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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Jul 2020

Singapore International Commercial Court

Hai Jiao 1306 Ltd and others v Yaw Chee Siew

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[2020] SGHC(I) 16Case no. Suit Nos 7–9 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiffs are three special purpose vehicles controlled by ICBC Financial Leasing Co Ltd (“ICBCL”). Each of them is incorporated in the Marshall Islands. ICBCL is a state-owned company in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”). ICBCL is in the business of ship leasing with strong roots in the maritime and offshore industry.

  3. [2] The defendant, Mr Yaw Chee Siew (the “defendant” or “Mr Yaw”), is an individual who was at all material times the sole director and Executive Chairman of Otto Marine Limited (“OML”). OML was a Singapore-incorporated company originally listed on the main board of the Singapore Stock Exchange (“SGX”) until its delisting on 6 October 2016. At its heyday, OML controlled a large fleet of offshore vessels through its group of companies, collectively, the Otto Marine Group (“OM Group”). Following its delisting and until it entered liquidation on 5 October 2018, OML was wholly owned by Ocean International Capital Limited (“Ocean International”), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands which was beneficially owned by the defendant and of which the defendant was the sole shareholder and director.

  4. [3] In 2013 and 2014, ICBCL provided substantial financing to OML in relation to three super-large anchor handling tugs, ie, the “Go Phoenix”, “Go Pegasus” and “Go Perseus” (collectively, the “vessels”). The agreed financing was up to the value of US$255m, of which US$185.5m was paid by ICBCL to OML and the remaining US$69.5m was in the form of OML’s seller’s credit. In summary, the financing took the form of what was, in effect, a sale-and-leaseback of each of the vessels whereby each of the plaintiffs became registered owners of each of the vessels and then chartered them back to companies in the OM Group under separate bareboat charterparties. In summary:

  5. (a) The Go Phoenix and the Go Pegasus were both chartered by the second plaintiff (ie, Hai Jiao 1207 Ltd) and the third plaintiff (ie, Hai Jiao 1307 Ltd) respectively to Otto Fleet Pte Ltd (“Otto Fleet”), a subsidiary of OML under separate bareboat charterparties both dated 26 July 2013 (respectively the “Go Phoenix BBC” and the “Go Pegasus BBC”). In addition, a corporate guarantee was issued by OML in favour of the second plaintiff and third plaintiff, guaranteeing as primary obligor the due and punctual performance by Otto Fleet of all its obligations under the two bareboat charterparties, including its payment of charter hire amongst other things.

  6. (b) The Go Perseus was chartered by the first plaintiff (ie, Hai Jiao 1306 Ltd) to another separate entity within the OM Group, Go Offshore (L) Pte Ltd (“Go Offshore”) under a separate bareboat charterparty dated 26 December 2014 (the “Go Perseus BBC”). In addition, OML and Go Offshore’s parent company, Go Marine Group Pty Ltd (“Go Marine”), which was itself a wholly owned subsidiary of OML, extended a corporate guarantee jointly and severally in favour of the first plaintiff, guaranteeing as primary obligors the due and punctual performance by Go Offshore of all its obligations under the Go Perseus BBC.

  7. We refer to the Go Phoenix BBC, Go Pegasus BBC and the Go Perseus BBC collectively as the “BBCs”; Otto Fleet and Go Offshore collectively as the “Charterers”; OML and Go Marine collectively as the “Guarantors”; and the three corporate guarantees extended by OML and/or Go Marine in favour of each of the plaintiffs, as the case may be, collectively as the “guarantees”.

  8. [4] Thereafter, crude oil prices suffered a marked decline, leading to significant fluctuations in oil prices coupled with an overall deterioration in upstream capital expenditure of oil and gas projects. This in turn had knock-on effects, which included depressed demand for offshore vessels, shipbuilding and subsea services. The utilisation and charter hire rates of the vessels were also severely impacted by the sharp decline in oil prices. The result was that financial difficulties hit the Charterers as well as OML and its related entities.

  9. [6] Following various meetings and discussions in the course of mid-2016, the plaintiffs consented to the delisting of OML in consideration of the defendant agreeing to issue letters of support. These letters of support were drafted by ICBCL and sent to the defendant for his execution of the same (we subsequently refer to these letters as the “First Letters of Support”; see [54] below); they were subsequently amended, and eventually issued to the plaintiffs in September 2017 after extensive delay and protracted negotiations (in this amended form, the letters are subsequently referred to as the “Second Letters of Support”; see [140] below). The three Second Letters of Support were in identical form, but for the formal parts and provided in relevant parts as follows:

  10. [7] As stated above, OML was delisted on 6 October 2016. However, substantial amounts due under the BBCs remained unpaid. Thereafter, the first plaintiff eventually terminated the Go Perseus BBC on 15 November 2017; the second and third plaintiffs terminated the other two BBCs a little later on 31 January 2018. On 21 March 2018, OML was placed in judicial management. However, this failed, and OML subsequently entered liquidation on 5 October 2018. The result is that the plaintiffs have lost substantial sums of money and have outstanding claims including claims for loss of charter hire and damages.

  11. (a) A claim for damages for breach of contract, ie, breach of what are said to be the obligations of the defendant as contained in the relevant letters of support – in particular, the obligation by the defendant to use “best endeavours” to support the Charterers and the Guarantors.

  12. (b) A claim for damages for loss allegedly caused to the plaintiffs as a result of certain misrepresentations allegedly made by or on behalf of the defendant during the various meetings and discussions in the course of 2016 and relied upon by the plaintiffs. That case is advanced at common law on the basis that the said representations were made fraudulently or negligently and/or under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (the “Misrepresentation Act”).

  13. (c) A claim for damages for breach of what the plaintiffs say were one or more collateral undertakings by the defendant.

  14. The total value of the claims advanced by the plaintiffs exceeds US$200m plus interest and costs.

  15. [9] The defendant denies any liability. Further, there are substantial issues concerning quantum which we deal with below.

  16. [10] In this Judgment, we set out the relevant factual background including certain important findings of fact before considering the main substantive issues as well as issues of quantum. However, before doing so, we should mention certain important preliminary matters in particular with regard to the overall shape of the trial and the evidence tendered by the parties.

  17. The trial

  18. [11] The main part of the trial took place over nine days in November 2019. During that period, the following witnesses gave oral evidence and were cross-examined:

  19. (a) On behalf of the plaintiffs:

  20. (i) Mr Hong Xing (also known as Jacky Hong): Executive Director in the Shipping Finance Department of ICBCL. He joined ICBCL in July 2011 and left in March 2018.

  21. (ii) Ms Cao Jiangxin: Senior Manager in the Oil and Gas Offshore Department of ICBCL.

  22. (iii) Mr Yang Changkun: Head of Shipping Finance Department at ICBCL. He joined ICBCL in April 2013 and left in September 2018.

  23. (b) On behalf of the defendant:

  24. (i) The defendant himself, Mr Yaw.

  25. (ii) Ms Chong Sieh Jiuan: Former Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of OML (“Ms Chong”).

  26. (iii) Mr Ooi Kok Chye: Vice President, Treasury of OML (“Mr Ooi”, also known as KC Ooi).

  27. In passing, we should mention that the conduct of the trial was severely disrupted by, in particular (a) the necessity to deal with a number of outstanding applications on the first day of the trial; (b) the production by the defendant in the course of the trial of an avalanche of further documents by way of further disclosure; and (c) various applications on behalf of the defendant to serve additional affidavits of evidence-in-chief and call additional witnesses. It is unnecessary to refer to these events in detail. However, we should note that the result was that whereas the trial had originally been fixed to be completed within the allocated nine days in November 2019, this proved impossible and it became necessary to adjourn the remainder of the trial for the purpose of hearing the expert evidence and final closing oral submissions.

  28. [12] Following the first tranche of the trial, the parties served written factual closing submissions, and the adjourned trial resumed for a further two days in January 2020 when the following experts gave evidence and were cross-examined:

  29. (a) On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr Lee Antony Manning (“Mr Manning”). He is a chartered accountant as well as a licensed insolvency practitioner. He was previously a partner at Deloitte in London for 14 years and is currently a partner in Resolve Advisory.

  30. (b) On behalf of the defendant, Roderick John Sutton (“Mr Sutton”). He is a practising Certified Public Accountant in Hong Kong and a Chartered Accountant in Australia. He is a Special Advisor to the Asia Pacific Region of FTI Consulting and is based in Hong Kong and Singapore.

  31. In broad terms, the expert accounting evidence covered two main issues viz:

  32. (a) The assets that were available to the Charterers, OML and the defendant to meet the payments due under the BBCs. This is relevant, in particular, to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.

  33. (b) What the plaintiffs would have been likely to recover had they declared events of default under the BBCs, terminated them and taken recovery action against the Charterers and/or the Guarantors in 2016. This is relevant to the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims.

  34. [13] Following that hearing, the parties served written closing submissions on the expert evidence. A final hearing took place over two days in February 2020 when counsel made final closing oral submissions. Thereafter, in May 2020, further written submissions were invited for parties to address the issue of whether there was to be a single mortgage over the Parkcity Everly Hotel Bintulu (the “Bintulu Hotel”) in favour of all three plaintiffs for US$14m, or a mortgage for US$14m in favour of each plaintiff. We elaborate on this issue below (see [132] and [363] onwards below).

  35. Striking out of the Defence/Adverse inferences

  36. [16] At trial, the plaintiffs’ position was and remained that the defendant continued to be in breach of various orders of court as well as his general disclosure obligations; that this had seriously prejudiced the fair trial of this case and that the court should therefore strike out, in whole or in part, the defences on liability as to the defendant’s breaches of his best endeavours obligations; and alternatively, that appropriate further adverse inferences be drawn against the defendant. We mention these matters at this stage if only to indicate our conclusion that we reject the plaintiffs’ submission that we should strike out the whole or part of the Defence. We deal with the parties’ respective submissions with regard to this aspect of the case, the reasons for our conclusion and also the questions as to what, if any, further adverse inferences should be drawn later in this Judgment (see [198] to [210] below).

  37. Admissibility of documents/Expert evidence

  38. [17] We should also mention that there was considerable controversy during the trial with regard to (a) the admissibility of certain documents; and (b) the expert evidence. We will deal with these matters when addressing the substantive issues as to which of the said documents/evidence are relevant. However, it is convenient at this stage, for context, to address briefly the plaintiffs’ submission that various documents sought to be relied upon by the defendant were inadmissible on the basis of (a) the failure to prove authenticity; and/or (b) the rule against hearsay.

  39. Authenticity of documents

  40. [18] As to authenticity, the plaintiffs relied upon the principles relating to proof of documents as set out by the Court of Appeal in Jet Holdings Ltd and others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769 (“Jet Holdings”), which they summarised as follows:

  41. (a) Whether or not documents exhibited to an affidavit could be admitted into evidence as authentic documents would depend on the satisfaction of the relevant provisions (ie, ss 63–67) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (the “Evidence Act”). The mere fact that the documents were exhibited to an affidavit does not, without more, automatically admit the documents into evidence (see Jet Holdings at [36]).

  42. (b) The aim of ss 63–67 of the Evidence Act is to ensure that the best evidence is available before the court, which is why, as a general rule, all documents must be proved by primary evidence (which is defined in s 64 of the Evidence Act as meaning the document itself produced for the inspection of the court). Where the original document cannot be produced, secondary evidence may be given in the circumstances set out in s 67 of the Evidence Act (Jet Holdings at [38]).

  43. (c) Whilst formal proof of the documents concerned (ie, authenticity) is dispensed with by the inclusion of such documents in an agreed bundle of documents, the party seeking to introduce the documents will still have to prove the truth of their contents in the absence of any agreement or admission to the contrary (Jet Holdings at [44], [76]).

  44. (d) In the absence of an agreed bundle of documents, the party seeking to introduce the documents into evidence must satisfy the relevant provisions (ie, ss 66–67) of the Evidence Act. However, a balanced approach ought to be taken to ensure that the best evidence is before the court without unduly burdening the party seeking to introduce the documents concerned by producing the original documents or calling the maker of the documents sought to be introduced into evidence (particularly in cases of complex litigation involving numerous documents) (Jet Holdings at [48]–[50], [56]).

  45. (e) Thus, where the party seeking to introduce the documents concerned has not satisfied the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act, the opposing party ought to promptly object to the admission of such documents at that point in time and, in any event, before the documents have been marked and admitted into evidence. If there has been no objection taken by the opposing party at that particular point in time, that party cannot subsequently object to the admission of the documents. This applies a fortiori where the opposing party subsequently cross-examines the relevant witnesses on those documents in an attempt to discredit the truth of the contents stated therein (Jet Holdings at [51], [56]).

  46. [19] In this case, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendant had failed to agree any bundle of documents with the plaintiffs; and that the plaintiffs had filed the following Notices of Non-Admission in respect of various lists of documents filed by the defendant viz:

  47. (a) a Notice of Non-Admission of Authenticity of Documents dated 13 November 2019 as to documents listed at S/N 1–32 of the defendant’s Supplementary List of Documents dated 8 November 2019 and S/N 1–19 of the defendant’s Supplementary List of Documents dated 10 November 2019;

  48. (b) a Notice of Non-Admission of Authenticity of Documents dated 13 November 2019 as to documents listed at S/N 1–2 of the defendant’s Supplementary List of Documents dated 5 November 2019; and

  49. (c) a Notice of Non-Admission of Authenticity of Documents dated 15 November 2019 as to documents listed at S/N 1–36 of the defendant’s Supplementary List of Documents dated 14 November 2019.

  50. Further, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendant had entirely failed to prove the documents in accordance with ss 63 to 67 of the Evidence Act during the trial; and that, accordingly, the foregoing documents are inadmissible under the Evidence Act.

  51. Rule against hearsay

  52. [20] As to the rule against hearsay, the plaintiffs relied upon the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that it was the plaintiffs’ submission that, as explained in that case, even where a document has been proven in accordance with ss 63 to 67 of the Evidence Act, if the truth of its contents have not been proven by way of witness testimony of a person with personal knowledge of the information contained therein, then the document is inadmissible on the basis that it is hearsay. A fortiori, a document which has not been introduced into evidence by way of witness testimony to prove the truth of its contents (either as an exhibit to an affidavit of evidence-in chief or otherwise by cross-examination) is generally inadmissible. On this basis, the plaintiffs took the hearsay objection in relation to various classes of documents, including but not limited to: (a) documents exhibited in affidavits of evidence-in-chief filed by the defendant’s factual witnesses (including the defendant himself) where these witnesses have confirmed under cross-examination that they did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the said documents; and (b) documents not introduced into evidence by way of any affidavits of evidence-in-chief filed by either the plaintiffs’ or defendant’s factual witnesses or through the examination of the relevant factual witnesses at trial.

  53. [21] So far as relevant, we deal with these submissions with regard to authenticity and hearsay at the appropriate juncture later in this Judgment.

  54. The facts

  55. [22] In broad terms, the BBCs were in substantially similar terms. For present purposes, the most relevant provisions were as follows:

  56. (a) Each BBC was for a period of 96 months, ie, eight years.

  57. (b) Charter hire was payable in advance at regular quarterly intervals (falling on 2 February, 2 May, 2 August and 2 November) throughout the year (clause 32.1.6 in each of the BBCs). As the BBCs were, in effect, financial leasing arrangements, payments of charter hire were on a “hell or high water” basis (clause 38.6 in each of the BBCs).

  58. (c) The daily charter hire for the Go Phoenix and Go Pegasus was initially fixed at US$21,700, and the daily charter hire for the Go Perseus, at US$23,950. Late payment of the charter hire attracted default interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

  59. (d) The Charterers were obliged to pay all earnings obtained through the employment of the vessels into a specified earnings account (clause 46 read with Additional Clauses, clause 32.1.14 in each of the BBCs; henceforth the “Earnings Account”), over which the plaintiffs had a charge, which was duly registered.

  60. (e) Events of Default under the BBCs (see, for example, clause 48 of the Perseus BBC; henceforth referred to as “Event(s) of Default”) included:

  61. (i) Failure to pay charter hire or any sum under the BBCs.

  62. (ii) The declaration of the Charterers/the Guarantors as insolvent or their entry into winding up, dissolution, liquidation or bankruptcy.

  63. (iii) The delisting of OML, which (as stated above) was, at the time when the BBCs were entered into, a company listed on the SGX. (This term was subsequently deleted from the BBCs pursuant to addenda entered into between the parties – as to which see further below at [68]).

  64. (f) If any such Event of Default occurred, the plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the relevant BBC, whereupon the Charterers would be obliged to pay all unpaid charter hire as well as charter hire which was to become due and payable until the end of the charter period, and all other sums due and payable but which had been unpaid.

  65. [23] The BBCs were the subject of various addenda. So far as relevant, we deal with these below (see [24], [68] and [142] below).

  66. Decline in the offshore & marine market: Negotiations on unpaid charter hire

  67. [24] On 3 August 2015, the Go Perseus BBC was amended by way of an Addendum whereby the parties agreed inter alia to the revision of charter hire rates for the Go Perseus BBC and the provision of additional security documents for all of the BBCs. Similar Addenda were entered into with respect to the Go Phoenix and Go Pegasus BBCs.

  68. [25] On 2 December 2015, a meeting took place in Shanghai between Mr Yang Changkun, Mr Hong Xing, the defendant, Mr Michael See (“Mr See”), Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of OML and Group CEO of the OM Group, and Mr Alan Seah (“Mr Seah”) of Northcape, OML’s brokers. At the meeting, the defendant requested that the plaintiffs agree to reduce the charter hire rates under the BBCs in the short and medium term in light of the adverse market conditions affecting the vessels’ utilisation. In this connection, the defendant assured the plaintiffs inter alia that he would do his best and utilise his professional network to find employment for the vessels, including making alternative arrangements to deploy the vessels in non-oil related work, such as deep-water pipe laying work; and that he would, in his personal capacity, continue to provide financial and non-financial support to the OM Group.

  69. [26] By early 2016 each of the Charterers was in default under the BBCs by reason of their late payment of charter hire. On 17 February 2016, ICBCL wrote to OML noting that the charter hire for each vessel due on 2 February 2016 had not been received. OML responded on 19 February 2016 advising that two of the three vessels (Go Phoenix and Go Perseus) were in “negative cashflow”. OML sought ICBCL’s “understanding to consider the restructuring of the lease agreement to defer the payment[s]” and advised that “upon the restructuring we will aggressively sell one of the vessels to lighten the burden”.

  70. [27] On 25 February 2016 ICBCL notified OML that its failure to pay the charter hire without any explanation or rescheduling in advance was “unacceptable”; and requested payment before any meeting could take place “for further arrangement”.

  71. [28] Thereafter, further meetings took place between representatives of ICBCL and the OM Group to discuss issues arising out of the financing of the vessels. At these meetings, ICBCL and the plaintiffs were generally represented by some or all of the following individuals: for ICBCL, Mr Yang Changkun, Mr Hong Xing and Ms Cao Jiangxin. The OM Group, on the other hand, was represented by some or all of the following individuals: the defendant, Mr See, Mr Ooi and Ms Chong.

  72. Meeting on 3 March 2016 – the suggestion of privatisation is made

  73. [29] On 3 March 2016, Mr Yang Changkun and Mr Hong Xing met Mr See in ICBCL’s office in Beijing. The defendant did not attend that meeting but he was aware that Mr See was attending. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the current financial position of the Charterers and the potential restructuring of the BBCs. During the meeting, Mr See informed the plaintiffs’ representatives that the Charterers were having difficulty paying charter hire under the BBCs as the vessels’ earnings were insufficient. However, he assured them that the defendant had personally assisted OML to make full payment of the charter hire for the vessels in 2015 and that the OM Group had the support of its other financiers (including Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (“OCBC”), United Overseas Bank (“UOB”), and DBS Bank (“DBS”)) in tiding it through this difficult period. Mr See then informed the plaintiffs’ representatives that the defendant wished to delist OML and sought the plaintiffs’ consent to the delisting. In this connection, Mr See explained the reason for the decision to delist OML on the basis that OML had suffered huge losses in 2015 due to the continuous decline in oil prices but was able to remain solvent by relying heavily on the defendant’s personal financial support; and that the defendant remained committed to the survival of the OM Group and would take all steps necessary, including the injection of funds in his personal capacity, to ensure the solvency of the OM Group. However, as matters stood then, Mr See explained that it did not make sense for the defendant to inject further personal funds into OML as he was merely one of the many shareholders in the publicly-listed company; that doing so at his personal expense would only benefit the other shareholders; and that delisting presented a solution to this dilemma by allowing the defendant to inject further personal funds into OML.

  74. [30] On 11 March 2016, Mr Hong Xing informed OML by email that any proposed refinancing or restructuring could only be submitted to ICBCL’s credit committee “on the basis that there is no outstanding payment”.

  75. Meeting on 17 March 2016

  76. [31] On 17 March 2016, a further meeting took place in Singapore between Mr Yang Changkun, Mr Hong Xing and Mr See. The main purpose of the meeting was for the plaintiffs’ representatives to assess whether major financiers continued to be supportive of the OM Group so as to enable the plaintiffs to assess the proposed delisting of OML. In this respect, Mr See arranged for the plaintiffs’ representatives to meet with representatives of OCBC. Although Mr See had purportedly attempted to arrange meetings with UOB and DBS, those meetings ultimately did not take place. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the plaintiffs’ representatives were satisfied that OCBC remained supportive of the OM Group.

  77. [32] Following the meeting with OCBC, Mr See further represented to the plaintiffs’ representatives that:

  78. (a) the defendant and his family collectively owned and had an interest in approximately 60% of the shares in OML and had continued to provide financial support to OML on a number of occasions;

  79. (b) the continued listing of OML on the SGX limited the amount of financial support that the defendant and his family could provide to OML; and

  80. (c) the delisting and privatisation of OML would allow decisions to be taken quickly as well as allow the defendant and his family to provide further financial support to the OM Group.

  81. [33] In addition, Mr See advised ICBCL that OML was “planning to start privatisation in the near future” and that “after privatisation, the [Yaw] family’s holding ratio will not be lower than 90%, which is more conducive to quick decision-making and further support”. Mr See said that he hoped that ICBCL would support OML’s plans.

  82. [34] In light of these assurances (and the apparently supportive attitude of OCBC), the evidence of Mr Yang Changkun (which we accept) was that the plaintiffs’ representatives decided to continue further discussions regarding the proposed delisting of OML and reduction of charter rates with a view to seeking the approval of the plaintiffs’ and ICBCL’s management.

  83. Meeting of 15 April 2016

  84. [35] To facilitate the approval process, Mr Yang Changkun and Mr Hong Xing arranged a meeting with the plaintiffs’ and ICBCL’s management (including Mr Yang Changkun’s superior, Mr Ji Fuxing, Deputy CEO of ICBCL) and the defendant. The meeting was attended by the defendant personally and Mr See, as well as (amongst others) Mr Yang Changkun and Mr Hong Xing as the plaintiffs’ representatives.

  85. [36] During the meeting, the defendant pressed for a reduction in charter hire under the BBCs so that the Charterers could continue fulfilling their payment obligations under the BBCs, and the Guarantors under the guarantees. In addition, the evidence of Mr Yang Changkun (which we accept) was that the defendant made the following representations viz:

  86. (a) In the past year, he had extended financial support to the OM Group in his personal capacity, which had been used in part to pay charter hire under the BBCs.

  87. (b) He was willing to continue supporting the OM Group. However, the continued listing of OML and his status as a majority shareholder (holding or controlling approximately 60% of the shares) severely limited his ability to provide such financial assistance. The privatisation would remove the limitation to his ability to personally support the company. The defendant would then be able to provide further financial support to the OM Group (using his personal resources, including his family’s connections) which was necessary for the group’s survival.

  88. (c) He would, in connection with the delisting process, personally inject approximately S$150m into OML. These sums would be used to, inter alia, provide working capital for OML.

  89. [37] In light of these reassurances, Mr Ji Fuxing indicated during the meeting that he was, in principle, agreeable to the delisting of OML on various conditions including full payment of all outstanding charter hire under the BBCs by 23 April 2016; the reduction of charter hire for two vessels to less than US$9,000 each; and OML undertaking to accelerate the payment of US$7m as the principal for the third vessel within a certain time (preliminarily fixed at 60 days) after delisting, so as to ensure that the book value of the vessel in ICBCL’s account would not be higher than the market value.

  90. [38] A record of the discussions at that meeting includes the following:

  91. [39] Shortly after this meeting, a conversation took place on 17 April 2016, the key points of which were captured in an email sent by Mr Ooi to one Joseph Lau (the defendant’s cousin) and the defendant on 18 April 2016. This conversation discussed a loan being granted by RHB Bank Berhad, Singapore Branch (“RHB”) in the net amount of S$70m, which was to be used towards the privatisation of OML. The loan would be made in two tranches. A first tranche of S$70m would be made available to the defendant, who would then loan the sum as a bridging loan to OML to “settle the [medium term notes] due on 1st August 2016”. A second tranche of S$70m would be made available to OML after successful privatisation, with OML to use the proceeds to repay the bridging loan from the defendant who would then “return the same amount to RHB to clear the 1st tranche bridging loan”.

  92. [40] On 19 April 2016, one Cezzane See of OML wrote by email to Mr Hong Xing referring to the meeting on 15 April 2016, expressing her “utmost gratitude” for ICBCL “accepting our proposed restructuring ideas for the Go Pegasus, Go Phoenix and Go Perseus”. That email confirmed that this was subject to OML clearing the outstanding February 2016 charter hire by the end of April 2016. Mr See followed up on this email the next day, 20 April 2016, by confirming to Mr Hong Xing that the defendant had called him about the matters referred to in the email. Mr See indicated that OML was “committed to have the matter resolved”, and requested ICBCL’s support, while at the same time acknowledging that ICBCL’s agreement was “subject to Feb settlement”.

  93. [41] During March and April 2016, the outstanding charter hire for the vessels that had been due on 2 February 2016 was paid. The amount of US$1,508,850 due in respect of Go Perseus was paid on 29 April 2016. The amount of US$1,367,100 due in respect of Go Phoenix was paid on 28 April 2016. The amount of US$1,367,100 due in respect of Go Pegasus was paid in three instalments: US$239,000 on 9 March 2016; US$224,965 on 13 April 2016; and US$903,135 on 29 April 2016.

  94. ICBCL approves the OML delisting and restructuring of the BBCs

  95. [42] The internal process at ICBCL for approval of the change in arrangements with the OM Group occurred in late April and early May 2016. As submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, this was not a mere rubber-stamping exercise but was a process involving various important stages. The first step of this process involved an application by ICBCL’s Shipping Finance Department to its Project Review Committee. The application dated 21 April 2016 was initially prepared by Mr Hong Xing. It was thereafter approved by one Mr Lyu Zhuo before subsequently being approved by Mr Yang Changkun (respectively the Group Head and Department Head of ICBCL’s Shipping Finance Department). In broad terms, it was recommended that ICBCL agree to the delisting of OML and reduction of the charter hire for the Go Perseus for two years, subject to payment of the sum of US$70m or the provision of security in lieu within 90 days of privatisation by OML, and certain other measures to reduce ICBCL’s risks:

  96. [43] The grounds in support of the recommendations included the following:

  97. [44] Mr Yang Changkun’s unchallenged evidence was that he consented to the application in reliance on the following representations/assurances of the defendant:

  98. (a) The defendant had injected his personal funds into the Charterers/the Guarantors and had procured them to make timely payment of the charter hire payments under the BBCs to the plaintiffs.

  99. (b) The defendant would continue to inject his personal funds into the Charterers/the Guarantors to keep them as going concerns, and procure them to (a) make timely payment of charter hire, and (b) perform their other payment obligations under the BBCs/the guarantees.

  100. (c) OML’s delisting was to facilitate the provision by the defendant of further funding to OML.

  101. (d) The defendant would inject personal funds of approximately S$150m in connection with the delisting and would inject further funds into the Charterers/the Guarantors as and when necessary to keep them as going concerns and procure them to make timely payment under the BBCs/the guarantees.

  102. [45] On 22 April 2016, ICBCL’s internal auditor considered this application. The internal auditor noted that the market value of OML was only about US$35m, whereas shareholder’s equity was US$207m. It therefore considered that “privatisation [was] economically meaningful to some extent”. In addition, the internal auditor noted that Mr See had communicated that the privatisation would involve the redemption of S$70m of mid-term notes maturing in August 2016 and the injection of working capital. The substantial shareholder, meaning the defendant, was also said to be providing “a total of about SGD150 million … for the privatization, which will mainly be the own fund[s] of the substantial shareholder”. That said, the internal auditor expressed its doubts over this proposed course of action, noting that “[c]onsidering the current general depression of the shipping market, whether the shareholder may complete the privatization as scheduled and inject sufficient fund[s] to repay the debt is somewhat uncertain”.

  103. [46] In the event, the internal auditor supported the proposal, subject to three conditions: (a) that all outstanding charter hire be paid before execution of the agreement; (b) that an additional mortgage in the sum of not less than US$8m in aggregate be provided for the vessels by 31 December 2018; and (c) that the privatisation process of OML be monitored to ensure that the debts remained payable in spite of the privatisation, and that accelerated payment of US$7m be made by “the shareholder” (ie, the defendant) in respect of the Go Perseus within 90 days after completion of privatisation.

  104. [47] The proposal next went before ICBCL’s Project Review Committee on 5 May 2016. The Project Review Committee approved the proposal subject to the conditions proposed by the internal auditor, and introduced an additional condition of its own: that a letter of support be obtained from the defendant to provide “fund support” in the event the Charterers faced difficulties in paying the charter hire. The minutes of the committee’s meeting record:

  105. [48] That same day, 5 May 2016, a Vice President of ICBCL’s Project and Investment Approving Department inserted a comment that the “[s]hareholder support letter shall be obtained within 90 days of privatization”; another Vice President agreed with this comment the next day. The application was approved on 6 May 2016 (see [51] below).

  106. [49] In addition, ICBCL proposed to restructure the BBCs. This was conveyed by an email from ICBCL to OML on 28 April 2016. The key terms of the restructured BBCs were that: (a) all outstanding charter hire would be paid before the end of April; (b) the daily charter hire for both the Go Phoenix and Go Perseus would be reduced to US$9,000 from 2 May 2016 to 2 February 2018; (c) at the end of the charter period for the Go Pegasus, the lessor (ie, the third plaintiff) would have a put option to sell the vessel to OML at US$35,870,000 (net of OML’s seller’s credit); (d) OML’s delisting would be accepted; (e) OML would place a US$7m deposit (“the Deposit”) in the “[l]essor’s” account within 60 days of the delisting, which would not be refundable (though not apparent from ICBCL’s email, it became clear that “the lessor’s account” was a reference to a bank account of the first plaintiff’s choosing – the first plaintiff was to notify the Charterer, Go Offshore, of the specific bank account the Deposit was to be transferred to); and (f) OML would provide an additional ship mortgage of not less than US$8m before 31 December 2018. OML was also reminded that the next payment date was 2 May 2016.

  107. The First Letters of Support

  108. [50] Meanwhile, during the approval process, ICBCL raised the possibility of the defendant providing a personal guarantee in consideration of ICBCL’s consent to the restructuring. This was to take into account the fact that the guarantee from OML would cease to be security from a listed company upon delisting. This requirement was conveyed orally by Mr Hong Xing to the defendant through Mr See; the defendant refused to provide a personal guarantee, and this was conveyed to Mr Hong Xing. Following this, by an email dated 25 April 2016, Mr Hong Xing wrote to Mr See stating that the Vice President of ICBCL’s Risk and Credit Department had “compromised” and requested instead a “letter of support” to be provided by the defendant.

  109. [51] On 6 May 2016, the application was formally approved by ICBCL’s management. Accordingly, the evidence of Mr Yang Changkun (which we accept) was that ICBCL and the plaintiffs agreed to the proposed restructuring of the OM Group and the delisting of OML from the SGX, on the basis inter alia that the following conditions were satisfied:

  110. (a) the outstanding charter hire under the BBCs had to be paid;

  111. (b) OML would make payment of the Deposit to the plaintiffs within 90 days of the delisting of OML; and

  112. (c) the defendant would execute the letters of support within 90 days of the delisting of OML.

  113. [52] The nature of this last “condition” was the subject of some confusion and conflicting evidence at the trial. According to Mr Yang Changkun, even though the internal requirement was for the defendant to deliver the letters of support within 90 days of the delisting of OML, this requirement was conveyed orally by the plaintiffs through Mr Hong Xing to the defendant as a “condition precedent” to the proposed restructuring and delisting. That this was the common understanding of the parties at the material time is also supported by two fairly contemporaneous emails dated 6 and 19 September 2016 respectively sent by Stephenson Harwood LLP (“Stephenson Harwood”), lawyers for OML (we elaborate on these emails at [81] below). As stated in paragraph 20 of his affidavit of evidence-in-chief dated 17 September 2019, the defendant accepts that in or around May 2016, he “… agreed to issue Letters of Support in favour of the First Plaintiffs in consideration for the Plaintiffs’ agreement to the de-listing of the Guarantor.” Notwithstanding, according to paragraph 19 of the same affidavit, the evidence of the defendant was that the plaintiffs did not “at this juncture, make the execution and delivery of the said letter of support a condition precedent to [the delisting of OML]”; and that “the notion of a letter of support being a condition precedent only surfaced in or around July 2017.”

  114. [53] These two statements are not easy to reconcile. In our view, the confusion arises because of the use of the term “condition precedent”. Plainly, if the agreement was that the defendant would execute the letters of support only within 90 days of the delisting of OML, the provision of such letters of support in executed form by the defendant could not be said to be a “condition precedent” to the delisting if the latter were intended to mean that such letters of support had to be provided before the delisting. However, given the nature of the discussions that had taken place and the circumstances which existed in and following April/May 2016, it would seem likely that the agreement or at least mutual understanding of the parties was that the plaintiffs’ consent to the delisting was on the basis that the defendant would provide letters of support to the plaintiffs; and that the agreement or at least mutual understanding of the parties to provide such letters of support was, in that sense, a “condition precedent” to the plaintiffs’ consent to the delisting of OML albeit the letters of support would only be executed after the delisting. In other words, the plaintiffs’ consent to the delisting of OML was conditional upon the defendant agreeing to provide the letters of support within 90 days of the delisting of OML. To a certain extent, this debate is, in our view, somewhat arid because of subsequent events including the terms of the Addenda agreed by the parties in July 2016 (as to which see [68] below).

  115. [54] Be that as it may, on 5 May 2016, ICBCL wrote to OML and Stephenson Harwood attaching draft letters of support (ie, the First Letters of Support) to be provided to each of the plaintiffs by the defendant; and, requesting OML to arrange for the defendant to sign the First Letters of Support, leave them undated and send a scanned copy of each to ICBCL by email with the originals to follow in the post.

  116. More delays in payments

  117. [55] According to the defendant, the Charterers continued to face difficulties in making payments of the charter hire due on 2 May 2016. On 9 May 2016, Mr See wrote to Mr Hong Xing indicating that it would be “very tough” to pay the charter hire due that month, and that payment of the charter hire due in May 2016 could not be a “CP”, or condition precedent, for the delisting of OML. He explained the significant difficulties OML had in finding work for the vessels. Mr Hong Xing replied indicating that he could not accept Mr See’s “proposal” (ie, ICBCL could not accept any more delays in payment), and that if ICBCL had realised that even the first tranche of charter hire due after the restructuring would not be paid, he did not believe the restructuring would have been approved.

  118. [56] Even as the charter hire due to ICBCL was not paid, however, on 18 May 2016 Mr See sent a text message to the defendant in the following terms:

  119. [57] ICBCL, for its part, continued to pursue OML for payment. On 24 May 2016, Mr Hong Xing sent an email to Mr See, with the subject title “Due and Payable charterhire, urgent!!!”. He wrote: “[w]e are pushed [sic] very hard for the due and payable charterhire of all three ships, please check and confirm urgently when it will be paid as it has been due on 2nd of May”.

  120. [58] Mr See then wrote to the defendant, informing him that Mr Hong Xing had “called everyday” and expressed the concern that he (Mr Hong Xing) “may not be able to hold”. In response to Mr See, the defendant wrote:

  121. [59] Mr See responded to the defendant on the same day in the following terms:

  122. [60] The defendant responded to Mr See on the same day in the following terms:

  123. [61] In response, Mr See advised the defendant that he would call Mr Hong Xing the following morning and noted that the payment of US$1m was to be made to ICBCL that week.

  124. [62] On 26 May 2016, US$269,957.30 of the amount due of US$828,000 was paid in respect of Go Phoenix; and US$270,000 of the amount due of US$828,000 was paid in respect of Go Perseus. On 16 May 2016, US$499,980 of the amount due of US$1,397,480 was paid in respect of Go Pegasus.

  125. Announcement of the voluntary delisting

  126. [63] On 7 June 2016, a further meeting took place between inter alia Mr Yang Changkun, Mr See and the defendant to follow up on the status of the restructuring. During the meeting, the defendant confirmed the proposed restructuring was progressing as expected. The defendant and Mr See outlined the proposed timelines for the delisting (targeting October 2016) and the defendant then further confirmed that he had no problems funding the restructuring exercise. Additionally, he again emphasised his willingness to invest his personal wealth and other resources (including procuring the backing of his family and the Samling Group, which was a group of companies owned and run by the defendant and his family) to support the OM Group.

  127. [64] However, on the very next day, ie, 8 June 2016, OML (as “the Company” in the excerpt below) and Ocean International (as “the Offeror” in the excerpt below) made a Joint Announcement of the proposed voluntary delisting of OML from the Official List of the SGX.

  128. [65] The Joint Announcement included the following:

  129. [66] ICBCL was caught by surprise by the announcement of the voluntary delisting of OML. Upon learning of the announcement, Mr Hong Xing immediately wrote to Mr See protesting that OML had made the delisting announcement without ICBCL’s consent, which had “obviously breach[ed] Clause 48 of the [BBCs]”. Thus, ICBCL “strongly request[ed]” OML to either (a) pay all outstanding charter hire immediately following which “[ICBCL] will agree to the delisting” or (b) withdraw the delisting announcement.

  130. [67] On 12 June 2016, Mr See replied on OML’s behalf stating in material part:

  131. July 2016 Addenda

  132. [68] On 12 July 2016 the plaintiffs and the Charterers entered into Addenda to each of the BBCs (the “July 2016 Addenda”). The recitals to the Addenda for the Go Perseus and Go Phoenix BBCs (in each case entitled Addendum No 2) were in substantially similar form and included the following:

  133. Further, pursuant to clause 32.1.6 of Schedule 3 of the respective Addenda to these two BBCs, the charter hire rate was lowered to US$9,000 per day.

  134. [69] An Addendum, entitled Addendum No 3, was similarly agreed in respect of the Go Pegasus BBC on 12 July 2016, but its recitals were different. Instead, the recitals relevantly read:

  135. Unlike the Go Perseus and Go Phoenix BBCs, the charter hire rate under clause 32.1.6 of the Go Pegasus BBC was not lowered pursuant to this Addendum.

  136. [70] Each of these three Addenda included the following clause 5.1 viz:

  137. [71] Consistent with clause 5.1, Part I of Schedule 1 contained a list of what were described as “Condition Precedent Documents” including (in paragraph 7): “Any further documentation which may be required by the Owners”.

  138. [72] The Go Perseus BBC, but not the other BBCs, as amended included clause 44.38 pursuant to which Go Offshore (the Charterer) agreed, subject to certain events that are not material, as follows:

  139. [74] However, the defendant did not take any steps to execute and deliver the First Letters of Support to the plaintiffs. Although the defendant’s representatives (ie, Ms Chong, Mr See and Mr Ooi) had repeatedly reassured the plaintiffs as well as their lawyers, Wikborg Rein Singapore Pte Ltd (“Wikborg”), that the First Letters of Support would be provided in due course, it remained the case that delivery of the First Letters of Support was not forthcoming (see [78]–[84] below). This state of affairs persisted up to and even after OML’s delisting in October 2016. (As elaborated below, although it appears that the defendant did sign the First Letters of Support at some time prior to 10 November 2016, they were never actually delivered or handed over to the plaintiffs or ICBCL).

  140. August 2016 meeting

  141. [75] In or around end July 2016, there was an internal reorganisation in ICBCL. A new department, known as the Energy Department, was set up and all offshore projects were transferred to within its purview. Mr Hong Xing was transferred to this department and began working on the project relating to the vessels with new colleagues from the Energy Department. Mr Yang Changkun, however, remained in the Ship Financing Department and thus was not involved in the project during this period until the projects were transferred back to the Ship Financing Department in December 2016.

  142. [76] Between 3 and 5 August 2016 a team from ICBCL travelled to Singapore and Batam to carry out project handover and customer due diligence for the vessels. During that visit, a meeting took place between the parties’ representatives viz on the plaintiffs’ side Mr Hong Xing, Ms Cao Jiangxin as well as other various persons from the Energy Department; and on the defendant’s side, Mr See and Ms Chong. In the course of that meeting, there were some general discussions with regard to the financial position of the OM Group. In particular, during those discussions, certain representations were made by Mr See and/or Ms Chong viz:

  143. (a) The most recent round of charter hire payments by the Charterers had been made using funds personally injected by the defendant.

  144. (b) The defendant and his family remained supportive of the Charterers/OML. The defendant remained committed to support the business of the OM Group and had ample financial resources, including the resources of the Samling Group, to support the OM Group.

  145. (c) The defendant would inject funds of approximately S$140m into OML in connection with the delisting and would inject further funds as and when necessary to support the business of the OM Group.

  146. (d) The delisting of OML was to allow the defendant to provide greater financial support for the Charterers/the Guarantors.

  147. [77] An internal report of that visit noted that having regard to the low international oil price and the decline in the global utilisation ratio and hire rate of marine support vessels, “the overall operation of Otto Marine is challenging”. The report also included the following:

  148. Requests for the First Letters of Support

  149. [78] On 12 August 2016, SGX approved OML’s application for delisting.

  150. [79] On 6 September 2016, Wikborg wrote to Mr See in terms that included the following:

  151. Mr See asked that either Ms Chong or Mr Ooi “handle” this issue.

  152. [80] On 13 September 2016, Wikborg wrote again to OML requesting it to have the defendant sign the First Letters of Support. When there was no response, a further request was made by Wikborg on 15 September 2016. There were further follow-up communications on 19 September 2016. By this time, OML’s lawyers, Stephenson Harwood, were writing to Ms Chong and Mr Ooi asking for the signed First Letters of Support.

  153. [81] On 19 September 2016, Mr Ooi finally responded to Stephenson Harwood. He wrote that he was “advised the signing of the Letter is upon delisting of [OML], which should be after the Exit Offer closed on 30th September 2016”. Stephenson Harwood’s response, however, was that this was not the case. Instead, Stephenson Harwood clarified to Mr Ooi that “the signed letters were a condition precedent which should have been delivered to [ICBCL] at the time the bareboat charters for the three vessels were amended”, and it was only because Mr Yaw was travelling at that time that closing proceeded on the condition that the “letters would be signed and delivered to [ICBCL] as soon as possible thereafter”.

  154. [82] Mr Ooi then wrote to the defendant attaching the unexecuted First Letters of Support, requesting that the defendant return a signed copy through email with the originals to follow. The defendant replied with the following:

  155. [83] Mr Ooi replied to the defendant on 20 September 2016 in the following terms:

  156. [84] There was no response given to ICBCL or Wikborg and a further follow-up email was sent on 22 September 2016 suggesting that ICBCL could attend upon the defendant so that he could sign the First Letters of Support “soonest”. After further communications both by email and text message, ICBCL was informed by Wikborg on 27 September 2016 that OML had “assured” a “commitment” for the defendant to sign the First Letters of Support and that the board/management acknowledged that it must be signed. It was suggested that the delay was “simply because” the defendant “ha[d] not been in Singapore the last couple of weeks”. Nothing further happened and on 6 October 2016 a further follow-up email was sent to Mr Ooi seeking an “update” with a request for the First Letters of Support to be provided by close of business on 7 October 2016.

  157. OML delists from the SGX

  158. [85] On 7 October 2016, OML delisted from the SGX.

  159. [86] In passing, we should mention that it was the plaintiffs’ case that based on the defendant’s assurances, the delisting should have enabled the defendant to procure even more funding for OML (both from himself and his family) to enable OML to continue as a going concern, and (more importantly from the perspective of the plaintiffs) to ensure that the Charterers/the Guarantors made timely payment of sums due under the BBCs/the guarantees. However, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that this was far from the case. In fact, as further submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, even at the time of OML’s delisting, the Charterers were in default of their obligations to pay the 2 August charter hire instalment under the BBCs. This persisted despite various email reminders sent by Ms Cao Jiangxin to Mr See and Ms Chong (on 21 September 2016, 8 October 2016, ie, immediately after the delisting, and 11 October 2016). This charter hire instalment was only finally paid on 25 October 2016 after the plaintiffs issued a letter of demand from their legal department on 18 October 2016 requiring payment within seven days. Even this payment, however, was short as it did not include default interest payable under the BBCs (an issue only finally resolved by a further payment on 27 October 2016). This is further discussed below (see [88] and [89]).

  160. ICBCL makes further requests for payment of charter hire and delivery of the executed First Letters of Support

  161. [87] On 8 October 2016, ICBCL wrote to OML advising it was very glad to hear of the delisting on 7 October 2016. That communication included the following:

  162. [88] As stated above, a charter hire instalment had been due on 2 August 2016, but was only finally paid on 25 October 2016 after the plaintiffs issued a letter of demand on 18 October 2016 requiring payment within seven days. But, again as stated above, even this payment was short as it did not include default interest which had also become due, which payment was only made on 27 October 2016.

  163. [89] Meanwhile, ICBCL’s further attempts in early October 2016 to have the First Letters of Support signed by the defendant were unsuccessful. On 10 October 2016, Wikborg wrote to OML in terms that included the following:

  164. [90] On 12 October 2016 Mr Seah (of Northcape) wrote to Mr Hong Xing telling him that Mr See had just returned from Malaysia the previous day where he had given a presentation about OML to the Samling Group management and stating in relevant part:

  165. As is apparent from the reproduced extract, OML was to fall under the Samling Energy Group which specialised in the energy industry – Samling Energy is one of several groups under the umbrella of the larger and diversified Samling Group.

  166. [91] It is the plaintiffs’ position that by this time, there were already several defaults on the part of the Charterers/the Guarantors which entitled the plaintiffs to immediately terminate the BBCs and call upon the guarantees. These were:

  167. (a) the Charterers’/the Guarantors’ failure to make full and timely payment of the charter hire due on 2 August 2016;

  168. (b) the defendant’s failure to execute and/or to deliver the First Letters of Support to the plaintiffs, which was a condition under the July 2016 Addenda (and upon which they were premised); and

  169. (c) the delisting of OML which, but for the July 2016 Addenda which in turn was conditional upon the delivery of the First Letters of Support, would have been an Event of Default.

  170. [92] Moreover, it is the plaintiffs’ case that Mr See (acting as the defendant’s representative) had caused Mr Seah to send the 12 October 2016 email to the plaintiffs and had allowed the representations in the email to continue so as to induce the plaintiffs to forbear from immediately taking steps to enforce their rights under the BBCs and/or the guarantees; and that this ploy succeeded. In this context, the plaintiffs rely on the unchallenged evidence of Mr Hong Xing that: (a) he relied upon the representations in the email and, as a result, did not make recommendations to ICBCL’s management to adopt a more aggressive approach against the Charterers/the Guarantors in respect of the foregoing defaults; and (b) in the absence of these representations, he would have recommended that the Charterers/the Guarantors be treated as a defaulting customer and for the plaintiffs to take steps (or threaten to take steps) to enforce their rights under the BBCs/the guarantees and the First Letters of Support.

  171. [93] On 14 October 2016, Mr Clarence Lun, the then General Counsel of OML, forwarded copies of “revised” letters of support to Wikborg and Mr Hong Xing for “further review”. Mr Lun stated that he had amended the wording from “best endeavours” to “reasonable endeavours” as that would “suffice [for] the purposes for the letter of support”. Mr Lun also suggested that provisions for arbitration be included together with a “tiered dispute [resolution] clause for mediation”. In passing, we should note that this is the same Mr Lun who has also acted as counsel on behalf of the defendant in these proceedings.

  172. [94] That same day, on 14 October 2016, Wikborg replied stating that the “drafts were in agreed form”, and that ICBCL was “not accepting any changes”. Mr See, who had been copied to this correspondence, then intervened, noting that the form was “like a guarantee”, but it “[had] been clear that it should not be a guarantee but [a] mere support letter”. Mr See forwarded this correspondence to the defendant, who had previously not been party to the correspondence, informing him: “Fyi … We are pushing back on wordings”. Wikborg replied to Mr See, stating that the First Letters of Support were not worded as a guarantee and requested that Stephenson Harwood advise OML accordingly.

  173. [95] On 17 October 2016, Mr Hong Xing replied to the correspondence confirming the position taken by Wikborg. He stated the following:

  174. [96] On 18 October 2016, Mr Lun sent an email to Wikborg and Mr See with copies to inter alios Mr Hong Xing referring to the fact that Wikborg had highlighted in their email that the First Letters of Support were “… essentially a letter from Mr Yaw to confirm that he will support [OML] and its related subsidiaries and is not enforceable as a personal guarantee per se”. Mr Lun then stated that “[f]ollowing your confirmation, we have no further issues or queries”.

  175. [97] Further defaults followed with the Charterers/the Guarantors defaulting on the 2 November 2016 charter hire instalments. Various emails were sent by Mr Hong Xing and Ms Cao Jiangxin in this regard to Mr See and Ms Chong. Thus, for example, on 3 November 2016, Ms Cao Jiangxin sent Mr See an email reminding him that the main reason why the plaintiffs had consented to the delisting was for the defendant to provide financial support to the Charterers/OML so that payments to the plaintiffs would be made punctually. The email states in this regard:

  176. No substantive response to this email was ever received.

  177. [98] It is apparent that by 10 November 2016 the defendant had in fact signed the First Letters of Support, as scanned copies of the signed First Letters of Support were sent to the defendant, Mr See and Mr Ooi for their records. It is not disputed, however, that these scans and the signed copies were never delivered or handed over to the plaintiffs or ICBCL.

  178. ICBCL asks that pending issues be settled urgently

  179. [99] On 24 November 2016 Mr Hong Xing wrote to Mr See referring to previous discussions and stating that certain “issues are still pending” with a request that he arrange for them to be “settled urgently”. The pending issues were listed as: (a) the Deposit to be paid within 60 days from the delisting, ie, before 6 December 2016; (b) the First Letters of Support to be signed by the defendant and dated immediately upon the delisting; and (c) payment of the charter hire due on 2 November 2016.

  180. [100] On 5 December 2016, Ms Chong replied on OML’s behalf. She described the depressed market outlook for the industry and proposed that certain changes be made:

  181. [101] On 7 December 2016, Mr Hong Xing responded rejecting the proposal and stating in material part:

  182. The question as to the financial position of OML and the defendant at this time is a critical part of this case. So far as relevant, we deal with this below when considering the plaintiffs’ case with regard to the defendant’s obligations.

  183. [102] On 9 December 2016, by email to a number of people including Mr See and Mr Lun, ICBCL requested OML to scan a copy of the signed First Letters of Support (referred to in this communication as “the signed letters of undertaking”) and to have the originals sent by courier to ICBCL “soonest possible”. An alternative suggestion was made for ICBCL to collect the First Letters of Support that afternoon. The reference to the term “undertaking” appears to have concerned OML and it then sought an opinion from Mr Lun as to whether the First Letters of Support were in fact letters of undertaking.

  184. [103] On 12 December 2016, ICBCL sought an “update” from OML as to the status of the delivery of the First Letters of Support. On 15 December 2016, Wikborg again requested that the scanned copies of the First Letters of Support (although described again in the email as “letters of undertaking”) be sent urgently to them. Mr See directed Wikborg to take up the matter with Mr Lun. On 16 December 2016 Wikborg wrote to Mr Lun, asking that he “immediately scan copies of the [First Letters of Support]” [emphasis in original] to them. Mr Lun did not respond immediately but an email in evidence records that he did pick up a call from Wikborg on 19 December 2016.

  185. [104] On 21 December 2016, Mr Lun wrote to Wikborg seeking further clarification on the First Letters of Support. He was concerned about the use of the term “letters of undertaking” and stated OML’s position that “the letters are merely a letter of comfort and do not have any legal obligation”. He indicated that OML would like to “enquire on the purpose and intent of the letter” before it released the First Letters of Support.

  186. December 2016 Meeting

  187. [105] On 15 December 2016, representatives of ICBCL, including Mr Hong Xing and Ms Cao Jiangxin, had a meeting with the defendant and Mr See in Singapore. During the meeting, the former’s representatives expressed their concerns that, despite the defendant’s earlier representations that he would inject funds into OML and that those funds would be used to fulfil the Charterers’/the Guarantors’ payment obligations under the BBCs/the guarantees, there remained approximately US$10.05m outstanding as of the date of the meeting. Mr Hong Xing and Ms Cao Jiangxin demanded inter alia that the defendant furnish the plaintiffs with the First Letters of Support without further delay and provide long-term solutions such as asset replacement/refinancing of the debts of OML by using other assets and properties owned by the defendant personally, whether in Malaysia or elsewhere. The defendant agreed to the above and assured Mr Hong Xing and Ms Cao Jiangxin of his continued support for the OM Group.

  188. [107] The defendant and Mr See also said that the utilisation rate of Go Phoenix in 2016 was 30% whilst the utilisation rate of Go Pegasus in the same year was 100%. The third vessel, Go Perseus, had been “put on sale” at a price of US$60m with a potential purchaser from Norway having been identified. ICBCL commented that if OML was unable to give a deadline for the sale, it would look for other purchasers concurrently.

  189. [108] The record of the meeting included the following:

  190. [109] The evidence of Mr Yang Changkun (which we accept) was that in reliance on the representations made during this meeting, the plaintiffs did not take any immediate enforcement action against the Charterers/the Guarantors.

  191. The First Letters of Support are withheld

  192. [110] On 27 December 2016, Mr Lun sent an email to ICBCL stating that he had “decided to hold back the release of the letters for now” and explained his reasons. He suggested that ICBCL’s reference to the First Letters of Support as a letter of “undertaking” demonstrated some “divergence” between the parties’ understanding because OML’s position was that the First Letters of Support were “merely letters of comfort”. Mr Lun stated:

  193. [111] In that email, Mr Lun also disclosed that he had separately sought formal legal advice from a reputable law firm (ie, Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP (“Dentons Rodyk”)) on the First Letters of Support. A copy of their written advice (dated 23 December 2016), which was addressed to him, was attached as an enclosure to a letter from Dentons Rodyk to Mr Lun. In particular, the advice considered the nature of the obligation to use “best endeavours” in light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in KS Energy Services Ltd v BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 SLR 905 (“KS Energy”). The main conclusions are set out in paragraph 11 of the letter from Dentons Rodyk in the following terms:

  194. [112] In his covering email, Mr Lun suggested that this advice seemed to be “contrary to the intent between the parties” and he made the following proposals:

  195. [113] Mr Lun also requested ICBCL to write a letter to confirm that “the content of the letter does not require Mr Yaw to draw on his personal wealth to fulfil the financial obligations and/or that [ICBCL] will not call on the letter to bring proceedings against Mr Yaw personally”. During discussions with ICBCL, Mr Lun suggested that he would propose some amended wording by 5 January 2017. On 5 January 2017 ICBCL wrote to Mr Lun noting that his amendments had not been received and asked him to “revert”. However, he did not do so. As stated above and at the risk of repetition, the First Letters of Support had, in fact, already been signed by the defendant by then – but they were never delivered to the plaintiffs or ICBCL.

  196. ICBCL issues letters of demand

  197. [114] On 6 January 2017, ICBCL, through its solicitors Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (“Rajah & Tann”), issued letters of demand to OML, demanding that it make payment of the outstanding charter hire for the period of 2 November 2016 to 2 February 2017 for the vessels, as well as the Deposit, which had been due 60 days from the delisting on 6 December 2016 in respect of the Go Perseus BBC.

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