General Division of the High Court · Decided 11 February 2026
Singapore was held the wrong forum for the trial; a case management stay was refused
Welton International Enterprises Pte Ltd and others v Averis Pte Ltd and others
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 34 · Case no. Originating Claim No 926 of 2024 (Registrar’s Appeals No 143, 144, 145, 146 and 147 of 2025)
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Singapore was held the wrong forum for the trial; a case management stay was refused
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraph [185]
There is no fuller plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] Almost 40 years ago, Lord Templeman in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”) – the locus classicus on the question of when a stay would be granted on forum non conveniens grounds (CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 (“Dresdner Kleinwort”) at [25]) – gave a salutary warning to Judges facing jurisdictional matters. His Lordship said (at 465F–G):
- [2]
[2] The need for proportionality in jurisdictional disputes, and “the avoidance of mini-trials and the exercise of judicial restraint, in particular in complex cases”, has been repeated in numerous cases subsequent to Spiliada (Vedanta Resources plc v Lungowe [2020] AC 1045 (“Vedanta Resources”) at [9]). A rationale for this is that jurisdictional challenges can be used to “wear down a poorer party, or by a party with a weak case to prevent, or at least to discourage, a party with a strong case from enforcing its rights” (VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn [2013] 2 AC 337 (“VTB Capital”) at [82]).
- [4]
[4] These observations apply forcefully to substantial jurisdictional challenges like the present case, where the claimants appeal against the decisions of the learned Assistant Registrar Beverly Lim Kai Li (“AR”) to:
(a) stay HC/OC 926/2024 (“OC 926”) on the basis that Singapore is forum non conveniens;
(b) set aside the order, HC/ORC 6183/2024 (“ORC 6183”), granting permission to serve the second, sixth and eight defendants out of jurisdiction; and
(c) stay OC 926 on case management grounds pending final determination of proceedings in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (“RMI”).
- [5]
[5] Having considered the parties’ written and oral submissions, I dismissed the claimants’ appeals in relation to [4(a)] and [4(b)] but allowed the appeal in relation to [4(c)]. I now set out the full grounds of my decision.
Facts
- [6]
[6] OC 926 is an action by the three claimants (collectively, “Claimants”) – Welton International Enterprises Pte Ltd (“Welton”), Kito Investments Pte Ltd (“Kito”), and Abornes International Inc (“Abornes”) – against the eight defendants. At its core, the Claimants’ case is that the eighth defendant – Jahangir Usmanov (“Jahangir”) – had, together with the other defendants, “orchestrated a scheme to siphon assets and funds out of the Claimants to Jahangir and/or entities beneficially owned and/or controlled by Jahangir”, thereby causing loss and/or damage to the Claimants.
Parties to the dispute
- [7]
[7] The Claimants are asset-holding companies that had been incorporated on the instructions of the late Mr Mirabror Usmanov (“Mirabror”), an Uzbekistan national who passed away on or around 15 March 2019. During the lifetime of Mirabror, Christoph Andreas Niemack (“Andreas”) and Felix Faeh (“Felix”), the sixth and seventh defendants respectively, managed the business affairs of Mirabror through incorporating and administering asset-holding companies in various jurisdictions.
- [8]
[8] Abornes was the holding company of Welton and Kito and was incorporated in the RMI on Mirabror’s instructions to Andreas and Felix. Welton and Kito are Singapore-incorporated companies and are wholly owned subsidiaries of Abornes. Prior to Mirabror’s passing on or around 15 March 2019, Mirabror was the sole shareholder of Abornes, and therefore, the (indirect) owner and controller of Welton and Kito.
- [9]
[9] The first defendant, Averis Pte Ltd (“Averis”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of providing corporate management services. Andreas and Felix each hold 50% of the shares of Averis. Felix is also a director of Averis. The second defendant, Interis AG (“Interis”), is a company incorporated in Switzerland, also in the business of providing corporate management services. Andreas is a director of Interis, while Felix is a shareholder (though the amount of his shareholding is and remains unclear). The Claimants have also asserted that Felix had acted as Interis’s “officer, employee, representative and/or agent”, by dint of him using the email addresses faeh@averis.sg and faeh@interis.ch interchangeably in his communications with Abornes’s shareholders after Mirabror’s death.
The agreements between Mirabror, Averis and Interis
- [10]
[10] By way of separate agreements with Mirabror, Averis agreed to provide various corporate secretarial services to Welton and Kito respectively. These services included, amongst others, the appointment of local directors and the management of the companies’ legal and financial affairs. These two agreements, referred to hereinafter as the “Averis/Welton Agreement” and the “Averis/Kito Agreement”, were entered into on 10 March 2012 and 7 August 2018 respectively.
- [11]
[11] Like Averis, Interis entered into an agreement with Mirabror, under which Interis was engaged to provide corporate secretarial services in managing the legal and financial affairs of Abornes. This agreement, referred to as the “Interis/Abornes Agreement”, was entered into on 2 November 2015. In fact, it was pursuant to this agreement that Abornes was incorporated. On or around 14 January 2019, Interis assigned the Interis/Abornes Agreement to Averis by way of an agreement of assignment (“Interis-Averis Assignment”). Averis therefore stepped into the shoes of Interis and assumed the latter’s responsibilities to provide corporate secretarial services to Abornes.
- [12]
[12] Simultaneously, Abornes was managed by a company known as ALP Management Inc Majuro, Marshall Islands (“ALP”) – a company also controlled and/or managed by Andreas and Felix. ALP was, at least until 6 July 2021, the sole director, president, secretary and treasurer of Abornes.
The management of Welton and Kito
- [13]
[13] The third defendant, Tong Chiew Kin (“Tong”), was the sole director of Welton during the period of 31 March 2016 to 6 May 2024. Tong was also the sole director of Kito from 1 November 2023 to 25 November 2024. Both appointments were made by Averis pursuant to the Averis/Welton and Averis/Kito Agreements, under which Felix and Andreas – through Averis – could appoint directors onto the board of Kito and Welton.
- [14]
[14] The fourth defendant, Chuah Lay San (“Chuah”), was a Singaporean citizen who was the sole director of Welton from 6 May 2024 to 25 November 2024. Chuah was appointed as director of Welton by Averis when Tong’s appointment ceased. Similarly, the fifth defendant, Pang De-Chang Aaron (“Pang”) was the sole director of Kito from 31 January 2019 to 1 November 2023. Tong was appointed as director of Kito by Averis following the cessation of Pang’s appointment as director. At all material times, therefore, Welton and Kito had a single director.
- [15]
[15] While Tong, Chuah and Pang admit that they were directors of Welton and/or Kito in the aforementioned periods, they assert that they were at all material times mere nominee directors acting solely on the instructions of Averis. Specifically, the terms of their appointment were governed by “Nominee Director Agreements” entered into between each individual and Averis. These agreements contained terms to the effect that: (a) Averis “acts directly for and on behalf of the beneficial owner” of Welton and/or Kito; (b) Tong, Chuah and Pang may only act on behalf of Welton and/or Kito “in accordance with the written and verbal instructions of Averis at all times”; and (c) Tong, Chuah and Pang may only pledge, sell, assign or otherwise impair the assets of Welton and/or Kito on “the express instructions of Averis”.
The changes in the shareholding of Abornes
- [16]
[16] On or around 15 March 2019, Mirabror passed away intestate. By way of a consent agreement, his family members agreed to distribute Mirabror’s shares in Abornes in the following proportions: (a) 62.5% to Usmanova Rumilya (“Rumilya”), Mirabror’s wife; (b) 12.5% to Jahangir, Mirabror’s son; (c) 12.5% to Usmanova Nargiza (“Nargiza”), Mirabror’s daughter and Jahangir’s sister; (d) 6.25% to Usmanova Dinara (“Dinara”), Mirabror’s granddaughter; and (e) 6.25% to Usmanov Sanjar (“Sanjar”), Mirabror’s grandson (collectively, “Heirs of Mirabror”). It is important to note that this consent agreement had been signed by all five beneficiaries, including Jahangir. Presently, Jahangir disputes the validity of this agreement, and asserts that he had been “named as [his] father’s sole heir in [his] father’s written will and testament”, though there is no evidence to suggest that Jahangir had raised any protests against it when it was signed.
- [17]
[17] Following the distribution of the shares in Abornes pursuant to the consent agreement, there were various transfers between the heirs inter se and the heirs and companies controlled by them:
- [18]
[18] Consequently, as of this date, the shareholding in Abornes is held in the following proportions: (a) 81.25% by Dinara; (b) 12.5% by Comina; and (c) 6.25% by Oriental Star LLC. It is not disputed that, as the majority shareholder of Abornes (which is in turn the sole shareholder of Welton and Kito), Dinara is the driving force behind the Claimants’ present suit against the defendants.
Background to the dispute
Alleged misappropriation/dissipation of Welton’s shares in Ezgu Niyat and Saxovat
- [19]
[19] In their Statement of Claim (“SOC”), the Claimants allege that Averis and Tong exercised their control and management over Welton to facilitate the misappropriation and/or dissipation of its assets. To explain, at the time of Mirabror’s passing, Welton’s most substantial asset lay in its shareholding in two Uzbekistan companies – Ezgu Niyat Ko’p Tarmoqli Tibbiyot Markzai (“Ezgu Niyat”) and Saxovat-Sport-Servis (“Saxovat”). Specifically, Welton held 28% of the shares in Saxovat and 41.6% of the shares of Ezgu Niyat, which are alleged to have a combined value of at least US$9–10m.
- [20]
[20] Welton is no longer a shareholder of Ezgu Niyat and Saxovat. It is the Claimant’s case that Welton’s shares in Ezgu Niyat have been transferred to Dagnall Ltd (“Dagnall”), a company incorporated in the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, for no consideration. Dagnall is alleged to be a company that is controlled by Jahangir. While there is no evidence of any direct transfer between Welton and Dagnall, the latter’s initial shareholding of 54.50% in Ezgu Niyat (when Welton was a shareholder) has increased to 93.30%, with the difference of 38.8% corresponding roughly to Welton’s initial 41.6% stake in Ezgu Niyat.
- [21]
[21] Similarly, Welton’s 28% stake in Saxovat has allegedly been transferred without any consideration to various entities that are beneficially controlled and/or owned by Jahangir. These entities are alleged to be Ardus LLC (“Ardus”), ILK Plyus and Universalint LLC (“Universalint”), all of which are companies incorporated in Uzbekistan. It should be prefaced, however, that there has been no change in ILK Plyus and Ardus’s shareholding in Saxovat on the evidence that has been adduced by the Claimants. Strictly speaking, therefore, the recipient of Welton’s 28% stake in Saxovat, if any, must be Universalint, and not ILK Plyus and/or Ardus.
- [22]
[22] The Claimants have further alleged that the misappropriation and/or dissipation of Welton’s shares in Saxovat have benefitted Jahangir, owing to his control and/or ownership of Ardus, ILK Plyus, Universalint and Dagnall. To elaborate:
(i) An authorised signatory for Professional Nominee Ltd is one Markus Hugelshofer (“Markus”), who is a lawyer that has been on record as representing the interests of Comina and Jahangir. Markus had signed the Annual Financial Returns of Dagnall for the year ending 31 December 2023 on behalf of Professional Directors Ltd and Professional Secretarial Ltd.
(ii) Further, a shareholders’ meeting for Dagnall had been held at a location in Zurich, Switzerland. An online search of this address shows that Markus is a tenant or proprietor at that address.
(iii) The Claimants assert that Dagnall is in fact managed by Markus through Professional Directors Ltd and Professional Secretarial Ltd, which are mere nominee directors. Further, they assert that Markus acts on the instructions of Jahangir, especially since Markus has been on record as representing Jahangir and/or Comina. Therefore, the Claimants argue that Jahangir is “the true and ultimate beneficial owner of Dagnall, which he holds through Markus and Markus’s entities”.
- [23]
[23] In response, Felix (on behalf of Averis) and Tong have denied any wrongdoing on their part. Tong has asserted that Averis had instructed him to execute a power of attorney on behalf of Welton to appoint one Komola Sharipova as its attorney (“Welton POA”). The Welton POA granted Komola Sharipova (“Komola”) wide-ranging powers to, inter alia, deal with Welton’s shares in Ezgu Niyat and Saxovat. This is corroborated by Felix and Averis, who assert that any disposal of Welton’s shares in Ezgu Niyat and Saxovat was conducted by “Uzbekistan citizens and persons authorized under powers of attorney, whom we understand were acting on instructions which ultimately came from [Jahangir]”.
Alleged misappropriation/dissipation of Welton’s receivables
- [24]
[24] The Claimants also asserted that Averis and Tong exercised their control and management over Welton to dissipate and/or misappropriate receivables in Welton’s financial accounts. Specifically, in or around 2020, Averis is said to have caused Tong to write off US$3,321,230 of receivables from the balance sheet of Welton without any basis and without any consideration.
- [25]
[25] In contrast, Felix responded that the receivables were derived from the sale of two Uzbekistan entities named “Angren Shakar” and “Xorazm Shakar”. This sale, Felix asserts, had been conducted in 2018 by “certain Uzbekistan citizens authorised under powers of attorney by [Mirabror] prior to his passing”. Subsequently, in or around 2024, Averis had been provided with information from “persons authorised under powers of attorney by [Mirabror] that in 2018, [that Mirabror] had donated the proceeds [of the sale] in respect of the mentioned receivables to his charitable foundation known as Ezgu Maqsad and transferred some of it to himself”.
- [26]
[26] Tong, on the other hand, stated that as nominee director, all of Welton’s financial statements had been prepared by Averis, and that his role was limited to reviewing them. As such, having been informed by Averis that certain receivables were deemed “uncollectible and should be written off as bad debts”, Tong did not question the said information and proceeded to reflect the US$3,321,230 as written off for the financial year of 2020.
Failure to Defend OC 3417
- [27]
[27] Between 2022 and 2023, Averis issued invoices to Welton, allegedly for fees due and owing in respect of corporate secretarial services provided to Welton under the Averis/Welton Agreement. The total sums due under the invoices was around US$22,866.36 (“Invoiced Sum”). It should be noted that despite Mirabror’s death, Averis continued to provide services to Welton (and for that matter, Kito), apparently pursuant to the Agreement. This was because clause 2 of the Averis/Welton Agreement permitted Averis to bill its fees directly to Welton or Kito.
- [28]
[28] The Claimants assert that Tong, as director of Welton at the relevant time, neglected or otherwise failed to ensure payment of the Invoiced Sum. Instead, on or around 1 April 2024, he signed a promissory note on Welton’s behalf with Averis, under which Welton agreed to provide its shares in Saxovat and Ezgu Niyat as security for the Invoiced Sum. Following the continued default of Welton to pay the Invoiced Sum, on 25 April 2024, Averis commenced MC/OC 3417/2024 in the Magistrates’ Court against Welton, claiming for non-payment of the Invoiced Sum and breach of the promissory note (“OC 3417”).
- [29]
[29] Between 26 April 2024 and 6 May 2024, nothing was done to cause Welton to participate in OC 3417. On 6 May 2024, Tong ceased to be the director of Welton, and Chuah was appointed by Averis in his stead. Welton continued to do nothing despite having been served with OC 3417. Consequently, on 4 June 2024, the Magistrates’ Court granted default judgment against Welton for failing to file a Notice of Intention to Contest or Not Contest.
- [30]
[30] In his defence, Tong argued that all invoices issued by Averis to Welton for services provided by the former would be paid only with the approval of Abornes qua beneficial owner of Welton. As no approval had been given or forthcoming, coupled with the fact that he was not an authorised signatory of Welton’s bank accounts, Tong was not in a position to cause Welton to pay the Invoiced Sum. Tong has also stated that he signed the promissory note on Averis’s instructions, in the genuine and honest belief that the promissory note was part of an arrangement between Averis and the beneficial owner of Welton (ie, Abornes) to settle the Invoiced Sum.
- [31]
[31] Chuah argued that while he had been aware of the commencement of OC 3417 against Welton, he was not in a position to cause Welton to make payment on the invoice because he was not a signatory to Welton’s bank accounts. Additionally, all invoices issued by Averis to Welton for services provided by the latter would be paid only with the approval of Abornes qua beneficial owner of Welton. However, no approval had been given or was forthcoming at the relevant time. Further, it was a term of Chuah’s Nominee Director Agreement with Averis that, in the event of any legal claims against Welton, Averis “shall take over [Chuah’s] role in respect of the same”. While Chuah was permitted under the same term to use Welton’s assets for the defence of claims against it, he was not bound to “if no assets [had been] made available to [him] for this purpose”. Given that no assets had been made available to him, Chuah was not in a position to defend OC 3417.
Alleged misappropriation/dissipation of Kito’s shares in Savdogar Bank
- [32]
[32] I turn now to the assets of Kito which are alleged to have been misappropriated/dissipated by the defendants. As at the time of Mirabror’s death, Kito held 15.66% of the shares in Ezgu Niyat and 18.62% of the shares in Savdogar Bank, which are alleged to be worth approximately US$1.64m and US$2.85m respectively. It is the Claimants’ case that both of these assets had been misappropriated and/or dissipated pursuant to a concerted scheme. The first step in this purported scheme is alleged to have been taken by Pang on 9 January 2020, who as director of Kito caused a power of attorney to be issued to one Bokiev Shokir (“Bokiev”) to represent Kito in relation to the acquisition or disposal of shares in “legal entities in Uzbekistan” (“Kito POA”). The Kito POA was in fact signed by Rumilya, Jahangir, Dinara and Sanjar.
- [33]
[33] On or around 28 July 2020, Bokiev caused Kito to sell its entire stake in Savdogar Bank, a company listed on the Tashkent Stock Exchange, to Jahangir for a price of around US$1.17m (or 50 Uzbekistani Soums per share). The Claimants allege that this sale was at an undervalue as the par value of the shares was 100 Soums per share, and transaction data from the Tashkent Stock Exchange showed that in the period between June and August 2020, the shares of Savdogar Bank had been trading at 173 to 180 Soums per share. Subsequently, on or around 29 November 2021, Jahangir sold the Savdogar Bank shares at 120 Soums per share, being more than double the price at which he acquired the Savdogar Bank shares from Kito.
- [34]
[34] Jahangir does not dispute that Kito’s shares in Savdogar Bank had been sold to him, or that he had profited from their subsequent sale. Instead, his defence lies in the assertion that Kito’s shares had been transferred to him pursuant to the Kito POA, the existence of which was known to and, indeed, consented to by all the Heirs of Mirabror (including Dinara). Further, sometime in July 2019 (ie, prior to the execution of the Kito POA), the Heirs of Mirabror had signed a power of attorney in favour of one Ravshan Ilkhomov, expressly authorising him to sell Kito’s shares in Savdogar Bank at a minimum price of US$732,000. On this basis, Jahangir additionally argued that the sale price of US$1.17m or 50 Soums per share was not at an undervalue, and that the Heirs of Mirabror had all along “consciously planned to withdraw from [Savdogar Bank]”. Lastly, it has also been asserted that it was Nargiza herself who had proposed to issue the Kito POA to Bokiev, an Uzbekistan national who is employed at the Samarkand Tea Packing Factory, which is in turn ultimately owned by Nargiza. In light of these facts, Jahangir argued that there was no affirmative evidence indicating that Bokiev had, or would have, acted on his instructions to transfer the Savdogar shares to him at an undervalue. In rebuttal to this, the Claimants pointed to the fact that, when questioned by, among others, Nargiza as to the alleged undervalue divestment of Kito’s Savdogar Bank shares to Jahangir, Bokiev informed Nargiza that Jahangir forbade him from giving any information to her.
- [35]
[35] In this respect, Averis and Pang have taken the position that they had merely been acting on the instructions of the heirs in executing the Kito POA in favour of Bokiev, and that whatever subsequently transpired was a matter between the heirs and Bokiev.
Alleged misappropriation/dissipation of Kito’s Shares in Ezgu Niyat
- [36]
[36] The Claimants also allege that, on or around 22 June 2020, Averis and Pang exercised their control and management over Kito to cause it to transfer all its shares in Ezgu Niyat to ILK Plyus for no consideration. This transfer was carried out through a “deed of gift” executed and signed by Bokiev on behalf of Kito, ostensibly pursuant to the Kito POA. Subsequently, the Defendants are alleged to have caused ILK Plyus to transfer its stake in Ezgu Niyat to Dagnall, resulting in Dagnall – a company controlled by Jahangir – being the 93.3% shareholder of Ezgu Niyat.
- [37]
[37] The Claimants have also asserted that, sometime in 2020, Averis and Pang had exercised their control over Kito to write off around US$1.81m of receivables that were due and owing to Kito by one Ulidepan Holding AG (“Ulidepan”) without there having been any reasonable basis for the same. It has been alleged that Andreas is the sole director of Ulidepan, a company incorporated in Switzerland. As a result of these actions, Kito reported losses of around S$6.03m in its statements for the financial year of 2020.
The defendants’ alleged scheme to financially paralyse the claimants
- [38]
[38] Sometime in early 2021, Nargiza, who at the material time was a majority shareholder of Abornes, became aware of what she perceived to be Jahangir’s “attempts to unlawfully steal the assets of Abornes and its subsidiaries Welton and Kito with the help of the other Defendants”. Consequently, on or around 16 April 2021, in a bid to prevent any further harm to the Claimants, Nargiza wrote to Interis, ALP and Felix, requesting an annual shareholder meeting be called pursuant to the Business Corporations Act of the RMI. However, despite more than 13 months having elapsed since the last annual meeting of Abornes’s shareholders, no meeting was called by Interis, ALP and/or Felix. The Claimants allege that Interis, ALP and Felix had been acting on the instructions of Jahangir when they refused to call for the meeting.
- [39]
[39] Subsequently, owing to the inaction of Interis, ALP and/or Felix, Nargiza proceeded to call for a “special meeting” of Abornes’s shareholders on 28 April 2020. The meeting was held on 6 July 2021, wherein the majority of Abornes’s shareholders resolved to: (a) dismiss ALP from its position as the sole director, president, secretary and treasurer of Abornes; (b) appoint an independent individual, Ms Ingrid Vanessa Sucre Yunda (“Ingrid”) as the sole director of Abornes; and (c) to appoint Ingrid as the president, secretary and treasurer of Abornes (“Resolutions”). Immediately after the meeting, Ingrid requested Andreas, Felix, Averis, Interis and ALP to, inter alia, hand over the books and records of Abornes over to her as the new director and officer of Abornes. Ingrid’s request was not complied with despite the shareholders’ resolutions in the 6 July 2021 meeting.
- [40]
[40] On 25 April 2022, Dinara commenced proceedings against Abornes in the RMI by way of Civil Action No. 2022-00941 (“Civil Action 941”), seeking declaratory judgment to the effect that the Resolutions are valid and binding on Abornes and Abornes’s shareholders, as well as Averis, Interis and ALP (and their directors and officers). Judgment was granted in favour of Dinara by the High Court of the RMI on 10 April 2024. While Civil Action 941 had been ongoing, Jahangir, by way of an email dated 8 May 2022, warned Dinara that: (a) Civil Action 941 would “lead to a compete asset freeze and potential further investigative measures to examine the companies’ activities throughout their existence, resulting in irreparable consequences for everyone”; and (b) he would “buy out all the shares of [Dinara’s] Uzbek enterprises that do not belong to [Dinara]”.
- [41]
[41] On 9 May 2022, Felix informed the Heirs of Mirabror that the bank account of Abornes with Mirabaud Bank (“Mirabaud Account”) had been frozen “due to ongoing legal proceedings” and that Mirabaud Bank “may decide to close the account”. Further, Felix informed the other shareholders of Abornes that he had been informed by Mirabaud Bank that “money transfers have been made from the bank account that are contrary to the interests of [Abornes]”, and that the signatory rights of Ingrid qua director of Abornes had been “revoked to prevent further payments”.
- [42]
[42] It is the Claimants’ case that, between 2022 and 2023, despite having knowledge of Abornes’ bank account being frozen and that it would consequently be unable to make any payments, Interis and Averis continued to invoice Abornes and Welton for services provided. The quantum of these invoices rendered amounted to $22,866.36, and were the same invoices that Averis had relied upon in OC 3417 to obtain default judgment against Welton. Subsequently, on or around 19 January 2023, Interis applied to the District Court of Zurich in Switzerland for an order to freeze the sums of US$206,653.45 and US$2,792.25 in Abornes’s Mirabaud Account, on account of outstanding fees purportedly owed to Averis by Abornes, Welton and Kito. Andreas was the signatory of the application to the District Court of Zurich. On or around 27 May 2023, a Deed of Arrest was issued by the District Court of Zurich, which had the effect of freezing the sums of US$206.653.45 and US$2,792.25 in Abornes’s Mirabaud Account. The Deed of Arrest was subsequently set aside by the District Court of Zurich, and Interis’s appeal against the decision was dismissed.
- [43]
[43] The Claimants allege that the foregoing events were part of a deliberately concocted scheme to “paralyse the Claimants financially by freezing Abornes’[s] bank account [with Mirabaud]”. Specifically, they allege that there was no legal basis for Abornes’s bank account to have been frozen, or for Ingrid’s signatory rights to the Mirabaud Account to have been revoked. In this respect, the Claimants argued that Felix, Andreas, Averis, Interis and/or ALP had been acting on the instructions of Jahangir when they: (a) ignored the instructions of Nargiza to call for the “special meeting” of Abornes’s shareholders; (b) caused Abornes’s Mirabaud Account to be frozen; (c) caused Ingrid’s signatory rights to the Mirabaud Account to be revoked; and (d) caused the Deed of Arrest to have been issued by the District Court of Zurich. In addition, the Claimants have asserted that, by commencing two distinct suits in two separate jurisdictions on the same Invoiced Sum, Averis and Interis are abusing the processes of the Switzerland and/or the Singapore Courts.
The claimants’ claims
- [44]
[44] By virtue of the abovementioned facts, the Claimants make the following claims in their SOC against the defendants on either an individual or collective basis. In relation to the claims against Averis, it has been alleged that:
- [45]
[45] In relation to the claims against Tong, the Claimants alleged that:
- [46]
[46] In relation to the claims against Chuah, the Claimants have alleged that:
- [47]
[47] In relation to the claims against Pang, the Claimants have alleged that:
- [48]
[48] In relation to the claims against Jahangir, the Claimants have alleged that:
- [49]
[49] Last, but not least, the Claimants have alleged that all the defendants had conspired and combined together with the intent to injure the Claimants by lawful and/or unlawful means. Specifically, the defendants are alleged to have conspired to transfer the assets of Welton and Kito to Jahangir and/or entities beneficially owned or controlled by him. This claim in conspiracy has been pleaded as comprising of the following key components:
Procedural history
The proceedings in the Marshall Islands
- [50]
[50] The proceedings in the Singapore Courts were preceded by an earlier set of proceedings filed by Comina in the RMI. On 16 April 2024, Comina commenced Civil Action No. 2024-00526 (“Civil Action 526”) against Abornes. The background to this dispute stems from the fact that Abornes, on 21 August 2019, had authorised the issuance of 2,000 registered shares by amending its articles of incorporation. These registered shares had been issued to the Heirs of Mirabror in exchange for their shares for Abornes which had hitherto been held in bearer form. The crux of Comina’s claim in this respect is that Abornes had failed to comply with the recording requirements of the Business Corporation Act of the RMI (“BCA”), which requires corporations to, inter alia, maintain records of shareholders and beneficial owners of bearer shares.
- [51]
[51] In Civil Action 526, Comina sought declaratory judgment on two counts:
- [52]
[52] In response to Comina’s filing of Civil Action 526, Abornes filed a motion to dismiss on 17 June 2024. After a hearing of the motion, the High Court of the RMI issued an Order dismissing Count 2 on 20 November 2024. Abornes then proceeded to file a motion for summary judgment in relation to Count 1 on 18 February 2025.
- [53]
[53] On 4 September 2025, Chief Justice Carl B. Ingram of the High Court of the RMI granted Abornes’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Comina’s remaining request for declaratory judgment under Count 1. In summary, the learned Chief Justice held:
- [54]
[54] On 3 October 2025, Comina (through Jahangir) filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of Chief Justice Carl B. Ingram. The questions raised by the appeal relate mainly to whether the RMI Court had interpreted and applied various RMI legislation correctly in determining the validity of Abornes’s shares. The appeal remains underway in the Supreme Court of the RMI.
Decision below
- [55]
[55] Upon the Claimants’ filing of their SOC, the Defendants took out various applications (either individually or collectively) to stay OC 926 on grounds of forum non conveniens and/or case management. As Interis, Andreas and Jahangir had been served the OC and SOC out of jurisdiction pursuant to the Court’s order in ORC 6183, they applied to set aside ORC 6183 as well.
HC/RA 144/2025 & HC/RA 146/2025
- [56]
[56] On 4 March 2025, Averis filed HC/SUM 579/2025, applying to this Court for, amongst others, an order that the proceedings against Averis be stayed in their entirety on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Similarly, on 5 May 2025, Felix filed HC/SUM 1213/2025, applying to this Court for, amongst others, an order that the proceedings against him be stayed in their entirety on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
- [57]
[57] On 15 July 2025, the AR granted both orders, holding that OC 926 be stayed in its entirety on the grounds of forum non conveniens as against Averis and Felix. In relation to the stay on forum non conveniens grounds, the AR applied the principles governing the grant of the same as set out in Spiliada. Having done so, she concluded that Singapore was not the appropriate forum, and that Uzbekistan is “a clearly or distinctly more appropriate forum than Singapore”. First, applying stage one of the Spiliada test, the AR reasoned:
- [58]
[58] Turning then to stage two of the Spiliada test, the AR refused to hold that Dinara and/or the Claimants would be unable to have a fair trial in Uzbekistan despite the Claimants’ allegations that: (a) Jahangir poses a threat to Dinara’s safety; and (b) the integrity of court processes in Uzbekistan was compromised. On this basis, the AR held that Singapore was forum non conveniens for the resolution of OC 926 and ordered a stay of the same in its entirety as against Averis and Felix.
(1) Claimants’ case
- [59]
[59] In HC/RA 144/2025 (“RA 144”) and HC/RA 146/2025 (“RA 146”), the Claimants appealed against the decision of the AR to stay OC 926 on the basis that Singapore is forum non conveniens. First, the Claimants argued that Singapore is the more appropriate forum for OC 926 to be heard at stage one of the Spiliada test, on the basis that:
- [60]
[60] In addition, the Claimants also argued that the AR erred in refusing to find that there would be a real risk that the Claimants would be denied substantial justice in Uzbekistan under stage two of the Spiliada test. Namely, the Claimants argued that there are “grave and genuine doubts” regarding their ability to obtain a fair and impartial hearing in Uzbekistan, particularly due to Jahangir’s alleged “influence and conduct”. In support of this allegation, the Claimants pointed to:
HC/RA 143/2025 & HC/RA 147/2025
- [61]
[61] On 4 March 2025, Jahangir filed HC/SUM 586/2025, applying to this Court to set aside ORC 6183 which granted the Claimants permission to serve Jahangir, Interis and Andreas out of jurisdiction. Similarly, on 5 May 2025, Interis and Andreas filed HC/SUM 1214/2025, applying to this Court to set aside ORC 6183 as well.
- [62]
[62] On 15 July 2025, the AR granted Jahangir, Interis and Andreas’s applications to set aside ORC 6183. Preliminarily, the AR rejected their arguments that there was no serious question to be tried on the merits of the Claimants’ case. Though the Claimants had no conclusive evidence with regards to their claims in conspiracy or knowing receipt, it was unnecessary for the Claimants to have such evidence at the jurisdictional stage, given that the Claimants had raised indirect evidence of the same. In any case, even if the conspiracy claim, as pleaded in the SOC, were lacking particulars (which the AR did not agree with), “the claim in conspiracy only constitute[d] one part of the claim[s]” in OC 926.
- [63]
[63] However, the AR proceeded to set aside ORC 6183. First, as Singapore was not the forum conveniens for the trial of OC 926, it followed that a crucial element required for the grant of service out under Order 8, Rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 – viz, that Singapore is “the appropriate court to hear the action” – was not satisfied (see paragraph 63(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021).
- [64]
[64] Next, the AR held that the Claimants had failed to discharge their duty to provide full and frank disclosure of all material facts, namely: (a) the existence of Civil Action 526; (b) the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Uzbekistan Courts in the constitution of Ezgu Niyat; (c) the exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Swiss Courts in the Interis/Abornes Agreement; and (d) the fact that the Uzbekistan Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes relating to the ownership of shares in Uzbekistan companies. Whilst the AR recognised that the Court has the discretion as to whether to set aside a service out order for non-compliance with the duty of full and frank disclosure, she proceeded to set aside ORC 6183 as Singapore had been found not to be the appropriate forum.
(1) Claimants’ case
- [65]
[65] In HC/RA 143/2025 (“RA 143”) and HC/RA 147/2025 (“RA 147”), the Claimants appealed against the AR’s decision to set aside ORC 6183 on the basis that Singapore is not the forum conveniens and that the Claimant had breached its duty of disclosure. First, in relation to the existence of Civil Action 526, the Claimants argued this was not a material fact as there were no overlapping issues between OC 926 and Civil Action 526. Second, in relation to the existence of exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the constitution of Ezgu Niyat and the Interis/Abornes Agreement, the Claimants argued that this is “a neutral factor at best”. This, the Claimants argued, was because OC 926 concerned “the wrongful acts committed by the Defendants against the Claimants”. It was neither “a shareholder dispute between the shareholders of Ezgu Niyat”, nor was it a claim founded directly on the Interis/Abornes Agreement for a breach of contract. The clauses did not “oust the Singapore Court’s jurisdiction to hear the said claims” and therefore were not “material facts” that ought to have been disclosed.
HC/RA 145/2025
- [66]
[66] On 26 March 2025, Tong, Chuah and Pang filed HC/SUM 808/2025, applying to this Court for an order that OC 926 be stayed pending the final determination of Civil Action 526 by the Courts of the RMI (including any appeals therefrom). On 15 July 2025, the AR granted the order, holding that a case management stay was appropriate in the circumstances as Civil Action 526 “may determine” OC 926. Namely, a possible outcome of Civil Action 526 was that Dinara – who is the driving force behind OC 926 – would no longer be the majority shareholder of Abornes. Additionally, Civil Action 526 had been commenced before OC 926, and was therefore at a more advanced stage than OC 926 where jurisdiction is still being disputed.
- [67]
[67] While the Claimants had adduced an expert opinion from Dr Klaus Dimigen (“Dimigen”) to the effect that Civil Action 526 had no bearing on OC 926, the AR placed “little weight” on the opinion as Dr Dimigen had failed to disclose that he had acted for Dinara in Civil Action 941, and that he had been the Chairman of the shareholders’ meeting for Abornes on July 2021 where Ingrid had been appointed in replacement of ALP as the sole director, president, secretary and treasurer of Abornes. Additionally, Dr Dimigen’s reasoning was “hard to follow”. While Dr Dimigen stated that it was “absolutely impossible” that the RMI Courts would render a decision on whether Abornes’ shares were invalid since Comina would also lose its shares (and consequently, its standing to pursue Civil Action 526), this appeared to be “inconsistent with the decision of the [RMI] Court to let the matter proceed to trial”.
(1) Claimants’ case
- [68]
[68] In HC/RA 145/2025, the Claimants appealed against the AR’s decision to grant the case management stay. They said that it would be “premature” for this Court to even consider granting a case management stay at this stage, as there were no “separate legal proceedings giving rise to a real risk of overlapping issues”. This was because, in the main, Civil Action 526 was concerned with whether the conversion of Abornes’s shares from bearer form to registered form had been validly conducted by the TCMI. This, the Claimants said, was “unrelated” to OC 926, which concerned “potential damages claims against directors and purported beneficial owners”. Hence, even if little weight were to be placed on Dr Dimigen’s opinion, there was “no real or material overlap” between the issues to be determined in OC 926 and those in Civil Action 526, and consequently no grounds to stay OC 926 temporarily on a case management basis.
- [69]
[69] In any case, on 20 November 2024, the RMI Court had dismissed Comina’s prayer for declaratory judgment on Count 2 (ie, that the purported transfer of 1,625 shares of Abornes to Dinara is not valid and that Dinara does not own 1,625 shares in Abornes), on the basis that Comina lacked standing and had failed to join “indispensable parties”. Accordingly, the AR was wrong to have held that Civil Action 526 may potentially determine OC 926 by removing Dinara as the majority shareholder of Abornes. There were neither any overlaps, nor any dependency, between Civil Action 526 or OC 926 that warrants the latter being stayed on case management grounds.
- [70]
[70] It should, however, be prefaced that a week before the hearing of these appeals, on 4 September 2025, the High Court of the RMI issued its decision in respect of Civil Action 526, dismissing Comina’s prayer on Count 1. However, given that the case management stay ordered by the AR covered “any appeals arising” from Civil Action 526, the issue of whether this stay should be set aside remained a live issue before this Court. As noted above, Jahangir – who controls Comina – had confirmed to this Court that an appeal will be filed.
Issues to be determined
- [71]
[71] Based on the foregoing, the issues that arose in this appeal were:
Issue 1: Whether Singapore is the Forum Conveniens
Stage one of Spiliada
- [72]
[72] The legal principles governing applications for a stay on the ground of forum non conveniens as set out by Lord Goff in Spiliada are trite and proceeds in two broad stages. At the first stage, the burden is on the applicant to show that there is another forum which is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Singapore” for the trial of the dispute (Ivanishvili, Bidzina v Credit Suisse Trust Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 638 (“Ivanishvili”) at [82], citing Dresdner Kleinwort at [26]). This behoves the Court to undertake an inquiry as to the connecting factors that link the dispute with the connecting jurisdictions, some of which are: (a) the personal connections of the parties and the witnesses; (b) the connections to the relevant events and transactions; (c) the applicable law to the dispute; (d) the existence of proceedings elsewhere; and (e) the “shape of the litigation”, which is simply a “shorthand for the manner in which the claim and the defence have been pleaded” (Ivanishvili at [82]; Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International [2017] 2 SLR 265 (“Rappo Tania”) at [71]; JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”) at [41]–[42]).
- [73]
[73] This non-exhaustive list of connecting factors follows from the broader definition of the “natural forum” – viz, that with which “the action has the most real and substantial connection” (Spiliada at 478A; Dresdner Kleinwort at [26]). Needless to say, the weight and significance given to any individual connecting factor “varies in different cases and the ultimate appraisal ought to reflect the exigencies dictated by the factual matrix” (Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw Investments”) at [15], citing Peter Rogers May v Pinder Lillian Gek Lian [2006] 2 SLR(R) 381 at [20]). Ultimately, the aim of a Court tasked with identifying the natural forum is to ascertain whether any of the connections point towards a jurisdiction in which the case may be “tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice” (Rappo Tania at [72], citing Spiliada at 476C).
- [74]
[74] Before delving into the analysis of the natural forum proper, it is apt to say a word on the “burden of proof” in cases like the present. Strictly speaking, as the question of whether a given jurisdiction is forum non conveniens or forum conveniens is a question of law, the burden of showing that a given jurisdiction is the natural forum is not a “burden of proof”. Instead, the burden is one of persuasion, which entails “demonstrating the normative weight to be given to each connecting factor in light of all the circumstances of the case” (Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007 (“Holdrich Investment”) at [7]; Yeo Tiong Min SC, Commercial Conflict of Laws (Academy Publishing, 2023) (“CCL”) at para 4.002). This is to be distinguished from the burden that a party bears in proving the existence of a fact which is relied on to show that a given jurisdiction is the forum non conveniens or forum conveniens, which is properly termed as a “burden of proof”. In such cases, the general rule that he who alleges must prove applies (Holdrich Investment at [6]).
- [75]
[75] Moving to the question of the incidence of this burden, in stay applications where a given defendant has been served in the jurisdiction, and it is the defendant who applies for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds, the burden of showing that there is a foreign forum that is clearly or more distinctly appropriate than Singapore lies on the defendant-applicant (Rappo Tania at [69]; Rickshaw Investments at [14]). In contrast, where a claimant seeks leave (on an ex parte basis) to serve a defendant out of jurisdiction under Order 8, Rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2021, the burden of showing that Singapore is the forum conveniens lies on the claimant-applicant (paragraph 63(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021). The claimant continues to retain that burden even at the inter partes stage, when the defendant – having been served – applies to the Singapore Court to set aside the order granting the claimant permission to serve the defendant out of jurisdiction (Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (“Broadcast Solutions”) at [75]). The rationale for this difference lies in the fact that jurisdiction is primarily territorial in nature, and hence there must be judicial caution in compelling “a foreigner, who owes no allegiance here, to the inconvenience and annoyance of being brought to contest his rights in this country” (Spiliada at 481C, citing Société Générale de Paris v Dreyfus Brothers (1885) 29 Ch D 239 at 242-243; Holdrich Investment at [7]; Broadcast Solutions at [72]).
- [76]
[76] Here, Averis and Felix are applying for a stay on forum non conveniens grounds, and thus, the burden is on them to satisfy this Court that there is another forum which is clearly more appropriate than Singapore to hear OC 926. In contrast, Interis, Andreas and Jahangir are applying to set aside permission granted to the Claimants to serve them out of jurisdiction. It follows that the Claimants retain the burden of showing that Singapore is the forum conveniens for the trial of OC 926. Whilst the difference in the incidence of the relevant burden should be borne in mind, the Court may, in such circumstances, “consider the question in the round and ask which jurisdiction is the natural or most appropriate forum for the trial of the action” (Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2023) at para 75.097; Broadcast Solutions at [80]).
- [77]
[77] To recapitulate, the claims against Averis in these proceedings are that of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and unlawful means conspiracy. The claims against Jahangir are in knowing receipt and unlawful means conspiracy. Finally, the claims against Interis, Andreas and Felix are in unlawful means conspiracy. Though Tong, Chuah and Pang do not challenge the existence or the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over OC 926, their alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in causing Welton and Kito to transfer their assets to entities controlled by Jahangir are said to be part of the conspiracy against the Claimants. In such a case where multiple claims are advanced against multiple defendants, it is necessary to determine what the natural forum is “for each separate action” (Adeline Chong & Yip Man, Singapore Private International Law: Commercial Issues and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2023) (“Chong & Man”) at para 3.141). The parties’ submissions, which appear to amalgamate the various actions into a single composite analysis, have therefore been approached with a degree of caution.
The parties’ connections
- [78]
[78] Turning first to the connections of the parties, these are determined not only at the time of litigation, but also at the time of the relevant events constituting the action (Chong & Man at para 3.156). Welton and Kito are companies incorporated in Singapore who, at the relevant time, had directors ordinarily resident in Singapore (ie, Tong, Chuah and Pang). Their parent company, Abornes, is a company incorporated in the RMI, while Dinara, who is presently the majority shareholder of Abornes, is an Uzbekistan citizen residing in the United Arab Emirates. Tong, Chuah and Pang, who were the nominee directors of Welton and/or Kito at the relevant time, are Singaporean citizens who were (and are) resident in Singapore.
- [79]
[79] Against this, Interis is a company incorporated in Switzerland from where it appears to carry on its business. Further, Andreas and Felix are Swiss citizens residing in Switzerland. While Averis is a company incorporated in Singapore, it is beneficially owned by Andreas and Felix, who are 50-50 shareholders. Jahangir, in contrast, is an Uzbekistan citizen who is resident in Uzbekistan. The connections of the parties, in this regard, do not point clearly towards a single forum. Indeed, it has been said that, in a cross-border dispute such as this, where the parties are resident in different jurisdictions, the parties’ connections as a connecting factor is simply a neutral one (Chong & Man at para 3.156; Cosmetic Care Asia Ltd v Sri Linarti Sasmito [2021] SGHC 157 (“Cosmetic Care”) at [129]–[131]). As such, I treated it as such and found it not to be a helpful connecting factor in the present case.
Location and compellability of witnesses
- [80]
[80] Generally, the physical location of witnesses has assumed a reduced significance in the forum non conveniens analysis, owing to the widespread adoption of communications technology that allows for witnesses to give evidence remotely (eg, video-link evidence) (Lakshimi Anil Salgaocar v Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra [2019] 2 SLR 372 (“Lakshimi”) at [72]). Despite this, the courts have been willing to assume that it would “typically be easier to secure the evidence of witnesses in the jurisdiction where they are located” [emphasis in original] (Ivanishvili at [96]). Of course, the location (and compellability) of witnesses gains significance as a connecting factor in the forum non conveniens analysis where the case will turn on issues of fact, and where the relevant witnesses are not under the control of any of the parties to the suit (Ivanishvili at [84]; Lakshimi at [73]). Further, since it is the claimants who wish to pursue their claims in Singapore, the Court will not “usually be overly concerned with the availability of evidence for the [claimant’s] case”. Rather, the focus is on “the potential prejudice to the defendant in running its defence that is likely to be significant” [emphasis in original] (Ivanishvili at [86]).
- [81]
[81] It is likely that the resolution of the dispute in OC 926 will require the resolution of both questions of law and fact. Examples of questions of law that may arise are: (a) whether Averis did owe Welton and Kito fiduciary duties; (b) whether the Claimants can enforce the Welton/Averis and Kito/Averis Agreements against Averis despite the Claimants not being party to the agreements; and (c) whether Jahangir can be liable for knowing receipt despite the fact that it had been his companies and not himself, personally, which had received the shares.
- [82]
[82] On the other hand, there are also important questions of fact that must be resolved for the determination of OC 926. Specifically:
- [83]
[83] From the factual issues listed above, it is evident that cross-examination by the defendants of (a) the other heirs, such as Rumilya, Nargiza and Sanjar; (b) Bokiev and Komola; and (c) the other POA holders referred to by Felix in his affidavit will be necessary. Yet, given that these key non-party witnesses are resident in Uzbekistan (save for Nargiza, who is resident in Cyprus), they would not be compellable in Singapore. Consequently, prejudice would be caused to the defendants if they were required to defend OC 926 in Singapore without the testimony of these key witnesses (Ivanishvili at [94]; MAN Diesel & Turbo SE v IM Skaugen SE [2020] 1 SLR 327 (“IM Skaugen”) at [148]). While the defendants have not shown that the witnesses are unwilling to testify in Singapore, the fact that there are key witnesses who remain non-compellable is nonetheless a factor that militates against Singapore being the natural forum (Sinopec International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Bank of Communications Co Ltd [2024] 3 SLR 476 (“Sinopec International”) at [88]–[91]; CCL at para 4.035). This, therefore, is a factor that points towards Uzbekistan being the natural forum.
Applicable law
- [84]
[84] At the stage of jurisdiction, the Court is entitled to decide the stay application based on its prima facie view on the governing law (Yeoh Poh San v Wong Siok Wan [2002] SGHC 196 at [15]). The relevance of the governing law in the jurisdictional stage is that, where a claim is governed by a foreign lex causae, it would generally be more efficient and conducive to justice for the case to be tried in the forum whose law applies (Rickshaw Investments at [42]; VTB Capital at [46]). The weight to be accorded to the governing law as a connecting factor, naturally, depends on whether the material or dispositive issues arising out of a case are factual or legal in nature (Cosmetic Care at [73]; Shen Sophie v Xia Wei Ping [2023] 3 SLR 1092 (“Sophie Shen”) at [124], [114]; Chong & Man at para 3.163).
- [85]
[85] Turning then to the applicable law, it should be noted that the law governing the claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, knowing receipt and unlawful means conspiracy may not necessarily be the same as the relevant choice of law rules are different. Hence, it is prudent to approach them sequentially, starting with the claims for breaches of fiduciary duty asserted by Welton and Kito against Tong, Chuah and Pang.
(1) Breach of fiduciary duties
- [86]
[86] Generally, it has been held that in determining the law governing a claim for breach of an equitable obligation, it is necessary to investigate the root source of that obligation to see if it arises from “a factual matrix where the legal foundation is premised on an independent established category such as contract or tort” (Rickshaw Investments at [81]). If this is answered in the affirmative, the choice of law rule for that established category will apply to the equitable claim (Rickshaw Investments at [81]; Chong & Man at para 9.22). In relation to a claim for breach of a director’s fiduciary duty to a company, it has been held that the law of the place of incorporation of the company will be the governing law (Focus Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1086 (“Focus Energy”) at [31]–[33]). It follows that the claims made by Welton and Kito, both of which are incorporated in Singapore, against their directors – Tong, Chuah and Pang – are all governed by Singapore law.
(2) Breach of contract
- [87]
[87] Next, turning to Welton and Kito’s claims against Averis for breach of the Averis/Welton and Averis/Kito Agreements respectively, these claims fall to be governed by Singapore law. This is because the Agreements contain an express choice of Singapore law as the law governing the contract. As a matter of law, where there is an express choice of law made by the parties to a contract, it is “virtually conclusive of the proper law governing the law contract” (Peh Teck Quee v Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale [1999] 3 SLR(R) 842 at [17]). There was some difficulty in this regard as Welton and Kito are not party to the Averis/Welton and Averis/Kito Agreements respectively. Nonetheless, I found that both questions as to: (a) Welton and Kito’s standing to enforce these Agreements; and (b) the scope and content of Averis’s obligations under these Agreements were governed by Singapore law. These questions raised issues as to privity of contract and contractual interpretation, which were clearly issues governed by the lex contractus.
- [88]
[88] In relation to Welton’s and Kito’s claims against Averis for breach of fiduciary duty, the Claimants’ argument is that Averis owed Welton and Kito fiduciary duties as it had been “engaged to act in the service of Welton’s interests to the exclusion of its own interests” under the Averis/Welton and the Averis/Kito Agreements (see [44(b)] and [44(d)] above). The juridical basis of the fiduciary duties alleged to be owed by Averis therefore finds its roots in the Averis/Welton and Averis/Kito Agreements. Accordingly, the governing law for Averis’s claims for breach of fiduciary duties against Welton and Kito ought to be the same as that governing those particular contracts, which is Singapore law (Rickshaw Investments at [83]).
(3) Conspiracy
- [89]
[89] Turning next to the claim in conspiracy, it is trite law that the choice of law rule for tortious claims is the double actionability rule. This rule states that, for a tort to be actionable in Singapore, the alleged wrong must be actionable under both the lex fori and the lex loci deliciti (JIO Minerals at [88]; Rickshaw Investments at [53]). The lex loci deliciti, in turn, is determined by looking at the events constituting the tort and asking where, “in substance, the cause of action arose” (JIO Minerals at [90]). The key factors to consider in applying this “substance test” to a claim in conspiracy are: (a) the identity, importance and location of the conspirators; (b) the locations where any agreements and combinations took place; (c) the nature and places of the concerted acts or means; (d) the location of the claimant; and (e) the places where the claimant suffered losses (Sophie Shen at [117]; EFT Holdings, Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [53]).
- [90]
[90] Turning first to the location of the Claimants, the immediate claimants – Welton and Kito – are based in Singapore. When the shares of Ezgu Niyat, Saxovat and Savdogar Bank were misappropriated from Welton and Kito pursuant to the alleged conspiracy, Abornes suffered corresponding losses in the diminution of the value of its shares in Welton and Kito. Generally, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it can be assumed that “the damage for each distinct claim is suffered in the jurisdiction where the relevant entity is incorporated” (IM Skaugen at [78]; Raffles Education Corp Ltd v Shantanu Prakash [2020] SGHC 83 (“Raffles Education”) at [67]). Here, the essential complaint of the Claimants is that the shares in the three Uzbekistan entities – Ezgu Niyat, Saxovat and Savdogar Bank – had been transferred out of the Singapore-incorporated Welton and Kito to Uzbekistan entities controlled by Jahangir for no or insufficient consideration. It follows, therefore, that the losses had been sustained by Welton and Kito in Singapore, and Abornes in the RMI.
- [91]
[91] In this regard, the defendants’ reliance on Christopher Yun Hian Chen v BHNV Online Ltd [2020] SGHC 284 (“Christopher Chen”) is misplaced. In that case, the claimant had sued the six defendants, alleging that they had conspired to injure him by unlawful means. The essence of the claimant’s complaint was that the defendants had acted in concert to, amongst others, manipulate his options trading activities and misappropriate his moneys, causing him to make various funds transfers totalling US$11.55m to the first defendant’s Romanian bank accounts. These transfers were made for the purposes of binary options trading by the claimant on the first defendant’s online trading platform. Subsequently, as a consequence of a series of bad trades by the claimant (which he alleged he had been induced into making by virtue of the second defendant’s misrepresentations), he suffered heavy losses, reducing his account balance down to US$5.5m. This sum was subsequently frozen and seized by the Romanian authorities (Christopher Chen at [23]). A facet of his claim was that, owing to the second and third defendants’ “cajoling”, the claimant had liquidated his investments in LinkedIn shares to fund his investments in certain options. This, the claimant argued, had caused him losses to the tune of US$1.33m (Christopher Chen at [19]).
- [92]
[92] The first, fifth and sixth defendants proceeded to seek a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction over them and to set aside permission granted to the claimants serve them out of jurisdiction. In particular, they argued that the claimant ought not to have been given permission to serve them out of jurisdiction since the claimant had failed to establish a “good arguable case” on the jurisdictional gateway set out in the former Order 11, Rule 1(f)(ii) of the Rules of Court 2014 (Christopher Chen at [97]). This required the claimant to show, on the standard of a good arguable case, that damage had been suffered in Singapore and was caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring (Christopher Chen at [103]).
- [93]
[93] Chionh JC (as she then was) agreed with the defendants that the claimant had failed to establish a good arguable case on this gateway. Specifically, Chionh JC held that any losses in relation to the liquidation of the LinkedIn shares “would appear to have been sustained in the United States” (Christopher Chen at [107]). Averis and Felix rely on this single statement to argue that the actual losses suffered by the Claimants had been sustained in Uzbekistan. I found the defendants’ arguments to be unpersuasive and rejected it accordingly. First, it is not immediately apparent what direct loss the disposal of LinkedIn shares had caused the claimant in that case. By selling the publicly listed shares on the exchange, the claimant in Christopher Chen had obtained precisely what his shares had been worth at the material time. Second, as Chionh JC subsequently held, the immediate and direct losses suffered by the claimant in Christopher Chen, ie, the US$11.55m transferred to the first defendant, would “more likely have occurred in Romania, where the [claimant’s] moneys were frozen and allegedly misappropriated” (Christopher Chen at [107]).
- [94]
[94] Moving to the other factors listed at [89] above, on the Claimants’ own case, the alleged conspiracy had been planned, orchestrated and implemented by Jahangir who was (and is) in Uzbekistan. He was, in that sense, the puppet master who pulled the strings from Uzbekistan by giving instructions to Andreas, Felix, Averis, Interis, Pang, Tong and Chuah, who in turn are alleged to have exercised their powers of management and control over Welton and Kito to cause them to transfer their shares to the Jahangir-controlled entities. Put differently, Jahangir’s “instructions to the other defendants, in pursuance of the conspiracies, to perform acts which caused damage to the [Claimants] would have been likely given by him from [Uzbekistan]” (Raffles Education at [66]).
- [95]
[95] Additionally, the existence of the Welton and Kito POAs granted in favour of Bokiev and Komola (both of whom are Uzbekistan citizens presumably resident in Uzbekistan) is a crucial indicator that the place of the conspiracy is Uzbekistan. This is because Welton and Kito’s shares in Ezgu Niyat, Saxovat and Savodgar Bank had been transferred to Jahangir himself, or the entities allegedly controlled by Jahangir, pursuant to those POAs. These POA holders, Bokiev and Komola, who are also Uzbekistan citizens resident in Uzbekistan, are also said to have acted on the instructions of Jahangir. Any combination or agreements between Jahangir and Bokiev and/or Komola, are therefore likely to have been hatched in Uzbekistan. Subsequent instructions to Averis, Interis, Tong, Pang and Chuah to execute and implement the variegated aspects of the conspiracy, would have emanated from Uzbekistan. It follows that the places of the concerted acts or means, as well as the locations where any agreement or combinations took place, would have been in Uzbekistan. The important players, as well as the mastermind of the purported conspiracy, are also located in Uzbekistan.
- [96]
[96] While it is true that the Claimants had suffered losses in Singapore, it should not be forgotten that the Claimants are ultimately asset-holding companies who are beneficially owned solely by the Heirs of Mirabror, who are all resident in Uzbekistan (save for Nargiza, who is resident in Cyprus). In an economic and practical sense, therefore, the losses caused by the alleged conspiracy would thus have been suffered by the Uzbekistan-based heirs in Uzbekistan. The Heirs of Mirabror (save for Jahangir), who are (or were) based in Uzbekistan, are thus the ultimate victims of the alleged conspiracy.
- [97]
[97] In reasoning as such, I drew support from Avonwick Holdings Ltd v Azitio Holdings Ltd [2020] EWHC 1844 (Comm) (“Avonwick Holdings”). That was a very substantial judgment of Picken J which, very briefly, concerned (amongst others) a Ukrainian metallurgical business called the Industrial Union of Donbass (“IUD”). IUD was controlled by three Ukrainian businessmen – Mr Vitaliy Gaiduk (“Gaiduk”), Mr Sergiy Taruta (“Taruta”) and Mr Oleg Mkrtchan (“Mkrtchan”). Their interests in IUD were held by Castlerose Ltd (for Gaiduk), Muriel Ltd (for Mkrtchan) and Kairto Ltd (for Taruta). The shares in Castlerose Ltd, Muriel Ltd and Kairto Ltd were in turn held by Gaiduk, Mkrtchan and Taruta through their respective corporate vehicles, Avonwick, Azitio and Dargamo respectively. Amongst the various claims and counterclaims between the parties to the dispute was that of the “Avonwick Claim”, where Avonwick (and its controller, Gaiduk) alleged that it had been induced by the misrepresentations of Taruta and Mkrtchan into disposing its shares in Castlerose Ltd (which in turn held a 33.84% stake in IUD) at a significant undervalue. The claim made by Avonwick (Gaiduk’s vehicle) against Azitio (Mkrtchan’s vehicle) was one in conspiracy which was alleged to have been orchestrated by Mkrtchan and Taruta in Ukraine.
- [98]
[98] What is important for our purposes is Picken J’s reasoning in determining to which forum the alleged conspiracy was “manifestly more closely connected with” for the purposes of Art 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II Regulation”), which is the EU Regulation governing choice of law for non-contractual obligations / delicts. The inquiry under Art 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation is similar to that undertaken pursuant to “substance test”, as the essential focus in both inquiries is on identifying the forum to which the tort is more closely connected at the time of its commission. In holding the alleged conspiracy was manifestly more closely connected to Ukraine, an aspect of Picken J’s reasoning was that “the ultimate victims of the alleged wrongdoing were Mr and Mrs Gaiduk in their capacity as the ultimate owners of the interest in IUD” (Avonwick Holdings at [172]). Therefore, though one would ordinarily not be permitted to look through corporate structures owing to the principle of separate legal personality, Picken J’s reasoning in Avonwick Holdings fortified my belief that it is permissible – in so far as these corporate structures are in place merely for the purpose of asset-holding – to look to the “ultimate victims” of a conspiracy in determining the place of the tort for the purposes of the substance test.
- [99]
[99] Moving onto the other relevant factors, I considered it relevant that the assets at the centre of the conspiracy – the shares in Ezgu Niyat, Saxovat and Savdogar Bank – were all shares in Uzbekistan-incorporated companies. The recipients of these shares – ILK Plyus, Universalint and Ardus – were also Uzbekistan-based companies, save for Dagnall which is a company incorporated in the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. I found these facts to be relevant in the natural forum analysis since the Claimants were seeking proprietary relief in relation to these shares. Whilst the Claimants subsequently clarified at the hearing that “their focus [was] really on in personam liquidated damages” as opposed to proprietary remedies, this did not change the fact that the Claimants, in their SOC, were seeking proprietary remedies in relation to the shares. Consequently, these are valid considerations for this Court to consider in determining the place of the tort.
- [100]
[100] Looking at the events constituting the tort in the round, I found that the cause of action for conspiracy arose, in substance, in Uzbekistan. The governing law for the conspiracy claim is therefore Uzbekistan law.
(4) Knowing receipt
- [101]
[101] The choice of law rule for claims in knowing receipt was considered in the case of Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312 (“Thahir”). There, Yong CJ endorsed Millett J’s views in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (at 736), where Millett J (as his Lordship then was) held that a claim in knowing receipt is “the counterpart in equity of the common law action for money had and received. Both can be classified as receipt-based restitutionary claims”. As such, the law governing claims for knowing receipt would be the law of the place of enrichment (Thahir at [47]).
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.