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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Mar 2026

General Division of the High Court

A judge's ruling was set aside because it did not weigh the prosecution's case

Public Prosecutor v Pek Lian Guan and another appeal

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[2026] SGHC 62Case no. General Division of the High Court — Magistrate’s Appeals No 9196 of 2024 and No 9197 of 2024 Sundaresh Menon CJ 22 July 2025

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A judge's ruling was set aside because it did not weigh the prosecution's case

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [222], [223]

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The Judiciary is entrusted by the public to state the law and to resolve disputes on this basis. The Judiciary’s effectiveness in discharging its constitutional function rests on its legitimacy in the eyes of the society it serves. This is so because the willingness of the public to abide by its decisions stands in large part on whether it reposes trust and confidence in the Judiciary.

  3. [2] This is what underlies the cardinal principle that justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. It is also why, for example, s 8(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) prescribes the general rule that court proceedings be held in “an open and public court to which the public generally may have access”; justice should, at least in general, be done in the open, rather than hidden from the public eye (see, for example, Chua Yi Jin Colin v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 1133 at [34]). As Lord Atkinson explained more than a century ago in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, while the hearing of a case in public may cause discomfort to both the parties and witnesses, it is “on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, [and] the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect” (at 463).

  4. [3] By and large, our judicial officers have consistently upheld the highest standards in their work, an observation that is reflected in the privilege the Singapore Judiciary enjoys of a high level of public confidence. But there is no room for complacency. Each time a matter comes before the court, it is incumbent on each Judge and judicial officer to conduct it in a manner that reaffirms the justification for that confidence. And when, occasionally, this standard is not met, it is incumbent on the appellate courts to call it out.

  5. [4] These appeals, unfortunately, present such a case. They are the latest in a small number of cases where the headline submission before the appellate court is not solely that the judge below erred on some point of legal principle or fact, but that the judge abdicated his duty to judiciously consider the evidence and submissions by reproducing a party’s submissions in the judgment and presenting it as the judge’s reasons for his decision. In this Judgment, I use “judicious consideration” as a compendious term to refer to a judge’s duty to arrive at a decision founded on reason following a fair, diligent and careful consideration of the material placed before the court; and “judicial copying” to refer to the reproduction of a party’s submissions as the reasons for a judge’s decision.

  6. [5] As I explain in this Judgment, judicial copying does not invariably result in the judgment in question being set aside. That depends on a range of considerations. But it is almost always decried as a poor practice for judges to engage in and I myself have said as much (see Newton, David Christopher v Public Prosecutor [2024] 3 SLR 1370 (“Newton”) at [3]). This is so for a number of reasons, which I set out at [6] below; but an unsatisfactory judicial practice can cross the line and become a failure of the judicial function, which is when the affected judgment becomes liable to be set aside. The question in this case is how and where that line is to be drawn. The Prosecution contends that the district judge who heard the matter below failed to discharge his judicial duty, in that the judgment he issued explaining his decision to acquit the respondents reflects such a degree of copying and adoption of the respondents’ written submissions that it gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that he unthinkingly adopted the respondents’ submissions without giving judicious consideration to the case advanced by the Prosecution and the evidence on record. The judge in question, District Judge Soh Tze Bian (“DJ”) who has since retired, has been the subject of similar complaints on at least two prior recent occasions – first, before me in Newton, and more recently, before a different Judge of the General Division of the High Court in Ler Chun Poh v Public Prosecutor [2024] 6 SLR 410 (“Ler Chun Poh”).

  7. [6] It should be quite obvious why judicial copying is unacceptable from at least three perspectives. First, it gives rise to the risk of the losing party feeling that it has not had a fair hearing when the judge appears essentially to have unthinkingly adopted the case mounted by the other side. Second, in the eyes of the public, allegations of such copying embarrass the Judiciary and can engender a potential loss of confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. Third, from the perspective of the appellate court, there is a needless waste of the judicial resources that must be marshalled to examine not only the substantive merits of the decision below, but also the propriety of the process by which that decision was reached.

  8. [7] The present case illustrates these points, but I emphasise the last point here. This was a case of some factual complexity. The trial before the DJ lasted more than 40 days spread over a period in excess of two years. The matter came before me with a record in excess of 18,000 pages. The general rule in such a case would have been for me to approach the DJ’s decision with the usual measure of deference accorded to a trial court, especially on matters of fact, as it is not the role of an appellate court to retry a matter before it (see Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor [2025] 2 SLR 176 (“Soh Chee Wen”) at [1]). But that paradigm only holds where there is no real concern over the procedural fairness of the decision or proceedings below such that the trial court’s decision is one which it is appropriate to accord deference to. Here, the Prosecution has challenged that paradigm. It argues that, due to the nature and extent to which the DJ allegedly copied from the respondents’ submissions, there was a serious failure of the judicial process below such that I should set aside the DJ’s grounds of decision and consider the matter afresh. Because this complaint against the process by which the DJ arrived at his decision may affect the approach I would take to the Prosecution’s substantive complaint against that decision, it has become necessary for me to deal with the former as a preliminary issue in this appeal. In short, an already complex appeal has been made more so. Accordingly, this Judgment does not address the respondents’ guilt or innocence on the charges against them. Instead, it focuses on the anterior issue of the lens through which the appellate court should approach the appeals.

  9. [8] However, this case does present the opportunity to dispel any lingering misconception that judicial copying may be a legitimate or acceptable judicial practice. It is not. And that is so even though such copying is not in and of itself a ground on which a decision will or must be impugned. As I explain below, Newton and other decisions that have touched on the implications of judicial copying establish that judicial copying is not in itself a basis for displacing a decision. Instead, they emphasise that much will depend on the circumstances, and such copying may be, and often is, a symptom of an underlying problem. Given this, in considering whether to set aside a judgment that is infected with judicial copying (or for that matter any other process failing), it will often be helpful to approach this in terms of whether the copying (or other failing) occasions a breach of natural justice. In my judgment, the framework of natural justice is an appropriate prism through which complaints of process failings should generally be viewed because the principles of natural justice embody the baseline standards of due process that litigants are entitled to expect from the courts. In turn, the question of whether there has been a breach of natural justice in a given case must be answered based on whether a fair-minded and informed observer would reasonably suspect or apprehend that there has been a failure in due process. Where that threshold is crossed, it is taken that public confidence in the Judiciary may be undermined, and the appellate court must set that right by responding with the appropriate consequence(s): this may include remitting the tainted matters back to the same judge, or setting aside the impugned decision and then either ordering a retrial, or reconsidering the evidence and the submissions afresh.

  10. [9] Applying this framework, I have come to the view that the Prosecution’s complaint is well-founded. In my judgment, it would reasonably be apprehended in the circumstances of this case that the DJ failed to judiciously consider the submissions and evidence before him, in particular the case advanced by the Prosecution. The effect of this finding is that the DJ’s decision should be set aside. The parties are agreed that if I came to that view, I should not order a retrial but should consider the matter afresh. This stems from the fact that no complaint has been raised with the way the evidence was taken. In the circumstances, the appropriate course is for me to consider the matter afresh based on the record as it stands, and I will proceed to hear submissions on this basis.

  11. Background facts

  12. [10] As this Judgment does not address the merits of the charges brought against the respondents, a brief overview of the background facts will suffice.

  13. [11] The respondents are Mr Pek Lian Guan (“Pek”) and Mr Pay Teow Heng (“Pay”). At the material time, Pay was a director of Tiong Seng Contractors (Pte) Ltd (“TSC”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Tiong Seng Holdings Ltd (“TS Holdings”). Pek was the managing director of TSC, as well as the chief executive officer and a director of TS Holdings.

  14. [12] Pay and Pek each faced two charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”) for their involvement in extending two loans to Mr Foo Yung Thye Henry (“Foo”). Foo was an employee of the Land Transport Authority of Singapore (“LTA”) at the material time.

  15. [13] The alleged impropriety arose from the LTA’s engagement of TSC as the contractor for the construction of the Great World Station and tunnels (“T220 Project”) on the Thomson-East Coast Line (“TEL”) of the Mass Rapid Transit system. Foo was the employee of the LTA responsible for supervising the execution of the T220 Project in varying capacities. When Foo encountered some personal financial difficulties, he reached out to Pay on two occasions seeking his help to arrange some loans. Pay did not immediately agree, but took Foo’s requests to Pek, who facilitated the approval of two staff loans from TSC to Pay, to enable Pay to use the money to extend two loans to Foo in June 2017 and March 2018 (referred to collectively as the “Loans”).

  16. [14] In October 2018, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) received an anonymous complaint that Foo had been soliciting loans from contractors involved in LTA projects under his charge. Foo had also requested loans from other contractors of the LTA (see, for another recent case involving Foo, Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group Co Ltd (Singapore Branch) [2025] 4 SLR 69). Following investigations, the Prosecution brought seven charges against Foo for corruptly obtaining or attempting to obtain gratification under s 6(a) of the PCA. Foo pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced on 2 September 2021 to a total of 66 months’ imprisonment.

  17. [15] In the proceedings below, the Prosecution brought two charges each against Pay and Pek for their respective roles in arranging and providing the Loans to Foo:

  18. (a) For providing the Loans to Foo, Pay faced two charges under s 6(b) read with s 7 of the PCA, of corruptly giving gratification to Foo to induce Foo to do acts in relation to the LTA’s affairs which advanced TSC’s interests in relation to existing and future contracts with the LTA.

  19. (b) For facilitating the making of the Loans to Foo, Pek faced two charges under s 6(b) read with ss 7 and 29(a) of the PCA, of abetting Pay’s corrupt giving of gratification to Foo by causing TSC to extend staff loans to Pay with the knowledge that Pay would use the money to extend loans to Foo.

  20. [16] The CPIB recorded two statements from Pay. Pay’s 1st statement was recorded by Investigation Officer Tay Wenxun (“IO Tay”) on 11 September 2019 (“Pay’s 1st Statement”), and his 2nd statement was recorded by Chief Special Investigator Lim Eng Cheung (“IO Lim”) on 12 September 2019 (“Pay’s 2nd Statement”).

  21. [17] Two CPIB statements were also recorded from Pek. Pek’s 1st statement was recorded on 12 September 2019 (“Pek’s 1st Statement”) by Chief Special Investigator Tan Kian Tat (“IO Tan”). Following Pek’s indication on 13 November 2019 to Chief Special Investigator Johnston Kan (“IO Kan”) that he wished to clarify his 1st Statement, IO Tan recorded a 2nd statement from Pek on 3 February 2020 (“Pek’s 2nd Statement”).

  22. The parties’ arguments below

  23. [18] Without oversimplifying matters, there was no dispute that the staff loans were advanced to Pay, who in turn extended the Loans to Foo. The key question at trial was the intent with which these had been done. In this regard, s 8 of the PCA provides that where a gratification is given to a person who is an employee of the Government or a public body by a person who has or seeks to have dealings with the Government or any public body, the gratification is presumed to have been given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward. The Prosecution’s case was that this presumption applied, and the Loans were deemed to have been given by Pay as an inducement or reward to advance TSC’s business interests with the LTA. The presumption of a corrupt intent under s 8 of the PCA was also invoked against Pek such that he was deemed to have intentionally aided Pay with the requisite knowledge. The Prosecution contended that the respondents had not been able to rebut the presumption of the Loans having been advanced corruptly, and it therefore maintained that it had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The alleged corrupt purpose was said to be “to prevent Foo from causing trouble in the T220 [Project]”. To establish its case, the Prosecution relied primarily on admissions in the respondents’ CPIB statements and some objective evidence.

  24. [19] The crux of Pay’s defence was that he had extended the Loans to Foo because he had a genuine friendship with Foo and for no other reason. Pay challenged the reliability of his 2nd Statement and submitted that the objective evidence did not prove that he had made the Loans with a corrupt intent.

  25. [20] Pek made a preliminary argument that the presumption under s 8 of the PCA did not apply to his charges of abetment. His main defence was that he had approved the staff loans to Pay (and thus the Loans indirectly) because he believed that Pay was helping Foo as a friend in need, and that this was for a good cause. Pek disputed the reliability of both of his CPIB statements and pointed to other evidence, such as Foo’s evidence that he (Foo) had no corrupt intent when he asked for and received the Loans and that he did not believe that Pay or Pek had any corrupt intent in extending the Loans to him, to establish his innocence.

  26. Decision below

  27. [21] At the close of the Prosecution’s case, the respondents made a submission of no case to answer. The first section of the DJ’s grounds of decision (“GD”) dealt with this issue. The DJ accepted that the presumption of corruption under s 8 of the PCA applied to both Pay and Pek (GD at [19] and [22]). The DJ accordingly dismissed the respondents’ submission that there was no case to answer and called on the respondents to present their respective defences. It follows from what has been set out above that there was no dispute that the Loans had been made, and the key issue was the motive with which this had been done, or in other words, whether the presumption had been rebutted, and therefore, whether the Prosecution had made out its case on the totality of the evidence.

  28. [22] The DJ ultimately acquitted the respondents of all their charges and set out his reasons for the acquittals in the second section of the GD. The DJ considered that the entire case could effectively be determined based on three key issues: (a) whether the respondents’ incriminating CPIB statements were inaccurate, unreliable and unsafe to rely on (“Issue 1”); (b) whether Foo’s evidence as to his and the respondents’ states of mind was relevant and, if so, whether this was consistent with the respondents’ account that the Loans had been made innocently (“Issue 2”); and (c) whether a series of WhatsApp messages between Pay and Foo showed that Foo’s agency relationship with the LTA had been suborned (“Issue 3”) (GD at [28]).

  29. [23] On Issue 1, the DJ found that Pay’s 2nd Statement and Pek’s CPIB statements were unreliable (GD at [30]). Even though Pay had signed his 2nd Statement, the DJ considered that there were numerous deficiencies in the process by which IO Lim had recorded the statement that rendered the statement unreliable. In the DJ’s view, IO Lim had, among other things, predetermined Pay’s guilt, selectively recorded inculpatory evidence, retyped in his own words the amendments which Pay wished to make to his statements and provided false or incorrect explanations of certain words in the statement to Pay who was already exhausted at that time, thereby making it impossible for Pay to verify the accuracy of the amendments (GD at [30(a)(i)] and [30(a)(iv)]–[30(a)(viii)]).

  30. [24] Similarly, although Pek signed both his CPIB statements, there were several deficiencies in the process by which IO Tan recorded the statements that rendered them unreliable. According to the DJ, IO Tan had, among other things, admitted to trying to “frame” Pek, used a cut-and-paste method to assemble Pek’s 1st Statement which resulted in the repetition and emphasis of incriminating evidence and took the liberty of drafting Pek’s 1st Statement in his own words (GD at [30(d)(i)]–[30(d)(xiv)]). The DJ considered that Pek may not have been aware of the incriminating content of his 1st Statement because of the false sense of security engendered by the manner in which the 1st Statement was recorded and Pek’s possible inability to comprehend the recorded statement and therefore to correct any inaccuracies (GD at [30(d)(viii)] and [30(d)(x)]). Similar issues were also considered as having compromised the reliability of Pek’s 2nd Statement (GD at [30(d)(xv)]).

  31. [25] On Issue 2, the DJ held that Foo’s account that the Loans were given without corrupt intent was consistent with the respondents’ evidence, and the Prosecution was bound to accept the truthfulness of Foo’s evidence because it had not sought to impeach his testimony (GD at [34]–[38]). I note in passing here that even in this context, the DJ did not address the Prosecution’s contentions in respect of matters arising from the cross-examination of the respondents.

  32. [26] On Issue 3, the DJ found that the WhatsApp messages between Pay and Foo, which pertained to tenders or proposals for future LTA projects, did not indicate that Foo’s agency relationship with the LTA had been suborned or that Foo was beholden to or felt indebted to Pay (GD at [44]–[47]).

  33. [27] The DJ found on this basis that the Prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt its case against Pay and Pek that the Loans were given corruptly (GD at [49]). Given the DJ’s view that these three issues were dispositive of the case, he considered it unnecessary to decide on the other issues which arose from the trial, including the existence of objective evidence which was said to demonstrate the respondents’ corrupt intent (GD at [50]).

  34. The scope of this Judgment

  35. [28] In this Judgment, I deal only with the preliminary issue which arose from the Prosecution’s contention that the DJ failed to discharge his duty to consider the matter judiciously. This contention was based, among other things, on the nature, extent and manner in which the DJ had or appeared to have copied from, reproduced, or adopted the submissions of the Defence.

  36. [29] To briefly explain, I took this course because the Prosecution submits that, if I were to conclude that the DJ failed to judiciously consider the matter below, I should give no weight to his decision and findings and proceed as if I were a first instance judge without exercising the usual restraint observed in terms of appellate intervention in a trial court’s decision, especially on findings of fact. Given that the resolution of this complaint would affect how I (and the parties) should approach the issue of the respondents’ guilt or innocence on the charges against them, I decided, after discussion with the parties at a Case Management Conference, to deal first with the issues of (a) whether the DJ had failed to consider the matter judiciously; and (b) if so, the consequences that should follow. It is with these two issues that this Judgment is concerned, and which I invited the parties to file supplementary skeletal arguments on.

  37. The parties’ arguments

  38. [30] The differences between the parties’ arguments centre around three points: (a) first, the appropriate legal test to be applied to determine the Prosecution’s contention that I should have no regard to the DJ’s findings because of his alleged failure to discharge his judicial duty; (b) second, whether the DJ had failed to discharge his judicial duty; and (c) third, what, if any, consequences should follow upon the conclusion to the second question.

  39. The Prosecution’s arguments

  40. [31] The Prosecution submits that the relevant question is whether there is a reasonable apprehension or suspicion, judged from the vantage point of a fair-minded and informed observer, that the DJ failed to discharge his duty to judiciously consider the material before him. The threshold of a “reasonable suspicion” is drawn from the principle articulated in cases involving allegations of bias, and the Prosecution contends it is equally applicable when determining whether a judge had failed to discharge his duty to consider the material.

  41. [32] Applying this test, the Prosecution submits that there is a reasonable suspicion that the DJ failed to discharge his judicial duty. The Prosecution’s case is that the nature and extent of judicial copying in this case, together with the DJ’s failure to consider certain key issues the Prosecution had raised, form the evidentiary basis upon which a fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend that there might have been such a failure. Thus, the Prosecution contends that no weight should be accorded to the GD, and I should consider afresh the evidence that is on the record and come to a conclusion as to the respondents’ guilt on the charges.

  42. Pek’s arguments

  43. [33] Pek disagrees and submits that it is insufficient for the Prosecution to establish a reasonable suspicion of such a failure. Pek contends instead that the Prosecution must prove on a balance of probabilities that the DJ failed to discharge his judicial duty. According to Pek, the threshold of “reasonable suspicion”, which stops short of an actual finding of fact, is too low and inconsistent with the standard of proof in criminal proceedings that requires any doubts to be resolved against the Prosecution. However, Pek concedes that the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is too high, and submits that the lower standard of the balance of probabilities is an appropriate compromise and balance between the rights of the accused person and the integrity of the judicial system.

  44. [34] Pek further submits that the “reasonable suspicion” threshold should be confined to cases concerning apparent bias, and to the extent that there are precedents which have apparently applied it to allegations that a judge had failed to discharge his duty to judiciously consider the material, those cases are distinguishable because they involved allegations by the accused person rather than by the Prosecution. According to Pek, there is nothing anomalous in holding the Prosecution to the higher standard of the balance of probabilities because the criminal standard of proof means that the Prosecution is fundamentally required to do more in terms of proof than an accused person.

  45. [35] Applying the approach he contends for, Pek submits that it has not been shown on the balance of probabilities that the DJ failed to discharge his duty to consider the material advanced by all the parties judiciously. In the main, Pek argues that it is unduly simplistic to focus on the fact that the DJ may have adopted parts of the respondents’ written submissions in the GD, given that there are other indicia which suggest that the DJ did apply an independent and judicious mind to the matter before him. These include: (a) the DJ’s own identification of three issues on which the case turned; (b) the DJ’s rearrangement and reorganisation of the respondents’ submissions in the GD; (c) the supplementation of the respondents’ submissions with the DJ’s own observations and analysis; (d) the DJ’s references to the Prosecution’s arguments in the GD; and (e) the DJ’s engagement with counsel, including the Prosecution, in oral closing submissions. Pek submits that, having regard to all the circumstances, it cannot be said that the DJ had failed to apply his mind judiciously to the issues and evidence, or that he had adopted the respondents’ submissions unthinkingly, and there is therefore no basis for the appeal to proceed on the basis of ignoring the DJ’s findings or of not according due deference to them.

  46. [36] Finally, if I were to conclude that the DJ had failed to apply his mind with due diligence to the matter, Pek advances several points on how I should proceed. First, he contends that it would not necessarily follow that I should consider the material wholly ignoring the DJ’s findings because it remains the case that this court is exercising appellate (as opposed to original) jurisdiction. Second, in line with the first point, Pek argues that any fresh consideration of the issues without regard to the DJ’s findings should be confined to the points that the Prosecution has raised on appeal. In any case, Pek also contends that I may nonetheless consider the GD and the findings set out there, but subject to such circumspection as I consider appropriate.

  47. Pay’s arguments

  48. [37] Pay’s positions on the issues above are broadly aligned with those of Pek. Pay too disputes the Prosecution’s reliance on the “reasonable suspicion” test and submits that this should not be taken outside the context of cases on apparent bias. Instead, Pay argues that, in a case like the present where apparent bias is not alleged, the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person apprised of the circumstances would conclude (and not merely suspect) that the judge below had failed to discharge his judicial duty by failing to apply his mind to the evidence and the issues. Pay’s “reasonable conclusion” test entails proof on the balance of probabilities, and his position on the law is therefore in substance identical to Pek’s. Indeed, counsel for Pay, Mr Tan Chee Meng SC (“Mr Tan”), confirmed this at the hearing before me.

  49. [38] On this basis, Pay argues that it cannot be said that the DJ had failed to discharge his judicial duty. Among other things, Pay disputes the Prosecution’s claim that the DJ had unthinkingly copied Pay’s written submissions and highlights the DJ’s exchanges with counsel in oral closing submissions as evidence of the DJ’s understanding of the case and the parties’ arguments. In any case, even if I were to adopt the “reasonable suspicion” test, Pay relies on the same factors to contend that the DJ did not fail to discharge his judicial duty.

  50. [39] Finally, as to what should follow if I were to conclude that the DJ had failed to discharge his judicial duty, while Pay does not go as far as Pek to suggest that I should remain open to placing such weight as I think fit on the DJ’s findings in the GD, he contends that the extent to which I should disregard the DJ’s findings in the GD should be guided by the issues that have been framed and identified by the parties in their submissions.

  51. Issues to be determined

  52. [40] In this Judgment, I deal with the following issues:

  53. (a) first, the applicable legal framework and principles for assessing the Prosecution’s claim that the DJ had failed to discharge his duty to consider the materials advanced by all the parties judiciously;

  54. (b) second, based on the relevant principles determined at [40(a)] above, whether the DJ had indeed failed to discharge his duty to consider the matter judiciously; and

  55. (c) third, the consequences that should follow as a result of my conclusions on the foregoing issues.

  56. [41] This is not the first case involving allegations that a judge copied a party’s submissions unthinkingly or that a first instance judge failed to apply his or her mind judiciously to the matter. An argument of a similar nature was made before me in Newton, as well as before another Judge in Lim Chee Huat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 433 (“Lim Chee Huat”) and Ler Chun Poh. I have also previously dealt with a case where the source of the alleged copying by the lower court judge in that case was a decision rendered by that judge in a different case (rather than from a party’s submissions) (see Yap Ah Lai v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 180 (“Yap Ah Lai”)). Most recently, the Singapore International Commercial Court and Court of Appeal encountered a variation on this theme in the context of arbitration, where an arbitral tribunal was alleged to have incorporated into its award material that had been substantially copied from awards rendered in two different arbitrations which were chaired by the same presiding arbitrator (see DJP v DJO [2025] 1 SLR 576 (“DJP”) and DOI v DOJ [2025] 4 SLR 657).

  57. [42] While the issue is not new, the legal framework by which such matters may be addressed remains a matter of some controversy. This is apparent from the way the present parties have taken fundamentally divergent positions even on the framing of the relevant inquiry: while the Prosecution submits that the question before me is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that the DJ had failed to discharge his duty, the respondents argue that any such allegation must be proved at least on a balance of probabilities. What underlies this are three points. First, there is a difference of view as to whether the “reasonable suspicion” threshold, which was developed in the context of cases concerning bias, should be extended beyond that context to cases such as the present where there is no allegation of bias against the DJ. Second, while the Prosecution claims that the DJ failed to discharge his judicial duty, it has not always been clear what the specific content of the alleged “duty” is. Indeed, in its initial submissions for the appeal, the Prosecution advanced its argument in two ways: (a) one, that the DJ failed to apply his mind to the matter; and (b) two, that the DJ failed to give proper reasons for his decision. Third, there is a difference of view as to whether the test varies when it is raised in the context of a decision that is in favour of an accused person in criminal proceedings.

  58. [43] On the first point, the Prosecution’s approach is perhaps a consequence of the prevailing case law, where the same circumstance of judicial copying has been analysed in different ways. In Newton, for example, the alleged copying of the Prosecution’s written submissions was relied on to mount a complaint of apparent bias. A different approach was taken in Lim Chee Huat, where the appellate court’s focus was on whether the nature and extent of the copying indicated that the district judge below had failed to apply his mind to the matter. Although it might be thought that these are inconsistent approaches, in my judgment, the better view is that expressed by Aidan Xu J in Ler Chun Poh, which is that an alleged failure by a judge to apply his mind to the matter, on the one hand, and bias, on the other, may be “related, but separate, grounds for setting aside a trial judge’s decision” [emphasis added] (at [14]).

  59. [44] While these may be separate grounds, there is often a common thread that underlies these cases, and that is the concern that there has been a breach of natural justice which taints either the proceedings or the decision with the colour of procedural unfairness. To use judicial copying as an example, the reason that essentially the same circumstance was capable of supporting different analyses in Lim Chee Huat and Newton is that the focal point of the analysis was not the copying itself, but the underlying problem of which the copying was a symptom or manifestation. That problem ultimately was a breach of natural justice. Procedural fairness is most starkly expressed in the rules of natural justice.

  60. [45] There are at least three consequences of situating a given complaint within the framework of natural justice.

  61. (a) First, depending on which rule of natural justice is alleged to have been breached, the relevant considerations and consequences may vary. As I will discuss below, this explains what might on first impression appear to be inconsistent outcomes in prior cases. Further, because a complaint that a judge manifested an appearance of bias is of a different nature to one that the judge failed to apply his or her mind to the matter, the analysis should be specifically tailored to each complaint.

  62. (b) Second, and following from the first point, the remedies or consequences that follow may differ depending on the rule of natural justice that is implicated, the gravity and implications of the alleged breach, and its effect on the proceeding or decision. In some cases, a minimally invasive approach may be appropriate, and the matter may be remitted to the decision-maker to cure any unfairness; in others, the actual or perceived unfairness may be more pervasive, and the possibility of a retrial may have to be considered.

  63. (c) Third, once it is understood that the question is ultimately one of natural justice, it follows that the correct inquiry is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that a breach of natural justice has occurred, because the “reasonable suspicion” threshold focuses on the appearance of justice and gives effect to the fundamental principle that justice must not only be done, but it must be seen to be done.

  64. The importance of procedural justice

  65. [46] In most cases, an appeal against a first instance decision will take the form of a challenge against its merits. The appellate court’s task in such cases is to assess the correctness of the lower court’s decision in law and/or in fact, with the extent of intervention in relation to matters of fact being circumscribed by the well-established principle that an appellate court will be slow to overturn a lower court’s findings of fact unless these can be shown to be plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence (see, for example, Soh Chee Wen at [65]).

  66. [47] This contrasts with the supervisory role of the courts in the arbitral ecosystem at least in our jurisdiction and in most others that adopt some variant of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”), where the merits of the tribunal’s decision are beyond the limits of the court’s jurisdiction. The court’s focus in applications to set aside or resist enforcement of an award, is not whether the tribunal arrived at the correct decision, but whether there is some jurisdictional or procedural defect that taints the tribunal’s decision (see, for example, AKN v ALC [2015] 3 SLR 488 at [37]–[39]; BLC v BLB [2014] 4 SLR 759 at [53]; and Swire Shipping Pte Ltd v Ace Exim Pte Ltd [2024] 5 SLR 706 (“Swire Shipping”) at [1]–[4]).

  67. [48] Because there is no bar against an appellate court intervening on the ground that it considers the decision below to be wrong, it is not surprising that the distinction between substantive and procedural justice has not featured to the same degree in litigation as opposed to arbitration. In litigation, if a party is dissatisfied with a decision, it has the option of simply challenging it on its merits and inviting the appellate court to arrive at a different conclusion upon discharging the appropriate burden. Because of this, it may often be thought unnecessary, whether for tactical reasons or otherwise, to challenge a first instance court judgment on procedural grounds even if this may potentially be available. In arbitration, on the other hand, the typical inability to challenge a tribunal’s decision on the ground of an error of fact or law means that procedural injustice may be the primary or even the only available angle of attack.

  68. [49] This does not mean that procedural fairness is less important in court proceedings than in arbitration. The courts are as much concerned with ensuring that they arrive at their decisions in a procedurally just manner as they are with the substantive correctness of their decisions. In United Overseas Bank Ltd v Ng Huat Foundations Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 425 (“Ng Huat”), Andrew Phang Boon Leong JC (as he then was) encapsulated the interplay between substantive and procedural justice in the following observations (at [4]–[9]):

  69. [50] While these observations were made in the context of civil proceedings, they are equally applicable to criminal proceedings (see Mohammed Ali bin Johari v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 1058 (“Mohammed Ali bin Johari”) at [119] and Public Prosecutor v Goldring Thomas Nicholas [2014] 1 SLR 586 at [40]). Indeed, given that criminal proceedings implicate not only private interests, but the public interest and the life and liberty of the accused person, it stands to reason that courts will be all the more anxious to ensure the fairness of the process.

  70. [51] Although the concept of “procedural justice” might seem amorphous, its core resides in the principles of natural justice. It is well-established that there are two foundational pillars of natural justice, namely, that: (a) the parties should be given a proper opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partes); and (b) the adjudicator should be disinterested and unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua) (see, for example, Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] 1 SLR(R) 95 (“Shankar Alan”) at [42] and DJP at [36]). I refer to the former rule as the “fair hearing rule” and to the latter as the “rule against bias”. These rules of natural justice and their practical outworking set down the baseline standard of due and fair process.

  71. [52] Notwithstanding that the same factual matrix may engage both rules, it is important to bear in mind that they are “separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations” (see Tang Kin Hwa v Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board [2005] 4 SLR(R) 604 at [10], citing B Surinder Singh Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 at 337). As I explain below, the conceptual distinction between the fair hearing rule and the rule against bias is significant because the inquiry and the relevant factors that go into it may differ.

  72. [53] It follows that it is open to a litigant in court proceedings to challenge a decision on the basis that there has been a failure in the process that led to it, by showing that there has been a breach of either or both of the rules of natural justice. While this is not often pursued because of the possibility of seeking relief simply on the basis of error, such challenges are nonetheless raised from time to time.

  73. [54] An example is the argument – often encountered in civil appeals – that the trial judge’s finding concerned a point that was inadequately pleaded or was an impermissible departure from the parties’ cases. In V Nithia v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithingam [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”), the Court of Appeal articulated the general principle that “the parties are bound by their pleadings and the court is precluded from deciding on a matter that the parties themselves have decided not to put into issue”, subject to the exception that a party may be permitted to depart from its pleadings if doing so would not cause irreparable prejudice to the other party (see V Nithia at [38]–[40] and How Weng Fan v Sengkang Town Council [2023] 2 SLR 235 at [18]).

  74. [55] The common thread which runs through both the rule and the exception is procedural fairness (see V Nithia at [37]). As noted in Sheager s/o TM Veloo v Belfield International (Hong Kong) Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 524, “pleadings serve the important function of upholding the rules of natural justice” by requiring a party to give his or her opponent fair notice of the case he or she has to meet (at [94]). The specific rule of natural justice engaged in this context is the fair hearing rule.

  75. [56] There is a parallel to this in arbitration where the claim made is that the tribunal adopted an unforeseeable chain of reasoning. The sting of such a complaint is that there has been a breach of natural justice because (a) the parties did not have reasonable notice of the tribunal’s intended reasoning; or (b) the tribunal’s reasoning did not have a sufficient nexus to the parties’ arguments (BZW v BZV [2022] 1 SLR 1080 (“BZW”) at [60(b)]), as a result of which the parties did not have the opportunity to address the tribunal on a point that proved decisive as far as the tribunal was concerned. In Vietnam Oil and Gas Group v Joint Stock Company (Power Machines – ZTL, LMZ, Electrosila Energomachexport) [2025] 2 SLR 273 (“Vietnam Oil”), the Court of Appeal explained that such a complaint involves the fair hearing rule, because “[t]he overriding concern … is fairness in that a tribunal ought to give the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their cases and to respond to what is being raised against them” [emphasis added] (at [37]).

  76. [57] Where the gravamen of the complaint lies in procedural unfairness, if the failure is of sufficient gravity, it may even displace arguments that the judge’s finding may be correct in law or on the evidence. As Phang JC observed in Ng Huat, “[t]he obsession with achieving a substantively just and fair outcome does not justify the utilisation of any and every means to achieve that objective”, and “[t]here must be fairness in the procedure or manner in which the final outcome is achieved” (at [5]). A corollary to this is that the court may on occasion be forced to reject a claim even if it considered that the claim might have succeeded if argued differently (Al-Medenni v Mars UK Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1041 at [21]; Satyam Enterprises Ltd v Burton [2021] 2 BCLC 724 at [38]).

  77. Situating a complaint within the natural justice framework

  78. [58] Hence, the Prosecution’s case in these appeals implicates both the procedural and substantive aspects, though these are related. As a substantive matter, the Prosecution contends that the DJ’s findings were incorrect as a matter of fact and law. But it also complains that this failure stemmed from a serious procedural failure, which in my judgment falls within the framework of the rules of natural justice. The heart of the Prosecution’s complaint on the procedural justice point is that the DJ failed to apply a judicious mind to consider its arguments, and that he adopted the case mounted by the Defence without due regard to the Prosecution’s submissions. This “goes not to whether the decision is correct on the merits having regard to the evidence and the law, but to whether the process by which it was reached is procedurally fair” (see Cojocaru v British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre [2013] 2 SCR 357 (“Cojocaru”) at [12]). I digress to make a brief observation on a separate point that is a feature of Canadian law and was dealt with in Cojocaru at [14]–[29]. That is the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality. I do not think it is either necessary or appropriate to consider its applicability in the present case which, as I explain below, is concerned with whether there is a reasonable basis for apprehending a failure of natural justice, rather than with whether there has in fact been a judicial failure on the part of the DJ. In my view, the said presumption will not be relevant in the former case, and I therefore say no more about it.

  79. [59] Returning to the main thread of my analysis, in my view, the duty of a judge to consider a matter judiciously is an aspect of the fair hearing rule. More specifically, it is a correlative duty to the parties’ right to be heard, which consists of: (a) a positive aspect, in the opportunity to present the evidence and advance the propositions of law which support one’s case; and (b) a responsive aspect of having notice of one’s opponent’s case and the opportunity to respond to it (see Swire Shipping at [79], citing JVL Agro Industries Ltd v Agritrade International Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 768 at [146]–[147]). Both aspects would only have meaning if the opportunity to present one’s case is met with active, impartial, fair and diligent judicial consideration. If the position were otherwise, and all that the right to be heard entailed was the judge physically reading or listening to the parties’ cases, the fair hearing rule would be devoid of any meaningful content. It follows that a failure of a judge to consider the matter before him or her judiciously may found a complaint of breach of natural justice based on the fair hearing rule.

  80. [60] As prefaced at [43]–[45] above, situating a complaint of procedural unfairness within the framework of natural justice in this way will often afford a more principled and doctrinally satisfactory analysis as opposed to an approach that treats specific instantiations of procedural unfairness as independent grounds of challenge that are governed by their own idiosyncratic rules and standards. For example, to ask how much judicial copying is “too much” begs the question of the applicable legal yardstick that determines when a judge would be found to have crossed the line. Similarly, where it is alleged that the judge gave “inadequate reasons”, it is difficult to assess in the abstract what amounts to “adequate” or “inadequate” reasons without knowing the purpose for which the question is being asked. The same could be said in the context of excessive judicial intervention. In my view, the principles of natural justice can and, in this case, do provide the context in which complaints of procedural unfairness fall to be considered and the legal yardstick against which they should be answered. This, as I have noted above, provides insight into how seemingly irreconcilable cases can stand with one another upon closer analysis. In each case, one must first identify what the gravamen of the complaint really is. I illustrate this below with reference to three types of allegations of poor judicial conduct that have emerged in the case law and which I have referred to above: (a) allegations of judicial copying; (b) allegations that a judge has failed to give adequate reasons for his or her decision; and (c) allegations of excessive judicial interference.

  81. Judicial copying

  82. [61] Cases of judicial copying have arisen in two contexts which are differentiated by the source of the copying: (a) first, where the judge is alleged to have copied or adopted a party’s submissions (see, for example, Lim Chee Huat and Newton); and (b) second, where the judge is alleged to have copied from another decision, whether of his or her own or of another judge (see, for example, Yap Ah Lai and DJP (albeit the latter was in the context of arbitration)). However, even within each category, there are divergences in the focal point of the courts’ reasoning. This is explicable by the different bases upon which the complaint was framed in each of these cases – whether under the fair hearing rule or the rule against bias.

  83. [62] The complaint levelled against the district judge in Lim Chee Huat was focused on the fair hearing rule. There, the district judge’s grounds of decision bore such a degree of similarity to the Prosecution’s submissions that they even reproduced a typographical error made in those submissions. After a survey of foreign authority, Xu J opined that what was critical was that “the judge must have exercised some judgment or thought” and, therefore, the question was whether, in light of the alleged copying, it appeared that “the trial judge exercised his mind on the facts and circumstances of the case before him” (at [49]). In my view, the question in Lim Chee Huat was whether there was a breach of the fair hearing rule by reason of the district judge not having applied his mind to the matter. The court’s analysis was consistent with this, as it held that the combination of the extent and manner of the district judge’s reproduction of the Prosecution’s submissions – described as an “unprocessed adoption” – and the lack of any indication of an assessment of the submissions of both sides and weighing between them, meant that it could not be said that the district judge had properly applied his mind to the matters before him, particularly the Defence’s arguments (at [51]–[52]). The fair hearing rule was breached because the right of the Defence to be heard had been rendered illusory, and on this basis, the court examined the matter afresh without deference to the district judge’s findings (at [56]–[59]). Implicit in this, is the point I have noted earlier that the right to a fair hearing extends beyond the literal “hearing” all the way through to the consideration, evaluation and determination of the matter.

  84. [63] In contrast, the complaint in Newton was advanced on the basis of bias based on prejudgment. The appellant alleged that a “fair-minded and informed observer would reasonably apprehend that the [district judge] was biased against his client” based on a confluence of (a) the district judge having already prepared his grounds of decision before hearing oral submissions from either side; and (b) the reproduction of substantial portions of the Prosecution’s submissions in the grounds of decision (at [22]). Even if the facts of the case could conceivably have disclosed grounds for a complaint based on a breach of the fair hearing rule in similar terms to that mounted in Lim Chee Huat, that was not how the appellant proceeded, and the principal question before me was whether the district judge’s decision ought to be set aside on the ground of apparent bias (at [29]). After considering the totality of the circumstances, I answered this in the negative (at [43]). Notwithstanding the district judge reproducing almost the entirety of the Prosecution’s written submissions in his grounds of decision and, at least initially, intending to give his decision without hearing oral submissions, he did accede to the request of the appellant’s counsel to make oral submissions. The exchanges between the district judge and the appellant’s counsel during these submissions indicated that the district judge had digested the parties’ cases and considered their merits (at [45]–[47]).

  85. [64] The differences between Lim Chee Huat and Newton go beyond the fact that the complaint was made out in the former but not the latter. The two cases demonstrate the importance of a proper appreciation (a) first, of whether the complaint is grounded in the fair hearing rule or the rule against bias; and (b) second, of how the rule of natural justice that has been invoked is specifically alleged to have been breached. To illustrate, consider, for example, the factor of the judge’s engagement with the parties at the hearing. I accorded this significant weight in Newton, and indeed, it outweighed the undisputed fact that the district judge had reproduced almost the entirety of the Prosecution’s written submissions and analysis (at [44]). But this has to be seen in light of the complaint in Newton being that the district judge appeared to have been biased in having prejudged the matter, and to have been unwilling or seemingly unable to hear the appellant out. In those circumstances, the fact that the district judge agreed to hear and then engaged with the appellant’s oral submissions undermined the complaint because the district judge had done precisely what the appellant claimed he was either not willing or able to do. It does not follow from Newton, however, that the judge’s engagement with the parties or their counsel would invariably be a decisive (or even necessarily a relevant) factor for other types of complaints grounded in the fair hearing rule. In the final analysis, context is everything and much will depend on the facts of the case and the specific complaint in question.

  86. [65] In cases like Lim Chee Huat which involved complaints that were in substance grounded in the fair hearing rule, it may not be the case that a single factor, such as engagement with the parties during the hearing, would necessarily bear considerable weight in resolving the matter. This is reflected in the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Lo Kai Shui v HSBC International Trustee Ltd [2023] 6 HKC 411 (“Lo Kai Shui”), where Kwan VP (with whom Yuen JA and Lam JA agreed) observed as follows (at [14]):

  87. [66] I agree with these observations and reiterate – context is everything. For one thing, the complaint that the judge below had not properly applied his mind to the matter, as was the case in Lim Chee Huat, is wider in scope than the targeted complaint in Newton, that the district judge had prejudged the matter before the hearing by reason of the fact that he had come prepared to deliver judgment and did subsequently deliver a judgment that reproduced the submissions. As I also observed in Newton, in our system of litigation where in most matters comprehensive written submissions will have been filed in advance of the oral hearing, a judge would be expected to come prepared for the hearing having read those submissions and in so doing, having formed certain provisional views (especially where such matters do not involve unduly complex issues or difficult questions concerning the oral evidence) (at [50(c)]). The judge should remain open to being persuaded otherwise at the hearing, but there is no expectation that the judge should come to the hearing with an empty mind or a blank slate; only an open mind (see Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v King, Ann Rita [2018] 1 SLR 1 (“Prometheus Marine”) at [39]). In Newton, the matter concerned sentencing upon a plea of guilt pursuant to an admitted statement of facts, and written submissions had already been filed and had evidently been digested. This again was quite different from the much more contentious setting in Lim Chee Huat, where the appellant claimed trial and raised disputes of fact that called for a proper appreciation and assessment of evidence. Similarly, Lo Kai Shui involved a hotly contested civil action.

  88. [67] Further, the nature of the complaint in Lim Chee Huat called for an examination of the judge’s conduct throughout the entirety of the proceedings, so that the judge’s engagement with the parties and their counsel was unlikely to carry the same weight, because that, at best, could show that the judge had been exercising his mind at the hearing. Where a judge reserves his decision, that would suggest a need to consider and resolve points of some factual or legal difficulty. If the judge then subsequently hands down a decision that appears on its face to be an uncritical adoption of one side’s submissions, the fact that he might have demonstrated an application of his mind at an earlier point in time provides no assurance that he had continued to do so after the hearing and, most importantly, when he arrived at his decision (see Lo Kai Shui at [65] above).

  89. [68] That said, notwithstanding the conceptual differences between the fair hearing rule and the rule against bias, they are not mutually exclusive and there may often be an overlap between them such that the same set of facts could potentially found a complaint on either basis. Depending on which line is taken, it is possible that a complaint put one way may be made out while a different complaint put another way may fail on a similar set of facts. Simply put, since the question is different, so too may the answer be. This is demonstrated by a comparison between Yap Ah Lai and DJP, which both involved allegations that the decision-maker’s decision was copied from a different decision rendered in a different case.

  90. [69] In Yap Ah Lai, it was alleged that certain key paragraphs of the district judge’s decision, in which he set out the reasons for the sentences he imposed on the appellant, were identical to three paragraphs of another decision he issued in a different case at about the same time (at [4]). In these circumstances, I considered the question before me to be whether there was an appearance that the district judge had failed to properly apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before him (at [70]). Given the material differences between the facts of the two cases, I was satisfied that there was a reasonable basis for thinking that in adopting the same reasons given in a different case, the district judge had failed to fully appreciate and evaluate the material in the case that was before him (at [73]).

  91. [70] The focus in Yap Ah Lai was on the fair hearing rule. The concern was of a similar nature to the complaint in Lim Chee Huat, in that the appellant’s right to a fair hearing (which would, as I have noted at [59] above, include the right to a judicious consideration of the specific facts, evidence, and arguments advanced in his or her case) had been denied given the manner in which the district judge seemed to have approached the matter. In Lo Kai Shui, Kwan VP described this, from the perspective of the court, as the “core judicial responsibility [of a judge] to think through for himself, the issues he has to decide” (at [14]). In my view, that is a fair summary. Even if it might have been possible in Yap Ah Lai for the complaint to be made on the basis of prejudgment or apparent bias, that was neither how it was put nor how I approached the matter. However, I was satisfied that it could reasonably be apprehended that the district judge had failed to consider the matter judiciously given the identical framing of the reasons and evaluation of the facts despite the seemingly different circumstances in the two cases.

  92. [71] On the other hand, in DJP, an application was brought to set aside an arbitral award for breach of natural justice, with the headline complaint being that the tribunal had copied substantial parts of the award from awards in parallel arbitrations that involved similar facts and similar underlying contracts (albeit with some material differences). Notably, the same presiding arbitrator had sat in all three arbitrations, although the co-arbitrators in the impugned arbitration were not involved in the parallel arbitrations.

  93. [72] There were distinct facets to the complaint in DJP. One key facet was put in terms of bias; it was argued that there was a reasonable suspicion that the tribunal had prejudged the matter by using the outcome in the parallel arbitrations as the starting point for its decision (DJP at [65(a)]). Specifically, it was contended that the way in which the tribunal developed its award meant that its decision-making process was tainted by both an anchoring bias and a confirmation bias (DJP at [34]). The issue was not so much whether the tribunal had given effect to the applicant’s right to be heard by applying its mind to the matter before it (as was the case in Yap Ah Lai), but whether the tribunal had approached the arbitration in a manner that gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that it had failed to consider the matter with a truly open mind. There is of course some overlap between these two questions given that one element of failing to keep an open mind to the case at hand is a failure to apply a judicious mind to it. Thus, for example, the fact that the tribunal in DJP had gone as far as to reproduce portions of the awards in the parallel arbitrations that were plainly not applicable to the dispute before it could, apart from showing that the tribunal had not approached the specific circumstances of the case before it with an open mind, equally demonstrate a failure on its part to consider the matter judiciously. But the two inquiries are ultimately distinct. While the focus in Yap Ah Lai was on whether the district judge could be said, in a meaningful sense, to have made a decision on the matter before him, the focus in DJP was on a logically anterior matter: the starting point of the tribunal’s decision-making (namely, using the awards in the previous arbitrations as a base for deciding the matter before it) and whether that starting point resulted in the parties being on an unequal footing (at [65] and [67]).

  94. [73] The Court of Appeal held that there were clear grounds for reasonably apprehending that the presiding arbitrator may have been materially influenced by the earlier decisions that he had been a party to in the parallel arbitrations. It was not permissible for the presiding arbitrator (or, for that matter, any member of the tribunal) to draw on these earlier decisions or to use them as a starting point, as it was incumbent on the tribunal to consider the matter before it afresh (DJP at [70]). While the tribunal had made some adjustments to the awards in the parallel arbitrations to account for what were thought to be the specificities of the arbitration and could, at least to some extent, be said to have applied its mind to the matter, this did not address the problem that it appeared predisposed towards the same outcome, findings, and reasoning that had obtained in the parallel arbitrations. This predisposition, as the court explained, manifested in the two forms noted above: (a) first, anchoring bias, referring to an unconscious tendency to rely on a conclusion earlier made without regard to new information and fresh analysis; and (b) second, confirmation bias, referring to the difficulty of persuading a decision-maker who has come to an initial view to then change its view (DJP at [74]).

  95. [74] In short, whether or not the tribunal had actually applied its mind to the dispute before it, it appeared to have approached the dispute with a coloured mind, and once this was shown to be the case, it could not have made a difference how diligently the material was analysed. As a result, even if the fair hearing rule might not have been breached in the same manner as in Yap Ah Lai, the tribunal had breached the rule against bias, which did give rise to a serious breach of natural justice.

  96. [75] For completeness, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal also found that the tribunal did breach the fair hearing rule, albeit in a different way. The fair hearing rule encompasses a number of aspects, of which the duty to consider matters judiciously is but one. In DJP, the Court of Appeal held, separately, that there had been a breach of the fair hearing rule, in that the tribunal’s knowledge of and access to material from the parallel arbitrations were extraneous considerations in the tribunal’s decision that the parties were unaware of and so were given no opportunity to address (DJP at [80]–[82]). This underscores the importance of focusing not just on the rule of natural justice invoked, but also on the specific way in which the rule is alleged to have been breached.

  97. Inadequacy of reasons

  98. [76] A different strand of complaint is the contention that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his or her decision. In my view, while the cases have not situated such complaints within the framework of natural justice, there may be instances where it may be possible to do so, and in those instances, doing so may present a more principled means of analysing the issue, and help avoid the dangers of attempting to assess the adequacy or sufficiency of reasons in the abstract.

  99. [77] In the judicial context, the leading decision on this issue is Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 676 (“Thong Ah Fat”), where the Court of Appeal highlighted four reasons that underlay the judicial duty to give reasons:

  100. (a) First, the process of engaging with the parties’ submissions and analysing the evidence before the court leads to sounder decisions (at [20]).

  101. (b) Second, the provision of reasons to the parties ensures that they know why they have won or lost (at [21]).

  102. (c) Third, the provision of reasons assists the appellate court by giving it sufficient material to understand and do justice to the decision taken at first instance (at [22]).

  103. (d) Fourth, the giving of reasoned decisions is a facet of open justice in that it curbs arbitrary exercises of power by allowing decisions to be scrutinised, attacked and defended (at [23]).

  104. [78] The failure to give adequate reasons will not typically afford a freestanding basis for setting aside a decision. One instance where it may do so is where it is relied on to establish a sufficiently serious breach of natural justice based on the fair hearing rule.

  105. [79] It is important here to emphasise that while judges – and, as will be seen, arbitrators or quasi-judicial decision-makers to a more limited extent – are generally subject to a duty to give reasons for their decisions, the content of the duty is context-sensitive, as are the consequences of failing to adhere to it. This follows from the fact that the four justifications identified by the Court of Appeal in Thong Ah Fat as undergirding the duty to give reasons are not uniformly applicable to different types of decision-makers. Indeed, this point was emphasised by the Court of Appeal in CVV v CVB [2024] 1 SLR 32 (“CVV”), which concerned an application to set aside an arbitral award. Although the court accepted that an arbitral tribunal was under a general duty to give reasons under Art 31(2) of the Model Law, it cautioned that it was wrong to import the principles laid down in Thong Ah Fat into arbitration without appropriate modification because “Thong Ah Fat sets out the standards applicable to judges in court cases, and different considerations are in play in a court case as opposed to arbitration” [emphasis in original] (at [33]).

  106. [80] Turning to the justifications identified by the Court of Appeal in Thong Ah Fat for the judicial duty to give reasons, the third reason – the facilitation of appellate scrutiny – is not generally relevant to arbitration because there is generally no right of appeal against the merits of an arbitral tribunal’s decision. The facilitation of appellate scrutiny over a decision is grounded in the fair hearing rule because it ensures that the right of appeal is meaningful (see R v Sheppard [2002] 1 SCR 869 at [66]). The point, as one commentator has put it, is that “[t]he judge whose decision is being revisited should not be able, through the provision of no reasons, or inadequate reasons, to deny a party its positive right to effective judicial review or appeal” (see B V Harris, “The Continuing Struggle with the Nuanced Obligation on Judges to Provide Reasons for Their Decisions” (2016) 132 LQR 216 at p 221).

  107. [81] Thus, in Thong Ah Fat, the Court of Appeal set aside the appellant’s conviction on a capital charge of drug trafficking and ordered a retrial because it found itself “unable to affirm or overrule” the trial judge’s decision because it did not understand how he had arrived at certain findings that led him to reject the appellant’s defence (at [58]). These deficiencies included, for example, the lack of clarity as to what the judge had found in respect of the appellant’s mens rea, in that it was unclear whether the appellant had been convicted based on a finding of actual knowledge or wilful blindness as to the nature of the drugs in his possession or based on the statutory presumption of knowledge not having been rebutted. The problem with such ambiguity, as the court observed, was that the appellant could not “exercise his right of appeal effectively” without knowing what the judge had found his precise mens rea to be (at [48]).

  108. [82] An argument of this kind will generally hold no water in arbitration because, as noted above, the court does not usually sit on appeal from an arbitral tribunal’s decision (see CVV at [34]). And while a breach of the fair hearing rule is a ground for setting aside an arbitral award on the ground of breach of natural justice, the focus is on a fair hearing before the tribunal and not a fair hearing of an appeal before the court since no such right of appeal exists in the first place. Similarly, such an argument would hold less weight in final appellate proceedings because there is strictly no further right of appeal in these cases. Thus, the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Takaaki Masui [2022] 1 SLR 1033 held at [50] that a High Court hearing a Magistrate’s Appeal may dismiss the appeal without providing independent reasons where the grounds of appeal have been considered in detail and rejected by the trial judge.

  109. [83] The fourth reason in Thong Ah Fat – open justice – is another point of divergence between litigation and arbitration. Given arbitration’s nature as a private and consensual mode of dispute resolution, an arbitral tribunal is not accountable to the public in the same way that the courts and judges are. Instead, as party autonomy is a cornerstone of the legal framework on arbitration, “an integral feature and consequence of party autonomy is that parties choose their arbitrators and are bound by the decisions of their chosen arbitrators” (see COT v COU [2023] SGCA 31 (“COT”) at [2]). The arbitrators are principally accountable to the parties whose consent is the fount of their authority, and, from the parties’ perspective, this means that their avenues of complaint against what they consider to be inadequate reasoning are far more limited.

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