimants contest the defendants on every issue.

  47. (b) Second, Singapore is the appropriate forum for the claims. Therefore, proceedings should not be stayed.

  48. Issues to be determined

  49. [36] The issues that arise for my determination are:

  50. Issue 1: Whether the dispensation of personal service order should be set aside

  51. Whether permission to serve out of jurisdiction should have been obtained before dispensation of personal service

  52. Importance of forum considerations

  53. [43] Counsel for the defendants stressed that an application for permission to serve out of jurisdiction is a crucial control valve in considering whether to establish jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Andrew Ang J (as he then was) emphasised that “civil jurisdiction in personam was founded at common law on the physical presence of the defendant within jurisdiction”, and that “in the interests of international comity, the court should be slow to find jurisdiction in cases where the defendant was overseas” (Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665 (“Consistel”) at [34]). Ang J held that where a defendant is out of jurisdiction, a claimant must apply for permission for service out of jurisdiction before an application for substituted service within jurisdiction may be made (Consistel at [30]). An application for substituted service in jurisdiction without obtaining permission to serve out of jurisdiction would “circumvent the requirement for the court’s careful consideration whether the Singapore court was the forum conveniens” and “[t]his could not have been the intention behind the enactment of the ROC” (Consistel at [42]). This was explained to be a “hierarchy of service which must be adhered to” (Consistel at [31]).

  54. [45] I agree that, in view of international comity, establishing jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is one that should be exercised with circumspection, and the court should have regard to the appropriateness of Singapore as the forum.

  55. Avoidance of prejudice to the defendant

  56. Whether the facts of the case justify dispensation of personal service

  57. [49] Putting aside the issue of whether Singapore is the appropriate forum for the time being, I am satisfied that the facts merit dispensation of personal service. Chua J was of the view that dispensation of personal service can be justified if “personal service can reasonably be expected to be difficult or disproportionately time-consuming and the mode of ordinary service to be employed would be as effective in ensuring that the recipient is notified of the documents” (Madison Pacific at [57]).

  58. [51] In the present case, the twin requirements of (a) difficulty in effecting personal service and (b) efficacy of proposed ordinary service are met:

  59. (a) First, it would be difficult and disproportionately time-consuming to personally serve the claim on Mr Fu. Mr Fu had a Singapore residential address indicated in the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority’s records. However, the claimants’ process server was informed by the occupants that there was no such person at that address, and that the owner of that address was a person unrelated to this matter. A property search also reveals that the property is registered to a “Zhang Dan”. Mr Fu later explained that this was an address filled in by the corporate secretary and he did not know about the address. I agree with the claimants that Mr Fu could not be easily located – Mr Fu stated in his 5th affidavit that he permanently resides in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, China. However, when the Chinese courts served Mr Xu’s claim in the Chinese proceedings on Mr Fu, the receipt of service dated 7 August 2024 from the Chinese courts showed that Mr Fu was served at a Shanghai address. This is despite Mr Fu’s averment in the Chinese proceedings that he had ceased to stay at the Shanghai address since 2016 and had long since moved out. Further, the service of the court documents in China would have to be effected through diplomatic or consular channels, and this would typically take six to nine months. This difficulty is compounded by Mr Fu’s many addresses, which may complicate the service process even further. For completeness, while the claimants say that Mr Fu has applied for permanent residency in Singapore and travels between Singapore and China frequently, this is denied by Mr Fu, and there is insufficient evidence to show one way or another.

  60. (b) Second, Mr Fu was well aware of the proceedings, having entered a notice of intention to contest and having appointed solicitors to represent him in the dispute. The solicitors had already made applications in relation to the Worldwide Mareva and had appeared before the court to argue for an extension of time to comply with the ancillary disclosure orders (see [30] above). The proposed method of ordinary service, viz, service on Mr Fu’s solicitors, would undoubtedly have led to Mr Fu being notified of the documents, as his solicitors would have had a duty to bring the documents to Mr Fu’s attention. The proposed method of ordinary service, ie, service via the appointed solicitors, would be as efficacious as personal service.

  61. Issue 2: Whether Singapore is the appropriate forum for the action

  62. [56] I shall first consider whether there is a good arguable case that an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Shareholders’ Agreement indicates that Singapore is not the forum to hear the disputes.

  63. Whether there is a valid exclusive jurisdiction clause

  64. [57] The Shareholders’ Agreement between Mr Fu and Mr Xu was drafted in Chinese. Article 11 stipulates that if parties are unable to reach an agreement through negotiation, the parties shall submit the matter to the local arbitration committee for arbitration, or bring a lawsuit in the local “人民法院” in accordance with the law (“Article 11”). Parties dispute the appropriate translation of “人民法院”. The defendants argue that “人民法院” means “local people’s court” and this refers to the Chinese people’s courts. The claimants, on the other hand, opine that “人民法院” means “local civil court” and submit that this is not a reference to the Chinese courts.

  65. [58] The parties’ cases in the current proceedings are diametrically opposite to their stances taken before the Shanghai Maritime Court. At the Shanghai Maritime Court, Mr Xu had relied on Article 11 to argue that the term means “local people’s court” and this refers to the people’s court in Shanghai, as the contract was signed in Shanghai, home addresses of the parties were in Shanghai and the contact address for the Pacific Glory Group was in Shanghai. However, in this instant case Mr Xu seeks to impugn Article 11’s validity. On the other hand, at the Shanghai Maritime Court, Mr Fu had argued that the Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over the shareholders’ dispute, not the Chinese courts. In this instant case, however, Mr Fu now takes the position that Article 11 is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Chinese courts. Since both parties have taken contradictory positions throughout the course of this dispute, I do not think that it should weigh against either party’s current position in the present proceedings.

  66. Whether Article 11 is a valid exclusive jurisdiction clause

  67. [59] I shall now consider whether there is a good arguable case that Article 11 is a valid exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Chinese courts.

  68. (1) Applicable law

  69. [60] The defendants have to show that there is a good arguable case that the clause constitutes an exclusive jurisdiction agreement that governs the dispute in question (Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (“Vinmar”) at [41]). The Court of Appeal in Vinmar provided useful guidance on what constitutes a good arguable case:

  70. (2) My analysis

  71. [61] In this case the contracting parties, namely Mr Xu and Mr Fu, clearly intended to have Article 11 in the Shareholders’ Agreement as the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The central issue in Article 11, however, is which is the jurisdiction which they have contracted to resolve their disputes. This issue of jurisdiction in Article 11 is ambiguous. As I have mentioned above at [58], when the parties were before the Shanghai Maritime Court, Mr Xu asserted that Article 11 states that the Chinese courts have jurisdiction while Mr Fu argued that the Chinese courts do not have jurisdiction. In the present case the parties took the opposite arguments. In my view, the defendants have not made out a good arguable case that Article 11 is a valid exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Chinese courts. Article 11 is uncertain and ambiguous, thus it is difficult to ascertain the intention of the parties as to their intended jurisdiction to handle their disputes.

  72. [62] The claimants’ expert, Mr Li Hongdeng (“Mr Li”), referred to two cases where the Chinese courts had found the terms “local people’s court” and “people’s court in Changsha” to be uncertain, declining to enforce the clause as a result. Mr Li’s evidence is that “[i]t is the mainstream view that jurisdictional clauses providing for “local people’s court” are too uncertain and are invalid”, as it is not possible to point to the exact court that the parties have chosen. Mr Li relies on two statutory provisions – Article 30 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law and Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Law:

  73. [63] Mr Li stated that since it is not possible to determine the “people’s court with jurisdiction” under Article 30, the Chinese courts would decline to enforce the clause and apply the default statutory law on jurisdiction.

  74. [64] The following are some of the responses from the defendants’ expert, Ms Xue Jiang (“Ms Xue”), to Mr Li’s report:

  75. (a) The term “local people’s court” is certain insofar as it is a reference to the people’s court of China.

  76. (b) Ms Xue argued that the two cases Mr Li cited did not pertain to a dispute resolution clause framed in similar terms as the current one. Both Articles 30 and 35 apply to choices between “people’s courts”. Therefore, Articles 30 and 35 apply only to an intranational choice of court clause between multiple people’s courts under the Chinese court system, as opposed to an international choice of court clause between the courts of two states. .

  77. [65] I am not convinced that the Chinese cases can be distinguished from the present one. Even though those cases relate to an intranational choice between multiple Chinese people’s courts, as opposed to an international choice between the courts of two states as in the present case, these two cases are still a useful indicator of the Chinese courts’ stance towards a clause containing the same wording.

  78. [66] Therefore, even if the phrase “local people’s courts” were interpreted to mean the Chinese courts, the defendants have not shown a good arguable case as to the validity of Article 11 as an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

  79. Whether Singapore is the natural forum for the claims

  80. [67] I shall now consider whether Singapore is the natural forum for the four claims, viz, the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims, the Trusts Vessel Claims, the Unauthorised Transfer Claims and the s 4(10A) Claim.

  81. [68] The parties agree that the two-stage test enunciated in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (the “Spiliada test”) applies. The first stage of the Spiliada test involves a consideration of whether Singapore is the appropriate forum for the dispute. This involves the identification of the connecting factors that establishes Singapore as the natural forum to deal with the dispute of the parties. The second stage comes into play only when Singapore is not found to be the appropriate forum, then the court will consider whether substantial justice can be obtained in the foreign prima facie natural forum (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore – Conflict of Laws vol 6(2) (LexisNexis Singapore, 2023 Reissue) (“Halsbury’s Laws”) at para 75.111).

  82. [69] In relation to Mr Fu, the first stage is to ascertain whether Singapore is the appropriate forum for the dispute. In this case, the burden of proof to show that Singapore is the appropriate forum is on the claimants (Zoom Communications at [72]).

  83. [70] In relation to the second to ninth defendants, the first stage is whether, prima facie, there is another available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate for the case to be tried. The burden of proof of showing that Singapore is not the appropriate forum is on the second to ninth defendants (Zoom Communications at [72]).

  84. [71] In the first stage of the Spiliada analysis, the court will have to consider the factors connecting the dispute with the competing jurisdictions. Five non-exhaustive connecting factors are: (a) personal connections of the parties and witnesses; (b) connections to relevant events and transactions; (c) governing law; (d) other proceedings (lis alibi pendens); and (e) the shape of the litigation (JIO Minerals FZC and others v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”) at [42]; Best Soar Ltd v Praxis Energy Agents Pte Ltd [2018] 3 SLR 423 (“Best Soar”) at [16]). This list of relevant indicators, while useful, should not be applied in a mechanistic manner, as the weight to be ascribed to a particular connecting factor would depend on all circumstances of the case (Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 at [71]).

  85. [72] I shall now consider the various claims made by the claimants and ascertain the appropriate forum for the disputes.

  86. Shareholders’ Agreement Claims

  87. [73] The claim-specific connecting factors in relation to the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims tilt in favour of Singapore.

  88. (1) Personal Connections of Parties and Witnesses

  89. [74] The personal connections of parties and witnesses, on the balance, tilt in favour of Singapore as the second to eighth defendants are Singapore-registered companies. Mr Fu travelled between China and Singapore frequently. Being parties to the suit, Mr Fu and Mr Xu will be amenable to testify in either China or Singapore. The main issue is the convenience and compellability of the potential non-party witnesses to the dispute.

  90. [75] Mr Xu argues that there are at least 17 Singapore-registered companies within the Pacific Glory Group and these companies would be required to register one director and secretary ordinarily resident in Singapore. These directors and secretaries would be compellable to give evidence. Further, the Singapore-registered companies had engaged the same corporate secretarial firm to prepare their accounts and tax filings and representatives from this corporate secretarial firm may be required to give evidence. Moreover, the Singapore-registered companies will have bank accounts in Singapore, and these will facilitate tracing of the defendants’ assets. Conversely, Mr Fu argues that the employees of the companies that Mr Xu alleges to be part of the Pacific Glory Group would be relevant in determining the application and scope of the Shareholders’ Agreement. Further, two ex-employees with whom Mr Xu had conversations with, namely Ms Luo Xuemeng and Ms Li Li, may be relevant to the proceedings. Mr Xu had based his allegations of misappropriation on these conversations and, therefore, their evidence would be relevant.

  91. [76] The convenience of witnesses is a neutral factor given that China is situated relatively close to Singapore, and it would not be prohibitively inconvenient for witnesses to travel between the jurisdictions. Further, there is no evidence that evidence via video link was not an option.

  92. [77] Next, I shall deal with the issue of compellability of witnesses. I agree with Mr Xu that the compellability of employees associated with Mr Fu’s companies is not relevant, as employers will generally be able to procure the attendance of their employees. I take Mr Xu’s point that the testimony of the corporate director and secretary of the Singapore-registered companies ordinarily resident in Singapore may be relevant in so far as it would go to establish the operations of the Singapore-registered companies. This is notwithstanding that the operations, secretarial services and corporate finances were based in China. Representatives from the corporate secretarial firm engaged by the Singapore-registered companies may be relevant. It may be foreseeable that the corporate director, secretary and representatives of the corporate secretarial firm will have to be compelled to give evidence against Mr Fu, who is alleged to be the ultimate beneficial owner of these companies.

  93. [78] Mr Fu, on the other hand, has provided no evidence that the ex-employees would have to be compelled. The burden of proof to show that a foreign witness would be unwilling to testify is on the party who seeks to rely on the witness compellability factor (Raffles Education Corp Ltd and others v Shantanu Prakash and another [2020] SGHC 83 at [78]). I do not think this is proven for the ex-employees.

  94. (2) Connection to relevant events and transactions

  95. [80] Another consideration under this factor is the availability of documents. The claimants argue that the Singapore-registered companies belonging to the Pacific Glory Group would be required to keep proper records under the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Singapore Companies Act”), and that this would be relevant to prove the financials of the relevant companies. The defendants’ position during the hearing is that the documents are based in China, reiterating that it is the common position between parties that the companies are but shell companies. It is trite that the physical availability of documents is a neutral factor as documents can easily be transported across jurisdictions (Man Diesel at [150]). The Singapore Companies Act obliges the companies to keep the necessary records. Therefore, the second to eighth defendants, which are Singapore-registered companies, have to maintain the relevant records in compliance with the Singapore Companies Act. These records may be relevant to the parties and thus subject to the disclosure regime.

  96. (3) Governing Law

  97. [82] The defendants argue that Chinese law governs the Shareholders’ Agreement. The established approach in determining the governing law of the contract was expounded by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and another appeal [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (at [36], citing Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v Turegum Insurance Co [2001] 2 SLR(R) 285 at [82])):

  98. [83] The Shareholders’ Agreement states the Chinese law to be the governing law of the Shareholders’ Agreement. It is stated as follows:

  99. [84] Weighing the relevant factors, some of the factors seem to indicate that China may be the natural forum, and some factors indicate that Singapore is the natural forum. Overall, I am satisfied that Singapore is the prima facie natural forum for the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims.

  100. Trust Vessels Claims

  101. [85] In my assessment, the claim-specific connecting factors in relation to Trust Vessels Claims tilt in favour of Singapore.

  102. (1) Personal Connections of Parties and Witnesses

  103. [86] The parties to the Trust Vessel Claims are Mr Xu, Mr Fu for dishonest assistance in the breach of trust by the second to ninth defendants, and Acrux (the third defendant) and Fuxing (the fourth defendant) for breach of trust. In my view, the circumstances surrounding the Trust Vessel Claims in relation to the parties and witnesses are substantially similar to that of the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims (at [74]–[78] above). The defendants submit that additional witnesses that may be relevant would be other Vessel Investors and that all of them are resident in China. However, for the reasons canvassed above (at [78]), Mr Fu has not shown that these Vessel Investors (many of whom would be employees) would not be willing to testify, and the inconvenience associated with travelling from China to Singapore in the modern day and age is not significant. Therefore, I am satisfied that, just as I found in relation to the Shareholders’ Agreement Claims, this factor weighed in favour of Singapore due to the compellability of the director and corporate secretary ordinarily resident in Singapore as well as the corporate secretarial firm.

  104. (2) Connection to relevant events and transactions

  105. [87] I am of the view that the same connecting factors relevant to the documents canvassed at [79]–[81] above apply here. The Certificate of Share Acquisition is in Chinese and entered into by investors in China. However, the third to eighth defendants are required to keep proper records under Singapore law, which may go to show the inflow of funds and the beneficial interest that Mr Xu has in the Trust Vessels.

  106. (3) Governing Law

  107. [88] My view is that the governing law of the trusts is Singapore law. The claimants argue that Singapore law governs the trusts as parties had chosen Singapore as the place of incorporation for the third to eighth defendants to hold the Trust Vessels. Further, the claimants note that there is little dispute over the existence and terms of the trusts. The key issues of the dispute are factual, relating to Mr Xu’s beneficial interests in the Trust Vessels and the profit and sales generated by the Trust Vessels that Mr Xu is seeking an account of. The defendants submit that the law governing the trusts should be Chinese law as the Singapore-registered companies are essentially shell companies and operations are run out of China. The agreements and arrangements in relation to the investments were also made in China.

  108. [89] I agree with the claimants that the governing law of the trusts should be Singapore law. In determining the governing law of the trusts, the court first considers whether the parties had made an express or implied choice of law. If there is no such choice, the court will then ascertain the law with which the trusts have the closest connection, which would then be the governing law (Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi (North) Sdn Bhd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 814 (“Trisuryo”) at [41]). In this case, there is no express choice of law to govern the trust.

  109. [90] The Trust Companies were incorporated in Singapore for the purpose of holding the Trust Vessels on trust for the beneficiaries. This, in my view, is an implied choice of Singapore law to govern the trusts. In Trisuryo, the parties had incorporated a special purpose vehicle to hold the shares and deliberately chose Singapore to be the jurisdiction in which the company would be constituted. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it would be “highly implausible that parties would have intended to create a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore for the sole purpose of holding [the shares], but intended at the same time that such holding should be governed by the laws of another jurisdiction” (at [87]). I note that the Court of Appeal in Trisuryo also took into consideration the fact that Indonesian law did not contain the concept of a trust (at [88]). However, in the present case, neither the claimants nor the defendants submitted on whether Chinese law recognises the concept of a trust.

  110. [91] Further, in Baker, Michael A (executor of the estate of Chantal Burnison, deceased) v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd and others [2020] 4 SLR 85, the Singapore International Commercial Court cited Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore affirmatively and held (at [206]) that “[w]here a trustee is a corporate vehicle specially incorporated for a particular purpose, it may be inferred that the law of the place of incorporation was intended as the governing law for the trust”. I agree. The fact that the second to eighth defendants are incorporated in Singapore is sufficient to ground a finding that there was an implied choice of Singapore law to govern the trusts. For the ninth defendant, which is incorporated in Hong Kong, Hong Kong law would govern the trust formed over the Trust Vessels.

  111. (4) Lis Alibi Pendens

  112. [92] The defendants argued that the Chinese proceedings in relation to the liquidation of the Trust Vessels count as lis alibi pendens in favour of China. Mr Fu mentions that there is a pending Chinese proceeding in relation to the Trust Vessels Claims. Counsel for the claimants assures the court at the hearing that if the court found that it has jurisdiction over all the claims, Mr Xu would discontinue the Chinese proceedings and proceed in Singapore. This factor is therefore moot.

  113. [93] Assessing the relevant factors, I am satisfied that Singapore is the prima facie natural forum for the Trust Vessels Claim. The governing law of the trusts is Singapore law, and there are relevant witnesses in Singapore.

  114. Unauthorised Transfer Claims

  115. [94] The Unauthorised Transfer Claims have two categories: (a) the conspiracy claims which encompass both Mr Fu and Quan An; and (b) the claims based on legal title and unjust enrichment which are solely directed at Quan An.

  116. (1) Personal Connections of Parties and Witnesses

  117. [95] Changzhou is claiming against Mr Fu for conspiracy and against Quan An for conspiracy, unjust enrichment and proprietary claim. Quan An is incorporated in Singapore but Changzhou is incorporated in China. The claimants argue that evidence as to the operations of Quan An is important and Quan An’s resident director(s) would be compellable to give evidence in the Singapore courts. In contrast, the defendants argue that evidence from the third-party shippers would be relevant to show that Changzhou entered into legitimate transactions with numerous third parties in China. On balance, this factor is neutral.

  118. (2) Connection to relevant events and transactions

  119. [96] In my view, the connection to relevant events and transactions tilts in favour of China as the forum. While some of the transactions alleged to be unauthorised transfers were between Changzhou and Quan An, a Singapore-incorporated company, other transactions took place between Changzhou and third parties based in China and therefore bore no relation to Singapore at all. Similarly, all documents (eg fixture notes) and contracts appear to be concluded in Chinese.

  120. (3) Governing law

  121. [97] Under the double actionability rule, Chinese law is relevant to the claim in conspiracy while the governing law of the legal title and unjust enrichment claims is Singapore law.

  122. (A) Conspiracy claims

  123. [98] For the conspiracy claims, the general principle is that the place where a tort was committed ought prima facie to be the natural forum for that tortious claim (JIO Minerals at [106]; Best Soar at [20]; Rickshaw Investments Ltd and another v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw Investments”) at [39]). The Albaforth principle (as the Court of Appeal termed it in Rickshaw Investments) is premised on the consideration that it would be just and reasonable for the defendant to answer for his wrongdoing in the jurisdiction the alleged tort was committed in (Cordoba Shipping Co Ltd v National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey (The Albaforth) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91 at 96, as cited in Rickshaw Investments at [39]).

  124. [99] Changzhou’s cause of action against Mr Fu and Quan An is premised on the tort of conspiracy. The defendants argue that the acts that Changzhou alleges to be part of this conspiracy took place in China and, therefore, the place of the tort is China.

  125. [100] In construing the place of the tort, the court will apply the “substance of the tort” test and examine the series of events constituting the elements of the tort to determine, in substance, where the cause of action arose (EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [53]). For the tort of conspiracy, the key factors in determining the substance of the tort are “the identity, importance and location of the conspirators, the locations where any agreements or combinations took place, the nature and places of the concerted acts or means, the location of the plaintiff and the places where the plaintiff suffered losses” (EFT Holdings at [53]).

  126. [101] Examining Changzhou’s pleaded case in relation to conspiracy, the place of the tort should be China. Changzhou’s case is that Mr Fu’s cousin, Ms Fu Fen, controlled Changzhou’s finances as she had the log-in password for Internet banking, as well as the company stamp and finance department stamp required to authorise transfer from Changzhou. This is despite an understanding that Mr Xu would have to first approve any transfer from Changzhou. Mr Xu discovered a series of transfers made without his knowledge or approval to Quan An and to a series of third parties. Mr Xu claims that Ms Fu Fen and/or other employees in the finance department carried out these transfers from Changzhou under the instructions or in concert with Mr Fu who had full control over the Pacific Glory Group’s financial affairs, for no legitimate purpose. Further, Quan An, having received the funds, was also a conspirator.

  127. [102] The alleged conspirators, ie, Ms Fu Fen, the unnamed finance department employees, and Mr Fu himself, are predominantly based in China, even though Quan An is incorporated in Singapore. The purported agreement among the alleged conspirators would also likely be made in China. The concerted acts, viz, the purported unauthorised transfers, would have taken place from Changzhou’s bank accounts. Changzhou is incorporated in China and its purported losses would have been suffered in China. One relevant connection to Singapore would be that the transfers from Changzhou to Quan An was received in Quan An’s Singapore bank accounts. Nonetheless, on balance, the factors leant in favour of China as where the tort was in substance alleged to have been committed.

  128. [103] Therefore, the place of the tort is China and China would be prima facie the natural forum for the claims in conspiracy.

  129. [104] Further, by the double actionability rule, the tort of conspiracy must also be actionable in China under Chinese law. The defendant argues that this should weigh in favour of the Chinese courts as the natural forum. Whether the double actionability rule should be considered in the determination of natural forum has been subject to some controversy. In Shen Sophie v Xia Wei Ping and others [2023] 3 SLR 1092 (“Shen Sophie”), Goh Yihan JC (as he then was) undertook a survey of the relevant cases and found that the High Court authorities in Singapore seemingly pointed in both directions (at [67]–[74]). Goh JC followed the broad approach espoused by Vinodh Coomaraswamy J in IM Skaugen SE and another v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE and another [2018] SGHC 123, where Coomaraswamy J was of the view that the double actionability rule was relevant in determining the governing law of the tortious claim as part of the natural forum inquiry (Shen Sophie at [67]).

  130. [105] There appears to be two strands of reasoning as to the relevance of the place of the tort in determining the natural forum of the dispute. The first is premised on the Albaforth principle that it would be just and reasonable for the defendant to answer for his wrongdoing in the court in which jurisdiction the alleged tort was committed in (per Rickshaw Investments at [39]; JIO Minerals at [106]; see [98]–[103] above). The second is grounded on the need to show actionability at the place of the tort under the double actionability rule, which may require the courts to consider questions of foreign law that may be best resolved in their native courts (per JIO Minerals at [88]–[96]; Shen Sophie at [67]). The question, then, is whether both strands of reasoning can be applied in the same case, which may arguably give rise to overemphasis on the place of the tort. In JIO Minerals, the Court of Appeal applied both the Albaforth principle as well as the double actionability rule. Regardless, the courts should bear in mind not to mechanistically rely on the place of the tort and must holistically weigh all other connecting factors in determining the natural forum of the dispute.

  131. [106] For completeness, even though parties did not submit on the governing law of the claim on unjust enrichment and legal title, I turn to briefly consider the prima facie governing law for those claims. Generally, a claim based on unjust enrichment is governed by the law of the place where the enrichment occurred as that would be the place where the claim has the closest connection (CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 (“CIMB Bank”) at [58]). This is not a strict rule, for instance, a pre-existing relationship between parties that may justify giving weight to the law that governed the relationship (CIMB Bank at [59]). In the present case, Singapore is the location where Quan An was allegedly unjustly enriched as a result of the transfers from Changzhou. This is sufficient, in my view, to ground Singapore as the prima facie governing law over the unjust enrichment claim.

  132. [107] Further, the Court of Appeal in CIMB Bank also affirmed Rule 230 of Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2006), which suggests that the proper law of the obligation that does not arise in connection with a contract or a transaction concerning an immovable (land) should be the law of the country where the enrichment occurs (at [31]). Without the benefit of submissions on this point, I preliminarily view the proper law of Quan An’s proprietary claim to be Singapore law.

  133. Overall Shape of the Litigation

  134. [109] The key witnesses in these claims, namely Mr Fu, Mr Xu, and Ms Fu Fen, are common. Further, broadly speaking, these claims pertain to the internal financial management of the defendant companies. The central plank of Mr Xu’s claim for breach of trust and dishonest assistance in the distribution of profits is on the premise of Mr Fu’s misappropriation. Mr Xu has alleged that Mr Fu misappropriated funds from the Pacific Glory Group, sought to quantify these misappropriated funds, claimed a 23.5% interest in these funds and calculated his share of the Pacific Glory Group’s voyage profits attributable to his share of the misappropriated funds on top of his personal contributions. The defendants also argue that Mr Xu had claimed that a portion of his own share of the Trust Vessels was paid for by the Pacific Glory Group’s dividends. I think that the issues surrounding the Shareholders’ Agreement – whether Mr Xu is entitled to dividends and whether Mr Fu had misappropriated funds – are inextricably intertwined with the Trust Vessel Claims and the quantification thereof and it is not wise to separate the two.

  135. [110] Mr Xu asserts that Mr Fu has substantial assets in the bank accounts in Singapore. Mr Fu also has shares in Singapore-registered companies. He is also the Chief Executive Officer of PGS Shipping Pte Ltd, a Singapore-registered company. Mr Fu admits that he has beneficial interests in vessels that are owned by Singapore-registered companies. According to Mr Xu, prior to the commencement of the present case, Mr Fu came to Singapore regularly. Mr Xu alleges that Mr Fu told him that Mr Fu has applied for permanent residence in Singapore. This was denied by Mr Fu.

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