Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 2 May 2024
TG Master Pte Ltd v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC(A) 13 · Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 53 of 2023
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [2]
[2] Although there was no evidence about the customary period for an ordinary option to purchase (an “Option”), TG Master had submitted in the appeal that a two-week Option was commonplace, and the Respondents did not disagree. Indeed, parties proceeded on the basis that an option period of 24 months was unusually long.
- [3]
[3] Subsequently, TG Master also lent the sum of $620,000 to Tung Kee, which was guaranteed by Mr Yung.
- [4]
[4] The option periods of the OTPs were also extended in exchange for extension fees agreed by Mr Yung and Tung Kee, or Mr Yung alone. However, the Respondents did not eventually exercise the OTPs and the envisioned sales never materialised. No sale and purchase agreements were ever concluded. Tung Kee refused to return possession of the Properties after the tenancies expired and failed to repay the loan. Part of the extension fees were not paid. TG Master therefore claimed against the Respondents for the repayment of the loan and for unpaid extension fees. Mr Yung made a counterclaim for the return of various sums, which we will elaborate on below.
- [5]
[5] In TG Master Pte Ltd v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2022] SGHC 316 (the “Judgment”), the trial judge (the “Judge”) allowed TG Master’s claim for the repayment of the $620,000 loan (plus interest of six per cent per annum on an accrued basis and compounded monthly) but denied its claim for the unpaid extension fees. The Judge also allowed Mr Yung’s counterclaim for the return of $4,550,000, being substantially all the sums that he had previously paid to TG Master, save for the $475,000 total “Option Fees” (see [10] and [16] below) paid in respect of the Properties. The net result was that TG Master had to repay the Respondents a substantial sum of money (and interest). By agreement, TG Master paid $3,885,223.17 into court on 6 June 2023, pending the determination of this appeal. This sum comprised the moneys payable by TG Master less the moneys payable to TG Master and interest, as calculated by the parties.
- [7]
[7] Before the Judge, the parties focused their submissions on the application of the framework governing the law of deposits as set out in Hon Chin Kong v Yip Fook Mun and another [2018] 3 SLR 534 (“Hon Chin Kong”), and the application of the penalty doctrine in relation thereto (the “Hon Chin Kong framework”). Before us, TG Master adopted a different approach and primarily contended that the Hon Chin Kong framework did not apply at all, though it made submissions based on the framework as its fallback case. We therefore considered the novel issue of the proper ambit of the law of deposits in the context of an Option.
- [8]
[8] In our view, with respect, the Judge did not properly consider (and the parties did not adequately identify) the nature of the sums that had been paid by Mr Yung pursuant to the OTPs before applying the Hon Chin Kong framework. In our judgment, the sums that were paid should not have been considered under the Hon Chin Kong framework and Mr Yung was not entitled to claim their return. Additionally, the Judge had also incorrectly dismissed TG Master’s claim for unpaid extension fees on the basis that it had insufficiently particularised its pleadings or that it had failed to prove that the Respondents or Mr Yung were legally obliged to pay such extension fees. We therefore allowed TG Master to retain the sums paid by Mr Yung pursuant to the OTPs and also allowed its claim for extension fees. We set out the facts and our reasons below.
Facts
- [9]
[9] Mr Yung, a Hong Kong resident, was the sole shareholder of Tung Kee, a company incorporated in Singapore. Pursuant to the OTPs, Tung Kee was granted a tenancy agreement for each of the Properties and possession thereof. TG Master subsequently succeeded in compelling the return of possession of the Properties (which possession was returned to TG Master on 24 September 2021) by obtaining a summary judgment for possession. The subsequent appeal by Tung Kee and Mr Yung failed.
The OTPs
- [10]
[10] As mentioned (above at [1]), TG Master granted Mr Yung eight OTPs in respect of the eight Properties. Each OTP was dated 3 January 2018 and expired on 2 January 2020, for a total option period of 24 months. It was undisputed that their terms were substantially the same. Clause A of the OTPs provided that:
Clause B of the OTPs provided that:
- [12]
[12] Finally, Clause E(d) provided that:
After the OTPs were issued, Mr Yung signed a letter dated 8 January 2018, declaring that he had read and understood the terms of the OTPs and recording his acceptance and agreement to their terms. This letter was signed and witnessed by Mr Yung’s solicitors in Hong Kong.
- [13]
[13] Before the date of each OTP, there was a document dated 2 January 2018 titled “Offer to Purchase” (the “Offer to Purchase”). This document appeared to originate from Mr Yung as the prospective purchaser of the Properties. It was in any event undisputed that Mr Yung had signed the Offer to Purchase. The Offer to Purchase set out Mr Yung’s offer to purchase the Properties for the same total price of $22,375,000, subject to several conditions, including:
- [14]
[14] The Offer to Purchase also included a statement that Mr Yung confirmed and agreed that “any non-exercise of the OTP would result in a forfeiture of the option fee of 20%(EDPS) of the purchase price”. The Offer to Purchase therefore evidently contained substantially the same key terms as the agreement contained in the OTPs. However, the “Option Fee” and “Further Sum” referred to in the OTPs were referred to as the “[f]irst payment” and “[s]econd payment” respectively under the Offer to Purchase. In other words, under the Offer to Purchase, both payments were to “constitute and form the option fee”. This was although under each OTP, only the first sum of $59,375 (totalling $475,000 for the Properties) was referred to as the “Option Fee” whereas the second sum of $500,000 (totalling $4,000,000 for the Properties) was referred to as a “Further Sum”. In addition, the Offer to Purchase showed that at that time, Mr Yung wanted to buy the Properties collectively and not individually or in a piecemeal way. We will return to the significance of these points later.
The Tenancy Agreements
- [15]
[15] TG Master thereafter granted Tung Kee (as Mr Yung’s “designated entity” under cl B of the OTPs) a tenancy agreement in respect of each of the Properties (the “Tenancy Agreements”). The eight Tenancy Agreements, which contained substantially the same terms save for their commencement dates, each leased the respective Properties to Tung Kee for a term of 30 months. The latest end date for the term of the leases of the Properties was in April 2021, which was in respect of 7, 11, and 13 Miltonia Close. Clause 4(a)(iv) of the Tenancy Agreements provided that TG Master was entitled to terminate the respective tenancy and repossess the property if the Respondents did not exercise the relevant OTP in accordance with its terms before the OTP expired. As mentioned above (at [9]), possession was returned to TG Master only on 24 September 2021, well after the expiry of all the leases.
Non-exercise of the OTPs
(a) The Option Fees totalling $475,000 were paid on 4 January 2018. The Further Sums were paid in tranches between 30 April 2018 and 28 December 2018. The total amount of Further Sums to be paid was $4,000,000. The Renovation Costs of $550,000 were paid on 30 April 2018. Therefore, Mr Yung was supposed to have paid a total sum of $5,025,000 to TG Master (ie, $475,000 + $4,000,000 + $550,000).
(b) As mentioned (above at [5]), the Judge allowed Mr Yung’s counterclaim for $4,550,000.
(c) However, for accuracy, we mention that we were informed that there was actually a goodwill discount of $80,000 granted by TG Master in relation to the Further Sums. In other words, Mr Yung in fact paid $3,920,000 instead of $4,000,000. However, this was overlooked at the trial below. Mr Yung therefore paid a total sum of $4,945,000 to TG Master (ie, $475,000 + $3,920,000 + $550,000).
- [17]
[17] It was also undisputed that Mr Yung did not exercise the OTPs by the initial expiry date of 2 January 2020.
The Loan Agreement
- [18]
[18] On or around 31 December 2019, the Respondents sought a loan from TG Master. By a written agreement dated 22 January 2020, TG Master agreed to lend $1,240,000 to Tung Kee in two equal tranches, with Mr Yung acting as guarantor (the “Loan Agreement”). It was undisputed that the Respondents were acting under legal advice when they entered into the Loan Agreement. Clause 3.1 of the Loan Agreement provided that:
Pursuant to cl 3.2 of the Loan Agreement, interest was at the rate of six per cent per annum on an accrued basis and compounded monthly. On 22 January 2020, the first tranche of $620,000 was disbursed to Tung Kee. The second tranche of $620,000 was contingent on the exercise of the OTPs for 3, 9, 11, and 15 Miltonia Close, and was never disbursed. The disbursed sum of $620,000 and interest thereon were not repaid on 30 June 2020.
The Extension Agreements
- [19]
[19] It was undisputed that Mr Yung had requested extensions of time to exercise the OTPs, and that TG Master had agreed and granted such extensions of time beyond the original option periods. Despite these extensions, the OTPs were never exercised. It was further undisputed that Mr Yung had paid to TG Master $62,720 on 13 May 2020 and $60,000 on 3 August 2020 as extension fees to extend the expiry date of the OTPs. These sums, totalling $122,720, were the only extension fees Mr Yung paid to TG Master. However, it was disputed whether the Respondents collectively or Mr Yung individually were obliged to pay other extension fees. Before the Judge, TG Master contended that it was entitled to be paid six sets of extension fees, totalling $985,867. After deducting payment of the $122,720, the unpaid total was $863,147. While the first set of extension fees was contained in the Loan Agreement, the subsequent five sets were premised on oral agreements with Mr Yung. In other words, the obligation to pay the first set of extension fees was said to rest on both Respondents as that obligation was stated in the Loan Agreement which was guaranteed by Mr Yung. The obligation to pay the other five sets of extension fees allegedly rested on Mr Yung alone since he was the one who had the benefit of the OTPs in the absence of any other agreement binding Tung Kee. On the other hand, Mr Yung claimed the return of the $122,720 he had paid as extension fees.
- [20]
[20] The extensions were granted mostly in respect of two groups of four properties, ie, 3, 9, 11 and 15 Miltonia Close (the “1st Group of 4 Properties”) and 1, 5, 7 and 13 Miltonia Close (the “2nd Group of 4 Properties”).
Extensions under the Loan Agreement
- [21]
[21] Under cl 4.1 of the Loan Agreement, the OTPs for the 1st Group of 4 Properties were extended to 3 March 2020 for a fee of $89,600. Under cl 4.2 of the Loan Agreement, the OTPs for the 2nd Group of 4 Properties were extended to 30 June 2020 for an extension fee of $268,800. The total amount of extension fees set out in cll 4.1 and 4.2 was $358,400 (the “1st Set of Extension Fees”). Clauses 4.4 and 4.5 obliged Tung Kee to “procure and ensure” that the respective OTPs “shall be exercised” by 3 March 2020 and 30 June 2020. Mr Yung executed a deed of guarantee and indemnity dated 16 January 2020 in respect of the loaned amounts as well as the 1st Set of Extension Fees.
Extensions to 3 April, 3 May and 30 June 2020, for the 1st Group of 4 Properties
- [22]
[22] According to TG Master, after the initial extension of time granted under cl 4.1 of the Loan Agreement, the parties agreed that TG Master would grant a further extension of time in respect of the OTPs for the 1st Group of 4 Properties from 3 March 2020 (under cl 4.1 of the Loan Agreement) to 3 April 2020. The fee agreed for this further extension was $44,800 (the “2nd Extension Fee”) to be paid by 31 March 2020. Including the $89,600 in extension fees set out in cl 4.1 of the Loan Agreement (above at [21]), the total extensions fees for the 1st Group of 4 Properties amounted to $134,400. Notably, Mr Yung gave TG Master a cheque for $134,400 dated 31 March 2020. However, this cheque was dishonoured.
- [23]
[23] According to TG Master, Mr Yung requested, and the parties thereafter orally agreed that TG Master would grant a further extension of time in respect of the OTPs for the 1st Group of 4 Properties from 3 April to 3 May 2020. The fee for this extension of time was $44,800 (the “3rd Extension Fee”), to be paid by 30 April 2020. Mr Yung also agreed to transfer the outstanding extension fees of $134,400 to TG Master’s bank account on 30 April 2020. This was not done.
- [24]
[24] According to TG Master, the parties thereafter orally agreed on yet another extension of time in respect of the OTPs for the 1st Group of 4 Properties from 3 May to 30 June 2020 (“the 4th Extension”) and agreed to an extension fee of $62,720 (the “4th Extension Fee”). As mentioned above (at [19]), Mr Yung paid an extension fee of $62,720 on 13 May 2020, and an extension fee of $60,000 on 3 August 2020 without specifying for which extension each payment was made.
Extension to 3 November 2020 (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 Miltonia Close), to 17 November 2020 (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 Miltonia Close), and to 4 December 2020 (15 Miltonia Close)
- [25]
[25] According to TG Master, Mr Yung thereafter again requested for an extension of time from 30 June to 3 November 2020 in respect of the OTPs for seven properties, ie, all the Properties except 15 Miltonia Close, for an extension fee of $325,440 (the “5th Extension Fee”). This request was allegedly made in September 2020. The parties thereafter allegedly reached an oral agreement for further extensions in respect of the OTPs for the seven properties to 17 November 2020 and in respect of 15 Miltonia Close to 4 December 2020 for an extension fee of $36,587 and $113,120 respectively (the “6th Set of Extension Fees”), with all outstanding extension fees to be paid by 13 November 2020.
- [26]
[26] For easy reference, we set out a table of the extension fees which TG Master initially claimed:
- [27]
[27] As mentioned, Mr Yung did not pay most of the extension fees. By a letter dated 22 February 2021, TG Master gave notice to the Respondents to hand over vacant possession of the Properties by 8 March 2021 as extension fees had not been fully paid by 13 November 2020. A final notice was given by a letter dated 23 March 2021. As the Respondents were not forthcoming with payment or possession, TG Master commenced proceedings against them on 5 April 2021.
Decision below
TG Master’s claim for the loan repayment
- [28]
[28] TG Master claimed for the repayment of $620,000 plus interest under the Loan Agreement. By the time of the trial, the Respondents did not contest that the loan was owed and due. The Judge was satisfied that the Respondents were obliged to repay the amount of $620,000 with contractual interest, and accordingly allowed this claim against the Respondents on a joint and several basis. There was no appeal against this decision.
TG Master’s claim for unpaid extension fees
- [29]
[29] However, the Judge dismissed TG Master’s claim for the unpaid extension fees because it had not “proved the underlying contract(s) that entitle[d] it to claim the Extension Fees”: Judgment at [47].
- [30]
[30] First, based on a plain reading of cll 4.1 and 4.2 of the Loan Agreement (which we set out later at [138]), the Judge held that the 1st Set of Extension Fees was payable only upon the exercise of the OTPs, and that cll 4.1 and 4.2 did not impose an obligation on the Respondents to pay the 1st Set of Extension Fees without more. In particular, focusing on the specific phrase “subject to payment” [emphasis added] in cll 4.1 and 4.2, the Judge found that TG Master’s obligation to grant an extension of time and Mr Yung’s obligation to pay the 1st Set of Extension Fees were “interdependent” rather than independent obligations, where Mr Yung’s payment of the extension fees was required before TG Master was obliged to grant the extension of time. The Judge reasoned that TG Master therefore could not impose on Mr Yung the obligation to pay by unilaterally granting an extension of time. If Mr Yung elected not to pay the 1st Set of Extension Fees, TG Master would not be obliged to grant the extension of time, and any extension of time so granted would be “out of pure goodwill” by TG Master. The Judge therefore dismissed TG Master’s claim for the 1st Set of Extension Fees: Judgment at [48]–[53].
- [31]
[31] Second, in respect of the remaining extension fees, the Judge held that as TG Master had not pleaded the “particulars as to when these oral agreements were agreed” with sufficient specificity, the claim for extension fees on the basis of oral agreements could be entirely dismissed on this basis alone: Judgment at [54]–[56]. In any event, the Judge held that the evidence did not support TG Master’s entitlement to extension fees. TG Master’s obligation to grant the relevant extension of time would only arise if Mr Yung paid the relevant extension fee(s). The documentary evidence relied upon by TG Master showed only “interdependent” obligations, or recorded mere offers, or failed to capture any specific agreement: Judgment at [57]–[68].
- [32]
[32] On the other hand, the Judge held that TG Master did not need to return the $122,720 in extension fees already paid: Judgment at [69]. His reason was that because this sum was paid, TG Master was then obliged to grant “the relevant extensions of time” and there was no suggestion that it had not done so.
The Respondents’ arguments on unilateral mistake
- [33]
[33] The Respondents had contended that the OTPs should be set aside due to a unilateral mistake. The Judge rejected this submission, as the Respondents had not pleaded any particulars concerning the knowledge element of the mistake or the particulars of the mistake itself. This caused TG Master irreparable prejudice as it had made it difficult for TG Master to know the case it had to meet: Judgment at [83]–[86]. There was no appeal against this aspect of the decision.
The Respondents’ counterclaim for the Option Fees, Further Sums, and Renovation Costs
The Option Fees
- [35]
[35] After the trial, the Respondents conceded that the Option Fee of $59,375 payable in respect of each of the OTPs was a true deposit that TG Master was entitled to forfeit. The Judge therefore rejected the Respondents’ claim for the refund of the total sum of $475,000. The Judge also agreed that each Option Fee would be regarded as a deposit: Judgment at [89].
Further Sums
- [36]
[36] The Judge allowed the Respondents’ counterclaim for the sum of $4,000,000, being the aggregate of the Further Sums paid to TG Master (as claimed by the Respondents).
- [37]
[37] Applying the Hon Chin Kong framework, the Judge held that the Further Sums were not reasonable as earnest money and were therefore not true deposits that could be forfeited by TG Master. First, the Further Sum was approximately 17.88 per cent of the purchase price of each of the Properties. He referred to prior case authorities to derive “the customary figure of 10%” as a deposit: Judgment at [96] and [99]. As the Option Fee and Further Sum taken together amounted to 20 per cent of the Sale Price of each of the Properties, the Judge held that TG Master was obliged to show “special circumstances” to justify the higher amount of deposit. TG Master was unable to do so other than alluding to the fact that the Further Sums were for allegedly keeping the OTP open for 104 weeks. The Further Sums were therefore part payments that had to be tested against the penalty rule: Judgment at [100].
- [38]
[38] Further, the Judge reasoned that as the Respondents had obtained immediate possession of the Properties for two-and-a-half years and the right to sublet them, they were treated as being akin to an owner, which cohered with the Further Sum being a part payment towards a purchase: Judgment at [101].
Renovation Costs
The Supplemental Judgment
- [41]
[41] Subsequently, the Judge also released TG Master Pte Ltd v Tung Kee Development (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2023] SGHC 64 (the “Supplemental Judgment”). This followed a request by TG Master for further arguments after the Judgment was released.
- [42]
[42] First, TG Master had submitted that the Further Sums were the agreed consideration for the grant of the 30-month tenancies and hence the payment of the Further Sums was a primary obligation to which the penalty doctrine did not apply. The Judge rejected this submission on the basis that it was the Hon Chin Kong framework, and not the traditional penalty doctrine, that was applicable. On TG Master’s argument, as forfeiture related to sums that have already been paid over, it would never amount to a secondary obligation (ie, a payment to be made “only when there was a breach of contract”) such as to attract the application of the traditional penalty doctrine, since forfeiture was predicated on a primary obligation to pay money over: Supplemental Judgment at [53]–[55].
- [43]
[43] Second, TG Master had submitted that the Respondents had failed to discharge their burden of proving the applicable customary rate of deposit for an Option. The Judge rejected this submission on the basis that Hon Chin Kong had mentioned a customary rate of 10 per cent and he was entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that this was a well-established position in Singapore: Supplemental Judgment at [57]. The Judge also found that TG Master had failed to lead evidence on the nature and quantum of the losses it had suffered, and in any event the forfeiture of the Further Sums was “likely incommensurate with the losses that [TG Master] might suffer as a result of a potential breach”: Supplemental Judgment at [58]–[59].
The appeal
TG Master’s case
- [45]
[45] TG Master claimed that it was entitled to retain the Further Sums and submitted as follows:
(a) First, it was undisputed that the Further Sums had been consideration for the grant of the 30-month tenancies for the Properties. Thus, the Hon Chin Kong framework was fundamentally inapplicable, as consideration for the grant of a lease was neither a deposit nor a part payment. A claim in restitution was impossible as there was a valid contract and no total failure of consideration.
(b) Second, the Hon Chin Kong framework was inapplicable to unexercised OTPs, as there was no obligation to exercise the OTP. A non-exercise did not result in breach. The fact that cl E used the word “forfeit” could not be conclusive of whether it was a secondary obligation. Instead, the payment of the Further Sums was a primary obligation, being the condition for the right to exercise the OTPs, and the Further Sums were not payable upon breach. The penalty doctrine, which applied only to primary obligations, was therefore also inapplicable.
(c) Third and alternatively, if the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable, the Further Sums were akin to a true deposit, as Mr Yung had signalled his commitment to eventually enter into a purchase by electing to make payment of the Further Sums. There was nothing unconscionable about its forfeiture upon Mr Yung’s failure to exercise the OTPs. The Judge had erred in relying on the figure of 10 per cent as the customary amount. What was reasonable as a true deposit depended on the context and circumstances, which in this case justified a higher amount. In any event, 20 per cent was the customary amount of deposit. Even if it was not a true deposit, the Further Sums were not a penalty as the Respondents had failed to discharge their burden of proving that it was extravagant.
- [47]
[47] Finally, TG Master argued that the Judge erred in dismissing its claim for the 1st Set of Extension Fees and 2nd to 4th Extension Fees:
(a) For the 1st Set of Extension Fees (above at [21]), the Respondents’ obligation to pay the fees was a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent to the extensions of time granted. Such extensions also could not be conditional on the payment of the fees as some of the extended option periods would have expired before Mr Yung was required to pay those fees. This position is also fortified by the surrounding provisions in the Loan Agreement.
(b) For the 2nd to 4th Extension Fees (above at [22]–[24]), TG Master argued that any lack of particulars did not prejudice Mr Yung as he knew the case he had to meet. His obligations to pay these fees were clearly reflected in the contemporaneous evidence. Furthermore, Mr Yung’s obligation to pay each of the extension fees arose at the time of agreement on each extension and not only when Mr Yung paid the extension fee.
- [48]
[48] However, the sum of $62,720 with respect to the 4th Extension Fee was actually academic because the Judge had allowed TG Master to retain the $62,720 (as part of the $122,720 that had been already paid to TG Master). We will therefore focus on the 1st Set of Extension Fees, as well as the 2nd and 3rd Extension Fees.
The Respondents’ case
- [49]
[49] The Respondents made the preliminary point that TG Master had raised new arguments on appeal, namely: (a) TG Master’s characterisation of the Further Sums as consideration for the Tenancy Agreements (above at [45(a)]); and (b) TG Master’s submission that the Hon Chin Kong framework was not applicable to unexercised OTPs and its submission that the penalty doctrine did not apply because the non-exercise of an OTP did not constitute a breach of contract (above at [45(b)]).
(a) First, the Further Sums were “not in substance treated as the consideration for the grant of the tenancies” [emphasis in original].
(b) Second, the first step of the Hon Chin Kong framework did not require that the contractual entitlement to forfeit arises only upon breach of contract.
(c) Third, the Further Sums were part payments, as the context showed that TG Master did not have a need for any further earnest moneys beyond the Option Fees. The Option Fees and Further Sums, which amounted to 20 per cent of the Sale Price, were higher than the customary amount of 10 per cent. As part payments, the Further Sums could not be forfeited as they were unenforceable penalties.
(a) On the 1st Set of Extension Fees, TG Master could not impose an obligation on Mr Yung to pay the fees by performing its obligation of granting extensions of time. This was because the two obligations were interdependent, as borne out by the wording of cll 4.1 and 4.2. The Judge’s finding that Mr Yung’s obligation to pay the fees was a condition precedent to TG Master’s obligation to grant extensions of time should be upheld.
(b) On the 2nd and 3rd Extension Fees, TG Master had failed to plead sufficient particulars of the alleged oral agreements as it had not even pleaded a general time period during which these agreements were entered. In any event, the contemporaneous documentary evidence was insufficient to show that Mr Yung owed any obligations to pay such fees.
Issues
- [53]
[53] The issues that arose in this appeal were:
New arguments on appeal
The parties’ positions
- [54]
[54] The Respondents submitted that TG Master had raised new arguments on appeal, without highlighting that the points were new and without filing an application for permission to raise new points.
- [55]
[55] First, the Respondents submitted that TG Master’s characterisation of the Further Sums as being consideration for the Tenancy Agreements (above at [45(a)]) had not been properly raised before the Judge, as TG Master had consistently referred to the Further Sums as having been “forfeited” rather than “retained” as consideration. We shall refer to this argument by TG Master as the “Characterisation Argument”. The Respondents claimed that they would be prejudiced by the Characterisation Argument, as they would be denied the opportunity to cross-examine TG Master’s witness on “whether, in substance, the Further Sum was treated by parties as consideration for the grant of the tenancies” [emphasis in original].
- [56]
[56] Second, the Respondents objected to TG Master’s contention that: (a) the Hon Chin Kong framework was not applicable to unexercised OTPs; and (b) the penalty doctrine did not apply as the non-exercise of an OTP did not constitute a breach of contract (above at [45(b)]). We shall refer to these arguments as the “Contractual Nature Argument” and “No-Breach Argument” respectively. According to the Respondents, before the Judge, TG Master had relied only upon authorities where the vendor of a property was found to be entitled to retain a deposit upon the purchaser’s breach. TG Master’s position at trial was therefore that both the Option Fees and the Further Sums comprised a deposit that would be “forfeited” upon the expiry of the OTPs and TG Master had made submissions on the premise that the penalty doctrine could be applicable to cl A of the OTPs in principle. Raising these new points allowed TG Master a second bite at the cherry, causing irreparable prejudice to the Respondents, who would be unable to cross-examine TG Master’s witness on “matters germane”.
- [57]
[57] TG Master submitted that the Characterisation Argument was not new and arose from undisputed facts. It had been expressly pleaded and was an agreed issue between the parties, which the Respondents had conceded before trial. The Characterisation Argument was also raised in further submissions. As for the Contractual Nature Argument and the No-Breach Argument, TG Master submitted that they had already been made before the Judge and in any event concerned points of law that did not require any cross-examination. However, at the hearing before us, counsel for TG Master correctly conceded that the Contractual Nature Argument and the No-Breach Argument had not been raised before the Judge and were new points on appeal. TG Master thus sought our permission to raise the new arguments.
Our decision
- [58]
[58] Under the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), O 19 r 31(1)(b) requires an Appellant’s Case to contain “detailed submissions on the facts and the legal issues, including the relevant authorities, highlighting any new points not raised in the lower Court” [emphasis added]. The importance of adhering to this requirement cannot be understated. It reflects the overarching concern that parties must not conduct an appeal by ambush through raising a new point without first providing adequate notice. However, the appellate court may still allow a new point to be raised on appeal even if it was not highlighted in the Appellant’s Case as such.
The Characterisation Argument
- [60]
[60] We agreed with TG Master that the Characterisation Argument was not a new point at all. The Respondents unduly relied upon TG Master’s reference to the “forfeiture” of the Further Sum. However, contrary to the Respondents’ submissions, TG Master had also repeatedly maintained that the Further Sums had been consideration for the Tenancy Agreements in:
- [61]
[61] This characterisation was also acknowledged in the Judgment at [21]. While the use of the word “forfeited” in the OTP was arguably distracting, this did not detract from the fact that the Characterisation Argument was not a new point. Furthermore, the Respondents had already “conceded” that the Further Sums were consideration for the grant of the tenancies before the trial. There was no prejudice to the Respondents and no new evidence or amendment to the pleadings was required by the Characterisation Argument.
- [62]
[62] In any event, we would have allowed TG Master to raise the Characterisation Argument even if it had been a new point and not highlighted in the Appellant’s Case as such. The Characterisation Argument essentially depended on the contractual interpretation of cl B of the OTPs (see [10] above). Contractual interpretation in the overall context was a question of law that did not depend on the parties’ subjective views on the interpretation of cl B, and we were just as well placed as the court below to adjudicate upon this issue.
The Contractual Nature Argument and the No-Breach Argument
- [63]
[63] We agreed with the Respondents that counsel for TG Master had run its case before the Judge on the assumption that the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable in principle. Hence, the Contractual Nature Argument and the No-Breach Argument were new points raised on appeal and TG Master should have clearly mentioned in its Appellant’s Case that these were new points. Nevertheless, counsel for TG Master sought the court’s permission during the hearing of the appeal to raise these arguments.
- [64]
[64] After considering the relevant factors, we exercised our discretion to allow both arguments to be raised.
- [65]
[65] In our view, adequate notice of both arguments had been provided to the Respondents. Those had been raised in TG Master’s request for further arguments before the Judge and the Judge had briefly expressed his views on the arguments in the Supplemental Judgment (above at [41]–[43]). Furthermore, both arguments were purely legal arguments that concerned the legal nature of Options, the applicability of the Hon Chin Kong framework to the general category of unexercised Options, and the ambit of the penalty doctrine. An appellate court is in just as good a position as the trial court to adjudicate upon purely legal issues (Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 304 at [56]). Importantly, no new evidence was required for either argument and no prejudice was occasioned to the Respondents. Indeed, the Respondents could not articulate any actual prejudice, except for the generic submission that they would be prevented from cross-examining TG Master’s witness on unspecified “matters germane”.
The Further Sums
- [66]
[66] Having allowed the Characterisation Argument, Contractual Nature Argument and No-Breach Argument to be raised, we considered whether TG Master was entitled to retain the Further Sums. The Judge had allowed the Respondents’ counterclaim for the return of the Further Sums, finding that they were part payments rather than a true deposit, and that their “forfeiture” was a penalty. The Judge appeared to have considered that the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable to the “forfeiture” of any sum (regardless of its nature), so long as those sums were already paid over under a contract (regardless of its nature), in contrast with being a sum that was payable only after a breach of contract (above at [34] and [42]).
The nature of the Further Sums
The parties’ cases
- [68]
[68] TG Master submitted that it was in fact undisputed that the Further Sums constituted the consideration for the grant of the 30-month tenancies of the Properties, being akin to a lump sum rental payment. Clause B of the OTP had expressly stated that each Further Sum was consideration for the tenancies. As the 30-month tenancies had been granted, TG Master was entitled to the Further Sums, and the court ought not to question the adequacy of consideration. Accordingly, the Hon Chin Kong framework was inapplicable to the Further Sums. In allowing the Respondents’ counterclaim, the Judge had effectively allowed the Respondents to benefit from the 30-month tenancies for free, including the right to sublet the Properties. Furthermore, this was contrary to the principle that restitution could not operate where there was a valid contract conferring payment. Here, there was no total failure of consideration as the tenancies had been granted and Mr Yung had in fact enjoyed possession of the Properties even beyond the maximum term of the tenancies. There was accordingly no ground for restitution of the Further Sums.
- [69]
[69] The Respondents denied this characterisation of the Further Sums and submitted that they were “not in substance treated as the consideration for the grant of the tenancies” [emphasis in original]. They suggested that the Option Fees alone could have been the consideration for the tenancies. In reply, TG Master submitted that this line of argument was not open to the Respondents, as they had already “conceded” that the Further Sums had been consideration for the grant of the tenancies prior to the trial.
Our decision
- [70]
[70] We were of the view that while TG Master’s characterisation of the Further Sums as consideration for the grant of the tenancies was supported by the plain wording of cl B of the OTPs (see above at [10]), the overall context of the OTPs also had to be considered.
- [71]
[71] The Further Sums could not be divorced from the OTPs. Pursuant to cl A of each OTP, a Further Sum had to be paid before the OTP could be exercised, failing which the OTP would be deemed to have lapsed. In cl B of the OTP, the Further Sum was described not only as the consideration for the grant of the tenancies, but also as the “balance of twenty per cent (20%) of the Sale Price” (above at [10]). Had any of the OTPs been exercised, both the Option Fee and the Further Sum paid in respect of that property would have been taken into account as payments made towards the Sale Price.
- [72]
[72] In our view, what was referred to in each OTP as a “Further Sum” was in substance a part of the fee for the option to buy, being the right to exercise the OTP whereupon a sale and purchase agreement would be constituted. Each tenancy agreement was granted pursuant to the OTP and the payment of both the “Option Fee” and the “Further Sum”. What cl B meant in stating that “in consideration of the Further Sum, [TG Master] shall grant a tenancy …” was that the tenancy agreement would be granted if the Further Sum was paid. That did not mean that the Further Sum was consideration only for the tenancy agreement.
- [73]
[73] The Respondents argued that Tung Kee was granted a tenancy agreement for one of the Properties before the Further Sum was paid. This did not take them very far for it could simply have meant that TG Master had not insisted on payment of the Further Sum first, as a matter of timing.
- [74]
[74] In other words, the “Option Fee” and the “Further Sum” were both parts of a larger option fee of $559,375 (per property), which we shall refer to as the “True Option Fee”. The True Option Fee amounted to 20 per cent of the Sale Price. This was why the Further Sum was described in cl B as being the “balance” of 20 per cent of the Sale Price and had to be paid before Mr Yung was entitled to exercise the Option. Our conclusion was buttressed by Mr Yung’s Offer to Purchase, which described the “first payment” of $475,000 (corresponding to the aggregate total amount of “Option Fees” payable) and “second payment” of $4,000,000 (corresponding to the aggregate total amount of “Further Sums” payable) as together constituting “the option fee” for the transaction (above at [13]–[14]). Furthermore, TG Master’s evidence at trial was that its practice was to collect 20 per cent of the purchase price upfront, and that the stated “Option Fee” of $59,375 per OTP would have been “too little”. The Judge appeared to have accepted this evidence: Judgment at [98]. Had the drafter of the OTPs simply provided for one option fee that was payable in two tranches, the true nature of the True Option Fee would have been clear.
Whether the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable
- [75]
[75] The Judge decided that the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable to each OTP, and we considered whether this was correct.
The parties’ cases
- [76]
[76] TG Master submitted that the Hon Chin Kong framework was not applicable to unexercised Options. The analysis in Hon Chin Kong was concerned with the situation where sums were paid prior to the breach of a sale and purchase agreement, where the defaulting purchaser was already obliged to complete the purchase and the sums already paid could accordingly be considered as part payment towards the whole purchase price. Conversely, an unexercised Option simply granted a prospective purchaser the right to purchase and did not oblige him to exercise the Option or purchase the property.
- [77]
[77] In this case, the non-exercise of the OTPs did not result in a breach by Mr Yung as Mr Yung had the right but not the obligation to exercise the OTPs. TG Master was simply entitled to retain the Further Sums as the natural consequence of the non-exercise. It was only upon the exercise of the OTPs that the Further Sums could possibly be described as part payments. The mere fact that cl E used the word “forfeit” could not be conclusive of the characterisation of a clause as a secondary obligation to which the penalty doctrine applied, and merely made clear that TG Master was entitled to retain the Further Sums if the OTPs expired without being exercised.
- [78]
[78] TG Master’s retention of the Further Sums was not subject to the penalty doctrine, as the Respondents’ obligation to pay the Further Sums was a primary obligation (a condition) for the right to exercise the OTP for any one of the Properties. The non-exercise of an OTP did not constitute a breach that attracted the application of the penalty doctrine. The Further Sum was also not payable upon breach. The “bundling provision” in cl A of the OTPs, which required all of the Further Sums to be paid, was simply a condition to the right to exercise the OTPs individually. Separately, it could not even be regarded as an onerous primary obligation as the Sale Price of the Properties was premised on a bulk discount in favour of Mr Yung.
- [79]
[79] The Respondents submitted as follows. The first step of the Hon Chin Kong framework did not require that the contractual entitlement to forfeit arises only upon breach. TG Master’s submission had been rejected by the Judge in the Supplemental Judgment, where the Judge opined that the Hon Chin Kong framework was applicable to the forfeiture of sums already paid over. As the Judge was able to apply the Hon Chin Kong framework, there was therefore no conceptual difficulty in applying the framework and the penalty doctrine to the context of sums paid under an unexercised OTP. Furthermore, there was a policy justification in favour of applying the penalty doctrine, to prevent property developers from taking advantage of their superior bargaining position by allowing them to demand exorbitant option fees to make bigger profits. Counsel for the Respondents suggested that the Judge had extended the Hon Chin Kong framework to the context of unexercised OTPs due to an unarticulated policy reason, namely the need for judicial regulation of contracts that were commonly used by laypersons.
- [80]
[80] Notably, the Respondents did not argue that the payment of the Further Sums was a secondary obligation.
Options to purchase
- [81]
[81] We first considered the nature of a typical Option.
- [82]
[82] An Option is fundamentally a contract between a vendor and prospective purchaser of a property, under which the vendor undertakes to sell the property on the stated terms (usually at a fixed purchase price) upon the exercise of the Option by the prospective purchaser. The vendor limits his right to deal with the property in exchange for an option fee paid by the prospective purchaser. The prospective purchaser is granted an exclusive right to purchase the property and the vendor is obliged to keep the property off the market for the duration of the option period.
- [84]
[84] While an option fee will typically be credited as part of the payments made towards the purchase price if the Option is exercised and a sale and purchase agreement is constituted, it remains fundamentally distinct from other part payments because it is paid by the prospective purchaser as full payment in consideration for the grant of the Option, rather than by a purchaser pursuant to an obligation to pay the purchase price under a sale and purchase agreement. If the prospective purchaser opts not to exercise the Option, the option fee is not recoverable as it is paid as good and valuable consideration for the vendor’s grant of the Option and the right to exercise contained therein (Ong Keh Choo v Paul Huntington Bernardo and another [2020] SGCA 69 at [129]; Li Jialin and another v Wingcrown Investment Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 256 (“Li Jialin”) at [48]). Before the Option is exercised, the option fee is not part payment towards the purchase. Unless otherwise agreed, an option fee operates as a non-returnable booking fee that the vendor is entitled to keep.
- [85]
[85] Here, each OTP was in nature the same as a typical Option. No sale and purchase agreement would be constituted unless the OTP was exercised. The difference was in the details as mentioned above at [1].
Hon Chin Kong
- [86]
[86] In Hon Chin Kong, the plaintiff entered into a sale and purchase agreement for the defendants’ shares in a company, for a purchase price of $828,000. The parties had initially agreed on a lump sum payment, but after the plaintiff repeatedly failed to make timely payment, he sought a variation for payment in three tranches. It was agreed that the first tranche of $300,000 was to be a “down payment deposit”. However, no further payments were made although the plaintiff was granted extensions of time. The plaintiff then repudiated the contract and failed to complete the sale. Thereafter, he demanded the return of the $300,000 arguing, inter alia, that there was no express forfeiture clause, or that the forfeiture amounted to a penalty. The defendants claimed that they were entitled to keep the $300,000.
- [87]
[87] Kannan Ramesh J (as he then was) held that the defendants were contractually entitled to forfeit the $300,000. In the absence of an express forfeiture power, whether a sum was intended to be a forfeitable deposit was a question of construction and depended on the intended nature of the payment as expressed in the contract (Hon Chin Kong at [44]). Whilst the word “deposit” was not conclusive, if the sum was paid as a “deposit”, it would normally be implied that the sum was forfeitable on the purchaser’s default, unless the overall context of the contract evinced a contrary intention (at [45] and [49]–[50]). References to the nature of the payment in the contract were therefore important in construing its effect and consequences (at [51]).
- [88]
[88] The nature of a deposit was to serve as security for performance by the purchaser (Hon Chin Kong at [49]). In that case, the plaintiff had failed to pay for the purchase of the defendants’ shares and then proposed to pay in three tranches. The defendants then stipulated that the first payment of $300,000 would be a “down payment deposit”. In that case, this proved that the sum was intended as a deposit to secure performance of the contract and was forfeitable upon the plaintiff’s breach (at [47]).
- [89]
[89] Ramesh J next considered whether the forfeiture would be subject to the penalty doctrine and held that the doctrine did not apply to true deposits (Hon Chin Kong at [123]). The penalty doctrine was directed at regulating clauses which purported to serve as a genuine pre-estimate of loss (ie, a liquidated damages clause). Such clauses were remedial in that they focused on compensating for a breach of contract. A true deposit was not intended to compensate for a breach of contract. It was intended to be earnest moneys given to guarantee performance of the contract and to signal the good faith commitment of the purchaser towards completing the purchase. Forfeiture of a true deposit was not punitive, as disallowing forfeiture would allow a purchaser to escape from his bargain and take advantage of his own wrong (at [124]–[127]). Ramesh J found that the $300,000, amounting to 36 per cent of the purchase price, was reasonable as a true deposit that could be forfeited by the defendants (at [145]).
- [90]
[90] Accordingly, a deposit, being a sum paid as security for performance by the purchaser, was exempt from the penalty doctrine if it could be considered a true deposit: a deposit which is reasonable as earnest moneys. This prevented the abuse of the label of “deposit” as a guise for the forfeiture of sums that far exceeded what would be reasonably necessary to serve the function of earnest money (Hon Chin Kong at [130] and [132]).
- [91]
[91] The framework set out by Ramesh J was as follows (as adapted from Hon Chin Kong at [95], [107], [136]–[140], and [143]; and Kwek Mean Luck J’s restatement in Li Jialin at [30] and [34]):
(a) First, the court determines whether there was an express or inferred power to forfeit. The power is inferred if the sum was intended to be paid as a deposit. If there was no power to forfeit, the sum must generally be returned on a failure to complete, subject to any right of set-off. The basis for the return is unjust enrichment.
(b) Second, the court then determines whether the sum is a true deposit. A true deposit is a sum that is reasonable as an earnest or is customary or moderate. This is distinct from the penalty doctrine. A true deposit need not be a genuine pre-estimate of loss and may be forfeited regardless of its proportionality or relation to any actual loss occasioned. The touchstone of reasonableness looks at whether the sum is “so large that it cannot be objectively justified by reference to the functions which such a deposit properly serves”, assessed in the specific context of the facts of each case. Therefore, even if a customary or conventional amount for a particular type of contract can be ascertained as a matter of evidence, it nevertheless represents only a starting point. The court may have regard to any factors relevant to the effectiveness of the true deposit as an earnest of performance, including: the history of dealing between the parties, their financial means, the degree of commitment required on the part of the vendor to keep the property “off the market” for the duration of the sale in light of the prevailing market conditions, and the parties’ relative bargaining power.
(c) Third, even if the sum is larger than the customary amount for the type of transaction in question (if such a convention is discernible), the vendor may show “special circumstances” to justify that amount. The vendor bears the onus of proving reasonableness.
(d) Fourth, if the sum is reasonable or otherwise justifiable, it may be forfeited as a true deposit. The penalty doctrine does not apply and the forfeiture of a true deposit cannot be regarded as a penalty. However, if the sum is not a true deposit, it will be characterised as a part payment in law, even if expressly described as a “deposit”.
(i) If there was no express provision for forfeiture or retention, the purchaser may sue for the return of the part payment in unjust enrichment without invoking the penalty doctrine. As the transaction failed prior to the transfer of the subject matter of the aborted sale, the purchaser may seek restitution for unjust enrichment by relying on the unjust factor of total failure of consideration.
(ii) If there was an express power of forfeiture or retention, the purchaser does not have any automatic right to recover the part payment. The contractual power to forfeit remains exercisable. To recover the part payment, the purchaser must successfully invoke the penalty doctrine.
- [92]
[92] The Hon Chin Kong framework was therefore concerned with the forfeiture of sums paid under a sale and purchase agreement, where the sums were paid pursuant to the purchaser’s obligation to complete the purchase, but the purchaser subsequently failed to do so. More specifically, the Hon Chin Kong framework dealt with sums that were intended to be paid as a deposit or at least as a partial payment towards the purchase price, and governed whether that sum was forfeitable as a true deposit or was a part payment the forfeiture of which could be subject to the penalty doctrine.
Our decision
- [93]
[93] In our view, the Hon Chin Kong framework was not applicable to an Option or an option fee paid under the Option. It was not applicable to each OTP or to the True Option Fee.
- [94]
[94] The Hon Chin Kong framework applied only to a sum that could properly be classified as a deposit or as a part payment towards the acquisition of the subject matter of a sale. The binary characterisation of a sum as being either a true deposit or a part payment presupposed an obligation to complete a purchase. A deposit secures the obligation to complete the purchase, and a payment is partial because it is made towards the whole purchase price. The Hon Chin Kong framework therefore did not apply to a sum that was neither a deposit nor a part payment, such as where the payment constituted a full payment made in consideration of the transaction. This must be so a fortiori where the sum was paid for an entirely distinct contractual objective from completing a purchase and where there was no obligation to complete any purchase at all, as such payments cannot meaningfully be described as either a deposit or a part payment towards a purchase. Ramesh J did not need to consider the logically anterior question of whether the sum in question could even be regarded as a deposit or part payment on the facts of Hon Chin Kong, but properly appreciating the true nature of the Respondents’ payments was imperative in this case.
- [95]
[95] We have already explained that in the present case, the OTPs were not sale and purchase agreements. Mr Yung had the right to exercise each OTP but was not under any obligation to exercise or to complete any purchase when the OTP was granted.
- [96]
[96] With respect, the Judge erred in applying the Hon Chin Kong framework without considering the nature of the payments. The True Option Fee was the fee payable for the grant of the OTPs (above at [82]–[84]). It did not secure, and was not paid pursuant to, any obligation to complete a purchase and therefore could not be classified as either a deposit or a part payment.
- [97]
[97] TG Master’s entitlement to the True Option Fee was therefore not subject to the Hon Chin Kong framework. In general, the Hon Chin Kong framework would not apply to a sum paid under an unexercised Option, as such a sum would typically be the option fee paid for the grant of the Option. While Mr Yung could have exercised the OTPs, his failure to do so did not detract from the fact that he had nevertheless already got what he had bargained for: the right to exercise the OTPs. Having granted that right, TG Master was therefore entitled to keep the True Option Fee (above at [84]).
- [99]
[99] As the payment of the True Option Fee was made in exchange for the grant of the right contained in the OTPs, it was made in fulfilment of a primary obligation. The payment of the True Option Fee therefore could not be a penalty. The applicable test for whether a clause amounts to a penalty is whether it provides a genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss suffered by the innocent party pursuant to the breach by the offending party. The pre-estimate is as at the time of contracting, rather than at the time of breach. The penalty doctrine does not apply to primary obligations, given the court’s reluctance to intervene in the contents of the parties’ contractual bargain even if the term is particularly onerous (Denka Advantech Pte Ltd and another v Seraya Energy Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2021] 1 SLR 631 at [82], [92]–[93], [151]–[153] and [281]). Clause E(i) of the OTPs was not a secondary obligation triggered by a breach of contract, as the triggering event in cl E(d), viz., the non-exercise of an OTP, did not constitute a breach. Clause E(i) was therefore not subject to the penalty doctrine.
- [100]
[100] We therefore allowed the appeal and held that TG Master was entitled to retain the True Option Fee, comprising the Option Fees of $475,000 and Further Sums of $4,000,000. As TG Master had upheld its end of the bargain in granting Mr Yung the right to exercise the OTPs, TG Master had earned the True Option Fee and there could also be no suggestion of total failure of consideration. There was therefore no basis for the Respondents’ claim for the Further Sums.
Relief against forfeiture
- [102]
[102] The Respondents’ legal submissions on relief against forfeiture were spartan save for a cursory reference to Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong and another [1995] 2 SLR(R) 643 (“Pacific Rim”) at [60]. In the first place, it is unclear whether there exists a standalone doctrine of relief against forfeiture in the context of deposits (see, generally, Hon Chin Kong at [79], [93], and [99]). As TG Master pointed out, the doctrine of relief against forfeiture as discussed in obiter in Pacific Rim (at [60]) related to relief against forfeiture of a purchaser’s proprietary interest in land under a contract of sale where there was a breach of a provision as to payment, in respect of which time was of the essence. This was distinct from relief against forfeiture of a deposit paid by a purchaser to a vendor, which the Court of Appeal described as an “exercise of the courts’ power to relieve against a penalty” (Pacific Rim at [42]). TG Master suggested that this latter situation refers to the penalty doctrine and does not establish a standalone basis for intervention. In contrast, the Respondents failed to provide any explanation or elaboration on why relief against forfeiture should be available in this context.
The Renovation Costs
The parties’ cases
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.