General Division of the High Court · Decided 19 June 2026
Singapore was not the right court for the claim; the US court was more appropriate
Twitter Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Media Matters for America
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 134 · Case no. Originating Claim No 556 of 2024 (Registrar’s Appeal No 213 of 2025)
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Singapore was not the right court for the claim; the US court was more appropriate
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [196], [212]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] HC/OC 556 of 2024 (“OC 556”) is an action by the Appellant, Twitter Asia Pacific Pte Ltd, a Singapore-incorporated subsidiary of X Corp. (“X Corp”), against the Respondent, Media Matters for America, for defamation and malicious falsehood. Both X Corp and Media Matters are based in the United States (“US”).
- [2]
[2] The Appellant’s claims arise from an article published on the Respondent’s website which alleged that the X platform, a social media platform owned and operated by X Corp, had been placing advertisements for reputable companies like Apple and IBM alongside pro-Nazi content. The Respondent’s article, and the response by X Corp Chairman, Mr Elon Musk (“Mr Musk”), attracted widespread media attention. In addition to OC 556 in Singapore, X Corp has commenced proceedings against the Respondent in the US (specifically, in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division (the “Texas Court”)). Another X Corp subsidiary has also started litigation against the Respondent in Ireland. All three suits arise from the same article.
- [3]
[3] In HC/SUM 3344/2024 (“SUM 3344”), the learned Assistant Registrar (“AR”) granted the Respondent’s application to set aside the order granting the Appellant permission to serve the claim outside of Singapore. This is the Appellant’s appeal against the AR’s decision.
Facts
The parties
- [5]
[5] The Appellant is a Singapore-incorporated company and a subsidiary of X Corp, a corporation currently based in Nevada. X Corp owns and operates the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter). The Appellant and X Corp are part of the X group of companies (“X Group”), which also include X Corp’s subsidiaries in other jurisdictions such as Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Appellant is the representative of the X Group in the Asia-Pacific region and the legal entity through which the X Group contracts with advertising clients in the region to place advertisements on the X platform.
- [6]
[6] The Respondent is a web-based, not-for-profit organisation incorporated in the District of Columbia and based in Washington, D.C., where it maintains its sole physical office. The Respondent is a research and information centre dedicated to comprehensively monitoring, analysing, and correcting misinformation in the US media.
The Article
- [7]
[7] On 16 November 2023, the Respondent published an article on its website (the “Webpage”) titled: “As Musk endorses antisemitic conspiracy theory, X has been placing ads for Apple, Bravo, IBM, Oracle and Xfinity next to pro-Nazi content” (the “Article”). The Article’s by-line read: “CEO Linda Yaccarino previously claimed that brands are ‘protected from the risk of being next to’ toxic posts”. The Article was written by Mr Eric Hananoki (“Mr Hananoki”), a Senior Investigative Reporter employed by the Respondent.
- [8]
[8] For completeness and ease of reference, I set out the text of the Article in full, with the alleged defamatory statements marked in bold:
- [9]
[9] On the same day and shortly after the publication of the Article, Mr Hananoki posted a hyperlink to the Article on his public personal page on the X platform (the “X Post”). In the X Post, Mr Hananoki also repeated portions of the Article by stating the following:
Proceedings in other jurisdictions
- [10]
[10] I have noted that apart from OC 556, other X Group entities have also commenced proceedings against the Respondent, Mr Hananoki and their associated parties in other jurisdictions. I set out the details of these proceedings, insofar as they are relevant for present purposes, below.
Proceedings in Texas
- [11]
[11] On 20 November 2023, X Corp commenced proceedings against the Respondent and Mr Hananoki in the Texas Court for tortious interference with contract, business disparagement and interference with prospective economic advantage (the “Texas Proceedings”). Mr Angelo Carusone, the Respondent’s President and CEO, was subsequently added as a defendant (I refer to the Respondent, Mr Hananoki and Mr Carusone collectively as the “Media Matters Parties”).
- [12]
[12] On 6 March 2025, the Media Matters Parties filed a motion to transfer the Texas Proceedings to the Northern District of California on the basis of a mandatory forum-selection clause in X Corp’s “X Terms of Service” in favour of “federal or state courts located in San Francisco County, California, United States”, but this motion was denied on 2 May 2025. On 20 May 2025, the Media Matters Parties filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appealing against the denial of the motion to transfer. This appeal was granted in part, and a limited remand was issued for the Texas Court to conduct a more complete venue analysis.
- [13]
[13] On 16 September 2025, the Texas Court again denied the transfer motion and ordered that the trial in the Texas Proceedings be scheduled to commence on 26 October 2026.
- [14]
[14] Pursuant to the Texas Court’s Revised Scheduling Order dated 23 April 2026, fact discovery is now to be completed by 6 November 2026 and the trial is scheduled to commence on 29 March 2027. More than 60 rounds of documents have been produced in the Texas Proceedings thus far, comprising more than 400,000 documents. As at 28 May 2026, X Corp has taken one deposition, the Media Matters Parties have taken five depositions, and two further depositions are expected to take place. All of the witnesses to be deposed are located in the US.
Proceedings in California
- [15]
[15] On 10 March 2025, the Media Matters Parties filed their complaint against X Corp, Twitter International Unlimited Co. (an X Group entity incorporated in Ireland) and the Appellant (collectively, the “X Parties”) in a federal court sitting in California (the “California Court”), seeking, among others, an injunction to stop the X Parties from prosecuting proceedings in Singapore and Ireland, and to stop X Corp (whether directly or through its subsidiaries) from prosecuting or initiating litigation against the Respondent in jurisdictions outside of the US (the “California Proceedings”).
- [16]
[16] On 10 April 2025, the California Court partially granted the Media Matters Parties’ application for a preliminary injunction against the X Parties. The X Parties filed an appeal against this ruling on 14 April 2025 to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. After a number of interlocutory motions, the preliminary injunction was vacated and the case was remanded to the California Court for further proceedings.
- [17]
[17] On 12 March 2026, the parties to the California Proceedings came to an agreement and filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal which stated that “[the Media Matters Parties] hereby dismiss their claims in the [California Proceedings] against the [X Parties] with prejudice. […] This dismissal is without prejudice to [the Media Matters Parties] seeking relief for any future lawsuits filed by X. Corp. and/or related entities against Media Matters for America and/or its employees.”
- [18]
[18] As a result of the Media Matters Parties’ decision not to proceed with the California Proceedings, they are no longer relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis (at [173]–[200] below).
Proceedings in Ireland
- [19]
[19] On 6 December 2023, Twitter International Unlimited Co. (now known as X Internet Unlimited Co.), an X Group entity incorporated in Ireland, commenced proceedings against the Respondent in the Irish High Court (“Irish Court”) for defamation and malicious falsehood (the “Irish Proceedings”).
- [20]
[20] On 7 May 2025, following an agreement between the Respondent and X Internet Unlimited Co. to adjourn the Irish Proceedings in light of the preliminary injunction granted by the California Court, the Irish Court granted the Respondent’s application to adjourn the Irish Proceedings indefinitely, with liberty to either party to re-enter on one week’s notice. Parties indicated at the hearings on 1 April 2026 and 25 May 2026 that the Irish Proceedings have recommenced but are currently “at the jurisdictional stage”.
Procedural history
- [21]
[21] As numerous interlocutory applications have been filed in this action, I do not intend to canvas the entire procedural history of the matter in detail. I will instead focus on the key milestones in the case.
- [22]
[22] The Appellant filed its Originating Claim in OC 556 on 23 July 2024. As the Respondent is incorporated in the District of Columbia, the Appellant applied on 25 July 2024 for permission of court to serve the cause papers on the Respondent in HC/SUM 2084/2024. This was granted on 26 July 2024, and the Appellant confirmed that service was effected on 27 August 2024 (Washington time) or 28 August 2024 (Singapore time).
- [23]
[23] The Respondent filed its Notice of Intention to Contest on 17 September 2024, and its Defence to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the action on 2 October 2024, on the grounds that the Appellant had not satisfied the requirements under O 8 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), and that Singapore is forum non conveniens.
- [24]
[24] On 15 November 2024, the Respondent filed SUM 3344. Pursuant to various applications, numerous rounds of factual affidavits were filed along with expert affidavits on US law.
- [25]
[25] SUM 3344 was heard by the AR below on 14 April 2025 and 9 May 2025. Further affidavits were exchanged between parties after these hearings to update the court on the status of the parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions. The AR rendered his decision on 24 October 2025, and the Appellant filed the present appeal on 7 November 2025.
- [26]
[26] Both parties then indicated that they wished to file additional affidavits. The Appellant’s further affidavit was to clarify a factual discrepancy that had arisen at the hearing before the AR, while the Respondent’s further affidavit was to update the court on the developments in the Texas Proceedings. I heard and allowed HC/SUM 137/2026 (“SUM 137”) and HC/SUM 135/2026, being their respective applications to file further affidavits in these proceedings, on 20 January 2026.
- [27]
[27] The appeal came up for hearing before me on 1 April 2026 and 25 May 2026. In the interim, further affidavits were filed with permission by the Appellant (to address a discrepancy in the Appellant’s invoices that was uncovered in the course of submissions on 1 April 2026) and the Respondent (to update the Court on the latest developments in the Texas Proceedings).
AR’s decision below
- [28]
[28] In his decision on 24 October 2025, the AR allowed the Respondent’s application to set aside permission for service out of Singapore for the following reasons:
(a) the Appellant had shown a good arguable case of sufficient nexus to Singapore under paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (“Practice Directions”) for both its claims in defamation and malicious falsehood, and under paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the Practice Directions for the claim in defamation only;
(b) there was a serious issue to be tried as to the publication of the Offending Statements in Singapore, the falsity of the Offending Statements and whether they were made with malice, but not as to whether the Offending Statements referred to the Appellant; and
(c) Singapore was, in any case, forum non conveniens.
- [29]
[29] On [28(a)] above, the AR considered that the Appellant had furnished sufficient direct evidence as to the publication of the Offending Statements in Singapore. Mr Foo Sie Seng Winston (“Mr Foo”), a director of the Appellant, had stated on affidavit that at least 183 users based in Singapore had clicked on the Webpage from the X platform to access the Article 54 times, and at least 7,455 users based in Singapore had interacted with Mr Hananoki’s X Post. As for damage suffered in Singapore, the AR found that evidence of this was required for the claim in malicious falsehood but not for defamation, as reputational damage is presumed from publication. The AR concluded that the Appellant had failed to prove special damage in Singapore as there was no evidence that its invoices were not paid or that it had lost any advertising revenue on account of the Article.
- [30]
[30] On [28(b)] above, the AR accepted that there was a serious question to be tried on the merits as to whether the Offending Statements were false and/or maliciously made. However, he found no reference to the Appellant in the Article. The Offending Statements referred specifically to the placing of advertisements on the X Platform next to objectionable content (ie, deciding the actual location of the advertisements to the user). On the Appellant’s own case, it had no role in making such decisions. There was therefore a lack of overlap between the Appellant’s activities and the mode of business or activities referred to in the Article.
- [31]
[31] On [28(c)] above, after considering the relevant connecting factors, the AR concluded that, in light of the pending proceedings in the US and the substantial overlap in the issues to be determined, Singapore was forum non conveniens as the relevant US court(s) were more appropriate to try the Appellant’s claims.
Parties’ cases on appeal
- [32]
[32] The Appellant sought to affirm the AR’s findings that there is a good arguable case that the Offending Statements had been published in Singapore, that the Appellant had suffered damage to its reputation in Singapore (for the defamation claim), and that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether the Offending Statements were falsely and maliciously made and defamatory of the Appellant. However, the Appellant argued that the AR had erred in finding that: (a) the Offending Statements did not refer to the Appellant; (b) the Appellant had failed to show that special damage was suffered in Singapore for the tort of malicious falsehood; and (c) Singapore was forum non conveniens.
- [33]
[33] The Respondent contended that the AR’s decision should be affirmed for four key reasons: (a) there was no publication and/or republication of the Offending Statements in Singapore; (b) the Appellant did not suffer damage in Singapore; (c) the Offending Statements did not refer to the Appellant; and (d) Singapore was forum non conveniens.
Issues to be determined
- [34]
[34] The issues to be determined in this appeal are therefore:
- [35]
[35] Before turning to the substantive issues in this appeal, I deal with a preliminary point of law on the approach to determine if a claimant has shown a good arguable case that its claims have a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
Preliminary issue: Approach to show good arguable case of sufficient nexus to Singapore
- [36]
[36] In civil cases where a defendant is not located in Singapore, this court has jurisdiction to hear the matter if the defendant is served with the originating claim in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by ROC 2021: s 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969.
- [37]
[37] Under O 8 r 1(2) of ROC 2021, a claimant seeking approval to serve an originating process out of Singapore must demonstrate why the Singapore court has jurisdiction or is the appropriate court to hear the action. Paragraph 63(2) of the Practice Directions states that for the purpose of showing why the Singapore court is the appropriate court to hear the action, the claimant must show that: (a) there is a good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore; (b) Singapore is the forum conveniens; and (c) there is a serious question to be tried on the merits of the claim.
- [38]
[38] Paragraph 63(3) of the Practice Directions further provides that a claimant may, for the purposes of demonstrating a sufficient nexus to Singapore, refer to a list of non-exhaustive factors, including that the claim is: (a) founded on a tort, wherever committed, which is constituted, at least in part, by an act or omission occurring in Singapore (paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the Practice Directions); or (b) wholly or partly founded on, or is for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring (paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the Practice Directions). These were the specific factors that the Appellant relied on.
- [39]
[39] The Appellant’s case was that: (a) paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) was established as publication is an element of its claims in both defamation and malicious falsehood, and the Offending Statements were published in Singapore; and (b) paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) was made out as the Appellant had suffered damage to its reputation in Singapore (as a result of publication in Singapore) and also special damage in Singapore (as the Appellant’s clients had withdrawn their advertising campaigns on the X platform as a result of the Offending Statements).
- [40]
[40] The AR below proceeded on the basis that the Appellant only needed to make out a good arguable case that the specific factors listed in the Practice Directions (ie, publication or damage) were established, and the rest of the elements of its claims could be made out based on the lower standard of a serious question to be tried. In my opinion, the AR fell into error here.
- [41]
[41] I start by laying out the difference between the two tests. A “good arguable case” requires more than a prima facie case or a prospect of success. Although it does not require the claimant to make out its claim to the standard of a balance of probabilities given the limits inherent in the stage at which the application is being heard, the claimant must have “the better of the argument, on the evidence before the court” [emphasis in original]: Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (“Vinmar Overseas”) at [45]. In contrast, a “serious question to be tried” is a lower standard of proof than a “good arguable case”: Shen Sophie v Xia Wei Ping [2023] 3 SLR 1092 (“Shen Sophie”) at [99]. A serious question to be tried can be established as long as the court is satisfied that the proposed claim is not clearly unsustainable: Wang Aifeng v Sunmax Global Capital Fund 1 Pte Ltd [2023] 3 SLR 1604 at [40].
- [42]
[42] The legal position based on the authorities pre-dating ROC 2021 was that if a claimant sought leave to serve out of jurisdiction under Order 11 of the Rules of Court 2014 based on a jurisdictional gateway that engaged the merits of the claim (such as the factors relied on by the Appellant in this case), the claimant had to satisfy the court of the existence of its cause of action to the standard of a “good arguable case”. In other words, the claimant had to make out a good arguable case that all the necessary elements of his pleaded cause of action were established, not just the specific factor it was relying on as a jurisdictional gateway.
- [43]
[43] This was made clear by the Court of Appeal in Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156 (“Bradley Lomas”) at [19]:
- [44]
[44] As the Court of Appeal in Bradley Lomas noted, if a claimant successfully established the existence of a viable cause of action by proving all the necessary elements of its claim to the higher threshold of a “good arguable case”, there would then be no need for the court to go into the question of whether the claimant had also established a serious question to be tried on the merits of its claims.
- [45]
[45] In my view, the same approach would have applied to O 11 r 1(f)(ii) of the Rules of Court 2014, the predecessor to paragraph 63(3)(f)(ii) of the Practice Directions. This limb also engaged the merits of the claim as it required the claimant to show that the damage suffered in Singapore was caused by a tortious act or omission: IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] SGHC 123 at [38]. Although the focus of this limb was on the damage suffered by the claimant, the requirement that the damage must have been caused by a “tortious act or omission” necessarily hinged on a tort having been committed in the first place, and this would require an examination of the merits of the claim.
- [46]
[46] While the ROC 2021 has since revised and simplified the rules on service outside of Singapore, there is nothing to suggest that the amendments were intended to change this fundamental approach, which continues to make good sense as a matter of principle and policy. The ultimate focus of O 8 r 1 of ROC 2021 remains to ensure that service out of Singapore is only allowed where a claimant has established that the Singapore court is the appropriate court to hear the action. The need to establish a nexus with Singapore serves to prevent the unwarranted extension of the jurisdiction of this court beyond the territorial limits of the country: Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 (“Review Publishing (HC)”) at [23].
- [47]
[47] I am aware that a claimant no longer needs to show that its claims fall under at least one of the enumerated jurisdictional gateways, as the inquiry under O 8 r 1 is now a broader and more flexible one. I also accept that the present jurisdictional gateways are now found in the Practice Directions instead of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, I do not find that this changes the underlying principles. A claimant who relies on a tortious cause of action founded on an act or omission occurring in Singapore, or damage suffered in Singapore that is caused by a tortious act or omission, to make out a sufficient nexus to Singapore must logically also establish the existence of its tortious cause of action to the same standard of proof. If there is no good arguable case that there is a viable cause of action in tort to begin with, then the jurisdictional gateways relied on by the claimant are simply not established. There would consequently be no reason for the Singapore court to even consider exercising its jurisdiction to hear the action.
- [48]
[48] Although the parties’ submissions adopted the same approach as that taken by the AR below, counsel readily accepted that this was erroneous in light of the authorities above. It follows from this that for the Appellant to establish that its claims in defamation and malicious falsehood each had a sufficient nexus to Singapore because of publication or damage in Singapore, the Appellant had to establish all the elements of its causes of action in defamation and malicious falsehood to the level of a “good arguable case”.
- [49]
[49] To make out a viable claim in defamation, the Appellant had to show a good arguable case that: (a) the statement was defamatory in nature, in that it lowered the Appellant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, caused the Appellant to be shunned or avoided, or exposed the Appellant to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (b) the defamatory statement referred to the Appellant; and (c) the statement was published: Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 751 at [35]–[36]; Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 752 at [106].
- [50]
[50] To establish a case in malicious falsehood, the Appellant had to show a good arguable case that: (a) the Respondent published to third parties words which are false; (b) the words referred to the Appellant, its property or its business; (c) the words were published maliciously; and (d) special damage followed as a direct and natural result of the publication: Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2014] 1 SLR 639 (“Low Tuck Kwong”) at [64] and [102]; WBG Network (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Meridian Life International Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 727 (“WBG Network”) at [68].
- [51]
[51] I now turn to consider each of the substantive issues arising in this appeal.
Issue (a): Whether the Offending Statements were defamatory in nature, false and made with malice
- [52]
[52] To establish the existence of its pleaded causes of action, the Appellant had to make out a good arguable case that the Offending Statements were defamatory in nature (for its claim in defamation), and that they were false and maliciously made (for its claim in malicious falsehood). The AR below had found that the Appellant had successfully established these elements to the standard of a “serious question to be tried”.
Parties’ cases
- [53]
[53] The Appellant argued that despite the error in the standard of proof, the AR had correctly held that the Offending Statements could not be characterised as mere “neutral observations” because they carried the following pleaded meanings:
(a) That the Appellant intentionally placed its major clients’ advertisements next to antisemitic and/or racist content on the X platform: (i) in support of Mr Musk’s alleged “descent into white nationalist and antisemitic conspiracy theories”, and/or (ii) to exploit the antisemitic and/or racist content for the Appellant’s own financial gain, and/or (iii) to boost and/or promote the reach of the antisemitic and/or racist content;
(b) That the Appellant recklessly or negligently placed its major clients’ advertisements next to antisemitic and/or racist content on the X platform;
(c) That the Appellant does not have adequate content moderation controls in place, which resulted in its major clients’ advertisements appearing next to antisemitic and/or racist content on the X platform;
(d) That the Appellant endorses and/or encourages antisemitic and/or racist content; and/or
(e) That the Appellant is indifferent towards antisemitic and racist ideology.
These statements were not only defamatory but also false and malicious, as Mr Hananoki had deliberately engineered the appearance of these advertisements next to the objectionable content through an elaborate scheme designed to “game” the X platform’s algorithm and bypass its content controls, all whilst giving the impression that the Article’s findings represented the authentic experience of an average user of the X platform.
- [54]
[54] The Respondent’s counsel did not seriously press this point before me, save to refer me to her written submissions filed in the court below. The Respondent’s position before the AR was that the Offending Statements were simply observations of fact which the Appellant did not dispute, ie, that Mr Hananoki did find advertisements for major corporations next to extremist content. According to the Respondent, the Article did not go on to speculate that the placement of the advertisements next to such content was intentional, nor did it suggest that the Respondent or Mr Hananoki had “organically discovered” these advertisements.
Analysis and decision
- [55]
[55] While I have earlier found that the AR fell into error in assessing these elements (which went to the existence of the Appellant’s causes of action in defamation and malicious falsehood) to the lower standard of a “serious question to be tried”, the AR’s conclusions on the merits of these issues cannot be faulted. Even when tested to the requisite standard of a “good arguable case”, I agree with the Appellant that there is a good arguable case that: (a) the Offending Statements bore at least one or more of the pleaded defamatory meanings; and (b) they were falsely and maliciously made.
- [56]
[56] I pause to note that the applicable law is another preliminary question which must be answered before determining whether the Appellant has made out a good arguable case.
- [57]
[57] Although Singapore law may not be the lex loci delicti for both claims in defamation and malicious falsehood (a point I discuss in greater detail below), the Appellant must satisfy the double actionability rule for its tortious claims to be actionable in Singapore: Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw Investments”) at [53]. In other words, regardless of where the place of the torts may be, the Appellant must establish that the alleged wrongs are actionable under Singapore law as the law of the forum (subject to a flexible exception). Parties also approached the merits of the claims before me on the basis of Singapore law principles. I thus deal with parties’ arguments based on Singapore law below, notwithstanding that they may or may not make out a good arguable case under a foreign lex loci delicti.
Claim in defamation
- [58]
[58] In determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words for a potential claim in defamation, the court will decide what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words is not confined to their literal or strict meaning, but includes inferences or implications that the ordinary reasonable person might draw from those words in light of his or her general knowledge, common sense and experience: Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing (CA)”) at [27]–[31]. Importantly, the words are not to be read in isolation but must be construed in the context of the Article as a whole: Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 465 at [53]–[54].
- [59]
[59] The most relevant extracts from the Respondent’s Article are reproduced again here:
- [60]
[60] In my view, the Respondent could not seriously contend that the Offending Statements, read in context, amounted to nothing more than neutral, factual observations.
- [61]
[61] The title of the Article drew a deliberate association between the placement of the advertisements next to pro-Nazi content, and Mr Musk’s alleged endorsement of antisemitic conspiracy theory. This link was also directly made by Offending Statement 1, which read: “As X owner Elon Musk continues his descent into white nationalist and antisemitic conspiracy theories, his social medial platform has been placing ads for major brands like Apple, Bravo (NBCUniversal), IBM, Oracle, and Xfinity (Comcast) next to content that touts Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party.” [emphases added in bold, italics and underline]
- [62]
[62] These were not two seemingly unconnected observations. I accept that the Offending Statement did not directly assert that Mr Musk had caused the X platform to present the advertisements next to the objectionable material to support his own political views. Nevertheless, insinuation may be as defamatory as an explicit statement and even more mischievous: Gatley on Libel and Slander (Richard Parkes KC & Godwin Busuttil joint eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th Ed, 2022) (“Gatley”) at para 3-018. Presented in this manner, the ordinary reasonable reader would inevitably draw the inference that the placement of the advertisements next to such content by Mr Musk’s social media platform was intentional and designed to further his alleged extremist views.
- [63]
[63] The Respondent’s contention that the Article never speculated that the placement of the advertisements next to such content was intentional is clearly untenable. The plain and literal meaning of the word “placing” is “[t]o determine or fix the place of; to assign a place to”: “place (v.), sense 3.a” in Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2026). This connotes deliberate, as opposed to accidental, action. Coupled with the reference to Mr Musk’s alleged endorsement of antisemitic theory and the reference to the X platform as “his social media platform”, the unmistakeable inference that the ordinary reasonable reader will draw is that the placement of the advertisements in this manner was by design and influenced by the views of Mr Musk, who owned the X platform. If the Appellant was implicated in such conduct by the Article (an issue I will address later), these statements would, by any measure, have injured the Appellant’s reputation by lowering it in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally: see Gatley at para 2-012.
- [64]
[64] Offending Statement 2, read on its own, could be characterised as a more factual statement, in that it simply stated: “We recently found ads for Apple, Bravo, Oracle, Xfinity, and IBM next to posts that tout Hitler and his Nazi Party on X.” Insofar as this was a statement that the screenshots featured in the Article were authentic (in the sense that they were not doctored images), the Appellant did not dispute this.
- [65]
[65] However, I agree with the Appellant that the use of the word “found”, read in the context of the Article as a whole (including Offending Statement 1), would lead an ordinary reasonable reader to understand the statement not simply as a factual observation that the Respondent had seen these advertisements next to the objectionable content, but also a clear implication that the Respondent had just happened to come across the advertisements presented in this manner. This is reinforced by the preceding paragraph, which states that “[d]uring all of this Musk-induced chaos, corporate advertisements have also been appearing on pro-Hitler, Holocaust denial, white nationalist, pro-violence, and neo-Nazi accounts” [emphases added]. Put simply, the impression conveyed to an ordinary reasonable reader would be that the Respondent did not play any role in orchestrating the placement of these advertisements, as the words used suggested that their appearance reflected the authentic experience of an average user of the X platform. This would have been understood as evidence to support the Article’s central thesis: that Mr Musk had influenced the X Group to intentionally place advertisements by major brands next to pro-Nazi content on the X platform, as part of his own political agenda.
- [66]
[66] It is also significant that Ms Linda Yaccarino’s (“Ms Yaccarino”) statement that “brands are ‘protected from the risk of being next to toxic posts’ on the platform” appeared no less than three times in the same Article. By repeatedly juxtaposing the title of the Article and the Offending Statements against the remarks by Ms Yaccarino, X Corp’s then-CEO, I agree with the Appellant that an ordinary reasonable reader would also have taken the Respondent’s words as suggesting that, contrary to Ms Yaccarino’s assurances, the X Platform’s content moderation controls were either inadequate or intentionally allowing such advertisement placements as a result of Mr Musk’s views.
Claim in malicious falsehood
- [67]
[67] Insofar as the Appellant’s claim in malicious falsehood was concerned, the Appellant had to establish a good arguable case that the statements were both false and maliciously made. In support of this, the Appellant pleaded that in order to manipulate the placement of the advertisements in the manner presented in the Article, the Respondent’s employees (including but not limited to Mr Hananoki) had set up and utilised a separate account (an “Alternate Account”) which exclusively followed a subset of X platform users falling into two categories: (a) those known to produce extreme, fringe content; and (b) the X Group’s major advertising clients. To ensure that only a limited type of content would be featured in the Alternate Account’s feed, the Alternate Account only followed 30 X users (as opposed to the average number of accounts followed by a typical active X user, which was 219 X users). According to the Appellant, the Respondent also repeatedly scrolled and refreshed the selected feed on the Alternate Account to generate 13 to 15 times more advertisements per hour than those viewed by an average X platform user. In this way, the Respondent managed to bypass the X platform’s content moderation mechanism and “game” the algorithm into generating the placement of the advertisements next to extremist content, which it then reported as news.
- [68]
[68] Importantly, the Respondent did not dispute these assertions before me. While I accept that these proceedings are only at an interlocutory stage, if these claims are established at trial, the Respondent would have engaged in an elaborate campaign to present a contrived user experience (which it had deliberately orchestrated) as an authentic one, with the express purpose of calling into question the legitimacy of the X platform as a viable advertising avenue for mainstream companies. The Respondent would have done so knowing that the imputations in its Article were false, and that they would lead advertisers to pull out of the X platform. The latter point was made clear in the Respondent’s Article itself, which repeatedly juxtaposed the sting of the Offending Statements against Ms Yaccarino’s comments that brands were “protected”, and which the Respondent itself observed were made to “bring advertisers back to the platform by claiming it’s safe for business”.
- [69]
[69] It bears noting that malice, in the context of the tort of malicious falsehood, may be made out even if the maker of the statement honestly believed in its truth, if the statement was published “for the purpose of doing harm” and it transpired that the statement was false: Wilts United Dairies v Thomas Robinson Sons and Company Ltd [1957] RPC 220 at 237. In my view, the Appellant has made out a good arguable case that the Offending Statements were false and maliciously made in a calculated attempt to cause pecuniary loss to the X Group.
Issue (b): Whether the Offending Statements referred to the Appellant or the Appellant’s business
- [70]
[70] I next address the issue of whether the Appellant has made out a good arguable case that the Offending Statements referred to the Appellant (for defamation) and/or its business (for malicious falsehood).
- [71]
[71] It is axiomatic that for a claim in defamation to succeed, the words complained of should be published “of the plaintiff”: Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 at 120 (“Knupffer”). There is no cause of action unless the words refer to and reflect on the claimant: Gatley at para 8-001. As for a claim for malicious falsehood, a claimant must be able to show that the words which are false “refer to the claimant or his property or his business”: WBG Network at [68(b)].
- [72]
[72] This was, to my mind, a threshold issue. If the Appellant failed to establish the necessary reference, it could have no claim whether in defamation or malicious falsehood, and it would have failed to make out a good arguable case that it had any tortious claim, let alone one with a sufficient nexus to Singapore. There would then be no need for the court to even consider whether the elements of publication or damage in Singapore were made out.
Parties’ cases
- [73]
[73] Although the Article did not specifically identify the Appellant, it referred to advertisements placed on “X”, which was described as “[Mr Musk’s] social media platform”. The Appellant argued that a reasonable reader (and in particular, an advertiser which had historically contracted with the Appellant) would have understood the Article and the Offending Statements as referring to the X platform and the Appellant, which was the client-facing entity of the X Group in the region and the company which advertisers dealt with to put their advertisements on the X platform. Further, the Offending Statements attacked the quality of the X platform and its content moderation controls. By impugning the manner in which the X platform conducted its advertising business, objective reasonable readers (including the Appellant’s advertising clients) would understand the allegations being made about the X platform as being directed against the Appellant as well.
- [74]
[74] The Respondent countered that there could be no reference to the Appellant given that the Article only implicated the placement of the advertisements on the X platform, in the sense of deciding on the actual location where the advertisements appeared to X users (I use the terms “placing” and “placement” of advertisements in this specific sense in the rest of this Judgment). As the Appellant conceded that it did not play any role in the placement of advertisements as its business was simply to sell advertising space on the X platform, the ordinary reasonable reader would not have ascribed anything to the Appellant from the Offending Statements. The Appellant’s clients would also have been aware that the Appellant played no role in the placement of advertisements on the X platform. As there was no overlap between the business activity that is implicated and the Appellant’s actual business activity, the words could not be understood as referring to the Appellant.
Analysis and decision
- [75]
[75] Where a claimant is not named in the offending material, the court considers whether an objective, reasonable reader, being aware of the relevant circumstances and any special facts, would reasonably understand the claimant to be referred to by the offending words: Review Publishing (CA) at [49]. The test is whether the words are such as would reasonably lead persons “acquainted with” the claimant to believe that he or she was the person referred to: Knupffer at 121; Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1245–1246. In other words, the court imputes to the hypothetical reader some degree of knowledge about the claimant which need not be found in the offending material: Dyson Technology Ltd v Channel Four Television Corp [2023] 4 WLR 67 (“Dyson Technology”) at [37].
References to corporate groups
- [76]
[76] At the outset, it is important to emphasise that it was not the Appellant’s case that the necessary reference was made out simply because the Respondent’s Article was directed at the X Group, and the Appellant was one of the entities in the X Group. This must be correct.
- [77]
[77] The fact that a corporate group may be identifiable in a statement does not necessarily mean that every entity in a group is necessarily implicated. Where a publication relates to a business with a complex corporate structure, care should be taken to bring the claim in the name of a company which (a) would be identified by reasonable readers as the subject of the allegations; and (b) is apt to suffer damage to its own trading reputation as a result of the publication: Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co, Ltd v Goh Teck Beng [2016] 4 SLR 977 (“Qingdao Bohai”) at [58], citing Brian Neill et al, Duncan and Neill on Defamation (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 10.02.
- [78]
[78] In assessing whether the necessary reference to the specific claimant is made out, much will depend on the substance of the allegations, the context in which they were made, how the entities in the group operated and, importantly, what persons acquainted with the group entities would have known and how they would have understood the statements: see for eg, Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136 (“Palace Films”) at [18]–[24]; Craftsman Homes Australia Pty Limited v TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited [2003] NSWSC 124 at [26]–[31]; Elite Model Management Corp British Broadcasting Corp [2001] All ER (D) 334 (“Elite Model”) at [9]–[20].
The hypothetical reasonable reader
- [79]
[79] The Appellant’s case was that an objective, reasonable reader (in particular, an advertiser) would have understood the Offending Statements as referring to the Appellant and its business for two reasons: first, because this advertiser would have historically contracted with the Appellant to purchase advertising space on the X platform; and second, because the statements impugned the manner in which the X platform conducted its advertising business, and advertising on the X platform was the Appellant’s entire business enterprise.
- [80]
[80] The AR below found that the Appellant had failed to establish the necessary reference because the Appellant’s own case was that it did not play any role in the operation of the X platform. Hence, the Appellant could not have had anything to do with the placement of the advertisements next to antisemitic content.
- [81]
[81] With respect, I take the view that the AR fell into error here as he appeared to have ascribed perfect knowledge to the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader. While the extensive evidence placed before the court today makes clear that the Appellant in fact plays no role in operating the X platform, there is insufficient evidence before me to suggest that an objective, reasonable advertiser who was acquainted with the Appellant and who may have previously contracted with the Appellant would have had this level of knowledge of the Appellant’s role vis-à-vis the operation of the X platform at the time of publication.
- [82]
[82] The reasonable reader may be acquainted with the claimant and its business, but that does not assume that those persons who read the words know all the circumstances or the full details about the claimant: David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 at 238 (cited in Gatley at para 8-002); Dyson Technology at [47]. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to ascribe to the hypothetical reasonable reader a complete and perfect understanding of how the Appellant’s business operates, especially with the benefit of hindsight.
- [83]
[83] The Respondent pointed out that the Appellant’s own Master Services Agreement with its clients at Clause 1 incorporates the separate “terms and conditions, if any, of the Programs in which [the clients] participate”. In particular, “TWITTER ADS PROGRAM T&Cs” at paragraph 2 states:
- [84]
[84] However, the fact that a reasonable advertiser may have been put on notice that the Appellant may not own or operate the X platform is different from saying that a reasonable advertiser knew or must have known that the Appellant had nothing to do with operating the X platform. The clause is a disclaimer rather than a conclusive statement of fact.
- [85]
[85] In my view, a reasonable advertiser reading the Article and the Offending Statements would know that the Appellant was affiliated to the X Group and responsible for selling advertising space on the X platform. Given that the Offending Statements directly impugned the placement of advertisements on the X platform and the Appellant’s core business was precisely to sell advertising on the X platform, a reasonable advertiser – even one with knowledge of the clause above – could reasonably understand the Respondent’s Article to be referring to the Appellant and its business.
- [86]
[86] I agree with the Appellant that the cases of Bawang International (Group) Holding Ltd v Next Magazine Publishing Ltd [2016] HKEC 1145 (“Bawang International”) and Sin Heak Hin Pte Ltd v Yuasa Battery Singapore Co Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR(R) 123 (“Sin Heak Hin”) are instructive.
- [87]
[87] In Bawang International, two plaintiffs claimed for defamation and malicious falsehood against the defendant publisher in respect of an article published in the defendant’s magazine about the presence of a carcinogenic substance known as 1,4-dioxane in the plaintiffs’ shampoos. The first plaintiff, which was the ultimate holding company of the BaWang Group of companies, was named in the defendant’s article. However, the second plaintiff, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the first plaintiff, was not. The Hong Kong High Court nevertheless found that there was sufficient reference to the second plaintiff as a reasonable reader should have understood that the BaWang businesses in Hong Kong and mainland China were actually operated through subsidiaries, and the defendant’s attack on the quality of BaWang’s shampoo products would have led reasonable readers to understand the allegations as being directed not only against the holding company (the first plaintiff) but also the other subsidiaries in the group which were responsible for the manufacturing and marketing of BaWang shampoo products in Hong Kong (which included the second plaintiff): Bawang International at [72]).
- [88]
[88] In Sin Heak Hin, the two plaintiffs were in the business of dealing with automotive batteries and other motor vehicle accessories. The defendant was the Singapore-incorporated subsidiary of Yuasa Battery Co Ltd of Japan and carried on business as a manufacturer and supplier of automotive batteries bearing the name “Yuasa Pafecta” under licence from Yuasa Japan. After receiving information that Yuasa batteries manufactured in China were going to be imported and sold in Singapore, the defendant issued a circular to all its dealers stating that Yuasa Japan did not have a manufacturing facility in China and any “Yuasa” brand batteries in the Singapore market which purported to be manufactured in China were imitations. The batteries imported by the plaintiffs were in fact parallel imports, so the statement of inauthenticity was untrue. The plaintiffs successfully sued the defendant for defamation. Although the circular did not specifically identify the first plaintiff as the importer of the alleged imitations (Sin Heak Hin at [26]), Prakash J (as she then was) held that it was apparent from the evidence that dealers in the Singapore battery market were aware that both plaintiffs were in the process of importing Yuasa brand batteries from China for sale in Singapore. Accordingly, the natural and ordinary meaning of the defendant’s circular was that the Yuasa brand batteries imported by both plaintiffs were imitations and that the importers of those batteries (whom the recipients of the circular would have identified as the plaintiffs) were wrongfully holding them out to the Singaporean public as being authentic: Sin Heak Hin at [28].
- [89]
[89] These cases lend support to my conclusion that the necessary reference to the Appellant and its business was made in the Article. The Article would have been understood by a reasonable reader as an attack on the X platform’s advertising practices. Just as the hypothetical reasonable reader in Bawang International would have known that the business of the BaWang group was operated through subsidiaries and interpreted an attack on the quality of the group’s products as an attack on the subsidiaries involved in the manufacturing and marketing of the product, a reasonable advertiser reading the Article would similarly have known that the X platform (which was the “product” in question) was operated by a large corporate group and understood the Respondent’s attack on the X platform’s advertising practices as an attack on the X Group entities involved in advertising on the X platform. Further, just as the dealers in Sin Heak Hin would have been aware that the statements in the circular referred to the plaintiffs because they were aware that the plaintiffs were importing the Yuasa batteries into Singapore, the Appellant’s advertising clients would have read the Article as referring to the Appellant and its business, as they would have been aware that the Appellant was in charge of selling advertising on the X platform.
- [90]
[90] The AR found that these authorities did not assist the Appellant because unlike the claimants in those cases, there was no overlap between the business activity implicated in the Respondent’s Article and the Appellant’s business activity. This was because, according to the AR, the business activity impugned in the Respondent’s Article was the placement of advertisements next to antisemitic content, but the Appellant’s business activity was only about selling advertising space without any role in deciding on the placement of the advertisements.
- [91]
[91] In my assessment, the AR took an unnecessarily narrow view of what “business activity” entailed in this context. I accept that the Respondent’s Article and the Offending Statements specifically attacked the placement of advertisements on the X platform, and that the Appellant had no control in deciding the precise location of its clients’ advertisements on the platform. But the entire thrust of the Article and the Offending Statements was to call into question the legitimacy and viability of advertising on the X platform.
- [92]
[92] This was not a case in which the claimant’s business activity had absolutely no connection, or only a peripheral connection, to the allegations being made: cf, Palace Films, where the claimant company was completely uninvolved in the film distribution business discussed in the allegedly defamatory articles; and Craftsman Homes, where the subject matter of the offending programme was about poor building work and the first plaintiff was a franchisor that did no building work. On the contrary, from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable advertiser who was acquainted with the Appellant, the X platform was the central (and indeed sole) product of the Appellant, and advertising on the X platform was the core business of the Appellant. In the circumstances, it would be entirely reasonable for the ordinary reasonable advertiser to interpret the Offending Statements as implicating the Appellant and its business as well.
Unduly narrow analysis should be avoided
- [93]
[93] I would add that the UK Court of Appeal in Dyson Technology also explicitly cautioned against taking an unduly narrow analysis in the context of large, international corporate groups. Dyson Technology concerned defamation proceedings brought by Sir James Dyson, Dyson Technology Ltd and Dyson Ltd against the broadcasters of a news report which alleged abuse and exploitation of employees at a Malaysian factory run by a company called ATA, where Dyson appliances were manufactured. At first instance, the court had found as a preliminary issue that the broadcast did not refer to Dyson Technology Ltd and Dyson Ltd as they (unlike Sir James Dyson) were not specifically named in the report, and there was no evidence that they were responsible for oversight of the contractual relationship with ATA.
- [94]
[94] In overturning the judge’s decision on appeal, the UK Court of Appeal made the following points at [53]–[56]:
- [95]
[95] Similarly in the present case, while the Offending Statements were specifically about the placement of advertisements next to extremist content on the X platform, the overall theme of the Article was to attack the viability of advertising on the X platform. A hypothetical reasonable reader acquainted with the Appellant would not undertake such an “unduly refined analysis” as to consider that the Appellant was only implicated if it was in fact the entity specifically responsible for the placement of advertisements on the X platform.
- [96]
[96] I accept that there was other material in the report in Dyson Technology which also pointed to Dyson Technology Ltd and Dyson Ltd. Nevertheless, the case serves as authority for the proposition that an unduly narrow perspective should not be taken when one considers whether the necessary reference to a claimant is made out.
- [97]
[97] The court took a similarly broad approach in Elite Model, which concerned a television programme that alleged that young models managed by Elite Model Management Milano S.r.l. (“Elite Milan”) were being exploited by Elite Milan’s senior executives. The three claimants in the libel case were the Elite modelling agencies based in New York and London as well as a Swiss-based company within the Elite group which was responsible for organising the Elite Model Look modelling contest worldwide.
- [98]
[98] In finding that there was an arguable case that the programme contained a reference to the claimants even though it focused entirely on the conduct of senior executives in Elite Milan, Eady J noted that the New York and London agencies could potentially be “mother agencies” identifiable to some viewers as having failed to protect the models for whom they are partially responsible while in Milan (Elite Model at [18]). As for the Swiss-based company that was responsible for the modelling contest, while it was not involved in model management per se, the court found it possible that some viewers would have inferred that it was responsible for some of the alleged failures to ensure the safety and security of the contestants (Elite Model at [26]). Thus, a claimant could maintain a libel action even in circumstances where it was not involved in the exact same business activity that was directly impugned but a related one.
- [99]
[99] I deal finally with the case of Sikhs for Justice v Lord Raminder Singh Ranger [2025] EWHC 2210 (KB) (“Sikhs for Justice”), which the Respondent cited ostensibly for the principle that where an allegedly defamatory article only referred to the parent company (ie, X Corp in this case) and not its subsidiary (ie, the Appellant), the reasonable reader would understand the article to refer only to the parent company. However, a careful reading of the judgment makes clear that it does not stand for any such proposition.
- [100]
[100] The offending material in that case was an article published in the Pakistan Daily in which the defendant questioned the faith and funding sources of the group Sikhs for Justice, which was described as “a US-based secessionist group” (which I will refer to as “SFJ US”). The article also discussed a referendum campaign for the establishment of an independent homeland for the Sikhs of India, which was organised by the United Kingdom branch of SFJ US (referred to as “SFJ UK”), although SFJ UK was never identified or otherwise referred to in the article.
- [101]
[101] While it is true that Mr Justice Jay found that SFJ UK could not maintain its claim in defamation, this was not because SFJ UK was not identified in the article while SFJ US was. Rather, it was because the court found that it was “not possible without straining language beyond its permissible bounds to conclude that the article is referring to more than one entity”: Sikhs for Justice at [29]. For SFJ UK to succeed in its claim, it had to establish that the article was only referring to SFJ UK, but that was clearly untenable having regard to the language of the article and the relevant context. In other words, the court’s finding in Sikhs for Justice was based entirely on the construction of the article as being capable of referring only to a single entity, which in that context could only be SFJ US.
- [102]
[102] That is entirely distinguishable from the present case. The Article did not make any allegations against any specific entity in the X Group or even identify any particular company in the X Group. Instead, the Article denounced how advertising was presented on the X platform, which would necessarily have implicated those entities in the X Group which were responsible for, or involved in, advertising on the X platform.
Issue (c): Whether the Offending Statements were published in Singapore
- [103]
[103] This was one of the specific factors the Appellant relied on to demonstrate that its claims had a sufficient nexus to Singapore. As noted earlier, paragraph 63(3)(f)(i) of the Practice Directions provides that one of the ways in which the requisite nexus can be made out is if the claim is founded on a tort, wherever committed, which is constituted, at least in part, by an act or omission occurring in Singapore. As publication is a crucial element of a claim in both defamation and malicious falsehood, establishing a good arguable case of publication of the Offending Statements in Singapore would allow the Appellant to demonstrate that its claims had a sufficient nexus to Singapore.
- [104]
[104] It is well-established that publication is a bilateral act with two components: (a) the act of making the material available to a third party in a comprehensible form (the “first component”); and (b) the receipt of that information by a third party in such a way that it is understood (the “second component”): Qingdao Bohai at [35]. For material that is published on the Internet, the mere act of uploading or posting the material on a website alone is insufficient to establish publication as that only relates to the first component of publication but not the second. The critical component of publication for a claim in defamation is the second component, as defamation protects a person’s reputation and that can only be damaged when the material was communicated to a third party, ie, accessed and downloaded in a comprehensible form: Qingdao Bohai at [38]–[41].
Parties’ cases
- [105]
[105] In this case, the Appellant relied on both direct and indirect evidence to make out the second component of publication in Singapore. Insofar as direct evidence was concerned, the Appellant’s director, Mr Foo, had stated the following in his affidavit filed in support of the Appellant’s application for permission to serve the claim outside of Singapore:
- [106]
[106] No supporting evidence (such as the underlying user data or a report from the X Group) was adduced to support this assertion, nor did Mr Foo provide any further details to explain how he had arrived at this conclusion.
- [107]
[107] At the hearing before the AR below, the Respondent pointed to a discrepancy in the figures: if, according to Mr Foo, at least 183 Singapore users had clicked on the webpage, why was the Article only accessed 54 times? The Appellant clarified in Mr Foo’s subsequent affidavit that, “based on the X Group’s review of its user data”, a hyperlink to the Respondent’s webpage containing the Article “had appeared on the X Platform interface at least 183 times to users in Singapore”, and at least 54 users in Singapore clicked on the hyperlink to access the webpage. This was the full extent of the Appellant’s direct evidence of publication in Singapore.
- [108]
[108] Alternatively, the Appellant invited me to draw an inference of publication in Singapore from the following facts:
(a) Various local news outlets such as The Straits Times, Business Times, Channel News Asia and Today Online had published news articles about the Respondent’s Article and Mr Musk’s response. Some employees of these Singapore news outlets would have downloaded and accessed the Article in order to publish these articles.
(b) An email dated 16 November 2023 from EightBar Collective, an advertising agency representing IBM, contained a hyperlink to the Article. Some EightBar Collective employees would have downloaded and accessed the Article in Singapore before writing that email.
- [109]
[109] The Respondent contended that there was insufficient evidence to make out publication in Singapore, and the only evidence of publication was in the US. With regard to Mr Foo’s evidence that at least 54 users in Singapore had accessed the Article, this was a bare assertion that was unsupported by any evidence or explanation as to how this information was derived. Furthermore, the fact that users based in Singapore may have interacted with Mr Hananoki’s X Post (which contained a hyperlink to the Article) did not necessarily mean that they must have accessed and downloaded the Article linked in the post. Mr Foo’s affidavit did not even explain what an “interaction” meant and how the X Group had derived this data.
- [110]
[110] The facts relied on by the Appellant were also insufficient for the court to infer publication in Singapore as:
(a) All the articles featured by the Singapore news outlets were syndicated, ie, they were not written by reporters from The Straits Times, Business Times, Channel News Asia or Today Online. There was therefore no basis for the court to infer that some employees of these local news outlets would have downloaded and accessed the Article in Singapore in order to publish these articles.
(b) The email from EightBar Collective containing the hyperlink to the Article was sent by its New York office. The Appellant could point to no other evidence to suggest that the Article must have been downloaded and accessed by some EightBar Collective employees in Singapore.
- [111]
[111] The Respondent also raised a new argument before me on appeal. Relying on the “separate tort thesis”, which posits that each publication of offending material amounts to a separate cause of action, the Respondent argued that even if the Appellant had made out a good arguable case of publication to 54 users in Singapore, the Appellant could not rely on publication to these 54 anonymous users to ground its claim for special damages of US$26,650,938 (the amount of revenue loss the Appellant claimed it suffered as a result of the pause in advertising by Apple and IBM). Taking a novel formulation of the “separate tort thesis”, the Respondent suggested at the appeal hearing that the Appellant needed to make out a good arguable case that the Article was published to Apple and IBM before it could make out its claim for such damages.
Analysis and decision
Separate tort thesis and publication to third parties
- [112]
[112] I first address the Respondent’s contention that the Appellant had to show evidence of publication to Apple and IBM to “ground” its claim for special damages.
- [113]
[113] To my mind, this represented a misconception of the “separate tort thesis” as it conflated the separate elements of publication and damage. While the “separate tort thesis” provides that each publication is a separate cause of action, and there is authority for the proposition that this applies to both claims for defamation and malicious falsehood (Maag, Daniel v Lalit Kumar Modi [2025] 3 SLR 1093 (“Daniel Maag”) at [72]), it does not follow from this that a claimant must establish publication to specific third parties before it can mount a claim for special damages. The element of publication for both causes of action only requires that the offending material be published to third parties. The cause of action is complete once this is made out and the other elements of the torts (see [49]–[50] above) are satisfied. Whether a claimant can claim any special damages it has pleaded depends on whether it is able to successfully prove that these damages flowed as a direct and natural result of the publication: Low Tuck Kwong at [108]. This is a separate inquiry and is not necessarily dependent on the publication having been made specifically to those parties who were responsible in one way or another for the losses that were claimed as special damages.
Evidence of publication in Singapore
- [114]
[114] Having said that, I agree with the Respondent that the Appellant’s case fell short of establishing a good arguable case of publication in Singapore.
- [115]
[115] While a good arguable case does not require a claimant to make out its case on the balance of probabilities, the claimant must do more than establish a prima facie case; it must have the better of the argument: Vinmar Overseas at [45]. The fact that a court hearing an application for leave will not attempt to try disputes of fact on affidavit does not mean that a claimant can simply rely on bare assertions to be made good later, as it still bears the burden of proof at the inter partes stage: Shen Sophie at [83]. Indeed, a claimant who relies on bare assertions to make out its case on a disputed issue of fact runs the risk that, having regard to the surrounding facts and evidence, a court may find that its evidence is so incomplete or lacking that it does not in fact have the better of the argument. That was exactly the case for the Appellant here.
(1) Direct evidence of publication
- [116]
[116] Dealing first with Mr Foo’s direct evidence that the X Group’s review of its user data showed that 54 users in Singapore clicked on the hyperlink in the X Post to access the Article in the six-month period following its publication, I agree with the Respondent that the AR erred in accepting this as sufficient evidence of publication in Singapore.
- [117]
[117] As I have noted earlier, Mr Foo’s first affidavit dealing with this issue was vague and somewhat misleading. His initial evidence suggested that the X Group’s data indicated that the Article was published to at least 183 users in Singapore since he stated unequivocally that “at least 183 users based in Singapore […] had clicked on the Webpage” [emphasis added]. Confronted with the inconsistency between this number and his statement that the Article was accessed 54 times, Mr Foo then had to explain in his further affidavit that what he meant was that the hyperlink appeared to at least 183 times to users in Singapore.
- [118]
[118] It is self-evident that this clarification substantially changed the complexion of his evidence on this point. The appearance of a hyperlink to a particular number of users does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the same number of users must have clicked on the hyperlink to access the Article. Just as there is no presumption that Internet material that is made available to users in Singapore has been published in Singapore (Qingdao Bohai at [136]–[137]), this court cannot presume, from the “appearance” of a hyperlink, that someone must have clicked on the hyperlink to access the material. Mr Foo’s first affidavit had elided the first and second components of publication.
- [119]
[119] Leaving aside this discrepancy, there are other fundamental concerns with Mr Foo’s evidence on publication in Singapore. Nowhere in his affidavits did Mr Foo make any effort to explain the source of the user data he had relied on (beyond simply stating that it was from the X Group), how this data was derived, his own role in the Appellant and his technical competencies, and the steps he took to verify that this data was accurate. It was not even clear whether Mr Foo had reviewed and verified the raw data such that his evidence was based on his personal knowledge, or whether he had simply accepted the findings presented to him by an unidentified entity in the X Group as being true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. All of this would be highly relevant for the court to decide whether his evidence was sufficient to discharge the Appellant’s burden of showing a “good arguable case”. Despite the fact that Mr Foo was given the opportunity to adduce further evidence on appeal to clarify his evidence on the X Group’s review of its user data in SUM 137, he did not address these important gaps.
- [120]
[120] My concerns were compounded by the complete lack of documentary evidence or other material to support Mr Foo’s assertions. Mr Foo’s evidence on this point amounted to nothing more than a bare assertion. Counsel for the Appellant argued that it would be unreasonable to require the Appellant to adduce third party evidence at the leave stage, the implication being that this court should consider any such supporting material “third party evidence” as it would have to come from some other entity in the X Group.
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