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Grounds publishedDecided 28 May 2020

Singapore International Commercial Court

Beyonics Asia Pacific Ltd and others v Goh Chan Peng and another

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[2020] SGHC(I) 14Case no. Suit No 10 of 2018

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  1. Background

  2. [1] Mr Kyle Arnold Shaw Junior (“Mr Shaw”) is a successful private equity investor. He is a graduate of the University of Virginia and of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Some 30 years ago, he was involved, together with two colleagues, Mr S. L. Choi and Mr Andy Kwei, in the purchase of the Asian business of a company called Flextronics. The chief financial officer of that business was Mr Goh Chan Peng, the first defendant (“Mr Goh”). Mr Shaw worked closely with Mr Goh and the business flourished. Mr Shaw concluded as a result that Mr Goh was a “straightforward guy”.

  3. [2] In early 2000, Mr Goh was approached by Mr Chay Kwong Soon (“Mr Chay”), the Chairman of the parent company of the Beyonics group of companies (the “Beyonics Group” or “Beyonics”) of which the five plaintiffs are subsidiaries. Mr Chay invited Mr Goh to become the chief executive officer (“CEO”) of the Beyonics Group. Mr Goh left Flextronics and on 1 May 2000 was appointed CEO of the Beyonics Group. He remained CEO until 30 April 2013.

  4. [3] The Beyonics Group consisted of two manufacturing divisions, the Precision Engineering Services (“PES”) Division and the Electronic Manufacturing Services (“EMS”) Division. Amongst other things, the PES Division manufactured and sold baseplates for hard disk drives (“HDDs”) destined for end customers, such as Seagate, Hitachi and Western Digital. The dispute in this action concerns the PES Division, specifically, the baseplate manufacturing business.

  5. [4] At the time of the matters giving rise to the dispute, the parent company of Beyonics was called Beyonics Technology Ltd (“BTL”). The first plaintiff (“BAP”), the fourth plaintiff (“BTEC”), the fifth plaintiff (“BPM”) and a further subsidiary, Beyonics Technology (Thailand) Co Ltd (“BTT”), were part of the PES Division. BTEC owned and operated a baseplate manufacturing facility in Changshu, China; BPM owned and operated a baseplate facility in Tampoi, Malaysia; and BTT owned and operated a baseplate facility in Ayutthaya, Thailand. BAP did not own or operate any such facility but was the sales company for the baseplates manufactured by BTEC, BPM and BTT. The second and third plaintiffs (“BIL” and “BTS”) are also subsidiary companies of BTL but are not part of the PES division. I refer to these companies collectively as the “Plaintiffs”.

  6. [5] By 2010, Mr Shaw had become a partner in an independent private equity fund manager, Shaw Kwei & Partners (“SKP”), based in Hong Kong. One of the managing directors was Mr Tsui Sung Lam (“Mr Tsui”), who had worked with Mr Goh at Flextronics. In late 2010 or early 2011, Mr Tsui and Mr Goh met and Mr Goh indicated that Beyonics was considering the sale of its business. Mr Tsui informed Mr Shaw and, as a result, SKP proposed that its investment vehicle, Bayport Capital Ltd (“Bayport”) should consider acquiring the Beyonics Group through a BVI company, Channelview Investments Ltd (“Channelview”). This led to an Implementation Agreement dated 5 October 2011, followed by due diligence which resulted in a formal offer to take over the Beyonics Group. This was approved in a shareholders meeting on 30 December 2011 and the scheme was sanctioned by the High Court of Singapore and completed on 2 February 2012. Mr Shaw then became chairman of Channelview with both Mr Goh and Mr Chay being directors as well as not insubstantial shareholders.

  7. [6] As was apparent in the witness box, both Mr Shaw and Mr Goh are powerful personalities, used to being the directing minds of commercial operations and accustomed to being leaders rather than followers. Mr Shaw expected Mr Goh to follow his lead and Mr Goh expected Mr Shaw to allow him, with his more than ten years in the business, to continue to run Beyonics with the freedom he had been given by the previous board of directors. A falling out was perhaps inevitable and it duly occurred. I shall have to consider in some details the factual background leading up to the fall out. It is sufficient for present purposes to record that it occurred, with the result that on 9 January 2013 Mr Goh resigned his directorships in the various companies in the Beyonics Group. Resignation agreements (the “Resignation Agreements”) were signed with a number of those companies (including BAP, BIL and BTS) and Mr Goh ceased to be employed on 30 April 2013.

  8. [8] Be that as it may, following a lengthy investigation, FTI identified a number of documents which gave Mr Shaw reason to believe that Mr Goh had not been acting in the best interests of the Beyonics Group in his dealings with a competitor, Nedec/Kodec (see below at [134(b)]), and indeed that he had accepted bribes from that competitor. In particular, three agreements between the second defendant, Pacific Globe Enterprises Ltd, a company owned and controlled by Mr Goh which, at the relevant time, was named Wyser International Ltd, (“Wyser”), and Nedec/Kodec were discovered which indicated that Wyser had been paid substantial sums by Nedec/Kodec.

  9. [9] FTI’s final report (the “FTI Report”) was issued on 23 July 2013 and proceedings were brought on 25 July 2013 by BTL and one subsidiary company (Beyonics International Pte Ltd or “BIPL”) against Mr Goh, his wife and Wyser in Singapore in High Court Suit No 672 of 2013. I shall refer to this action as “the 672 Action” and to the Plaintiffs in that action as BTL and BIPL or, together, as “the 672 Plaintiffs”, and to Mr Goh, his wife, and Wyser as “the 672 Defendants”.

  10. [11] Mr Goh denied that he was in breach of duties and maintained that he acted in the best interests of the 672 Plaintiffs at all times. He did not deny that he received payments from Nedec/Kodec, but claimed that they were legitimate payments for consultancy services. Hence, there was no conspiracy between Mr Goh, Wyser and Nedec/Kodec to injure the Plaintiffs and Wyser did not dishonestly assist in the breach of his duties. The loss of Seagate’s business, in whole or in part, was not caused by them. Finally, Mr Goh contended that the expenses and salary were justified.

  11. [12] The action was heard by Hoo Sheau Peng JC (as she then was) (“the 672 Trial Judge”) over a period of 19 days in August and September 2015 which, following written closing submissions, resulted in a judgment on 28 June 2016 ([2016] SGHC 120, reported as [2016] 4 SLR 472) (“the 672 Judgment”). The 672 Plaintiffs were almost entirely successful although the damages awarded for the loss of the Seagate business were less than those claimed. Mr Goh and Wyser appealed and, whilst the Court of Appeal did not reverse any of the findings of fact, by its judgment of 27 June 2017 ([2017] SGCA 40, reported as [2017] 2 SLR 592) (“the 672 Appeal Judgment”) it held that BTL was not entitled to recover certain of the losses that it had claimed and which had been awarded by the 672 Trial Judge, as those losses had not been suffered by BTL, the parent company, but had in fact been suffered by various subsidiary companies which are now the plaintiffs in this action.

  12. [13] The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was as follows:

  13. [14] Having suffered that reverse, this action was commenced on 21 August 2017 by the five subsidiary companies against Mr Goh and Wyser (the “Defendants”) claiming both the losses which had been disallowed in the 672 Action as well as certain other alleged losses which had not been claimed in that action. The Plaintiffs accepted that they could not rely on the findings of fact made in the 672 Plaintiffs’ favour in that action and that, in so far as the Defendants did not admit liability, the necessary evidence would have to be adduced afresh and the matter ruled upon at a subsequent trial.

  14. [15] The Defendants made no admissions. They contended that on the basis of subsequently obtained material the outcome of any later trial would be different and would result in findings in their favour. In addition, however, they contended that the bringing of this action by these Plaintiffs was an abuse of the process of the court as the claims now made in this action could and should have been made by them in the 672 Action. They rely on the well-known doctrine of the extended form of res judicata having its origin in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 999 (“Henderson v Henderson”).

  15. The Issues

  16. [17] The Substantive Issue however requires the findings of the 672 Action to be disregarded. No plea of estoppel is raised by the Plaintiffs. It is common ground that this issue can only be and must be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial of this action. It is therefore open to this court to come to a different conclusion on the facts to that reached by the 672 Trial Judge in the 672 Action if the evidence given at this trial requires it.

  17. [18] Immediately prior to the trial of this action the Defendants objected to certain passages in the affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) sworn on behalf of the Plaintiffs because they sought to rely on findings in the 672 Action as being true. An application was therefore made to strike out those passages.

  18. [19] I heard arguments on the first day of the trial and gave judgment on the second day. In that judgment I set out the distinction between the approach to those two wholly discrete issues which I draw upon in [20] to [37] below.

  19. [20] It is trite law that only evidence relevant to the issues in the case is admissible at trial. Evidence which is relevant and admissible on one of those issues may not be relevant to the other. The court must be astute in identifying to which issue a given piece of evidence is relevant and to ensure that if it is inadmissible in relation to another issue, it does not serve to cloud the judicial mind on that other issue.

  20. [21] Admissibility of evidence relating to the Henderson v Henderson Issue is governed by s 42 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) which is as follows:

  21. [22] The Plaintiffs referred me to the commentary on s 42 which is found in paragraph 7.003 of Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 6th Ed, 2017) by Professor Jeffrey Pinsler SC, which states:

  22. [23] The Plaintiffs also referred me to the decision in Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor JP [2000] SGHC 111 (“Arul Chandran”). I shall cite more out of that judgment than the Plaintiffs referred me to because it is also relevant to the question of evidence on the Substantive Issue which I shall consider below. Paragraphs 141–144 read as follows:

  23. [24] This judgment highlights very clearly the circumstances in which previous statements are admissible at a subsequent trial on the merits and those where they are not. I shall return to this below. However, in the case of res judicata, the previous judgment is admissible, but only for the limited purposes outlined above, either (a) to prove its existence, or (b) to identify issues that were previously determined.

  24. [25] Additionally, of course, in a case of an alleged Henderson v Henderson estoppel, evidence relating to why the plaintiff could not or should not have brought the claim in the previous action and any other evidence relevant to the question of abuse of process will be admissible.

  25. [26] On the Substantive Issue, s 42 does not apply. Questions of admissibility are governed by s 45 of the Evidence Act which reads:

  26. [27] The existence of the judgment is not a fact in issue in relation to the Substantive Issue and, thus, the question is whether it is relevant under some other provision.

  27. [28] Both parties accept that this provision is based on s 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and each referred me to Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, the Plaintiffs choosing to use the 16th edition (Sudipto Sarkar and V R Manohar, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (Wadhwa & Co, 16th Ed, 2007)) and the Defendants the 19th edition (Sudipto Sarkar and Dr H R Jhingta, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 19th Ed, 2016)). I can discern no difference between them. Since the first one I read was the 16th edition, I shall cite from that at page 952:

  28. [29] The editors then turned to consider the latter portion of the section at pages 952–953:

  29. [30] The commentary continues:

  30. [31] In a following passage, the editors state as follows:

  31. [32] With regard to that last sentence, it is important to note that the editors are talking about the right of a party; that is, a party to the subsequent litigation who was also a party to the earlier case. It is not a reference to any other party, more specifically to a party to the earlier litigation who is not a party to the subsequent action or vice versa. The right of any of the Plaintiffs in this action has not already been concluded by a previous judgment.

  32. [34] The Defendants referred me to the case of Zainal bin Kuning and others v Chan Sin Mian Michael and anor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 858 (“Zainal”) at [68]–‍[70] where the Court of Appeal, when considering whether previous convictions were admissible in evidence, said this:

  33. [35] The position under s 45 is clear. A finding of fact in a previous judgment cannot be relied upon to prove primary facts which have to be proved in a subsequent action. It is, I think, succinctly put in the passage emphasised above in Zainal (at [69]).

  34. [36] What can be used, if relevant, is evidence given at a previous trial if its purpose is to challenge or discredit the evidence given by a witness at a subsequent trial. If a witness has made a previous inconsistent statement, this can be put to the witness to challenge the subsequent evidence and to give the witness the opportunity to satisfy the court, if they can, that the later evidence is to be preferred. This is not because it is evidence given in a previous trial, it is because it is an antecedent inconsistent statement. It could just as well have been given in a pre-existing document.

  35. [37] This type of evidence is covered by s 157(c) of the Evidence Act, which reads, so far as relevant:

  36. The Henderson v Henderson Issue

  37. Preliminary Issue

  38. [40] With hindsight I regret that decision and wish that I had followed my instincts. The Henderson v Henderson Issue could have been prepared for hearing and heard in a relatively short period of time. The hearing would have lasted a day, two at the most. If successful, even after an appeal, the time and expense of the trial that has now taken place would have been avoided. Yes, there might well have been a delay but that it is price well worth paying to investigate the possibility that the trial should not be allowed to take place at all.

  39. [41] I consider that it will rarely, if ever, be the case that an allegation that a subsequent action should be struck out on Henderson v Henderson grounds should not be heard as a preliminary issue, even if this does cause a measure of delay.

  40. Henderson v Henderson – The Law

  41. [43] As is well known, the extended form of res judicata has its origins in the celebrated statement by the Vice-Chancellor, Sir James Wigram, in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 999 at 114:

  42. [44] The doctrine has evolved over the years both through decisions in Singapore and in the United Kingdom. The foundation of the current approach to the doctrine lies in the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 (“Johnson v Gore Wood”).

  43. [45] In that case a company, Westway Homes Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Johnson, had previously brought an action against Gore Wood & Co, a firm of solicitors, for negligent advice. That action was eventually settled during the trial with the payment of a substantial sum of money to the company. Prior to the trial, Gore Wood’s solicitors were informed that Mr. Johnson also had a claim against Gore Wood arising out of the same facts which he would pursue in due course.

  44. [46] Following the settlement with the company, in 1993 Mr Johnson commenced his own action which proceeded slowly towards trial. It was not until December 1997, some 4½ years later, that the defendant sought to strike out the action as an abuse of the process of the court relying on the Henderson v Henderson doctrine. Even at this late stage, this issue was directed to be heard as a preliminary issue. The judge held in favour of the plaintiff but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and the action was struck out. The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords.

  45. [47] The leading opinion was that of Lord Bingham of Cornhill. It is necessary to cite a number of passages from that opinion (at 22C–F):

  46. [48] After reviewing a number of earlier authorities, Lord Bingham continued (at 31A–F):

  47. [49] Lord Bingham then went on to consider the question of the extent to which the doctrine applied to parties to the later action who had not been parties to the earlier action (at 32C–G):

  48. [50] Lord Millett concurred and said this (at 60C–D):

  49. [51] On the particular facts of that case, the House of Lords held that Mr Johnson was acting reasonably in not bringing his claim as part of the earlier litigation so that there was no abuse of process and the action was therefore not struck out.

  50. [52] The dictum of Lord Bingham cited above was applied by Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was) in Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 when he summarised the approach as follows at [53]:

  51. [53] In Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 760, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, also applied the reasoning in Johnson v Gore Wood ([44] supra) and made the following observations (at [39]–[43]):

  52. [54] Reference was then made to a West African decision and the judgment continued at [43]–[44]:

  53. [55] The policy reasons underlying the doctrine were further examined by George Wei J in Antariksa Logistics Pte Ltd and others v Nurdian Cuaca and others [2018] 3 SLR 117 at [81]–[84]:

  54. [56] The latest consideration of the scope of the doctrine and the principles to be applied is to be found in the judgment of Lord Sumption in the UK Supreme Court in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd and others [2019] 2 WLR 984 (“Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd”), a case involving an application to set aside a judgment allegedly obtained by fraud, when he said this (at [61]–[63]):

  55. [57] The task facing the court therefore is, first, to consider whether the claims made in the second action could, and if so, should have been brought in the first action. If so, the court must then go on to consider whether at the time the second action was started, in the light of everything that had happened prior to that date, it would be an abuse of process to allow the second action to proceed. The burden is on the Defendants to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs are abusing the process of the court by bringing the second action. The burden is a heavy one. As Lord Bingham put it, “[l]itigants are not without scrupulous examination of all the circumstances to be denied the right to bring a genuine subject of litigation before the court” (see [47] above). But equally, on the other hand, as Lord Diplock put it, the court must possess the power “to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people” (see [47] above).

  56. The claims brought in the 672 Action

  57. [58] In the 672 Action claims were made by BTL, the parent company, and by BIPL, neither of which is a party to this action. The Plaintiffs in this action were not parties to that action.

  58. [59] The claims made in the 672 Action were as follows:

  59. (a) by BTL against Mr Goh:

  60. (i) breach of contractual, statutory and/or equitable fiduciary duties in his capacity as a director/employee of BTL;

  61. (b) by BIPL against Mr Goh:

  62. (i) unjustified expenses claims made against BIPL;

  63. (ii) unjustified payment of salary by BIPL;

  64. (c) by BTL against Wyser:

  65. (i) dishonest assistance of Mr Goh in committing his various breaches and/or knowing receipt of the payments under the Wyser Agreement; and

  66. (d) by BTL against Mr Goh and Wyser:

  67. (i) unlawful conspiracy together with Nedec/Kodec to injure BTL and its subsidiaries, by diverting the baseplate production capacity of the Beyonics Group in favour of Nedec/Kodec.

  68. [60] Under [59(a)(i)], the claims were made under four headings as explained in [40] of the 672 Judgment:

  69. [61] Under this claim, BTL sought damages/equitable compensation for:

  70. (a) sums received under the Wyser Agreements;

  71. (b) loss of profit suffered by the Beyonics Group as a whole by reason of diversion of baseplate products manufactured by Nedec/Kodec at the Beyonics Group expense (“the Diversion Loss”); and

  72. (c) loss of profits from the loss of future sales that would have been obtained by the Beyonics Group but for the breaches (“the Total Loss”).

  73. [62] The claim by BIPL under [59(b)] above was in relation to salary paid by BIPL pursuant to one of the Resignation Agreements referred to in [6] above.

  74. [63] As indicated, the 672 Trial Judge found in favour of the 672 Plaintiffs although the sums awarded in respect of the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss were less than the sums claimed by the 672 Plaintiffs (at [225]–[226]):

  75. [64] The Court of Appeal upheld the awards made in relation to the sums paid under the Wyser Agreements and those made in respect of the unjustified expenses and salary. It disallowed the awards in relation to the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss on the basis that any such loss had not been incurred by BTL but by BAP, which was not a party to the 672 Action.

  76. The claims brought in this action

  77. [65] The primary claim in this action is brought by BAP and is founded upon an allegation that Mr Goh owed a duty of loyalty and fidelity to BAP. In the alternative, substantially the same claim is made on behalf of BAP, BTEC and BPM individually. The alleged breaches are based on the same allegations as were made in the 672 Action.

  78. [66] There is also a claim against Wyser brought by BAP or, alternatively, by BAP, BTEC and BPM, for dishonest assistance of Mr Goh together with a claim for conspiracy by unlawful means against Mr Goh and Wyser. Again this is based on the same allegations as were made in the 672 Action.

  79. [67] The relief sought in respect of all these claims is for the same Diversion Loss and Total Loss that was disallowed in the 672 Action. These claims therefore mirror the claims previously made by BTL in the 672 Action. It is however to be noted that the sums claimed in relation to those alleged losses were not the sums awarded by the 672 Trial Judge but the higher sums claimed by the 672 Plaintiffs.

  80. [68] Additional claims have, however, been brought in this action.

  81. [69] First, it is alleged that Mr Goh breached his duty to disclose to BAP his alleged breaches of fiduciary duties such that BAP paid Mr Goh the sum of S$200,000 as a bonus which BAP would not have paid had Mr Goh disclosed his breaches (the “Unjustified Bonus Claim”).

  82. [70] Secondly, it is alleged that Mr Goh’s failure to disclose to BAP, BIL and BTS his alleged breaches of fiduciary duties caused those parties to enter into one of the Resignation Agreements referred to in [6] above and thus to pay Mr Goh’s salaries until 30 April 2013 which they would not have done had they been made aware of his breaches. These claims are equivalent to the claims made by BILP in the 672 Action (“the Unjustified Salaries Claim”).

  83. Could these claims have been brought in the 672 Action?

  84. [71] It is clear that Mr Shaw was informed before the 672 Action was commenced that the losses claimed by BTL in the 672 Action were in fact losses which would have been directly suffered by BAP. Paragraph 3.4 of the FTI Report states:

  85. And continues in paragraph 3.6:

  86. [72] Mr Shaw was cross-examined on these matters and was somewhat evasive in answering the direct question of whether he knew before the 672 Action was commenced that the loss had actually been suffered by BAP but eventually accepted that at that time he was clear where the revenue was booked.

  87. [73] I am therefore satisfied that the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss claims could have been brought by BAP (and, if necessary, in the alternative, by BAP, BTEC and BPM) in the 672 Action.

  88. [75] Mr Shaw was cross-examined on these matters and accepted that he was aware of the existence of these claims before the 672 Action was commenced. Three passages should be noted:

  89. [76] On the basis of this, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs were aware of the facts giving rise to the Unjustified Bonus Claim and the Unjustified Salaries Claim and could have been authorised by Mr Shaw to bring those claims in the 672 Action.

  90. Should these claims have been brought in the 672 Action?

  91. [77] As Lord Sumption noted in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd ([56] supra) at [63], the word “should” refers to something which the law would expect a reasonable person to do in his own interest and in that of the efficient conduct of litigation.

  92. [78] Dealing first with the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss claims, the factual background to these claims was necessarily going to be investigated in the 672 Action because of the claims made for those losses by BTC. All that was necessary therefore was for the pleadings to be amended to add BAP, BTEC and BPM as Plaintiffs in the 672 Action, claiming in the alternative to BTL in much the same way as has now been done in this action.

  93. [79] The Plaintiffs accept that had the allegation that BAP rather than BTL had suffered the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss been expressly pleaded in the 672 Action, that BTL “could have easily taken steps to add BAP” to the 672 Action. They assert however that since the matter was not pleaded and was alluded to only twice in cross-examination and was covered in greater detail only after the trial in closing submissions that it was reasonable for them not to have applied to amend to join BAP, BTEC and BPM as plaintiffs in the 672 Action.

  94. [80] In [68] and [69] of the 672 Appeal Judgment, it was held that there was no requirement that the matter should be expressly pleaded and that it was wrong to say, as the 672 Plaintiffs contended, that the 672 Defendants had dropped the matter. In so far as it is open to me to consider the matter afresh, which I doubt, respectfully, I agree. At the latest, by the time the written closing submissions were received the Plaintiffs’ advisers could have been in no doubt that the point was being taken and they elected to deal with the matter by taking the pleading point and contending that they had been taken by surprise. No application to amend was made.

  95. [82] An application to amend can be made during or even after trial (see Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 (Vol 1) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2020) at para 20/8/6). The principles which apply to any application to amend are well known and are considered in para 20/8/8 of the same. For present purposes it is sufficient to record that in general amendments ought to be allowed to be made “for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties” (per Jenkins LJ in G.L. Baker Ltd v Medway Buildings and Supplies Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 1216 at 1231). The guiding authority which has been applied in Singapore is the UK House of Lords case Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] 1 AC 189 where Lord Brandon said this at 212:

  96. [83] Had the 672 Plaintiffs applied to amend either when the matter was first raised during cross-examination or after receipt of the 672 Defendants’ written closing submissions, I am in no doubt that applying the above principles, the 672 Trial Judge would, in the exercise of her discretion, have allowed the amendment. The amendment was necessary to allow the real question in controversy to be decided which was whether the Beyonics Group had suffered loss by reason of Mr Goh’s actions. The 672 Defendants were contending that, if there was any loss, it was BAP rather than BTL that had suffered it. BAP was thus a necessary and proper party. The application would have been made late and it may have been necessary for the experts to consider in a little more detail precisely where the losses had fallen, which might have led to the addition of BTEC and BPM as parties if the 672 Defendants took the additional point that it was those companies rather than BPM that had actually suffered some of the losses.

  97. [85] It is these factors which lead me to the clear conclusion that the 672 Plaintiffs should have made an application to add BAP, BTEC and BPM as parties to the 672 Action to seek to recover the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss and that this application would have been allowed.

  98. [86] I turn then to consider the Unjustified Bonus Claim and the Unjustified Salaries Claim. In this case it would have been necessary for BAP, BIL and BTS to be joined as parties, for the issues to be pleaded and the necessary evidence adduced. In the case of the Unjustified Salaries Case, since the claims mirrored that being made by BIPL, minimal extra evidence would have been required. The Unjustified Bonus Claim arose out of the same matrix of facts as underlies the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss claims. Absent special circumstances, these factors are compelling. The 672 Plaintiffs knew of the existence of the potential claims yet elected not to include them in the litigation.

  99. [87] The only special circumstance relied upon by the Plaintiffs is the fact that the Defendants were specifically informed that BTL reserved the Plaintiffs’ right to bring the claims at an appropriate time (see [73] above). In Johnson v Gore Wood ([44] supra) a similar reservation was made and was a factor in the House of Lords’ conclusion that in the circumstances of that case there was no abuse of process in allowing the second action to proceed. The primary reason however lay in the fact that the settlement provisions of the earlier action only made sense on the basis of an assumption that Mr Johnson was likely to make a personal claim and that he had compelling reasons to defer prosecution of that claim.

  100. [88] There are no equivalent reasons here. In cross-examination it was suggested that Mr Shaw had reserved the right to bring further proceedings as a means of putting pressure on Mr Goh. I do not accept this. I prefer Mr Shaw’s evidence recited in [74] above which is to the effect that he and his lawyers had identified many possible claims and made an election as to which to put forward in the 672 Action for reasons which he cannot now explain. He advanced no reasons for making the election not to include these claims in that action and, without compelling reasons, it is right to conclude that these claims should have been included in the 672 Action as well.

  101. [89] The Plaintiffs deal with the question of whether they should have brought the current claim in the 672 Action at some length in their written closing submissions.

  102. [90] First, they contend that plaintiffs must be at liberty to decide whether to sue and, if so, who to sue and when. This however cannot be an unfettered freedom. One of the fetters on that freedom is the Henderson v Henderson doctrine. The suggested freedom cannot be exercised if it results in an abuse of process.

  103. [91] Secondly, they contend that there is no principle that a related group of companies is obliged to commence a single suit against a given defendant. Again, if there is such a principle, it must be a principle conditioned by or subject to the Henderson v Henderson doctrine.

  104. [92] Thirdly, they assert that BTL reasonably considered itself to be the proper party that suffered the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss and that this factor, in some way, justifies the bringing of the second action. I regret that I do not follow the logic of this. I fully accept that BTL were either advised or itself formed the belief that it was the appropriate plaintiff to claim those losses but the Court of Appeal has decided that it was mistaken in so doing. The reasonableness or otherwise of the grounds on which the belief was formed is neither here nor there; it was wrong. The question I have to decide is whether the Plaintiffs or the Defendants should suffer because of that mistaken belief. It cannot of itself constitute a basis for concluding the Plaintiffs should not have been joined as parties to the 672 Action.

  105. [93] Fourthly, they submit that since the Defendants did not take the affirmative position that BAP was a proper party to the 672 Action and/or admitted that BPL was the proper party to that action and/or failed to seek to strike out the 672 Action in so far as it related to the Diversion Loss or the Total Loss, this should count against the conclusion that BAP should have been joined as a party to the 672 Action. This is however merely a different way of contending that the Court of Appeal should not have decided the appeal in the way it did. I have to proceed on the basis that BPL was not the proper party and that this was an issue of law which the 672 Plaintiffs should have taken into account in formulating the 672 Action.

  106. [94] Finally, the Plaintiffs draw my attention to a number of matters which have occurred since the commencement of this action and which, it is suggested, should be taken into account. I do not accept this. The question of abuse of process has to be considered as at the date of the writ in this action. Subsequent events cannot influence that decision. This is amply demonstrated by the facts in Johnson v Gore Wood ([44] supra) where there was a 4½ year delay in bringing the application under Henderson v Henderson yet it was allowed to proceed.

  107. [95] None of these points therefore undermine the conclusion I have reached that the Plaintiffs in this action should have been joined as parties to the 672 Action and brought the claims made in this action in the 672 Action. To echo the words of Lord Sumption in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd ([56] supra), I have concluded that in the circumstances of this case the law would have expected a reasonable person to done this both in his own interest and in that of the efficient conduct of litigation. Indeed, Mr Shaw reluctantly accepted this at the end of his cross-examination on this issue quoted in [74] above when he accepted that he did not have a good answer to the question why BAP, BIL and BTS were not joined as plaintiffs to make their claims in the 672 Action.

  108. Abuse of process

  109. [96] The fact however that a subsequent claim could and should have been brought in an earlier action does not inevitably mean that the subsequent action should be struck out as an abuse of process. As indicated in [56] above, there is a heavy burden on the Defendants to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs are abusing the process of the court by bringing this action. The Plaintiffs will only be denied the right to bring a genuine subject of litigation before this Court if it would be manifestly unfair to the Defendants for this to be done. In the light of the 672 Judgment it is plain that the Plaintiffs have a genuine cause of action.

  110. [97] I therefore turn to consider the factors that the Defendants rely upon as supporting the suggestion that it would be manifestly unfair on them to be exposed to the burden of a further trial.

  111. [98] Mr Goh gave evidence as to the way in which the 672 Action was conducted in paragraphs 452 to 500 of his AEIC in this action, which was not the subject of cross-examination. I can consider his evidence concerning the Plaintiffs’ and Mr Shaw’s conduct under three headings: conduct before the 672 Action, conduct during the 672 Action and conduct after the 672 Appeal Judgment prior to the writ in this action.

  112. Conduct before the 672 Action

  113. [99] Mr Goh ceased to be a director of companies in the Beyonics Group on 9 January 2013 and under the Resignation Agreements, his employment was to end on 30 April 2013. On 12 April 2013, Mr Shaw asked Mr Goh to attend a meeting on 23 April 2013 to discuss “important matters relating to the past and future business of the Beyonics Group of companies”. Mr Goh responded indicating his unavailability on that date and said that he was travelling for the rest of that week. He asked what the purpose of the meeting was, for an agenda and an indication of the attendees and suggested that the meeting be fixed for another day.

  114. [100] Mr Shaw did not provide the information requested but said that it was imperative that Mr Goh made time to meet. Mr Goh responded saying that if discussion of the matters was critical, Mr Shaw should write to him and he would consider the matters whilst on his travels. Mr Shaw then turned abusive and responded by an e-mail on 17 April 2013 insisting that Mr Goh attend the meeting on 23 April 2013 to discuss his past management practices and activities as CEO and ended with the statement that Mr Goh should “act like a man instead of shrinking like a boy”.

  115. [101] Notwithstanding this Mr Goh responded on 20 April 2013 saying that he was available for a meeting in May. Mr Shaw did not take him up on this offer. It is regrettable that the parties did not meet as this might have served to diffuse the worsening relationship but, having seen both in the witness box, I rather doubt it. Taken on their own however, abusive comments prior to litigation cannot carry much, if any weight, in the overall assessment of manifest unfairness.

  116. Conduct during the 672 Action

  117. [106] The effect of the 672 Appeal Judgment was that the Defendants only had to pay the 672 Plaintiffs some US$500,000.00 so that, in the event, the two Mareva injunctions gave the 672 Plaintiffs far greater protection than they were entitled to.

  118. [107] Mareva injunctions are exceptional remedies granted in specific circumstances where the potential loss to plaintiffs if defendants are not restrained from disposing of assets outweighs the invasion of the defendants’ privacy and deprivation of their right to deal with their assets and live their lives as they please. It is a necessary shield for plaintiffs but one cannot get away from the fact that it will inflict damage not only financial but also, almost inevitably, emotional on defendants without their first having been held to be liable to the plaintiffs at all. This is particularly so in a case such as the present where Mrs Goh, against whom no cause of action was raised, was subject to the Mareva injunction.

  119. [108] I emphasise that the 672 Plaintiffs did nothing wrong in seeking the Mareva injunctions. The courts held that they were entitled to them and the variation nine months later still placed a fetter on Mr and Mrs Goh’s freedom to deal with their properties as they saw fit. Where a party obtains these exceptional remedies, which inevitably will serve to place pressure on the defendants, it is incumbent on them to prosecute their claims against those defendants with the utmost diligence in accordance with the rules and with respect for the defendants’ position.

  120. [109] In my judgment, the 672 Plaintiffs failed in that duty. First, rather than bringing all their claims in the 672 Action, they expressly elected to reserve certain claims for a later date and did not seek to join the current Plaintiffs to that action. In the circumstances, this was inappropriate as it left the 672 Defendants uncertain as to when the litigation was going to end. Once the Mareva injunctions were in place I consider that there was an added burden on the 672 Plaintiffs to ensure that all the claims which the Beyonics Group wished to make arising out of the same matrix of facts were in fact made so that there could be an end to the dispute as early as possible.

  121. [111] At the time, it appears that Mr Shaw was aware of and indeed wanted there only to be one trial and must therefore have accepted that the claims that he had purported to reserve would never be brought. In cross-examination he said this:

  122. Conduct subsequent to the 672 Appeal Judgment

  123. [112] Following the 672 Appeal Judgment, the 672 Defendants sought the return of the excess damages that they had paid following the first instant judgment. They had paid some US$8 million and the Court of Appeal’s award was for less than US$500,000. The 672 Defendants’ solicitors sought repayment by letter dated 4 July 2017. The 672 Plaintiffs’ solicitors replied by letter dated 10 July 2017 refusing to do so on the basis that there could be no dispute that the Defendants were liable to pay the excess sums to BAP. On the same day BAP, BIL and BTS wrote to the Defendants demanding not only that the excess sums should be paid over to BAP but also making the Unjustified Bonus and the Unjustified Salaries Claims.

  124. Other factors

  125. [115] In different ways, both parties sought to draw the Court’s attention to the fact that allowing this trial to go ahead would amount to some form of collateral attack on the findings of fact made by the 672 Trial Judge. This however is the inevitable effect of allowing a second trial where the same or similar issues arise for consideration. As a general rule, of course, this is undesirable as it may lead to inconsistent outcomes, but in circumstances where it is appropriate to hold a second trial, as for example in Johnson v Gore Wood ([44] supra), it is a potential consequence of requiring evidence to be led again. This does not amount to an impermissible attack on the findings in the previous judgment. What would be impermissible would be to seek in the second action to revisit the findings of the Court of Appeal in the 672 Action. This would be an impermissible collateral attack on the legal outcome which would constitute an abuse. But it is not what the Plaintiffs are seeking to do.

  126. [116] However, in considering the question of unfairness, it is right that I should take into account the fact that the 672 trial was a burdensome trial, lasting some 19 days in court followed by extensive written submissions. The 672 Judgment ran to 228 paragraphs and almost 100 pages. It is not something that an individual defendant, however pecunious, should lightly be exposed to. Yet the consequence of the decisions made by 672 Plaintiffs in that action leading to the bringing of this action must necessarily expose the Defendants, effectively Mr Goh, to a further trial of equivalent magnitude if it was allowed to proceed. In my judgment, where, as here, the new claims could and should have been brought in the earlier action with little or no additional expense, the 672 Plaintiffs should not only show that that they behaved properly towards the Defendants in that action but also that there are good reasons for allowing the second action to go to trial.

  127. [117] The sole reason put forward by the Plaintiffs is that striking this action out would be a travesty. As counsel for the Plaintiffs put it in opening:

  128. [118] The problem with this submission is that it presumes that the Plaintiffs will succeed in the second action. Whilst, having regard to the facts as found in the 672 Action, the Plaintiffs may well have viewed their prospects of success as being very high, they do not dispute that a full trial is needed to obtain judgment in their favour. It will almost inevitably be the case that the Plaintiffs in any subsequent action will believe that their prospects of success are good otherwise they would have been unlikely to start that action. The Henderson v Henderson doctrine works on the basis that a potentially valid claim will not be allowed to go to trial and this is why the unfairness to the Defendants must be manifest before the Plaintiffs are denied the right to bring a genuine claim. This is a genuine claim but it is no more than that.

  129. [119] Further, the fact that the Defendants did not seek to have the Henderson v Henderson Issue determined as a preliminary issue and therefore accepted the inevitable burden of a subsequent trial is not a matter that, in my judgment, carries any weight. Mr Goh would naturally have preferred there to be no second trial but the way in which he conducted the second trial once it had been commenced, weighing up the burden of a further trial as against the possibility of a further appeal on the Henderson v Henderson Issue, followed by the second trial if the Defendants failed on the Henderson v Henderson Issue, was a matter for him. It is not a matter relevant on the Henderson v Henderson Issue as it occurred after the date of the writ in this action.

  130. Conclusion on the Henderson v Henderson Issue

  131. [120] Drawing all these factors together, the Plaintiffs in this action could and should have brought the claims made in this action in the 672 Action. Had the claims been raised in that action they could have been adjudicated upon without materially increasing either the burden or length of that trial. It could be foreseen when the writ in this action was issued that if this action proceeded to trial it would be of equivalent magnitude to the 672 trial. The Defendants are Mr Goh and a company controlled by him. Effectively, therefore, it is an individual who is being forced to bear the burden of a second trial.

  132. [121] The 672 Plaintiffs cannot be criticised for seeking relief in that action in the form of Mareva injunctions but where such injunctions are sought, particularly when sought against individuals, more especially against individuals against whom no other relief is sought, the Plaintiffs must act with due diligence in accordance with the rules and with respect for the position in which they have placed the Defendants by obtaining Mareva relief.

  133. [122] The 672 Plaintiffs did not do this. On more than one occasion they used the position the litigation had placed them in to further the Beyonics Group’s interests but disregarded their obligations to the Defendants.

  134. [123] Taking all these factors into account I am satisfied that the Defendants have discharged the heavy burden upon them to demonstrate an abuse of process. In my judgment it would be manifestly unfair to the Defendants, particularly to Mr Goh, for a second trial to take place based on the same matrix of facts as arose in the first trial. The unfairness is such that it outweighs the right of the Plaintiffs to have what is plainly a genuine cause of action tried. This action should therefore be struck out.

  135. [125] As to (a), it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Henderson v Henderson doctrine applies. The unfairness must be manifest. There must be an abuse. This is not a doctrine which gives the court an unfettered discretion to deal as it sees fit with unfairness which falls short of being manifest. It is a matter of judgment not discretion; either the abuse is manifest or it is not. If it is, the only appropriate relief is striking out. If it is not, the application fails and the trial goes ahead in the usual way.

  136. The Substantive Issue

  137. [126] Strictly speaking the decision on the Henderson v Henderson Issue makes it unnecessary for me to give judgment on the Substantive Issue. However the parties wished the trial on the Substantive Issue to go ahead, the evidence was heard and submissions were made. I shall therefore give judgment on the basis that I am wrong on the Henderson v Henderson Issue.

  138. The HDD Industry

  139. [127] This action concerns the manufacture of baseplates which, subsequently, are further processed by the addition of motors and drives to make an end product, a HDD (hard disc drive), which is then incorporated into both desktop and laptop computers.

  140. [128] At all material times, the Beyonics Group had two manufacturing divisions, the PES (Precision Engineering Services) Division and the EMS (Electronic Manufacturing Services) Division (see [3] above). The PES Division manufactured and sold baseplates destined for end customers, such as Seagate, Hitachi and Western Digital. These baseplates are manufactured for an end customer under what is described as a “baseplate programme”, with each programme having its own design specifications and schematics, and a manufacturer of baseplates must be qualified by an end customer to undertake a specific baseplate programme.

  141. [129] The baseplate manufacturing process has two main stages called the “1st Stage” and the “2nd Stage” (see [141] below). Thereafter, completed baseplates are sent to a company which assembles the other components of the HDD in a process called the motor baseplate assembly (“MBA”). This company will then ship the completed baseplate to the end customer. The MBA company which features prominently in this action is the Nidec Corporation (“Nidec”) (see [134(c)] below).

  142. [131] Prior to October 2011, the manufacture of baseplates within the Beyonics Group was divided between BTT, BPM and BTEC. In some cases, 1st Stage work was performed in one facility and 2nd Stage in another. In October 2011 there were extensive floods in Thailand which affected not only BTT’s premises but the premises of other baseplate manufacturers. BTT’s factory was a total write off and resulted in a significant insurance claim. The floods had a major effect on the HDD industry and it was the steps that the various players in that industry took to seek to alleviate the problems that arose that underlie this dispute.

  143. [132] At all material times, Mr Goh was both a director and the CEO of the parent company, BTL. He was also either a director or employee of all the Plaintiffs (see [153] below). The management structure of the Beyonics Group consisted of Mr Goh as the CEO of the Group and, reporting to him, there were General Managers at each manufacturing plant. Mr Lee Leong Hua, who gave evidence, was at all material times Senior General Manager of BTEC’s facility at Changshu.

  144. [133] The 2nd Defendant, currently named Pacific Globe Enterprises Limited, was at the material times named Wyser International Limited and is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It is (and was) owned and controlled by Mr Goh. I shall refer to it as “Wyser”.

  145. [134] The other companies that feature prominently are:

  146. (a) “Seagate”: Seagate Technology International, a company with its headquarters in California, was a customer of both divisions of the Beyonics Group. The PES Division manufactured and supplied baseplates for Seagate HDDs, including baseplates under what was known as the Brinks 2H programme (also known as the Pharaoh programme). The EMS Division manufactured and supplied printed circuit board assemblies. Seagate held about 40% of the HDD market over the relevant period. Mr Chua Wui Chung (“Mr Billy Chua”), Senior Manager for the Commodity Management Team (“CMT”) at Seagate, was subpoenaed to give evidence at the trial by the Plaintiffs.

  147. (b) “Nedec/Kodec”: Nedec Co Ltd and Kodec Co Ltd are incorporated in South Korea and manufacture HDD and automotive components. Nedec and Kodec together with a Chinese company, Langfang Nedec Machinery & Electronics Co. Ltd (“LND”), are members of the NEDEC/KODEC Group of companies. LND has a baseplate manufacturing facility in Langfang, China. Save where necessary, I shall refer to any or all these entities simply as Nedec/Kodec. The Nedec/Kodec group is a private group of companies. The owner and Chairman was Mr Neung Woong Hwang. His son, Mr Sejoon Hwang, also known as Stephen Hwang (“Mr Hwang”), was the CEO and the chief financial officer (“CFO”) was Mr Tae Sung Lee (“Mr Tony Lee”). Mr Tony Lee gave evidence on behalf of the Defendants.

  148. (c) “Nidec”: Not to be confused with Nedec/Kodec, Nidec Corporation is a Japanese manufacturer of electric motors. Their products are found in HDDs, electric appliances, automobiles and commercial and manufacturing equipment. Nidec (Zhejiang) Corporation (“NCC”) and Nidec Electronics (Thailand) Co Ltd (“NET”) were subsidiaries of Nidec Corporation and were at all material times MBA entities. In the case of the PES Division, NCC issued purchase orders to BAP for baseplates manufactured by BTEC, and NET issued purchase orders to BTT for baseplates manufactured by BPM and BTT. Again, save where necessary I shall refer to all these entities, together or individually, as Nidec. No witness from Nidec gave evidence at the trial.

  149. [135] In addition to Seagate, in 2010 the other principle HDD manufacturers were Western Digital, Toshiba, Samsung and Hitachi. There were two sizes of HDD, 2.5” and 3.5”. In 2011 there was a measure of consolidation in the industry. Seagate acquired Samsung’s HDD business, Western Digital acquired Hitachi’s 2.5” business and Toshiba the 3.5” business.

  150. [136] Other entities that were involved in the manufacture of baseplates in addition to companies in the Beyonics Group and Nedec/Kodec were MMI China (a subsidiary of MMI International Holdings Pte Ltd, a Singapore company) and Nidec Brilliant, a subsidiary of Nidec. Prior to the sale of Samsung’s HDD business to Seagate, Nedec/Kodec were qualified to manufacture baseplates for Samsung but not for Seagate. Prior to 2011 the Beyonics Group were qualified to manufacture baseplates for Seagate and Hitachi and, in 2011 began to manufacture also for Western Digital.

  151. [137] When the likes of Seagate, Western Digital and Toshiba launch a new product, a specific baseplate will be required. Whilst the various baseplates are fundamentally similar, the specification for each will vary.

  152. [140] Hence the fact that a company is qualified to manufacture baseplates for one customer does not entitle it to manufacture for another. Equally, qualification for one product does not enable to manufacturer to circumvent the rigorous qualification process for another product.

  153. [141] The manufacture of baseplates involves various manufacturing processes, which can be broadly divided into two main stages. The 1st Stage involves, among other things, die casting and ends with e-coating, and this stage is often referred to as “e-coating”. The 2nd Stage involves, among other things, precision machining and other work to produce a finished baseplate, and this process is often called “machining”.

  154. [142] In the 1st Stage, die casting molten metal is poured into a mould and allowed to solidify; the die casted parts are then sent for trimming, deburring and polishing after which they will be put through a process of stress relief to refine their grain structure. There is then a pre-treatment process to clean the baseplates using chemicals.

  155. [144] The baseplates will then be e-coated to coat the surface of the baseplates and they will be inspected prior to undergoing the 2nd Stage which may be carried out at the same facility as the 1st Stage or they may be transported to a different facility for the 2nd Stage.

  156. [145] In the 2nd Stage, CNCs and/or SPMs are used to drill holes and cut the baseplate. CNC Machines are more precise machines, but are more expensive than SPMs. Hence CNC Machines are generally used to drill critical holes and cut the baseplate whereas SPMs are used to do drilling and tapping of non-critical holes. Both machines can be used for all this work but because the SPM machine is less precise, the propensity for rejected products is greater.

  157. [146] Following sample inspection and the removal of machining burrs certain products will undergo pin assembly. The baseplates then go through a high pressure water jet and ultrasonic washing to clean the holes to remove particles that are not visible to the naked eye. The baseplates will thereafter be put through an air leak test and a final inspection before being shipped to the relevant MBA.

  158. The Issues

  159. [147] With that background, I can turn to consider the issues that arise for determination.

  160. [148] The main claims against Mr Goh and Wyser are for breaches of duties, dishonest assistance, and conspiracy. They are brought by BAP as the primary plaintiff. In the alternative, a similar claim is made by BAP, BTEC, and BPM. It is alleged that in his capacity as a director and/or an employee of those companies, Mr Goh allegedly:

  161. (a) used Wyser secretly to enter into the Wyser Agreements and received undisclosed payments from Nedec/Kodec pursuant thereto;

  162. (b) secured a collaboration between BAP and Nedec/Kodec (“the BN Alliance”) to divert 2nd Stage work in the manufacture of baseplates for Seagate HDDs from the Beyonics Group to Nedec/Kodec, and procured a US$2.5 Million Grant from Seagate to Nedec/Kodec to assist this; and

  163. (c) facilitated Nedec/Kodec’s business with Seagate for the supply/manufacture of baseplates for Seagate HDDs in competition with BAP, BTEC, and/or BPM, with the intention that Nedec/Kodec should supplant the Beyonics Group as a supplier and/or manufacturer of baseplates for Seagate HDDs in whole or in part.

  164. [149] The claim against Wyser is for dishonest assistance of Mr Goh’s alleged breaches of duty and against both Defendants for unlawful means conspiracy.

  165. [150] The primary loss allegedly suffered is the Diversion Loss and the Total Loss referred to in [61] above.

  166. [151] In addition a claim is made by BAP for the return of a bonus S$200,000 awarded to Mr Goh in January 2012 which, it is claimed, would not have been paid if Mr Goh’s alleged breaches had been known to the then directors at that time.

  167. [152] Further, claims are made by BAP, BIL and BTS for the return of the sums paid to Mr Goh under the various Resignation Agreements (see [6] and [70] above) which again, it is alleged, would not have been paid if Mr Goh’s alleged breaches had been known at that time.

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