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Grounds publishedDecided 16 Sep 2024

Appellate Division of the High Court

Darsan Jitendra Jhaveri and others v Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar (suing as the Administratrix of the Estate of Anil Vassudeva Salgaocar) and another

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[2024] SGHC(A) 27Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 88 of 2023

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal, AD/CA 88/2023 (“AD 88”), was the culmination of a protracted dispute which had not only persisted for over a decade but had also spawned a plethora of related proceedings before the Singapore courts as well as courts elsewhere. The dispute centred on a claim by Mr Anil Vassudeva Salgaocar (“Mr Salgaocar”) against Mr Darsan Jitendra Jhaveri (“Mr Darsan”) for breaches of trust. In the court below, the trial judge (“the Judge”) found in favour of Mr Salgaocar (or, more precisely, Mr Salgaocar’s estate, as he passed away not long after the suit below was commenced). Dissatisfied with the Judge’s decision, Mr Darsan appealed.

  3. [2] We heard AD 88 on 3 April 2024 and dismissed it on 17 April 2024 after considering the parties’ submissions. We delivered a brief oral judgment. We now provide the full written grounds of our decision.

  4. Facts

  5. The parties here and below

  6. [3] The first plaintiff in HC/S 821/2015 (“Suit 821”) was Mr Salgaocar. Mr Salgaocar was a highly successful Indian businessman. He was primarily involved in the business of selling and exporting iron ore from the iron mines which he and his family owned in India. This business was conducted principally through Mr Salgaocar’s main operating company, Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd (“SMI”).

  7. [4] The first defendant in Suit 821 was Mr Darsan. He is an Indian businessman based in Hong Kong. He hailed from a family of gemstone traders and was in the business of dealing in gemstones and polymers. He decided to relocate to Hong Kong in 2000 to expand his business into the Chinese market.

  8. [5] Mr Salgaocar commenced his claim in Suit 821 on 11 August 2015 against Mr Darsan on the basis that Mr Darsan was in breach of trust by, among other things, misappropriating the trust assets for his own benefit. According to Mr Salgaocar, this trust (“the 2003 Trust”) had been created pursuant to an oral agreement which was allegedly entered into in December 2003 between the two men (“December 2003 Agreement”). The agreement stipulated that Mr Salgaocar would set up special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) for the conduct of the iron ore business. These SPVs would be funded by Mr Salgaocar, who would be the sole beneficial owner of all the shares issued in the SPVs and all monies, investments and other assets held by the SPVs. Mr Darsan would be a shareholder and/or director of the SPVs and would hold the shares in the SPVs and any interest in the SPVs’ assets on trust for Mr Salgaocar. Mr Darsan would also act in accordance with all instructions from Mr Salgaocar on matters concerning the SPVs. As consideration for this, Mr Salgaocar would pay Mr Darsan US$0.50 for each wet metric ton (“WMT”) of cargo sold by SPVs incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”).

  9. [6] Following the alleged December 2003 Agreement, six SPVs were incorporated in the BVI between 2004 and 2011:

  10. These BVI-incorporated SPVs (“BVI SPVs”) were funded by Mr Salgaocar and used to trade in iron ore. Mr Darsan was the sole shareholder, director and bank signatory of Sino Ling Tao (BVI) and GBA Minmetals and was a nominee shareholder, director and bank signatory of Joyking and Cheermark. He was also a bank signatory for Ling Tao. Save for Eltina, however, these SPVs have since been struck off.

  11. [7] Another 21 SPVs were incorporated in Singapore from 2005 to 2012. These included the following 12 Singapore-incorporated SPVs (“Singapore SPVs”):

  12. [8] When Mr Salgaocar passed away on 1 January 2016, Suit 821 was continued by his widow, Mdm Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar (“Mdm Lakshmi”), in her capacity as the sole administratrix of his estate.

  13. Background to the dispute

  14. [11] Given the fact-centric nature of this appeal, we think it appropriate to set out in some detail the facts leading up to and following the alleged December 2003 Agreement and the parties’ dispute. The background facts are largely undisputed.

  15. [12] The dispute was closely intertwined with Mr Salgaocar’s iron ore business. While Mr Salgaocar’s family had sold and exported iron ore primarily to buyers in Japan following the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, Chinese demand for iron ore started to grow as a result of the large-scale construction of steel plants in China. As such, Mr Salgaocar started marketing iron ore into China in 2000.

  16. [14] According to Mr Salgaocar, Mr Darsan acted as Mr Salgaocar’s nominee shareholder and/or director and trustee in respect of the BVI and Singapore SPVs and their assets but was not involved in their day-to-day trading operations. Instead, Mr Salgaocar hired Mr Terence Kwan (“Mr Kwan”) and Ms Yuk Fang Chiang Mirrica (“Ms Chiang”) to do work relating to the BVI SPVs’ business and oversaw matters relating to the BVI SPVs himself. Mr Darsan, however, alleged that he was the one who had employed Mr Kwan, Ms Chiang and Ms Esther Tam (“Ms Tam”), a clerical assistant, to manage the operations of his iron ore trading business.

  17. [15] As for the Singapore SPVs, Mr Salgaocar’s position was that he had caused various individuals (including Mr Darsan) to hold their shareholding and/or positions in the Singapore SPVs for the benefit of and on trust for himself. These individuals included Mr N G Prabhu and Mr Rohit Ramesh Mathrani (“Mr Rohit”). Mr Salgaocar claimed that all major decisions regarding the investments and/or asset purchases made by the Singapore SPVs were made by him.

  18. [16] In 2007, Mr Salgaocar arranged for Mr Darsan to become a director of and obtain a majority shareholding in Singapore Star Holdings. In 2009, the Singapore SPVs were restructured such that Singapore Star Holdings served as a main holding company. This rendered Mr Darsan the sole or majority shareholder of the Singapore SPVs in name.

  19. [17] The Singapore SPVs made several notable investments:

  20. (a) Around 2006 to 2007, Mr Salgaocar decided to develop a block of condominium apartments named “Newton Imperial”. He designated Great Newton Properties to be the developer of Newton Imperial. This project took place from January 2007 to April 2011.

  21. (b) Around June 2008, Mr Salgaocar decided to purchase 60 office units in WCEGA Tower. He designated Sino Noble to be the asset holding company.

  22. (c) In January 2007, Mr Salgaocar decided to purchase 24 apartment units in a condominium development called “The Waterford Residence”. Capital Glory and Newton Noble were designated as the asset holding companies that acted as the registered owners of these apartments.

  23. (d) Around the same time, Mr Salgaocar decided to purchase four apartment units in a condominium development, Residences@Evelyn. He used four Singapore SPVs as the asset holdings companies for these apartments: Albana Investments Pte Ltd, Cargills Investments Pte Ltd, Singapore Star Investments and Sino Noble.

  24. (e) From 2006 to June 2012, Sino Ling Tao (SG) purchased various vessels and machinery. Mr Salgaocar was allegedly personally involved in the decision-making regarding these transactions.

  25. [18] Mr Salgaocar claimed that between 2011 and 2014, Mr Darsan had, among other things:

  26. (a) arranged for the BVI SPVs to pay US$270,372,938 to himself or entities controlled by or connected to him;

  27. (b) prevented Mr Salgaocar from dealing with the trust assets, which included the trading profits of the SPVs;

  28. (c) failed to comply with Mr Salgaocar’s instructions in relation to the trust assets and refused to transfer them to Mr Salgaocar or to provide him with a full and complete account of the assets;

  29. (d) made unauthorised transfers of units in Newton Imperial, Residences@Evelyn, WCEGA Tower and The Waterford Residence to various BVI-incorporated companies including Million Dragon Wealth Ltd (“Million Dragon”), whose sole shareholder was Ms Pooja;

  30. (e) procured the transfer of one Mr Madanmohan Rajendrarao Narsapur’s (“Mr Narsapur”) shareholding in GBA Minmetals and Eltina to himself without the knowledge, approval or consent of Mr Salgaocar; and

  31. (f) altered the accounting records of Singapore Star Holdings and its subsidiaries to reflect that US$350m was owed by Singapore Star Holdings and its subsidiaries to Ultra Best Limited (“Ultra Best”), a company owned and controlled by Mr Darsan.

  32. [19] Mr Salgaocar began demanding the transfer of at least some of the trust assets back to him in August 2012. One such asset was the shares in Trustworth Shipping. Mr Salgaocar demanded, around late 2012 and/or early 2013, that Mr Darsan arrange for the transfer of all the shares in Trustworth Shipping to Mr Salgaocar so that he could properly oversee the settlement of two ongoing disputes involving the company. Mr Darsan agreed. On 19 March 2013, Singapore Star Shipping transferred all of its shareholding in Trustworth Shipping to Mr Salgaocar for a nominal consideration of US$1. Trustworth Shipping settled one of the two claims in May 2013; the other claim was, apparently, still being contested in arbitration.

  33. [20] Following the transfer of the shares in Trustworth Shipping, Mr Darsan refused to transfer the remaining trust assets to Mr Salgaocar. As such, in April 2014, Mr Salgaocar instructed Haridass Ho & Partners (“Haridass Ho”), his Singapore lawyers at the time, to act for him in relation to the recovery of the trust assets. Haridass Ho then instructed Holman Fenwick Willan Hong Kong (“HFW”) to issue a letter of demand to Mr Darsan. This letter was sent on 14 May 2014 (“HFW Letter”) and stated that:

  34. The HFW Letter also required Mr Darsan to confirm that he would transfer the trust assets back to Mr Salgaocar and give a full account of the trading profits received by him by 28 May 2014, failing which Mr Salgaocar would commence proceedings against Mr Darsan.

  35. [21] In response to the HFW Letter, Mr Darsan had, according to Mr Salgaocar, caused the transfer of the shares in Winter Meadow to Mr Salgaocar for the nominal consideration of US$2 on 8 July 2014. On the same day, Ms Pooja transferred her shareholding in Million Dragon to Mr Salgaocar for a nominal consideration of US$1. Mr Darsan had also signed agreements on behalf of Sino Ling Tao (SG) to assign to Winter Meadow payments made by Sino Ling Tao (SG) to third parties and allegedly arranged for various documents and/or records of Trustworth Shipping to be delivered to the offices of Haridass Ho in 2014.

  36. [22] On a separate but pertinent note (see also [27] below), Mr Salgaocar lodged caveats over units in Newton Imperial, WCEGA Tower and The Waterford Residence in July 2015. Mr Darsan applied for these caveats to be removed in Originating Summonses Nos 727 and 945 of 2015 (“OS 727 and OS 945”) in August and October 2015, respectively.

  37. [23] As Mr Darsan had allegedly failed to account for the trust assets and to return these assets to Mr Salgaocar, Mr Salgaocar commenced Suit 821.

  38. Procedural history leading up to the decision below

  39. [24] After the suit was commenced on 11 August 2015, Mr Darsan filed his defence on 6 October 2015 and applied in Summons No 6205 of 2015 (“SUM 6205”) on 28 December 2015 to strike out the Statement of Claim (“SOC”) and for the suit to be dismissed on the basis that the SOC revealed that Mr Salgaocar’s export arrangements to China through the BVI SPVs breached Indian law.

  40. [25] As mentioned earlier at [8], Mr Salgaocar passed away on 1 January 2016. Following his passing, a dispute arose in the Family Justice Courts between Mdm Lakshmi and Ms Chandana Anil Salgaocar, Mr Salgaocar’s daughter, over the appointment of the administratrix of his estate. Mdm Lakshmi’s solicitors subsequently notified the court, on 15 May 2017, that a settlement of the issue on appointment was expected and that a single administratrix would administer the estate’s affairs, including the conduct of the suit below.

  41. [26] On 16 May 2017, Mr Darsan commenced proceedings against Mr Salgaocar’s estate and Million Dragon in the BVI (“BVI 83”). Mr Darsan claimed that he was the beneficial owner of the sole share in Million Dragon, which was transferred by Ms Pooja to Mr Salgaocar in July 2014 (see [21] above). Mr Darsan alleged that the transfer was made in return for Mr Salgaocar agreeing to transfer to Mr Darsan monies that were paid for the purchase of units in Newton Imperial by Million Dragon. As Mr Salgaocar failed to transfer the monies, Mr Darsan asserted that he was the beneficial owner of the share. About three weeks later, on 7 June 2017, Mdm Lakshmi, in her capacity as a beneficiary of the estate, filed Originating Summons No 627 of 2017 (“OS 627”) in the High Court for an anti-suit injunction to restrain Mr Darsan from proceeding in BVI 83. The application was not granted by the High Court in April 2018 but was later allowed by the Court of Appeal in July 2019. Mdm Lakshmi obtained the issue of the letters of administration (granted on 8 August 2017) of Mr Salgaocar’s estate on 25 September 2017.

  42. [27] On 16 October 2017, the applications by Mr Darsan for the removal of the caveats – OS 727 and OS 945 – were allowed by the High Court on the basis that the 2003 Trust related to the shares in the BVI SPVs and so Mr Salgaocar was not entitled to pierce their corporate veils and reach into the assets held by these SPVs. The appeal by Mr Salgaocar’s estate was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal. It was for this reason that Mdm Lakshmi and Winter Meadow did not make any claim to the assets of the SPVs in Suit 821 but instead limited their claim to the shares of the subsisting BVI SPVs and Singapore SPVs subject to the 2003 Trust.

  43. [28] On 15 November 2017, Mr Darsan applied in Originating Summons No 1293 of 2017 (“OS 1293”) for a declaration that the suit below had been automatically discontinued pursuant to O 21 r 2(6) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) on the basis that no party to the action had taken a step as reflected in the court records for over a year. This was resisted by Mdm Lakshmi, who applied in Summons 5581 of 2017 in OS 1293 for a declaration that the suit below was not deemed discontinued or alternatively that the suit be reinstated. On 22 February 2018, the High Court determined that the suit had not been automatically discontinued. Separately, Mr Darsan was granted permission to withdraw SUM 6205 (the striking out application) on 25 May 2018.

  44. [29] On 2 October 2020, a third-party notice was issued to Mr Kwan by the defendants in Suit 821 (ie, Mr Darsan, Mdm Jashma, Ms Pooja and the Singapore SPVs listed at [7(a)] to [7(k)] above). In essence, the defendants were claiming against Mr Kwan for an indemnity or a contribution in the event that Mr Darsan was found liable to Mr Salgaocar’s estate in respect of the misappropriation claim in relation to Eltina (“the Third Party Action”).

  45. Procedural history following the decision below

  46. [31] On 5 June 2023, the respondents filed HC/SUM 1654/2023 (“SUM 1654”), an application for the following orders:

  47. [32] The appellants, on the other hand, filed HC/SUM 1897/2023 (“SUM 1897”) on 26 June 2023, which was an application for a stay of execution of the Judge’s orders in Suit 821.

  48. [33] They then proceeded to file two appeals against the Judgment on 14 August 2023. The first appeal was AD 88 which pertained to the Judge’s decision on the claims of Mr Salgaocar’s estate against Mr Darsan and the other defendants in Suit 821, whilst the second – AD/CA 89/2023 (“AD 89”) – pertained to the Judge’s decision on the Third Party Action between Mr Darsan and Mr Kwan. AD 89 was subsequently withdrawn by Mr Darsan on 23 February 2024.

  49. [34] On 13 September 2023, Hoo Sheau Peng J dismissed SUM 1897 and allowed SUM 1654. She permitted Mr Darsan 21 days instead of seven days to comply with the Judge’s orders.

  50. [37] On 4 November 2023, Mr Darsan filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14567 of 2023 (“Writ 14567”) in the High Court of Delhi against (a) the Union of India, through the Ministry of Finance, (b) the Central Board of Direct Taxes, through its Chairman, (c) the Commissioner of Income Tax, through the Assistant Director of Income Tax, (d) Mr Salgaocar’s estate, and (e) the Union of India, through the Ministry of External Affairs. In Writ 14567, Mr Darsan sought the following prayers:

  51. (a) that the court pass appropriate directions qua the subject monies/shares mentioned in the Garnishee Notice till there is final adjudication of the dispute between Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar’s estate.

  52. (b) that the court direct the relevant authorities to intervene in the proceedings pending before the Singapore High Court between Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar’s estate;

  53. (c) that the court direct Mr Salgaocar’s estate not to proceed with the execution proceedings before the Singapore Court in view of the present proceedings (“Prayer (iii)”);

  54. (d) that the court declare Section 32(17)(a) of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act 2015 (India) (“the BMA”) to be arbitrary and unconstitutional; and

  55. (e) that the court pass any other orders or such further orders as the court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances.

  56. [41] Following Goh J’s decision in SUM 3643, Mr Darsan applied to amend Prayer (iii) to state the following: “Direct [Mr Salgaocar’s estate] to hand over immediately to [the Commissioner of Income Tax] any assets (in any form whatsoever) obtained by her pursuant to the execution proceedings before the Singapore Court in view of the present proceedings.”

  57. [42] On 5 January 2024, the respondents filed AD/SUM 2/2024 (“SUM 2”), an application for permission to adduce further evidence in this appeal. As counsel for the respondents clarified at a case management conference on 31 January 2024, the relevance of the further evidence was solely with respect to the application of the Hadkinson principle (which originates from the case of Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P. 285) and not with respect to the merits of the appeal. As such, any overlap between the evidence sought to be adduced by way of SUM 2 and SUM 46 was inconsequential.

  58. [43] This was quickly followed by the filing of AD/SUM 5/2024 (“SUM 5”) by the appellants on 2 February 2024. This application sought to amend SUM 46 to seek the court’s permission to adduce another piece of evidence, namely an affidavit filed by the Indian tax authorities in Writ 14567, in the present appeal. As mentioned at [36] above, this application was made in conjunction with the appellants’ request for SUM 46 to be reheard by the full coram of the AD.

  59. [44] On 21 February 2024, the respondents filed AD/SUM 12/2024 (“SUM 12”) for an extension of time to be granted for the filing of SUM 12 and for the appellants’ notice of appeal to be struck out. The respondents then filed AD/SUM 16/2024 (“SUM 16”) on 20 March 2024 for permission to adduce further evidence for the purpose of SUM 12 and the application of the Hadkinson principle.

  60. [46] Besides giving our decision on the numerous interlocutory applications above on 3 April 2024, we also heard parties in relation to AD 88. We dismissed the appeal two weeks later on 17 April 2024 by way of an oral judgment.

  61. Decision below

  62. [47] For context, we briefly summarise the key points of the Judgment.

  63. [48] First, the Judge found that the December 2003 Agreement must have existed for the following three reasons:

  64. (a) Mr Salgaocar’s management of the BVI and Singapore SPVs suggested that he regarded the SPVs as his own, in contrast to Mr Darsan’s lack of involvement with their operations and affairs;

  65. (b) Mr Darsan’s defence was implausible; and

  66. (c) the events from around 2014, when Mr Salgaocar formally commenced claims for the trust assets, were indicative of the existence of the December 2003 Agreement.

  67. This agreement then gave rise to the 2003 Trust, which extended to the shares in the BVI and Singapore SPVs.

  68. [49] Second, the Judge held that Mr Darsan had breached the 2003 Trust by (a) misappropriating the monies held on trust, (b) refusing to take instructions from Mr Salgaocar and preventing him from dealing with the trust assets, (c) misappropriating units in Newton Imperial, (d) wrongfully disposing of other properties, (e) procuring the transfer of shares in GBA Minmetals and Eltina to himself, (f) wrongfully altering the accounting records of Singapore Star Holdings, and (g) misappropriating assets held by Sino Ling Tao (SG). As such, the Judge granted, among other things, a declaration that Mr Darsan and the Singapore SPVs held the trust assets on trust for Mr Salgaocar and that they were to transfer ownership of the trust assets to Mr Salgaocar’s estate.

  69. [50] Third, the Judge also found that the December 2003 Agreement was not illegal under Indian law, specifically under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act 1988 (India) (“the Benami Act”), the BMA, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 (India) (“the PMLA”), the Income Tax Act 1961 (India) (“the Income Tax Act”), the Customs Act 1962 (India) (“the Customs Act”) and the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (India) (“the FEMA”). This finding rendered the question of whether the 2003 Trust was rendered unenforceable by reason of foreign illegality moot.

  70. Parties’ cases on appeal

  71. [51] The appellants appealed against the whole of the Judge’s decision save for the Judge’s dismissal of Winter Meadow’s claim against Mr Darsan and the Judge’s finding that certain communications between Mr Darsan, Mr Ajaib Haridass (“Mr Haridass”) (Mr Salgaocar’s lawyer from Haridass Ho), Mr Salgaocar and other individuals in June and July 2014 were conducted on a “without prejudice” basis.

  72. Appellants’ case

  73. [52] The following points were raised by the appellants.

  74. [53] First, the Judge erred in finding that the respondents had proven the existence of the December 2003 Agreement. To this end, the appellants submitted that the Judge had approached the matter as a “binary question”, and found that the respondents had proven their case in Suit 821 simply because he had rejected Mr Darsan’s defence and counterclaim. Such an approach was wrong in law. The Judge had also failed to consider the evidence which contradicted the existence of this agreement, such as Mr Salgaocar’s conduct after the alleged breaches of trust, the management and funding of the SPVs by Mr Darsan, and the contemporaneous documentary evidence.

  75. [54] Second, the alleged December 2003 Agreement was void/unenforceable for illegality. This agreement, if it existed, violated the Customs Act, the BMA, the PMLA, the Benami Act, the Income Tax Act and the FEMA. This meant that the agreement was unenforceable pursuant to the principles set out in Foster v Driscoll and others [1929] 1 KB 470 (“Foster v Driscoll”) and Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (“Ralli Brothers”).

  76. [55] Third, the 2003 Trust failed for lack of certainty.

  77. [56] Fourth, the Judge erred in finding that Mr Darsan had breached the alleged December 2003 Agreement. The Judge’s finding was against the weight of the evidence. The Judge also failed to consider that Mr Salgaocar might have acquiesced to those breaches of trust.

  78. [57] Fifth, there was no basis for an account on a wilful default basis. There was nothing to suggest that Mr Darsan had committed other breaches of trust which were not yet known to the respondents or to the court.

  79. Respondents’ case

  80. [59] In response, the respondents took the following positions.

  81. [60] First, the Judge correctly found that the December 2003 Agreement existed and that the 2003 Trust arose pursuant to this agreement. The respondents argued that the Judge did not err in finding for the respondents as the pleadings made it clear that the Judge could only make his finding based on one of two possible versions of facts. In any case, the Judge arrived at his findings after a “very careful and detailed analysis of the facts and evidence”.

  82. [61] Second, the 2003 Trust was enforceable. There was no basis for the appellants to criticise the Judge’s finding that the December 2003 Agreement did not breach the relevant Indian laws. In any event, the principles in Foster v Driscoll and Ralli Brothers did not render the 2003 Trust unenforceable as they extend only to claims for breach of contract.

  83. [62] Third, the 2003 Trust was valid. The appellants’ arguments that the 2003 Trust was void for uncertainty were baseless and unsupported by the evidence.

  84. [63] Fourth, the Judge was correct in finding that Mr Darsan had breached the December 2003 Agreement. Not only did Mr Darsan admit to arranging payments from the BVI SPVs to be made to bank accounts belonging to him or persons or entities controlled by or connected to him, the fact that he had transferred six Newton Imperial units to himself and disposed of various properties was undisputed. The appellants’ claim that Mr Salgaocar had “acquiesced” to the breaches of trust was also not pleaded by the appellants and was not based on any evidence.

  85. Issues to be determined

  86. [66] Having regard to the parties’ submissions above, the following issues arose for our determination:

  87. Issue 1: Whether Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar entered into the December 2003 Agreement which gave rise to the 2003 Trust

  88. [67] The issue of whether Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar had in fact entered into the alleged December 2003 Agreement was a key plank of the appellants’ arguments on appeal. If we agreed with the appellants that the Judge had erred in finding that the December 2003 Agreement existed, it would follow that there was no trust in favour of Mr Salgaocar and all of the Judge’s other findings against the appellants in relation to the breaches of the 2003 Trust could not stand. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence before us, however, we were not satisfied that the Judge’s findings were plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence. We now deal with each of the appellants’ main contentions in turn.

  89. Whether the Judge had wrongly applied a “binary approach” or otherwise wrongly applied the applicable standard of proof

  90. [68] The appellants argued that the Judge had wrongly applied a “binary approach” in finding for the respondents. In other words, the Judge had concluded that the respondents’ case had been made out simply because he had rejected Mr Darsan’s defence and counterclaim. Such an approach was clearly wrong in law: Suying Design v Ng Kian Huan Edmund and other appeals [2020] 2 SLR 221 at [94]. The burden on the respondents to prove their claim on a balance of probabilities could not have been met simply because the respondents showed that their case was a “better explanation” than that put forth by Mr Darsan.

  91. [69] The appellants then pointed out that the Judge had failed to (a) consider Mr Darsan’s explanations as to why Mr Salgaocar wanted to involve him in the iron ore business, and (b) take into account the lack of evidence behind the respondents’ claim that Mr Salgaocar had wholly funded the SPVs. This indicated that the requisite burden of proof was not met on the evidence. Accordingly, the logical inference to be drawn was that the Judge had indeed engaged in the flawed “binary approach”.

  92. [70] The respondents argued that the court is not bound to choose between the parties’ competing version of events and is free to find that neither version has been proved. However, they also argued that a court had to come to a view on the pleadings and the facts. The respondents argued that the pleadings only allowed for two possible versions of facts – either Mr Darsan or Mr Salgaocar owned the SPVs and assets as pleaded in the SOC. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had recognised the binary nature of the present dispute in Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra [2019] 2 SLR 372 at [68], which was the Court of Appeal’s decision allowing Mdm Lakshmi’s application for an anti-suit injunction to restrain Mr Darsan from proceeding with BVI 83 (see [26] above). On the facts, the Judge was fully cognisant of and applied the applicable standard of proof, arriving at his findings only after a careful and detailed analysis of the facts and evidence.

  93. [71] We did not find the respondents’ argument on the binary nature of the dispute persuasive. The view expressed in the decision they relied on was in respect of only one particular factual dispute and not the entire dispute between the parties. As a general rule, even where the pleadings mention only two opposing narratives, this does not mean that the court must inexorably find that either narrative has been proved: see Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA (trading as Rabobank International), Singapore Branch v Motorola Electronics Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 63 at [35] and Suying Design Pte Ltd v Ng Kian Huan Edmund and other appeals [2020] 2 SLR 221 at [94]. A claimant only discharges his burden of proof if the court believes his case to be proved and not simply because the court disbelieves the other side’s version of events unless clearly there is no other possible version.

  94. [72] In any event, it was clear to us that the Judge did not find that the December 2003 Agreement existed simply because he had rejected Mr Darsan’s defence and counterclaim. Quite apart from disbelieving Mr Darsan’s defence and finding it implausible, the Judge had carefully considered the evidence for the respondents pertaining to the management and operations of the BVI SPVs as well as the Singapore SPVs. For example, he found that the documentary evidence as well as the evidence of Mr Kwan, Mr Cheong Hock Wee (“Mr Cheong”), who was the general manager of Sino Ling Tao (SG) and Singapore Star Shipping from 2007 to 2010, and Ms Tan Ai Kheng (“Ms Tan”), a real estate agent, supported the respondents’ position that all significant decisions concerning the trading of iron ore by the BVI SPVs were made by Mr Salgaocar or were at least made with his approval.

  95. [73] The Judge also examined the evidence pertaining to the management of three of the Singapore SPVs – Trustworth Shipping, Sino Ling Tao (SG) and Singapore Star Shipping – and found that they were under Mr Salgaocar’s control. At the same time, the Judge observed that Mr Darsan had adduced “no evidence” that he was involved in the operations of Sino Ling Tao (SG) and Singapore Star Shipping. The Judge (at [40] and [70] of the Judgment) had also expressly considered and rejected Mr Darsan’s “cogent explanation” as to why Mr Salgaocar had allegedly wanted to involve him in the iron ore business.

  96. [74] Importantly, it was Mr Darsan’s position that Mr Salgaocar required his assistance in the trading of iron ore with the Chinese market but the Judge found that there was no evidence that, prior to 2004, Mr Darsan had any iron ore trading experience, let alone in relation to the Chinese market (see [95] of the Judgment).

  97. [75] Finally, the Judge had, contrary to the appellants’ contentions, considered the issue of funding in the Judgment. For example, he found that Mr Darsan was unable to provide any evidence showing that he had provided the capital for Trustworth Shipping when it was first incorporated. We add that it is inconsequential that the Judge made no reference to the evidence of the respondents’ accounting expert, Mr Sim Guan Seng (“Mr Sim”), in this regard. This is because Mr Sim’s evidence would not, in any event, have assisted the appellants as he stated that the SPVs were owned and controlled by Mr Salgaocar through trustees and nominees and that the profits were transferred to at least some of the Singapore SPVs.

  98. [76] It was therefore clear to us that the Judge had properly weighed the two accounts of events which were put forth by the parties at trial and carefully explained why he accepted the respondents’ version as being the more credible version on the totality of the evidence before him. There was accordingly no merit to the contention that the Judge had engaged in a “binary approach” or had otherwise wrongly applied the burden of proof.

  99. Whether Mr Salgaocar’s conduct following the alleged breaches of trust showed that the 2003 Trust did not exist

  100. [77] The appellants argued that the Judge failed to consider Mr Salgaocar’s “complete inaction” following the alleged breaches of trust from 2011 to 2012. According to the respondents’ pleaded case, Mr Darsan had misappropriated monies from the BVI SPVs since 2011 and Mr Salgaocar had been demanding for the return of the SPVs and the trust assets from Mr Darsan since August 2012. However, not only was there no documentary evidence of any such demand by Mr Salgaocar, Mr Salgaocar did “absolutely nothing” to obtain the return of the SPVs and assets which were allegedly stolen from him. For example, he did not take steps to remove Mr Darsan as bank signatory of the SPVs or to prevent Mr Darsan from accessing the SPVs’ offices or documents. He remained inactive in July 2012 (when Mr Darsan’s misconduct allegedly began) and even in August 2013 (when Mr Kwan allegedly told Mr Salgaocar of Mr Darsan’s misconduct).

  101. [78] According to the appellants, Mr Salgaocar’s inaction was inexplicable in the light of the fact that Mr Salgaocar would have been aware of Mr Darsan’s misconduct from an early stage. Mr Salgaocar was described as a micro-manager who was involved in the day-to-day running of the SPVs and was regularly updated on the detailed financials of the SPVs. Each alleged misappropriation also involved substantial sums of money. It was inconceivable that Mr Kwan and Ms Chiang only discovered the alleged misappropriations more than two years after they occurred, given that Mr Kwan was reporting the cash flow positions of the BVI SPVs to Mr Salgaocar on a daily basis and Mr Salgaocar regularly obtained updated ledgers – which were primarily in relation to the BVI SPVs (“the Ledgers”) – from Ms Chiang.

  102. [79] On the contrary, Mr Haridass and Mr Kwan testified that Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar remained on good terms in 2012 and 2013. It also could not be said that Mr Salgaocar was prevented from dealing with the SPVs as Mr Vivek Khabya (“Mr Vivek”), who shared a “very close professional and personal relationship” with Mr Salgaocar, was appointed as the director of several Singapore SPVs in July 2012. Salgaocar Asia Pte Ltd (“SAPL”), which was a company operated by Mr Salgaocar, also entered into tenancy agreements with Mr Darsan and Mdm Jashma in November 2012 and paid rent in relation to six units in Newton Imperial. These units were alleged to have been misappropriated by Mr Darsan. In these circumstances, it could not be said that Mr Salgaocar did not know that Mr Darsan had bought over those units in Newton Imperial.

  103. [80] The respondents argued that any “inaction” on the part of Mr Salgaocar was due to the fact that he only discovered Mr Darsan’s breaches of trust in August 2013. He then promptly engaged Mr Haridass to act for him in relation to the return of the trust assets. In addition, there were good reasons as to why Mr Kwan and Ms Chiang only discovered the misappropriations in August 2013. These transactions were not included in the BVI Spreadsheets which were sent to Mr Salgaocar. Mr Kwan’s evidence was also that he did not act on transfers of funds to Ultra Best in 2012 because he knew that GBA Minmetals was transferring sums of money to Ultra Best which would in turn transfer monies to companies in Mr Salgaocar’s name.

  104. [81] We did not agree with the appellants that Mr Salgaocar had taken “complete inaction” following the alleged misappropriations by Mr Darsan in 2011 and 2012. This was because, as the respondents pointed out, Mr Salgaocar only began to uncover the breaches of trust in August 2013, when he was informed of these remittances by Mr Kwan. It was in our view not surprising that Ms Chiang and Mr Kwan only found out about the unauthorised remittances in August 2013 even though they occurred in 2011 and 2012. As Mr Kwan testified, he, Ms Tam and Ms Chiang were of the view that Mr Salgaocar and Mr Darsan maintained “a very good relationship” and that they were “very good friends” and Mr Salgaocar trusted Mr Darsan. As such, even if they had seen transfers from the SPVs to companies belonging to Mr Darsan, such as Ultra Best, they would have been under the impression that these transfers were authorised by Mr Salgaocar.

  105. [82] Moreover, given that these were allegedly unauthorised transfers, it was unlikely that they would have been recorded in the Ledgers which were sent to Mr Salgaocar by Mr Kwan or Ms Chiang. Mr Kwan was clearly not in possession of the supporting documents pertaining to these transfers. Ms Chiang’s role was limited to the input of data and other administrative tasks, and would not have included recording such transfers on her own accord. This provided a credible explanation in our view as to why these transfers were not brought to Mr Salgaocar’s attention by Ms Chiang and Mr Kwan before August 2013.

  106. [83] Given that Mr Salgaocar engaged Mr Haridass to act for him in February 2014, shortly after Mr Kwan informed him of Mr Darsan’s acts of misappropriation, it could not be said that there had been “complete inaction” on Mr Salgaocar’s part. The conduct of Mr Salgaocar must also be viewed in the light of the fact that he was not the legal owner of the shares in the relevant SPVs. As we pointed out to counsel for the appellants at the hearing on 3 April 2024, Mr Salgaocar would therefore have faced significant difficulty in removing Mr Darsan as a director or a signatory of the SPVs.

  107. [84] There was also no inconsistency in the fact that the respondents had, in their pleadings, indicated that Mr Salgaocar had demanded that Mr Darsan return the shares in the SPVs and the other trust assets since August 2012 even though he only found out about Mr Darsan’s acts of misappropriation in August 2013. As stated in the SOC at paras 147–148, the demands made by Mr Salgaocar in 2012 and 2013 for the transfer of the shares in Trustworth Shipping to Mr Salgaocar were made to ensure that Mr Salgaocar could oversee the resolution and settlement of two disputes involving Trustworth Shipping. Mr Salgaocar’s official demand for the return of the shares in the other SPVs was brought later on 14 May 2014 through the HFW Letter.

  108. [85] We were not persuaded by the appellants’ arguments pertaining to the appointment of Mr Vivek as a director of some of the Singapore SPVs as well as the tenancy agreements pertaining to the six units in Newton Imperial for the same reasons set out at [154] and [157] below respectively as they did not outweigh the overwhelming evidence in favour of the respondents.

  109. [86] Accordingly, Mr Salgaocar’s conduct following the alleged breaches of trust did not show that the 2003 Trust did not exist.

  110. Whether the SPVs were controlled by Mr Darsan or Mr Salgaocar

  111. [87] The appellants argued that the Judge failed to consider that it was Mr Salgaocar’s own position in the HFW Letter that the BVI SPVs were at the relevant times controlled and managed by Mr Darsan, that Mr Darsan was involved in the investment of the proceeds of the sale of iron ore and that Mr Darsan was in charge of managing the assets. Mr Haridass also testified that Mr Salgaocar had told him that the BVI SPVs were controlled and managed by Mr Darsan. In addition, Mr Darsan was involved in the operations of the BVI SPVs since he worked at the Hong Kong Gateway Office of the SPVs and was copied on Mr Kwan’s daily reports on the BVI SPVs to Mr Salgaocar. Mr Darsan also had demonstrable knowledge and understanding of the iron ore trade and the relevant employees, such as Mr Kwan, Ms Chiang and Ms Tam, took instructions from him.

  112. [88] These arguments were not persuasive. While the HFW Letter did state that the BVI SPVs were “at the relevant times controlled and managed” by Mr Darsan and this contradicted Mr Salgaocar’s version that he retained sole control and management of the SPVs, the HFW Letter also contained numerous other references to Mr Darsan holding companies and assets on trust for Mr Salgaocar. Furthermore, while the HFW Letter was not entirely consistent with Mr Salgaocar’s position for the action, it was only one piece of evidence to be considered.

  113. [89] The appellants’ argument that Mr Haridass testified that Mr Salgaocar had told him that the BVI SPVs were controlled and managed by Mr Darsan was unconvincing. Although Mr Haridass admitted that Mr Darsan played some role in the sale of iron ore into China, he quickly clarified that he would not “go so far as to say that [Mr Darsan] had a say in how the business was to be run” and that he did not “know the extent to which [Mr Darsan] was involved”. He also expressly rejected the suggestion that it was Mr Darsan who was trading iron ore through GBA Minmetals, Joyking and Cheermark. The evidence of Mr Haridass, taken as a whole, did not show that the BVI SPVs were controlled and/or managed by Mr Darsan.

  114. [90] Also, Mr Darsan did not possess demonstrable knowledge and understanding of the iron ore trade as we mentioned at [74] above. There was also no evidence that the relevant employees, namely Mr Kwan, Ms Chiang and Ms Tam, took instructions from Mr Darsan. On the contrary, the Judge pointed to several pieces of evidence (eg, at [51] and [211] of the Judgment) which showed that Mr Salgaocar was the person giving instructions in relation to matters involving the SPVs. We saw no reason to disagree with the Judge’s reasoning on this point.

  115. [91] Finally, nothing turned on the mere fact that Mr Darsan was copied on the daily reports which Mr Kwan sent to Mr Salgaocar. As the Judge found at [60] of the Judgment, Mr Kwan clarified that he had only done so at Mr Darsan’s request and because he did not see any reason to refuse. The Judge also observed that Mr Darsan was unable to produce “old emails” showing any instructions from him to Mr Kwan that Mr Darsan was to be given daily reports in the same manner as was given to Mr Salgaocar.

  116. Whether the SPVs were wholly funded by Mr Darsan or Mr Salgaocar

  117. [92] The appellants submitted that there was no evidence that Mr Salgaocar had wholly funded the SPVs or that the Singapore SPVs were wholly funded by the BVI SPVs’ trading profits. Instead, the evidence supported Mr Darsan’s account that he provided funding to the SPVs. The appellants pointed to, among other things, the HFW Letter, bank account statements for the SPVs, Ultra Best’s provision of unconditional financial support to Singapore Star Holdings and its subsidiaries, and the cash flow statement of Singapore Star Holdings. The Ledgers only showed that funds were transferred between the SPVs but not that it was Mr Salgaocar who funded the SPVs or that the Singapore SPVs were wholly funded by the trading profits of the BVI SPVs.

  118. [93] The respondents argued that there was no evidence that Mr Darsan had funded the SPVs. Not only did Mr Darsan accept that Mr Salgaocar owned and funded Ling Tao (one of the BVI SPVs), but it was also clear from the evidence of Mr Cheong and Mr Kwan that Mr Salgaocar owned and funded Sino Ling Tao (BVI). In relation to the cash flow statement of Singapore Star Holdings, the auditors stated that they were unable to ascertain the financial capability of Ultra Best due to a lack of sufficient audit evidence.

  119. [94] In our view, it was not clear on the evidence that the SPVs were entirely funded by Mr Salgaocar. We saw no reason, however, to disagree with the Judge’s view that there was no evidence that it was Mr Darsan who had personally funded the relevant SPVs (see [107] and [127] of the Judgment). Also, nothing in the HFW Letter suggested that Mr Darsan had funded the SPVs. On the contrary, the HFW Letter painted Mr Darsan as a trustee who was simply in charge of holding the relevant assets and companies on behalf of Mr Salgaocar.

  120. [95] The bank account statements which the appellants referred to belonged to Singapore Star Holdings and Sino Ling Tao (SG) and reflected inflows of monies into these accounts labelled with Mr Darsan’s name in the corresponding descriptions. These statements were, to our mind, inconclusive. This was because they did not show the source of the monies and thus could not show that Mr Darsan had personally funded the SPVs.

  121. [96] With respect to Ultra Best’s alleged provision of unconditional financial support to Singapore Star Holdings and its subsidiaries, we agreed with the respondents that the independent auditors’ report to the members of Sino Noble Holdings (which was later renamed to Singapore Star Holdings) showed that the financial capability of Ultra Best could not be ascertained. This was therefore insufficient evidence to show that Ultra Best had funded Singapore Star Holdings and/or its subsidiaries. As for the cash flow statement of Singapore Star Holdings, which was simply titled “Group Cash Flow Statement”, it was on the face of the document neither clear which companies made up this “group” nor apparent that the statement had been audited.

  122. [97] On the other hand, there was some evidence that Mr Salgaocar had provided funding for the SPVs. Mr Salgaocar was the guarantor and obligor in respect of loan facilities taken out by Great Newton Properties and HSBC. An extension of the loan facility again required a personal guarantee from Mr Salgaocar. In addition, Mr Cheong testified that, in his view, Mr Salgaocar was the person who had arranged and provided the funding for the operations of Singapore Star Holdings and its subsidiaries. This was consistent with the notes to Singapore Star Holdings’ Audited Financial Statement for the year ended 30 June 2008 which stated that Mr Salgaocar would continue to provide “unconditional financial support to the group and company”.

  123. [98] The appellants’ arguments on the Ledgers were also unpersuasive. They first argued that the Ledgers had not been shown to be authentic and admissible evidence. They then argued, presumably in the alternative, that the Ledgers demonstrated that Mr Darsan had deposited monies inside some of the SPVs. In relation to the appellants’ argument on the authenticity and admissibility of the Ledgers, we saw no reason to depart from the Judge’s finding that the respondents had adduced sufficient evidence to rely on the Ledgers as secondary evidence (see Judgment at [202]). Although Mr Kwan was unable to confirm where precisely the Ledgers had originated from, it was his testimony that he did obtain copies of the Ledgers. This was because he had been forwarded e-mails that Ms Chiang had sent to Mr Salgaocar which in turn enclosed the Ledgers and he could recall having seen some of the items listed in the said Ledgers. As for the appellants’ contention that the Ledgers showed Mr Darsan depositing monies inside some of the SPVs, this did not assist Mr Darsan as there was no evidence indicating the true source of such funds.

  124. [99] On this basis, we agreed that the Judge did not err in finding that Mr Salgaocar had wholly funded the SPVs.

  125. Whether there were “plausible reasons” for the existence of the December 2003 Agreement

  126. [100] The appellants argued that there was no plausible reason for the alleged December 2003 Agreement to exist from Mr Salgaocar’s perspective. This was because Mr Salgaocar had already been exporting iron ore directly into China since 2000 and there was no explanation why he would enter into the December 2003 Agreement to interpose Mr Darsan to do the same thing. There was also no reason for Mr Salgaocar to interpose Mr Darsan as a nominee shareholder when he could hold those shares himself. Mr Salgaocar had been exporting iron ore directly into China through two companies – Sino Source Industries Ltd (“Sino Source”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong, and GBA Products Ltd (“GBA Products”), a company incorporated in Dubai. Although the sole benefit to Mr Darsan was allegedly the US$0.50 for each WMT of cargo sold by the SPVs, there was no evidence of Mr Darsan ever receiving such payments.

  127. [101] The respondents argued that the entire purpose of the December 2003 Agreement was for Mr Salgaocar to earn higher margins on the second leg of the two-legged contracts. The respondents pointed out that Mr Darsan’s own evidence was that GBA Products and Sino Source were independent companies and not Mr Salgaocar’s companies. The profits earned were therefore not enjoyed directly by Mr Salgaocar and he wanted to enter into the December 2003 Agreement to earn more on the second leg. It was also perfectly legitimate, as a commercial arrangement, for Mr Salgaocar to interpose Mr Darsan as a nominee shareholder in the SPVs.

  128. [102] We took the view that there were plausible reasons for the parties to have entered into the December 2003 Agreement. For one, it was undisputed that Mr Salgaocar and Mr Darsan shared a very close relationship and mutual trust, to the extent that they were, in Mr Darsan’s own words, like “father and son” (Judgment at [17]). It was therefore not unusual for Mr Salgaocar to have requested Mr Darsan, a man he trusted at the time, to serve as his nominee shareholder in exchange for some consideration. We also accepted that there could have been plausible commercial reasons as to why the parties entered into the December 2003 Agreement, such as maintaining the privacy of Mr Salgaocar as the actual beneficial owner of the share(s). For these reasons, we disagreed with the appellants that there was no plausible reason for the parties to have entered into the December 2003 Agreement. This was in spite of our observation that the ownership of GBA Products and Sino Source could not be determined on the basis of the evidence before us, which rendered the benefits that Mr Salgaocar purportedly enjoyed from the second leg somewhat speculative.

  129. Whether the contemporaneous documents supported the existence of the December 2003 Agreement

  130. [103] As a final point, the appellants argued that despite voluminous documents in the trial bundles and the lengthy 12-year period between the December 2003 Agreement and the commencement of Suit 821, there was not a single document suggesting, let alone recording, the alleged December 2003 Agreement. The first time the December 2003 Agreement was mentioned was in the SOC dated 4 September 2015 and the HFW Letter was the first time Mr Salgaocar asserted some beneficial interest over the SPVs. The agreement was also not declared in Mr Salgaocar’s income tax returns. The appellants also submitted that the Judge failed to take into account documents which recorded Mr Darsan as the beneficial owner of the SPVs, such as an HSBC “Declaration of Beneficial Ownership Form” (“the HSBC Form”).

  131. [104] It was true that the December 2003 Agreement did not appear to have been recorded in contemporaneous written documents. This did not, however, prove that the oral agreement did not exist. At the time of the December 2003 Agreement, Mr Darsan and Mr Salgaocar shared a good relationship, one which Mr Darsan even described as akin to that between “father and son”. This would have explained the absence of documentary evidence in relation to the December 2003 Agreement. As for the fact that Mr Salgaocar’s tax returns did not disclose any interest in the SPVs, this was inconclusive. Lastly, with regard to the HSBC Form, there was no evidence as to who had prepared it, whether Mr Darsan had discussed it with Mr Salgaocar before signing it and, pertinently, whether the form was eventually submitted to and/or processed by HSBC. Besides, as mentioned, there was other evidence supporting Mr Salgaocar’s position.

  132. Summary

  133. [105] For the reasons above, we affirmed the Judge’s finding that the December 2003 Agreement existed and gave rise to the 2003 Trust.

  134. Issue 2: Whether the December 2003 Agreement was in breach of Indian laws and whether the 2003 Trust was thus void or unenforceable

  135. [106] This issue comprised the following two sub-issues:

  136. Whether the December 2003 Agreement was in breach of any of the relevant Indian laws

  137. [107] The appellants submitted that the December 2003 Agreement, assuming it existed, violated the FEMA, the BMA, the PMLA, the Benami Act, the Income Tax Act and the Customs Act. These arguments were similarly canvassed before the Judge, who rejected them and found that the December 2003 Agreement was not in breach of these laws. For the reasons below, we were not convinced that the Judge had erred in his finding.

  138. FEMA

  139. [108] The relevant section of the FEMA (s 4) prohibits an Indian resident from holding, owning, possessing or transferring any foreign exchange, foreign security or any immovable property situated outside India. At the trial below, the Judge accepted the evidence of the respondents’ expert, Justice Ramasubramanian Venkat Easwar (“Justice Easwar”), that the December 2003 Agreement was a rectifiable breach under the FEMA: Judgment at [185]–[186]. The case of Vijay Karia v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.L and others [2020] SCC Online SC 177 (“Vijay Karia”) was cited for the proposition that any infringement of the FEMA would amount to a rectifiable breach.

  140. [110] The respondents, on the other hand, pointed out that nothing in the FEMA prohibited the setting up of a foreign trust and Vijay Karia made it clear that the policy underpinning the FEMA was that breaches of its provisions could not be said to be an illegality. The appellants’ claim that a breach of the FEMA could not be rectified if it involved money laundering was made pursuant to Regulation 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Rules 2000, but this was not pleaded by the appellants and in any case this provision only came into force on 20 February 2017 and was not addressed by the parties’ experts. The respondents also argued that there was no evidence that Mr Salgaocar was a person resident in India under the definition found in the FEMA. This precluded any breach of the FEMA by Mr Salgaocar.

  141. [112] Accordingly, we were not persuaded to disturb the Judge’s finding that there was no breach of the FEMA.

  142. BMA

  143. [113] We turn to the BMA, which seeks to tackle the problem of “black money” in India, ie, undisclosed foreign income and assets by an Indian resident. The Judge held that the December 2003 Agreement did not violate (and was not intended to violate) the BMA since it only came into force on 1 April 2016. As such, the question whether the BMA was breached did not arise (Judgment at [172]). This much was conceded by the appellants’ expert witness, Justice Ajit Prakash Shah (“Justice Shah”).

  144. [114] On appeal, the appellants raised the Indian Supreme Court decision in Union of India v Gautam Khaitan (2019) 10 SCC 108 (“Gautam”) which allegedly stated that the BMA is applicable even in respect of offences committed prior to the enactment of the BMA. To this end, Mdm Lakshmi and the other beneficiaries of Mr Salgaocar’s estate were served notices by the Indian authorities under the BMA for the estate’s failure to disclose foreign assets claimed to belong to Mr Salgaocar in Suit 821 below. Moreover, the Judge erred in assuming that the performance of the December 2003 Agreement had been completed as the very purpose of the respondents’ claim in the suit below was to enforce the alleged December 2003 Agreement. Finally, the appellants submitted that s 51(1) of the BMA applied. This provision is stated as follows:

  145. Here, Mr Salgaocar had intentionally failed to disclose his interests in the SPVs which resulted in a breach of s 51(1).

  146. [115] We agreed with the respondents that Gautam did not stand for the proposition that the BMA was applicable even in respect of acts committed prior to the enactment of the BMA. This was not the position put forth by the appellants’ expert witness, Justice Shah. More precisely, all that Justice Shah admitted was that the court in Gautam held that tax would be charged on an undisclosed foreign asset acquired prior to 1 July 2015 in the year in which a notice for assessment was issued. In other words, any potential offence under the BMA would only be committed in the year in which a notice for assessment was issued.

  147. [116] On the facts, there was no evidence to show that Mr Salgaocar had “wilfully” committed any offence under s 51 of the BMA in 2003 or that he had failed to disclose his assets in breach of the BMA. In SUM 46, the appellants sought to adduce the notices issued against Mdm Lakshmi and the other beneficiaries of Mr Salgaocar’s estate in AD 88. These notices were again at best only statements of opinion by the Indian authorities as to whether there was a breach of the BMA, and the parties had already adduced expert evidence before the Judge.

  148. [117] In any case, even if these notices were taken to show that Mr Salgaocar had committed an offence under the BMA in 2021, ie, the year in which the tax notices were issued against his estate, such illegality would have stemmed from his failure to disclose his interests in the SPVs and in engaging in a wilful attempt to evade tax. This illegal act would however be wholly distinct and subsequent to the December 2003 Agreement. In other words, there was nothing to suggest that the December 2003 Agreement itself was void for illegality. As the Judge observed at [172] of the Judgment: “… the purpose of the December 2003 Agreement could not have been to circumvent an Act that did not exist when it was entered into”. Any illegality arising in 2021 would thus be wholly irrelevant given that the relevant obligations under the December 2003 Agreement pertaining to the beneficial ownership of the shares in the SPVs had, in our view, been performed before the BMA came into force.

  149. PMLA

  150. [118] The Judge found that there were no breaches of the PMLA. This was because the parties agreed that the BMA was a predicate offence for the PMLA. As such, it could only have been a predicate for the PMLA on and after 1 April 2016, when the BMA came into force (Judgment at [173]). As there was no relevant offence under the BMA at the time of the agreement, the transactions in the SOC would not attract any of the provisions of the PMLA. In any event, the Judge found that Mr Easwar’s unchallenged evidence was that the PMLA did not have any extra-territorial application and so did not apply to the December 2003 Agreement.

  151. [119] The appellants argued that there was a breach of ss 41 and 51 of the BMA. As the parties’ experts agreed that an offence under s 51 of the BMA would automatically lead to an offence under ss 3 and 2(u) of the PMLA, the PMLA was breached. The respondents argued that there was no breach of s 51 of the BMA and the PMLA does not have any extra-territorial application.

  152. [120] Given our finding above at [116] that there was no breach of the BMA, the appellants’ case on the PMLA failed accordingly. The appellants also failed to offer any response in the Appellants’ Reply to the respondents’ argument that the PMLA did not possess any extra-territorial application.

  153. Benami Act

  154. [121] The Judge found that the appellants had abandoned their arguments in relation to the Benami Act at trial. Justice Shah conceded that the Benami Act did not apply to the December 2003 Agreement as it was “not extra-territorial in operation” and was not engaged given that all the transactions and assets were outside India. This view was echoed by Justice Easwar (Judgment at [171]). There was thus no breach of the Benami Act as it did not apply to the December 2003 Agreement at all.

  155. [122] On appeal, the appellants submitted that there were in fact transactions in respect of assets within India that the Benami Act applied to. Specifically, Sino Ling Tao (BVI), GBA Minmetals, Cheermark and Joyking bought iron ore from SMI in India and on-sold it to buyers in China. The respondents had also in their SOC admitted that some of the trading profits had been invested in assets in India.

  156. [123] In response, the respondents argued that this was a point which was neither pleaded nor argued below and, in any case, was contradicted by Justice Shah’s evidence. This allegation was also not put to Justice Easwar, which deprived him of the opportunity of assisting the court.

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