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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Jun 2026

General Division of the High Court

A stay of the court case was refused; a foreign court was not the more appropriate forum

Exchange Union Co and others v Wo Qi and others

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[2026] SGHC 124Case no. Originating Claim No 107 of 2024(Summonses Nos 1750, 1751 and 2292 of 2025)

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A stay of the court case was refused; a foreign court was not the more appropriate forum

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [170], [176]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The fourth claimant in HC/OC 107/2024 (“OC 107”), Wo Wei Dong (“C4”), is a national of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). The second defendant, Sun Hongmin (“D2”), is his wife. The first defendant, Wo Qi (“D1”), and the twelfth defendant, Wo Quan (also known as James Wo) (“D12”), are, respectively, the daughter and son of C4 and D2. Distilled to its essence, OC 107 principally involves claims by C4 that D1, D2 and D12 have misappropriated his assets with a total value of approximately US$600m.

  3. [2] In HC/SUM 1750/2025 (“SUM 1750”) filed by D1 and D2, HC/SUM 1751/2025 (“SUM 1751”) filed by the third, fourth, ninth and tenth defendants, and HC/SUM 2292/2025 (“SUM 2292”) filed by D12 (together, “Stay Applications”), the aforesaid defendants seek a stay of OC 107 (a) on the ground that the PRC is the more appropriate forum for the hearing of the action or (b) alternatively, on case management grounds pending the final determination of divorce proceedings commenced by D2 against C4 before the PRC courts in Case No (2025) Hu 0106 Minchu No 24822 (“PRC Divorce Proceedings”).

  4. [3] Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I dismiss the Stay Applications for the reasons that follow.

  5. Main background

  6. Overview of the action in OC 107

  7. [4] C4 claims to own and operate a group of companies in and outside the PRC (“Huiyin Group”), which includes the first, second and third claimants (respectively, “C1”, “C2” and “C3”), and the third, fourth, ninth, tenth and eleventh defendants (respectively, “D3”, “D4”, “D9”, “D10” and “D11”, and together, “Foreign Companies”).

  8. [5] In respect of these companies:

  9. [6] C4 summarises the action in OC 107 as relating to his claim over “Assets” comprising (a) “Digital Assets”, which refer primarily to cryptocurrencies, tokens or other blockchain-based assets stored in decentralised wallets or exchange accounts that he had entrusted to D1 to manage on his behalf and (b) “Non-Digital Assets”, which refer to the shares in the Foreign Companies and specified assets held by the Foreign Companies, D2 and D12. His position is that the Assets were acquired using funds provided by him and were at all material times beneficially owned by him.

  10. Commencement of OC 107

  11. [7] In December 2023, D1 allegedly siphoned off, dissipated and/or denied C4 access to the Digital Assets he had entrusted to her. This precipitated the filing of OC 107 on 20 February 2024, in which the claimants initially named only eight defendants:

  12. (a) D1 to D4;

  13. (b) the fifth, sixth and seventh defendants, which own the cryptocurrency exchanges that host some of the digital wallets to which the allegedly stolen Digital Assets were traced, for the purposes of obtaining certain disclosure orders against them; and

  14. (c) the eighth defendant (“D8”), which refers to “Persons Unknown who own, control and/or know the passwords” to some of the digital wallets to which the allegedly stolen Digital Assets were traced.

  15. [8] The claimants explained that, at that time, “D12’s involvement was yet unknown”, which was why he (and D10 and D11) were not added as defendants.

  16. Statement of Claim filed on 6 May 2024

  17. [9] On 24 April 2024, the claimants were granted permission to add D9 as a defendant in OC 107.

  18. [10] On 6 May 2024, the claimants filed their Statement of Claim (“SOC”). They made two broad sets of claims in the SOC: (a) claims in relation to the Digital Assets; and (b) claims in relation to D3, D4, D9 and the 10% Share in C2.

  19. [11] The first set of claims centred on D1 and/or D2 having wrongfully taken control and made unauthorised transfers of the Digital Assets. In the main, the claimants pleaded that:

  20. (a) C4 was the sole originator and/or contributor of the funds used to acquire the Digital Assets and was the sole ultimate beneficial owner of the Digital Assets.

  21. (b) C4 would “typically appoint persons and companies from his group of companies and business, including [C1 to C3 and D3 and D4] to act as his agents and trustees in administering and operating his Digital Assets”.

  22. (c) C4’s Digital Assets had been held in digital wallets, some of which were registered to individuals or companies that were his trustees, including accounts with the cryptocurrency exchanges “Binance”, “OKX” and “Gate.io” registered in C1’s name (respectively, “Binance Account”, “OKX Account” and “Gate.io Account”).

  23. (d) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D1 in or around November 2021, C4 appointed D1 as his agent and trustee to administer and operate part of the Digital Assets (“C4-D1 Agreement”).

  24. (e) D1 acted in breach of the C4-D1 Agreement and/or trust and/or her fiduciary duties owed to C4 by failing to carry out C4’s instructions and doing other unauthorised acts in relation to the Digital Assets:

  25. (i) On 5 December 2023, D1 failed to comply with C4’s instructions to make a cryptocurrency transfer to the Gate.io Account.

  26. (ii) On 6 and 7 December 2023, from an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address located in Singapore, D1 logged into and disabled C4’s access to the Binance Account and OKX Account.

  27. (iii) From 8 December 2023, D1 made unauthorised transfers of the Digital Assets, including from the Binance Account and OKX Account, and continued to wrongfully exclude C4 from accessing the Digital Assets.

  28. (iv) On 12 February 2024, through D1’s then-solicitors from Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (“R&T”), D1 asserted that all the Digital Assets belonged to D2 and/or D3 and that she had transferred all the Digital Assets to them on 8 December 2023.

  29. (f) As D1 claimed that she had made the transfers on or around 8 December 2023 on D2’s instructions, D2 had induced D1 to breach the C4-D1 Agreement.

  30. (g) To the extent that the unauthorised transfers of the Digital Assets were made to digital wallets owned by D1 to D4, D1 to D4 were liable for conversion of the Digital Assets.

  31. (h) D1 to D4 and/or D8 were also liable for unjust enrichment in “the retention and/or holding of any such Digital Assets without the knowledge, consent or authority of the [c]laimants” and in “the absence of any basis or consideration for [them] to retain or hold on to the Digital Assets”.

  32. [12] The second set of claims centred on D1 and/or D2 having wrongfully denied that C4 was the ultimate beneficial owner of D3, D4, D9 and the 10% Share in C2 and prevented C4 from exercising his rights in relation to his beneficial interests in D3, D4 and D9. In the main, the claimants pleaded that:

  33. (a) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D2 in or around 2001, D2 agreed to hold the 10% Share in C2 on trust for C4 (“C4-D2 Shanghai Huiyin Agreement”).

  34. (b) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D2 in or around May 2018, D2 agreed to hold all the shares in D3 on trust for C4 (“C4-D2 DFGC Agreement”).

  35. (c) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D2 in or around April or May 2009, D2 agreed to hold all the shares in D4 on trust for C4 (“C4-D2 SRIL Agreement”).

  36. (d) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D2 in or around September 2021, D2 agreed to hold all the shares in D9 on trust for C4 (“C4-D2 W3CHCL Agreement”).

  37. (e) From December 2023 onwards, D2 acted in breach of trust and/or her fiduciary duties owed to C4 by exercising the powers attached to her directorships and/or shareholdings of D3, D4 and D9 to C4’s detriment, refusing to recognise C4’s beneficial ownership in D3, D4, D9 and the 10% Share in C2, and refusing C4’s demands that she transfer the shares in D3, D4 and D9 to C4.

  38. Defence (Merits) filed by D1 to D4 and D9 on 30 May 2024

  39. [13] On 30 May 2024, D1 to D4 and D9 (“Active Defendants”), then represented by R&T, filed a defence contesting the merits of the claimants’ claims in OC 107 (“Defence (Merits)”).

  40. [14] In respect of the first set of claims relating to the Digital Assets, the Active Defendants primarily pleaded that:

  41. (a) They were “unable to plead to the ownership of the ‘Digital Assets’ as defined in … the SOC as the definition [was] so vague and undefined to be incapable of answer”. However, in so far as the action related to any digital assets owned by D2 but claimed by the claimants (which the Active Defendants defined as “Disputed Digital Assets”), D2 was the sole originator and/or contributor of the funds used to acquire the Disputed Digital Assets and was the ultimate beneficial owner of the Disputed Digital Assets. The Disputed Digital Assets were held and/or traded under the brand “Digital Finance Group” (“DFG”), which operated through various affiliates, including D3, D4, D10 and D11. D12 was the sole shareholder and director of D10 and D11, and was at all material times the Chief Executive Officer of DFG. (While the Defence (Merits) referred to D10, D11 and D12, they had not been added as defendants to the action at that time.)

  42. (b) Their conception of the “Huiyin Group” comprised, more narrowly, C2 and other PRC entities that C4 managed (which I shall refer to as “Huiyin Group (PRC)”). D2 was “a shareholder and a joint owner of the companies in the [Huiyin Group (PRC)], but [did] not take active part in their management”. In or around 2017 when D2 and D12 decided to “corporatize DFG” to carry out larger scale cryptocurrency investment projects under DFG on D2’s behalf, they decided to “tap into the [Huiyin Group (PRC)’s] resources” to support DFG’s cryptocurrency custody and trading activities. However, D2 did not intend by this to grant any ownership interest in the assets controlled by DFG to C4 or the Huiyin Group (PRC). From or around 2017, D12 instructed a Huiyin Group (PRC) employee to set up digital wallets on behalf of DFG to receive and hold the cryptocurrency tokens acquired by DFG. D12 also instructed a trading team in the Huiyin Group (PRC) to execute trades (in accounts with various cryptocurrency exchanges registered in their personal names) on behalf of DFG.

  43. (c) The digital assets in the Binance Account, OKX Account and Gate.io Account were held for and on behalf of DFG and were ultimately beneficially owned by D2.

  44. (d) D1 was never appointed by C4 to work in and/or with C1 to C3 and/or any of C4’s companies. D1 denied the C4-D1 Agreement and averred that she was never appointed as C4’s agent or trustee to administer or operate any digital assets. At all material times, D1 was employed by D2 to manage D2 and D4’s trading activities. In or around November 2021, D1 was authorised by D2 to take over the administration and operation of DFG’s digital assets.

  45. (e) On 6 December 2023, D1 discovered that C4 and the Huiyin Group (PRC) team had made trades in the Binance Account and OKX Account which were contrary to D12’s instructions. On D2’s instructions, D1 disabled C4’s access to the Binance Account and OKX Account on 6 December 2023, and transferred all of the cryptocurrency tokens out of the Binance Account and OKX Account to DFG’s digital wallets from 8 to 10 December 2023.

  46. (f) Consequently, D1 denied the claims for breaches of the C4-D1 Agreement, trust and/or fiduciary duties; D2 denied liability for inducing D1 to breach the C4-D1 Agreement and for breach of trust; and D1 to D4 denied liability for conversion and for unjust enrichment.

  47. [15] In respect of the second set of claims relating to D3, D4, D9 and the 10% Share in C2, the Active Defendants primarily pleaded that:

  48. (a) At all material times, C4 held 90% of the shares in C2 while D2 held 10% of the shares in C2. That said, “as the [Huiyin Group (PRC)] [was] a family business, [D2] and [C4] regard[ed] [C2] as jointly owned by the both of them”. D2 denied entering into the C4-D2 Shanghai Huiyin Agreement.

  49. (b) D2 also denied entering into the C4-D2 DFGC Agreement, C4-D2 SRIL Agreement and C4-D2 W3CHCL Agreement. D2 was at all material times the sole shareholder, director and ultimate beneficial owner of D3, D4 and D9.

  50. (c) Consequently, D2 denied C4’s claims for breach of trust and/or fiduciary duties.

  51. Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) filed on 16 July 2024

  52. [16] On 16 July 2024, the claimants were granted permission to add D10, D11 and D12 as defendants in OC 107.

  53. [17] On 16 July 2024, the claimants also filed their Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) (“SOC1”). The claimants made three main sets of amendments in the SOC1.

  54. [18] The first main set of amendments pertained to claims against D12. The claimants pleaded that:

  55. (a) In November 2016, C4 brought D12 into the Huiyin Group to, among other things, assist with C4’s investments into digital assets. In December 2016, the Huiyin Group established a US$20m blockchain venture capital fund known as the “Huiyin Blockchain Venture” to manage C4’s digital asset investments. From August 2018 to 2020, a “DFG Platform” involving several of the Huiyin Group’s foreign companies, including D3, D4, D10 and D11, was created to replace the “Huiyin Blockchain Venture”. C4 allowed D12 to be held out as the public face of the DFG Platform and D3 on the understanding that the DFG Platform and D3 would be managed and operated by D12 as C4’s agent (“C4-D12 DFGC Agreement”). D12 acted in breach of trust and/or his fiduciary duties owed to C4 under the C4-D12 DFGC Agreement by refusing to manage and operate D3 in accordance with the C4-D12 DFGC Agreement.

  56. (b) By an oral agreement made between C4 and D12 in or around November 2017, D12 agreed to hold all the shares in D10 on trust for C4 and to be registered as the nominal director and shareholder of D10 (“C4-D12 Create Fortune Agreement”). By an oral agreement made between C4 and D12 in or around October 2017, D12 agreed to hold all the shares in D11 on trust for C4 and to be registered as the nominal director and shareholder of D11 (“C4-D12 Jumbo Agreement”). C4 had provided the funds used by D10 and D11 to make investments. D12 acted in breach of trust and/or his fiduciary duties owed to C4 under the C4-D12 Create Fortune Agreement and C4-D12 Jumbo Agreement by refusing to recognise C4’s beneficial ownership of D10 and D11 and act on C4’s instructions in respect of D10 and D11.

  57. (c) D12 had induced D1 to breach the C4-D1 Agreement by instructing her to make unauthorised transfers of the Digital Assets. The claimants’ claims in conversion and unjust enrichment of the Digital Assets were also extended to D12.

  58. [19] The second main set of amendments involved the claimants particularising the assets held by D3, D4 and D9 and pleading that C4 had provided these entities with the funds to acquire these assets.

  59. [20] The third main set of amendments expanded and clarified the bank accounts of D4, D10, D11, subsidiaries of the Foreign Companies, D2 and D12 in respect of which C4 claimed he had instructed his employees to hand over control and operation to D1.

  60. Defence (Merits) (Amendment No 1) filed by D1 to D4 and D9 on 2 August 2024

  61. [21] In response to the SOC1, the Active Defendants filed their Defence (Merits) (Amendment No 1) on 2 August 2024. By the amendments, the Active Defendants mainly:

  62. (a) repeated that D2 was at all material times the sole shareholder, director and ultimate beneficial owner of D3, D4 and D9;

  63. (b) repeated that D2 was the ultimate beneficial owner of the Disputed Digital Assets, and averred that there was an understanding between D2, D12 and “the affiliates of DFG [including D3, D4, D10 and D11] (through which its business has been operating)” that any digital assets acquired and/or traded under DFG were held on behalf of D2;

  64. (c) identified the transfers of Disputed Digital Assets made by D1 on D2’s instructions and “in the ordinary course of DFG’s business upon [D12’s] instructions”;

  65. (d) denied the existence of the C4-D12 DFGC Agreement, and averred that all management decisions in relation to the assets, investments and operations of D3 were made by or with the approval of D2;

  66. (e) expanded on the assets of D3 and D4 in respect of which D2 claimed to have provided “seed money”; and

  67. (f) did not admit and put the claimants to strict proof of C4’s claims that he had provided D3, D4 and D9 with the funds to acquire specified assets.

  68. Service of the originating process and SOC1 on D10 to D12 in September 2024

  69. [22] The originating process in OC 107 and SOC1 were served on D10 by way of personal service in Singapore on 10 September 2024, and on D11 and D12 by way of substituted service in Singapore on 20 September 2024. They did not enter an appearance in OC 107 at the time.

  70. Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) filed on 16 April 2025

  71. [23] On 14 March 2025, the claimants applied in HC/SUM 700/2025 (“SUM 700”) for permission to amend the SOC1. They identified five groups of amendments:

  72. (a) The first group of amendments “delineate[d]” the scope of the assets in dispute.

  73. (b) The second group of amendments “[went] towards the ownership of the assets in dispute”, relating to “the funding of the assets, agreements to entrust the assets to the Defendants … and instructions upon which the assets were acquired”.

  74. (c) The third group of amendments related to “the seizure of the assets in dispute by the Active Defendants and [D12] in December 2023”, “specify[ing] in greater detail what exactly transpired in December 2023, the circumstances leading up to such seizure, events following the seizure and put[ting] into focus the concerted efforts by several of the Defendants to seize the assets in question”.

  75. (d) The fourth group of amendments related to how C4 (as opposed to D2) “oversaw the administration of [D3, D4, D9, D10 and D11] and gave instructions for the acquisition and/or trading of the assets in dispute”. The claimants also pleaded a broadened scope of the oral C4-D2 DFGC Agreement, C4-D2 SRIL Agreement, C4-D2 W3CHCL Agreement, C4-D12 Create Fortune Agreement and C4-D12 Jumbo Agreement (together, “Foreign Companies Agreements”), contending that, in addition to all the shares in the Foreign Companies, the underlying assets of the Foreign Companies were also held on trust for C4 by D2 and/or D12 (as the case may be) “along with” the relevant Foreign Company.

  76. (e) The fifth group of amendments “add[ed] the following causes of action: unlawful means conspiracy, accessory liability for breaches of trust and/or fiduciary duties, breach of contract”, “flow[ing] from” the first to fourth groups of amendments. Of note, the conspiracy claim added by the claimants alleged that from 5 December 2023 onwards, D1, D2, D12 and the Foreign Companies had embarked on an unlawful scheme to seize control of the Assets from C4. The claimants’ claims in conversion and unjust enrichment of the Digital Assets were also extended to D10 and D11.

  77. [24] The Active Defendants opposed SUM 700 on substantive grounds. For example, in written submissions filed on 7 April 2025, they argued that C4 was impermissibly “adding to his claim [the] assets of the Active Defendants that he has discovered since” in a bid to “claim everything [he] can find belonging to the Active Defendants”.

  78. [25] On 14 April 2025, the claimants’ amendment application in SUM 700 was allowed by a learned Assistant Registrar (“AR”).

  79. [26] On 16 April 2025, the claimants proceeded to file their Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) (“SOC2”).

  80. [27] On 25 April 2025, the Active Defendants filed an appeal, vide HC/RA 101/2025 (“RA 101”), against the AR’s decision in SUM 700.

  81. Jurisdictional challenges mounted from May 2025

  82. [28] D2 filed for divorce from C4 in the Shanghai Jing’an District People’s Court in either March 2025 (according to C4) or May 2025 (according to D2). The available record shows that on 27 May 2025, the Shanghai Jing’an District People’s Court accepted D2’s “complaint regarding a divorce dispute” against C4 (see further [34] below).

  83. [29] In the first two weeks of May 2025, the Active Defendants changed their legal representation in OC 107 from R&T to Prolegis LLC (“Prolegis”), and D10 to D12 also appointed Prolegis to act for them. Specifically, D1, D2 and D12 became represented by a team led by Mr Daniel Chia (“Mr Chia”) of Prolegis, while D3, D4, D9, D10 and D11 became represented by Mr Jonathan Tang (“Mr Tang”) of Prolegis.

  84. [30] Thereafter, on 13 and 14 May 2025 respectively, (a) D1 and D2 and (b) D3, D4, D9 and D10 filed Defences (Jurisdiction) to the SOC2, contending that the court had no jurisdiction over the case; further and in the alternative, the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the case as it was not the appropriate court to do so; and the proceedings should thus be struck out or stayed.

  85. [31] On 19 May 2025, the Active Defendants withdrew their appeal in RA 101 against the AR’s decision in SUM 700.

  86. [32] The Stay Applications were then filed (a) on 16 June 2025 by D1 and D2 (vide SUM 1750), (b) on 16 June 2025 by D3, D4, D9 and D10 (vide SUM 1751) and (c) on 11 August 2025 by D12 (vide SUM 2292). I will henceforth refer to these defendants collectively as the “Applicant-Defendants”.

  87. [33] For completeness, pursuant to applications filed by D11 and D12 on 13 May 2025, service of the originating process in OC 107 and SOC1 on D11 and D12 was set aside on 11 July and 25 August 2025 respectively, for reasons immaterial to the Stay Applications. It is undisputed that D11 and D12 were subsequently properly served. SUM 2292 filed by D12 was thus heard with the other Stay Applications. D11 filed a Defence (Jurisdiction) on 18 September 2025 contending that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the case as it was not the appropriate court to do so, but did not apply for a stay.

  88. PRC Divorce Proceedings

  89. [34] On 27 May 2025, the Shanghai Jing’an District People’s Court accepted the divorce complaint filed by D2 (see [28] above). On 3 June 2025, C4 received notice of the PRC Divorce Proceedings. In September 2025, the Shanghai Jing’an District People’s Court heard the “preliminary issue” of whether a divorce decree ought to be granted. On 31 October 2025, D2 and C4 were notified that the Shanghai Jing’an District People’s Court had denied D2’s divorce petition. D2 filed an appeal against that decision. As of the date of this judgment, I have not been informed of the outcome (if any) of D2’s appeal.

  90. The parties’ cases

  91. [35] I set out an overview of the parties’ cases and will elaborate, where necessary, on their arguments at the relevant juncture.

  92. The Applicant-Defendants’ case

  93. [36] The Applicant-Defendants filed joint written submissions, and Mr Tang adopted Mr Chia’s oral submissions at the hearing of the Stay Applications.

  94. [37] The Applicant-Defendants’ primary position was that OC 107 should be stayed on the ground of forum non conveniens as “the PRC Courts” were the more appropriate forum for OC 107 to be tried.

  95. [38] In respect of the first stage of the test in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”):

  96. (a) The Applicant-Defendants’ main argument was that the claimants’ claims in OC 107 rested on the “false premise” that C4 was the sole beneficial owner of the assets in dispute. C4 and D2 were married in the PRC in 1991, and the assets were acquired in the course of their marriage. As a matter of Chinese law, assets obtained by spouses in the course of their marriage were the jointly owned communal property of both spouses unless there was an agreement in writing delineating ownership. The nature and extent of C4’s ownership of and right to deal with the assets in dispute in OC 107 was thus an “anterior” and “key” issue in OC 107, which was “governed by PRC matrimonial law” and had to be decided before the determination of the claims in OC 107. This was also a “key issue” in the PRC Divorce Proceedings. Accordingly, (i) the PRC courts were “best placed” to apply Chinese law to determine the “anterior question” of the ownership of the assets in dispute in OC 107 as between C4 and D2; and (ii) OC 107 should not be allowed to proceed in parallel with the PRC Divorce Proceedings given the risk of conflicting judgments.

  97. (b) In addition, the Applicant-Defendants argued that “many other connecting factors” pointed to the PRC as the appropriate forum, specifically: (i) Chinese law was “the likely governing law” of C4’s specific causes of action in OC 107; and (ii) key witnesses were located outside Singapore and could not be compelled to give evidence.

  98. [39] In respect of the second stage of the Spiliada test, the Applicant-Defendants argued that the claimants had not shown that they would be prejudiced or would suffer any substantial injustice if the matter was to be tried in the PRC courts.

  99. [40] On the following issues raised by the claimants (see [42(a)], [42(b)] and [42(e)] below), the Applicant-Defendants countered that:

  100. (a) The steps taken by the Active Defendants in OC 107 did not amount to a waiver of their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay.

  101. (b) In determining applications for a forum non conveniens stay, it was not the practice of the Singapore courts to require the applicant to identify a precise foreign court (as opposed to a foreign jurisdiction) said to be the more appropriate forum.

  102. (c) A transfer of OC 107 to the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) was not available and/or was inappropriate because the dispute in OC 107 was “quasi-matrimonial, not commercial”.

  103. [41] The Applicant-Defendants’ alternative position was that OC 107 should be stayed on case management grounds pending the final determination of the PRC Divorce Proceedings to avoid duplication of the fact-finding process and potentially conflicting decisions in both jurisdictions, and given that the PRC courts were best placed to apply their own laws to determine “the ownership of the assets of two PRC nationals … in complex matrimonial matters like these”.

  104. The claimants’ case

  105. [42] The claimants’ main arguments for opposing the grant of a forum non conveniens stay were:

  106. (a) The Active Defendants’ application for a forum non conveniens stay should be refused on the ground that they had waived any objection to the Singapore court’s exercise of jurisdiction over OC 107 by taking steps in the proceedings. Such refusal would then “definitively tilt the scales” in favour of also dismissing the Stay Applications of the remaining Applicant-Defendants (ie, D10 and D12) as it would make no sense for the claims against them to be tried separately from those against the Active Defendants.

  107. (b) At the first stage of the Spiliada test, an applicant for a forum non conveniens stay had to show (i) that there was an available alternative forum and (ii) that the alternative forum was clearly and distinctly more appropriate than Singapore. The Applicant-Defendants thus had to first identify a court in the PRC which had the jurisdiction to try the causes of action in OC 107 before the Singapore court would proceed to consider whether that PRC court was more appropriate to try the case. The Applicant-Defendants had failed to adduce evidence of an available forum to try the action between all the claimants and all the defendants in respect of all causes of action in OC 107. Where the PRC Divorce Proceedings were concerned, the Applicant-Defendants had not suggested that other parties (in addition to D2 and C4) could be joined to the same; the claims therein and in OC 107 were different in nature; and the assets to be divided therein formed only a small part of the disputed assets in OC 107.

  108. (c) The relevant connecting factors did not show that the PRC was the clearly or distinctly more appropriate forum: (i) the governing law of the claims in OC 107 was Singapore, BVI and/or Cayman law; (ii) the PRC courts did not have the experience to deal with cryptocurrency disputes; (iii) the relevant events and transactions were connected to Singapore in that the wrongful seizure of the Assets in December 2023 took place when D1, D2 and D12 were all resident in Singapore; (iv) the Applicant-Defendants had not suggested that any of their witnesses had difficulties travelling to Singapore to give evidence, and any difficulties of witnesses in travelling to Singapore could be resolved through the use of video-link evidence.

  109. (d) In particular, the claimants’ counsel, Mr Ng Jern Fei KC (“Mr Ng”), emphasised that the “beating heart” of OC 107 was a “conspiratorial scheme” to seize C4’s Assets from December 2023 onwards, which was “hatched from” and “furthered in” Singapore as the principal antagonists, viz, D1, D2 and D12, were all resident in Singapore at the time.

  110. (e) If the Singapore court considered that it was unable to properly deal with the application of various foreign laws, there was the possibility of a transfer to the SICC given that OC 107 was international and commercial in nature. The Chinese law issues raised by the Applicant-Defendants made OC 107 a “paradigm case” to be heard in the SICC as its bench included an International Judge who had served on the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC.

  111. (f) Even if it could be argued at the onset of OC 107 that there was another more appropriate forum, developments in Singapore, viz, the Active Defendants’ participation in OC 107 for close to 1.5 years and the claimants’ counsel’s build-up of considerable expertise and knowledge of the case, made Singapore “today” the natural forum for the dispute to be tried.

  112. (g) In their written submissions, the claimants also argued that the Applicant-Defendants were forum shopping to avoid the claimants’ applications for interim relief filed on 30 April 2025. However, they did not press this point in oral submissions, and Mr Ng stated that it had “fallen away” given that it was “now common ground between the parties that [they] would like the [c]ourt to first decide the [Stay Applications]”. I will therefore say no more about this argument.

  113. [43] The claimants’ main arguments for opposing the grant of a case management stay were:

  114. (a) The PRC Divorce Proceedings and OC 107 fundamentally differed in terms of claims, parties, nature of proceedings and assets in issue. It was unlikely that the court presiding over the PRC Divorce Proceedings would rule on the division of cryptocurrency assets or property located outside the PRC; it would likely suspend the division of overseas assets pending the Singapore court’s determination of the claims in OC 107. There was thus no real risk of overlapping issues and conflicting judgments.

  115. (b) The PRC Divorce Proceedings were still in progress and there was uncertainty whether a divorce would be granted.

  116. (c) The claimants would be prejudiced by a stay as OC 107 had been litigated for 1.5 years, whereas the Applicant-Defendants had not shown they would suffer prejudice if OC 107 continued.

  117. Issues to be determined

  118. [44] The key issues to be determined are:

  119. Waiver Issue

  120. The law

  121. [45] There was in substance no difference between the respective legal positions taken by Mr Ng and Mr Chia on the Waiver Issue. Both proceeded on the basis that “waiver” referred to a waiver by election, and shared the view that, in principle, a defendant could conduct himself in Singapore court proceedings in such a manner as to waive his right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay by election. Mr Chia added that whether there was such a waiver depended not just on whether the defendant had taken a “step” in the proceedings; there had to be an “unequivocal” act that made it “very clear” that the defendant had abandoned his right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay because he wanted to pursue litigation in Singapore.

  122. [46] In my view, two questions need to be addressed. First, does a defendant have a “right” to object on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in Singapore proceedings and to concomitantly apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the proceedings, which is capable of being waived? Second, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, what is the applicable test for such a waiver to be established?

  123. [47] I answer the first question in the affirmative for the reasons that follow.

  124. [48] I begin by considering the matter on principle. In this regard, it is apposite to start with the Court of Appeal’s explanation of the doctrine of waiver by election in Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 317 (“Audi Construction”) (at [54]):

  125. [49] In Audi Construction, the Court of Appeal expressed the view (albeit obiter) that, in determining an adjudication application, an adjudicator had the power under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed) (“BCISPA”) to decide matters which went towards his jurisdiction (at [45]). Correspondingly, a party had the right under the BCISPA to raise an available objection to an adjudicator’s jurisdiction by filing a payment response containing the said jurisdictional objection (at [44], [63] and [66]). This was a right “in principle capable of being elected and whose exercise [was] capable of being forborne” (at [62]); in other words, such right of objection could be waived by the party electing not to exercise it. In my reading of the decision, Audi Construction supports taking a broad view of the nature of a right that may be waived. The operation of the doctrine of waiver by election is not limited to Hohfeldian claim-rights (ie, a right that is matched by the party against whom it is held owing the corresponding legally enforceable duty: see D’Aloia v Persons Unknown [2025] 1 WLR 821 at [121]), but can extend to a party’s legal recourse or opportunity to raise an objection.

  126. [50] In the context of the present case, a defendant in Singapore proceedings may, even after submitting to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court, object on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the proceedings, and he may manifest that objection by applying for a forum non conveniens stay of the proceedings. His right to do so arises under common law (see Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR(R) 345 at [30]–[35]), is implicitly recognised under the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), and is given effect to by the ROC 2021. Specifically:

  127. (a) Order 6 r 7(4) of the ROC 2021 provides that a defendant who is challenging the jurisdiction of the court need not file and serve a defence on the merits but must file and serve a defence stating the ground on which he is challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Order 6 r 7(5)(b) provides that the challenge to jurisdiction may be for the reason that the court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the action. Order 9 r 7(2) sets out the procedure for the defendant to file and serve “the necessary application” if he is challenging the jurisdiction of the court. Together, these provisions operationalise a defendant’s right to object on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in, and to concomitantly apply for a forum non conveniens stay of, the Singapore proceedings.

  128. (b) This right is also mirrored by the power conferred on the court under the SCJA, First Schedule, para 9 to stay proceedings where “by reason of a court in Singapore not being the appropriate forum the proceedings ought not to be continued”.

  129. [51] In line with my views at [49] above, I see no reason a defendant’s right to object on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction and to apply for a forum non conveniens stay cannot be subject to the doctrine of waiver by election. In principle, the right is capable of being relinquished or abandoned by the defendant electing not to exercise the right.

  130. [52] Next, the following authorities further support this position. In Yeo Tiong Min SC, Commercial Conflict of Laws (Academy Publishing, 2023) (“Commercial Conflict of Laws”), the learned author opined that a defendant who has demonstrated an unequivocal, clear and consistent intention to have the case heard in Singapore may be found to have waived any forum non conveniens objection to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction (at para 02.054):

  131. [53] In Civelli, Carlo Giuseppe v Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel [2019] SGHC 182 (“Civelli”), the court considered an argument that the claimant, one Mr Civelli, had waived his right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the defendant’s counterclaim. The court appeared to accept that, in principle, a party could be found to have waived his right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay by virtue of the steps he had taken in the Singapore action, although the court found, on the facts of the case, that the steps taken by Mr Civelli did not amount to such a waiver (at [103]–[104]). For completeness, the defendant’s appeals against the court’s ultimate orders in Civelli (to dismiss the defendant’s application for an anti-suit injunction and allow Mr Civelli’s application for a forum non conveniens stay of the counterclaim) were dismissed by the Court of Appeal without any comment on the issue of waiver (see Mulacek, Philippe Emanuel v Civelli, Carlo Giuseppe [2020] 2 SLR 616).

  132. [54] In Wing Hak Man v Bio-Treat Technology Ltd [2009] 1 SLR(R) 446 (“Wing Hak Man”), a decision concerning a forum non conveniens stay application, Belinda Ang J (as she then was) made certain statements which, in my respectful view, suggested that a defendant could waive his right to contend that the Singapore court should decline jurisdiction in favour of another more appropriate jurisdiction by demonstrating an unequivocal, clear and consistent intention to have the dispute determined by the Singapore court (at [63]):

  133. [55] Indeed, Wing Hak Man at [63] was subsequently cited by the Court of Appeal in Reputation Administration Service Pte Ltd v Spamhaus Technology Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 342 (“Reputation Administration”) in support of the articulation of a test for waiver in connection with a stay application. In Reputation Administration, the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the appellant-defendant, which had sought a stay of the suit on the basis of an exclusive jurisdiction clause (“EJC”) in the subject contract, had waived its right to rely on the EJC. The Court of Appeal found that the appellant-defendant had waived its right to rely on the EJC (at [17]), and explained the test for waiver as follows (at [20(b)]):

  134. The Court of Appeal added that the inquiry involved a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of the particular case (at [21]). On the facts of the case, the appellant-defendant’s filing of its Defence (without any reservation) was “pivotal” in “clearly and unequivocally” demonstrating that it intended to have the dispute heard in the Singapore court as that step indicated that it wished to contest the suit within the jurisdiction (at [22(a)], [23] and [25]). While Reputation Administration concerned a stay application based on an EJC, the test for waiver was expressed with broad reference to a defendant having acted contrary to the position that the Singapore court should not exercise its jurisdiction in the action (at [20(b)]). In my view, it logically follows that a defendant who has acted in such a manner may similarly be found to have waived his right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the action.

  135. [56] Having concluded that a defendant has and may waive the right to object on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in Singapore proceedings and to concomitantly apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the proceedings, I turn to the second question of the applicable test for such a waiver to be established. This may be answered shortly. A defendant would be found to have elected not to exercise, and thus to have waived, the aforesaid right if he has taken steps demonstrating a clear, unequivocal and consistent intention to have the dispute determined by the Singapore court (Commercial Conflict of Laws at para 02.054; Wing Hak Man at [63]; Reputation Administration at [20(b)]).

  136. Whether the Active Defendants have waived their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay

  137. [57] Applying the above principles, I find that the Active Defendants have waived their right to object on natural forum grounds to the Singapore court hearing, and to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of, OC 107. The overarching basis for this conclusion is that the Active Defendants had taken steps in OC 107 which demonstrated a clear, unequivocal and consistent intention for the case to be heard in Singapore. While several of these steps pre-dated the filing of the SOC2, I do not think that the amendments made in the SOC2 fundamentally altered the nature of OC 107 such that the Active Defendants’ present purported objection to the Singapore court’s exercise of jurisdiction can be said to have been triggered only by the SOC2 amendments. I elaborate.

  138. The Active Defendants took several steps in OC 107 demonstrating a clear, unequivocal and consistent intention for the case to be heard in Singapore

  139. [58] In my judgment, the following six steps taken by the Active Defendants in OC 107, singly and even more so cumulatively, evinced a clear, unequivocal and consistent intention for the case to be heard in Singapore.

  140. (1) Filing of merits-based defences

  141. [59] First, the Active Defendants filed the Defence (Merits) on 30 May 2024 and the Defence (Merits) (Amendment No 1) on 2 August 2024, in both instances substantively and thoroughly traversing the claimants’ allegations against them in the SOC and SOC1 respectively (see [13]–[15] and [21] above). By so doing, the Active Defendants clearly indicated an intention to contest OC 107 in Singapore, in line with the Court of Appeal’s explanation in Reputation Administration of the implications of a defendant filing a (merits-based) defence (at [23]):

  142. [60] The Active Defendants relied on statements in Chan Chin Cheung v Chan Fatt Cheung [2010] 1 SLR 1192 (“Chan Chin Cheung”) (at [22]) and Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo [2011] 2 SLR 196 (“Sun Jin Engineering”) (at [17]) that the filing of a defence did not in itself disentitle a defendant from applying for a forum non conveniens stay of the action. I do not think that these general statements, when read in context with the rest of the respective decisions, assist the Active Defendants. In Chan Chin Cheung, for example, the Court of Appeal alluded to the possibility that the grounds justifying the application for a stay might only emerge some time after the defence was filed (at [24]). In Sun Jin Engineering, the Court of Appeal excused the defendant’s lateness (by a period of approximately one month and three weeks) in filing his stay application as the delay was due to his solicitors’ mistake in failing to realise that, under the Rules of Court 2014 (“ROC 2014”), the stay application had to be filed before the filing of the defence (at [43]–[45]). In my view, the germane consideration for the courts in both cases was whether a defendant could show good reasons why his filing of a defence prior to filing a forum non conveniens stay application did not signify that he had accepted that the Singapore court should exercise its jurisdiction to hear the action; where such good reasons could be shown, the pursuit of the forum non conveniens stay application might not be precluded. Thus rationalised, the cited statements in Chan Chin Cheung (at [22]) and Sun Jin Engineering (at [17]) are not inconsistent with the holding in Reputation Administration (at [23]) that the ordinary implication of a defendant filing a defence is that he accepts that the Singapore court should try the action (see [59] above).

  143. [61] It is further pertinent to note that Chan Chin Cheung and Sun Jin Engineering were decided under the previous ROC 2014 regime. Under the ROC 2014, there was no provision for a defendant to file a defence limited to challenging (the existence or exercise of) the court’s jurisdiction and not on the merits (see O 18 r 2). If the defendant failed to serve a defence within the prescribed time for service of the defence, the plaintiff was entitled to enter judgment in default of defence (see, eg, O 19 rr 2 and 3). Concurrently, if the defendant wished to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the action, he had to do so within the time limited for serving the defence (see O 12 r 7(2)). An extension of time had to be sought and granted where the application was made out of time. Where the ROC 2014 applied, it was thus not uncommon to encounter defendants who had made procedural missteps in rushing to file a defence to avoid default judgment before applying for a forum non conveniens stay. It was arguable (subject of course to the circumstances of each case) that such defendants had not actually intended to signify by their filing of a defence that the Singapore court should assume jurisdiction over the action.

  144. [62] In contrast, under the ROC 2021, a defendant seeking to challenge (the existence or exercise of) the court’s jurisdiction need only file a defence challenging jurisdiction and not a defence on the merits (see O 2 rr 5(2)–(3) and O 6 rr 7(4)–(5)). Once a defence challenging jurisdiction is filed within the prescribed time for filing a defence, the claimant is not entitled to apply for judgment in default of defence (see O 6 r 7(7)). If the defendant wishes to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of the action, the time for doing so starts to run only from the date of the case conference attended by the parties after service of the defence (see O 9 rr 7(1)–(2)). As such, a defendant intending to file a forum non conveniens stay application need not feel constrained to file a defence on the merits at all: he can simply file a defence challenging jurisdiction and will have amply reasonable time thereafter to prepare his stay application papers. Under the ROC 2021 regime, it will thus be more difficult for a defendant who files a defence on the merits to argue that he had not waived objection to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, as pointed out in Commercial Conflict of Laws (at para 02.054):

  145. [63] In the present case, the ROC 2021 applies. The Active Defendants could have filed defences limited to challenging jurisdiction but instead chose to file, twice over, merits-based defences. In these circumstances, the Active Defendants would need, but have failed, to show compelling reasons why they should not be taken to have waived objection on natural forum grounds to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in OC 107 (see also [74]–[80] below).

  146. (2) Confirmation in PCQ of no jurisdictional challenge

  147. [64] Second, on 3 June 2024, after filing the Defence (Merits), the Active Defendants filed their Pre-Case Conference Questionnaire (“PCQ”) and stated therein that they “do not intend to make any application to challenge jurisdiction”. This simply reinforced their intention, already communicated via the filing of the Defence (Merits), for the dispute in OC 107 to be determined in Singapore.

  148. (3) Requests for FNBPs of the SOC and SOC1

  149. [65] Third, on 19 June 2024 and 26 August 2024, the Active Defendants made detailed requests for further and better particulars (“FNBPs”) of the SOC and SOC1 respectively, resulting in the claimants filing 74-page and 99-page sets of FNBPs on 17 August 2024 and 28 September 2024 respectively. The requested FNBPs related to the merits of the claims in OC 107 and were only necessary if (and thus evinced that) the Active Defendants intended to litigate OC 107 in Singapore (see also Beltran, Julian Moreno v Terraform Labs Pte Ltd [2024] 4 SLR 674 (“Beltran”) at [87] and [91]).

  150. (4) Production of documents

  151. [66] Fourth, the claimants and Active Defendants exchanged their lists of documents in late September 2024 and exchanged requests for production of specific documents between December 2024 and January 2025, as part of the process for production of documents in OC 107. These steps by the Active Defendants moved OC 107 along to trial and evinced a clear intention for the action to be tried in Singapore.

  152. (5) Objections to SUM 700

  153. [67] Fifth, in early April 2025, the Active Defendants substantively contested the claimants’ application in SUM 700 filed on 14 March 2025 for permission to amend the SOC1 (see [23]–[24] above). The overarching legal premise of the Active Defendants’ objections was that “[t]he proposed amendments [would] not enable the real questions or issues in controversy between the parties to be determined as they were made in bad faith” [emphasis added]. In taking that position, the Active Defendants implicitly conveyed their expectation and intention for the issues in controversy between the parties in OC 107 to be determined in Singapore.

  154. (6) Request to apply for security for costs

  155. [72] Nor is it of import that the Active Defendants withdrew their request about a month later. By their request, they had waived objection to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. This waiver was not nullified by their subsequent withdrawal of their request because nothing materially changed from the time they made their request to the time they withdrew it (see also [74]–[80] below).

  156. (7) The composite picture

  157. [73] In sum, the above steps taken by the Active Defendants paint a composite picture showing that for about a year up to end-April 2025, the Active Defendants held and expressed a clear, unequivocal and consistent intention for the dispute in OC 107 to be tried in Singapore. The Active Defendants’ reliance on Civelli does not assist them because, contrary to the factual assessment in that case that Mr Civelli had not waived his right to a stay in the light of “the nature, quality and context of the steps taken in perspective” (at [104]), I have assessed in the present case that the steps taken by the Active Defendants in OC 107 (see [58]–[72] above) demonstrate that they had waived their right to object on natural forum grounds to the Singapore court hearing, and to apply for a forum non conveniens stay of, OC 107.

  158. The SOC2 amendments cannot account for or justify the Active Defendants’ about-face in applying for a forum non conveniens stay

  159. [74] In an about-face from the position they had hitherto taken (see [73] above), the Active Defendants then applied for a forum non conveniens stay of the proceedings in OC 107 on 16 June 2025.

  160. [75] A party’s waiver of a right requires him to be aware of the facts giving rise to the existence of the right he is said to have abandoned or elected not to exercise (Audi Construction at [54]). I therefore accept that, in theory, grounds justifying an application for a forum non conveniens stay might emerge latterly, for example, due to developments in the forum or elsewhere, such that a defendant’s prior waiver of objection to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction and of his right to apply for such a stay (as established by previous steps he took in the proceedings) might no longer be valid or applicable (see also Chan Chin Cheung at [24], referred to in [60] above).

  161. [76] In the present case, Mr Chia’s explanation for the timing of the Active Defendants’ Stay Applications can be summarised as follows: (a) the claimants added a conspiracy claim in the SOC2; (b) a key part of the conspiracy claim was that D1, D2, D12 and the Foreign Companies were “conspiring to purport that the [Assets] were beneficially owned by [D2] instead of [C4]”; and (c) it was only after seeing this pleading that “it dawned on us… that … [t]his was really a fight between a husband and wife over their matrimonial assets” and “steps need[ed] to be done to present the true nature of the claim [in OC 107]” by applying to the Singapore court for a stay. Mr Chia appeared to suggest that, therefore, only steps taken by the Active Defendants after the filing of the SOC2 on 16 April 2025 should be considered in assessing if they had waived their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay.

  162. [77] In my judgment, the SOC2 amendments to plead the claimants’ conspiracy claim cannot account for the lateness of the Active Defendants’ Stay Applications and do not nullify the Active Defendants’ waiver of their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay.

  163. [78] First and foremost, the Active Defendants’ primary reason for presently contending that Singapore is not the natural forum was already known to them from the inception of OC 107. To recapitulate, the Active Defendants’ primary argument in support of a forum non conveniens stay was that the assets in dispute in OC 107 were the matrimonial assets of D2 and C4; thus, the anterior issue of the nature and extent of C4’s ownership and right to deal with these assets had to be determined under Chinese matrimonial law prior to the determination of the claims in OC 107; and the PRC courts were best-placed to determine this anterior issue, which was also the subject of the PRC Divorce Proceedings (see [38(a)] above). In this regard:

  164. (a) It was clear from the time the SOC was filed that the claimants were asserting that C4 and not D2 beneficially owned all the Assets (see, eg, [11(a)] and [12] above). Indeed, the Active Defendants pleaded defences that D2 and not C4 was the ultimate beneficial owner of the disputed assets (see, eg, [14(a)], [14(c)], [15], [21(a)] and [21(b)] above). The issue of who, as between C4 and D2, owned the assets in dispute in OC 107 was thus already a known issue from the inception of OC 107. It was not the case that this issue became known only after the claimants added the conspiracy claim to the SOC2.

  165. (b) It was also clear to D2 from around December 2023 that divorce proceedings were contemplated. On D2’s own case, she had threatened to divorce C4 from as early as around December 2023 to early 2024 prior to OC 107 being filed, and C4 (and, a fortiori, D2) knew there would be “imminent divorce proceedings where the matrimonial assets would be liable for division under [Chinese] law”.

  166. In conjunction, these two factors indicate that, from the outset of OC 107, the Active Defendants were already equipped to argue (if they so wished) that the issue of ownership of the assets in dispute in OC 107 fell to be determined under Chinese matrimonial law such that the Singapore proceedings should be stayed in favour of the PRC courts as the more appropriate forum. Yet, they did not do so. In other words, these factors did not affect their prior choice and intention, as evinced by the steps they took in OC 107 (see [58]–[72] above), for the action to be tried in Singapore.

  167. [80] It therefore remains that the Active Defendants have waived their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay. On this basis, their applications for a forum non conveniens stay should be dismissed.

  168. Implications on the remaining Applicant-Defendants’ Stay Applications

  169. [81] The remaining Applicant-Defendants that have not waived their right to apply for a forum non conveniens stay are D10 and D12.

  170. [82] Where there is a high degree of overlap in the claims against the defendants in an action, it would not be in the interests of justice to grant a partial stay on the ground of forum non conveniens as against some but not other defendants as this would lead to the possibility of the defendants being sued separately in different jurisdictions, with the undesirable prospect of inconsistent decisions by different courts (Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd v PT Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi TBK [2016] 5 SLR 1322 at [92] and [96]).

  171. [83] In OC 107, the claims against D10 and D12 are intrinsically and inextricably linked to the claims against the Active Defendants. By way of example: (a) the conspiracy claim alleges a conspiracy between, inter alia, D1, D2 and D12 (see [23(e)] above); and (b) the Active Defendants’ defence includes assertions that D2 beneficially owned the Disputed Digital Assets which were held and/or traded under the DFG brand operated through, inter alia, D10 and D12 (see [14(a)] and [14(b)] above). Staying the claims against D10 and D12 in favour of the PRC while hearing the claims against the Active Defendants in Singapore, when all these claims are intrinsically and inextricably linked, will result in the undesirable fragmentation of litigation and prospect of inconsistent judicial decisions. On this basis, D10 and D12’s applications for a forum non conveniens stay should likewise be dismissed.

  172. [84] In the event that I am wrong in my analysis of the Waiver Issue and its implications, however, I go on to consider the FNC Stay Issue.

  173. FNC Stay Issue

  174. The law

  175. [85] The two-stage Spiliada test governs an application for a forum non conveniens stay.

  176. [86] At the first stage of the Spiliada test, the defendant bears the burden of showing that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Singapore for the trial of the action (CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 (“CIMB”) at [26]). At this stage, the court considers the connecting factors that link the dispute with the competing jurisdictions, which include: (a) the personal connections of the parties and the witnesses; (b) the connections to the relevant events and transactions; (c) the applicable law to the dispute; (d) the existence of proceedings elsewhere; and (e) the shape of the litigation, which refers to the manner in which the claim and defence have been pleaded (Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265 (“Rappo”) at [69] and [71]). The search is for the connections that have the most relevant and substantial associations with the dispute, and it is the quality (not mere quantity) of the connecting factors that is crucial in this analysis (Rappo at [70]).

  177. [87] If the court concludes at the first stage that there is a prima facie more appropriate forum, it will ordinarily grant a stay unless, under the second stage of the Spiliada test, there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nevertheless be refused (CIMB at [26]). At the second stage, the claimant bears the burden of establishing with cogent evidence that he will be denied substantial justice in the foreign prima facie natural forum (JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”) at [43]).

  178. Analysis under the first stage of the Spiliada test

  179. Availability of the alternative forum

  180. [88] Before the court can embark on a comparative assessment of the relative appropriateness of competing fora, the defendant must show that the alternative forum contended for is an “available” forum to begin with. An available foreign forum is one which would have jurisdiction over the defendant and the dispute, and which has not already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case. See Commercial Conflict of Laws at para 04.024:

  181. [89] In the Stay Applications, the Applicant-Defendants’ prayer for a forum non conveniens stay was framed as being sought “on the basis that the People’s Republic of China is the more appropriate forum to hear the present action”. Mr Ng submitted that the Applicant-Defendants “[did] not get [past] the initial hurdle of stage 1 of the Spiliada test for the simple reason that they have not been able to even pinpoint the precise Court in mainland China for which the stay is sought” [emphasis added]. Mr Chia countered that from his survey of the decisions in JIO Minerals, MAN Diesel & Turbo SE v IM Skaugen SE [2020] 1 SLR 327 (“MAN Diesel”), Rappo, Xu Xiangrong v Fu Xianwei [2025] SGHC 95 (“Xu Xiangrong”) and Fan Heli v Zhang Shujing [2016] 1 SLR 1457 (“Fan Heli”), the Singapore courts’ approach “has always been looking at the natural forum and the law of that particular jurisdiction, not of the precise Court or the jurisdiction of the precise Court or the ability of the precise Court”. An issue thus arises as to what impact the Applicant-Defendants’ omission to name a “precise” PRC court has on whether they have identified an available alternative forum for the purposes of their applications for a forum non conveniens stay. I begin by considering the authorities cited by the parties.

  182. [90] Mr Ng referred to three Hong Kong decisions in which the issue of identifying the alternative forum was canvassed. Before turning to those cases, it is useful to set the stage by considering Harain Lai Navalani v Tokai Bank Ltd [1994] 3 HKC 203 (“Harain”), a decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal which preceded the three cases to which Mr Ng referred. In Harain, the second and third defendants applied to stay the Hong Kong action in favour of “the courts of Japan” on, inter alia, the ground of forum non conveniens. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal expressed that it was “satisfied that both the courts of Japan and of Hong Kong had jurisdiction” to hear the matter (at 207) but ultimately concluded that Hong Kong was the most convenient forum and refused to stay the action in favour of Japan (at 208). Of significance, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal neither held nor suggested that the applicant-defendants had to specify which particular court in Japan they were contending was the more appropriate forum.

  183. [91] The approach in Hong Kong, as seen in Harain, appears to have first taken a turn in the unreported decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Greenwood Limited v Pearl River Container Transportation Limited (25 May 1994, CA) (HK) (“Greenwood”), the first case to which Mr Ng referred. In Greenwood, the first defendant applied for the Hong Kong proceedings to be stayed in favour of the PRC courts on the ground of forum non conveniens. The application was dismissed in the first instance by a deputy judge who stated, inter alia, that while it may have been more convenient for the witnesses to attend proceedings in Guangzhou than Hong Kong, he was not satisfied that Guangzhou in the PRC was the more appropriate forum. On appeal, the dismissal of the first defendant’s stay application was upheld.

  184. [92] In a passage emphasised by Mr Ng, Nazareth JA (as he then was) held:

  185. [93] The other two members of the court expressed similar views. Litton JA (as he then was) stated:

  186. [94] Power VP (as he then was) stated:

  187. [95] Unfortunately, it is not apparent from the decision what circumstances of and questions raised by the case had required the first defendant to identify the alternative foreign court with greater particularity than pointing to the PRC courts or Guangzhou courts. There is no indication in the decision that the concern was over determining whether the alternative foreign court would have jurisdiction over the case. The only specific consideration cited (by Nazareth JA) was that the connecting factors pertaining to “distance and communications between Guangzhou and Hong Kong, and the language of the witnesses and the court” meant that the identity of the alternative forum “assumed special significance” (see [92] above). However, to begin with, these factors, while relevant to the appropriateness of the alternative forum, do not appear to bear on the availability of the alternative forum. Further, on the issue of appropriateness, it is unclear why the identification of the Guangzhou courts generally as the alternative forum would not suffice for a comparative assessment of the relative appropriateness of the Hong Kong and Guangzhou courts in respect of connecting factors such as the location of and language spoken by the witnesses; it is unnecessary to identify a “precise” court in Guangzhou in order to determine whether a given witness has to travel farther to reach, or is able to communicate more effectively in, Guangzhou than Hong Kong (or vice versa). I would thus hesitate to place reliance on Greenwood as an authority for the proposition contended for by Mr Ng that a defendant applying for a forum non conveniens stay must name a “precise” foreign court as the alternative forum.

  188. [96] The second case Mr Ng referred to was Rambas Marketing Co LLC v Chow Kam Fai David [2001] 3 HKC 250 (“Rambas”), a decision of the Hong Kong Court of First Instance. Rambas involved an application for a forum non conveniens stay in favour of the courts of Nevada. The court observed (at 253B–D):

  189. [97] However, the court only stated that it was “advisable” to identify “the court or tribunal” in favour of which the stay was sought, without elaborating on what this entailed. Notably, there was no suggestion in Rambas that the defendant had to identify more particularly a “precise” court within the courts of Nevada as the alternative forum. Instead, the analysis in Rambas under the first stage of the Spiliada test proceeded on the basis of whether the courts of Nevada were more appropriate than the Hong Kong courts (at 255A).

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