General Division of the High Court · Decided 8 April 2026
A sale order gave the banks security over the proceeds, but their claims go to trial
Re Da Shun Shipping (Pte) Ltd
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 75 · Case no. Companies Winding Up No 51 of 2022 (Summonses Nos 2972 and 3030 of 2023 and No 2280 of 2025)
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A sale order gave the banks security over the proceeds, but their claims go to trial
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [112], [127]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Da Shun Shipping (Pte) Ltd (“Da Shun”) is a one-ship company which is part of the Hin Leong group of companies. Following the collapse of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (“Hin Leong”) and the Hin Leong group from around April 2020 onwards, Da Shun entered judicial management on 10 February 2021 and went into liquidation on 29 April 2022 in these proceedings ie, HC/CWU 51/2022. Da Shun’s main asset was the vessel “Sea Latitude” (“Vessel”). On 9 November 2021, Da Shun’s then judicial managers obtained an order of court under s 100 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“IRDA”) authorising the Vessel to be sold as if she was not subject to security (“s 100 Order”). In these proceedings, a number of parties contest how the sale proceeds of the Vessel should be applied.
- [2]
[2] This judgment deals with somewhat difficult issues relating to the law of unjust enrichment and subrogation. Additionally, I consider the extent to which my earlier decision in Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd v An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd [2025] 4 SLR 816 (“Da Hui (HC)”) applies to the facts of this case.
Facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] Mr Yit Chee Wah (“Mr Yit”) is the liquidator of Da Shun. While two of the applications before me are brought in his name, Mr Yit and Da Shun can be described as mere observers in the contest presently before me.
- [4]
[4] An Wei Shipping Pte Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) (“An Wei”) is a sister company of Da Shun. Both companies are subsidiaries of Xihe Capital (Pte) Ltd, another company in the Hin Leong group of companies. Like Da Shun, An Wei was also a one-ship company – An Wei’s main asset was the vessel “Sea Horizon”.
- [5]
[5] The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”) and Societe Generale, Singapore Branch (“SG”) are banks who made admiralty in rem claims against the Vessel. They are referred to collectively as the “Writ Claimants”.
The loan facility agreement
- [6]
[6] Da Shun and An Wei were joint and several borrowers under a US$33,800,000 term loan facility agreement with Bank of America, N.A., Singapore Branch (“BofA”) dated 27 November 2019 (“Facility Agreement” and “Loan”).
- [7]
[7] The loan amount under the Facility Agreement was split into two tranches as follows:
- [8]
[8] “Vessel A” was a reference to the “Sea Horizon” while “Vessel B” was a reference to the Vessel.
- [9]
[9] Clause 3 of the Facility Agreement provided that the sums advanced under Tranches A and B were to be used to refinance Vessels A and B respectively:
- [10]
[10] Notwithstanding that the Facility Agreement was notionally meant to fund two separate tranches to refinance An Wei’s and Da Shun’s respective vessels, their liability under the Facility Agreement was joint and several. The Loan was secured by, amongst others, cross-collateralised mortgages over both the “Sea Horizon” and the Vessel. Accordingly, BofA was at liberty to enforce its security interest against either vessel or both vessels to recover any sums owed to BofA under the Facility Agreement.
Sale of the “Sea Horizon”
- [11]
[11] Due to financial difficulties encountered by the Xihe Group entities (which were also part of the Hin Leong group of companies), the “Sea Horizon” (owned by An Wei) was sold subject to the terms set out in a BofA side letter dated 12 January 2021. BofA ultimately received US$21,376,185.54 from the sale of the “Sea Horizon”. The proceeds from that sale were sufficient to pay off sums owed under Tranche A of the Facility Agreement in full. Additionally, (a) a sum of US$132,604.42 was applied towards outstanding default interest under Tranche B; and (b) a sum of US$5,668,261.94 was applied towards the outstanding principal under Tranche B.
- [12]
[12] Accordingly, a total sum of US$5,800,866.36 was applied by BofA from the sale of the “Sea Horizon” (ie, An Wei’s vessel) towards the repayment of Tranche B, which concerned the “repayment of Da Shun’s rateable portion of the Facility Agreement”. This sum will henceforth be referred to as the “Contributed Sum”.
- [13]
[13] As of 10 February 2021, the total amount of principal and interest which remained due under the Loan stood at around US$8.4m.
The statutory liens
- [14]
[14] On 24 April 2020, HSBC filed HC/ADM 91/2020 (“ADM 91”), which was an admiralty action in rem against the Vessel for a claim by HSBC relating to a cargo of approximately 134,380.142 mt of low sulphur fuel oil said to be shipped on board the Vessel under a bill of lading no. OTK19-2992 dated 20 November 2019 (“HSBC BL”). The originals of the HSBC BL had been delivered to HSBC by Hin Leong pursuant to inventory financing that HSBC had provided to Hin Leong; HSBC claims that it was at all material times and remains the lawful holders of the HSBC BL. HSBC’s claim in ADM 91 is quantified in its proof of debt at US$29,040,000.
- [15]
[15] On 1 April 2021, SG filed HC/ADM 52/2021 (“ADM 52”), which was an admiralty action in rem against the Vessel for a claim by SG relating to a cargo of 155,268.649 mt of low sulphur fuel oil said to be shipped on board the Vessel under a bill of lading no. OTK19-3195 dated 4 December 2019 (“SG BL”). Like HSBC, SG had obtained the SG BL as security for inventory financing which it had given to Hin Leong, and SG claims that it was at all material times and remains the lawful holder of the SG BL. In its proof of debt, SG quantifies its claim at US$35,522,361.52.
- [16]
[16] ADM 91 and ADM 52 are referred to collectively as the “Statutory Lien Claims”.
Section 100 IRDA application and sale of the Vessel
- [17]
[17] Some time in 2021, the judicial managers of Da Shun formed the view that the Vessel was in an untenable position. This was because:
(a) After the sale of the “Sea Horizon”, the outstanding principal and interest owed under the Loan was around US$8.7m. This sum was still secured by, amongst others, BofA’s mortgage over the Vessel.
(b) Additionally, the Writ Claimants had since asserted the Statutory Lien Claims over the Vessel.
(c) The Vessel continued to “incur operating expenses in an untenable fashion without reciprocal benefit to the Company”. These operating expenses were estimated to be approximately US$163,994.92 per month.
(d) The Vessel was unable to trade due to the Statutory Lien Claims creating a risk of arrest should the Vessel enter Singapore’s port limits (at the time, the Vessel had remained anchored outside Singapore port limits to reduce the risk of an arrest).
- [18]
[18] In light of this untenable position, the judicial managers entered into discussions with HSBC and SG on the need to dispose of the Vessel free of encumbrances, including the Statutory Lien Claims, and the mechanisms by which to achieve this. One mechanism to achieve this was for the judicial managers to make an application to court under s 100(2) of the IRDA, which allows the court to authorise the disposal of secured property as if it were not subject to security, if it would promote one or more of the purposes of judicial management.
- [19]
[19] Following these discussions, Da Shun’s judicial managers, HSBC and SG entered into an agreement dated 17 June 2021 (“17 June Agreement”) containing the following key features. First, the judicial managers would apply to court under s 100 of the IRDA for an order allowing them to dispose of the Vessel as if it were not subject to any security (the “s 100 Application”). While the 17 June Agreement referred to s 100(1) of the IRDA, the eventual order was (correctly, in my view) made under s 100(2). Secondly, under the 17 June Agreement, the sale proceeds would be applied in the following order of priority:
- [20]
[20] For their part, the Writ Claimants agreed not to object to the s 100 Application . The Writ Claimants also undertook not to issue new writs or arrest the Vessel for a period of three months from the date of the agreement and to take reasonable steps to facilitate the sale of the Vessel.
- [21]
[21] While BofA was not a party to this agreement, it appears from the evidence that BofA was involved in the discussions leading up to it – the record contains a side letter from BofA to Da Shun dated 15 June 2021, in which BofA agreed to fund the s 100 Application. Subsequent to this agreement, BofA also played an active role in the discussions between the parties on the terms of the proposed s 100 Application.
- [22]
[22] The s 100 Application was eventually filed on 8 October 2021 in HC/OS 1023/2021 (“OS 1023”), where Da Shun’s judicial managers submitted that disposing of the Vessel was likely to promote a more advantageous realisation of Da Shun’s assets than on a winding up (see s 89(1)(c) of the IRDA). However, as the Statutory Lien Claims would survive the change of ownership of the Vessel, the Vessel was rendered “practically unsaleable”. No party would purchase it given the immediate threat of arrest upon any transfer of ownership, as a going-concern purchaser would not have the statutory moratorium that Da Shun enjoyed.
- [24]
[24] On 9 November 2021, Kannan Ramesh J (as he then was) granted the s 100 Order by consent, which by and large reflected the terms of the 17 June Agreement and the product of the subsequent negotiations between Da Shun’s judicial managers, HSBC and SG. As the terms of the s 100 Order are a key part of the present dispute, the relevant parts of the order are set out in full:
- [25]
[25] Pursuant to the s 100 Order, the Writ Claimants filed Notices of Discontinuance in ADM 91 and ADM 52 respectively. This enabled Da Shun’s judicial managers to “market the Vessel for sale free of encumbrances”.
- [26]
[26] The Vessel was sold by the judicial managers and delivered to its buyers on 4 February 2022. The sale proceeds from the Vessel amounted to US$24,645,009.27. BofA was repaid the monies it was owed and the Mortgage on the Vessel was discharged on 4 February 2022. Following the settlement of accounts and further receipts and/or payments from the sale proceeds, the balance proceeds paid into court amounted to US$12,450,771.26. While the affidavit of Mr Yit refers to a sum of US$12,452,818.82 as representing the balance proceeds, the amount eventually paid into court, as indicated in Directions to Accountant-General for Payment In in HC/DRI 62/2023 (Amendment No. 1) filed on 8 November 2023, amounted to US$12,450,771.26. Nothing turns on this difference but henceforth, this sum is referred to as the “Balance Proceeds”.
The competing claims and the present proceedings
- [27]
[27] There are, broadly, two sets of competing claimants to the Balance Proceeds that are relevant for the purposes of the applications before me:
(a) While the Writ Claimants have filed Notices of Discontinuance in respect of their Statutory Lien Claims, they continue, collectively, to assert a priority / security interest over the Balance Proceeds in accordance with paragraph 2(ii) of the s 100 Order.
(b) On 29 December 2022, An Wei’s previous solicitors informed Mr Yit that An Wei had a claim in contribution against Da Shun and sought to assert the proprietary remedy of subrogation against the Balance Proceeds.
- [28]
[28] Arising from these competing claims, this judgment deals with three applications:
(a) HC/SUM 2972/2023 (“SUM 2972”) is an application by Mr Yit as Da Shun’s liquidator. In SUM 2972, Mr Yit essentially seeks directions on the appropriate distribution of the Balance Proceeds, which have been paid into court. In particular, Mr Yit requests for a determination to be made under s 145(3) of the IRDA as to the respective rights and liabilities of HSBC’s, SG’s, and An Wei’s respective claims against the Balance Proceeds.
(b) HC/SUM 3030/2023 (“SUM 3030”) is Mr Yit’s application (under s 170(2) of the IRDA) for leave to commence SUM 2972 against An Wei, and for the costs of the application to be in the cause of SUM 2972.
(c) HC/SUM 2280/2025 (“SUM 2280”) is An Wei’s application. An Wei seeks leave under s 133(1) of the IRDA to commence and proceed with SUM 2280. Substantively, An Wei applies for an order to be paid the sum of US$6,083,702.55 out of the Balance Proceeds in priority over all other claimants including HSBC, SG and Da Shun. This sum comprises the Contributed Sum at [12] plus 50% of various costs incurred and claimed by BofA in relation to its enforcement of the Facility Agreement. An Wei asserts that it has an entitlement to stand as a secured creditor in the place of BofA under the Mortgage, following its payment to BofA which discharged part of Da Shun’s debt to BofA. Alternatively, An Wei seeks payment of the same by way of contribution, but as an unsecured creditor.
Issues to be determined
- [29]
[29] Three broad issues arise for my determination in these applications:
(a) whether An Wei is entitled to the proprietary remedy of subrogation (“First Issue”);
(b) whether the Writ Claimants have a security, proprietary or otherwise priority interest in the Balance Proceeds (“Second Issue”); and
(c) whether the Writ Claimants have proved their respective claims (“Third Issue”).
- [30]
[30] Before delving into the substantive issues, I deal briefly with the preliminary question of whether leave should be granted to the liquidators of Da Shun and An Wei respectively to commence/proceed with SUM 2972 and SUM 2280 respectively. Under s 170(2) of the IRDA which applies to companies in creditors’ voluntary liquidation, no action or proceeding may be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court. Similarly, under s 133(1) of the IRDA which applies to a company wound up by the court, leave is required for any person to commence proceedings against such a company. Da Shun was wound up by the court while An Wei is in creditors’ voluntary liquidation. Thus, s 170(2) of the IRDA would be relevant in relation to the applications made by Mr Yit against, inter alia, An Wei and s 133(1) would be relevant in relation to SUM 2280 brought by An Wei against, inter alia, Da Shun.
- [31]
[31] No party opposed the grant of leave, and all parties proceeded to make substantive submissions on the merits of their respective claims. In these circumstances, I consider it appropriate to grant leave to Mr Yit and An Wei respectively so as to enable the court to determine the substantive disputes relating to the Balance Proceeds.
- [32]
[32] Turning to the substantive issues enumerated at [29], I make a few observations regarding how these issues interact with the respective claims of HSBC, SG and An Wei:
(a) Assuming for current purposes that An Wei has a claim against Da Shun in contribution, An Wei still has to succeed on the First Issue to prevail over the Writ Claimants in terms of priority. This is because the quantum of the claims of the Writ Claimants, if proven, far exceeds the Balance Proceeds.
(b) The Writ Claimants on the other hand must succeed on the Third Issue to have any claim at all against the Balance Proceeds. Further, the Writ Claimants will need to prevail on the Second Issue as well in order for their claims to enjoy priority over An Wei’s claim.
(c) Should An Wei fail on the First Issue, and the Writ Claimants succeed only on the Third Issue but not the Second Issue, then An Wei and the Writ Claimants will only be able to recover their claims pari passu as unsecured creditors of Da Shun.
First Issue: Whether An Wei is entitled to the proprietary remedy of subrogation
- [33]
[33] To begin, none of the parties adverse to An Wei seriously disputes that An Wei has a right to claim a contribution from Da Shun in respect of the sums enumerated above at [28(c)]. Notwithstanding that An Wei and Da Shun were jointly and severally liable under Clause 2.1 of the Facility Agreement, it is clear that the purpose of the Facility Agreement was for each borrower to benefit from an equal (ie, 50%) share of the loan. This is evident from the structure of the Facility Agreement being split into two tranches of equal commitment value (see [7] above). Clause 3.1 also provided that each tranche was to be used to refinance each borrower’s respective vessel (see [9] above).
- [34]
[34] Additionally, Clause 2.2.2 of the Facility Agreement contemplates each co-borrower possessing rights of indemnity inter se in respect of the sums repaid under the Loan. Clause 2.2.2 reads:
- [35]
[35] In Da Hui (HC), I had summarised the law on contribution (at [32] and [35]) as follows:
- [36]
[36] Applying the above statements of law to this case, and based on the provisions of the Facility Agreement referred to above (at [33]–[34]), it can in my view be reasonably concluded that Da Shun and An Wei did not intend that their respective contributions to repaying the Loan would be disproportionate or unequal. Therefore, the presumption of “equity is equality” is not displaced on the facts of this case and as such, the rateable contribution sought by An Wei from Da Shun is justified.
- [37]
[37] Following from the conclusion above, the live issue that remains is whether An Wei can or ought to be subrogated to BofA’s security interest, so as to allow its claim a priority over the Vessel’s sale proceeds that is superior to that of the Writ Claimants’. An Wei submits that, having paid part of Da Shun’s share of the mortgage debt, it is entitled to the remedy of subrogation and to step into BofA’s shoes, thereby ranking ahead of the Writ Claimants in the distribution of the Balance Proceeds. Following Re Downer Enterprises Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 1074, subrogation entitles the paying party to succeed not only to the creditor’s underlying claim, but also to their priority position in liquidation.
- [38]
[38] As a general comment before I begin my analysis proper, the remedy of subrogation is generally designed to prevent unjust enrichment. The court thus examines whether the defendant/respondent has been enriched at the claimant’s/applicant’s expense, and whether that enrichment is unjust (Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (“BFC”) at 234). Even if unjust enrichment is established, subrogation may be refused on the ground of public policy (BFC at 234D, Da Hui (HC) at [66]). As these principles operate independently of any agreement between the parties, they circumvent questions about whether the Facility Agreement between BofA, An Wei and Da Shun envisioned such relief. In any case, An Wei does not rely on the terms of the Facility Agreement as a basis for its claim.
- [39]
[39] With the general comments above in mind, two principal questions arise for my consideration under the First Issue: (a) whether a case of unjust enrichment exists to justify granting the remedy of subrogation, and this includes considering whether my decision in Da Hui (HC) precludes An Wei from obtaining such a remedy (“Unjust Enrichment Issue”); and (b) whether public policy weighs against the grant of subrogation in any event (“Public Policy Issue”).
Analysis and decision
The Unjust Enrichment Issue
- [40]
[40] An Wei submits that it is entitled to subrogation on the grounds that Da Shun was unjustly enriched when An Wei paid part of Da Shun’s debt to BofA. An Wei’s right to subrogation, it argues, arises from its partial payment of Da Shun’s proportionate share of the debt as a joint and several borrower.
- [41]
[41] By paying part of Da Shun’s debt to BofA and discharging their joint liability, An Wei claims the right to stand in BofA’s shoes vis-à-vis Da Shun and the Vessel, thereby ranking ahead of the Writ Claimants. An Wei contends that its contribution directly benefitted Da Shun’s estate by increasing the funds available to creditors, and that this enrichment at An Wei’s expense being unjust forms the basis of its subrogation claim. In the alternative, An Wei relies on s 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 (2020 Rev Ed) (“MLAA”), which it submits preserves a joint and several co-debtor’s rights even after it pays off its co-debtor’s debt owing to the creditor. On this basis, BofA’s priority interest was not extinguished upon payment but is instead maintained for An Wei’s benefit to prevent unjust enrichment, and this would allow An Wei to step into BofA’s shoes and inherit the Mortgage with its attendant priority. An Wei contends that this proprietary right arises upon payment, survives liquidation, and is not defeated by the discharge or enforcement of the security.
- [42]
[42] The Writ Claimants submit that subrogation is unavailable on several grounds. First, An Wei has no claim in unjust enrichment against Da Shun, as An Wei knowingly assumed joint and several liability for the Loan. Secondly, the rationale for equitable subrogation is not engaged since the Vessel has been sold and delivered to the purchaser. As stated in Da Hui (HC) at [60], equitable subrogation aims to cure the unconscionability of the defendant being restored to his collateral in circumstances where the claimant discharged the defendant’s liability to his creditor. Since the Vessel has been sold, Da Shun no longer possesses any right or interest which Da Shun cannot in good conscience keep An Wei out of – put simply, there is no security left to which An Wei can be subrogated to.
(1) Subrogation and unjust enrichment
- [43]
[43] I turn first to the elements of unjust enrichment. As a starting point, it is well-established in Singapore that unjust enrichment is recognised as an independent cause of action, distinct from contractual or tortious obligations. This doctrinal position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [181]–[182], where it was clarified that the inquiry in unjust enrichment proceeds on its own doctrinal footing. The claimant must establish an enrichment of the defendant, at the claimant’s expense, which was unjust, and for which there is no applicable defence (BFC at 227A–B). Liability typically depends not on the existence of a contract or the commission of a tort, but instead on the autonomous principles governing unjust enrichment.
- [44]
[44] What constitutes unjust enrichment has been explained in some detail in Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Anna Wee”), where the Court of Appeal at [132]–[133] recognised several categories of unjust factors:
- [45]
[45] As to where the remedy of subrogation is situated in the realm of unjust enrichment, as noted by Lord Steyn in the House of Lords decision in BFC, “distinguished writers have shown that the place of subrogation on the map of the law of obligations is by and large within the now sizeable corner marked out for restitution”. Prof Tang Hang Wu, in his treatise – Principles of the Law of Restitution in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2019) (“The Law of Restitution”) notes at para 10.007 that in “certain situations, an unjust enrichment claimant may keep a security interest alive by way of subrogation”. Thus, the remedy of subrogation is typically sought in circumstances where the claimant is seeking that remedy to reverse the effects of an unjust enrichment.
- [46]
[46] Therefore, the remedy of subrogation in this context, properly understood, is inextricably linked to whether unjust enrichment, in its legal cause of action sense, exists. It does not suffice for a claimant to assert that the retention of the benefit is “unfair” in some abstract sense. Rather, the claimant must, as a threshold, identify a recognised unjust factor.
- [47]
[47] That the court approaches claims grounded on unjust enrichment (and any consequential remedies sought for equitable subrogation) in a principled manner which eschews any notion of a free-ranging discretion to help litigants is amply demonstrated in the UK Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidation) v Swynson Ltd [2018] AC 313 (“Lowick Rose”). The speech of Lord Sumption is particularly instructive:
22. … As with any novel application of the relevant principles, it is necessary to remind oneself at the outset that the law of unjust enrichment is part of the law of obligations. It is not a matter of judicial discretion. As Lord Reed points out in Investment Trust Companies (para 39) it
“does not create a judicial licence to meet the perceived requirements of fairness on a case-by-case basis: legal rights arising from unjust enrichment should be determined by rules of law which are ascertainable and consistently applied.”
English law does not have a universal theory to explain all the cases in which restitution is available. It recognises a number of discrete factual situations in which enrichment is treated as vitiated by some unjust factor. These factual situations are not, however, random illustrations of the Court’s indulgence to litigants. They have the common feature that some legal norm or some legally recognised expectation of the claimant falling short of a legal right has been disrupted or disappointed.
…
30. The cases on the use of equitable subrogation to prevent or reverse unjust enrichment are all cases of defective transactions. They were defective in the sense that the claimant paid money on the basis of an expectation which failed. Many of them may broadly be said to arise from a mistake on the part of the claimant. For example, he may wrongly have assumed that the benefit in question was available or enforceable or that his stipulation was valid, when it was not. However, it would be unwise to draw too close an analogy with the role of mistake in other legal contexts or to try to fit the subrogation cases into any broader category of unjust enrichment. It is in many ways sui generis. In the first place, except in the case of voluntary dispositions, the law does not normally attach legal consequences to a unilateral mistake unless it is known to or was induced by the other party. But it does so in the subrogation cases. This is, as I have explained, because the windfall character of the benefit conferred on the defendant means that it is not unjust to give effect to the unilateral expectation of the claimant. Secondly, where money is paid under a contract, restitution is normally available only if the contract can be and is rescinded or is otherwise at an end without performance (eg by frustration). This is because the law of unjust enrichment is generally concerned to restore the parties to a normatively defective transfer to their pre-transfer position. Subrogation, however, does not restore the parties to their pre-transfer position. It effectively operates to specifically enforce a defeated expectation. Thirdly, as Lord Clarke suggested in Menelaou (para 21), the rule may be equally capable of analysis in terms of failure of basis for the transfer. …
31. Two things, however, are clear. The first is that the role of the law of unjust enrichment in such cases is to characterise the resultant enrichment of the defendant as unjust, because the absence of the stipulated benefit disrupted a relevant expectation about the transaction under which the money was paid. The second is that the role of equitable subrogation is to replicate as far as possible that element of the transaction whose absence made it defective. This is why subrogation cannot be allowed to confer a greater benefit on the claimants than he has bargained for: see Paul v Speirway Ltd [1976] Ch 220, 232 (Oliver J), Banque Financière, at pp 236-237 (Lord Hoffmann), and Cheltenham & Gloucester v Appleyard, at paras 38, 41-42 (Neuberger LJ). It can be seen that the fact that all the cases relate to defective transactions is not just an adventitious feature of the disputes that happen to have come before the courts. It is fundamental to the principle on which they were decided.
[emphasis in italics added]
- [48]
[48] If one were seeking to find a common thread running through the categories of cases where equitable subrogation may be justified, it can be said to be, adopting the language of Lowick Rose at [30], that normatively, there has been some defect in the transaction which resulted in the claimant paying money on the basis of an expectation which failed. This thread is clearly apparent from a cumulative reading of Anna Wee and Lowick Rose, though it is important to emphasise that each case addresses a different aspect of the law: Anna Wee was a case concerning unjust enrichment generally, while Lowick Rose addresses when equitable subrogation might be available to prevent or reverse an unjust enrichment.
- [49]
[49] Such defects in the transaction typically manifest where the claimant’s transfer (or payment, as the case may be) occurs on a basis that either never existed or failed, or which was vitiated in a manner recognised by the law. The reason the remedy of equitable subrogation applies in these cases is, as explained in Lowick Rose at [30], that it operates to specifically enforce the defeated expectation rather than to restore the status quo ante. This distinguishes subrogation from unjust enrichment, which typically seeks to restore parties to their pre-transfer position following a normatively defective transfer.
- [50]
[50] What is also clear from Anna Wee and Lowick Rose is that this principled, doctrinal approach rejects abstract characterisations or general assertions of unfairness or injustice, and instead requires the claimant to specify the unjust factor it relies on to ground its claim.
- [51]
[51] The importance of this is also supported by academic commentary. In The Law of Restitution at para 10.008, Prof Tang cites BFC at 236 and underscores the point that recovery via the remedy of subrogation depends on proving a recognised unjust factor:
- [52]
[52] An Wei relies on BFC in support of its application, but it is clear from Lord Hoffmann’s speech in BFC quoted above at [51] that identifying a specific and recognised unjust factor is essential. It is only where such an unjust factor exists that, absent any public policy grounds to refuse relief, any justification would even begin to exist for the claimant to be afforded a priority interest over the defendant via the remedy of subrogation. Absent such an unjust factor, the elevation of the claimant’s interest above that of the defendant would lack principled justification and would, paradoxically to the claimant’s assertion that the remedy should be granted to prevent injustice to itself, result in an injustice to the defendant. The doctrine of subrogation will not be applied if its application would itself produce an unjust result (BFC at 241H, citing Boodle, Hatfield & Co v British Films Ltd 1986 PCC 176 at 182–183).
- [53]
[53] The need to identify an established unjust factor was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee at [134] and [136]:
- [54]
[54] The essence of this very same point was again succinctly emphasised by the UK Supreme Court in Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Investment Trust Companies [2017] UKSC 29 at [39], a decision referred to in Lowick Rose:
- [55]
[55] In Anna Wee, the appellant contended that her former husband had, in the course of ancillary proceedings relating to their divorce, fraudulently concealed the existence of lucrative agreements, thereby misrepresenting his true financial position. Upon discovering years later that the undisclosed assets had been settled into trusts prior to his death, the appellant commenced proceedings against her former husband’s estate and the trustees alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment.
- [56]
[56] On the facts of Anna Wee, it was clear to the court that the appellant had failed to point to “any specific unjust factor underlying her claim in unjust enrichment” (at [135]), and on that basis, the appellant’s claim failed. The appellant’s claim at its core was a simple assertion that the trust (and, by extension, the second respondent as trustee) received funds that the appellant would have been entitled to, and that it would be “unjust” for the second respondent to retain them. The court held that such an assertion had to fail as it did not “plead facts which [were] capable of bringing the case within one of the established restitutionary claims or some justifiable extension of them” (Anna Wee at [135], citing Uren v First National Home Finance Ltd [2005] EWHC 2529 (Ch) at [18]).
- [57]
[57] It can be seen from the cases cited above from the apex courts in England and Singapore that identification of a recognised unjust factor is an essential piece of the puzzle.
- [58]
[58] In the present case, similar to Anna Wee, An Wei has not identified any viable or recognised unjust factor in its affidavits and submissions. An Wei’s position is largely articulated on the basis of mere alleged factual inequities – namely, that it is unfair for An Wei to bear Da Shun’s share of the debt using the sale proceeds of An Wei’s own vessel. But that concern is already addressed by the available in personam remedy of contribution. To obtain something more, in particular a proprietary and priority interest by way of subrogation to BofA’s security, An Wei must do more and establish an unjust factor or event recognised at law. As the cases clearly explain, unjust enrichment as properly understood in its legal sense, and any remedies consequentially available, are not aimed at simply providing relief against hard bargains or adverse commercial outcomes. A mere assertion of unfairness will not suffice. Nor, in this case, does the mere fact that An Wei paid more than its rateable share of the debt due to BofA. That payment in and of itself does not result in unjust enrichment at law, nor does it automatically entitle An Wei to step into the shoes of BofA.
- [59]
[59] The facts of this case demonstrate that no unjust factor exists and accordingly, the cases relied upon by An Wei do not assist its case. For example, in BFC which An Wei relies on, the claimant advanced funds on the shared assumption that it would receive effective security, but due to a defect in the transaction, that security was not obtained ie, in essence, there was a failure of basis. The House of Lords held that this rendered it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit, and granted subrogation in favour of the claimant (at 234–235). Similarly, in Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd [2016] AC 176 (“Bank of Cyprus”), the bank advanced money on the mutual expectation that it would receive security over property, and that expectation failed through no fault of the bank. Again, present on the facts was a failure of basis, a recognised unjust factor (at [20]–[21]). Consequently, subrogation was permitted to reverse the unjust enrichment.
- [60]
[60] As an aside, in The Law of Restitution, Prof Tang criticises the reasoning in BFC and opines that it ought not to be applied in Singapore (at para 10.009). The parties before me argued the matter as if BFC was part of Singapore law. In Da Hui (HC), BFC was also cited to me by counsel and I discussed the case in my judgment. It was also cited with approval by the UK Supreme Court in Lowick Rose. Nevertheless, I do not consider it necessary to definitively come to any view on whether BFC is good law in Singapore. Instead, and for An Wei’s benefit, I proceed on the assumption that it is applicable in Singapore but even on that assumed basis, BFC does not, for the reasons above, assist An Wei in any event. Reverting to my analysis, no failure of basis has been demonstrated in this case, or any other recognised unjust factor or event. My conclusion is reinforced by the evident intention of the parties (or lack thereof) – to be clear, in this context, the relevance of intention is not for the court to divine what the parties’ intention was in any contractual sense. Rather, as Lord Hoffmann noted in BFC (at 234 D–E), it is because questions of intention may be “highly relevant to the question of whether or not the enrichment has been unjust”.
- [61]
[61] On the facts, An Wei was under an existing legal obligation to repay the entire debt to BofA, having entered into the Facility Agreement as a joint and several borrower alongside Da Shun. There was no shared assumption, expectation or intention (nor was any evidence adduced) that An Wei would obtain, over and above any rights of contribution it may have had against Da Shun, any security or proprietary benefit over the Vessel in the event the sale proceeds of its own mortgaged vessel were utilised to discharge BofA’s debt. Nor was An Wei compelled to make the payment in circumstances of legal necessity that would support equitable relief. It was An Wei’s commercial decision to enter into the Facility Agreement on joint and several terms and to offer its vessel as cross-collateralised security for the Loan. The subsequent realisation of the debt by BofA upon An Wei and Da Shun’s default under the Facility Agreement was thus entirely consistent with the risk allocation that An Wei had knowingly accepted. In short, what eventually transpired (ie, BofA enforcing its claim against both Da Shun and An Wei’s vessels for different and unequal sums) was entirely consistent with the very bargain that An Wei entered into. There was no failure of basis, or any normative defect in the transaction or defeated expectation that An Wei could point to in aid of its case. In my judgment, since no legally recognised unjust factor or event arises on the present facts for the reasons I have given above, no question of equitable subrogation arises either. On this basis alone, the relief that An Wei seeks in prayers 2 and 3 of SUM 2280 cannot succeed and must be dismissed.
- [62]
[62] The conclusion I have reached above would be sufficient to dispose of An Wei’s substantive application in SUM 2280. Nevertheless, I proceed to consider the other arguments raised by the parties, including whether my decision in Da Hui (HC) is distinguishable, and it is to that question that I now turn.
(2) Da Hui (HC) is in substance indistinguishable from this case
- [63]
[63] The Writ Claimants submit that An Wei’s claim stands to be dismissed also by reason of my decision in Da Hui (HC).
- [64]
[64] In Da Hui (HC), I held that subrogation is unavailable when the mortgagee’s security interest is spent as a result of the security itself being realised to discharge the primary debt (at [57]). Accordingly, in Da Hui (HC), I denied the applicant’s claim for subrogation.
- [65]
[65] In Da Hui (HC), the co-borrowers were Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd (“Da Hui”) and An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd (“An Rong”), both of which were one-ship companies in the Hin Leong group. Da Hui and An Rong entered into cross-collateralisation arrangements under a US$37.2m joint loan facility agreement with BofA. The loan was secured by mortgages over three vessels. Subsequently, when both borrowers were facing financial distress, Da Hui’s vessel was sold with the proceeds applied to partially satisfy the debt due to BofA. BofA recovered the remainder of the debt through admiralty actions in rem against An Rong’s vessels. Da Hui subsequently claimed subrogation to BofA’s extinguished mortgages over An Rong’s vessels, competing over the residual sale proceeds against two other admiralty claimants, namely Petrochina International (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Petrochina”) and SG, who had issued admiralty in rem writs against An Rong’s vessels. In Da Hui (HC), I was required to determine whether subrogation to BofA’s security interests remained available under s 2 of the MLAA in circumstances where the securities held by BofA had been fully realised.
- [66]
[66] In Da Hui (HC) at [57]–[63], I held that Da Hui could not be equitably subrogated to securities that had already been realised. BofA had already fully enforced its mortgages over An Rong’s vessels by the commencement of admiralty in rem proceedings and arrest of the vessels concerned, culminating in the judicial sale of those vessels. I further held that because BofA’s interests as mortgagee had been exhausted or merged into its admiralty causes of action and judgments, no proprietary interest remained for Da Hui to be subrogated into. Da Hui appealed my decision and the Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal – see Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd v An Rong Shipping Pte Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 998 (“Da Hui (CA)”).
- [67]
[67] An Wei submits that Da Hui (HC) is distinguishable from the present case. First, An Wei argues that in Da Hui (CA), the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on essentially procedural grounds ie, that Da Hui ought to have commenced proceedings before the admiralty court and not by way of an originating application. Thus, the Court of Appeal did not address whether my substantive decision on the merits was correct. An Wei’s second and related submission is that in any event, in Da Hui (HC), the mortgages were “spent” through judicial enforcement by BofA (namely, the arrest and judicial sale of An Rong’s vessels). Conversely, in the present case, BofA did not enforce the mortgage (in the sense of arresting the Vessel in admiralty proceedings and having it judicially sold) – the Vessel was instead sold privately by the liquidator and BofA’s security was “extinguished upon discharge of the debt by repayment”. On this basis, An Wei contends that BofA’s security was not “spent” in the same way as it was in Da Hui (HC). In this case, An Wei, as co-debtor, paid a portion of Da Shun’s debt and thus was entitled to obtain an equitable right to the surplus by subrogation as the obstacle identified by me in Da Hui (HC) does not arise in this case.
- [68]
[68] The Writ Claimants submit that this distinction is immaterial. How the security was realised does not affect the applicability of Da Hui (HC) to An Wei’s claim. In both Da Hui (HC) and the present case, BofA’s security was fully enforced and therefore spent. As a matter of fact, BofA received full repayment under the Facility Agreement from the sale of the Vessel and thereafter, discharged the Mortgage. The security held by BofA was thus fully spent.
- [69]
[69] In my view, the facts in Da Hui (HC) are, materially and in substance, similar to the present case. Thus, I am inclined to the view that just as in Da Hui (HC), the security held by BofA over the Vessel was also spent in this case. In my view, the differences highlighted by An Wei between the facts of Da Hui (HC) and those of the present case are superficial and do not suffice to render my decision in Da Hui (HC) distinguishable as a matter of substance. Specifically, An Wei has failed to satisfy me why the distinction between an admiralty arrest by BofA and judicial sale of the vessels concerned in Da Hui (HC), and a sale in this case of the Vessel by Da Shun’s liquidators as if she was not subject to security pursuant to the terms of the s 100 Order, is a distinction of substance as opposed to form.
- [70]
[70] In my view, the mechanism by which the realisation of BofA’s security (ie, the mortgaged vessel) took place in both cases is immaterial. What matters is that here, BofA’s secured debt was fully satisfied by liquidating the mortgaged vessel and converting it into cash through a court sanctioned process. In this case, that process involved a sale of BofA’s security sanctioned by an order of court (ie, the s 100 Order), granted on the application of Da Shun’s then judicial managers as officers of the court. The s 100 Order expressly preserved BofA’s rights and priority to the sale proceeds of the Vessel qua mortgagee. BofA in turn accepted and agreed to the terms of the s 100 Order which allocated the Balance Proceeds to other parties only after BofA was repaid in full. Clearly, the quid pro quo was that BofA would forbear from actively enforcing its rights against the asset that represented its security – that forbearance was key to the s 100 Order being successfully implemented. But that does not mean that the s 100 Order, a critical plank of the mechanism to sell the Vessel free from encumbrances, was not itself a means by which BofA was at the very least indirectly or passively enforcing its rights as mortgagee of the Vessel. It is noteworthy that in its side letter dated 15 June 2021 (see [21] above), BofA agreed to fund the s 100 Application “with a view to preserving and enforcing our rights under the Finance Documents (including the Mortgage) and our security interest in the Vessel…” (emphasis added in italics). Further, the s 100 Order itself (at paragraph 7 – see above at [24]) made clear that BofA was not obliged to discharge the Mortgage until all sums due to it had been paid from the proceeds of sale of the Vessel. BofA participated in the distribution of the sale proceeds as envisaged by terms of the s 100 Order and recovered the amounts due to it under the Facility Agreement from the Vessel’s sale proceeds, also in accordance with the terms of the s 100 Order. On completion of the sale of the Vessel, the liquidator confirmed that the Mortgage was discharged by BofA on 4 February 2022. For all intents and purposes, BofA’s enforcement rights against the Vessel were, on the completion of the sale pursuant to the s 100 Order, transferred to the Vessel’s sale proceeds.
- [71]
[71] In my judgment, the terms of the s 100 Order and the mechanics that were built into it as detailed above represented in substance a form of enforcement which balanced the rights of secured creditors like BofA and parties like HSBC and SG who had encumbered the Vessel with statutory liens, whilst allowing the liquidators of Da Shun to sell the Vessel without the Vessel being arrested by any of those parties. Thus, while BofA may not have actively enforced the Mortgage by arresting the Vessel itself, it would be artificial and blinkered to conclude that the sale of the Vessel by Da Shun’s liquidators pursuant to the s 100 Order was a pure private sale that involved no enforcement whatsoever by BofA of its rights as the mortgagee. In my view, it would be more accurate to characterise it as a court sanctioned sale by Da Shun’s then judicial managers involving the indirect or passive enforcement by BofA of its rights under the Mortgage.
- [72]
[72] Therefore, in my view, upon the completion of the sale of the Vessel pursuant to the s 100 Order and the distribution of the sale proceeds to BofA, BofA’s security was spent and extinguished (as was also the case in Da Hui (HC)). Accordingly, and as I held in Da Hui (HC), the remedy of subrogation cannot operate to revive a security that has been spent and thereby extinguished. Thus, if necessary for my decision, this would afford a further reason for me to dismiss An Wei’s substantive application. Furthermore, given my analysis and conclusion above, it is not necessary for me to reach a landing on the merits of An Wei’s first argument (at [67]) on whether or not the Court of Appeal in Da Hui (CA) affirmed my substantive decision in Da Hui (HC). Even if there was no such affirmation, it does not assist An Wei.
- [73]
[73] I make two final points here relating to Da Hui (HC).
- [74]
[74] The first concerns the Writ Claimants’ submission that An Wei, having previously confirmed to the court that it would be bound and abide by the outcome in Da Hui (HC), cannot now resile from that position. This follows from a confirmation given by the previous solicitors of An Wei during a Case Conference on 21 December 2023 and recorded by the Assistant Registrar who conducted the case conference, that An Wei agreed to be bound by Da Hui (HC) and any appeal therefrom on the basis that the legal issues to be determined in Da Hui (HC) and this case were similar. I reproduce the exchanges between the Assistant Registrar and the then counsel for An Wei:
- [76]
[76] The second point relates to An Wei’s submission that, by virtue of the principle in Ex parte James; In re Condon (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609, court officers including liquidators must not act in a manner that, even if lawful, falls below the standards of fairness expected of court officers. An Wei submits that the liquidator of Da Shun would be in breach of this principle if it is allowed to retain the benefit of An Wei’s payment that partially discharged Da Shun’s debt to BofA. An Wei contends that in these circumstances, any honest person would consider it fair to recognise An Wei’s subrogated security rights.
- [77]
[77] In my view, there is no basis to contend that Da Shun’s liquidators acted in a manner that attracts the principle (assuming it applies) such that they should be held to account, whether as constructive trustees or on any other basis. The then judicial managers applied for the s 100 Order and acted in accordance with its terms. After Da Shun went into liquidation, Mr Yit as Da Shun’s liquidator applied to the court for determination of the rights and interests of the three claimants (ie, HSBC, SG and An Wei) against the Balance Proceeds. Far from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of creditors, the liquidators of Da Shun discharged their duties as expected of them. Accordingly, I have no hesitation rejecting the submission advanced by An Wei.
(3) Section 2 of the MLAA does not assist An Wei
- [78]
[78] An Wei relies in the alternative on s 2 of the MLAA. An Wei submits that, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, equity may “keep the security alive” for the benefit of the party who discharged the debt, and this is envisioned by s 2 of the MLAA. Accordingly, repayment of the debt does not necessarily extinguish BofA’s security interest. Instead, s 2 may operate so as to treat the benefit of the mortgage as having been assigned to the paying party, effectively by way of subrogation (BFC at 236, Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1 WLR 328 (“Boscawen”) at 334 and 342, Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2010] 3 LRC 75 (“Bofinger”) at [48]–[50]). An Wei also cited the cases of Bank of Cyprus and Leon v Kensington Mortgage Co Ltd [2023] EWHC 121 (Ch) (“Leon”) in support of its case.
- [79]
[79] As I observed in Da Hui (HC) at [46], s 2 does no more than codify the existing common law principles of subrogation:
- [80]
[80] Codifying provisions like s 2 of the MLAA do not have the effect of, and should not be construed as, enlarging rights beyond those available under the common law (Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 144), and my reference here to the common law includes equity. Section 2 of the MLAA does not recalibrate the existing law or do away with any of the prerequisites for the remedy of subrogation under the common law. In particular, s 2 does not abrogate the equitable foundation of subrogation or dispense with the requirement of proving an unjust factor.
- [81]
[81] I note that even in An Wei’s written submissions, An Wei relies on case authorities on unjust enrichment to substantiate its case for relief under s 2 of the MLAA, and in fact contends that there is unjust enrichment in this case that justifies An Wei being granted relief under s 2. Thus, An Wei itself is cognisant that s 2 of the MLAA does not operate in isolation without regard to the relevant principles of common law that underpin it.
- [82]
[82] I turn next to some of the authorities cited by An Wei in support of its claim for the remedy of subrogation. In my view, none of the authorities carry An Wei’s case any further. I have already discussed BFC and Bank of Cyprus (above at [59]). The next case I consider is Boscawen.
- [83]
[83] In Boscawen, the Abbey National Building Society (“Abbey National”) advanced mortgage funds to purchasers on the understanding that it would obtain a first legal charge over the property once an existing mortgage held by the Halifax Building Society (“Halifax”) was discharged. The funds were transferred through the purchaser’s solicitors to the vendor’s solicitors before the completion of the purchase, but the transaction later collapsed, meaning that the Abbey National never received the expected security. However, part of the funds had already been used to discharge the Halifax mortgage on the property. When the vendor’s judgment creditors sought possession based on their charging order, Abbey National claimed that it should be subrogated to Halifax’s former mortgage rights. The court agreed and held that, because the loan was advanced on the basis that Abbey National would obtain a first charge, and that basis failed when the transaction collapsed, the society was entitled to subrogation and therefore to a charge over the property in priority to the judgment creditors. There, again, a recognised unjust factor was discernible on the facts – namely, a failure of basis. As Millett LJ observed (at 335), subrogation “arises from the conduct of the parties on well settled principles and in defined circumstances …” [emphasis added in italics]. I have emphasised the phrases “well settled” and “defined circumstances”. They underscore the point I have made earlier that the law regarding subrogation is a structured doctrine operating within established parameters under the umbrella of the law of unjust enrichment, as opposed to a discretionary response to perceived unfairness. In Boscawen, the court did not treat subrogation as being automatically triggered simply on account of some payment being made by one party to settle a debt due to a third party. Instead, it sought to reverse an unjust enrichment grounded on a recognised unjust factor.
- [84]
[84] The next case is Bofinger. In Bofinger, guarantors had sold their own properties and used the proceeds to reduce a company’s debt to the first mortgagee. Subsequently, when the first mortgagee exercised its power of sale over the company’s mortgaged properties, surplus proceeds remained after satisfying the company’s remaining debt. The guarantors sought to vindicate their position after these surplus sale proceeds were paid to the second mortgagee rather than to them. A close reading of the judgment in Bofinger would reveal that the court’s essential reasoning was based on fiduciary duty and constructive trust principles. The court in Bofinger held that the creditor became a constructive trustee of the surplus for the surety, and imposed personal liability on the creditor requiring it to account to the surety as a defaulting fiduciary (Bofinger at [50]). Bofinger was thus not a case about subrogation or s 2 of the MLAA, nor did it purport to expand the doctrine of subrogation beyond its established confines.
- [85]
[85] Finally, in Leon, the claimant and F Ltd, a company he controlled, had entered into a joint and several loan agreement with Kensington Mortgage Company Ltd. The loan agreement was secured initially by a mortgage and later by a lease held by F Ltd as substituted security. F Ltd was the mortgagor, while the claimant was a co-mortgagor but had no proprietary interest in the lease. F Ltd was dissolved in 2009, and the lease passed to the Crown bona vacantia and was subsequently disclaimed, following which the court ordered the lease to vest in the mortgagee. The claimant sought to invoke the UK equivalent of s 2 of the MLAA, arguing that upon the payment of the debt he should be subrogated to the mortgagee’s security under the UK equivalent of s 2. No enforcement of security arose in the relevant sense, and the case turned on its own particular facts. To the extent that observations were made about subrogation, they did not displace the basic requirement that equity intervenes in the form of subrogation only upon a recognised unjust factor being shown.
- [86]
[86] It can be seen, from a review of the cases cited by An Wei in support of its claim under s 2 of the MLAA, that none of them (where relevant) involved the remedy of subrogation being granted without a recognised unjust factor arising on the facts. This reinforces my conclusion that s 2 of the MLAA cannot be construed simply by referring to the literal words of the section. Since it is a codifying provision, it must be construed in the light of the common law principles applicable to the remedy of subrogation which in turn, at the risk of repeating myself, requires the claimant/applicant to prove a recognised unjust factor or event in order for the provision to come to the aid of that party. Thus, for the reasons I have already articulated above (at [61]) in relation to An Wei’s claim based on equitable subrogation, its alternative claim on the basis of s 2 of the MLAA also fails.
- [87]
[87] Before I leave the First Issue, I address a factual point that arises from An Wei’ submissions. An Wei argues, in reliance on Bofinger, that BofA was, whether as some form of fiduciary or as constructive trustee, obliged to account for the Balance Proceeds that BofA “released” to Da Shun and which were eventually paid into court. In my view, this contention is factually incorrect. It is plain from the record that, in carrying out the terms of the s 100 Order, the sale proceeds were paid by the Vessel’s buyer to Da Shun as the seller. Upon completion of the sale and delivery of the Vessel to the buyer on 4 February 2022, Da Shun’s judicial managers then paid BofA a sum of US$10,704,938.26 in satisfaction of BofA’s remaining claim under the Facility Agreement. As noted above, BofA discharged the Mortgage on the Vessel on the same day the sale of the Vessel was completed ie, on 4 February 2022. The Balance Proceeds were eventually paid into court by Da Shun’s liquidators sometime between September and November 2023. Thus, the factual premise upon which An Wei’s submissions are grounded (ie, that BofA was a fiduciary of the Balance Proceeds and subject to a constructive trust) is incorrect and contradicted by the evidence. BofA were never in possession of the Balance Proceeds, nor did they release or pay any of the proceeds over to Da Shun’s liquidators. The evidence shows that it was Da Shun (through its judicial managers and subsequently, liquidators) who were at all times in possession of the proceeds from the sale of the Vessel. As such, I fail to see how BofA could be under any obligation to account for the balance or surplus sale proceeds of the Vessel when they were never in possession of those proceeds in the first place.
The Public Policy Issue
- [88]
[88] I turn now to the Public Policy Issue. The Writ Claimants submit that the remedy of subrogation should in any event be refused on public policy grounds, as An Wei’s belated assertion of proprietary rights seeks to gain priority over other creditors, would improperly enlarge an extinguished mortgage beyond what BofA itself could claim, and would cause irreversible prejudice to the Writ Claimants, contrary to the principles governing fair distribution in liquidation.
- [89]
[89] Subrogation may be denied where public policy considerations outweigh the claimant’s interests (Da Hui (HC) at [66], citing BFC at 234) – by claimant, I mean the party making the claim for the remedy of subrogation. In Da Hui (HC), I found that the claimant was attempting, at a late stage, to gain priority over other lower ranking in rem creditors (such as Petrochina and SG) in seeking recovery from the residual sale proceeds of the An Rong vessels (at [66]). Allowing subrogation in that context would have interfered with the equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor’s assets, a matter of significant public policy. Permitting Da Hui to benefit from BofA’s spent mortgages would have been unfair, and subrogation was accordingly also refused on grounds of public policy.
- [90]
[90] In my view, in the present case, permitting An Wei to be subrogated would likewise disrupt the orderly priority of claims and undermine the equitable distribution of Da Shun’s assets. From the available evidence, by January 2021, An Wei would have been aware that the proceeds from the sale of its own vessel (the “Sea Horizon”) had been applied towards the repayment of part of Tranche B (ie, Da Shun’s “portion”). By May 2021, An Wei was also aware that BofA and the Writ Claimants were contemplating the disposal of the Vessel by way of a s 100 Order. It is not disputed that An Wei was represented at a meeting of Da Shun’s creditors on 11 May 2021 where a s 100 IRDA application was referenced and discussed.
- [91]
[91] Thus, if not in early 2021, then at least by May 2021, An Wei could and ought to have objected to the terms of the s 100 Order then contemplated or at least asserted its interest, had it considered that it possessed a proprietary interest ranking in priority to the Writ Claimants. It did not do so. Even when An Wei lodged its proof of debt with Da Shun’s liquidators as late as October 2022, An Wei failed to assert any security interest, instead indicating “Nil” in the box titled “Security Held”. An Wei asserted a proprietary / priority interest for the first time only on 29 December 2022 when its former solicitors raised the claim in a letter to Da Shun’s liquidators.
- [92]
[92] This significant delay (of almost two years), when viewed together with the fact that granting An Wei the right of subrogation would now permit An Wei to leapfrog the Writ Claimants in terms of priority, gives rise to a real concern of unfairness and the undermining of the public interest in maintaining predictability in insolvency priorities, particularly when overlaid with the complexity of admiralty claims encumbering an insolvent company’s ship. As in Da Hui (HC), to allow subrogation in these circumstances would, in my view, place An Wei’s private interest above broader considerations of fairness and legal certainty, and I see no justification to do so in this case. Thus, if necessary, I would also refuse An Wei’s application for subrogation on public policy grounds.
- [93]
[93] For the foregoing reasons, on the Subrogation Issue, I find against An Wei and dismiss the application in so far as it seeks the remedy of subrogation, as prayed for by An Wei in prayers 2 and 3 of SUM 2280. The remaining questions are (i) whether the Writ Claimants have superior priority claims, or whether they, like An Wei, should also rank only as unsecured creditors; and (ii) lastly, whether the Writ Claimants have any valid claims at all.
Second Issue: Whether the Writ Claimants have a security, proprietary or otherwise priority interest in the Balance Proceeds
- [94]
[94] The Writ Claimants rely on the s 100 Order to support their asserted security interest. This consent order was endorsed by the judicial managers of Da Shun, BofA, and the Writ Claimants.
- [95]
[95] The Writ Claimants contend that this court should give effect to the agreement of the parties as reflected in the s 100 Order. The order expressly contemplated the Writ Claimants giving up their rights to arrest the Vessel, in reliance on the promise or agreement by Da Shun to ringfence the Balance Proceeds, after payment of the higher priority claims, to secure the Writ Claimants’ claims pending their adjudication and determination. However, An Wei submits that the Writ Claimants should not be permitted to assert any claims against the Balance Proceeds as they are not secured creditors nor hold any security interest. An Wei relies heavily on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Natixis, Singapore Branch v Seshadri Rajagopalan [2025] 1 SLR 1020 (“Natixis (CA)”) (affirming my decision in Natixis, Singapore Branch v Seshadri Rajagopalan [2025] 4 SLR 1031). As held in Natixis (CA), an admiralty claimant only becomes a holder of security in its true sense upon the arrest of the relevant vessel by that claimant, and not by the mere issuance of an admiralty in rem writ against the vessel concerned (at [72]–[77]). Similarly, An Wei submits that as the Writ Claimants did not arrest the Vessel, the Writ Claimants hold no security or security interest in the Balance Proceeds and therefore have no priority entitlement under s 100(2) of the IRDA. Finally, on the whole, An Wei argues that the words of the s 100 Order cannot confer on the Writ Claimants security or any security interest (whatever the import of that phrase might be) where none existed. The s 100 Order does not create security as it is merely a procedural tool to allow a sale of property free of encumbrances, and only preserves existing security, which HSBC and SG lack.
Analysis and decision
- [96]
[96] First, it is not seriously disputed that this court is to interpret the s 100 Order in the same manner as a contract. The Singapore courts have consistently recognised that consent orders reached after negotiations may be treated as binding agreements, provided the elements of contract formation are present (Hoban Steven Maurice Dixon v Scanlon Graeme John [2007] 2 SLR(R) 770 at [39], citing David Freud Ltd v Vickbar Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1622; Blomberg, Johan Daniel v Khan Zhi Yan [2024] 3 SLR 1079 at [40]).
- [97]
[97] The parties do not dispute that the s 100 Order was a consent order reflecting an agreement reached by the interested parties in OS 1023, following negotiations on the terms of the said order. The court should therefore construe it using principles of contractual interpretation, which are well settled. In Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029, the Court of Appeal held that the purpose of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as objectively ascertained (at [125]). As the text of the agreement is the first port of call, the court starts with the plain language of the agreement (Lucky Realty Co Pte Ltd v HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 1069 at [2]) – here, that would translate to the terms of the s 100 Order. The exercise is an objective one, and contextual evidence may be considered where the relevant contextual points are clear, obvious and known to both parties (Zurich Insurance at [125], [128] and [129]). The court reads and interprets the words used in light of the background knowledge available to the parties at the time. The question is what a reasonable person would have understood the terms to mean in those circumstances.
- [98]
[98] Applying these principles, in my view, the s 100 Order did intend to accord HSBC and SG security over the Balance Proceeds. The relevant part of the s 100 Order at paragraph 2(ii) reads:
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