Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 12 December 2024
A husband's claims that the wife should share the mortgage instalments were rejected
WRQ v WRP
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC(A) 38 · Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 47 of 2024 (Summons Nos 35 and 37 of 2024) · 30 paragraphs
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A husband's claims that the wife should share the mortgage instalments were rejected
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [62], [64]
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] A large number of divorces commenced each year at the Family Justice Courts are filed on the “simplified track”, without parties contesting the divorce and ancillary matters. Such harmonious resolution of issues reached by the agreement of parties is aligned with the endeavours of a therapeutic justice system, which aims to assist parties to move forward without taking adversarial stances against each other.
Background facts
The parties’ divorce and consent order in 2013
The parties’ dispute
The decision of the Family Court
The decision of the Family Division of the High Court
Permission to appeal
AD/SUM 35/2024
- [14]
[14] After filing AD 47, the Husband filed AD/SUM 35/2024 (“SUM 35”), seeking permission to adduce further evidence on appeal. The evidence sought to be admitted in SUM 35 is set out in the following table, along with the Husband’s reasons for adducing them:
Item
Purpose
(a) Sterling Law Corporation’s letters dated 8 May 2012 and 17 May 2012 showing the Statement of Account on completion of the sale of [xxx], parties’ previous property;
Proof of proportions of parties’ respective contributions to the acquisition of the matrimonial home.
(b) Two Cashier's orders dated 16 May 2012 for $56,032 and $593,216.39 totalling $649,248.39 made in favour of the Respondent and the Appellant;
(c) CPF Redemption Statement dated 17 May 2012 showing that $189,574.86 was refunded into the Respondent's CPF ordinary account and $243,344.13 was refunded to the Appellant's CPF ordinary account;
(d) Sterling Law Corporation’s letter of completion dated 3 July 2012 and POSB Bank Statement as at 11 August 2012 showing a sum of $1,577,184.19 which was withdrawn from the Appellant's POSB Account Nos: [xxx] toward the purchase of [redacted address] (“the Property”) and a loan of $2,700,000 from DBS Bank Ltd;
Proof that the Wife has not used any of her personal savings or earnings to contribute to the purchase price of the matrimonial home.
(e) POSB Bank Statement as at 12 May 2012 showing that two sums of $45,000 and $180,000 were withdrawn on 4 April 2012 and 23 April 2012 from the Appellant's POSB Account Nos: [xxx] for payment of the 5% deposit of the purchase of the Property;
(f) CPF Statement dated 26 June 2012 showing that a sum of $129,600 was withdrawn from the Appellant's CPF account for legal and stamp fees for the purchase of the Property;
(g) The Appellant's company, [xxx]’s CPF contribution of $863 to the Respondent on November 2007;
Proof of date of commencement of Wife’s employment at Husband’s company.
(h) DBS Bank's Letter of Offer dated 27 June 2011 and DBS Bank's Letter dated 7 May 2013 for the financing of the Shenton Way condominium which shows 80% housing loan of $1,532,160 against the purchase price of $1,915,200;
Proof that Shenton Way property was purchased with 80% financing with Wife’s knowledge.
(i) DBS Bank Ltd Statements for the years ending 31st December 2022, 31st December 2023 and 31st May 2024;
Proof of parties’ payments for mortgage instalments and sources thereof.
(j) DBS Bank Ltd letter of Variation for interest rate for the housing loan dated 20th March 2024 showing that the Respondent is the surety and DBS Bank Ltd letter dated 21st May 2024 showing the latest refinancing amount of the Property at $7,894 in April 2024;
(k) The Appellant's Notice of Assessment for Year 2022, 2023 and 2024;
Proof of Husband’s current financial situation.
(l) The Appellant's CPF Contribution History for 1st January 2024 to 1st July 2024;
(m) The Appellant's own calculation of payment of the mortgage instalments from his CPF account and in cash and the Respondent’s payment of the mortgage from her CPF account from Aug 2022 to July 2024.
Husband’s own calculation of mortgage payments made.
AD/SUM 37/2024
- [15]
[15] The Husband also applied to admit further evidence in AD/SUM 37/2024 (“SUM 37”) which comprised the original letter of offer (the “Letter”) issued by the mortgagee bank to the Husband in 2012, and correspondence between the Wife’s counsel and the mortgagee bank’s solicitors (the “correspondence”). The evidence allegedly demonstrates that he and the Wife were in fact co-mortgagors of the matrimonial home, contrary to the Judge’s finding at [13]–[14] of the Judgment.
The parties’ submissions in SUM 35, SUM 37 and AD 47
The Husband’s submissions
SUM 35
SUM 37
- [17]
[17] The Husband argues that the Letter shows the parties were joint mortgagors of the matrimonial home and are both jointly and severally liable, contradicting the Judge’s finding that he was the sole mortgagor and bore the ultimate obligation to pay the loan, which was the premise of the Judge’s decision on the mortgage issue (Judgment at [13]–[14]). It was not adduced earlier as it only came to the Husband’s attention when adduced by the Wife in connection with her application in FC/SUM 1601/2024 to prevent him from disposing of the Shenton Way Property or any proceeds of sale thereof.
AD 47
- [19]
[19] The Husband also argues that even if there was no understanding of equal responsibility for the mortgage instalments, the court should impute a “presumed intention” to this effect. The parties’ mutual understanding that they would continue residing in the matrimonial home “must mean that the status quo continues”. He submits that the Wife’s voluntary return of $1m maintenance to the Husband, and her failure to object to his use of this sum for the mortgage instalments, further supports such a presumed intention.
- [22]
[22] In the alternative, given that the Husband has not been exercising his right to reside in the matrimonial home and is currently paying rental of $4,300 per month for other accommodation, he submits that he should be allowed to deduct this sum from his mortgage liability, and should no longer be liable for the mortgage repayments.
The Wife’s case
SUM 35
- [23]
[23] The Wife argues that the requirements in Ladd v Marshall ought to apply strictly. The items (a) through (i) do not satisfy the non-availability criterion. She also submits that all the items of evidence are ultimately irrelevant to the issue of how responsibility for the mortgage instalment repayments should be borne, or what parties intended in respect of this issue. Thus, she submits that SUM 35 ought to be dismissed in its entirety.
SUM 37
- [24]
[24] The Wife similarly submits that SUM 37 ought to be dismissed. The Husband could have adduced the Letter at a much earlier juncture, given that he was entitled to seek this letter from the mortgagee bank at any time. Moreover, the Letter defines “borrower” as “the person to whom the [Letter] is addressed”, and as it is addressed solely to the Husband, he is the sole borrower. The correspondence simply confirms that the Husband is the sole borrower and that she is only the surety.
AD 47
- [27]
[27] The Wife submits that in view of these arguments, the Judge’s decision that the Husband ought to bear sole responsibility for the outstanding mortgage repayments ought to be upheld.
Decision on adduction of evidence in SUM 35 and SUM 37
- [28]
[28] It is not in dispute that the relevant principles governing adduction of further evidence on appeal are those in Ladd v Marshall, as set out above at [16]. We also note that while these principles may not apply as stringently in ancillary matters (WRX v WRY and another matter [2024] 1 SLR 851 at [21]; TOT v TOU and another appeal and another matter [2021] SGHC(A) 9 (“TOT”) at [7]), they are not entirely irrelevant. In TOT, the court declined to allow the further evidence to be admitted as it was of equivocal relevance and there was no sufficient reason provided as to why they could not have been retrieved or admitted earlier (TOT at [8]–[9]).
- [29]
[29] In the present case, we are of the view that none of the evidence which the Husband seeks to adduce in SUM 35 or SUM 37 would have a perceptible influence on the outcome of the appeal. The Husband relies on items (a) to (c) to establish the parties’ common intention that both would contribute to the subsequent mortgage instalments from their respective CPF accounts. However, it is not in dispute that both parties did so contribute – the Wife made “regular and equal contributions to the mortgage loan repayments from her CPF funds” of a monthly sum of $6,216.50, which over time reduced the funds available until there was only $716.02 left in her ordinary CPF account. As we explain more fully later, this occurred without either party giving much thought to the matter, and hence the evidence does not shed light on the parties’ intentions.
- [31]
[31] With regard to items (i) and (m), it is not in dispute that the Wife had initially been contributing to the mortgage repayments out of her CPF account, and that when the funds in her CPF account fell below the sum required to be paid, the Husband began to cover the shortfall in cash. How much of this shortfall was made up from his own funds, and how much was made up from the $1,050,000 which the Wife transferred to him out of the maintenance moneys, is immaterial.
- [33]
[33] Finally, with respect to the Letter and correspondence, it is not disputed that the Husband was the borrower and that the Wife was the surety. The fact that the terms of the Letter may have defined her as a co-mortgagor is immaterial, for the Husband remains the borrower.
- [34]
[34] Thus, none of the items which the Husband seeks to adduce in SUM 35 or SUM 37 is material to the present appeal. We dismiss SUM 35 and SUM 37.
Decision on the mortgage issue in AD 47
The issue in AD 47
The Husband’s submissions
Legal principles in AYM on variation of order in s 112(4)
[emphasis added in bold italics]
Basis for making an order on the mortgage issue
- [52]
[52] In the present case, contrary to both parties’ assertions of a common understanding or mutual agreement, the evidence suggests that the parties did not apply their minds to the mortgage issue at all.
Evidence on the parties’ intentions or common understanding
- [53]
[53] In this appeal, the parties rely heavily on the principles of contractual interpretation; their submissions focus on what they intended or should be presumed to have intended in respect of the mortgage issue.
- [54]
[54] In her affidavit dated 21 April 2023, the Wife adduced several screenshots of text message correspondence between herself and the Husband concerning the mortgage issue:
- [56]
[56] Thus, not only is there an absence of any common understanding of equal responsibility, there is also evidence of an admission by the Husband that he did not have any agreement or common understanding on which to demand that the Wife shoulders half the mortgage repayments. It is unlikely that an agreement or understanding on the terms claimed by the Husband existed between the parties.
- [57]
[57] That said, the same evidence would also suggest that there was no common understanding that the Husband was to bear sole responsibility for the mortgage instalments, as the Wife claims. In the same screenshot containing the Husband’s admission that he had no right to ask the Wife to pay half, there is also a message from the Wife as follows:
- [58]
[58] Had there been a common understanding that the Husband bears sole responsibility for the mortgage instalments, the Wife would be expected to have raised this position instead of simply expressing uncertainty as to whether the Husband had a right to ask her to pay half. While the Wife attempts to rely on the Husband’s “admissions” in correspondence with their children that she “did not need to pay anything for the house”, that is not proof of any positive intention that the Husband would be obliged to bear sole responsibility for the payments.
The Husband’s alternative submissions
- [61]
[61] We address briefly the Husband’s alternative submissions relating to the doctrine of estoppel by convention, unjust enrichment, TIC principle and claim of rental sums.
Doctrine of estoppel by convention
- [62]
[62] It also follows from our finding that the Husband’s submission on the doctrine of estoppel by convention (see [20] above) must also fail. For an estoppel by convention to be made out, the parties must have acted on an assumption shared by both parties pursuant to an agreement or something akin to an agreement made by one party and acquiesced to by the other. Having already found on the evidence that there was no common understanding on the mortgage issue, we reject the Husband’s submission on estoppel by convention.
Unjust enrichment
- [63]
[63] Similarly, we do not think that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is of assistance to the Husband. The Husband seeks to rely on the unjust factor of payment under legal compulsion, which would have required him to show that he has been compelled or was compellable by law to make payments which discharged a liability of the Wife. He argues that he was compellable by law to pay the monthly instalments lest the mortgagee bank repossesses the matrimonial home and sues him for outstanding sums, and that in doing so, he also discharged the Wife’s liability as the surety.
- [64]
[64] We reject the Husband’s contention. He was the borrower who was liable for the mortgage repayments. He did not discharge a liability of the Wife, who was only a surety with obligations secondary to that of the Husband. There is no unjust factor in these circumstances.
TIC principle
- [65]
[65] As noted above at [21], the Husband relies on TIC for the proposition that it must be the ultimate beneficiary of a property who has to pay the outstanding instalments on a mortgage, as mortgage payments will affect the net equity of the ultimate beneficiary.
Claim of rental sum
- [67]
[67] The Husband submits that as he has a right to co-reside at the matrimonial home, he should be allowed to deduct the rental sums he is paying for his accommodation and no longer be liable for the mortgage instalments. We see no basis at all for such a claim as his argument assumes that we agree that he was denied co-residence by the Wife. It seems to us that he moved out for his own reasons.
Our order on the mortgage issue
- [71]
[71] It appears that when the issue of parties’ financial contributions to the matrimonial home was raised, the Wife seemed content to go along with the status quo, without addressing it in the agreement that they reached.
- [72]
[72] The Husband also claims that the Wife was aware of his use of her maintenance moneys, which she transferred to him in around June 2014, to continue paying for her share of the mortgage instalments. The Wife argues that this “subsequent conduct” should not be admissible as proof of actual intention but does not go so far as to deny that this took place.
- [75]
[75] We also make a note that it is not clear whether the Husband is in as dire a financial situation as he claims. As the Wife observes, he had no difficulty paying $2m maintenance within a relatively short period of time, which may suggest that he has other assets over and above the matrimonial home and the Shenton Way Property. Even if his income has decreased, he may possess assets of value. The court does not have sufficient information to make a determination on the parties’ respective financial positions.
Conclusion and costs
- [79]
[79] Parties and lawyers working on agreements to be incorporated in consent orders should apply their minds to matters such as the present. It is important that the parties think through with care all the key matters and the workability of their agreements addressing their financial matters after divorce.