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Grounds publishedDecided 31 Dec 2025

Appellate Division of the High Court

A party cannot make further arguments after a decision just to fix gaps in earlier ones

Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan

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[2025] SGHC(A) 26Case no. Appellate Division / Originating Application No 32 of 202532 paragraphs

The decision, in one line

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A party cannot make further arguments after a decision just to fix gaps in earlier ones

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [37], [41]

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This judgment addresses a procedural issue: on what basis should an appellate court allow further arguments from the parties after it has already rendered its decision on an application.

  3. [2] On 13 October 2025, we dismissed the applicant’s application in HC/OA 32/2025 (“OA 32”) for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in relation to the decision in HC/S 510/2021 (“S 510”). Two weeks later, the applicant filed a request to make further arguments in respect of that same application, OA 32. The respondent opposed the request. We refuse the applicant’s request for further arguments for the reasons set out below. Essentially, the applicant’s further arguments are aimed at curing deficiencies in her earlier submissions which had been identified in our brief reasons for dismissing OA 32.

  4. Background

  5. [3] The applicant is an advocate and solicitor of approximately 20 years standing. She became acquainted with the respondent sometime in 2015, and the two subsequently became friends. Their relationship eventually soured due to disagreements over some loans extended by the applicant to the respondent. Sometime in 2018, the respondent posted an unfavourable online review relating to the applicant on the Google page of The Law Society of Singapore (“LSS”). Later, in 2020, the respondent filed a written complaint to the LSS in respect of the applicant. The applicant sued the respondent in S 510 for defamation in respect of those two statements.

  6. [5] On 18 August 2025, the applicant attempted to file a notice of appeal. This filing was rejected the next day, on the basis that the appeal against the Judge’s decision on damages of 28 March 2025 was not filed within the timeline set out in O 19 r 25 read with O 19 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). The applicant was also informed, among other things, that she may apply for an extension of time to appeal that decision.

  7. [7] Finally, on 1 September 2025, the applicant filed OA 32 in the Appellate Division of the High Court (“Appellate Division”) seeking the following:

  8. (a) an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in respect of the decisions and orders made by the Judge in S 510 on 28 March (on the quantum of damages), 2 July (on the quantum of costs) and 12 August 2025 (on the quantum of disbursements);

  9. (b) an order that the notice of appeal be filed within 28 days of the determination of the application; and

  10. (c) liberty to apply.

  11. [8] At the time OA 32 was filed, the applicant was representing herself through her own law practice, Legal Eagles. Subsequently, on 27 October 2025, she appointed her present counsel to represent her. The respondent was and continues to be self-represented.

  12. Parties’ Submissions in OA 32

  13. Applicant’s Submissions

  14. [9] The applicant in her written submissions initially appeared to suggest that she was not out of time to appeal. She submitted that O 19 r 4(2)(b) of the ROC 2021 should apply. Order 19 r 4(2)(b) states that in the case of a bifurcated trial, the time for the filing of an appeal in respect of a distinct bifurcated portion of the trial starts to run from the date of the determination in respect of that bifurcated portion. She thus submitted that the time to appeal only started to run from 12 August 2025, when the Judge determined the quantum of disbursements. In this regard, the applicant stated that the “actual total sum of disbursements incurred by [her]” for both the liability and damages tranches, which allegedly amounted to more than $20,000, was a material sum, although she did not explain how this was “material” or how it impacted the analysis.

  15. [12] On her chances of succeeding on appeal, the applicant merely asserted, without presenting any basis, that she had a good chance of succeeding as “the damages awarded to her of $41,000 is too low”. She did not elaborate on this factor, stating that “[h]er reasons for the prospective appeal will be canvassed at length when leave [to file the notice of appeal] is granted”. She submitted that the threshold to satisfy this factor is low and the court tasked with determining if an extension of time is to be granted “does not scrutinise too closely the merits of the would-be appeal”.

  16. [13] Finally, she argued that there was no prejudice to the respondent, especially since there had yet to be any payment by the respondent of the judgment sum owed to the applicant.

  17. Respondent’s Submissions

  18. [15] The respondent attributed the delay to the applicant’s misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the law. This reason was, according to the respondent, “unacceptable and shocking” and “totally without any merits” given the applicant’s status as a practising lawyer. The respondent also alleged “grave injustice” and “prejudice” if the application were to be granted, although she did not particularise these assertions.

  19. Our decision in OA 32

  20. [16] Having considered the parties’ submissions above and the relevant circumstances, we declined to grant the extension of time sought and dismissed the application in OA 32 on 13 October 2025, setting out our brief reasons in a minute sheet issued to the parties. We reproduce broadly our reasons below.

  21. [18] Pursuant to O 19 r 25 of the ROC 2021, the notice of appeal in this case must be filed within 28 days after the expiry of 30 days of the Judge’s decision on 28 March 2025. Thus, the notice of appeal would have had to be filed by 26 May 2025. The applicant’s attempt to file the notice of appeal on 18 August 2025 was almost three months after 26 May 2025, and OA 32 was filed more than three months after that date.

  22. [19] In deciding whether an extension of time should be granted, the court will consider four factors: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the applicant’s chances of success on appeal; and (d) any prejudice that the respondent would suffer if the extension of time is granted (see Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party [2008] 1 SLR(R) 757 (“Lee Hsien Loong”) at [18]). All four factors are of equal importance and must be balanced amongst one another, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case (Lee Hsien Loong at [28]).

  23. [21] Turning to the third factor, the applicant’s chances of success, we considered whether the applicant’s prospective appeal is hopeless (see Aberdeen Asset Management Asia Ltd v Fraser & Neave Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 355 at [43]). The applicant had not provided anything on the merits of her intended appeal. The onus was on her to demonstrate that the prospective appeal was not hopeless. She had failed to do so.

  24. [22] As for the last factor on prejudice to the respondent, there appeared to be no undue prejudice to the respondent, especially since the judgment debt payable by her remained due and outstanding at that time. The only prejudice asserted by the respondent appeared to be the fact that the award of damages in the applicant’s favour may be increased, but that was inherent in the nature of any appeal.

  25. [23] At the end of the day, the court must, after weighing all the factors and circumstances, come to the conclusion that the application deserves sympathy if an extension of time is to be allowed (see Newspaper Seng Logistics Pte Ltd v Chiap Seng Productions Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 5 at [26]). Having considered all relevant circumstances including the factors set out above, we declined to grant the extension of time sought in OA 32, given especially the applicant’s failure to satisfactorily explain the inordinate delay and failure to show that the intended appeal is not hopeless.

  26. Applicant’s request to present further arguments

  27. [24] After we had issued our decision dismissing the application in OA 32, the applicant filed a request to present further arguments through her own law practice on 27 October 2025. The request was refiled by her current counsel the next day on 28 October 2025.

  28. [25] In the request to make further arguments, the applicant states that the dismissal of OA 32 was due to the applicant’s failure to disclose the merits of her intended appeal, which is explained to be the result of a “procedural misstep” as the applicant mistakenly believed that the focus of OA 32 was on the delay and that the merits of her appeal would be canvassed after the extension of time was granted. She further submits the following:

  29. (a) The applicant’s intended appeal has merits because, among other things, (i) the Judge had placed undue emphasis on special damages; and (ii) the Judge had placed undue emphasis on comparing the applicant’s damages with those awarded to well-known individuals, and instead should have drawn comparisons from cases involving defamed professionals and businessmen.

  30. (b) The applicant’s delay in filing her Notice of Appeal was in part a result of the Judge having issued his decision for damages, costs and disbursements over three different dates, which “severely disadvantaged” her. The amount of time which the Judge took in delivering his decision on each part resulted in an “excessive and unwarranted delay” and would not be justified given his own view that S 510 was not complex or novel.

  31. (c) It was in the interests of justice for the applicant to be granted an extension of time to appeal.

  32. Our Decision

  33. [27] As a preliminary issue, we consider whether a request to present further arguments can be made to this court in the first place. Within the ROC 2021, several provisions expressly regulate a party’s right to make further arguments after the court has heard the matter or rendered its decision. Two such provisions are O 18 r 38 and O 19 r 34 of the ROC 2021, which provide that unless the appellate court otherwise directs, there are to be no further arguments from the parties after the appellate court has heard the appeal and reserved its decision or after the appellate court has given its decision in the appeal. Those provisions are, however, not specifically applicable in the present context where the matter before this court is not an appeal but an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. In this regard, there appears to be no specific provision in the ROC 2021 that addresses a party’s right to request to present further arguments in the context of an application to the appellate court.

  34. [28] In our view, notwithstanding the lack of an express provision similar to O 18 r 38 and O 19 r 34 of the ROC 2021, the appellate court is not precluded from considering requests to present further arguments after it has heard an application and reserved its decision or after it has given its decision in the application. Order 3 r 2(2) of the ROC 2021 empowers the court to do what is necessary on the facts of the case before it to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court, so long as it is not prohibited by law and is consistent with the Ideals in the ROC 2021. In the appropriate circumstances, a request to make further arguments could promote fair access to justice.

  35. [29] We note that the court is not always immediately functus officio after it has given its judgment; there are a few circumstances where a court may either revisit its prior decision or clarify it (see Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 791 at [5]; Godfrey Gerald QC v UBS AG [2004] 4 SLR(R) 411 at [18]–[19]; Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 SLR 192 at [15]–[16]).

  36. [30] However, while this court may consider the applicant’s request to make further arguments, it must also determine whether it should allow the request, having already rendered the decision in OA 32 with brief grounds. In this regard, we think that it is helpful to refer to the approach provided in O 18 r 38 and O 19 r 34 of the ROC 2021. In our view, even though those provisions apply in the context of appeals, the same broad principles – the finality of the court process and the interests of justice – are at play in the present context (see [34]–[36] below).

  37. [31] Order 18 r 38 and O 19 r 34 of the ROC 2021 are identical in effect to para 92(2) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2013 (“SCPD 2013”), which prescribes that as a general rule, unless directed by the Court of Appeal or the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeal and the Appellate Division would not receive further arguments after the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal (see Singapore Rules of Court: A Practice Guide (Chua Lee Ming editor-in-chief; Paul Quan gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2023) at paras 18.120–18.121 and 19.105–19.106). Pursuant to para 92(3) of the SCPD 2013, this general rule would only be relaxed in “very exceptional circumstances”, such as if an authority which was not available at the hearing would be decisive.

  38. [32] The high threshold to be met before a request to make further arguments is granted under the SCPD 2013 has been retained in the ROC 2021. In British Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association Ltd v Thresh, Charles [2024] 2 SLR 317 (“British Steamship Protection”), the Court of Appeal held that O 19 r 34 of the ROC 2021 does not permit requests for further arguments as of right, and instead, a direction from the court is required before the parties may provide further arguments. This was contingent on the requesting party “provid[ing] good reasons to justify deferring the finality of the appeal process” (at [85]). In that case, the further arguments concerned a matter which had already been raised by the court to the parties. The court thus found that the appellants had failed to show “good reasons” to defer the finality of the appellate process (at [85]). In any case, the court was satisfied that the further arguments had no impact on the outcome of the appeal as they did not go towards the determination of any issue in the appeal (at [86]).

  39. [33] We further note that, consistent with the tenor of the remarks in British Steamship Protection, the introduction of these new provisions in the ROC 2021 has been described as intended to discourage parties from “attempting to have a second bite at the cherry if they felt that their submissions had not been well received at the hearing of the appeal, [thereby] facilitating the streamlining of the litigation process and reducing excessive wastage of court time and resources” (see Singapore Civil Procedure 2025 vol 1 (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2024) at paras 19/21/2 and 19/34/1).

  40. [34] Drawing from British Steamship Protection, the principle of finality of the litigation process is a key principle to bear in mind when considering a request to present further arguments. It is apt to reiterate the remarks of the Court of Appeal in Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 at [1] and [47]:

  41. [35] The principle of finality has been described as an objective of civil procedure for at least 175 years (see AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] 4 All ER 777 (“AIC”) at [31], referring to Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313). We think it helpful to refer to the remarks of the UK Supreme Court in AIC (at [31]), a case which concerned a request for reconsideration similar to the present case:

  42. [36] The principle of finality is, however, not absolute (see Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [11] where the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the principle is subject to narrow exceptions in the context of civil proceedings). Indeed, in British Steamship Protection, the Court of Appeal accepted that the finality of the litigation process could potentially be deferred if there were good reasons (at [85]). This is a recognition of the other fundamental principle undergirding the litigation process, which is that of ensuring there is no miscarriage of justice. The principles of finality and of ensuring justice is delivered must be properly balanced when considering a request to make further arguments.

  43. [37] A party requesting to present further arguments after the court has delivered its decision ought to demonstrate exceptional circumstances sufficient to displace the principle of finality in the process. What is sufficient or not depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Advancing new or improved arguments in a veiled attempt to get a second bite of the cherry will not suffice. Patching up the deficiencies in one’s case after the court has identified them, without more, will also be insufficient; the court does not play the role of legal adviser to parties. Making further arguments in such contexts is, to use the words of Coulson LJ (see [35] above), akin to treating the court’s earlier decision as “some kind of rehearsal” to allow the unsuccessful party to “hurry away to come up with some new evidence or a better legal argument”. Such conduct does not promote the interests of justice and falls short of justifying why finality of the court proceedings should be deferred.

  44. [38] Turning to the present case, we are of the view that the applicant has not raised any exceptional circumstances that would displace the finality principle and warrant a reconsideration of this court’s decision. The further arguments which the applicant seeks to make have already been canvassed in the applicant’s earlier submissions and if they were not, they ought to have been raised then and not as new arguments now. The applicant is effectively seeking a second bite at the cherry by first identifying the court’s holdings that were not in her favour and thereafter seeking to make further arguments to address the deficiencies in her earlier submissions. As we have explained above, this should not be permitted.

  45. [39] We note that a significant portion of the applicant’s further arguments relate to the supposed merits of the intended appeal. The applicant explains that “[i]t was not a failure [of the applicant] to provide merits as such, but a procedural misstep” arising from “an error of judgment” (see [25] above). She contends that this defect can be cured by setting out the merits of her intended appeal and proceeds to do so. This approach however rests on a misperception that the applicant could and should be allowed to “cure defects” in her submissions by way of a request to make further arguments. We have explained that this does not, without more, constitute exceptional circumstances or good reasons for the court to reconsider its decision.

  46. Conclusion

  47. [41] We therefore refuse the applicant’s request to present further arguments. The further arguments which the applicant seeks to make are unexceptional and do not constitute good reasons to defer the finality of these proceedings.