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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Sep 2019

Singapore International Commercial Court

B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd

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[2019] SGHC(I) 12Case no. Suit No 7 of 201718 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] The Defendant has appealed against the finding of liability and the appeal is listed to be heard in October 2019.

  3. [4] The issues which arose for consideration were set out in paragraph 7 of a letter from the Registry to the parties dated 2 July 2019:

  4. (a) The question of costs.

  5. (b) The limitation of liability issue.

  6. (c) The question of whether there should be an interim payment and, if so, in what sum.

  7. (e) The question of any election between damages at common law or in equity.

  8. (f) Whether there should there be a stay of the assessment of damages once the question of an interim payment has been decided pending the outcome of the appeal to the Court of Appeal?

  9. [5] During the course of the hearing I informed the parties of the conclusions that I had reached on each issue and indicated that I would give full written reasons in due course. These are my reasons.

  10. Issue 1: Costs

  11. The approach to costs in a transfer case

  12. [15] The Defendant, however, submitted that, although the parties had agreed that O 110 r 46 rather than O 59 should apply post-transfer, since there had been no express agreement by the parties additionally to disregard Appendix G, it should continue to be relevant post-transfer and that due weight should therefore be accorded to Appendix G in a transfer case.

  13. [16] Vivian Ramsey IJ considered a similar submission in CPIT at [21]-[27]:

  14. [18] Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case, which I shall consider in more detail below, I do not consider that it is appropriate to place any material weight on Appendix G.

  15. Assessment of costs in the present case

  16. [19] By any standards this was a complex case, both factually and legally. I do not propose in this Judgment to recite the details of the complexities which are covered fully in the Main Judgment, a judgment which ran to 258 paragraphs in over 100 pages. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the Plaintiff raised claims in both breach of contract and breach of trust. The Defendant relied on six defences, including the defence of unilateral mistake which raised novel questions of law in relation to mistake in relation to computer programs. The factual investigation into the relevant computer programs was technically complex and was rendered more difficult owing to the confidential nature of the Plaintiff’s trading software. Since the Plaintiff and Defendant were in competition as market makers on the Defendant’s trading platform, it was necessary for independent experts to be instructed to report on the software and it was most convenient for this to be done in Lisbon. The written closing submissions were extensive.

  17. [21] Turning then to the specifics of para 152(3) of the SICC Practice Directions:

  18. (a) There is nothing in the manner in which the Plaintiff conducted itself which can be said to have been unreasonable. The costs were increased by the number and nature of the defences but this increase cannot be laid at the Plaintiff’s door.

  19. (c) The subject matter involved – understanding how the computer programs worked – was technically complex.

  20. (d) This therefore required expert reports from independent highly-skilled computer programmers.

  21. (e) Novel questions arose both legally and factually.

  22. (f) I have indicated the significant amount of time and effort required both in the interlocutory hearings and at trial.

  23. (a) Pleadings pre-transfer: The Plaintiff claims S$35,000. Appendix G sets out the range as being between S$5,000 and S$20,000. The pleadings were not that complex or voluminous. I set the figure at S$12,500.

  24. (b) Disbursements pre-transfer: The Plaintiff also claims S$1,640.80 in respect of disbursements incurred in the period pre-transfer. Paragraph 16 of its Reply Submissions on Costs explains how this sum was arrived at and the Plaintiff is entitled to this sum.

  25. (c) Pleadings post-transfer: The Plaintiff claims S$25,000. In asserting that this figure is reasonable, the Plaintiff draws attention to the fact that the Defendant’s costs estimate for the entirety of pleadings was S$70,000. I do not consider that this is a helpful analogy in this instance as the Plaintiff’s pleadings were significantly less complex than those of the Defendant. I set the figure at S$17,500.

  26. (d) Case Management Conferences (“CMC”): The Plaintiff claims S$30,000 and the Defendant suggests that S$10,000 is reasonable particularly on the basis that more than one application was considered at a given CMC. There is substance in this and I set the figure at S$15,000.

  27. (e) Discovery: The Plaintiff claims S$50,000 and justifies the sum on the basis that it includes the costs incurred in relation to the inspection of the Plaintiff’s confidential documents by the Defendant’s independent expert in Lisbon. The Defendant submits that most of the work done on discovery was done by the Defendant and that it would not be fair for the Defendant to bear the additional costs due to the stringent confidentiality regime that was sought by the Plaintiff. I accept the first point but the Plaintiff did have to make applications for further discovery. I do not accept the latter point. The confidentiality regime was, in the circumstances of this case, justified. It inevitably served to increase the costs but this is not something for which the winning party should be penalised. I set the sum at S$42,500.

  28. (f) Factual and Expert Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chief: The Plaintiff claims S$150,000 in respect of the preparation of the Plaintiff’s factual affidavits and expert reports and in reviewing the Defendant’s equivalent affidavits and reports. It seeks to justify this large sum in relation to five witnesses and nine AEICs on three main grounds. First, it accuses the Defendant’s approach to the case as having been to “throw the proverbial kitchen sink” in that it raised all six defences and sought also to raise wide-ranging allegations of market manipulation. Second, it contends that the difficulty of the task of preparing the evidence was increased because of the Defendant’s change of position which resulted in late amendments to the pleadings. Third, in relation to the expert reports, it points to the necessity to instruct an independent expert not only to review the Plaintiff’s programs but to deal with the fact that the Defendant’s expert reports went beyond the scope of the agreed list of issues. In response, the Defendant draws attention to the fact that although there were six defences, the factual bases for these overlapped and were dealt with by only one witness, Mr Boonen. Further, the need for the amended pleadings was communicated to the Plaintiff more than two months before the AEICs were due to be served and the Plaintiff’s expert reports did not extend much beyond the agreed issues. There is some substance in all these assertions from both parties. The fact, however, remains that this was a complex action, the factual matrix was intricate and the issues covered by the experts involved a detailed understanding of the workings of computer programs. Taking all these factors into account, I set the sum at S$120,000.

  29. (g) Preparations for Trial: The Plaintiff claims S$150,000 and draws attention to the fact that it was responsible for the preparation of the 14 trial bundles. The Defendant contends that S$50,000 would be appropriate. The figure of S$150,000 does strike me as being on the high side but I accept that a greater burden would have been placed on the Plaintiff than the Defendant and that preparation for cross-examination would not have been straightforward. I set the figure at S$100,000.

  30. (h) Trial and Closing Submissions: The Plaintiff claims S$210,000. The Defendant asserts that S$80,000 would be reasonable. The trial was a five-day trial and the written closings of each party were around 200 pages in length. Because of the complexity of the action and the number of issues which arose, the Court required (and received) significant assistance from both the oral and written submissions. In consequence the Court did not see fit to place a page limit on the written closings. The fact that both turned out to be of a similar large size is perhaps the best indication of the measure of work that was involved. I do not consider that either Appendix G or the amount of the awards in previous SICC cases afford much assistance in the circumstances of this case. I set the figure in this case at S$180,000.

  31. (j) Disbursements post-transfer: The Plaintiff claims S$76,150.68 in respect of all post-transfer disbursements save for its expert’s costs which were paid in Pounds sterling and amounted to £52,961.99. The Defendant contended at the hearing that it was unable to take a meaningful position on the magnitude of these disbursements without a further breakdown and itemisation of the disbursements. I do not accept that that is an appropriate stance to take. The objective is to allow “reasonable costs”. There is no suggestion that these sums were not the sums actually paid out by the Plaintiff. Experienced practitioners can readily form a view as to whether any particular item falls outside the boundaries of reasonableness. A way of testing this would be for the Defendant to have regard to the sums it incurred in respect of the items and to draw the Court’s attention to any surprisingly high figure. The Plaintiff can then be required to justify that figure, but I do not consider that it is necessary or appropriate for any greater detail to be provided in relation to each figure. No specific objection was taken to any particular figure and I therefore allow the sums claimed. The figure of £52,961.99 should be converted into Singapore Dollars at the exchange rate prevailing on the date the relevant invoices were paid.

  32. Issue 2. Limitation of Liability

  33. [25] In paras 25 and 26 of its Defence, the Defendant asserted that, if it was liable to the Plaintiff in respect of any cause of action, that liability was limited by reason of a limitation of liability clause in the Agreement.

  34. [26] The clause in question reads as follows:

  35. [27] In broad terms, the Defendant contends that on its true interpretation the passage highlighted in bold constitutes an all-encompassing clause serving to limit the Defendant’s liability as operator of the Platform to any “user or member” of the Platform regardless how that liability arose or by whom the claim was brought.

  36. [28] The Plaintiff however asserts that, properly construed, any purported indemnity relates only to loss suffered which arises from the use of the Platform by a “user or member” which was in breach of the terms of the Agreement. It does not extend to exempt the Defendant from its own breach of contract or breach of trust. Further, it asserts that if the Defendant’s suggested construction was correct it would have the effect of limiting the Defendant’s liability for its own wrongdoing such as to absolve the Defendant from all duties and liabilities under the Agreement, which would defeat its main purpose and would be unenforceable pursuant to the terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (“UCTA”). Finally, it submits that if the clause was effective to limit the Defendant’s liability for damages for breach of contract, this limitation would not apply to its liability for breach of trust.

  37. [31] The Defendant opted for the latter course and, accordingly, all further argument of the limitation of liability clause is stood over to the assessment hearing.

  38. Issue 3. Interim payment

  39. [35] I accept all these points and shall take them into account in exercising the Court’s discretion. The factual position is as follows:

  40. (a) The Plaintiff has obtained a judgment in its favour with damages or financial compensation to be assessed.

  41. (b) An appeal has been lodged and this appeal is listed to be heard before a five-judge bench of the Court of Appeal in October 2019. It is unlikely that the appeal will result in an ex tempore judgment. The best assessment is that judgment will be handed down early in 2020.

  42. (c) If the appeal fails, it will be necessary for the assessment to proceed with the necessary financial and other evidence being prepared. It is therefore unlikely that the assessment will be concluded until late 2020 or early 2021; or even somewhat later if the assessment judgment is appealed.

  43. (d) The Plaintiff is a company registered in England and Wales and is therefore a foreign corporation. It has no assets in Singapore. It is, it asserts, well-capitalised with reserves of about S$15m.

  44. (e) Christopher Drake, the Senior Legal Counsel of the Defendant, accepts at para 17 of his affidavit that the Defendant is not itself in a position to pay the sum sought by way of an interim award and that payment would have a severe impact on the Defendant’s business.

  45. (g) Both parties trade in the cryptocurrency market which is well-known to be volatile.

  46. [36] On the basis of the above facts, the Plaintiff asserted that an interim award was justified. The Plaintiff had been kept out of its money already for over two years and it was likely that a further 18 months at the minimum would elapse before final assessment. Although the Defendant’s directors and parent company had stood behind the Defendant, there was no reason to believe that they would continue to do so if the appeal failed. More specifically, it asserted, correctly in my view, that since neither the directors nor the parent company were parties to the action, any judgment against the Defendant could not be enforced against them. Hence it was said that the delay coupled with the uncertainty of payment constituted relevant prejudice which exceeded any prejudice to the Defendant in circumstances where its directors and/or parent company were able and willing to pay.

  47. [37] The Defendant contended that no interim award should be made because of the upcoming appeal, the fact that any subsequent delay was not great and the fact that the directors and/or parent company would continue to support the Defendant.

  48. [38] In my judgment, unless the Plaintiff can be guaranteed that any sums awarded on the final assessment will be paid by its directors and/or parent company, the balance of these factors is in favour of making an interim award provided that the Defendant can be protected so as to ensure repayment if the appeal succeeds or the limitation of liability issue is decided in its favour.

  49. Issue 4. Protection for the Defendant in relation to any sums paid by way of an interim award or costs.

  50. Issue 6. Stay of further proceedings on the assessment pending judgment on the appeal.

  51. Issue 5. The Election between damages at common law or in equity.

  52. [43] Since there is to be a stay, it makes sense to defer further argument on this issue until after the stay is lifted. It may then not be a live issue.

  53. Simon Thorley International Judge