Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 5 December 2024
The engagement terms were unreasonable and void, and the fees were excessive
Arbiters Inc Law Corp v Arokiasamy Steven Joseph and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC(A) 37 · Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 10 of 2024 · 44 paragraphs
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The engagement terms were unreasonable and void, and the fees were excessive
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [63], [65]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [5]
[5] The grounds of our decision are set out below.
Background to the dispute
The respondents’ engagement of legal services
- [6]
[6] Mr Salvin Foster Steven (“Mr Salvin”), the son of the respondents, committed suicide on 7 September 2017. He had a history of mental illness and was admitted to the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) in 2010.
- [7]
[7] After Mr Salvin’s suicide, the respondents contacted Mr Anil Narain Balchandani (“Mr Balchandani”) of Red Lion Circle Advocates and Solicitors (“Red Lion Circle”) in 2017 for legal advice. They subsequently formally engaged Mr Balchandani in 2020 to act for them to sue two doctors (the first and second defendants) and the IMH (the third defendant) (collectively, the “defendants”) for an alleged breach of duty and negligence that led to Mr Salvin’s suicide. On 2 September 2020, HC/S 833/2020 (“S 833”) was commenced by Mr Balchandani on behalf of the respondents; Mr Steven sued in his personal capacity and as the administrator of Mr Salvin’s estate, and Mdm Tan sued in her personal capacity.
- [8]
[8] In November 2020, on Mr Balchandani’s advice, the respondents instructed Arbiters Law to assist Mr Balchandani in S 833. Mr Vijay Kumar Rai (“Mr Rai”) was the lawyer in charge of the matter. The respondents signed a letter of engagement on 25 November 2020 for Arbiters Law to represent them in the action, alongside Red Lion Circle.
- [9]
[9] Mr Rai claimed that, subsequently, the respondents “decided that it would be prudent for them to be separately represented”. Therefore, according to Mr Rai, Mr Steven signed a fresh letter of engagement on 8 April 2021, whereby he would be represented by Arbiters Law. Mdm Tan remained represented by Mr Balchandani. We refer to the letter of engagement dated 25 November 2020 and the letter of engagement dated 8 April 2021 collectively as the “LOEs”. The terms of the LOEs are the same, save that only the 25 November 2020 letter of engagement stipulates a request for an “initial deposit of S$4,000” in cl 17. We reproduce the material portions of the LOEs:
The conduct of S 833
- [11]
[11] Subsequently, Mr Rai realised, through the first defendant’s supplementary expert report dated 29 April 2022, that his client’s case hinged on proof that one of the drugs prescribed to Mr Salvin, “Concerta”, was inappropriate, and he needed expert evidence to prove it. This led Arbiters Law to contact Prof Eleni, an expert psychopharmacologist, by email on 19 July 2022 to request that she provide an expert report. Prof Eleni responded in late August, and sometime in mid-September, the respondents provided Prof Eleni with the relevant documents and the letter of instruction.
- [12]
[12] At a pre-trial conference before the Judge on 10 October 2022, Mr Rai sought leave to engage Prof Eleni as an expert for the respondents. By that time, dates for the trial had been fixed beginning from 12 January 2023. The parties’ lists of witnesses and their affidavits of evidence-in-chief had been filed. Mr Rai submitted that he was earlier unable to engage Prof Eleni, who is from London, because she was undergoing chemotherapy for cancer. The Judge allowed Mr Rai’s application on the condition that he file Prof Eleni’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) by 25 October 2022. Her AEIC was not filed by that date.
- [14]
[14] On 12 January 2023, the first day of trial, Mr Rai made a fresh application to file Prof Eleni’s AEIC. Counsel for the first and third defendants understandably objected to Mr Rai’s application. The Judge accepted that the expert evidence was crucial to the respondents’ case, and thus allowed the application and adjourned the trial to 11 September 2023.
- [16]
[16] As it transpired, Arbiters Law and Red Lion Circle were discharged by the respondents on 26 July 2023. However, the lawyers did not seek leave from the court to be discharged. Sometime between 27 July 2023 and 1 August 2023, the respondents personally contacted the first and third defendants in S 833 and secured a settlement without admission of liability, wherein the first and third defendants would pay the respondents an ex gratia sum of $330,000.
SUM 2331 and SUM 2424
- [17]
[17] On 2 August 2023, Arbiters Law filed HC/SUM 2331/2023 (“SUM 2331”), by which it sought, among other things: (a) to record the settlement between the respondents and the first and third defendants; (b) for the settlement sum to be paid into court by these defendants; and (c) for the trial to be vacated and the action discontinued. The reason for this step was that Arbiters Law was of the view that the respondents ought not be allowed to receive any settlement sum without any assurance that their legal fees would be paid. However, on 4 August 2023, the respondents filed notices of their intention to act in person: see Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 230 (“Arokiasamy”) at [4]. On 7 August 2023, the Judge granted leave for Mr Rai and Mr Balchandani to be discharged from acting for the respondents.
- [19]
[19] On 14 August 2023, the court recorded the settlement between the respondents and the first and third defendants, the terms of which (aside from the quantum of the settlement sum) are confidential: Arokiasamy at [6]. During the hearing before us, Mr Steven confirmed that the settlement sum of $330,000 had been released to him and Mdm Tan.
The bills of costs in relation to S 833
- [22]
[22] These bills were also not inclusive of the expert fees claimed for Prof Eleni of £12,300 (which parties did not dispute were equivalent to $20,541), which were also unpaid. Her hourly rate was £300, and the breakdown for her fees, as stated in her invoice, was as follows:
OA 1008
- [25]
[25] Excluding disbursements, the combined fees of Arbiters Law were $399,000 (ie, $36,000 + $22,562.50 + $340,437.50). The unpaid fees were $363,000 (ie, $22,562.50 + $340,437.50). The total disbursements were $27,483.03 (ie, $6,444.18 + $20,065.60 + $973.25) and the unpaid disbursements were $7,417.43 (ie, $6,444.18 + $973.25). This was not inclusive of the expert fees claimed for Prof Eleni (ie, $20,541 or £12,300).
Decision below
- [27]
[27] The decision of the Judge in OA 1008, out of which the present appeal arose, is set out in Arbiters Inc Law Corporation v Arokiasamy Steven Joseph and another [2024] SGHC 26 (the “Judgment”). The Judge held that the LOEs were not CBAs. His reasons were as follows (Judgment at [15] and [17]):
(a) First, the estimate of the “total professional fees exclusive of disbursements” in cl 22 was way off mark to enable the LOEs “to be of any use as a [CBA]”.
(b) Second, no advice was given as to what sort of disbursements were needed.
(c) Third, at the time that the LOEs were entered into, the critical expert, Prof Eleni, was not engaged, let alone the determination of her fees.
(d) Fourth, cl 22 was written in a way that “may give the clients the impression that the trial would only last a day or two”. Further, the reference to “the total professional fees” in cl 22 may or may not be a reference to a two-day trial. There was also no provision as to what would happen when the trial exceeded two days.
Therefore, Arbiters Law was not entitled to the costs it claimed without an assessment of costs.
- [30]
[30] As for Prof Eleni’s fees, the Judge thought that they were excessive: she did not have to attend court, and her report mainly consisted of answering questions from counsel (Judgment at [30]).
- [31]
[31] Based on the foregoing, the Judge made the following orders:
(a) The respondents were to pay Arbiters Law solicitor-and-client costs fixed at $60,000 inclusive of reasonable disbursements, and the sum of $56,065.60 was taken as part payment (Judgment at [26]).
(b) The respondents were to pay Mr Balchandani solicitor-and-client fees fixed at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements, and any sums previously paid were taken as part payment (Judgment at [29]).
(c) The respondents were to pay Prof Eleni’s fees in the reduced sum of $9,000 (Judgment at [30]).
(d) Arbiters Law was to pay the respondents the costs of OA 1008 fixed at $2,000 each (Judgment at [31]).
Parties’ cases on appeal
- [35]
[35] Arbiters Law took pains to emphasise that S 833 required substantial work, experience and expertise. The respondents were prepared to call 13 factual witnesses and two expert witnesses for the trial, and the factual witnesses would give evidence involving their medical expertise. The extremely technical subject matter and the differing positions taken by medical expert witnesses made matters complex.
- [36]
[36] Lastly, Arbiters Law submitted that the Judge should have awarded the full sum of Prof Eleni’s fees, and in pounds sterling instead of Singapore dollars. The Judge ignored the respondents’ position that they intended to pay Prof Eleni’s fees in full, which was effectively an admission that her fees were reasonable. Further, Prof Eleni’s evidence was highly technical and complex, which attracted lengthy responses from the defendants’ witnesses.
- [38]
[38] In the alternative, if the LOEs were CBAs, the respondents argued that the LOEs ought to be declared void pursuant to s 113(4) of the LPA. They submitted that the terms of the LOEs were unfair and unreasonable because: (a) the professional fees claimed were excessive and disproportionate; and (b) the contents and terms of the LOEs were not properly explained to the respondents.
- [40]
[40] Finally, the respondents averred that it was irrelevant that they had been agreeable to pay Prof Eleni’s fees of £12,300. This did not detract from the court’s power to exercise its discretion in fixing the quantum of disbursements.
Issues to be determined
- [41]
[41] Three primary issues arose for the determination of this court:
(a) First, whether the LOEs were enforceable, such that Arbiters Law’s bills of costs would not be subject to assessment. This depended on these sub-issues:
(i) whether the terms governing the fees of the LOEs were sufficiently certain or specific, so as to qualify the LOEs as CBAs within the meaning of s 111(1) of the LPA; and
(ii) if the LOEs qualified as CBAs, whether they should nonetheless be declared void for being unfair or unreasonable under s 113(4) of the LPA.
(b) Second, if the LOEs were declared void, whether the Judge erred in his award of costs for S 833.
(c) Third, whether Prof Eleni’s fees should be paid in full and in which currency and by whom.
The applicable legal principles
(a) First, the agreement must be made in writing: s 111(1) of the LPA.
(b) Second, the agreement must be signed by the client: s 111(2) of the LPA; see Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Asia Law Corp and another [2010] 4 SLR 590 (“Sports Connection”) at [17] and Re Nirumalan Kanapathi Pillai [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1037 at [25] and [26]).
(c) Third, there must be sufficient certainty or specificity of the terms governing the fees: Chancery Law Corp v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1024 [2016] 4 SLR 480 (“Chancery Law”) at [25], citing Shamsudin bin Embun v P T Seah & Co [1985-1986] SLR(R) 1108 (“Shamsudin”) at [22]. To satisfy this requirement, “the agreement must be sufficiently specific – so as to tell the client what he is letting himself in for by way of costs”: per Lord Denning, Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982] 1 WLR 1443 (“Chamberlain”) at 1445, cited in Chancery Law at [59] and in Shamsudin at [18]–[22]. Similarly, in Ho Seow Wan v Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC (formerly known as Stamford Law Corporation) [2018] SGHC 31 (“Ho Seow Wan”) at [66], Chan Seng Onn J stated that the agreement must be “specified in sufficiently clear terms so that the client would be in a position to make a reasoned calculation based on the agreement as to what his legal fees would eventually be upon completion of the contentious legal matter” [emphasis added], and that what was to be regarded as sufficiently clear would be an “intensely fact-specific inquiry”. Conversely, merely setting out an indication or guide as to the rate of charging upon which the bill is to be drawn may not be enough: Chancery Law at [64].
- [47]
[47] In this regard, we emphasise that under ss 113(3) to 113(4) of the LPA, the court’s powers would extend to reviewing the implementation of a LOE, in particular, to address overcharging:
We agree in particular with Chan J’s observations in Ho Seow Wan at [85] that “the terms of the agreement” as provided for under s 113(4) of the LPA ought to be read broadly when the fee agreement concerned was an agreement as to charge-out rates, so as to encompass a review of how the solicitor had in fact utilised his time on the agreed scope of work to be done by him. This position finds support in the case law on solicitors’ costs agreements with clients.
- [49]
[49] Where fees are charged on a time basis, overcharging may occur if the number of hours billed for has been inflated, or where the solicitor enlarged the size of the total bill by deliberately engaging in work unnecessary to achieve the purpose of the retainer or taking an unnecessarily long time for the work by failing to act with reasonable due diligence to increase the actual time taken for the work (Law Society of Singapore v Andre Ravindran Saravanapavan Arul [2011] 4 SLR 1184 (“Andre Arul”) at [30]; Ho Seow Wan at [81]). Where such instances of overcharging occur, even if the “terms” of the fee agreement per se appear to be fair or reasonable on the face of it, the court may still void the CBA under s 113(4) of the LPA.
- [50]
[50] The basis for the court’s supervisory role and power of intervention is the court’s recognition of the unequal relationship between the solicitor and client, and the influence of a solicitor over his client (Shamsudin at [27]). In Allison v Clayhills (1907) 97 LT 709 at 712 (cited in Shamsudin at [25]), Parker J stated that a solicitor:
In general, a solicitor is in a better position to evaluate the appropriate and reasonable remuneration for the legal work done for the client. Even where a client is well-educated and fluent in English, the court recognises that, more likely than not, he or she would not be accustomed to litigation or dealing with lawyers when engaging a solicitor (see Marisol Llenos Foley v Harry Elias Partnership LLP [2022] 3 SLR 585 (“Marisol”) at [3]). Therefore, most clients would be unable to make an accurate assessment of the likely costs that may ultimately be incurred. In the words of the authors of Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin, the Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart Publishing, 1999) (“The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales”) at p 284:
Issue 1: Whether the LOEs were enforceable CBAs
The LOEs did amount to CBAs under s 111 of the LPA
- [53]
[53] The primary dispute between the respondents and Arbiters Law was in respect of the fees charged and not the disbursements, leaving aside Prof Eleni’s fees for the time being. There was no dispute that the LOEs satisfied the first two requirements under s 111 of the LPA to be a CBA. The question was whether the terms governing the solicitors’ fees were sufficiently certain or specific. In our view, the terms of the LOEs themselves were sufficiently certain such that the LOEs could be considered to have satisfied the third requirement. In this regard, we respectfully differed from the Judge’s views to the contrary for the reasons which we shall elaborate on below.
- [54]
[54] Similar to the case of Ho Seow Wan at [67], the LOEs at cl 6 specified the specific scope of matters that were covered under the fee agreement. Clause 16 provided that Mr Rai and a legal associate were in charge of the matter, and it set out their specific charge-out rates. We noted that the LOEs did not specify the identity of the legal associate, but we accepted Mr Rai’s explanation during the hearing that the assigned legal associate was subsequently identified (at least in the bills rendered) and remained on the file throughout the duration of the matter where his fees remained the same. Clause 16.2 also made clear that the professional fees excluded disbursements and Goods and Services Tax (see Ho Seow Wan at [68]; Chamberlain at 1446; Shamsudin at [14]). Further, cl 14 of the LOEs stipulated that the charge-out rates were to be applied to the actual number of hours spent by the respective solicitors concerned. It stated that the “professional fees [would] be based on the actual time spent in connection with this matter by the lawyers having conduct of [the client’s] matter” and explained what fell within the ambit of such “conduct”.
- [58]
[58] The question remained as to whether the terms of the LOEs were certain enough to constitute CBAs. At the heart of this inquiry was whether the inclusion of hourly rates with an estimate of the overall fees was good enough. If not, when would the terms of a letter of engagement be sufficiently certain? Must it be for a fixed sum or at least have a maximum cap on the fees? We noted that neither s 111(1) LPA nor the cases mandate this. Section 111(1) refers to “a gross sum or otherwise” and “at either the same rate as or a greater or a lesser rate” than that for which the law practice may be entitled to be remunerated. In the circumstances, we were of the view that the LOEs were CBAs.
- [59]
[59] To the extent that the Judge noted that the estimate of $150,000 was “way off mark”, we were of the view that this did not mean that the LOEs were uncertain at the time they were entered into, ie, 25 November 2020 and 8 April 2021 respectively. However, it was relevant to a different question, namely, whether the LOEs were enforceable.
- [61]
[61] As for cl 22 of the LOEs, while the Judge was of the view that the reference to “the total professional fees” may or may not be a reference to a two-day trial, we were of the view that the estimate of “the total professional fees” was, in fact, a reference to a two-day trial. However, the clause should have been better drafted to make this clear.
- [62]
[62] To the extent that the Judge noted that there was no provision in cl 22 as to what would happen if the trial exceeded two days, we were of the view that it would be fair to assume that the fees would then increase at the rates specified. However, this would not be an issue of uncertainty at the time the LOEs were entered into. If the trial exceeded two days, then this would be a factor in considering whether the initial estimate was fair and whether the LOEs were enforceable.
Whether the terms of the LOEs were unreasonable
- [63]
[63] In our view, the terms of the LOEs were unreasonable within the meaning of s 113(4) of the LPA. Therefore, we declared the LOEs void and unenforceable.
- [64]
[64] Mr Rai submitted that the LOEs were neither unfair nor unreasonable because the respondents had negotiated his hourly rate from $1,500 per hour to $1,000 per hour and they knew what they were in for. However, as explained above (at [47]), “the terms of the agreement” under s 113(4) of the LPA should be read broadly when the fee agreement sets out the solicitor’s charge-out rates, and this would encompass a review of how the solicitor had utilised his time on the agreed scope of work to be done by him. Therefore, even if the hourly rates of Mr Rai and his legal associate were reasonable on the face of the LOEs, the terms of the agreement as a whole including how they were applied to reach the total fees charged could still be determined to be unreasonable upon the court’s review.
- [65]
[65] In our view, the fees claimed by Arbiters Law under the LOEs were excessive and amounted to overcharging. We took three main considerations into account. First, the total professional fees charged by Arbiters Law was $399,000, which was more than 2.5 times the amount of professional fees estimated in cl 22 of the LOEs (ie, $150,000). Furthermore, as we noted above at [55], cl 22 stated that if the matter was settled before trial, the professional fees would be “correspondingly lower” than the estimate of $150,000. While the figure of $150,000 was only an estimate, on an objective view one would not have expected that estimate to be so far off the figure that Arbiters Law ultimately sought to charge, when S 833 was in fact settled and did not eventually proceed to trial. There was no satisfactory explanation for the variance and whether the respondents had been given any prior notice that the fees would be much more than the initial estimate. In the circumstances, the sum of $399,000 was disproportionate and excessive.
- [70]
[70] The fact that the total sum of Arbiters Law’s fees amounted to $399,000 reflected the inappropriate appreciation that Mr Rai had of the matter. In our view, a reasonable lawyer acting for the respondents in these circumstances would not have charged such an excessive sum for his total professional fees up to the trial. Based on the foregoing, we found that the LOEs were unreasonable and thus void and unenforceable.
Issue 2: Whether the Judge erred in his award of costs for S 833
Costs to Arbiters Law
Prof Eleni’s fees
- [76]
[76] As for the invoiced fees for Prof Eleni’s report, we found that the Judge had erred, with respect, when he reduced her fees by more than half from £12,300 (or $20,541) to $9,000.
- [77]
[77] In Mr Steven’s affidavit dated 26 October 2023, he stated that the respondents fully intended to make payment to Prof Eleni for her work done in preparation for her expert report in S 833. Tan Kok Quan Partnership (“TKQP”), who had acted for the respondents pro bono in OA 1008, wrote a letter to Arbiters Law dated 19 October 2023, and requested for Prof Eleni’s contact details to verify her invoice and payment details, so that the respondents could thereafter make payment of her professional fees directly to her. At the hearing of OA 1008 on 11 January 2024, Mr Paul Seah, from TKQP, reaffirmed that the respondents would make direct payment to Prof Eleni. In our view, the court should be slow to substitute its view for what the respondents had unequivocally stated they were agreeable to.
Mr Rai’s conduct
- [79]
[79] We have set out above our reasons for allowing the appeal in part and varying certain orders made by the Judge. At this juncture, we turn to express our grave concerns as to Mr Rai’s conduct in S 833 and in the present proceedings. In our view, both the overcharging issue, which we have already addressed at length above, and other aspects of Mr Rai’s conduct ought to be referred to the Law Society of Singapore for the necessary further steps to be taken.
- [80]
[80] First and foremost, there was the question of whether separate legal representation for the respondents was justified. In Mr Rai’s affidavit dated 2 October 2023, he expressed that there was a potential conflict of interest as certain matters that were “confidential” and “subject to solicitor and client privilege” had arisen. The respondents did not claim privilege.
- [81]
[81] However, according to [27] of the Judgment, Mr Rai gave a different reason to the Judge on 14 August 2023, ie, that Mr Balchandani had sought to have Arbiters Law come on board because Mr Balchandani “was not experienced in medical negligence” and had “played a passive role as counsel for [the] second [respondent]”. As can be seen, this response conflated two things. The first was whether Arbiters Law, in addition to Mr Balchandani, should have been asked to act for both respondents. The second was why each respondent had to be separately represented by Arbiters Law and Mr Balchandani subsequently. Mr Rai’s response did not adequately explain why Mr Balchandani had to act for Mdm Tan separately. If Mr Balchandani did not have the requisite experience, the question which needs to be addressed is whether he should be acting for Mdm Tan separately. It was no excuse to say that he played a passive role for Mdm Tan.
- [82]
[82] Subsequently, in Mr Balchandani’s letter to the court dated 19 January 2024, Mr Balchandani explained that the respondents were separately represented because: “they were on the verge of divorce (and indeed asked our firm for such assistance), inter alia, and more importantly, they were blaming each other for the deceased’s death (a symptom of their complex bereavement disorder)”.
- [83]
[83] At the hearing before us on 14 August 2024, Mr Rai alluded to the respondents being on the brink of divorce as the matter that had been subject to privilege. However, Mr Rai then offered a different reason. He claimed that the reason for separate legal representation was because the defendants in S 833 had alleged that Mdm Tan was contributorily negligent for Mr Salvin’s death. As can be seen, this was not the reason proffered by Mr Rai before the Judge in OA 1008 on 14 August 2023. More importantly, this explanation could not have been true. Mr Rai’s position was that the defence of contributory negligence was only disclosed in the defendants’ Defence, which had been filed on 17 May 2021. However, by that point, Mr Steven had already signed the 8 April 2021 letter of engagement for separate representation. Therefore, when the two sets of solicitors decided that the respondents should be separately represented, any concerns about contributory negligence had not yet come to the fore and could not have been operating on their minds. Mr Rai’s inability to precisely articulate why the respondents had to be separately represented, as well as his contradictory explanations, made it difficult to accept his explanation that there was a potential conflict of interest that necessitated the respondents’ separate legal representation.
- [87]
[87] In S 833, the Statement of Claim made significant reference to how the first and second defendants had allegedly beached their duty of care by inappropriately prescribing Concerta to Mr Salvin. According to the respondents, Mr Salvin’s dependence on Concerta worsened his psychosis, which led him to commit suicide. Based on these claims, it should have been clear to Arbiters Law from the outset that they would have to prove whether the defendants had been negligent in prescribing Concerta to Mr Salvin, and whether Mr Salvin’s consumption of Concerta had a causal connection to his death. Yet, Arbiters Law only decided to engage an expert on these issues much later, and only contacted Prof Eleni on 19 July 2022. While Arbiters Law had initially engaged another expert witness, Dr Sivakumar Thurairajsingam (“Dr Thurairajsingam”), who filed an AEIC dated 17 October 2022 and an expert report dated 13 November 2018, Dr Thurairajsingam’s expert report did not examine the issues relating to treatment with Concerta in any depth. Instead, his expert report was stated in rather general terms.
In our assessment, Mr Rai fell short of his duties to his clients. He ought to have done more in keeping the respondents informed of the escalating costs.
- [94]
[94] For the above reasons, we are of the view that the conduct of Mr Rai warrants a referral to the Law Society of Singapore. We sum up the concerns as follows:
(a) first, overcharging the respondents by claiming a total of $22,562.50 from the respondents as its fees and $340,437.50 from Mr Steven as its fees when the costs estimate in cl 22 of the LOEs was “about $150,000” for up to two days of trial (exclusive of disbursements) and the court’s assessment of costs and disbursements was $87,000 (excluding Prof Eleni’s fees);
(b) second, failing to advise the respondents that the fees were escalating beyond the LOEs’ estimate;
(c) third, unnecessarily compounding costs for the respondents through separate legal representation by Arbiters Law and Red Lion Circle, when there did not appear to be a real issue of conflict of interest that necessitated separate representation; and
(d) fourth, giving the misleading impression to the court that Arbiters Law was amenable to assessment for the costs of Arbiters Law and the respondents were not.
- [95]
[95] We direct the Registrar of the Supreme Court to refer the conduct of Mr Rai to the Law Society of Singapore for its Council to refer the matter to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel under s 85(3)(a) of the LPA to inquire whether Mr Rai had acted in the interest of the respondents or Mr Steven in respect of [94(a)]–[94(c)] and whether Mr Rai had attempted to mislead the court in respect of [94(d)] above.
Conclusion