A fugitive under the Extradition Act was refused bail, disclosure and expert evidence

[1] The applicant, Mr Tjhin Thian Po, also known as Paulus Tannos, seeks judicial review in respect of extradition proceedings against him. The applicant is presently in remand awaiting committal proceedings before Deputy Principal District Judge Luke Tan (“DyPDJ Tan”) in the State Courts under s 16(8) of the Extradition Act 1968 (“Extradition Act”). The background to these proceedings is set out in the earlier decisions of this court in Paulus Tannos v The State [2025] 5 SLR 620 (“Bail Decision”) and Paulus Tannos v Attorney-General [2026] SGHC 118 (“Judicial Review Decision”). It is unnecessary to rehearse that background in detail here and it suffices to only set out the material context relevant to this application.

[2] The applicant was arrested on 17 January 2025 by an officer from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau pursuant to an extradition request lodged by the Indonesian government. The extradition request concerns his alleged involvement in a corruption scheme connected to a government procurement initiative known as the “e-KTP project”. Two documents from the extradition request are of particular relevance: an Indonesian-language document titled “Surat Perintah Penangkapan” (“Document A”), and an English-language document titled “Arrest Warrant” (“Document B”).

[3] Both documents are dated 26 November 2024 and their original copies were shown to the State Courts during the committal hearing on 4 February 2026. Both documents were made available to parties in the committal proceedings in the State Courts. The documents refer to the arrest warrant originating from the Indonesian authorities on which the extradition request is founded.

[4] By way of further background, the present application is not the first occasion on which the applicant has sought to challenge the extradition proceedings commenced pursuant to the extradition request by the Republic of Indonesia. In the Bail Decision, the applicant previously applied for bail on grounds of ill health, and that application was dismissed at both the state Courts and in the High Court, which found that the Singapore Prison Service was able to reasonably manage his medical conditions and that he posed a real risk of flight: at [52]–[64]. In the Judicial Review Decision, the applicant further applied for permission to seek prerogative orders against the Minister for Law’s decision to issue a notice under s 11(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, raising seven grounds of challenge to the extradition request. Those grounds included alleged defects in its authentication, the absence of a valid arrest warrant, and the insufficiency of the accompanying evidence: at [9]. The applicant also sought a review of detention on the basis that no valid extradition request had been received within the mandatory 45-day period under the relevant extradition treaty: at [10]. The applications were dismissed, upon the finding that the evidence did not disclose a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought: at [135] and [140]–[141].

[5] In the present application (HC/OA 431/2026, hereafter referred to as “OA 431”), the applicant challenges the extradition request principally on the grounds of the accuracy and reliability of the translations of the relevant documents and the authority of the signatory to the extradition request. The applicant seeks principally three forms of relief: bail pending the conclusion of the extradition proceedings, disclosure of documents pertaining to his suspect status and the arrest warrant, and recourse to Indonesian expert evidence.

[6] The applicant’s primary contention is that the extradition request is not underpinned by a properly authenticated and legally valid arrest warrant, as is required under the extradition treaty between Singapore and Indonesia and the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act. He contends that Documents A and B differ materially in their content and legal effect and that Document A is not accompanied by an authenticated translation. Additionally, he submits that the individual who signed both documents may not have held the requisite authority under Indonesian law. On these grounds, he characterises his case as a “special case” warranting bail, separately seeks disclosure of the underlying documents and evidence and seeks recourse to Indonesian expert evidence.

[7] The respondent urges this court to dismiss the above prayers. On the question of bail, the respondent submits that the applicable framework permits bail for fugitives only in narrowly defined circumstances, namely, where the fugitive is a juvenile, where the fugitive is sick or infirm in a manner that cannot be adequately managed within the prison system, or where the requesting state does not oppose bail. However, none of these statutory grounds are applicable. The applicant has placed no medical evidence before the court and has done no more than assert that he is 72 years of age with unspecified health concerns, which falls well short of the requisite threshold. The respondent further contends that the bail application constitutes an abuse of process, as it seeks to revisit matters already determined in the Bail Decision, bypasses the State Courts, and additionally has been brought by way of an originating application rather than the appropriate procedural vehicle. On disclosure, the respondent submits that the prayer is insufficiently particularised and, assuming that what the applicant seeks are copies of the arrest warrant issued by the Indonesian authorities, is largely redundant given that the relevant documents have already been furnished to the applicant. Finally, the respondent submits that the prayer is unsupported by any legal or evidential foundation as the applicant is qualified to opine on neither the translation of the documents from Bahasa Indonesia into English, nor Indonesian law.

[8] The respondent raises two preliminary points in addition to the above. First, although the applicant describes OA 431 as a judicial review application, he has neither filed a statement as required under O 24 r 5(3)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”) nor sought permission under O 24 r 5(1)(b). He is in any event out of time to seek judicial review of DyPDJ Tan’s decision and is not seeking any of the prerogative orders typical to a judicial review application in OA 431. Second, to the extent the applicant raises complaints about the conduct of the committal proceedings, any such challenge must be brought before the committal court.

[9] The following issues arise for determination. The first two are preliminary matters raised by the respondent that must be addressed, before turning to the latter two that concern the substance of the application:

[10] None of the issues raised by the applicant support his application, which thus fails entirely.

[11] OA 431 is improperly brought for two reasons. The first reason concerns the prayer for bail only. I agree with the respondent that bail applications under s 97(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”) should be brought by way of a petition for criminal revision or a criminal motion: Sakthivel Sivasurian v Public Prosecutor [2023] 5 SLR 1588. Order 1 r 2(8) of the ROC further provides that the civil rules have no application to CPC proceedings, thereby precluding a bail application from being mounted by way of an originating application under the ROC. Further, the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in bail matters is revisionary rather than original in nature: Muhammad Feroz Khan bin Abdul Kader v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 SLR 1062. The revisionary jurisdiction is subject to a demanding threshold that requires the applicant to demonstrate that a material and serious injustice has resulted from the lower court’s error, and this was noted too in the Bail Decision at [12]. The applicant, having brought its prayer for bail directly before the High Court by way of a civil originating application, has not used the appropriate procedure for bail relief.

[12] The second reason concerns all three principal reliefs sought: bail, disclosure and expert evidence. The reliefs may perhaps permissibly be brought before the High Court, rather than directly in the ongoing committal proceedings in the State Courts, if the application were truly one for judicial review. However, I agree with the respondent that OA 431 cannot properly be so characterised. Judicial review invokes the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions of public bodies and is ordinarily pursued through the public law remedies available in such proceedings: Gobi a/l Avedian v Attorney-General [2020] SGCA 77 (“Gobi”) at [44]. An applicant must also follow the prescribed procedure, including obtaining permission before proceeding: Gobi at [44]. The ROC 2021 enshrines this requirement in O 24 r 5(1)(b). None of this was done here. I acknowledge that the applicant’s submissions, besides stating that he is making an application for judicial review, make passing reference to the judicial review framework on illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. But invoking the language of judicial review does not make an application one for judicial review. The applicant has sought neither a prerogative order nor any other public law remedy. Instead, he seeks bail, disclosure and permission to adduce expert evidence, none of which are remedies capable of arising from the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. The label the applicant has chosen to attach to OA 431 does not, unfortunately, alter its true character.

[13] It follows that OA 431 is not founded on a proper legal basis and must fail for that reason. The applicant’s complaints are addressed below only to show that even if given the benefit of the doubt on the above, they would not ground the reliefs sought.

[14] I must emphasise that this insistence on proper procedure is not mere red tape. The proper process must be followed, so that it is clear what rules and what standards apply. The court’s powers are derived from these procedural rules and can only be invoked if the procedure laid down according to law are followed. Using an improper process risks confusing matters.

[15] The applicant’s fundamental concern is that the legal and documentary requirements for his arrest, continued detention and extradition have not been satisfied. Five issues are complained of:

(a) that Documents A and B are materially different in their content and legal meaning and/or effect, such that Document B cannot be regarded as an accurate translation of Document A;

(b) that Document A is not accompanied by an authenticated translation;

(c) that the required document (a “surat penahanan”) is therefore absent from the extradition request; and

(d) that the person who signed the documents lacked the authority to do so. In respect of the first two, the applicant contends that the court should not simply assume that Document B is a correct translation of Document A.

[16] On the first issue, the applicant submits that Documents A and B, as defined at [2] above, are not equivalent in content or legal effect. In the Indonesian language, “penangkapan” denotes a temporary apprehension for the purpose of investigation or examination, and under Articles 16–18 of the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure (the “KUHAP”), such an apprehension is subject to a prescribed time limit of one day. “Penahanan”, by contrast, refers to detention or remand following the relevant investigative steps, as provided under Article 21 of the KUHAP. Document A employs the expression “surat perintah penangkapan” (ie, an order for temporary apprehension for investigative purposes) whereas Document B describes the document as an “arrest warrant”. The applicant submits that the latter expression more accurately corresponds to a “surat penahanan”.

[17] On the second issue, the applicant further submits that Document A is not accompanied by an authenticated translation. This is unlike the other Indonesian-language documents in the extradition request which are accompanied by authenticated English translations. The applicant contends that the court should not simply assume that Document B is an accurate translation of Document A.

[18] The applicant submits that two consequences follow from its above observations. First, Document B should not be relied upon as the English equivalent of Document A merely because it describes the document as an “arrest warrant”. Second, and more fundamentally, the applicant contends that the Indonesian-language extradition request does not contain the “surat penahanan” which, on his interpretation of the applicable treaty requirement, is required. Instead, it contains a “surat perintah penangkapan”, which he says is a document concerning apprehension for examination rather than detention.

[19] The final complaint concerns the authority of the signatory. Article 162 of the KUHAP provides that an arrest or apprehension order must be issued by an investigator or assistant investigator, but both Documents A and B were signed by Nurul Ghufron solely in his capacity as Vice Chairman of the KPK with no indication that he was acting as an investigator. The applicant contrasts this with other documents in the extradition request in which the Director of Investigation and the Chairman of the KPK expressly signed in their investigative capacity. The applicant further relies on Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 49/PUU-XI/2013, which establishes that the authority of the KPK leadership must be exercised collectively and collegially. The KPK leadership comprises five persons, but Documents A and B lack endorsement from the remaining four members. The applicant therefore submits that Ghufron did not possess legal authority to issue the document, did not sign it in the legally required capacity and contravened the rule on collectivity and collegiality.

[20] Two points clearly go against what the applicant argues.

[21] First, the applicant himself is uncertain whether Document B is even a translation of Document A, having stated only that the two documents “appear substantially similar in their format and presentation” and that “[t]his gives the impression that Document B is intended to be an English translation of Document A”. A mistranslation complaint premised on that degree of uncertainty is difficult to sustain.

[22] Second, it is in any event well-established that under O 3 r 7 of the ROC, all documents filed or used in court must be in the English language and accompanied translations are certified by a court interpreter or verified by an affidavit or a person qualified to translate the document. It has been emphasised that this is not a mere technicality – only a court interpreter or qualified translator is competent to provide the requisite translation, and a court cannot itself supply a translation in place of the required translation: Lin Yueh Hung v Andreas Vogel & Partner, Rechtsanwaelte, AV & P Legal LLP [2024] SGHC 31 at [41]–[44]. Such certified or verified translations being authoritative, the court does not look behind the face of these officially translated documents unless there is good reason to do so. Where a party seeks to challenge a translation, it must place before the court a proper evidential basis for doing so and a bare assertion as to the meaning of the foreign-language document is insufficient. In any event, these are matters properly for DyPDJ Tan to consider in the committal proceedings.

[23] I accept that there is, at least on the applicant’s case, a potential distinction between “penangkapan” and “penahanan”, and that the distinction may have legal significance under Indonesian law. The fact that both expressions may be translated into English using the word “arrest” does not, without more, establish that the expressions are legally interchangeable.

[24] However, I need not make any finding as to whether the documents have been mistranslated, nor whether the signatory lacked authority, both of which turn on questions of Indonesian law. It suffices for present purposes that even taking the applicant’s complaints at their highest, they do not lead to the reliefs sought. I explain why below.

[25] On bail, the default position is that bail is not available to a fugitive apprehended under the Extradition Act. The High Court has the power to grant bail only under s 97 of the CPC, and under s 95(2)(c) of the CPC read with r 6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2018 (“CPR”), bail is available only in the three limited circumstances set out above at [7]. The applicant does not fall within any of them. The only potentially relevant ground is the “sick or infirm” exception, but the applicant has clarified that he does not rely on it. He accepts that it was conclusively rejected in the Bail Decision and instead advances what he terms a “special case” for bail, founded on his complaints about the arrest warrant documents. However, there is no legal basis for bail to be granted on a “special case” or on these facts.

[26] Even if the applicant did rely on the “sick or infirm” exception, the applicant has not placed any medical evidence before this court and offers no more than the bare assertion that he is 72 years old with unspecified medical issues. Those complaints would also revisit the same matters already considered and rejected in the Bail Decision. Accordingly, the prayer for bail is dismissed.

[27] On disclosure, the scope of the applicant’s prayer is not entirely clear. In so far as it can be understood, the applicant appears to seek the disclosure of two categories of documents. The first is documents relating to his designation as a suspect and to the arrest warrant, which appears to include CCTV recordings, audio recordings, meeting records, bank records, company financial records and witness statements. The second is the “surat penahanan” that he alleges to be missing.

[28] The prayer for disclosure is also dismissed, for two reasons. First, as pointed out by the respondent, the material documents have already been disclosed to the applicant. Second, no legal basis has been identified for the disclosure sought. In respect of the various records sought, the Singapore courts are not concerned with the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the requesting state’s case, nor with the internal processes by which the fugitive came to be designated a suspect. Those are matters for the trial in the requesting state. In respect of the “surat penahanan”, the applicant’s complaints about the translation and the signatory’s authority, even if made out, would not entitle him to the production of investigative materials from Indonesia. In any case, such arguments are more appropriately raised in the committal proceedings before DyPDJ Tan, where they can be properly examined with the benefit of the relevant materials and, if necessary, expert evidence on Indonesian law. OA 431 does not afford the court the evidentiary or procedural basis to resolve them at this stage. Accordingly, the prayer for disclosure is also dismissed.

[29] The applicant’s complaints found his prayer for expert evidence. He appears to seek both a linguistic expert and an expert on Indonesia law in light of the nature of his complaints. Although the applicant was born and raised in Indonesia and is a native speaker of Bahasa Indonesia, he acknowledges that he cannot properly opine on the specific legal meanings of the relevant terms or on Indonesian law in this context. The court would also require assistance to assess whether there is merit in his complaints.

[30] The applicant identifies five matters on which he says expert evidence is needed: the legal distinction between “penangkapan” and “penahanan”; the legal nature of Documents A and B; the document required under both the Indonesian and English versions of the extradition treaty; who had the authority to issue and sign the relevant document at the material time; and whether Documents A and B constitute the arrest warrant contemplated under the extradition treaty.

[31] The prayer is dismissed for two reasons. First, as is known to the applicant himself, the respondent already has a translation expert by the name of Mr Richard Siburian. The applicant has not shown why his evidence is unreliable or otherwise insufficient. There must be a legal and factual basis for adducing one’s own expert evidence in response. Second, and as noted above at [28], these matters are more appropriately dealt with in the committal proceedings in the State Courts, where they can be properly examined with the benefit of the full set of facts and materials.

[32] The remaining assorted reliefs sought by the applicant in his written submissions include the clarification of Document A, a direction for a “side-by-side” comparison of Documents A and B and permission to rely on not just Indonesian legal expert evidence but also textbook material. These prayers are dismissed for the similar reason in that they have no properly pleaded legal basis and are more appropriately dealt with in the committal proceedings, and additionally for the reason that they have not been adequately particularised and were mentioned only in passing by the applicant in his submissions.

[33] For the reasons set out above, OA 431 is dismissed in its entirety.