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Grounds publishedDecided 14 Dec 2020

Singapore International Commercial Court

Esben Finance Ltd and others v Wong Hou-Lianq Neil

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[2020] SGHC(I) 25Case no. Suit No 6 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The trial of this action was conducted over some eight days using the Zoom platform followed by the exchange of the parties’ detailed written submissions on a number of important discrete points. With a very large volume of documents (perhaps 40,000 or more in some 80 bundles) provided by the parties in both electronic and hard-copy form and oral testimony from numerous factual witnesses as well as experts on accountancy and foreign law, the conduct of this trial presented considerable logistical difficulties. I am grateful for the cooperation and assistance of counsel as well as the support from the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) Registry which ensured the smooth running of the trial.

  3. [2] The present action concerns a family dispute on a grand scale. I was told that it forms only part of various proceedings in different jurisdictions including Malaysia and the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). On the plaintiffs’ side, the main driver of the present action appears to be an individual called Wong Kie Yik (“WKY”). The defendant, Neil Wong Hou-Lianq, is his nephew.

  4. [3] The first two plaintiffs, Esben Finance Limited (“Esben”) and Incredible Power Limited (“Incredible Power”) are companies incorporated in the BVI. The third and fourth plaintiffs, Rayley Co Limited (“Rayley”) and Lismore Trading Company Ltd (“Lismore”) are companies incorporated in Liberia. All four companies are (at least in a loose sense) part of what has been referred to in this action as the WTK Group of companies (“WTK Group”) which was named after its founder, the late Datuk Wong Tuong Kwang (“WTK”).

  5. [4] WTK was a successful Malaysian businessman whose empire spanned many businesses, including timber logging and harvesting. The flagship company of the WTK Group is WTK Realty Sdn Bhd (“WTK Realty”) which was incorporated in Malaysia in the early 1980s. The WTK Group comprises over 50 companies, many of which were incorporated in Sarawak, Malaysia with the WTK Group’s head office situated in the capital, Sibu, Sarawak. Some of the companies in the WTK Group or originally established by WTK were incorporated in Singapore, Papua New Guinea, the BVI and Liberia (together, the companies incorporated in Liberia and the BVI are referred to as the “Offshore Companies”) including the plaintiffs.

  6. [5] An organogram submitted by the plaintiffs identifying in summary form the relevant parts of the corporate structure of these companies is attached as Annex A to this judgment although I should note that this organogram was disputed in part by the defendant, the main areas of contention being with regard to (a) the directorship of Incredible Power and Rayley; and (b) whether one of the named companies viz Elite Honour Sdn Bhd (“Elite Honour”) should be included as one of the “Logging Companies” (ie, the Malaysian companies that were in the logging business). So far as relevant, I deal with these points below.

  7. [6] Although the plaintiffs are, as I have said, part of the WTK Group at least in a loose sense, it is important to note that they were not included in the audited financial statements of WTK Realty. However, as appears from Annex A, there is no doubt that there were common shareholdings between the plaintiffs and other companies within the WTK Group strictly so-called. Further, the consolidated accounts of the WTK Group reflect the close interplay between the finances of the plaintiffs and that of the logging companies which were at the heart of the WTK Group. As submitted on behalf of the defendant, this is evident from the document titled “WTK Organisation – Consolidated Accounts”, which shows that the WTK Group’s intercompany account balances would not be complete without the inclusion of the plaintiffs’ account balances, which are required to balance the debits and credits of the various companies within the WTK Group. Thus, it is the defendant’s case that the Offshore Companies including the plaintiffs were, in effect, treated as a single economic entity.

  8. [7] Be all this as it may, it is common ground that the Offshore Companies including the plaintiffs were in the business of buying timber from the Malaysian companies in the WTK Group and selling the timber on to third parties including buyers in India, China, Japan and Taiwan. To that extent, the plaintiffs were, in effect, intermediaries. On any view, there was plainly a very close connection between the plaintiffs and the other companies within the WTK Group strictly so called.

  9. [8] WTK had three sons, WKY, Wong Kie Nai (“WKN”) and Wong Kie Chie (“WKC”), (together the “Wong Brothers”). They joined WTK in his business in the late 1960s and 1970s. According to WKY, the three brothers were “close” and had a “very good relationship”.

  10. [9] Following a stroke in 1993, WTK handed over responsibility for the overall management and control of the WTK Group as well as the plaintiffs to WKN, WKY and WKC, although I should emphasise that one of the important issues in this case concerns the precise part played by each of the individuals in that context.

  11. [10] For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that it is the plaintiffs’ case that following WTK’s stroke, it was WKN who handled the day-to-day management of a number of the Malaysian companies in the WTK Group, including Elite Honour, Ocarina Development Sdn Bhd (“Ocarina”), Sunrise Megaway Sdn Bhd (“Sunrise Megaway”), Harvard Rank Sdn Bhd (“Harvard Rank”), Faedah Mulia Sdn Bhd (“Faedah Mulia”) and WTK Management Services Sdn Bhd (“WTK Management”). It is common ground that at all material times, WTK Management provided administrative services, including marketing and accounting to the Malaysian companies in the WTK Group. Two of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, Ms Janice Ting Soon Eng (“Ms Ting”) and Ms Helen Loh Leh Fong (“Ms Loh”), were (and are) employees of WTK Management. Ms Ting joined WTK Management in 1982 as the head of the accounts department. Today, she is its Chief Financial Officer. Ms Loh joined WTK Management in 1989 as an accountant. Today, she is its Financial Controller. Ms Loh also handled the accounts of Elite Honour, Ocarina and Sunrise Megaway.

  12. [11] The evidence of Ms Ting and Ms Loh is that they reported to and worked closely with WKN from the time they joined WTK Management until his death in March 2013. According to Ms Ting, WKN was “authoritative and domineering” and expected his employees to do as they were told. To similar effect, the evidence of Ms Loh was that WKN was a “strong character” who was “very quick but firm with his instructions” and expected his instructions to be carried out immediately.

  13. [12] In summary, it is the plaintiffs’ case that WKN was also in charge of the day-to-day management, affairs and business of the Offshore Companies including the plaintiffs; that from 1993 until his own death in March 2013, it was WKN who directed the plaintiffs’ affairs, made all the decisions affecting the plaintiffs and exercised complete control over the plaintiffs; that although WKY was the eldest of the three brothers, WKN became, in effect, the patriarch of the family; and that he had absolute control over and could do what he liked with the plaintiffs and would brook no interference.

  14. [13] At the material times, the plaintiffs each had US$ and/or S$ bank accounts with the Singapore branch of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (“HSBC”). Lismore, Rayley, and Incredible Power each had bank accounts in US$ and S$, while Esben had one bank account in US$ (“plaintiffs’ accounts”). WKN, WKY and WKC were the authorised signatories of these accounts. Any one out of the three authorised signatories’ signatures could authorise payments from the plaintiffs’ accounts.

  15. [14] On 11 March 2013, WKN passed away after a period of illness leaving a widow, Kathryn Ma Wai Fong (“Mdm Ma”) and two children, Neil Wong Hou Lianq (the defendant) and Mimi Wong. On the death of WKN, effective control of the WTK Group and the plaintiffs passed to WKY and WKC.

  16. Summary of the plaintiffs’ case

  17. [15] In summary, it is the plaintiffs’ case that following WKN’s death, WKY and WKC discovered that over a period of some 11 years between January 2001 and November 2012, some 50 separate payments had been made from the plaintiffs’ various bank accounts on the instructions of WKN to the defendant amounting in total to US$20,278,565.41 and S$4,473,100.52 (the “50 Payments”) in circumstances where (so say the plaintiffs) WKY and WKC were unaware of these payments to the defendant, the defendant did not provide any consideration to the plaintiffs for those payments, the plaintiffs did not receive any benefit from the defendant for those payments and those payments were made to the defendant even though they were not in the plaintiffs’ interests.

  18. [16] A table setting out the date of each payment together with other relevant information is attached as Annex B to this judgment.

  19. [17] It is the plaintiffs’ case that the 50 Payments to the defendant were discovered by WKY only after WKN’s death in circumstances which are described in paras 119 to 139 of WKY’s first affidavit of evidence in chief (“AEIC”). In summary:

  20. (a) Shortly after WKN’s death in March 2013, WKY looked into the accounts and financial affairs of the companies that WKN had managed.

  21. (b) As part of that exercise, WKY told Ms Ting to ask Mr Richard Tiang (“Mr Tiang”) (who was, according to WKY, the person responsible for carrying our administrative services for the plaintiffs including arranging payments to be made from the plaintiffs’ HSBC bank accounts) what the balances in the HSBC’s bank accounts were. Mr Tiang then sent the bank statements to Ms Ting who then showed them to WKY.

  22. (c) The bank statements showed that there was less than US$2.2m and S$1.3m in the plaintiffs’ HSBC bank accounts. According to WKY, he was surprised at these balances because they were much lower than what he had thought they would be.

  23. (d) WKY then asked Ms Ting to check with Mr Tiang why there was so little money left in the plaintiffs’ bank accounts. According to WKY, Ms Ting was supposed to speak with Mr Tiang and get back to him but she did not do so.

  24. (e) About a year later, in March 2014, WKY reminded Ms Ting to check with Mr Tiang, which Ms Ting said she would do.

  25. (f) A few days later, Ms Ting told WKY that she had spoken to Mr Tiang and that he (Mr Tiang) had told her that the balances were low because (according to Mr Tiang) over many years, WKN had given instructions for large sums of monies to be remitted from the plaintiffs’ accounts to the defendant by way of telegraphic transfers.

  26. (g) Mr Tiang gave Ms Ting certain further documents (including telegraphic transfer forms (“TT forms”)) from which she prepared a summary showing that between January 2001 and November 2012, the 50 Payments totalling US$20,278,565.41 and S$4,673,100.52 were remitted from the plaintiffs’ accounts to the defendant’s bank accounts with American Express Bank Ltd, Singapore and Standard Chartered Bank Singapore.

  27. (h) Subsequently, Mr Tiang informed Ms Ting that he had on instructions given to him by WKN in April 2012, destroyed the documents of all the Offshore Companies, including the plaintiffs’ documents but only much later, ie, in September 2014.

  28. (i) After some further considerable delay, on 21 April 2016, Incredible Power, Rayley and Lismore demanded that the defendant repay the monies that had been remitted to him from their bank accounts. In those letters, Incredible Power, Rayley and Lismore identified the amounts and dates of the payments. At that time, Esben had been struck off the register.

  29. [18] It is an important part of the plaintiffs’ case that they did not, at the time, receive any satisfactory response from the defendant (or Mdm Ma) to those demands nor any explanation that might justify the receipt by the defendant of the 50 Payments. Indeed, it is the plaintiffs’ case that WKN and Mdm Ma had taken steps to ensure that WKY and WKC did not uncover the documents relating to the 50 Payments and that correspondence in May 2016 shows that Mdm Ma and the defendant were surprised that WKY and WKC had found out about them.

  30. [19] Thereafter, after some yet further delay, the plaintiffs commenced the present action by issuing a Writ of Summons dated 20 November 2017. The date is important because, as appears further below, it is the defendant’s case that the plaintiffs’ claims in respect of 49 of the 50 Payments are time-barred.

  31. Summary of the defendant’s case

  32. [22] The defendant admits that he received all the 50 Payments. However, he denies any wrongdoing either on his part or on the part of his father, WKN; and he denies any liability to the plaintiffs.

  33. [23] Moreover, it is the defendant’s case that both WKY and WKC had actual knowledge or at least ought to have had knowledge of most if not all of the 50 Payments when they were made; and that, in that context, the defendant relies heavily upon the fact that a large number – some 25 – of the 50 TT forms authorising the 50 Payments made by the plaintiffs to the defendant bear WKY’s initials or signature either on its own or together with WKN’s signature.

  34. [24] In summary, it is the defendant’s case that these claims are all time-barred by virtue of s 6 of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) (“Limitation Act”); and/or are barred by the doctrine of laches and/or the doctrine of acquiescence. Alternatively, it is the defendant’s case that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the legal burden of proof; and that the claims should be rejected for that reason. In particular, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that, on the plaintiffs’ own case, all of its witnesses had absolutely no involvement in the plaintiffs’ business prior to March 2013; and that they therefore had no knowledge whatsoever as to the purpose of the 50 Payments.

  35. [25] In the further alternative, the defendant has raised a number of substantive positive defences. However, it is important to note that, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, the defendant’s case has changed more than once with regard to these positive defences.

  36. [26] Thus, as pleaded in the original Defence served on 26 March 2018, the defendant admitted at para 18 that he:

  37. Further, in para 19 of the original Defence, the defendant positively averred that he did “not know whether any consideration was provided to the [p]laintiffs for the [50 Payments] by any other persons including WKN and if the [p]laintiffs received any benefit from any other persons including WKN for the [50 Payments].”

  38. [27] Some nine months after service of the original Defence and after new lawyers (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) had been instructed, the defendant changed his position with extensive deletions and additions to his pleading. Thus, in Defence (Amendment No 1) dated 10 January 2019, paras 18 and 19 of the original Defence as referred to above were deleted; and the defendant set out in some detail and at considerable length a positive case with regard to the payments in question. In particular, it was pleaded at para 4(d) that:

  39. Further, at para 4(e), it was pleaded:

  40. [28] Paragraphs 37 to 63 of Defence (Amendment No 1) then set out what were, in effect, particulars of these alleged “transactions’’ and “gifts”. In broad summary, it was the defendant’s case that the “transactions” consisted of various payments made by the plaintiffs to him “on behalf of” certain Malaysian companies pursuant to oral “agreements” involving him and his father to settle the “debts” that those Malaysian companies owed the defendant’s companies and the defendant; and that the “gifts” were made in the context of a “close and loving relationship” which, until WKN passed away in 2013, existed between WKN, Mdm Ma, the defendant and Mimi Wong. In particular, it was pleaded:

  41. (a) 22 payments totalling US$11,078,618.84 and S$2,479,852.43 were made in the connection with “logging and transportation services provided by the defendant’s company [ie, Golden Cash Harvest Sdn Bhd (“GCH”)] to the WTK Group”.

  42. (b) 15 payments totalling US$3,772,912.83 and S$1,325,544.42 were made in connection with “management consultancy services provided by the defendant’s company [ie, Demeter Resources Management Sdn Bhd, formerly known as Archer Oscar Sdn Bhd (“DRM”)] to the WTK Group”.

  43. (c) Three payments totalling US$442,729.17 and S$867,703.67 were made in connection with “the provision of timber logs from the defendant’s company [ie, WTK Reforestation Sdn Bhd (“WTK Reforestation”)] to the WTK Group”.

  44. (d) Three payments of US$50,000, US$179,456 and US$263,852 were “directors’ fees and/or shareholder dividends for the defendant’s directorships and shareholding within the WTK Group”.

  45. (e) 11 payments totalling US$4,490,997 were gifts from WKN to the defendant, Mdm Ma and/or Mimi Wong.

  46. As already stated, these payments are all listed in Appendix B to this judgment. By way of clarification, it is important to note that whereas, as I have said, there were 50 payments in total, it is the defendant’s case that four of these payments were in, in effect, split into two parts. Hence the total number of the payments identified in sub-paragraphs (a)-(e) is 54.

  47. [29] As a result of the defendant’s pleading concerning the alleged “transactions” in the Defence (Amendment No 1), the plaintiffs say that they had to undertake a massive and expensive inquiry into the Malaysian companies’ documents. The plaintiffs say that that exercise showed no record of any such “debts” to the defendant’s companies or the defendant. Thus, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that that meant that the plaintiffs could not have made the 39 payments to the defendant as pleaded in the amended Defence “on behalf of” the Malaysian companies; that that new defence had been “trumped up”; and that it was for this reason that having been caught out, and knowing that he would not be able to defend his lie, the defendant decided not to testify.

  48. [30] Thereafter, the plaintiffs say that the defendant changed his case again. As advanced in the AEICs of his witnesses, that case is that the Malaysian companies’ services were split into “onshore” and “offshore” components and the payments to him were for the “offshore” payments that were not documented. The nub of that case appeared at paras 90 to 91 of the AEIC of Mdm Ma. That evidence was the focus of much attention during the trial and it is therefore convenient to quote it in full:

  49. [31] It was the plaintiffs’ case that none of this had been pleaded. This gave rise to considerable dispute between counsel; and a number of court hearings. It is unnecessary to set this out in detail. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the defendant applied to amend further his Defence on successive occasions in the lead-up to trial; and, with very considerable and increasing reluctance, I allowed three further amendments viz Defence (Amendment No 2) dated 25 April 2020; Defence (Amendment No 3) dated 10 June 2020 and Defence (Amendment No 4) dated 8 July 2020, the last being only a few days before the commencement of the trial.

  50. [32] For present purposes, the most important of these amendments was an amendment to para 4(d) and, in particular, the introduction of a new para 4(d)(iv) of the Defence and new particulars thereunder which were again the focus of close attention at the trial and which (as they stood as at the beginning of the trial) were as follows:

  51. [33] In broad terms, the purpose of the new para 4(d)(iv) was to allow the defendant to advance a positive case (the “para 4(d)(iv) practice”) as reflected in paras 90 to 91 of the AEIC of Mdm Ma quoted above.

  52. [34] In response, the plaintiffs served their Reply (Amendment No 2) which joined issue with this new case and, further, raised a new important plea of illegality. In summary, as set out in para 2B of the Reply (Amendment No 2) dated 3 July 2020, it was the plaintiffs’ case that taking the defendant’s case at its highest (which the plaintiffs denied) most of the payments (apart from those which are said to be gifts from WKN, directors’ fees or shareholder dividends) would have been made pursuant to an arrangement between WKN and the defendant and/or the defendant’s companies “that was illegal and/or involved illegal acts and/or a conspiracy to evade taxes under Malaysian law”; and that the defendant “cannot and/or is precluded from and/or the [c]ourt will not recognise, or allow him to rely on, such arrangement as a defence to the [p]laintiffs’ causes of action”. I shall refer to the foregoing as the “illegality issue”.

  53. [35] The plaintiffs also say that the defendant’s narrative on the other payments has shifted. In his original Defence, the defendant did not specifically mention that any of the 50 Payments were “gifts”. Then, in Defence (Amendment No 1) he claimed that he reasonably and honestly believed that some 11 payments were gifts from WKN and that they “formed part of WKN’s entitlement of the assets held by the [p]laintiffs or were otherwise WKN’s own funds which were routed through the [p]laintiffs” because WKN was a “beneficial owner” of the plaintiffs. It was the plaintiffs’ case that there were “serious problems” with this new case; and that, as a result, the defendant advanced a new case viz that the plaintiffs held the timber sales proceeds for the shareholders of the Logging Companies; and that it was the “practice” of these companies to “route” the sale of their timber through the plaintiffs which then collected the sale proceeds and distributed them in cash to the shareholders of the Malaysian companies, including WKN. In summary, it was the plaintiffs’ case that if the defendant’s new case is to be believed, that would mean that this alleged “practice” involved black money; that, again taking the defendant’s case at its highest, WKN had no right to the monies that he allegedly gifted his son; that he (ie, WKN) would be entitled to that money only if the Malaysian companies which were entitled to the sale proceeds declared dividends. The plaintiffs argued that until that happened, WKN had no business treating the monies as his own; and that, in any event, there is no evidence that the logging companies had made profits from which dividends could be declared. The plaintiffs say that, realising this, the defendant has once again tried to change his narrative on the “gifts” (at least in part). The defendant now claims, in the last amendment application (which I again reluctantly allowed) that a further three payments, which he had previously described were directors’ fees and/or shareholder dividends “could in fact be gifts which were made by WKN”.

  54. [36] The plaintiffs say that the ease with which the defendant has changed his case, including at a very late hour shortly before the commencement of the trial, shows that he is just making things up as he goes along. In particular, it was submitted by the plaintiffs in their Opening Statement: “[the defendant] tries one fiction. When it falls flat on its face, [the defendant] changes his story to overcome the flaws. This is not a game. But the [d[efendant does not care.”

  55. [37] I have set out the foregoing at some length because it provides an important overall view of the background to the trial and the issues which arise with regard to the positive substantive defences raised by the defendant.

  56. [38] The end result is that the defendant’s case as advanced at trial was, in summary, as follows:

  57. (a) The plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their own burden of proof to establish any of the causes of action advanced by them against the defendant.

  58. (b) In any event, the defendant denies any wrongdoing by his father, WKN, or himself.

  59. (c) The other directors of the plaintiffs, WKY and WKC, were or ought to have been aware of the payments – or at least most of them.

  60. (d) The payments were all made for legitimate purposes. In particular:

  61. (i) 36 of the payments were made on behalf of the WTK Group for goods and/or services which were provided by companies controlled by Mdm Ma and the defendant (the “36 payments”). These 36 payments may be grouped into the following categories of services viz (A) services provided by GCH; (B) services provided by DRM; (C) supply of timber logs from WTK Reforestation.

  62. (ii) Three of the payments comprised the defendant’s entitlement to directors’ fees and/or shareholders dividends; alternatively were gifts made by WKN.

  63. (iii) 11 of the payments comprise WKN’s entitlement from the plaintiffs which he in turn gifted to the defendant/his mother and/or his sister.

  64. The Evidence

  65. [39] The following individuals provided AEICs and were cross-examined in the course of the trial:

  66. (a) On behalf of the plaintiffs:

  67. (i) WKY: He was born in 1941. As he told the court at the beginning of his oral evidence, he had certain health issues. In giving evidence, he appeared to me somewhat frail and it was obvious that he had difficulty in remembering certain matters although that is perhaps unsurprising given that some of the relevant events stretch back almost 20 years.

  68. (ii) Ms Ting: she joined WTK Management in 1982 as the head of the accounts department and is now the Chief Financial Officer (see [10] above).

  69. (iii) Ms Loh: she joined WTK Management in 1989. In 2007, she was promoted to the position of Financial Controller of WTK Management, a position which she still holds today (see [10] above).

  70. (b) On behalf of the defendant:

  71. (i) Mdm Ma: as noted above, she is the widow of WKN and the mother of the defendant.

  72. (ii) Chieng Muk Pang (“Mr Chieng”): from July 2000 to October 2015, he was employed as a Chief Surveyor by GCH whose directors and shareholders are Mdm Ma and the defendant.

  73. (iii) Hii Siik Kiong (“Mr Hii”): he joined the WTK Group in 1990 as a logging camp manager in Papua New Guinea. In about 1999, he joined GCH as Operational General Manager reporting directly to the defendant. He continued in that role until 2010 when he was promoted to General Manager, his current position, again reporting directly to the defendant.

  74. (iv) Ling Thien Kwong (“LTK”): he joined the WTK Group as a management trainee in March 1999. In October 2003, he left the WTK Group and joined GCH as an assistant accountant. In 2005, he was promoted to the role of Senior Accounts Supervisor for the GCH group of companies which comprised a number of businesses owned by the defendant and Mdm Ma including GCH, DRM and WTK Reforestation. (Their shares in WTK Reforestation were sold to the WTK Group in 2007).

  75. (v) Ling Heu Chong (“Mr Ling”). From 2001 to 2014, he was employed as a Log Pond Supervisor by Harvard Rank.

  76. [40] The plaintiffs also relied upon the evidence contained in two affidavits of Mr Tiang dated 28 August 2018 and 11 October 2018. He was previously employed by a company in Singapore, Double Ace Trading Co (Pte) Ltd (“Double Ace”) which had offices at 3 Shenton Way # 20-08, Shenton House, Singapore 068805. The directors and shareholders of Double Ace included WKN, WKY and WKC. However, the precise organisational structure of Double Ace is unclear. According to WKY, an individual called Ong Kim Siong was the “resident director” but the plaintiffs’ operations were run administratively by Mr Tiang: he was “working for looking, after [sic]” the four offshore companies, ie, the plaintiffs. According to WKY, Mr Tiang was first employed by WTK as a clerk; and “years later” was promoted by WKN to the position of “accounts clerk”. He was, again according to WKY, responsible for carrying out administrative services for the plaintiffs including arranging for payments to be made from the plaintiffs’ HSBC accounts on the instructions of WTK or WKN. It is not clear what other individuals (if any) were employed by Double Ace. There was a suggestion that Double Ace did not have any employees other than Mr Tiang. However, it is fair to say that WKY stated in para 65 of his AEIC that WTK and WKN “used to work closely with Double Ace’s employees particularly Mr Tiang”; and, as already noted, in his oral evidence WKY referred to an individual called Ong Kim Siong as the “resident director”. Notwithstanding, the number of other individuals who may have been employed by Double Ace at any one time is unknown; and certainly no other individuals were identified by name. Who these supposed employees were (if there were any) is unknown.

  77. [41] In my judgment, there is no doubt that Mr Tiang was, during the relevant period, a key individual acting directly on the instructions of WKN. In his own words, he was, the “[p]laintiffs’ bookkeeper”.

  78. [42] However, it is important to note that Mr Tiang is a convicted criminal and, as I understand, currently serving a substantial prison sentence. In February 2019, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of some 15 criminal charges, with a further 54 charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing, of, inter alia, dishonest misappropriation of some S$46.2 million of the plaintiffs’ monies over an extended period of time. Thus, he is a convicted fraudster on a massive scale.

  79. [43] Mr Tiang was not called to give evidence. However, on the plaintiffs’ application, I allowed these two affidavits to be adduced in evidence pursuant to s 32(1)(j)(i) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) on the basis that Mr Tiang was unfit to give evidence because of his physical and medical condition as a result of a stroke. My reasons for so doing are set out in a separate ruling dated 8 June 2020 which I do not propose to repeat. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that (a) it was undisputed that Mr Tiang was unfit to give evidence at the date of the trial; (b) I considered the evidence in those affidavits potentially relevant; and (c) I rejected the defendant’s submission that I should exclude such evidence as a matter of discretion under s 32(3) of the Evidence Act, in particular, on grounds of low probative value or unreliability. However, as recognised by s 32(5) of the Evidence Act and as I emphasised in my ruling at the time, it remains to consider what weight, if any, to give to such evidence. So far as relevant, I deal with this further below.

  80. [44] Both parties also served expert reports on certain accounting issues viz from Mr Andrew Heng (“Mr Heng”), a partner of Ferrier Hodgson MH Sdn Bhd (appointed on behalf of the plaintiffs) and Mr Michael Peer, Head of Disputes Advisory and a partner in PricewaterhouseCoopers South East Asia Consulting’s Forensic Team (appointed on behalf of the defendant). Both these experts gave evidence during the trial.

  81. [45] In addition, both parties submitted reports in the form of written submissions or affidavits from experts on foreign law as follows:

  82. (a) Malaysian law: On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr Subbramaniam A/L Arjunan of Shanker & Arjunan & Chua, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. On behalf of the defendant, Mr Saravana Kumar Segaran of Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Both these experts gave oral evidence and were cross-examined during the trial. Their evidence was concerned with the illegality issue.

  83. (b) BVI law: on behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr Kenneth MacLean QC of One Essex Court, London. On behalf of the defendant, Mr Shaun Raymond Folpp of Mourant Ozannes, BVI.

  84. (c) Liberian law: On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr T Negbalee Warner of Heritage Partners & Associates, Liberia. On behalf of the defendant, Benedict F Sannoh of Sannoh & Partners, Liberia.

  85. [46] In broad terms, the submissions of the experts on BVI law and Liberian law were concerned principally with the rights and duties of a director of a company incorporated in the respective jurisdictions with regard to the defendant’s time-bar defence. With the consent of the parties, it was agreed that such submissions could be placed before the court in written form without the makers themselves addressing the court orally and that counsel were at liberty to make such submissions in relation thereto as might be appropriate. So far as relevant, I deal with these submissions below – although I should mention that it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the time-bar defence raised by the defendant did not depend on either BVI law or Liberian law but ultimately depended on the law of Singapore and, in particular, the scope and effect of s 29 of the Limitation Act.

  86. [47] The evidence in this case has raised various difficult issues for a number of reasons which it is convenient to note and so far as necessary address at this stage. I deal with these difficulties under a number of heads as set out below.

  87. (i) Oral Evidence; absence of critical witnesses.

  88. [48] I have already identified the three witnesses who provided AEICs and were called to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs viz WKY, Ms Ting and Ms Loh. So far as relevant, I deal with their evidence below. However, at this stage, it is important to note that, as I have said, WKY (who is a director of the plaintiffs and, as I have said, is obviously the main driver behind the present proceedings) is now almost 80 years old and suffering from health issues and a failing memory. Moreover, his own evidence was that prior to 2013, he had no involvement in the management of the plaintiffs or even the wider WTK Group; that he trusted WKN and did not press him for information (in particular, information with regard to the TT forms which he accepted he had signed) because he wanted “to maintain the good relationship with [WKN]”. To that extent, his evidence was, in one sense, of limited assistance. Further, the evidence of the other witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiffs (Ms Ting and Ms Loh) was, in my view, equally of limited assistance in supporting the plaintiffs’ case on the key issues.

  89. [49] Second, following the death of WTK, it was the plaintiffs’ case (which I accept) that WKN effectively took control of the WTK Group and “ran the show”. This continued to be the position until at least March 2011 when, due to illness, he went to Australia for medical treatment. It is obvious that until that time, he managed and controlled the plaintiffs and to some extent at least continued to do so until his death some two years later. No doubt, WKN’s evidence would have been most valuable and provided answers to key questions. However, because of his death in March 2013, this was, of course, impossible. The result is that the present trial was, in a sense, Hamlet without the prince.

  90. [50] Unfortunately, the trial proceeded in the absence of at least three further potentially crucial witnesses viz:

  91. (a) Mr Tiang: as stated above, he was, in his own words, the “[p]laintiffs’ bookkeeper”. As such, his evidence would have been very valuable indeed. However, as I have also already explained, he was unfit to give evidence because of a stroke last year.

  92. (b) WKC: he went to live in Australia during the 1980s. He appears to have played little, if any part, in the plaintiffs’ business operations. To that extent, his absence would seem of little, if any, relevance.

  93. (c) The defendant himself.

  94. [51] The absence of the defendant was the subject of major attack by counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs given, in particular, that it was undisputed that he could, if he wished, have attended the trial and given evidence. Further, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, it is noteworthy that the defendant has been intimately involved in this dispute and the conduct of the present proceedings in the course of which he has filed no less than 30 affidavits including affidavits in support of his first and second applications to amend the Defence where he claimed to have personal knowledge of the (alleged) para 4(d)(iv) practice and the (alleged) agreements/arrangements. The defendant also continued to file affidavits after Mdm Ma said in her AEIC of 21 January 2020 that the defendant would not be coming to give evidence. In fact, he signed his latest affidavit even after the trial, ie, on 28 July 2020.

  95. [52] There is no suggestion that the defendant was unfit or otherwise unable to attend the trial and give evidence. On the contrary, it is undisputed that his non-attendance was the result of his own deliberate decision.

  96. [53] Various explanations have been offered for the defendant’s absence. But I accept that, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, none of them satisfactorily explains his absence.

  97. [54] First, Mdm Ma said in her AEIC that the defendant was not testifying because the present action was “frivolous and baseless”. However, even if that is her belief, I do not consider that this is an acceptable reason for the defendant’s absence. As submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, a reason that relates to the merits of this action is not an acceptable explanation (see Sudha Natrajan v The Bank of East Asia Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 141 (“Sudha”) at [21]); and, in any case, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, I accept that Mdm Ma’s explanation makes little sense: if Mdm Ma or the defendant believed that this action was “frivolous and baseless”, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to understand why there was reason to call any witnesses at all. But the defendant called six witnesses including, of course, Mdm Ma herself.

  98. [55] Second, it was submitted in the defendant’s Opening Statement that his witnesses were able to give the “necessary evidence on the true nature and circumstances under which the [50] Payments were made”. In my judgment, that submission overstates the position. I readily accept that the evidence of Mdm Ma was potentially of assistance. So too was the evidence of Mr Hii, LTK and Mr Ling, although, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, these witnesses could say nothing about the alleged “gifts” and were not personally present when the alleged “agreement[s]” and “arrangement[s] and/or understanding[s]” relied upon by the defendant with regard to the other payments were entered into. In any event, there can be no doubt that the evidence of the defendant himself would have been very valuable with regard to the alleged “gifts” as well as the alleged agreements, arrangements or understandings which are the foundation of the defendant’s positive case with regard to the other payments and also determining the true nature and circumstances under which the 50 Payments were made.

  99. [56] Third, Mdm Ma claimed during cross-examination that she had discussed the “frivolous and baseless” allegations with the defendant and told him that she would testify. On behalf of the plaintiffs, it was submitted that this makes no sense because Mdm Ma was not in any position to give evidence on the allegations against WKN and, as she herself admitted, she was not involved in the management of the plaintiffs. So far as relevant, I deal with Mdm Ma’s evidence below. In any event, I accept that her desire and attempt to respond to allegations against WKN does not explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not testify.

  100. [57] Finally, Mdm Ma said that the defendant did not testify because this action is part of WKY’s plan to harass the defendant and “all the case is about documentation [sic]”. Mdm Ma may well be right in suggesting that the present action is part of WKY’s plan to harass the defendant, at least from her own perspective and that of the defendant. (Once again, it is noteworthy, that following the death of WKN, there have been numerous highly contentious and acrimonious legal proceedings - in particular, in Malaysia and the BVI - between or at least involving, on the one hand, WKY, and, on the other hand, Mdm Ma and the defendant in relation to allegations of fraudulent conduct by WKN during his lifetime.) However, be that as it may, the present case raises serious allegations against the defendant; and the fact that she and the defendant may perceive the present action to be part of WKY’s plan to harass the defendant is, in my view, no or at least no proper justification for the defendant’s decision not to give evidence. Further, the suggestion that the case is about “documentation” is inconsistent with Mdm Ma’s own evidence that the payments to the defendant were deliberately kept off the books.

  101. [58] In light of the above, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that having regard to (a) the defendant’s absence at trial in circumstances where (say the plaintiffs) he is the only person alive who knows why the payments were made to him; (b) the absence of any credible explanation for the defendant’s deliberate decision not to testify; and (c) the many shifts in his defence, the court should draw a two-fold adverse inference against the defendant viz:

  102. (a) First, the court should infer that the defendant has been lying about the reasons why he says he received the payments. Where a party who personally knows the whole circumstances does not give evidence and submit to cross-examination, his non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the truth of his case (citing SC Sarkar, Sarkar Law of Evidence vol 3 (LexisNexis, 2016 Ed) (“Sarkar”) at p 2724; Tan Eck Hong v Maxz Universal Development Group Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 240 at [37]).

  103. (b) Second, the court should draw the inference that the 50 Payments were not made for the reasons advanced in any versions of the Defence. The effect of an adverse inference is to strengthen the evidence against the defendant, ie, to increase the weight of the evidence given on such issue by the plaintiffs and to show that the payments were not made in the course of plaintiffs’ business or in its interests or for its benefit: see Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324 (“Wisniewski”) at 339.

  104. [59] In support of that submission, the plaintiffs further relied upon a number of authorities including ARS v ART and another [2015] SGHC 78 at [137]-[141], [147]; and Red Star Marine Consultants Pte Ltd v Personal Representatives of the Estate of Satwant Kaur d/o Sardara Singh, deceased and another [2019] SGHC 144 at [75].

  105. [60] On behalf of the defendant, it was accepted that under s 116(g) of the Evidence Act the court may in certain circumstances be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence of a witness. However, in summary, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant:

  106. (a) Whether an adverse inference should be drawn will depend on all the evidence adduced, and the circumstances of each case: there is “no fixed and immutable rule of law” for the drawing of such an inference: Sudha ([54] supra) at [19]-[20]; Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 (“Tribune”) at [50].

  107. (b) The effect of an adverse inference is to “strengthen” the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to “weaken” the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness: Sudha at [20(b)].

  108. (c) However, an adverse inference is not invariably drawn whenever a party fails to give evidence. If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence can be explained to the satisfaction of the court, then no adverse inference may be drawn: Sudha at [20(d)].

  109. (d) Significantly, the defendant’s absence does not in any way diminish the plaintiffs’ burden to establish primary facts establishing a prima facie case on its claims: Cheong Ghim Fah and another v Murugian so Rangasamy [2004] 1 SLR(R) 628 (“Cheong”) at [38] . The drawing of an adverse inference cannot be used as a mechanism to shore up glaring deficiencies in the opposite party's case, which on its own is unable to meet up to the requisite burden of proof: Tribune at [50].

  110. I accept these submissions. In particular, the exposition of relevant principles as set out in the judgment of VK Rajah JC (as he then was) in Cheong at [38]-[44] is, in my view, very helpful and one which I readily adopt.

  111. [61] Here, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that no adverse inference should be drawn by reason of the absence of the defendant for the following reasons:

  112. (a) The plaintiffs have failed to make out even a prima facie case of any of the four claims put forth by them. On this basis alone, the court should refuse to exercise its discretion to draw an adverse inference against the defendant: Tribune at [50]-[51].

  113. (b) In any event, the adverse inferences suggested by the plaintiffs consists of vague allegations that the defendant is not testifying because his evidence would “be adverse to or undermine” various aspects of his defence. This is inadequate since the plaintiffs must identify with specificity what inference it invites the court to draw, and the precise manner and extent to which the evidence not given would have been unfavourable to the defendant. The court cannot simply speculate as to what the evidence may show: Sudha at [23]; Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd [2019] SGHC 68 (“PNG”) at [83].

  114. [62] As to these submissions, my observations and conclusions are as follows:

  115. (a) There is no obligation on a defendant to give evidence. As stated by VK Rajah JC in Cheong at [39], it is perfectly permissible for a party not to call witnesses or adduce evidence on any material point in issue.

  116. (b) However, as I have already concluded, there is, in my view, no satisfactory explanation as to why the defendant has deliberately chosen not to give evidence. In such circumstances, it seems to me that it is certainly open for the court to draw adverse inferences against the defendant. Indeed, in the present circumstances as I have already described, it seems to me that this is a paradigm case for the court to draw appropriate adverse inferences against the defendant.

  117. (c) The adverse inferences which the plaintiffs have invited the court to draw are not, in my view, “inadequate” or lacking in specificity.

  118. (d) In deciding whether to draw an adverse inference, it is important to exercise caution so as, in effect, not to reverse the burden of proof. As appears from the citation by Rajah JC in Cheong at [42] to a passage in the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Wisniewski ([58(b)] supra) at 340 (see also Sudha at [20]):

  119. (e) In light of the above, I propose to deal with the question as to what, if any adverse inference(s) are to be drawn when considering the merits of the plaintiffs’ various claims and, in particular, whether they have established a “case to answer” and, even in such case, what if any adverse inferences might properly be drawn.

  120. (ii) Time of Relevant Events

  121. [63] Second, as already noted, the 50 Payments which are the subject of the present proceedings cover an extended period of some 11 years stretching back between 2001-2012 the earliest of which is almost 20 years ago. In these circumstances, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that it is hardly surprising that it was difficult, if not impossible, for him to recollect at least initially when the plaintiffs’ claims were first advanced, the exact true purpose of many of the payments which are the subject of these proceedings; and that this explains the various iterations of his pleaded Defence. I have some sympathy with that submission. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in the course of cross-examination, WKY was himself unable to explain the nature or purpose of a number of specific substantial payments that appear from bank statements to have been paid out of the plaintiffs’ bank accounts to him.

  122. (iii) Plaintiffs’ documentary record

  123. [64] Third, I readily accept that the difficulties caused by the fact that proceedings may involve events many years ago are sometimes solved or at least alleviated by an examination of the relevant documentary record. Indeed, in such cases, the contemporaneous documents are very often the most important and most reliable source of evidence. However, there are, in the present case, significant gaps in the available documents. Indeed, that is, in my view, a gross understatement. That is so for two main reasons.

  124. [65] First, as I have said, the plaintiffs are offshore companies registered in either the BVI or Liberia. The companies did not have any employees of their own. They did not themselves keep or produce any financial documents or statements. The plaintiffs’ position was that WTK Management did not provide any marketing or accounting services to the plaintiffs. Rather, all administrative services were provided by Double Ace. According to WKY, WTK originally had a room to himself at Double Ace’s office where he would attend to the affairs and business of the Offshore Companies including the plaintiffs; and WKN also occupied a separate room in that office which WKC and WKY would use when they visited. According to WKY, the services provided by Double Ace included updating and maintaining the plaintiffs’ financial records, liaising with the banks, and arranging for payments to be made from the plaintiffs’ bank accounts in Singapore.

  125. [66] However, so far as Ms Ting was aware, the plaintiffs had no proper accounting system. Her unchallenged evidence was that apart from certain “intercompany ledgers” or “subledgers”, no trial balances were ever prepared; as far as she was aware, there were no financial statements, no monthly management accounts, no year-end accounts. Certainly, apart from various banks statements and a limited number of what have been referred to as the “CAD Documents” (as to which see further below), no proper financial statements or other records have been produced by the plaintiffs.

  126. [67] The absence of any such documents represents a major lacuna in the evidence before the court for which, it should be noted, the defendant is in no way to blame. The foregoing reinforces the reason why the evidence of Mr Tiang would certainly have been most valuable. However, as already noted above, he could not be called as a witness at trial; and what he said in the two affidavits which I did allow in evidence was of limited assistance with regard to the main issues in this case – and on one specific point (as to which see below) was highly controversial.

  127. [68] Second, it is undisputed that a very large number of the plaintiffs’ documents were deliberately destroyed by Mr Tiang. As set out in paras 24 and 25 of Mr Tiang’s affidavit dated 28 August 2018, his evidence is that WKN instructed him “in or around April 2012” to remove all the documents and records of the plaintiffs, including the documents and records relating to the 50 Payments from the plaintiffs’ Singapore office; that subsequently “in or around May 2012”, WKN instructed him to destroy those documents; and that, in accordance with those instructions, he (Mr Tiang) did indeed arrange for those documents to be removed from the plaintiffs’ Singapore office in or around April 2012 and then arranged for those documents to be destroyed albeit only about some 29 months later “in or around September 2014”. That evidence of Mr Tiang was supported in part by Ms Ting whose evidence was that Mr Tiang had informed her at the end of 2014 that he (Mr Tiang) had destroyed the documents on WKN’s instructions – although the fact that Mr Tiang may well have told Ms Ting that he had destroyed the documents on WKN’s instructions does not, of course, necessarily mean that he did destroy the documents on WKN’s instructions.

  128. [69] As to the foregoing, it is undisputed that Mr Tiang probably did destroy a very large number of the plaintiffs’ documents – perhaps some 100 boxes. However, the account given by Mr Tiang as to the circumstances in which the documents were destroyed was hotly disputed. In particular, Mdm Ma’s evidence was that any destruction of the documents by Mr Tiang was more likely to have been done at WKY’s or WKC’s behest; but this was entirely speculative and specifically denied by WKY.

  129. [70] In any event, it was strenuously denied by counsel on behalf of the defendant that WKN ever gave any instructions to carry out such removal and destruction of the plaintiffs’ documents and records; and it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that Mr Tiang’s evidence to that effect should be rejected. In support of that latter submission, counsel on behalf of the defendant made a number of points which I would summarise as follows:

  130. (a) As already noted above, Mr Tiang is, on his own admission and plea of guilty, a convicted fraudster on a massive scale.

  131. (b) Given the conduct of Mr Tiang in dishonestly misappropriating the plaintiffs’ funds over an extended period, Mr Tiang had his own personal strong motive for destroying the documents and seeking to put the responsibility for so doing on WKN who had, of course, passed away by that time and could not challenge what Mr Tiang said.

  132. (c) The evidence of Mr Tiang is both inherently unreliable and, on its face, untrue in certain respects. As stated above, Mr Tiang’s evidence is that WKN instructed him to destroy all the plaintiffs’ documents and records in around May 2012; but that he did not do so immediately and only carried out such instructions over 2 years later, ie, around September 2014. However, as submitted on behalf of the defendant, there is no credible reason why Mr Tiang would wait for a substantial period of about some 30 months after WKN”s purported instructions to destroy the plaintiffs’ documents and records to carry out those purported instructions; nor any credible reason as to why Mr Tiang would suddenly decide to follow those purported instructions and destroy the plaintiffs’ documents and records in September 2014, some 18 months after WKN’s death in March 2013.

  133. (d) Mr Tiang’s evidence is that he destroyed “all of the documents and records of the plaintiffs” [emphasis added]. That is demonstrably false: according to para 6(f) of the plaintiffs’ Reply, Mr Tiang had apparently overlooked destroying “….a separate file containing copies of some of the [documents and records relating to the 50 Payments] which [Mr Tiang] had kept separately. That file … only came to the plaintiffs’ attention after WKN passed away.” Thus, on the plaintiffs’ own case and contrary to what was stated by Mr Tiang in his affidavit, Mr Tiang did not destroy “all” of the plaintiffs’ documents and records.

  134. (e) Further, in the course of a discovery application by the defendant against the plaintiffs in these proceedings, it emerged that in August 2014 the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) had seized at least some of the plaintiffs’ documents and records (ie, the “CAD Documents”) in connection with the prosecution and subsequent conviction of Mr Tiang for dishonest misappropriation of the plaintiffs’ monies; that Double Ace had requested the return of the CAD Documents in May 2016; and that the CAD Documents had, in fact, been returned to Double Ace shortly thereafter in June 2016. The existence of these CAD documents is inconsistent with Mr Tiang’s evidence that he destroyed “all” of the plaintiffs’ documents and records.

  135. [71] I accept those submissions. In particular, although I accept that Mr Tiang probably did destroy a large number of the plaintiffs’ documents, I am unable to conclude on the evidence whether this was done (a) on the instructions of WKN, (b) on his own initiative for his own personal reasons or (c) on the instructions of WKY or WKC. Be that as it may, it is, in my judgment, absolutely clear that the CAD Documents could and should have been disclosed by the plaintiffs in these proceedings as part of the ordinary disclosure process. The fact that they were not originally disclosed and only came to be disclosed following an application for specific disclosure by the defendant represents a serious failure by the plaintiffs to comply with their disclosure obligations. The explanation for this failure was given by WKY at para 12 in his 10th affidavit dated 5 November 2019 in response to the defendant’s application for specific disclosure viz that “[WKY] had forgotten about the existence of the CAD [D]ocuments and was only reminded of their existence after the [d]efendant’s application for disclosure was served.” I regard that explanation as, at best, totally unsatisfactory if not disingenuous.

  136. [72] In passing, I should mention that it was an important part of the evidence of the plaintiffs’ accountancy expert, Mr Heng, and indeed a major plank of the plaintiffs’ case that the defendant’s case should be rejected because it was largely unsupported by contemporaneous documents. I deal below with the substance of the defendant’s case. However, at this stage, I would merely note that the apparent dearth of relevant documents would seem to be due, at least in part, to the matters stated above and, to that extent, not in any sense the fault of the defendant. Specifically, this seems to be a result of: (a) the fact that the plaintiffs did not have a proper accounting system and (b) the destruction of a large number of the plaintiffs’ documents and records by the plaintiffs’ own bookkeeper, Mr Tiang.

  137. [73] For the sake of completeness, I should mention that I have not forgotten the fact that, as I have already stated, Mdm Ma arranged for the steel cabinets in WKN’s room in WTK Management’s offices to be removed, and that there is no longer any trace of these documents. What the documents were is unknown. But on the basis that the plaintiffs’ business operations were administered not by WTK Management in Sibu but by Double Ace from their office in Singapore, it is perhaps doubtful that the steel cabinets removed by Mdm Ma from WKN’s room in WTK Management’s offices would necessarily be relevant to the plaintiffs’ business operations, although I accept that that is somewhat speculative.

  138. (iv) Status of the CAD Documents

  139. [74] Fourth, there was a major issue between the parties concerning the evidential status of most of the CAD Documents. The issue was important because the CAD Documents were heavily relied upon by the defendant. Indeed, as appears below, they constituted a crucial part of the defendant’s case. The plaintiffs advanced forceful submissions why the CAD Documents were inadmissible in evidence as to the truth of their contents and could not be relied upon by the defendant.

  140. [75] Given the importance of this issue, I directed further written submissions following the trial. I deal below with these submissions. In so doing, I should make plain that a limited number of the CAD Documents were obviously admissible – for example, those signed or attested to in the course of the trial by the plaintiffs’ own witnesses including WKY and Ms Loh. However, there remained a hotly contested debate between the parties as to the admissibility of the remainder of the CAD Documents as to the truth of their contents.

  141. [76] As stated above, the CAD Documents were seized by the CAD from the offices of Double Ace, ie, the plaintiffs’ agents in Singapore in August 2014 and returned to them in June 2016. It was common ground that these documents were “authentic”. However, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the contents of these documents were, in effect, hearsay statements (including manuscript writing) and thus inadmissible as to their truth unless the defendant could establish (the burden being on him) that what was stated in the documents was admissible as to the truth of their contents under one or more of the exceptions in s 32 of the Evidence Act.

  142. [77] In this context, it was accepted by the defendant that under s 5 of the Evidence Act, evidence may only be given of facts in issue or relevant facts; that hearsay evidence is prima facie inadmissible as it is perceived as irrelevant facts: Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [67]; that hearsay evidence will only be admitted where (a) it falls within one or more of the heads of exception in s 32(1) of the Evidence Act; and (b) the court determines that it should not exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence under s 32(3) of the Evidence Act in the interests of justice: see Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd and others and another appeal [2015] 2 SLR 686 (‘Gimpex’) at [95]; and that, even where hearsay evidence is admitted, the court retains the ultimate discretion under s 32(5) of the Evidence Act to assign the weight that it deems fit to all hearsay evidence that is admitted.

  143. [78] It was accepted on behalf of the defendant that (save to the extent that the statements contained in the documents were attested to by witnesses with relevant knowledge as to the truth of their contents) the contents of the CAD Documents were hearsay statements and prima facie inadmissible as to the truth of their contents. However, on behalf of the defendant, it was submitted that these the CAD Documents were admissible as to the truth of their contents pursuant to s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act and/or s 32(1)(j) of the same Act:

  144. In support of the foregoing and insofar as might be necessary, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that Mr Tiang was the “maker, compiler and/or maintainer of the CAD Documents”.

  145. [79] Further, with regard to the scope and effect of s 32(1)(b), the defendant relied upon a number of texts and authorities including Gimpex at [91]-[92] in particular where the Court of Appeal referred to the Consultation Paper issued by the Ministry of Law in 2011; the statement by the Minister for Law K Shanmugan where he explained that the parliamentary intent behind s 5 of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act 4 of 2012), which expanded the scope of the hearsay exceptions, was “to give the courts the discretion to sieve through the evidence to see which part should be allowed … [as] there is an interest of society in allowing relevant evidence, and that the judge is best placed to decide on what is relevant”: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012) vol 88 (K Shanmugam, Minister for Law) p 1141. Further, the defendant relied on a large number of other cases which, it was submitted, consistently reflect the parliamentary intent behind the 2012 amendments: that is, to “remove … technical limitations to the scope of the “business statement” exception, and to allow a court the discretion to admit all business records produced in the ordinary course of business which appear prima facie authentic” [emphasis added]: Gimpex at [92].

  146. [80] The defendant’s reliance on s 32(1)(b) was disputed by plaintiffs on a number of grounds which I would summarise as follows:

  147. (a) The defendant has the burden of showing that he is entitled to invoke one of the exceptions prescribed in s 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

  148. (b) The rationale for the s 32(1)(b) exception is that statements contemporaneously made in the ordinary course of routine business may be presumed to have been made with a disinterested motive and may therefore be taken to be generally true. In other words, what lends business records their reliability is the element of regularity rather than the profit motive or nature of the person carrying on the activity (relying on Bumi Geo Engineering Pte Ltd v Civil Tech Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1322 (“Bumi”) at [104]; Phipson on Evidence (Hodge M Malek et al eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2017) at para 29-13).

  149. (c) The plain and ordinary meaning of the words “in the ordinary course” is matters that usually and regularly occur. Those words are then followed by the words “trade, business, profession or other occupation”, which are of wide scope. What is important is that that activity is a known and recognised activity that is carried on regularly and in an organised fashion. According to the editors of the Halsbury’s Law of Singapore vols 10 and 10(2) (LexisNexis Singapore, 2020)(“Halsbury’s Law of Singapore”) at para 120.137:

  150. (d) The plaintiffs identified two questions. First, what is the relevant party’s business ? Second, were the documents made in the course of that business ?

  151. (e) There is a fatal circularity which undermines the defendant’s reliance on this exception. He is seeking to use the CAD Documents which he says were made in the ordinary course of the plaintiffs’ business to prove that they were made in the course of that business. (For convenience, I shall refer to this as the “bootstraps argument”). That is not permissible. There must first be proof, without reliance on the documents, of what the plaintiffs’ business was. The defendant cannot use the inadmissible documents to show what the plaintiffs’ practice and therefore business was so as to then admit the documents. In short, the documents are not relevant and admissible under this exception for the purpose of showing what the business was. The documents become relevant and admissible only once there is proof of the ordinary course of business. If the defendant is allowed to do what he is seeking to do, it will make a nonsense of this exception.

  152. (f) There is no evidence of the (alleged) para 4(d)(iv) practice or the (alleged) agreements/arrangements. It thus cannot be said that the payments were made in the course of the plaintiffs’ business, which in turn means that the documents could not have been made in the course of that business.

  153. (g) The cases relied upon provide no support to the defendant. In particular, in none of them were the documents that were sought to be admitted used to prove what the business was. There had also been no dispute in those cases that the documents were admissible.

  154. (i) In support of the foregoing, the plaintiffs relied upon Hope v Hope [1893] WN 20 as well as certain other parts of the speech referred to above by the Minister of Law and the Consultation Paper.

  155. (j) Here, there is simply no evidence to prove that Mr Tiang was the “maker, compiler and/or maintainer of the CAD Documents.” Also, the premise of that contention is flawed as it assumes that the CAD Documents were created in the ordinary course of the plaintiffs’ business and therefore Mr Tiang must have prepared them. It is also speculative as there is no evidence that Mr Tiang made the CAD Documents, eg, handwriting evidence.

  156. (k) The defendant’s reliance upon the evidence of WKY to suggest that the maker, compiler and/or maintainer of the CAD Documents could only have been Mr Tiang is misplaced and erroneous. Further, if the defendant wished to show that the plaintiffs “owned” the CAD documents, then the defendant should have called one of Double Ace’s employees which has not happened.

  157. (l) The foregoing is fatal to the defendant’s applications under both s 32(1)(b) and s 32(1)(j).

  158. (m) In any event, the CAD Documents should be excluded in the interests of justice under s 32(3) of the Evidence Act.

  159. [81] As for these submissions, my observations and conclusions are as follows.

  160. [82] I readily accept that the statements in the CAD Documents are prima facie inadmissible save to the extent that (a) the statements contained in the documents were attested to by witnesses with relevant knowledge as to the truth of their contents; and/or (b) they fall within one or both of the exceptions relied upon by the defendant; and that the burden of establishing the latter lies on the defendant.

  161. [83] The question as to whether the exception in s 32(1)(b) applies arises in the present case in rather unusual circumstances. Thus, this is not a case where (for example) a party (here, the defendant) is seeking to rely on that provision to admit in evidence documents produced by that party itself or by (say) an employee/agent of that party; or documents produced by some third party. Rather, in this case, on the basis that I am right in my conclusion that the CAD Documents are properly regarded as the plaintiffs’ documents and records (as to which see below at [84]), it is the plaintiffs who are themselves seeking to exclude evidence contained in their own documents and records. Knowledge as to the actual “maker” of the statements lies entirely with the plaintiffs. In my view, the suggestion that the defendant might have called one of Double Ace’s unidentified employees (whoever they may be) to give evidence with regard to the status of the CAD Documents (or specifically their “maker”) is unrealistic if not disingenuous.

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