General Division of the High Court · Decided 21 January 2026
Employment contracts carry a duty of trust; its breach here led to nominal damages
Prashant Mudgal v SAP Asia Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 15 · Case no. Originating Claim No 83 of 2023
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Employment contracts carry a duty of trust; its breach here led to nominal damages
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [2], [288]
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Official text from eLitigation
- [2]
[2] Previously described as a “Trojan horse” because of its supposed potential to retroactively import a wide range of obligations into employment contracts, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence has spawned a corpus of authorities which have, at times, signalled a measure of ambivalence about its existence. That is far from saying, however, that the writing is on the wall. As such, much ink in this judgment will be expended on dealing with the question of whether the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exists in employment contracts under Singapore law. I ultimately answer that question in the affirmative and find that the defendant has breached this implied term. I now proceed to explain how I have arrived at this determination.
Facts
The parties and dramatis personae
- [3]
[3] The claimant is Mr Prashant Mudgal.
- [4]
[4] The defendant is SAP Asia Pte Ltd, a Singapore-incorporated company which is a subsidiary of SAP SE. SAP SE is a German multinational software company that develops enterprise applications to manage business operations.
- [5]
[5] Prior to his employment with the defendant, the claimant was employed by another subsidiary of SAP SE since October 2012. He was then employed by the defendant as a “Solution Sales Engagement Manager Expert” on 11 August 2015 and the final day of his employment was on 31 December 2019. He last held the position of “Head of Services Sales” for the Ariba line of business in the Asia Pacific and Japan (“APJ”) region. The Ariba line of business concerns a cloud-based management software that helps purchasers and suppliers manage their procurement processes.
- [6]
[6] The cast of characters within the defendant or the larger SAP SE Group who are central to this case include the following individuals – Ms Otsakchon Raman (“Ms Raman”), Ms Charmaine Seabury (“Ms Seabury”), Mr Baber Farooq (“Mr Farooq”), Ms Adele Teo-Gomez (“Ms Teo-Gomez”) and Ms Valerie Blatt (“Ms Blatt”).
- [7]
[7] Ms Raman was, at the material time, the “Head of Services Delivery” for the Ariba line of business for the APJ and Greater China (“GCN”) regions.
- [8]
[8] When a customer purchases an Ariba software licence, the defendant is able to provide the customer with certain services in order to help the customer implement and integrate the software into its workflow. The services sales team, which the claimant headed, is responsible for selling those services to customers who have purchased the defendant’s Ariba software. After a customer buys those services, the services delivery team, which was headed by Ms Raman, is responsible for providing those services to the customer. As such, Ms Raman and the claimant had to work closely with each other as the heads of the services delivery and services sales teams respectively.
- [9]
[9] It will become apparent below that the strained relationship between the claimant and Ms Raman, as well as some members of their respective teams, was the catalyst for the events that led to the conduct of the defendant which the claimant complains of and the termination of the claimant’s employment.
- [10]
[10] As for the other individuals in the ensemble cast, it bears noting that, at the time of the events leading up to the termination of the claimant’s employment, only Ms Seabury and Ms Blatt were in the direct reporting line of the claimant and/or Ms Raman. While Mr Farooq and Ms Teo-Gomez were not, they were nonetheless involved in the material events which transpired.
- [11]
[11] Mr Farooq was the “General Manager of the Customer Value Organisation” for the Ariba line of business in the APJ and GCN regions. In that role, he was responsible for customer satisfaction, adoption and contract renewals and hence worked closely with the services sales and services delivery teams. The claimant reported to Mr Farooq from March 2017 to January 2018, before there was a re-organisation in SAP SE’s business.
- [12]
[12] After the re-organisation, the claimant reported to Ms Seabury. Ms Seabury was the “Global Vice President of Services Sales” for the Ariba line of business. She was the person who informed the claimant that his employment would be terminated.
- [13]
[13] Ms Seabury and Ms Raman, in turn, reported to Ms Blatt. Ms Blatt was the “Global Vice President of Services” for the Ariba line of business. In that capacity, she had oversight of both the services sales and services delivery teams headed by the claimant and Ms Raman respectively. It was also in that role that she approved the termination of the claimant’s employment with the defendant.
- [14]
[14] Ms Teo-Gomez was the “Human Resources Business Partner” in charge of the APJ region. In that capacity, she was aware of the events leading up to the termination of the claimant’s employment.
- [15]
[15] It is worth highlighting that, while Ms Raman, Ms Blatt, Mr Farooq and Ms Teo-Gomez all made an appearance in this trial, Ms Seabury was absent. Ms Seabury was originally listed by the defendant as an intended witness, but was later substituted by Ms Blatt (who was not originally in the defendant’s intended list of witnesses).
Background to the dispute
- [16]
[16] The events leading up to the termination of the claimant’s employment centre around two incidents, the “Wipro Incident” and the “Sesa Goa Incident”.
The Wipro Incident
- [17]
[17] In June 2018, a decision was made to transfer one Mr Girish Kumar Saripalli (“Mr Saripalli”) from the services delivery team headed by Ms Raman to the services sales team headed by the claimant. This was because a member of the services sales team, Mr Sudeep Gupta (“Mr Gupta”), was “at capacity workwise”. However, although Mr Saripalli was “formally transferred” to the services sales team and placed under the headcount which the claimant was responsible for in July 2018, his onboarding was deferred because the services delivery team was unable to source for a suitable replacement for him. In fact, as it so happened, Mr Saripalli never ended up working in the services sales team.
- [18]
[18] At the time that Mr Saripalli was “formally transferred” to the services sales team, he was working on a project for Wipro Limited (“Wipro”) in India. Before a suitable replacement for him was found, Mr Saripalli informed Wipro that he would be leaving the project. It is a point of dispute as to whether Wipro was upset because Mr Saripalli was leaving or because there was no suitable replacement for him, although I have doubts about whether such a distinction can be meaningfully drawn. The bottom line is that Wipro did not take kindly to the news that Mr Saripalli was leaving.
- [19]
[19] On the back of this, Ms Raman sent an e-mail on 11 July 2018 to certain key personnel involved in the Indian market, including the claimant, Mr Gupta, and Mr Nanda Kalyan (“Mr Kalyan”), the head of the services delivery team in India, in which she stated:
- [20]
[20] This sparked a series of e-mail exchanges between Ms Raman and Mr Gupta, in which Mr Gupta stated that the services sales team had “clearly called out the customer expectation a long time ago”. That exchange ended with Ms Raman telling Mr Gupta that they “need[ed] to move on from an ‘us’ and ‘you’ mindset” and that she was “done with this email trail and [would] not be responding further”. She also told Mr Gupta to “call should [he] need to discuss further”.
- [21]
[21] On 12 July 2018, a day after Ms Raman ended her e-mail exchange with Mr Gupta, the claimant responded to Ms Raman privately (without Mr Gupta and the rest of the personnel who were originally copied in the preceding e-mail chain), stating as follows:
- [22]
[22] When Ms Raman replied asking the claimant if he was able to talk to her, the claimant replied:
- [23]
[23] I will refer to the e-mails quoted in [21] and [22] above collectively as the “12 July 2018 E-mails”.
- [24]
[24] In a follow-up e-mail, Ms Raman denied that she had a personal vendetta against Mr Gupta and once again reached out to the claimant to “chat”. She then proceeded to forward the preceding e-mail chain to Ms Blatt, her direct superior (and the claimant’s superior as well), saying that she “may need some advice working with/managing [the claimant]”. Ms Blatt’s response was: “Yes. Wow. We need to do something here.”
- [25]
[25] According to Ms Blatt, after reviewing the e-mail exchange, she found the claimant’s response to be “unnecessarily aggressive and divisive”, as the claimant had “adopted an abrasive, finger-pointing approach” instead of focusing on resolving the issue of finding a suitable replacement for Mr Saripalli. She was of the view that such behaviour fell below what was expected of the claimant as a senior regional leader and accordingly asked Ms Seabury, the claimant’s direct superior, to coach the claimant to be more professional in his dealings with others.
- [26]
[26] It is not clear exactly what sort of “coaching” Ms Seabury provided to the claimant in the following months, as there is no documentary evidence of such coaching on the record. However, on 27 September 2018, the claimant forwarded the e-mail chain containing the 12 July 2018 E-mails to Ms Seabury in order to “provide context on the ‘incompetence’ of the Services Delivery team to address staffing and other issues which ‘were not yet resolved’” [emphasis in original omitted]. The claimant also said the following:
- [27]
[27] It would not be long, however, before tensions flared up between the claimant and members of the services delivery team once again.
The Sesa Goa Incident
- [28]
[28] In an incident concerning another customer in India, Sesa Goa Iron Ore (“Sesa Goa”), it was discovered that Mr Gupta had “unilaterally reduced” the delivery timeline for the scope of work for a project proposal from 11 months to eight months. Essentially, discussions between the services sales and services delivery teams for the Sesa Goa project were proceeding on the basis that the timeline for delivering the project would be 11 months. However, on 13 October 2018, Mr Gupta submitted a quote containing a reduced timeline of eight months to Ms Raman, without highlighting the change. Ms Raman, believing that there were no changes to the delivery timeline from the previously discussed 11-month timeline, approved the quote “in good faith” (ie, without opening the quote document containing the proposed delivery timeline) on 15 October 2018.
- [29]
[29] A second quote with “minor modifications”, but no changes to the eight-month delivery timeline in the first quote, was submitted by Mr Gupta on 28 October 2018. It was only after this second quote was submitted that the services delivery team became aware of the change in the delivery timeline from 11 months to eight months. As it was made clear to the services delivery team that a delivery timeline of eight months was “the ask of the customer [ie, Sesa Goa] before signing the contract”, and that a commitment to such a delivery timeline was already made known to Sesa Goa, Ms Raman “agreed to leave [the delivery timeline] as it [was]” and accordingly approved the second quote on 30 October 2018.
- [30]
[30] On that very same day, Mr Jasper Chong (“Mr Chong”), the “regional Head of Transformation and Adoption for Services Delivery in the APJ and GCN regions” (ie, a member of the services delivery team), organised a call with the claimant and Mr Gupta, amongst others, to “resolve the issue”. After the call, Mr Chong sent the claimant an e-mail and carbon copied Ms Raman. In that e-mail, Mr Chong purported to reiterate the discussion which took place during the call regarding Mr Gupta’s improper conduct:
- [31]
[31] It is a subject of dispute as to whether the points which Mr Chong purported to reiterate in his e-mail were an accurate summary of the discussion during the call. Nevertheless, it suffices for present purposes to say that the claimant was clearly unhappy about the contents of Mr Chong’s e-mail, particularly his comments on Mr Gupta’s conduct. It was at this moment that tensions reached a crescendo.
- [32]
[32] The claimant replied to Mr Chong (the “31 October 2018 E-mail”), carbon-copying Ms Raman as well as Mr Samrat Pattnaik, the “Customer Engagement Manager” and “Customer Value Organisation lead” in India, Mr Farooq, and Mr Rupesh Bhayana, “Head of Digital Technology Services” for APJ. In the 31 October 2018 E-mail, the claimant sought to “defend” Mr Gupta, and also addressed Ms Raman directly:
- [33]
[33] Ms Raman replied, saying that Mr Chong was “calling out his observations based on the discussion [the claimant, Mr Chong, Mr Gupta, and others] had”. She also told the claimant not to “muddy this discussion by [his] personal opinions about [her]”, and added that they could “discuss this in a forum that is more appropriate”.
- [34]
[34] Ms Raman later forwarded the e-mail chain containing the 31 October 2018 E-mail, and her response, to Ms Blatt, stating:
- [35]
[35] Ms Blatt responded, saying, “Ok. I need to intervene here; I think.” She also forwarded the e-mail chain to Mr Farooq, telling him that she was “not sure of all the small details” but that the claimant’s e-mail (ie, the 31 October 2018 E-mail) was “way out of line”. Mr Farooq agreed that it was “completely out of line” and added that he had spoken to the claimant about it.
- [36]
[36] Slightly less than two weeks later, on 13 November 2018, Ms Seabury reached out to the claimant to “discuss the breakdown in relations between [Mr Gupta] and [the services delivery team] in India”. She also told the claimant that, based on the e-mails she had been sent, “this [had] gone a lot further in public debate [than] it ever should have done” and that she had “received a formal request from mgmt. for this to be dealt with [once] and for all”. The claimant told Ms Seabury that “this [was] a pointless distraction” as there were “much bigger issues” that needed to be addressed, and that he was “confident that [Mr Gupta] [would] come out shining in this”.
- [37]
[37] Ms Seabury, however, highlighted the severity of the issue to the claimant and told him to apologise to Ms Raman:
- [38]
[38] On or around 14 November 2018, the claimant sent an e-mail to Ms Seabury, in which he stated, amongst other things:
- [39]
[39] On that same day, Ms Seabury also reached out to Mr Farooq to “talk about [the claimant] and the last email exchanges regarding [Mr Gupta] and his comments about [Ms Raman]”.
The Compliance Complaint
- [40]
[40] On 20 November 2018, Mr Chong sent an e-mail to Ms Seabury, carbon-copying Ms Raman, to lodge a formal complaint against Mr Gupta for his alleged misconduct with regards to his handling of the delivery timelines for the Sesa Goa project (the “Compliance Complaint”). The alleged incidents of misconduct in the Compliance Complaint were as follows:
- [41]
[41] The claimant was interviewed as part of the investigations into Mr Gupta’s conduct by the Corporate Audit department (the “CA department”), since he was Mr Gupta’s team leader. Ms Teo-Gomez, who was generally copied on the correspondence relating to the Compliance Complaint and aware of the investigative process, initially suggested that the investigators look into the claimant’s actions as well since it was not clear if the claimant was involved in the reduction of the delivery timeline for the Sesa Goa project. However, the claimant was ultimately not investigated.
- [42]
[42] As it turned out, the CA department did not make any finding of non-compliance against Mr Gupta, concluding instead that there was a disconnect between the services sales and services delivery teams.
Escalation of the claimant’s conduct to Ms Teo-Gomez and the events leading to the Performance Improvement Plan (the “PIP”)
- [43]
[43] On 20 November 2018, the same day that the Compliance Complaint was lodged, Ms Seabury sent an e-mail to Ms Teo-Gomez, attaching various e-mail exchanges involving the claimant, including the e-mail chains containing the 12 July 2018 and 31 October 2018 E-mails (which pertained to the Wipro Incident and the Sesa Goa Incident respectively). She expressed her dissatisfaction with the claimant’s conduct in the e-mail exchanges and elsewhere, including his refusal to apologise to Ms Raman for the 31 October 2018 E-mail. She also intimated her view that the claimant “[could not] continue in his role”:
- [44]
[44] Ms Seabury also sent another e-mail to Ms Teo-Gomez on the same day, stating:
- [45]
[45] While Ms Teo-Gomez agreed that some of the claimant’s e-mails “do create tension/friction; undermines a leader and doesn’t reflect well of expected leadership [behaviours]”, she asked for evidence of coaching or feedback which had been provided to the claimant and suggested that a “final written warning” be provided instead of removing the claimant.
- [46]
[46] Over the course of the next month or so, Ms Teo-Gomez, along with other personnel from the Employee Relations department, discussed with Ms Seabury the various options open to her with regards to the claimant. These included having the compliance department investigate the claimant to see if any of the conditions for terminating the claimant’s employment for cause were made out, as well as placing the claimant on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) and/or issuing him a warning letter. Ultimately, it was decided that the claimant should be placed on a PIP.
The PIP and the termination of the claimant’s employment
- [47]
[47] On 1 February 2019, Ms Seabury sent to Ms Teo-Gomez, for her comments, an official warning letter which she intended to issue to the claimant. She also told Ms Teo-Gomez that she had drafted a PIP for the claimant and intended to do a “Zero increase in salary and implement the PIP” upon the claimant’s return from an overseas trip.
- [48]
[48] On 21 March 2019, Ms Seabury wrote to the claimant to inform him that he would be formally placed on the PIP for a period of 45 days starting from that day. The PIP listed five key “Performance concerns/improvement areas”:
- [49]
[49] The PIP ended on 5 May 2019. According to Ms Teo-Gomez, Ms Seabury and Ms Blatt did not consider the issues with the claimant’s conduct to have been satisfactorily resolved and were of the opinion that the claimant was only “simulating his behaviour so as to satisfy the PIP”. However, they were “open to discussion about the action to be taken following the PIP”.
- [50]
[50] While Ms Teo-Gomez sought documentation of the PIP process from Ms Seabury, Ms Seabury did not ask for any specific step regarding the claimant’s employment to be taken and, hence, Ms Teo-Gomez assumed that Ms Seabury was content to continue working with him.
- [51]
[51] On 25 October 2019, however, Ms Seabury wrote to Ms Teo-Gomez to inform her that there continued to be issues with the claimant’s conduct following the expiry of the PIP. Ms Seabury made known her desire for the claimant’s employment to be terminated “as soon as possible”:
- [52]
[52] Ms Seabury and Ms Teo-Gomez then began to plan for the termination of the claimant’s employment. The notice of termination was finally served on the claimant on 21 November 2019. It stated that the claimant would be placed on garden leave from 22 November 2019, and that his last day of employment with the defendant would be 31 December 2019.
- [53]
[53] It should be noted that the termination of the claimant’s employment was effected in accordance with the claimant’s employment contract (the “Employment Agreement”). Clause 11.1 of the Employment Agreement stated:
- [54]
[54] In fact, the defendant gave the claimant more than the required one month’s notice.
The parties’ cases
The claimant’s case
- [55]
[55] The claimant’s case is that the defendant’s senior leaders pinned the blame on him for its severe fundamental organisational issues and “conspired to silence him”. He names as the conspirators Ms Blatt, Ms Seabury, Ms Raman, Mr Farooq and Ms Teo-Gomez (collectively, the “Conspirators”) and says that they “plotted to remove him” after he refused to apologise to Ms Raman in the manner directed by Ms Seabury in the 31 October 2018 E-mail.
- [56]
[56] The claimant submits that the defendant terminated his employment pursuant to an unlawful means conspiracy. The unlawful acts which the claimant identifies as founding the unlawful means conspiracy are breaches of various implied terms in the Employment Agreement. Amongst other things, the claimant alleges that:
(a) He was merely defending Mr Gupta in the 12 July 2018 E-mails and the remarks which he directed at Ms Raman were intended to highlight that she was “ducking blame for [the services delivery team’s] issues and foisting it onto [Mr Saripalli] and [Mr Gupta]”, as well as to call out her motivations to blame Mr Gupta due to pre-existing tensions between her and Mr Gupta.
(b) Following the 12 July 2018 E-mails, Ms Raman forwarded the e-mail chain which contained a one-sided picture to Ms Blatt, without any context surrounding the underlying problems which the claimant and his services sales team were facing, in order to portray the claimant in a bad light.
(c) He was justified in sending the 31 October 2018 E-mail as Mr Chong’s previous e-mail had contained falsehoods and it was reasonable for him to defend Mr Gupta considering the severity of Mr Chong’s allegations. Moreover, he had merely carbon-copied individuals who had a long working relationship with Mr Gupta so that they could provide their own view of what Mr Chong was suggesting were serious character flaws on Mr Gupta’s part.
(d) He was targeted and eventually terminated from his employment by the Conspirators as punishment for not apologising to Ms Raman. This is evidenced by the fact that he underwent a “pre-ordained HR process” after Ms Teo-Gomez was first notified of his conduct in November 2018. While he was willing to apologise to Ms Raman on a “mutual basis”, this was not an apology in the manner which the defendant’s senior leaders (ie, Ms Blatt, Ms Seabury and Mr Farooq) dictated.
(e) The defendant’s senior leaders did not evaluate his side of the story and, by focusing primarily on the apology to Ms Raman, failed to address the “severe substantive issues” plaguing the services delivery team in the APJ region that he and his services sales team were trying to communicate to them.
(f) The Compliance Complaint was instituted by Ms Raman’s services delivery team to deflect from their own incompetence and the issues which gave rise to the Sesa Goa Incident.
(g) The PIP which he was placed on was a charade. It was a hatchet job and its outcome was pre-ordained in that it was never legitimately introduced to give him an opportunity for long-term correction and Ms Teo-Gomez already had the “end-game” of terminating his employment in mind when he was placed on the PIP.
(h) There were no issues relating to his performance during or after the PIP.
(i) After the notice of termination was served on him, Ms Teo-Gomez had a meeting with him in which she threatened him to “not even think of challenging” his termination in court as “[t]his is Singapore”.
- [57]
[57] Alternatively, the claimant says that there was a lawful means conspiracy to terminate his employment. According to the claimant, the Conspirators conspired to hide the services delivery team’s failures and their own management shortcomings in order to “blame it all” on him and Mr Gupta. In so doing, he was “put through a traumatic and humiliating series of events” before his eventual termination.
- [58]
[58] In relation to the Employment Agreement, the claimant alleges that the defendant breached two implied terms – namely, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and the implied term not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith.
- [59]
[59] Finally, the claimant submits that the defendant’s breaches and/or the Conspirators’ conduct led him to suffer loss and damage in the form of:
- [60]
[60] The claimant also says that he is entitled to aggravated damages and punitive damages because of the defendant’s “outrageous conduct” in its treatment of him.
- [61]
[61] In the main, the claimant seeks a sum of $4,961,767.05 in damages.
The defendant’s case
- [62]
[62] The defendant says that the claimant brought his case because the business he started after his employment was terminated failed and he was unable to achieve the level of remuneration he enjoyed when he worked for the defendant.
- [63]
[63] The defendant’s position is that the claimant’s inability to work with other leaders and teams in the business led to frequent escalations, and Ms Blatt had to spend a disproportionate amount of time managing these conflicts. Ultimately, Ms Blatt took an executive decision to exercise the contractual right to terminate the claimant’s employment.
- [64]
[64] In its submissions, the defendant emphasises that the claimant’s employment was terminated lawfully in accordance with the contractual termination provision of the Employment Agreement. The defendant submits that the claimant’s argument for an implication in law of a term that an employer cannot exercise its contractual right to terminate a contract of employment arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, irrationally, or in bad faith flies in the face of the trite common law rule that an employer can terminate the employment of its employee for any reason or for none, so long as it is provided for in the contract.
- [65]
[65] In any case, the decision to terminate the claimant’s employment was a management decision “borne out of genuine concerns about [the claimant’s] inability to conduct himself professionally as a senior regional leader”. This arose from, amongst other things, the claimant’s “abrasive and confrontational” management style, hostility and inability to work professionally with people, manner of dealing with challenges (which included “pointing the finger” at other teams, lecturing other leaders on how to do their jobs and adopting a “take-it-or-leave-it” approach which precluded collaboration and promoted an “us-against-them” mindset), and injection of irrelevant personal attacks into workplace discussions. Specifically, the defendant alleges that:
- [66]
[66] The defendant also says that Ms Seabury saw the logic in providing the claimant with opportunities to improve himself, and that the PIP which the claimant was placed on was “a developmental, not a disciplinary process”. However, “problems with [the claimant] persisted”, including that he remained hostile towards Ms Raman’s team, and the decision to terminate the claimant’s employment was made because of the “deeper, systemic issues with [his] ability to work productively within a cross-functional leadership team”.
- [67]
[67] The defendant also submits that there is no implied duty of mutual trust and confidence under Singapore law. Even if there was such an implied duty, the damages which the claimant seeks are unsustainable at law as there is no basis for relief beyond the required notice payment in the Employment Agreement. In addition, the claimant’s claim for psychiatric injury damages is unsustainable and baseless.
- [68]
[68] As for the breach of the implied term to conduct fair investigations, which the claimant says is a subset of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the defendant argues that such a claim is legally and factually unsustainable because it is “merely a repackaged wrongful termination claim” and thus does not entitle the claimant to any damages beyond his notice pay. The claimant was never the subject of any investigation, and there was no duty on the part of the defendant to investigate before exercising its right to terminate the claimant’s employment. In any case, the claimant was afforded opportunities to clarify his position.
- [69]
[69] Finally, in relation to the conspiracy claim, the defendant says that it must fail in limine because a company cannot conspire with its employees acting within the scope of their authority. The defendant also submits that it is fanciful to characterise the exercise of the contractual right to terminate as evincing a predominant purpose to injure in a conspiracy, since the consequences of either side exercising that right were known to both parties. In any event, the conspiracy claim is superfluous because it is a mere repackaging of the claimant’s wrongful termination claim, and the claimant’s conduct before and during these proceedings debunks the conspiracy claim.
Issues to be determined
- [71]
[71] The following issues arise for determination:
- [72]
[72] Before turning to deal with the claimant’s causes of action proper, it is important to emphasise that there is nothing inherently wrongful about terminating an employment contract if such termination was effected in accordance with the contract itself. One need not look further than the Court of Appeal’s (“CA”) remarks in Leiman, Ricardo v Noble Resources Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 386 at [125] (“Leiman”) (citing Vasudevan Pillai v City Council of Singapore [1968–1970] SLR(R) 100 at [7] and Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 65) for the trite proposition that “an employer [can] terminate an employment contract at any time, and for any reason or for none”, provided that the employer does so in a manner warranted by the contract. This flows from the general principle that parties are free to enter into and exit contracts (see Dong Wei v Shell Eastern Trading (Pte) Ltd [2022] 1 SLR 1318 (“Dong Wei”) at [92]), and that contracting parties are generally entitled to act in their own interests (see Leiman at [133]).
- [73]
[73] I emphasise this because, in parts of his pleadings and closing submissions, the claimant has sought to characterise his termination as being “wrongful”. I will deal with some of these specific instances below. It suffices to say at this juncture that I see no merit in this characterisation, as it was well within the defendant’s right to terminate the claimant’s employment at any time in accordance with the Employment Agreement. In fact, as detailed above (at [52]–[54]), the defendant went beyond its obligations in the Employment Agreement by giving the claimant more than the requisite one month’s notice.
- [74]
[74] Furthermore, it bears mentioning that the claimant himself acknowledged during the trial that the defendant could have terminated his employment in accordance with the Employment Agreement at any time:
- [75]
[75] As such, any claim which rests on the termination of the claimant’s employment being wrongful must necessarily fail.
- [76]
[76] I now turn to address each of the claims in detail.
Whether the claimant’s conspiracy claims are made out
- [77]
[77] As summarised in EFT Holdings, Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [112], in order for a claim in unlawful means conspiracy to be made out, the claimant must show that:
- [78]
[78] For a lawful means conspiracy, the following elements must be made out (see Tuitiongenius Pte Ltd v Toh Yew Keat [2020] 5 SLR 354 at [114], citing Visionhealthone Corp Pte Ltd v HD Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 47 at [44] and EFT Holdings at [112]):
- [79]
[79] Essentially, as its name suggests, a lawful means conspiracy can be made out even if the acts performed by the conspirators in furtherance of the agreement were lawful. However, instead of simply showing that the conspirators had the intention to cause damage or injury to him by performing those lawful acts, the claimant must show that the predominant purpose of the conspirators was to cause damage and injury to him. In other words, the threshold at which the requisite mental element on the part of the conspirators will be made out is higher for a lawful means conspiracy than for an unlawful means conspiracy. As the CA noted in EFT Holdings (at [96]), “where self-interest is the predominant motivation [in a lawful means conspiracy], the act may be justified”.
Whether the unlawful means conspiracy claim is made out
- [80]
[80] To begin with, I have some difficulty understanding the claimant’s case as it is framed.
- [81]
[81] The claimant’s pleaded case is that the defendant and the Conspirators “agreed between and amongst them to take steps to terminate the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant” [emphasis added]. The claimant then refers to the following two particulars:
- [82]
[82] In his closing submissions, the claimant says that the Conspirators “combined to perform acts in furtherance of an agreement to terminate [him]” [emphasis added], and that the “unlawful acts” are the defendant’s “breaches of implied terms of contract”.
- [83]
[83] To my mind, to say that there is a conspiracy to terminate the claimant’s employment is an odd submission to make. It is difficult to see how there can be a conspiracy amongst various actors to terminate the claimant’s employment when the defendant could, at any time, and for any reason or for none, bring the Employment Agreement to an end. It simply does not make sense to say that there is a conspiracy to terminate a contract. As I pointed out to the claimant at trial, the defendant would have only needed to resort to a conspiracy if there was no mechanism to terminate the Employment Agreement. That, however, is not the case, as the defendant had a legally supportable way to terminate the claimant’s employment by giving him one month’s notice.
- [84]
[84] In any event, an unlawful means conspiracy has not been made out on the facts of this case. I am not convinced that the claimant has surmounted the first barrier to establishing a conspiracy, namely that there was a combination of two or more persons to do certain acts. In PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 818 (“PT Sandipala”) (at [63]), the CA noted that it would be wrong to treat a director of a company as conspiring with that company given that the director is acting as the company. As the CA explained, “[t]here is effectively only one legal actor in play, ie, the company, and this is typically fatal to the fundamental requirement of a conspiracy that there be two or more persons acting in concert.” [emphasis added] The only exception is where the director has acted in breach of his fiduciary or other personal legal duties owed to the company in causing it to commit the acts that form the subject of the conspiracy (Voltas Ltd v Ng Theng Swee [2023] SGHC 245 (“Voltas”) at [33], citing PT Sandipala). While the remarks in PT Sandipala and Voltas pertain to directors of a company, I am of the view that they are equally applicable to employees of a company as they, much like directors, are agents through which a company acts. After all, the proposition in PT Sandipala cited above was derived from the more general principle in O’Brien v Dawson [1941] 41 SR (NSW) 295 (at 307) that, when an incorporated company acts through its agents, the agents “are not in the position of outsiders who are influencing the independent volition of a contracting party who is capable of exercising volition for himself” (cited in PT Sandipala at [63]; see also Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 at 504–507, where the principle was held to apply to “either a managing director or a board of directors, or a manager or other official of a company”).
- [85]
[85] The claimant’s reliance on Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat [2008] 1 SLR(R) 80 (“Nagase”) to say that it was possible to find a conspiracy between the director and the company does not assist his case. It is true that, in Nagase (at [22]), Judith Prakash J (as she then was) was satisfied that “ in law, there can be a conspiracy between a company and its controlling director to damage a third party by unlawful means notwithstanding that the director may be the moving spirit of the company” [emphasis added]. However, as the CA emphasised in PT Sandipala (at [72]), the approach which it took “[did] not contradict the position (established in cases such as Nagase) that a company and its director, notwithstanding that the director is the moving spirit of the company, can in principle conspire to cause harm to third parties”. The CA was more concerned with demarcating the situations in which a company could be held to be conspiring with its director to breach the company’s contract. In this regard, the CA explained (at [70]) that Nagase was a case in which the director, who fraudulently overcharged the claimant in breach of the company’s contract with it, was “clearly in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to the company”.
- [86]
[86] In the present case, the claimant has not sought to demonstrate that the Conspirators had acted in breach of fiduciary or other personal legal duties owed to the defendant. In fact, the claimant is not seeking to hold the Conspirators personally liable for the defendant’s actions. Hence, there was effectively only one legal actor at play (ie, the defendant) as far as the termination of the claimant’s employment is concerned and, a fortiori, there could not have been a combination between the defendant and the Conspirators to terminate the claimant’s employment.
- [87]
[87] Even if one were to take the claimant’s case at its highest and assume that the defendant had committed unlawful acts by breaching various implied terms in the Employment Agreement, I do not think it can be said that the alleged conspirators had the intention to cause damage or injury to the claimant by those acts. In EFT Holdings (at [101]), the CA stated in no uncertain terms that, for the requisite state of mind for an unlawful means conspiracy to be made out, it is “not sufficient that harm to the claimant would be a likely, or probable or even inevitable consequence of the defendant’s conduct” [emphasis added], and that “[i]njury to the claimant must have been intended as a means to an end or as an end in itself”.
- [88]
[88] The claimant has not explained how the defendant and the Conspirators had intended to cause damage or injury to him as a means to an end or as an end in itself. Indeed, the claimant would be hard-pressed to do so. To recapitulate, the claimant says he suffered the following forms of loss and damage as a result of the conspiracy: (a) continuing financial losses, including loss of earnings; (b) damages for pain and suffering and disamenities caused by MDD; and (c) injury to his reputation, pride and dignity, and humiliation, distress, insult, and/or pain.
- [89]
[89] Further, even if I proceed on the assumption that these losses are made out, I am unable to find any conceivable basis to say that the defendant and the Conspirators had intended to cause these forms of loss and damage to the claimant as an end in itself, or as a means to the end-goal of terminating the claimant’s employment. It should be borne in mind that even an appreciation that a course of conduct would inevitably harm the claimant would not amount to an intention to injure (see EFT Holdings at [101]). There is no way that the injury suffered by the claimant can be said to be an inevitable consequence of the defendant’s and the Conspirators’ course of conduct.
- [90]
[90] As such, I have no hesitation dismissing the unlawful means conspiracy claim.
Whether the lawful means conspiracy claim is made out
- [91]
[91] My remarks above (at [84]–[86]) in relation to the claimant being unable to show that there was a combination between the defendant and its employees to do certain acts for an unlawful means conspiracy to be made out apply with the same force to the claim in lawful means conspiracy.
- [92]
[92] Furthermore, as I have found that the mental element for an unlawful means conspiracy claim to succeed is not made out, it follows that a lawful means conspiracy would likewise not be made out as it involves the more stringent mental element of having the predominant purpose to cause injury or damage to the claimant (see Chan Pik Sun v Wan Hoe Keet [2024] 1 SLR 893 at [173]). If the claimant cannot even establish that the defendant and the Conspirators had intended to cause injury to him, he would likewise fail in showing that the predominant purpose of their course of conduct was to cause such injury. Additionally, as the CA noted in EFT Holdings (at [96]), in the context of a lawful means conspiracy, the acts may be justified if self-interest is the predominant motivation. Hence, at least where a lawful means conspiracy claim is concerned, the defendant and the Conspirators would have been perfectly entitled to embark on the course of conduct which they did if their primary motivation was to remove the claimant from the defendant because they did not think he was a suitable fit for the job any longer.
- [93]
[93] Accordingly, I likewise dismiss the alternative claim in lawful means conspiracy.
- [94]
[94] I now turn to address the claimant’s allegation that the defendant has breached implied terms in the Employment Agreement.
Whether the implied term not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith and the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exist in the Employment Agreement
- [95]
[95] The claimant says that the defendant breached two implied terms – namely the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and the implied term not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith.
- [96]
[96] I will first deal with the implied term not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith, as the claimant’s arguments in relation to this term can be dismissed fairly easily. To the extent that the implied term to conduct fair investigations, while pleaded as a separate term from the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, is advanced in the claimant’s closing submissions as a subset of the latter, I will deal with them together.
Whether the implied term not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith exists
- [97]
[97] The claimant says that there is an implied term in the Employment Agreement not to engage in a termination process that is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, irrational and/or in bad faith.
- [98]
[98] In Dong Wei (at [91]–[92]), the Appellate Division of the High Court (the “AD”) was clearly unconvinced that such a limitation on the employer’s exercise of his express contractual right to terminate the employment of an employee in accordance with the employment contract should be implied into the contract. While the AD acknowledged that there were some authorities, such as Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661, MGA International Pte Ltd v Wajilam Exports (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 319 (“MGA”) and Leiman, which suggest that contractual discretions are not wholly unfettered, these cases pertained to rights subsisting within the contours of the contract and not the right to bring a contract to an end. The AD considered this to be a “crucial distinction which … powerfully [undercut]” the appellant’s argument that these authorities should be extended.
- [99]
[99] As the AD stated, different considerations are engaged where the termination of a contract is concerned. A key consideration, and indeed the golden thread underlying much of the common law surrounding contracts, is the notion of freedom of contract. The natural corollary of parties’ freedom to enter contracts is their freedom to exit contracts. This must be so, as the law does not generally impose an obligation on contracting parties to remain in a contractual relationship indefinitely.
- [100]
[100] In the face of the AD’s unambiguous view (in Dong Wei at [93]) that this was “not an acceptable direction in which the law of contracts ought to be developed”, I can see no basis for the claimant to advance a claim which is founded on this implied term.
- [101]
[101] I now come to the nub of the present case, namely, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
Whether the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exists
The law on the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
- [102]
[102] The implied term of mutual trust and confidence has its genesis in the House of Lords case of Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) [1998] AC 20 (“Malik”). The claimants there were former employees of the defendant bank who lost their jobs when the defendant collapsed. The defendant had, for a number of years, been carrying on its business fraudulently. The claimants alleged that, as a result of the corrupt and dishonest manner in which the defendant operated and which became widely known following its collapse, they were handicapped in the labour market by the stigma of being associated with the defendant. They claimed that they suffered loss as a result.
- [103]
[103] The House of Lords held that there was an implied obligation on an employer not to carry out a dishonest or corrupt business, and that damages were recoverable for financial losses sustained if the serious possibility that an employee’s future employment prospects would be handicapped was reasonably foreseeable. Such an obligation flowed from the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, which was defined by Lord Steyn as imposing an obligation that an employer shall not “without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee” (Malik at 45). This would become the locus classicus for the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
- [104]
[104] Leaving aside subsequent developments of the implied term in the UK and other jurisdictions at this juncture, the implied term would, over the course of the next 15 years, gradually find its footing in our legal landscape. In Scott Latham v Credit Suisse First Boston [1999] SGHC 302 (at [54]–[57]), Chan Seng Onn JC (as he then was), in assessing the claimant’s claim for assessment of loss arising from wrongful termination based on his discretionary bonus, mentioned the implied term in Malik in obiter remarks. Chan JC noted that, even if the implied term was pleaded, he did not think that a claim under the “stigma” head of loss could be made out in the circumstances of the case.
- [105]
[105] Subsequently, in Wong Leong Wei Edward v Acclaim Insurance Brokers Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 352 (“Edward Wong”) (at [52]), Steven Chong J (as he then was), in obiter remarks, accepted the claimant’s submission on the authority of Malik that, in principle, if it could be shown that the defendant had wrongfully dismissed him in a manner that was dishonest or illegitimate which amounted to a breach of the implied term, and as a direct result of that wrongful dismissal it can be proven that he suffered a real and provable financial loss, the claimant would be entitled to claim against the defendant for such loss beyond the contractual notice period. However, as Chong J had already found that the defendant was entitled to terminate the claimant’s employment on two separate grounds, there was no merit to the claimant’s claim for damages arising from the handicap he allegedly suffered in the labour market as a result of his dismissal.
- [106]
[106] Finally, in Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou Bio-Chem Technology Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 577 (“Cheah Peng Hock”) (at [59]), a Singapore court pronounced definitively for the first time that “unless there are express terms to the contrary or the context implies otherwise, an implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and fidelity, is implied by law into a contract of employment under Singapore law”. This was the first case that squarely dealt with the question of whether the implied term existed under Singapore law.
- [107]
[107] Given Quentin Loh J’s unequivocal pronouncement in Cheah Peng Hock that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence was implied by law into all employment contracts under Singapore law, it is easy to see why subsequent decisions proceeded on such a basis. As Prof Ravi Chandran describes in Employment Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2019) at para 4.434, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence can be said to have “strongly taken root here” after Cheah Peng Hock. Indeed, in Dong Wei v Shell Eastern Trading (Pte) Ltd [2021] SGHC 123, the decision which went on appeal in Dong Wei, Aedit Abdullah J accepted (at [32]) that the term was “implied by law in employment contracts, as has been recognised in a number of cases”.
- [108]
[108] In as much, however, as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence had “strongly taken root” in our local jurisprudence after Cheah Peng Hock, the AD’s comments about the implied term in Dong Wei raised the question as to whether the implied term can still be said to exist under Singapore law.
- [109]
[109] In Dong Wei, the AD dismissed the appeal entirely on the facts, as the appellant had not challenged various factual findings which formed the basis for his claim that the respondent had breached the implied term. The upshot of this was that he was taken to have accepted, amongst other things, that the investigation process which he was subject to prior to the termination of his employment was fair and the outcome was not preordained (see [41]). This undermined the appellant’s claim for breach of contract.
- [110]
[110] Nevertheless, the AD went on to make obiter remarks which cast some doubt on the existence of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in employment contracts under Singapore law. Specifically, while the AD accepted (at [70]–[71]) that Cheah Peng Hock stated in clear terms that the implied term formed a part of Singapore law and that other High Court cases had alluded to or implicitly accepted the term, it was of the view (at [82]) that the status of the implied term “ha[d] not been clearly settled in Singapore” and that it remained an open question for the CA to resolve in a more appropriate case. This followed the CA’s remarks in The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific Motor Credit (Pte) Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 695 (“One Suites”) (at [44]) that the position of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence was “still left open for decision in a future case”.
- [111]
[111] The claimant says that this is such a case. Indeed, this is a case in which it is necessary for me to decide whether to proceed on the basis that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exists or does not exist in employment contracts under Singapore law. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments and the relevant authorities, I have decided to proceed on the basis that such an implied term does exist under Singapore law. As I will explain, my conclusion is shaped by precedent, principle and policy.
(1) There is ample precedent for the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in Singapore law
- [112]
[112] To begin with, both the CA and AD have stated in no uncertain terms that the question of whether the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exists under Singapore law is an open question (see [110] above). Apart from Dong Wei and One Suites, the only other case at the appellate level which has dealt with the implied term is the CA’s decision in Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 357 (“Wee Kim San”).
- [113]
[113] Wee Kim San concerned an appeal against the assistant registrar’s decision to strike out the appellant’s suit. The appellant had argued, inter alia, that there was an arguable case that he was entitled to damages exceeding the amount of salary payable for his contractual notice period if such damages flowed from a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. However, the appellant’s claim for damages was beyond the amount of salary payable for his contractual notice period and was thus legally unsustainable. It was on this basis that the CA dismissed the appeal. As the AD noted in Dong Wei (at [73]), however, the CA’s discussion of the term was “limited substantially by the factual and procedural context of the case before it” and should not be taken as a formal endorsement of the term. Moreover, Wee Kim San was referred to in One Suites when the CA remarked that the existence of the implied term was still an open question. It is for this reason that the AD in Dong Wei said that, on the CA’s own reading of Wee Kim San, the question of whether such an implied term exists under Singapore law is a question that has yet to be determined.
- [114]
[114] As such, the references to Wee Kim San, in this judgment, on the term of mutual trust and confidence must be understood in the context that the comments on the implied term were obiter remarks.
- [115]
[115] Notwithstanding this, it is undeniable that there is ample precedent in our local jurisprudence at the High Court level to ground the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. In other words, such an implied term is not being plucked out of thin air. As noted by the AD in Dong Wei (at [71]), the High Court cases which have either alluded to or implicitly accepted the existence of the implied term include the following: Cheah Peng Hock, Edward Wong, Brader Daniel John v Commerzbank AG [2014] 2 SLR 81 (“Brader Daniel John”), Tullett Prebon (Singapore) Ltd v Chua Leong Chuan Simon [2005] 4 SLR(R) 344, Leong Hin Chuee v Citra Group Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 603 and Arul Chandran v Gartshore [2000] 1 SLR(R) 436. I am thus not in any shortage of company in proceeding on the basis that such an implied term exists in our law.
- [116]
[116] Moreover, as Andrew Phang J (as he then was) noted in Forefront Medical Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 927 (“Forefront Medical Technology”) (at [44]):
- [117]
[117] I note that, subsequent to Dong Wei, there were three General Division of the High Court decisions in which the implied term was considered or referenced. In two of them – namely, Kallivalap Praveen Nair v Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Pte Ltd [2023] 3 SLR 922 (“Kallivalap Praveen Nair”) and BCG Partners (Singapore) Ltd v Sumit Grover [2024] SGHC 206 (“BCG Partners”) – the court did not take a position on whether the implied term formed part of Singapore law.
- [118]
[118] In Kallivalap Praveen Nair (at [37]), Kwek Mean Luck J proceeded on the assumption that the implied term was part of Singapore law (while expressly stating that he was not making a judgment on it). He rejected the claimant’s pleaded version of the implied term, which he found to be “very different” from the original formulation of the implied term in Malik (see Kallivalap Praveen Nair at [35]–[37]). In BCG Partners (at [80]–[82]), Wong Li Kok Alex JC (as he then was) noted that the existence of the implied term was an open question and said that it was unnecessary for him to resolve this legal issue as, in his view, the claimant would not have breached the implied term even if it applied.
- [119]
[119] In Dabbs, Matthew Edward v AAM Advisory Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 260 (“Dabbs”) (at [89]), however, Wong JC stated in clearer terms that he was “not minded to conclude” that such an implied term existed under Singapore law. Dabbs and Dong Wei were cited by the defendant to advance the submission that “the Singapore Courts have answered [the question of whether the implied term exists] in the negative”.
- [120]
[120] On no reading of Dong Wei can it seriously be contended that the AD answered the question in the negative. The AD had explicitly left the question open and, on my reading of its grounds of decision, was concerned with correcting the misperception that the CA had, in Wee Kim San, accepted that the implied term exists in Singapore law (see [70] and [73] of Dong Wei). That leaves Dabbs as the only known case thus far in which a Singapore court has expressly pronounced that the implied term does not exist under Singapore law.
- [121]
[121] In spite of the pronouncement in Dabbs, I would still be in good and abundant company in taking the position that the implied term exists under Singapore law. To my mind, it is tolerably clear that the corpus of authorities in Singapore overwhelmingly supports the existence of the implied term in employment contracts under Singapore law. That the AD and CA have explicitly stated that the question remains open on two occasions does not, in and of itself, cause the pendulum to swing to the other end. At the very most, they exert a gravitational pull which brings it closer to an equilibrium.
- [122]
[122] I therefore conclude, following Forefront Medical Technology (at [44]) (see [116] above) that, on the basis of precedent, the implied term has existed and continues to exist in employment contracts under Singapore law since the court’s pronouncement in Cheah Peng Hock, unless and until Cheah Peng Hock is expressly overruled.
- [123]
[123] I am also of the view that principle and policy both militate toward the existence of such an implied term.
(2) The implied term of mutual trust and confidence is justified on principle
- [124]
[124] One of the objections raised by the defendant against implying the duty of mutual trust and confidence into Singapore law appears to be that it was developed specifically within the context of the UK’s unfair dismissal legislation. Indeed, this was the very reason why the High Court of Australia (the “HCA”) unanimously decided in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 312 ALR 356 (“Barker”) (at [26] and [91]–[101]) that the implied term did not form part of Australian employment law. The legislative developments in the UK, which provided the impetus for the UK courts to formulate the implied term, were very helpfully summarised by the AD in Dong Wei (at [76]):
- [125]
[125] In other words, the UK courts formulated the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in order to provide employees with a ground on which they could argue that their employer had committed a repudiatory breach of the employment contract, which would in turn allow them to say that they had been constructively dismissed (see also Wee Kim San at [24] and Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2005] 1 AC 503 (“Eastwood”) at [4]–[5]).
- [126]
[126] However, judicial innovations, much like those in the physical world, are rarely confined to and often outlive the original circumstances which birthed them. Early computers, for instance, were used only for mathematical calculations, but no one can realistically assert today that computers cannot be used for anything other than computation. Likewise, the implied term of mutual trust and confidence began taking on a life of its own in the UK apart from being used as a means of alleging constructive dismissal within the unfair dismissal legislative context. In Malik itself, the implied term was regarded as an independently actionable term on which damages under certain heads of losses could be recoverable (see also Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518 (“Johnson”) at [44] and [77] and Wee Kim San at [28]). I do not think that it would be right to say that the implied term does not exist in Singapore, just because the specific legislative context which gave rise to it is absent here.
- [127]
[127] Indeed, while the AD in Dong Wei was mindful of the legislative context which spawned the implied term, it also stated in no uncertain terms (at [79]) that “it is not self-evident that the common law principles developed in support of the application of the statutory regime (ie, the implied term) can only be understood in the legislative context in which they were developed”. The AD did not regard the historical origin of the implied term as a fundamental and insurmountable objection to its acceptance into Singapore law and expressed that such a term could exist independent of that legislative backdrop “[a]s long as the court is able to precisely delineate the scope of the implied term”.
- [128]
[128] It is also important to note that the AD was cognisant of the HCA’s decision in Barker when it made those remarks (see [75] of Dong Wei). So too was the CA when it remarked in One Suites (at [44]) that the position on the implied term was still left open for discussion. As noted in Dong Wei (at [75]), the HCA in Barker took the view that the implied term had arisen specifically within the context of the UK’s legislative framework and that, outside that framework, it was not necessary to secure the effective operation of employment contracts. The HCA also remarked that the implication of the term was “a step beyond the legitimate law-marking function of the courts” (see Barker at [1]).
- [129]
[129] Indeed, in Barker (at [36]), when analysing whether the implication of the duty of mutual trust and confidence into law was justified, the HCA took the view that it needed to determine whether the implied term was necessary in the sense that it would “justify the exercise of judicial power in a way that may have a significant impact upon employment relationships and the law of the contract of employment in this country”. Necessity, in turn, could be demonstrated by the “futility of the transaction absent the implication”.
- [130]
[130] It would appear that the HCA was concerned about the far-reaching implications which the implied term may potentially engender, including positive duties foisted unwittingly upon employers (see Baker at [39]):
- [131]
[131] It was in this context that the HCA said (at [40]) that “[t]he complex policy considerations encompassed by those views of the implication mark it, in the Australian context, as a matter more appropriate for the legislature than the courts to determine”. That is perhaps why the HCA so emphatically pronounced (in the opening paragraph of Baker, no less) that the implication of the duty of mutual trust and confidence was “a step beyond the legitimate law-making function of the courts”. Curiously, though, while the HCA ruled out the implied term of mutual trust and confidence from Australian law, it left open the question of whether the standard of good faith should be applied generally to contracts or particular categories of contracts (such as employment contracts) in Australia (see Baker at [107]). The duty of good faith has been considered to be wider and more nebulous than the implied term of mutual trust and confidence (see Cheah Peng Hock at [45]–[55]).
- [132]
[132] More fundamentally, it is unclear if the test for the implication of terms into law in Australia is the same as that in Singapore. As mentioned (at [129] above), the HCA in Barker had alluded to necessity as the key criterion governing the implication of terms into law. In a previous decision, Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 131 ALR 422 (at 450), the HCA alluded to the concept of necessity as encompassing an inquiry into whether “unless such a term be implied, the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless, or, perhaps, be seriously undermined” [emphasis added]. This undoubtedly sets a high bar for the implication of terms in law in Australia. Additionally, the HCA in Barker (at [36]) had explicitly rejected reasonableness as being the governing criterion for such implication – although it did leave some bandwidth for policy considerations to feature in the inquiry (see also University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 (at [141]–[147]).
- [133]
[133] On the other hand, in an oft-cited passage from Forefront Medical Technology (at [44]), Phang J described the rationale and test for the implication of terms in law in Singapore as follows:
- [134]
[134] The above paragraph was cited with approval by the CA in Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769 (“Jet Holding”) at [89]). The CA held (at [91]) that the implication of a term that each party owed each other a duty to take reasonable care in the performance of the respective parts of the contract they had entered into was justified on “general reasons of justice and fairness as well as of public policy”. No mention was made of the concept of necessity.
- [135]
[135] Considerations of fairness and policy are therefore central to the implication of terms in law. This was subsequently re-affirmed by the CA in Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518 (“Ng Giap Hon”) (at [40] and [46]) and Chua Choon Cheng v Allgreen Properties Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 724 (“Chua Choon Cheng”) (at [68]). In Chua Choon Cheng (at [69]), the CA also made reference to the concept of “reasonableness”, although it cautioned that a term would not be implied in law simply because it is reasonable:
- [136]
[136] It suffices to say that I am guided by the abovementioned decisions of the CA and their dicta on the applicable legal test for the implication of terms into law, which does not appear to be of the same level of strictness as the legal test in Australia.
(3) Policy considerations militate toward the implication of the duty of mutual trust and confidence
- [137]
[137] I am also persuaded that considerations of policy and fairness militate toward the implication of such a term in Singapore law. In my view, there are many features of employment contracts which set them apart from ordinary commercial contracts such that implying the duty of mutual trust and confidence into all employment contracts would be justified as a matter of policy and fairness.
- [138]
[138] As Lord Steyn aptly put it in Johnson (at [20]), one possible way of describing an employment contract in modern terms is as a “relational contract”. A relational contract is one which involves a longer-term relationship between the parties in which they make a substantial commitment. In Yam Seng Pte Ltd (a company registered in Singapore) v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321 (at [142]), the court observed that such contracts:
- [139]
[139] The unique nature of an employment relationship and the characteristics which set it apart from an ordinary contractual relationship have also received judicial recognition in Singapore. For instance, Steven Chong JC (as he then was) noted in Aldabe Fermin v Standard Chartered Bank [2010] 3 SLR 722 (at [54]) (cited in Cheah Peng Hock at [41]) that “[i]t is important to recognise that an employment contract is not a commercial contract. It involves a continuing relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and the employee.” [emphasis added] The special nature of an employment relationship, in particular the “closeness” between an employer and employee, is also what underpins the legal position that the doctrine of vicarious liability in tort applies de facto to employment relationships or those closely analogous to employment relationships (see Ng Huat Seng v Munib Mohammad Madni [2017] 2 SLR 1074 at [42]).
- [140]
[140] More specifically, an employment relationship can also be characterised by the power imbalance between the employer and employee, both at the stage in which the employment contract is entered into and when it is being performed. This power imbalance, coupled with the paramount role which a person’s occupation plays in his sense of identity and self-worth, makes employees especially vulnerable vis-à-vis their employers. This was very helpfully explained by Iacobucci J (delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada) in Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd [1977] 3 SCR 701 (at [91]–[93]):
- [141]
[141] Lord Hoffman similarly observed as follows in Johnson (at [35]):
- [142]
[142] In Johnson (at [19]), Lord Steyn went as far as to recognise the increased work pressure brought to bear on employees as a result of modern developments such as globalisation and deregulation in the labour market:
- [143]
[143] Lord Steyn’s remarks, which were made over 20 years ago, surely assume greater significance today in a world where globalisation and modern communication technologies have made work an even more pervasive and all-consuming part of one’s life. It needs no mentioning that the need to protect employees from harsh and unacceptable employment practices has greatly increased since then.
- [144]
[144] I doubt that this role can be fulfilled only by the legislature and not by the courts. The defendant has raised two arguments in support of its position that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence would intrude into Parliament’s sphere of law-making. First, the defendant says that the interposition of the implied term would intrude into the wrongful dismissal regime created under the Employment Act 1968 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”). Second, and more broadly, the defendant cites Parliament’s consideration of the fair balance to be struck between employers and employees as a reason why “there is simply no place for a broad and undefined implied duty of trust and confidence”.
- [145]
[145] The defendant’s arguments do not take its case very far.
- [146]
[146] In relation to the first argument, the defendant refers to the difference between the definition of constructive dismissal in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (c 18) (UK) (the “ERA”) and the EA. Section 95(1)(c) of the ERA defines constructive dismissal as a situation where “the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct” [emphasis added]. Section 2(1) of the EA, on the other hand, defines the term “dismissal” as including “the resignation of the employee if the employee can show, on a balance of probabilities, that the employee did not resign voluntarily but was forced to do so because of any conduct or omission, or course of conduct or omissions, engaged in by the employer” [emphasis added]. The defendant says that the EA, unlike the ERA, does not require any inquiry into whether the employer’s conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach or any implication of the term of trust and confidence.
- [147]
[147] Whilst it is true that the concept of constructive dismissal appears to be more specifically defined in the EA, this does not necessarily preclude the implication of the duty of mutual trust and confidence into employment contracts under Singapore law. Even if there is no need for the implied term in the constructive dismissal context because one can just have recourse to the statutory definition of “dismiss” in the EA, this does not inhibit the term from being implied for other purposes. Even in the UK, the implied term has existed independently of the statutory concept of constructive dismissal such that a breach of the implied term can found a claim in damages for breach of contract at common law (see [126] above). This is precisely the situation we are dealing with here.
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