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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Dec 2020

Singapore International Commercial Court

Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another

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[2020] SGHC(I) 27Case no. Suit No 4 of 2017

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The facts of the present dispute have been set out in DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kiri Industries and others and another suit [2018] 5 SLR 1 (the “Main Judgment”), and we do not propose to repeat them here. Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the abbreviations used in the Main Judgment. We briefly detail the procedural history of the present suit and the key findings in the various judgments that have been delivered.

  3. [2] In the Main Judgment, we held that Senda International Capital Ltd (“Senda”) had engaged in instances of oppressive conduct against Kiri Industries Ltd (“Kiri”). For the purposes of this Judgment, the relevant oppressive conduct includes the following:

  4. (a) the exploitation by Zhejiang Longsheng Group Co, Ltd (“Longsheng”) of the Orange 288 patent (the “Patent”), which was owned by DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“DyStar”);

  5. (b) the fees paid to Longsheng by DyStar for Longsheng’s provision of services to DyStar (the “Longsheng Fees”);

  6. (c) the payment of remuneration of US$2m to Ruan Weixiang (“Ruan”) as a director of DyStar (the “special incentive payment”); and

  7. (d) three financing transactions, which we refer to as the “Financing Transactions”, namely:

  8. (i) the granting of loans to Longsheng-related entities (the “Related Party Loans”);

  9. (ii) an arrangement made pursuant to an agreement we referred to in the Main Judgment as the “Cash-pooling Agreement”; and

  10. (iii) an arrangement that we referred to in the Main Judgment as the “Longsheng Financing Concept”.

  11. For ease of reference, we refer to these items collectively as the “Oppressive Acts”.

  12. [4] In Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2019] 4 SLR 1 (the “12 March 2019 Judgment”), this court held, inter alia, that no minority discount for lack of control (“DLOC”) should be applied to the valuation of Kiri’s shareholding in DyStar. In Senda International Capital Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1 (the “12 February 2020 CA Judgment”), the Court of Appeal upheld our decision on this issue in the 12 March 2019 Judgment.

  13. The evidence in the valuation proceedings

  14. [6] Expert evidence formed a central part of the valuation proceedings. The key experts who gave evidence were Ms Roula Harfouche (“Ms Harfouche”) for Kiri and Mr Lie Kok Keong (“Mr Lie”) for Senda. They expressed opinions on the correct approach to valuing DyStar and Kiri’s shares in DyStar as at the valuation date, and the value that ought to be arrived at based on the approaches they advanced. Their written evidence was in the form of several reports of significant length and complexity, which we list below:

  15. (a) Ms Harfouche provided the following four reports:

  16. (i) a report dated 22 August 2019 (“Ms Harfouche’s first report”);

  17. (ii) a report dated 11 October 2019 (“Ms Harfouche’s second report”);

  18. (iii) a report dated 24 March 2020 responding to document 23 of DyStar’s 20th Supplementary List of Documents (“Ms Harfouche’s comments on DyStar’s 20th SLOD”); and

  19. (iv) written updates to her calculations dated 30 March 2020 (“Ms Harfouche’s updated calculations”).

  20. (b) Mr Lie provided the following four reports:

  21. (i) a report dated 23 August 2019 (“Mr Lie’s report”);

  22. (ii) a report dated 15 October 2019 replying to Ms Harfouche’s first report (“Mr Lie’s reply report”);

  23. (iii) a supplementary report dated 24 March 2020 (“Mr Lie’s supplementary report”); and

  24. (iv) written updates to his reply report dated 31 March 2020 (“Mr Lie’s updated reply”).

  25. Both experts also gave oral evidence during the valuation proceedings. Ms Harfouche’s and Mr Lie’s evidence will take centre-stage in this Judgment; their evidence addresses squarely the pivotal question in the valuation proceedings, and that is the valuation approach we should adopt in arriving at the value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar. This Judgment begins with that question.

  26. [7] On behalf of Senda, other experts gave evidence on the following issues:

  27. (a) Mr Chan Kheng Tek (“Mr Chan”) gave evidence on the impact of the Oppressive Acts. He provided the following reports:

  28. (i) a report dated 23 August 2019 (“Mr Chan’s report”);

  29. (ii) a report dated 15 October 2019 replying to Ms Harfouche’s first report (“Mr Chan’s reply report”); and

  30. (iii) written updates to his reply report dated 31 March 2020 (“Mr Chan’s updated reply”).

  31. (b) Mr Tang EnLiang (“Mr Tang”) gave evidence on whether the intra-group charging mechanism between Longsheng and DyStar was reasonable. To this effect, he provided a report dated 19 August 2019 (“Mr Tang’s report”).

  32. (c) Mr Shi Xianping (“Mr Shi”) gave evidence on inter alia the state of the global dyestuff industry. He provided the following reports:

  33. (i) a report dated 19 August 2019 (“Mr Shi’s report”); and

  34. (ii) a report replying to Ms Harfouche’s first report dated 12 October 2019 (“Mr Shi’s reply report”).

  35. [8] Factual witnesses were also called to give evidence. They were mainly the key office holders in Kiri, Senda and DyStar. We will refer to these witnesses as we did in the Main Judgment.

  36. Issues

  37. [9] Our analysis in this Judgment is divided into two main parts. The first part concerns the issue of which expert’s (ie, Ms Harfouche’s or Mr Lie’s) valuation approach ought to be adopted (see [36]–[156] below). As noted earlier, this is the pivotal question and forms the starting point for the court’s valuation of Kiri’s shares in DyStar.

  38. [10] The second part concerns the discrete adjustments that have to be made to the preferred valuation approach (see [157] onwards). In their respective valuations, each of the experts, to varying degrees, took into account the impact (or lack thereof) of various risk events and other relevant factors affecting the value of Kiri’s shares in DyStar. We have grouped these events and factors into three broad categories:

  39. (a) The first category comprises what the parties have termed the “Five Risk Events”. They are:

  40. (i) the closure of DyStar’s dye production plant in Nanjing, China (the “Nanjing plant”);

  41. (ii) the closure of DyStar’s dye finishing plant in Wuxi, China (the “Wuxi plant”);

  42. (iii) the closure of DyStar’s dye finishing plant in Ankleshwar, India (the “Ankleshwar plant”);

  43. (iv) the expiration of the Patent, in conjunction with which we will consider the adjustments which must be made to DyStar’s valuation due to our finding in the Main Judgment ([1] supra) at [281(b)] that the loss from Longsheng’s use of the Patent is to be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation; and

  44. (v) the expiration of DyStar’s patent rights over the Indigo 40% solution in multiple jurisdictions (the “Indigo 40% patents”).

  45. (b) The second category comprises specific adjustments that have to be made to the discounted cash-flow (“DCF”) approach. The DCF approach, as will be explained (see [37] below), is a method used to value companies, which was relied on by both Ms Harfouche and Mr Lie albeit to varying extents. The adjustments that will be considered in this respect are:

  46. (i) the discount for lack of marketability (“DLOM”), and the extent to which this must be considered in the experts’ DCF approaches;

  47. (ii) two factors affecting DyStar’s cost of equity, which is a component of DyStar’s weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”). The WACC is a component of the DCF approach. These factors are the country risk premium and the size premium; and

  48. (iii) the tax rate to be applied on DyStar’s revenue.

  49. (c) The third category comprises the remaining discrete adjustments that must be made to DyStar’s valuation due to certain one-off events and transactions, and our finding in the Main Judgment that the value of the Oppressive Acts is to be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation (at [281(b)]). These are:

  50. (i) DyStar’s payment of the Longsheng Fees to Longsheng;

  51. (ii) the special incentive payment;

  52. (iii) the Financing Transactions;

  53. (iv) the US$4m insurance pay-out received by DyStar; and

  54. (v) three post-valuation tax and legal events, which will be elaborated upon in due course.

  55. We will address the parties’ factual and legal arguments with respect to each of these events and factors where relevant in the course of our analysis.

  56. [11] For reasons that will be made clear in the course of this Judgment, we prefer, generally speaking, Ms Harfouche’s approach to the valuation of DyStar and Kiri’s shares in DyStar. Her approach is to be used as the starting point for the valuation exercise. We will then consider and explain the adjustments that need to be made to Ms Harfouche’s approach.

  57. The parties’ cases

  58. [12] The parties structured their respective cases, by and large, according to the framework of issues set out at [9]–[10] above. They first made arguments on which expert’s general valuation approach is to be adopted by the court. They then examined the specifics of each of the relevant events and transactions, and made arguments on whether these should be, and if so to what extent, taken into account in the court’s valuation of DyStar and Kiri’s shares in DyStar. We briefly set out the parties’ general positions and conclusions on each of the issues, and will address the specifics of their arguments at the relevant junctures.

  59. Kiri’s case

  60. [13] Kiri’s case is that Ms Harfouche’s valuation approach and conclusions should be accepted.

  61. [14] Kiri argues that Ms Harfouche’s general approach to valuation represents a correct application of the DCF method and the market approach. Ms Harfouche’s reliance on independent market and broker reports in arriving at her valuation is unobjectionable; she had to take this approach because of the inadequacies in the evidence caused by Senda’s breaches of its disclosure obligations. Also, Ms Harfouche did not rely on the set of financial forecasts prepared by the DyStar board allegedly in April 2019 (“the April 2019 Forecasts”), which she regards as unreliable and skewed. In addition, Ms Harfouche’s amalgamation of both the DCF method and the market approach was principled, and the final figure she obtained reasonable.

  62. [15] In contrast, Mr Lie’s valuation approach suffers from a dearth of evidential underpinning, principally due to Mr Lie’s heavy reliance on the April 2019 Forecasts. The April 2019 Forecasts were prepared by DyStar’s management. According to Kiri, they were unsubstantiated, overly pessimistic, and deliberately skewed in favour of Senda with the valuation proceedings in mind. Mr Lie’s valuation approach hence ought to be rejected.

  63. [16] On the Five Risk Events:

  64. (a) The closure of the Nanjing plant should not be taken into account. There were sufficient short-term and long-term contingency measures in place to ameliorate any potentially deleterious effects that the plant closure would have had on DyStar’s revenue.

  65. (b) The closure of the Wuxi plant should not be taken into account. The Wuxi plant was a finishing plant, not a synthesis plant. Its role in DyStar’s production chain was therefore less significant. Further, there were sufficient contingency measures in place to ameliorate any potentially negative effects arising from the plant closure.

  66. (c) The closure of the Ankleshwar plant should not be taken into account as the event occurred after and was not foreseeable at the valuation date. In any event, the correspondence between DyStar and the authorities in Gujarat, India, revealed that DyStar could resume operations at the Ankleshwar plant. There is therefore no basis to regard the plant as closed.

  67. (d) As regards the Patent:

  68. (i) The benefit that Longsheng obtained via its exploitation of the Patent should be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation. This is to be in the form of an account of the profits that Longsheng obtained from its exploitation of the Patent in manufacturing and selling related products.

  69. (ii) The third-party licence fees obtained by Longsheng should also be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation. Senda failed to make complete disclosure of the licence fees obtained by Longsheng. Ms Harfouche’s valuation of the licence fees is based on what Longsheng did disclose, and is reasonable.

  70. (iii) The expiration of the Patent would have been known for a while and its impact, if any, should have been included in DyStar board pack forecasts. But the disclosed DyStar board meeting minutes show no discussion of the expiration of the Patent. Eric’s evidence on the projected impact of expiration is speculative. Further, given that DyStar does not itself produce Orange 288 products, and instead controls the market using the Patent, any price decrease in Orange 288 related products will not affect DyStar.

  71. (e) The expiration of the Indigo 40% patents would not affect DyStar’s valuation. Eric’s evidence on the projected impact of expiration is unsubstantiated. As DyStar has no current competitors in the Indigo 40% market, the expiry of the patents will not affect it. Further, there ought to have been in place contingency measures in light of the impending expiration of the patents. This issue was discussed in DyStar board meetings.

  72. [17] On the factors pertaining to the income (DCF) approach:

  73. (a) Senda’s oppressive conduct militates against an application of DLOM. Further, based on Ms Harfouche’s evidence and valuation, DyStar’s shares are unmarketable collectively. Hence, there is no basis to apply a DLOM to Kiri’s shares in DyStar.

  74. (b) On the factors affecting DyStar’s cost of equity:

  75. (i) A country risk premium is inappropriate. DyStar is globally diversified and operates in numerous jurisdictions. DyStar does not derive a significant part of its revenue from emerging markets. DyStar is also flexible and able to pivot to different jurisdictions quickly to reduce its exposure to any individual country risk.

  76. (ii) A size premium is inappropriate. DyStar earns an annual revenue of over US$1bn. It also stands as a leader amongst its peers in the industry, according to Eric’s evidence. Mr Lie has not been able to identify the specific risks DyStar faces vis-à-vis its peers simply by virtue of its size.

  77. (c) Ms Harfouche’s proposed applicable tax rate of 23% on DyStar’s revenue ought to be preferred over Mr Lie’s. Ms Harfouche’s tax rate is adjusted by normalising withholding taxes. Mr Lie’s tax rate is higher than DyStar’s historical effective tax rates.

  78. [18] As for the Oppressive Acts and other events and transactions:

  79. (a) Both the Longsheng Fees for 2015/2016 and 2017/2018 should be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation. The Longsheng Fees for 2017/2018 were procured under circumstances similar to that for the Longsheng Fees for 2015/2016. Ms Harfouche’s proposed quantum for the relevant fees should be accepted, as her calculations were correct.

  80. (b) Ms Harfouche correctly calculated the impact on DyStar’s valuation caused by the special incentive payment. She took into account the time value of money, namely, the interest that DyStar would have saved had it not paid the special incentive payment to Ruan.

  81. (c) On the Financing Transactions:

  82. (i) Ms Harfouche correctly calculated the impact of the Related Party Loans and the Cash-pooling Agreement on DyStar’s valuation. Ms Harfouche correctly offset the Related Party Loans and the value of the Cash-pooling Arrangement against DyStar’s external loans with highest interest rates.

  83. (ii) As for the Longsheng Financing Concept, Ms Harfouche selected a loan with a low interest rate to replace the said transaction. This is correct given that DyStar would have obtained such loans with lower interest but for the Longsheng Financing Concept.

  84. (d) As DyStar had in fact received an insurance pay-out in May and June 2019, this should be added back into DyStar’s valuation.

  85. (e) The three other tax and legal events raised by Senda were subsequent to the valuation date and should not be considered.

  86. Senda’s case

  87. [19] Senda’s case is that Mr Lie’s valuation approach and conclusions should be preferred over Mr Harfouche’s.

  88. [20] Senda contends that Mr Lie was correct to rely on the April 2019 Forecasts in arriving at his valuation. These forecasts were accurate and buttressed by a financial report known as the “February 2020 Model”. Mr Lie’s valuation is accordingly more accurate than Ms Harfouche’s, given that he relied on information prepared by DyStar’s management instead of relying on selected comparable companies.

  89. [21] Ms Harfouche was incorrect not to rely on the April 2019 Forecasts. Her use of independent market and broker reports is objectionable for various reasons. The market and broker reports and forecasts relied on by Ms Harfouche constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence. Her selected comparable companies were inappropriate. Ms Harfouche also did not hold herself to proper valuation standards. Amongst other things, she ought not to have applied the market approach and DCF method in conjunction.

  90. [22] On the Five Risk Events:

  91. (a) The closure of the Nanjing plant would negatively affect DyStar’s valuation. The alternative toll manufacturing arrangements that were put in place were costly, and did not ameliorate the negative impact of the plant closure.

  92. (b) The closure of the Wuxi plant would negatively affect DyStar’s valuation. Despite being a finishing plant, the plant was an indispensable part of DyStar’s production chain. Any planned contingency measures were insufficient to adequately replace the closure of the Wuxi plant.

  93. (c) The closure of the Ankleshwar plant would negatively affect DyStar’s valuation. It was a plant of strategic importance to DyStar, being the only one in the Indian subcontinent. The plant remains closed as it does not have the requisite authorisation to resume operations. Although the plant closure occurred after the valuation date, this does not mean that it should not be taken into account in DyStar’s valuation.

  94. (d) As regards the Patent:

  95. (i) DyStar, at best, would be entitled to a notional licence fee for Longsheng’s exploitation of the Patent. DyStar is not entitled to Longsheng’s profits because it would not have itself been able to make Orange 288 products given that it lacked the infrastructural capabilities to engage in production using the Patent. In any case, DyStar would not have been in a position to charge Longsheng any licence fee; the Assignment Agreement between DyStar and Longsheng does not stipulate a fee.

  96. (ii) Senda accepts that Longsheng must account to DyStar for the licence fees earned. Mr Chan’s valuation should be preferred to Ms Harfouche’s given that he correctly took into account refunds that had to be paid out to licensees by Longsheng.

  97. (e) The expiration of the Indigo 40% patents would reduce DyStar’s earnings, thereby affecting its valuation. The patents were an important revenue stream for DyStar. Upon expiration, DyStar’s competitors will enter the market. This will cause the selling price of Indigo 40% products to fall, affecting DyStar’s revenue.

  98. [23] On the factors pertaining to the income (DCF) approach:

  99. (a) A DLOM should be applied. This is distinguishable from a DLOC – the considerations undergirding each are distinct. This distinction is borne out in case law. Further, a DLOM should also be applied as a matter of principle where DyStar’s valuation is based primarily on information on publicly traded or listed companies.

  100. (b) As for the factors affecting DyStar’s cost of equity:

  101. (i) A country risk premium should be applied. Mr Lie has correctly averaged out the risk present in each of the jurisdictions DyStar operates in. This represents the net country risk that DyStar faces. Operating in different jurisdictions averages out, but does not nullify, individual country risk.

  102. (ii) A size premium should be applied. Based on Mr Lie’s assessment of DyStar’s equity value and independent market studies, a size premium of 2.68% ought to be applied. Ms Harfouche was incorrect to consider DyStar’s revenue instead of its equity value in the size premium inquiry, and her position should therefore be rejected.

  103. (c) Mr Lie’s proposed tax rate of 26.7% on DyStar’s revenue should be accepted. Ms Harfouche’s deductions for withholding tax are incorrect, and her tax rate is hence inaccurate.

  104. [24] On the Oppressive Acts and other events and transactions:

  105. (a) The Longsheng Fees for 2015/2016 should be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation, but Mr Chan’s calculations are more accurate and to be preferred. On the other hand, the Longsheng Fees for 2017/2018 should not be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation. The situation in 2017/2018 was different. Kiri’s directors in DyStar were informed of the fees, and the fees were properly approved. The issue had been discussed in board meetings. The situation was therefore unlike what had happened in respect of the Longsheng Fees for 2015/2016. Kiri’s representatives also could not prove that the pricing mechanism for the Longsheng Fees was unreasonable.

  106. (b) Mr Chan’s calculation on the special incentive payment should be preferred. Ms Harfouche’s calculation of the interest savings is incorrect. She also applied the wrong tax rate.

  107. (c) On the Financing Transactions:

  108. (i) Mr Chan’s calculations on the Related Party Loans and the Cash-pooling Agreement should be preferred. He selected appropriate existing loans taken by DyStar to substitute the value of the oppressive transactions.

  109. (ii) Mr Chan selected an appropriate three-year amortising loan to replace the Longsheng Financing Concept. The offer for this loan was in fact received by DyStar, meaning it is a loan that DyStar in fact could have taken.

  110. (d) The insurance pay-out DyStar received should not be incorporated into DyStar’s valuation. DyStar’s management should not be faulted for failing to include the value of an event that had yet to occur when the April 2019 Forecasts were prepared.

  111. (e) On the other tax and legal events:

  112. (i) The payment to the Italian tax authorities, while occurring only in 2019, was the product of a matter that had been ongoing since 2010. At the valuation date, there was a foreseeable risk that DyStar would have to make this payment.

  113. (ii) The tax events occurring in Osaka, Japan, would have a long-term impact on DyStar Japan’s tax exposure, which should be accounted for in the valuation of DyStar.

  114. (iii) DyStar has been laden with numerous civil suits commenced by Kiri. While these lawsuits were launched only after the valuation date, the court should infer that Kiri had a “cynical objective” to sabotage the valuation of DyStar without affecting Kiri’s buyout price. The court cannot allow Kiri to do so, and should deduct from DyStar’s valuation any sums that DyStar has to pay pursuant to these civil suits.

  115. [25] Before turning to our substantive analysis, we address an important preliminary question on the significance of the valuation date.

  116. The valuation date and its significance

  117. [26] The valuation date is crucial. In determining the valuation of DyStar, we accept Kiri’s submission that the court must consider (a) pre-valuation date events, and (b) post-valuation date events that were foreseeable as at the valuation date. On the other hand, the court should not use the benefit of hindsight to adjust the valuation for post-valuation date events which were not foreseeable as at the valuation date.

  118. [27] Senda contends otherwise, arguing that (a) the valuation date, as decided in the Main Judgment ([1] supra), is not “immutable”; and (b) the court ought to consider post-valuation date events even if these events were not foreseeable as at the valuation date.

  119. It thus becomes clear that Senda cites Koh Keng Chew out of context. The court in Koh Keng Chew made it clear that considerations of fairness should be taken into account when determining the appropriate valuation date, and the court might decide on a date other than the date of the judgment for the buyout. The court did not state that a valuation date, once fixed, may be varied.

  120. [29] Accordingly, if there were any issues concerning the fairness of the valuation date, these should have been raised to and ventilated before the Court of Appeal in the appeal against the Main Judgment. Senda did not do so, and is now precluded from re-litigating the issue by virtue of the principle of res judicata. Even if it could, Senda has not shown in these proceedings or in any of the proceedings prior why the valuation date, as determined in the Main Judgment, would lead to an unfair result.

  121. [30] It is significant that despite submitting, in reliance on Koh Keng Chew, that a new valuation date may be set, Senda offers no submission on what that date ought to be. This implicitly is a recognition of the challenge it faces from its failure to contest on appeal the valuation date decided in the Main Judgment. It also explains why it resorted to a second argument – that the court may take into account post-valuation date events that were not foreseeable as at the valuation date. We turn to consider Senda’s second argument next.

  122. [31] Senda’s second contention – that unforeseeable post-valuation date events may be taken into account – requires further discussion. Senda relies on observations in Poh Fu Tek and others v Lee Shung Guan and others [2018] 4 SLR 425 (“Poh Fu Tek”). It submits that the case stands for the proposition that the court can consider post-valuation date events which were not foreseeable as at the valuation date, if such events would allow for a fairer and more accurate estimate of the value of a plaintiff’s shares. We reproduce below the relevant excerpt from Poh Fu Tek:

  123. [33] Once a valuation date has been determined, the court may only take into account events that were foreseeable as at the chosen valuation date. There is no authority (apart from Poh Fu Tek) that suggests otherwise. We therefore respectfully depart from Poh Fu Tek on this point. The prevailing position is also sound in principle. To take into account events that were unforeseeable as at a given valuation date (but perhaps foreseeable as at a later date) would be artificially to shift the proverbial goalposts despite the valuation date having already been determined, and considerations of fairness having already been taken into account.

  124. [35] With the aforementioned principles in mind, we turn to consider the experts’ approaches to valuation.

  125. The experts’ approaches to the valuation of DyStar

  126. Overview of the valuation approaches

  127. [36] Ms Harfouche and Mr Lie both relied on two main valuation approaches. These were the DCF method (which is a subset of the “income approach”) and the market approach. It is agreed that both of these approaches are frequently used in company valuation exercises such as the present. However, despite relying on the same approaches, Ms Harfouche and Mr Lie differed in the manner in which they applied them.

  128. [37] The DCF method values a company based on the expected future cash flows of the company discounted to a present value as at the valuation date. The experts agree that a valuation under this method may be conducted using a company’s actual historical revenue figures, where available, or the market performance of similar companies in the industry.

  129. [39] Ms Harfouche adopted an amalgamation of the DCF method and the market approach. She first obtained separate valuations of DyStar using each approach, before computing a single final valuation by aggregating the results of the DCF method and market approach. Mr Lie instead primarily relied on the DCF method, and merely used the market approach as a cross-check. However, despite Ms Harfouche and Mr Lie embracing the DCF approach (albeit differently), there was a significant difference between them. That difference lay in the data they used in applying the DCF method.

  130. [40] Mr Lie relied heavily, if not entirely, on the April 2019 Forecasts. We will refer to the contents of the April 2019 Forecasts in detail when analysing Mr Lie’s approach below. Ms Harfouche disavows the April 2019 Forecasts and criticises these as unduly pessimistic. Indeed, a key facet of Kiri’s case is that the April 2019 Forecasts are unreliable. Kiri consequently submits that Mr Lie’s valuation approach ought to be rejected due to his reliance on the April 2019 Forecasts. For reasons that will be made clear, we agree with Kiri and Ms Harfouche on the (lack of) integrity of the April 2019 Forecasts. As a consequence, we have reservations about accepting Mr Lie’s conclusion on the value to be attributed to Kiri’s shares in DyStar.

  131. [41] We begin by addressing the merits of Ms Harfouche’s approach, before explaining the issues with the April 2019 Forecasts, and why these have led to us rejecting Mr Lie’s valuation of DyStar. Before that, however, we highlight the deficiencies in the evidence that arose as a result of Senda’s failure to disclose important financial documents.

  132. Senda’s failure to disclose key financial documents

  133. [42] Kiri has, in various parts of its written closing submissions, highlighted Senda’s breaches of its disclosure obligations. These include the following.

  134. (a) Although Senda disclosed DyStar board packs in April 2017, November 2017 and May 2018, which stated in broad terms DyStar’s revenue forecasts, Senda and DyStar did not disclose the “underlying calculations to ascertain the drivers of the [board pack] forecasts”. Nor did they disclose other relevant board packs or similar documents containing DyStar’s financial information. This resulted in Ms Harfouche finding these board packs rather unhelpful. Further, no forecasts for DyStar’s costs (and therefore profitability) were provided. As will be noted, these shortcomings affected the experts’ methodologies in valuing DyStar.

  135. (b) Senda’s belated disclosure of the February 2020 Model was also problematic in Kiri’s view. As noted (see [20] above), this model is a financial report relied on by Mr Lie and Senda that purportedly improved on the accuracy of the April 2019 Forecasts. Senda only disclosed the February 2020 Model on the eve of trial in DyStar’s 20th Supplementary List of Documents (“SLOD”) dated 25 February 2020.

  136. (c) Senda failed to disclose the underlying documents substantiating the April 2019 Forecasts and February 2020 Model.

  137. (d) In relation to the alleged closure of the Ankleshwar plant, Senda did not disclose correspondence between the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (“GPCB”) and DyStar India Pte Ltd. Such correspondence would have revealed the circumstances of the purported closure of the Ankleshwar plant (which we discuss subsequently; see [170] below onwards).

  138. (e) Senda belatedly disclosed some of the materials supporting Mr Lie’s various reports in DyStar’s 18th SLOD dated 24 October 2019, when these documents were available to Mr Lie and Senda much earlier. These include DyStar’s written answers to queries from PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services Pte Ltd, some of which were dated even earlier than Mr Lie’s first report.

  139. (f) Senda under-disclosed and belatedly disclosed the quantities of related products produced and sold by Longsheng using the Patent, the prices of the related products and Longsheng’s gross profit margins from the sale of these products.

  140. [43] Senda’s breaches of its disclosure obligations – particularly as regards DyStar’s financial information that undergirded the board packs, the April 2019 Forecasts and February 2020 Model – significantly influenced the approach that Ms Harfouche took. She felt compelled as a result to turn to independent market research and broker forecasts, as opposed to DyStar’s actual historical performance. In fact, and as will be highlighted at the relevant junctures, other parts of our analysis (eg, on the Five Risk Events and other relevant factors affecting DyStar’s valuation) were likewise impeded by the gaps in the evidence highlighted above.

  141. [44] Kiri submits that the court ought to draw adverse inferences against Senda for these non-disclosures. While we accept that there were shortcomings on Senda’s and DyStar’s part in meeting their discovery obligations, we are of the view that drawing adverse inferences is unnecessary. As will be made clear, the consequence of these shortcomings is that Senda’s case on valuation is undermined. To the extent that Senda’s conclusions and positions are not supported by primary evidence, they are of questionable evidential value. We will explain why later in this Judgment (see [139], [151] and [152] below).

  142. The soundness of Ms Harfouche’s approach

  143. [45] We begin by explaining how each of Ms Harfouche’s two valuation approaches made sense individually, before addressing how her amalgamation of the two approaches was also reasonable.

  144. Ms Harfouche’s application of the DCF method and the market approach

  145. [46] We note at the outset that both of Ms Harfouche’s approaches rely on market comparables and independent reports. Her approaches are comprehensive, and indeed warranted bearing in mind our observation above on the shortcomings in the information that Senda placed before the court.

  146. [47] We also observe that both the DCF method and the market approach involve multiple discrete and highly technical calculations. There are several individual aspects of each of these methods and the underlying basis of the experts’ respective views where the parties disagree. In this Judgment, we focus on the areas of contention between the parties and will examine the technical aspects of the experts’ calculations only when necessary.

  147. (1) DCF method

  148. [48] As mentioned, the basis of the DCF method is the company’s projected future earnings, discounted to present value by applying a relevant discount factor incorporating WACC. Ms Harfouche projected DyStar’s revenue until 2027 by using average revenue growth forecasts of comparable companies and the compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) published by MarketsandMarkets in various reports (“the MMR reports”), before decreasing the growth rate in a linear fashion to reach a long-term growth rate of 2.1%. She also projected DyStar’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”) using the performance of comparable companies and thereafter maintained a flat EBITDA margin of 14.8% from 2020 onwards. Using the projected revenue and EBITDA figures, Ms Harfouche arrived at a valuation of DyStar based on the DCF method. We address DyStar’s future revenue (based on the CAGR in the MMR reports) first before turning to the issue of DyStar’s EBITDA.

  149. [49] As a starting point, the CAGR in the MMR reports was a figure that Ms Harfouche adopted after taking into account Eric’s and Yao’s affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) dated 9 October 2019 and 15 January 2020 respectively. In so proceeding, Ms Harfouche recognised that there were several issues with the initial projections in her first report. This suggests that she had taken a balanced approach.

  150. [50] Senda attempts to undermine the MMR reports and another set of reports – reports by Research Reports Insights (“the RRI reports”) – that Ms Harfouche relied on in her valuation. Ms Harfouche relied on these reports for the CAGR mentioned above. In turn, the CAGR was used by her to draw up a pool of companies which she used to arrive at her projections for DyStar’s cash flow (see [60] below), and the projected growth trends for the dyestuff industry. By challenging Ms Harfouche’s use of these reports, Senda seeks to undermine her approach and conclusions.

  151. [51] We do not accept Senda’s submission that Ms Harfouche was incorrect in referring to these reports. Senda principally takes objection to the reliability of the growth rate figures in these reports on the basis that they are inconsistent with the IHS Markit report relied on by Mr Shi. However, Kiri correctly points out that whereas the IHS Markit report considered volume growth rates in the textile/dyestuff industry, the MMR and RRI reports considered revenue growth rates. The basis of comparison is thus incorrect. It seems to us that revenue growth rates are more relevant given that the DCF approach is based on revenue projections. Volume projections, while still relevant, do not readily translate into usable data (ie, revenue figures) for the purpose of a DCF calculation.

  152. [52] In fact, the MMR and RRI reports are corroborated by other reports cited by Eric and Manish. Mr Lie and Mr Shi failed to recognise this when they criticised Ms Harfouche’s reliance on the MMR and RRI reports. These corroborative reports were comprehensively tabulated by Ms Harfouche in her second report, and include reports from reputable sources such as Reuters. Notably, Mr Lie did not consider these reports and has been unable to adequately explain his failure to do so.

  153. [53] Mr Shi’s other criticisms of the MMR and other reports relied on by Ms Harfouche are equally wanting. Kiri has thoroughly canvassed these contentions, as well as their flaws, at paragraphs 357 to 360 of its written closing submissions, which we will reproduce briefly here.

  154. (a) Mr Shi asserted that the authors of the MMR reports do not appear to be experts on dyestuff, whereas the authors of the IHS Markit report were. However, the online profiles of the authors of the IHS Markit report do not indicate that they are experienced in the dyestuff industry. When re-examined on this point, Mr Shi claimed that it is not easy to find an expert “in the world” for this industry, and insisted that the IHS Markit report authors were experts based on his earlier exchanges with them – Mr Shi, however, produced no concrete evidence to this effect.

  155. (b) Mr Shi alleged that the MMR reports presented an inaccurate projection, specifically that the slope of the projections was steeper than the actuals. However, Kiri has explained that the graphs were accurate with reference to the variables tied to the X and Y axes of the relevant graphs.

  156. (c) Mr Shi also took issue with certain sections of the 2019 MMR report, namely that there is an inconsistency in the figures provided for the projected global revenue of the dyestuff industry and the projected CAGR. Kiri, however, explained that Ms Harfouche did not rely on the erroneous portions of the 2019 MMR report (which was a typographical error in the report), and that the other discrepancies pointed out by Mr Shi were explicable on the basis of the different variables used in the CAGR graphs.

  157. (d) Mr Shi claimed that he was unable to verify some of the sources of data used in a report from Morgan Stanley, which Ms Harfouche relied on. He similarly criticised the MMR reports as being plagued by issues of “research thoroughness and methodology”. However, Mr Shi never offered much elaboration on his criticism of the MMR reports. Nor did he substantiate his criticisms. Further, Kiri highlights that Mr Shi conceded, in cross-examination, that he also did not have knowledge of the underlying assumptions of the data used in certain aspects of the IHS Markit report. In this sense, Mr Shi’s criticism of the Morgan Stanley report would equally apply to the IHS Markit report which he relied upon.

  158. It suffices to note that each of Mr Shi’s criticisms was either unsupported by evidence, shown to be factually incorrect during Kiri’s cross-examination of Mr Shi, or otherwise unpersuasive.

  159. [54] We accordingly are of the view that Ms Harfouche’s reliance on the relevant reports, and in particular the CAGR in the MMR reports, was well-placed.

  160. [55] Ms Harfouche undertook a rigorous selection process in determining the comparable companies which were used to arrive at her projected EBITDA for DyStar:

  161. (a) She began with 811 companies, selected on the basis of their enterprise value (“EV”) and their involvement in the specialty, diversified or commodity chemicals industries.

  162. (b) This was refined down to 38 companies in the dye industry (i) with annual revenues that were comparable to DyStar (a minimum annual revenue of US$300m was used); and (ii) that had available EBITDA forecasts until financial year (“FY”) 2020.

  163. (c) This was further whittled down to 16 companies in light of the similarity between the specific dye-related services and dyes (based on the chemicals used in production) offered and produced by these companies and DyStar.

  164. [56] The 16 companies selected by Ms Harfouche were then divided into three buckets:

  165. (a) Bucket 1 comprised companies with diverse product offerings, a global presence, and a segment that manufactured or sold textile dyes/pigments. Bucket 1 included: Clariant AG (“Clariant”), Huntsman Corp (“Huntsman”) and LANXESS AG (“Lanxess”).

  166. (b) Bucket 2 comprised chemical companies that manufactured or sold textile dyes/pigments, but with a presence primarily in Asia. Bucket 2 included: Nippon Kayaku Co Ltd, Pidilite Industries Ltd, Longsheng and Zhejiang Runtu Co, Ltd (“Runtu”).

  167. (c) Bucket 3 comprised chemical companies that manufactured or sold non-textile dyes/pigments or colourants. Bucket 3 included: BASF SE (moved from Bucket 1 in Ms Harfouche’s second report), DIC Corp, D&L Industries, Elementis plc, Ferro Corp, ONMOVA Solutions Inc, PPG Industries, Inc, RPM International Inc and Solvay SA.

  168. Depending on the bucket in which a particular company was placed, Ms Harfouche attributed the relevant weight to that company’s revenue/EBITDA figures. It is not necessary to reproduce Ms Harfouche’s detailed calculations in this regard – what is critical is that from the classification criteria among the three buckets, Ms Harfouche (a) scrutinised the similarities between the comparable companies and DyStar; and (b) took them into account in her final calculations.

  169. [57] From the three buckets, Ms Harfouche excluded three outlier companies with anomalous trading multiples, leaving 13 companies. These were the companies Ms Harfouche used in her valuation.

  170. [58] Based on the above, we are of the view that Ms Harfouche’s selection criteria were sound. She identified and selected companies that were similar to DyStar not only in terms of the industry in which they operated, but also with reference to the relevant financial data such as revenue figures. This comports with the standards for a valuation exercise stipulated in the International Valuation Standards (“IVS”), a set of guidelines issued by the IVS Council. The IVS states at paragraph 50.3 that the test for comparability is whether the relevant companies are “in the same industry as the subject business or in an industry that responds to the same economic variables”. The IVS elaborates at paragraph 30.13(b) that:

  171. It is apparent from the discussion in the preceding paragraphs that Ms Harfouche’s selection criteria took into account these factors.

  172. [60] Senda’s other objections are also incorrect. Senda asserts that several of the companies selected by Ms Harfouche – namely Clariant and Lanxess – were not in the business of textile dyes. However, the evidence suggests the contrary.

  173. (a) The MMR reports for the textile and dyestuff industry, the RRI reports and the IHS Markit report (which Senda relies on) show that Lanxess was in the business of textile dyes.

  174. (b) The UBS report on Huntsman and Mordor Intelligence Report show that Clariant has been regarded as on par with Huntsman in the textile dye industry, and as being in the business of textile dyes in the plastics and coatings sector in particular.

  175. Ms Harfouche was accordingly correct to consider Clariant and Lanxess as appropriate comparable companies in Bucket 1.

  176. [61] Based on the foregoing, Ms Harfouche used the EBITDA and revenue forecasts of the 13 companies she selected to arrive at a projected future EBITDA for DyStar. Ms Harfouche used the average annual movement in EBITDA margin forecasts for these companies to project DyStar’s performance until FY 2020. She obtained the projected revenue and EBITDA margins for the selected companies from broker forecasts collated by Capital IQ.

  177. [62] Ms. Harfouche then extrapolated her projections for DyStar’s revenue and EBITDA between FY 2020 and FY 2027 to arrive at a “steady-state” of revenue growth and EBITDA. Ms Harfouche gradually decreased the annual revenue growth rate to a terminal revenue growth rate, which was the IMF’s long-term US dollar inflation rate of 2.1%. This again was conservative on Ms Harfouche’s part, as it implied no real revenue growth for DyStar. As mentioned (at [48] above), she also capped DyStar’s EBITDA margin at 14.8% from FY 2020 onwards.

  178. [63] Senda has not raised any material objections to Ms Harfouche’s methodology in this regard. Further, as will be explained (see [78] below), Ms Harfouche’s figures were reasonable when considered alongside DyStar’s actual revenue and EBITDA figures.

  179. [64] It also bears mention that Ms Harfouche used a longer period to determine DyStar’s “stable” terminal growth rate (until 2027, in contrast to Mr Lie’s end-point of 2023). She did so because she considered ten years (2018 to 2027) to be a “sufficient timeframe to arrive at a ‘steady-state’ or ‘perpetual’ level of financial performance”. In our view, the longer period used by Ms Harfouche is a more robust and accurate approach that will be less affected by aberrations in the data, and will average out year-to-year fluctuations in the market. This is a matter of prudence as much as it is of common sense. In fact, in setting her projected terminal growth rate, Ms Harfouche adopted conservative numbers (by maintaining a flat EBITDA margin from FY 2020 onwards) and projected no real revenue growth for DyStar.

  180. [65] The figures for DyStar’s EBITDA and revenue growth rates that Ms Harfouche arrived at were used to compute DyStar’s projected earnings. To this end, Ms Harfouche applied an appropriate discount rate. The issues relating to several discrete adjustments that are to be made to the DCF method are considered below in the section on “Adjustments to the income (DCF) approach” (see [224]–[268] below).

  181. [66] The rest of Ms Harfouche’s calculations on DyStar’s projected earnings have either not been raised as issues in the valuation proceedings or do not constitute pertinent areas of contention between the parties. We accordingly do not consider them. In totality, we consider that Ms Harfouche has (except where indicated below) correctly taken into account the relevant factors affecting DyStar’s projected earnings and growth. This resulted in a reasonable application of the DCF method.

  182. (2) Market approach

  183. [67] On the market approach, we accept that Ms Harfouche was correct to rely on her own projections, which were arrived at using appropriate comparable companies. Senda again criticises her methodology as arbitrary. However, the following points are relevant.

  184. [68] First and foremost, it was Senda’s non-disclosure of financial documents underpinning its projections in the April 2019 Forecasts which necessitated Ms Harfouche adopting this approach. Ms Harfouche cannot thus be faulted for building her own model based on comparable companies.

  185. [69] More importantly, as explained at [55]–[60] above, Ms Harfouche’s methodology in identifying the comparable companies was intelligible and comprehensive. These companies thus served as appropriate comparators in Ms Harfouche’s application of the market approach. Specifically, the EVs of these companies were used by Ms Harfouche to establish EV ranges, from which she could determine sound trading multiples – these trading multiples then allowed her to arrive at a reasonable projected EV for DyStar.

  186. [70] As noted earlier, Mr Lie also relied on the market approach save that it was used only as a cross-check. However, Ms Harfouche and Mr Lie disagreed on whether capital expenditure (“CapEx”) was a relevant factor in computing the trading multiples. Ms Harfouche used a formula of EV/(EBITDA - CapEx) in calculating her trading multiples. In contrast, Mr Lie disregarded CapEx and simply used the formula of EV/EBITDA in arriving at a trading multiple.

  187. [71] We agree with Ms Harfouche. The logic behind factoring in CapEx, as submitted by Kiri, is sound. Investors would sensibly take into account a company’s earnings levels with reference to its capital expenditure. A company that is able to generate greater earnings with lower capital expenditure would be one that is more profitable vis-à-vis its peers which may be making similar earnings but require greater expenditure to do so. We thus consider it appropriate for Ms Harfouche to have taken into account the CapEx of the comparable companies in arriving at her trading multiples, and prefer her application of the market approach to Mr Lie’s for this reason.

  188. [72] There is another reason why we prefer Ms Harfouche’s approach. Ms Harfouche considered a group of 13 companies classified into different buckets. On the other hand, Mr Lie considered only the non-listed segment of one comparable company in arriving at his trading multiple. This in our view is a less robust method. Restricting the data to only unlisted companies unnecessarily narrows the field of inquiry. It does not follow that just because DyStar is not listed, only non-listed companies are relevant comparables. It seems to us that the correct approach is to identify companies that are similar to DyStar based on the nature and characteristics of the business that are similar to DyStar’s business (for example, operating in the same market/industry and selling similar goods to the same class of consumers), with adjustments, if necessary, being made to take into account the fact that the comparable companies are listed.

  189. [73] Ms Harfouche also used the transactions multiples method. This involved an analysis of several acquisitions of companies similar to DyStar. Key to this was the selection of the appropriate acquisitions. Ms Harfouche did this in the following manner.

  190. (a) Ms Harfouche first reviewed reports by Capital IQ and Mergermarket, and reports on transactions produced by investment banks and brokers based on: (i) whether these transactions occurred in 2017 and 2018; and (ii) whether the target companies were in the specialty, commodity and diversified chemicals segment.

  191. (b) Ms Harfouche then excluded transactions for which there was insufficient information on the various financial metrics, as well as transactions involving companies that did not appear to sell or manufacture dyes and pigments. This narrowed the inquiry down to 28 transactions.

  192. (c) Of these 28 transactions, Ms Harfouche assessed those companies which were most similar to DyStar in terms of activities. This resulted in a list of four comparable transactions, which are set out in a table at paragraph A7.7 of Ms Harfouche’s first report.

  193. [74] Based on Ms Harfouche’s description of the companies in the four transactions, it is clear that the relevant companies were all large players in various segments of the paint/pigment manufacturing industry. Senda has not meaningfully challenged this. These transactions were valid reference points for Ms Harfouche to form her opinion on the valuation of DyStar based on the market approach.

  194. [75] Mr Lie eschewed the comparable transactions approach. He chose not to rely on comparable transactions as he “f[ound] it difficult to find transactions for companies which are comparable to DyStar”. We agree with Kiri that the approach of looking at comparable transactions is sensible as it lends to a more robust and reliable conclusion. The results of Ms Harfouche’s analysis of the relevant transactions served as another source of corroboration for her calculations under the trading multiples method, as well as her overall valuation of DyStar. Seeing how Ms Harfouche was in fact able to identify comparable companies by way of her selection criteria (see [73] above), which we find comprehensive and sensible, we do not see merit in Mr Lie’s position that it is “difficult” to find comparable companies for the purpose of this exercise.

  195. [76] Accordingly, it seems to us that Ms Harfouche has adopted a more robust and comprehensive methodology in her valuation of DyStar. She has considered the issue from the perspective of various different multiples, and taken into account a sizeable pool of comparable companies. On the other hand, Mr Lie was content at various junctures to settle on a limited sample size and fewer sources of corroborative valuations. The integrity of the approach that the experts adopted was critical in our view. This was because the projected financial performance of DyStar could not be arrived at based on DyStar’s financial documents alone given the shortcomings in the disclosure obligations highlighted earlier, and the difficulties with the integrity of the April 2019 Forecasts as later described (see [138]–[150] below). For these reasons, an alternative approach that was robust and comprehensive was key in arriving at the correct valuation of DyStar. We therefore prefer Ms Harfouche’s approach.

  196. The amalgamation of the two approaches

  197. [77] We agree with Kiri that, in the absence of reliable multi-year forecasts from DyStar prepared before the valuation date, Ms Harfouche’s approach of arriving at a final valuation between her market and DCF approaches is fair. Ms Harfouche did not adopt the higher of her two valuations (ie, the DCF approach, which resulted in a higher valuation range), but combined the results of her DCF valuation and other valuations and arrived at an aggregated figure. In our view, this was an appropriate course and resulted in a reasonable and balanced figure.

  198. [78] That Ms Harfouche’s revenue and maintainable EBITDA projections broadly correspond with DyStar’s actual revenue and maintainable EBITDA for FY 2018 and FY 2019 (as canvassed in the table below) speaks to the conclusion that her model is reasonable and reliable. We tabulate below the examples of these that Kiri has relied on in its written closing submissions.

  199. As seen, Ms Harfouche’s projections not only broadly corresponded to DyStar’s actual revenue/EBITDA figures, but in some years even fell below DyStar’s actual performance. It thus cannot be said that Ms Harfouche’s projections were exaggerated or inflated in any sense.

  200. [79] In response to Ms Harfouche’s evidence as set out above, Senda raises several objections, which we address in turn.

  201. Senda’s objections to the admissibility of independent broker and market reports relied on by Ms Harfouche

  202. [80] Senda raises multiple objections to the use by Ms Harfouche of reports by various broker and market reports which we have referred to above.

  203. (a) The first contention is that the reports are hearsay and inadmissible as the makers of the reports were not called as witnesses to testify as to the truth of their contents.

  204. (b) The second contention is that, in the alternative, less weight ought to be placed on Ms Harfouche’s evidence given her reliance on these reports.

  205. We first examine the former contention. In this respect, we are of the unanimous view that the reports Ms Harfouche relied on are admissible, but diverge in terms of our reasoning. The reasons at [81]–[104] below represent the views of Kannan Ramesh J and Anselmo Reyes IJ. The reasons at [105]–[124] below represent the views of Roger Giles IJ.

  206. The reasons of Kannan Ramesh J and Anselmo Reyes IJ

  207. [81] Senda’s objection to admissibility is untenable. At the outset, two points might be highlighted:

  208. (a) First, Senda and Mr Lie also rely on such reports. These include, for example, the IHS Markit report (see [53(d)] above), the studies Mr Lie relies on for his analysis on size premium (see [252] and [253] below), and certain restricted stock studies that Mr Lie refers to in his analysis on DLOM (see [245] below). The makers of those reports were never called to give evidence in court, and Senda has not explained why they should be treated differently. Therefore, to the extent that Senda has raised such objections against Ms Harfouche, the same criticism may be made against Mr Lie.

  209. (b) Second, Ms Harfouche had little option but to rely on independent market/broker reports, given Senda’s non-disclosure of financial documents.

  210. [82] More importantly, Senda’s argument fails to recognise the nature of the relevant reports, and the purpose for which Ms Harfouche has used them. Ms Harfouche has used these reports to substantiate, supplement and fortify her views. In such circumstances, it is incorrect to assert that Kiri’s failure to call the makers of these reports to prove their contents, including the underlying data that they rely upon, means that these reports fall foul of the hearsay rule and are therefore inadmissible.

  211. (1) Overview of market reports as evidence in valuation exercises

  212. [83] Experts who value companies frequently and often as a matter of necessity rely on market reports when forming their opinions on the value of a company. The reports may relate to comparable companies, the relevant industry or any other factor that is pertinent to understanding the valuation considerations that must be properly taken into account in arriving at an informed opinion. Such reports are commonly relied on as the source material upon which valuations are based.

  213. [84] Valuation experts, and indeed many experts, rely on the opinions of others in market reports and forecasts to support and explain their conclusions. To that extent, a valuation expert endorses the views and reasoning in the relevant report and presents those views as part of his or her expert opinion. Independent market reports, when relied upon for this purpose and in this manner, are in substance being used as source material to fortify, support and/or supplement the expert’s opinion. It is the view that is expressed in these reports of comparable companies or the relevant market, as incorporated into the testifying expert’s opinion, that is relevant. These reports are opinions of market sentiment, ie, what the market thinks, forecasts or is saying about a company, an industry or the economy at a given time. To use the MMR reports that Ms Harfouche relied on as illustration, these reports express a forecast of “the market size for textile dyes in terms of volume and value” based on existing market data, and thereafter project a CAGR for the industry from 2017 to 2022.

  214. [85] While it may be said that the hearsay rule if applied with full rigour will require the maker of these reports to be called and the underlying information to be proved by primary evidence, the rule is relaxed in such cases for two good reasons. First, requiring proof in this manner in each and every instance is neither practical nor feasible. Second, relaxing the rule recognises the real purpose for which these reports are being used namely for the opinions advanced therein, and not the data upon which they are based. Such reports are not adduced for the purpose of proving the truth of the underlying data (albeit the existence and veracity of the underlying data will lend credence to the view advanced, but that is an issue of weight, not admissibility, as we explain at [92] below). The foregoing views are consistent with jurisprudence in Singapore and in other jurisdictions.

  215. (2) The position in Singapore

  216. [86] The starting point is the basis rule, as stated in the recent decision of Anita Damu v Public Prosecutor [2020] 3 SLR 825 (“Anita Damu”). The basis rule stipulates that the factual basis for an expert’s opinion must be established on admissible evidence and not on hearsay (Anita Damu at [30]). The court at [30] cited the observations of Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21 with approval:

  217. [87] However, the court in Anita Damu recognised that the basis rule is not absolute. The court noted at [31]:

  218. [88] Market reports relied on in the context of valuation proceedings would often fall under the category of general hearsay, which calls for a relaxation of the basis rule as per Anita Damu. These reports constitute “extrinsic material customarily employed in their line of work” and it may be said that they constitute “prior research”. It is only where the expert relies on the specific hearsay evidence of another and the veracity of that evidence is challenged should the basis rule apply with full rigour.

  219. [89] Case law dealing with the admissibility of reports expressing market opinion supports this view. The High Court in Saga Foodstuffs Manufacturing (Pte) Ltd v Best Food Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 1013 (“Saga Foodstuffs”) considered whether market survey reports constituted inadmissible hearsay. In Saga Foodstuffs, the court considered a claim for passing off. As part of the evidence, both parties sought to introduce market survey reports on the relevant market, specifically the market sentiment on the relevant products and associated marks (at [7]–[9]). The hearsay objection raised in that case was that the makers of the reports were not called as witnesses (at [10]). The “makers” of the report were (a) the respondents in the market who provided answers to the survey; and (b) the interviewers who recorded the respondents’ answers, and collated and processed these results. The High Court held that the reports were admissible, and opined as follows (at [11] and [16]):

  220. [90] The approach therefore has generally been to allow market reports to be admitted where they are being adduced as evidence of market opinion/sentiment to support the opinions of the expert witness. For example, the High Court in Poh Fu Tek ([31] supra), in considering a share valuation dispute, recognised that the experts in that case relied on financial research reports. These reports were namely, the Ibbotson statistics, which is a set of statistics published by a financial research and information firm used to estimate applicable size premiums based on empirical evidence from the market: see [114] of Poh Fu Tek. The makers of the Ibbotson statistics were not called as witnesses. The court in Poh Fu Tek did not find the reliance on such reports objectionable and no issue of admissibility was raised. The court examined in depth the classification of companies under the size premium analysis in the Ibbotson statistics (Poh Fu Tek at [114]-–[117]).

  221. [91] The reasoning in Saga Foodstuffs is consistent with [83]–[85] above. The inquiry very much hinges on the purpose for which the relevant reports are adduced and the nature of the reports.

  222. [92] There is a caveat. It is open to a party to challenge the expert’s reliance on the relevant reports on the basis that these reports are not sound. If the opinions in these reports are based on questionable logic or inaccurate information or data, a party is free to show that to be the case. If shown, that will undermine the report and in turn the expert’s opinion that is based on it. But that is not a question of admissibility. It is one of the weight to be placed on the expert’s opinion. That the proper inquiry in such circumstances pertains to the question of weight is clear from case law on how expert opinion evidence has been dealt with by the court.

  223. (a) In Wellform Construction Pte Ltd v Lay Sing Construction Pte Ltd [2001] SGHC 12 (“Wellform Construction”), the High Court considered a challenge to the admissibility of an auditor’s report. The auditor in that case had prepared the report in reliance on work done by his staff and certain underlying documents of which he had no personal knowledge (at [19]). The makers of those underlying documents, and the auditor’s staff, were not called as witnesses. The plaintiff challenged the admissibility of the report on that basis. The High Court rejected the challenge to admissibility, and noted that “[t]he weight to be given to the report was another matter” (at [20]).

  224. (b) The Court of Appeal in JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong (a firm) [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460 at [138] cited Wellform Construction with approval. The Court of Appeal noted at [51] that the court’s duty is to “ensure, at a minimum, that the expert opinion is defensible and grounded in logic and plain common sense”. Where an expert’s opinion is indefensible or illogical, this will affect the weight the court places on the said opinion.

  225. (3) The position in other jurisdictions

  226. [93] The position on the basis rule in other jurisdictions is uncontroversial, and accords with what has been stated in Anita Damu ([87] supra). The locus classicus in the particular context of valuation experts is widely regarded as Megarry J’s decision in English Exporters Pty Ltd v Eldonwall [1973] 1 Ch 415 (“English Exporters”). Therein, Megarry J made the following observations on the evidence of an expert valuer (at 420E–421A):

  227. [94] This position has been accepted in Australia. English Exporters was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Clack v Murray [2018] WASCA 120, and described therein (at [46]) as “a leading authority in this area”. Similarly, English Exporters was endorsed in Pownall & Ors v Conlan Management Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Kalbarri Trust [1995] WASC 117 (“Pownall”).

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