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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Jan 2022
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Singapore International Commercial Court

Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank, Singapore Branch v PPT Energy Trading Co Ltd and another suit

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[2022] SGHC(I) 1Case no. Suit No 1 of 2021

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] On 3 April 2020, the plaintiff in Suit No 1 of 2021, Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank, Singapore Branch (“CACIB”) issued a letter of credit (“the Letter of Credit”) in favour of the defendant in that suit, PPT Energy Trading Co Ltd (“PPT”) on the application of Zenrock Commodities Trading Pte Ltd (“Zenrock”). The Letter of Credit was for the purchase by Zenrock of 920,000 (+/- 5%) barrels of Djeno crude oil (“the Cargo”) from PPT for the purpose of on-sale to Total Oil Trading SA (“TOTSA”).

  3. [2] In support of its application for the Letter of Credit, Zenrock furnished CACIB with a copy of its contract with PPT (“the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract”). Under the terms of the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract, PPT was to sell the Cargo to Zenrock at the unit price of the average of the mean quotations published in Platt’s crude oil marketwire under the heading “Brent Dated” (which I will hereafter refer to as “Platt’s”), plus a premium of US$3.24 per barrel. The Letter of Credit therefore reflected the purchase price of Platt’s plus US$3.24 per barrel.

  4. [3] As security, CACIB had a registered floating charge over goods purchased by Zenrock and financed by the Letter of Credit, and an assignment of the proceeds of the sale of the Cargo that were due from TOTSA, which was signed in acceptance by TOTSA.

  5. [4] On 2 April 2020, Zenrock furnished CACIB with a copy of what it claimed to be its contract with TOTSA (“the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract”). This document provided that Zenrock would sell the Cargo to TOTSA at Platt’s plus a premium of US$3.60 per barrel. This, had it been a genuine contract, would have meant that the assignment of the sale proceeds payable by TOTSA under the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract to CACIB would cover Zenrock’s purchase price from PPT and hence, CACIB’s exposure under the Letter of Credit. However, the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract that was supplied to CACIB on 2 April 2020, as the description suggests, had been fabricated for the purposes of the Letter of Credit. The true Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract (“the True Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract”), which was later furnished to CACIB by TOTSA on 28 April 2020, showed that the true sale price to TOTSA was not Platt’s plus US$3.60, but Platt’s minus US$3.60 per barrel. If the sale price payable by TOTSA under the True Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract is compared with the purchase price payable by Zenrock under the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract, Zenrock would suffer a loss of US$6,942,847.24 on the two transactions, instead of making a profit of approximately US$331,270, as a comparison with the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract would suggest.

  6. [6] Under Art 14(a) of The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 600 (“UCP 600”), which was incorporated into the Letter of Credit, CACIB was obliged to examine documents on presentation and “on the basis of the documents alone” to determine whether or not they appeared on their face to constitute a compliant presentation. Under Art 14(b), a maximum period of five banking days is allowed following the day of presentation to determine compliance. Having determined that a presentation complies, a bank must honour the letter of credit and if it determines that there is non-compliance, Art 16(d) requires it to notify the presenter no later than the close of the fifth banking day following the day of presentation and to state the discrepancy found in the documents presented. Under Art 16(f), if a bank fails to act in accordance with the provisions of the article, “it shall be precluded from claiming that the documents do not constitute a complying presentation”.

  7. [7] The period of five banking days following the date of presentation of documents by PPT (through the Bank of China (“BOC”)) - which was Wednesday, 16 April 2020 - expired at midnight on Wednesday, 23 April 2020. By that time, CACIB suspected fraud as a result of receiving an email from TOTSA stating that Zenrock appeared to have assigned the proceeds of sale of the Cargo twice over to different banks. However, CACIB neither paid nor sent an Art 14(c) notice refusing to pay and giving a reason for its refusal. CACIB sought to investigate the position with TOTSA, PPT and the rival bank for the sale proceeds due from TOTSA to Zenrock (“the TOTSA Receivable”), but never declined to pay until it sought and obtained an interim injunction from the High Court on an ex parte application on 28 May 2020 (of which PPT was given notice), prior to the due date for payment, which was 5 June 2020. That injunction was later discharged on 13 November 2020 following the court’s suggestion and an accommodation between the parties whereby payment under the Letter of Credit was made by CACIB to PPT against PPT’s provision of a bank guarantee from BOC (“the BOC Guarantee”), which would operate to pay should the court eventually decide that CACIB’s refusal to pay was justified.

  8. [8] What has since emerged is that Zenrock had entered into what are called “round-tripping” contracts, purchasing the Cargo from SOCAR Trading SA (“SOCAR”), on-selling it to Shandong Energy International (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Shandong”), which sold it to PPT, before the Cargo was then sold back to Zenrock under the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract. Having agreed to sell the Cargo back to TOTSA, under the terms of the True Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, Zenrock then assigned the TOTSA Receivable twice over, firstly to ING Bank NV (“ING”) in respect of the letter of credit it had opened for Zenrock in respect of its purchase from SOCAR, and secondly to CACIB. As explained earlier, CACIB believed the TOTSA Receivable to be much higher than the true figure as Zenrock had furnished it with the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, and not the True Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract when applying for the Letter of Credit (see [4] above).

  9. [10] The underlying (and apparently uncontroversial) transaction, to which I alluded at [8] above, involved:

  10. (a) a sale of the Cargo by SOCAR to Zenrock at Platt’s minus US$3.69 per barrel, with the aid of a letter of credit opened by ING at Zenrock’s behest (SOCAR had apparently purchased the Cargo from TOTSA, the French trading company in the Total group, which had obtained the Cargo from its affiliated company in Congo, Total E&P); and

  11. (b) a sale from Zenrock to TOTSA at Platt’s minus US$3.60, with an assignment by Zenrock of the TOTSA Receivable in favour of ING.

  12. I refer to this as apparently uncontroversial because TOTSA appears to have sold the Cargo to SOCAR and repurchased it from Zenrock for no good reason. That appears in the documents and in WhatsApp messages exchanged between Mr Jason Lai (“Mr Lai”) of Zenrock and Mr Naoki Uehara (“Mr Uehara”) of PPT sometime after concluding the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract. Mr Lai informed Mr Uehara that TOTSA had sold the Cargo “and put us in the chain”, which to my mind indicates that TOTSA itself may have indulged in a form of round-tripping, prior to the Zenrock pre-structured round-tripping involving itself, Shandong and PPT, of which CACIB complains.

  13. [11] The latter “round-tripping” contracts consisted of: (a) a sale from Zenrock to Shandong at Platt’s plus US$3.02 per barrel (“the Zenrock-Shandong Sale Contract”); (b) an on-sale from Shandong to PPT at Platt’s plus $3.05 per barrel (“the Shandong-PPT Sale Contract”); and (c) a further sale by PPT to Zenrock at Platt’s plus US$3.24 per barrel (ie, the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract”). These prices were recognised by the parties’ experts as being about US$10 per barrel higher than the market price at the time the round-tripping contracts were concluded, which was around US$12 per barrel.

  14. [13] On 23 April 2020, on receipt of a request for acknowledgement of CACIB’s financing interest in the Cargo sold under the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, TOTSA informed CACIB by email of the following (“the 23 April 2020 Email”):

  15. (a) it had received two competing notices of assignment from ING and CACIB in respect of the TOTSA Receivable (respectively, “the ING NOA” and “the CACIB NOA”, and collectively, the “Duplicate NOAs”) (see [8] above);

  16. (b) Zenrock had asked it on 31 March 2020 to approve an assignment of the TOTSA Receivable to ING, and that it had acknowledged receipt of the email, but it had not countersigned the ING NOA;

  17. (c) on 1 April 2020, Zenrock had asked it not to approve the ING NOA because there had been a mistake on Zenrock’s part as the TOTSA Receivable has been assigned to CACIB;

  18. (d) in consequence, TOTSA had countersigned the CACIB NOA on 3 April 2020;

  19. (e) TOTSA was willing to pay the legitimate beneficiary of the TOTSA Receivable.

  20. Copies of the relevant emails were attached to the 23 April 2020 Email.

  21. [14] On 28 April 2020, TOTSA sent a further email to CACIB (“the 28 April 2020 Email”). In that email, which had been sent after CACIB provided TOTSA with a copy of the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, TOTSA informed CACIB that the original terms of its contract with Zenrock had been misrepresented. TOTSA attached a copy of the True Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract and the deal recap dated 30 March 2020 and confirmed that the terms of the price clause had not been amended. It thus became plain to CACIB that it had been defrauded by Zenrock. Not only had Zenrock assigned the TOTSA Receivable to two different banks by issuing the Duplicate NOAs, but it had also procured the issue of the Letter of Credit by CACIB on the basis of a forged sales contract to TOTSA (viz, the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract), resulting in a figure in the Letter of Credit which was about 87% higher than the approximate market value of the Cargo. What CACIB did not know was the extent to which any other party, such as PPT, was involved in the fraud, but it was deeply suspicious.

  22. [15] After exchanges between the competing banks and TOTSA, ING and CACIB requested Mayer Brown (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Mayer Brown”) to act as escrow agent for the true sales proceeds from TOTSA pending discussions and agreement between them as to allocation of the sum in question. An escrow agreement was concluded on 12 June 2020 and on 17 June 2020, TOTSA paid US$16,517,003.06 to Mayer Brown as escrow agent. This resulted in interpleader proceedings, the outcome of which is not in evidence before me. Nonetheless, on the last day of the trial of these proceedings, it transpired that some of those proceeds, approximately US$6m, had been received by CACIB but had not been brought into account in its claim (whether for good reason or bad, did not appear). Zenrock went into interim judicial management on 4 May 2020 following another bank’s discovery of similar fraud or frauds perpetrated by Zenrock on it and is presumably unlikely to be a source of recoupment of any outlay.

  23. [16] It was in these circumstances that, in the two actions which have been heard together in this court, on transfer from the High Court:

  24. (b) PPT originally claimed from CACIB the sums which it says were due under the Letter of Credit, but, having received such a sum by reason of the accommodation referred to at [7] above, it now claims a declaration that it was entitled to such payment and/or damages for CACIB’s breach of the contract under the Letter of Credit, including the cost of the BOC Guarantee, together with the costs of a loan from its subsidiary company in Singapore, PPT Energy Trading Singapore Pte Ltd (“PPT Singapore”), because the sum paid by CACIB sits in a blocked account as counter-security for the BOC Guarantee and is not available to PPT.

  25. The ambit of the fraud exception in relation to letters of credit

  26. [17] Notwithstanding CACIB’s initial attempts to argue the contrary, it is a fundamental principle that letters of credit are the lifeblood of international commerce and are autonomous independent contracts between the issuing bank and the beneficiary and are therefore unaffected by any irregularities in the underlying commercial contract of sale. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Brody, White and Co Inc v Chemet Handel Trading (S) Pte Ltd [1992] 3 SLR(R) 146 (“Brody”) (at [19]):

  27. [18] It is trite law that, absent fraud, letters of credit must be honoured by the issuing bank if the terms of the letter of credit are satisfied and that the UCP 600 requires the issuing bank to determine compliance on the basis of the documents presented, without regard to anything else (see, eg, Art 14(a) of the UCP 600). It is also clear from Brody that the fraud in question must relate to the documents presented under the letter of credit rather than the underlying sale contract. As the Court of Appeal explained in Brody (at [21]):

  28. [19] CACIB’s case, as expressed in its Opening Statement, was that “fraud is committed when, among other things, a beneficiary dishonestly or recklessly presents documents for payment under a letter of credit, or he does so with indifference as to whether it is or is not a valid demand for payment”. CACIB relied upon the Court of Appeal decision in Arab Banking Corp (B.S.C.) v Boustead Singapore Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 557 (“Arab Banking Corp”) where the Court of Appeal said, in connection with a demand guarantee, that it would be fraudulent for a person to make a false representation if he was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of that which he was asserting at the time he made the statement and that a beneficiary who presented an invalid demand under a demand guarantee recklessly, indifferent to whether or not it was a valid demand, would also be acting fraudulently (at [63]-[64]). As the court explained, the fraud exception is an application of the maxim “fraud unravels all” (at [64]).

  29. [20] In an action for deceit, fraud is proved when it can be shown that a false representation has been made, either dishonestly (knowingly or without belief in its truth) or recklessly (without caring whether it be true or false): see Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 at [13], citing Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. However, as explained by the Court of Appeal in Brody, if the documents presented by a beneficiary to the issuing bank comply with the terms of the credit, the beneficiary is entitled to be paid if the documents themselves are not fraudulent and there is no fraudulent presentation. Since any fraud capable of vitiating a demand for payment under a letter of credit must be in the presentation of documents itself, in my judgment, such fraud can only, by definition, encompass a beneficiary who acts dishonestly, in presenting otherwise facially compliant documents either with the knowledge that what is contained therein is false, or without belief that what is contained therein is true.

  30. [21] Dishonesty is the key to the fraud exception to the obligation to pay under letters of credit and a presentation, said to be recklessly made without investigation by the beneficiary of the circumstances underlying the representation, or of the circumstances of the underlying transaction, cannot vitiate the presentation. Whilst an absence of belief in the truth of a representation, in the sense of not caring whether it is true or false, will suffice for deceit, there is no duty of care owed by a beneficiary to the bank when presenting documents to an issuing bank (DBS Bank Ltd v Carrier Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 261 (“DBS Bank v Carrier”) at [103]-[106]) and a failure, even a reckless failure to ascertain the truth of representations, which are made in the honest belief that they are true, will not amount to fraud for the purposes of non-payment under a letter of credit. In my judgment, there is a distinction between the law relating to letters of credit and the law relating to demand guarantees and so nothing in Arab Banking Corp impacts upon the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Brody.

  31. CACIB’s case as to fraud

  32. [23] By the time the parties came to make their closing submissions, counsel for CACIB accepted that CACIB had to show dishonesty on the part of PPT in the presentation of documents and that anything less was not enough to invalidate a demand to be paid under a letter of credit. The key allegation was that PPT had, in presenting the PPT Invoice and the LOI to CACIB, represented that there was a real sale transaction between PPT and Zenrock under which “marketable title” was to pass, when PPT knew that this was not the true position. There was thus a fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of PPT which vitiated its request for payment under the Letter of Credit and CACIB was entitled to refuse to pay. The phrase “marketable title” appears in the LOI as set out earlier in this judgment at [5].

  33. [24] CACIB alleged at paras 38-39 of its Statement of Claim that PPT’s demand to be paid under the Letter of Credit had been part of a fraudulent scheme to inflate the value of the Cargo and to procure double financing for it and was therefore fraudulent and/or unconscionable. Further, it was specifically alleged that PPT’s demand to be paid under the Letter of Credit was fraudulent because no marketable title to the cargo was transferred to Zenrock. It was pleaded that the Zenrock-Shandong-PPT-Zenrock sale transactions were not bona fide transactions and were entered into for the purpose of artificially inflating the value of the cargo so as to defraud CACIB into issuing the Letter of Credit and to procure double financing for the Cargo. It was said that title to the Cargo did not in fact pass from Zenrock to Shandong, or from Shandong to PPT, or to Zenrock once again, and that Shandong and PPT knew that they did not have good title or were reckless as to whether they did or did not have such good title to the Cargo.

  34. [25] In its amended pleadings, at para 38(iv) of its Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1), CACIB further alleged that by presenting its “False Invoice and LOI”, PPT fraudulently misrepresented that it had transferred marketable title of the Cargo to Zenrock, and was well aware that CACIB would rely on this representation when PPT demanded payment under the Letter of Credit, when, in truth, PPT did not have any such marketable title when it purported to transfer the Cargo to Zenrock. It was said that CACIB had relied on this fraudulent misrepresentation when it issued its “Advice for Receipt of Documents” to Zenrock on 22 April 2020 informing Zenrock that it had received conforming documents under the Letter of Credit, namely the PPT Invoice and the LOI and seeking instructions for settlement of the amount financed, including the submission of any “export documents” (ie, documents relating to the sale to TOTSA).

  35. [26] The thrust of CACIB’s case and most of the cross-examination of PPT’s witnesses centred on the allegation that PPT was a knowing participant in the round-tripping transactions and knew or should have known that the prices in the Shandong-PPT Sale Contract and the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract (see [11] above) were well above the market value of the Djeno crude oil at the time. The question arises as to the nature of the fraud which is said to have been perpetrated and PPT’s involvement in it, because it was never suggested in either the pleadings or cross-examination that any of the PPT witnesses were aware of the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, the issuance of the Duplicate NOAs and the consequent inducement to CACIB to issue the Letter of Credit in favour PPT. Neither was it put to the PPT witnesses that they knew that the purpose of the round-tripping transactions was to defraud CACIB in any way, nor that they knew that the prices which appeared in the round-tripping transactions were nearly double the market price, as, on the expert evidence, was the case.

  36. [27] The highest that the case was put in the Opening Statement was that PPT was not an innocent bystander or feckless participant in Zenrock’s fraudulent scheme but was aware that Zenrock had purchased the Cargo from SOCAR before buying it again from PPT, further down a chain of sales and purchases. It was said that PPT had actual knowledge of, or at least was wilfully blind to, the fact that this was a fraudulent scheme because of the following:

  37. (a) it had been offered a pre-structured deal;

  38. (b) the prices offered by Zenrock were not negotiated and were much higher than the market price of Djeno crude oil at the time;

  39. (c) PPT was facilitating over US$9m more credit being provided by CACIB over and above the true value of the Cargo;

  40. (d) the Cargo was being offered two to three days before loading and without Zenrock making any nomination of the vessel to PPT;

  41. (e) Trafigura Pte Ltd (“Trafigura”), which had previously been a projected purchaser from PPT in the chain of sales (but subsequently pulled out of the deal), had required presentation of original shipping documents or a letter of indemnity countersigned by PPT’s bank to trigger payment by it;

  42. (f) PPT switched from being the buyer of the Cargo from Zenrock to selling it to Zenrock;

  43. (g) other companies such as Itochu and Glencore declined to participate in the chain; and

  44. (h) Zenrock wanted 60 days credit for its purchase from PPT as compared with the credit period of ten days for payment by PPT to Shandong.

  45. [28] As the hearing progressed, it became plain that CACIB’s case was that PPT’s personnel were reckless as to the nature of the transaction in which they agreed to participate at Zenrock’s instigation and that they should have realised that something was seriously amiss by reason of the round-tripping nature of the transaction and the abnormally high prices which appeared in the Shandong-PPT Sale Contract and PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract. As already stated, it was never suggested that any of the PPT witnesses actually knew that Zenrock intended to defraud CACIB in the manner which actually occurred or knew that Zenrock intended to defraud CACIB in any other way (see [26] above). PPT’s witnesses were cross-examined on the basis that they had never made any enquiry as to the reason for their involvement in the round-tripping transactions and asked no questions about it, and not that they knew of an intended fraud. It was suggested that they ought to have realised that there was something seriously wrong with the transaction because of the features referred to at [27] above, but not that they actually knew of Zenrock’s intention to defraud CACIB and actively participated to assist in that.

  46. [29] At no stage was it ever pleaded or suggested to the PPT witnesses that any of them knew of any scheme by Zenrock to produce a forged contract between itself and TOTSA to induce CACIB to issue the Letter of Credit in its favour, nor that they knew of any scheme to issue Duplicate NOAs of the TOTSA Receivable to ING and CACIB. Moreover, in its closing address to the Court, counsel for CACIB accepted that he needed to show dishonesty on the part of PPT, whilst stating that blind-eye, Nelsonian knowledge would suffice. The furthest that CACIB was prepared to go was to say that the PPT witnesses had participated in round-tripping transactions without any regard for the inflated prices at which they took place or the reasons lying behind those transactions. It was said that the transactions were not bona fide but were sham transactions because there was no intention that property in the Cargo should ever pass under them and that they were financing transactions only, of which PPT was well aware. Thus, when presenting the PPT Invoice and the LOI to CACIB, PPT dishonestly represented that the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract was a genuine sale pursuant to which marketable title in the Cargo will pass.

  47. [30] I set out below the basis upon which I have made my findings of fact in relation to the knowledge and conduct of PPT in these transactions.

  48. The CACIB witnesses

  49. [31] I heard evidence from two of CACIB’s personnel, namely Mr Fabien Lautode (“Mr Lautode”) and Mr Edouard Cazals (“Mr Cazals”) whose evidence I accepted but which did not really touch on most of the issues which I have to determine. I reject any suggestion that the prices of the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract and the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract should have alerted CACIB to any potential problem with the transactions. Whilst the evidence showed that CACIB carried out a mark-to-market assessment on a daily basis, CACIB did not have access to the prices of Djeno crude oil and, on the material made available to it, it had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the sale contracts or the CACIB NOA furnished by Zenrock. Whilst CACIB might, had it taken more time and trouble, have ascertained that the price of Djeno crude oil in the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract was way above the then prevailing market price, the evidence was that, in March/April 2020, with COVID-19 on the rampage, the market was volatile and unpredictable. CACIB was likely to think that its customer Zenrock knew what it was doing and the margin between the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract and the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract was such that, with the CACIB NOA signed in acceptance by TOTSA and a deal which went through with an existing customer in a matter of three days or so, it had no cause for concern. CACIB, unlike PPT, was not a trader.

  50. [32] There was nothing in the application for the Letter of Credit or in the information supplied to CACIB, other than the price, which would or should have alerted it to any problem in the transaction as it was presented to it. On the face of it, the TOTSA Receivable (with a 60-day credit period) would have covered the sums payable under the Letter of Credit to PPT, due on the same date. There was nothing which would have put CACIB on notice that there was either any round-tripping or that there was any possibility of duplicate notices of assignment until, on the last day for acceptance of the documents presented under the Letter of Credit, TOTSA sent CACIB the 23 April 2020 Email informing CACIB of the Duplicate NOAs and seeking an explanation from Zenrock (see [13] above).

  51. [33] These two CACIB witnesses who gave evidence and were cross-examined, in truth, had little material evidence to give beyond anything that could be garnered from the documents in the trial bundles. It was put to them that they had sought to manufacture a case against PPT in circumstances where they had been defrauded by Zenrock and were looking to make recovery from anyone they could blame in circumstances where there was no possibility of any real recovery from Zenrock itself. I found them to be honest witnesses whose suspicions that PPT was involved in the fraudulent scheme led to a genuine belief that this was the case. They took the view that PPT had sought to avoid answering the questions which they raised following the receipt of information from TOTSA about the Zenrock fraud and, in particular, the questions asked about the content and whereabouts of the original bills of lading. Whilst, behind-the-scenes, it appears that PPT were making enquiries of Shandong about the original shipping documents and were being told by their own bank, BOC, not to answer questions or give any assistance to CACIB. CACIB was right to think that PPT made no real attempt to answer CACIB’s requests for information or to assist CACIB in its investigations and enquiries as to what had actually happened.

  52. [34] I have no evidence before me as to the reasons which lay behind Zenrock’s insolvency problems but it is clear that it had a liquidity crisis, perhaps in part resulting from the insolvency of Hin Leong Trading Pte Ltd and it may well be that the round-tripping, the inflated prices and the fraud were effected in an effort to alleviate this problem.

  53. The facts

  54. [35] The bare facts emerge from the documents and do not depend upon any evidence from witnesses but in setting out the most important facts, I record the evidence given by PPT’s witnesses both as to the background to their dealings with Zenrock and Mr Lai, in particular, and as to the dealings themselves. I also record the extent to which I accepted their evidence.

  55. [36] The documents show that ING had made financing facilities available to Zenrock since 2014 and on 3 September 2014, the latter executed a deed of charge and assignment of receivables its favour (“the ING Deed”). The effect of the ING Deed was to create a floating charge over all goods financed by ING and an assignment of all Zenrock’s contractual rights in respect of goods sold or to be sold and goods purchased or to be purchased where financing had been provided by ING or credit extended. A floating charge was also created over “unencumbered goods”, which referred to goods that were not financed by ING. The floating charge only crystallised on the occurrence of defined events which included Zenrock ceasing to carry on business or becoming insolvent, whether by being unable to pay its debts as they fell due or by being declared insolvent. The charge was registered on 3 September 2014 with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”) and was governed by Singapore law.

  56. [37] On 21 August 2018, CACIB offered, by way of a letter, credit facilities to Zenrock for the aggregate amount of USD 100 million (“the Facility Letter”). The Facility Letter stated that the purpose of the facility was to “finance the purchase of Crude Oil / Petroleum, Products and other products (the ‘Goods’) to be agreed by the Bank”. On 24 August 2018, Zenrock executed a deed of charge in favour of CACIB (“the CACIB Deed”). By cl 3.1 of the CACIB Deed (read together with cl 1.1), Zenrock essentially granted to CACIB a floating charge on all goods financed by CACIB and an assignment of all receivables in respect of goods which had been financed by it in one way or another (in a broadly similar manner to the ING charge referred to at [36] above). “Goods” were defined as meaning:

  57. [38] The floating charge would crystallise if any charged property became subject to an adverse security interest or if Zenrock failed to observe any of its obligations to CACIB. On 7 September 2018, the Deed was registered with ACRA. Like the ING charge, the CACIB charge was also governed by Singapore law.

  58. [39] I heard evidence from four witnesses who were employed by PPT, namely: (a) Mr Masahito Shimazaki (“Mr Shimazaki”), the Marketing Director; (b) Ms Fumi Yano (“Ms Yano”), the General Manager of the Oil and Gas Trading Department; (c) Mr Uehara, an Assistant Manager in that department; and (d) Ms Tomomi Shinya (“Ms Shinya”), an Assistant Manager in the operations department. Of these, Ms Yano and Mr Uehara were the most significant witnesses who, as two of the three traders employed by PPT, would be expected to know more about the nature of the transactions between PPT on the one hand and Shandong and Zenrock on the other, to which Mr Uehara agreed, whilst Mr Shimazaki, who gave his approval to the transaction, had a higher-level view and Ms Shinya, in the operations area, were not involved in the negotiation of the deal.

  59. [40] It was the evidence of Mr Shimazaki, Ms Yano and Mr Uehara that all deals were discussed amongst the trading team, which had a group email and WhatsApp chat. The latter two testified that many pre-structured deals had been concluded with Mr Lai and Zenrock in the past, although details of only two were given, namely transactions in July 2017 and October 2018, the first of which occurred when Mr Lai was employed at Gunvor and the second when he was at Zenrock. On each of these two occasions PPT was approached to act as a buyer from Mr Lai’s employers and to sell to another company. In making such approaches terminology such as “sleeve” or “credit sleeve” was apparently used. Whereas Mr Lai had historically dealt with Ms Yano, and on no occasion prior to the present transaction underlying the PPT-Zenrock Sale Contract had he dealt with Mr Uehara, it was the latter who negotiated this transaction with Mr Lai. Mr Uehara joined PPT in April 2017 and his trading experience only began in 2019, although the evidence shows that he consulted with the marketing team including Ms Yano and obtained Mr Shimazaki’s approval of the transaction. He had never dealt with Mr Lai before and had only done a few pre-structured back-to-back deals before.

  60. [41] Mr Shimazaki had some 30 years’ experience in trading in crude oil and petroleum products. Ms Yano had about 20 years of such experience. Neither had dealt much in Djeno crude oil and it appeared that PPT’s volume of trading in anything other than Indonesian oil was, in 2020, very limited, amounting to only two or three deals a month. This was borne out by the excitement shown when a deal was proposed by Zenrock. The reality is that PPT had very little business and was keen to enter into transaction actions offered to it.

  61. [42] As I have mentioned earlier, PPT had three traders, including Ms Yano and Mr Uehara. In the ordinary way, pre-COVID-19, they would sit at desks in close proximity to one another and discuss matters between them as part of the marketing/trading team. In March/April 2020, each would come into the office on some days and work from home on others and they would keep in touch by WhatsApp exchanges if they were not in the office at the same time. There were no large trading screens in the office with real-time prices. Each trader had a laptop with access to the daily (but not real-time) prices on Platt’s and RIM. Because of the nature of the trading in which PPT was involved, they said that there was no call to pay much attention to market rates. That would only be required in circumstances where a trader was taking a position and according to Mr Uehara it was an absolute rule that no transaction would be concluded by way of purchase unless a corresponding sale was concluded at the same time.

  62. [44] In cross-examination, Mr Shimazaki said that profit was not the only driver and that other factors were also considered, such as giving different opportunities or experience to people in PPT’s marketing division, as well as the question of volume of business. After considerable evasion of questions about the relevance of the market price, he eventually said that PPT did not consider the market price when deciding whether or not to enter into back-to-back transactions. He said that PPT traders would only know the major trends in the market but not the absolute value of any products they traded such as Djeno crude oil. Ms Yano’s evidence was to the same effect. Although it would have been possible to check on the market price for Djeno crude oil for the previous day, neither of them ever did so in the context of this transaction. Nor did Mr Uehara. They stated that they did not appreciate at the time that the prices in the transactions which lie at the heart of this dispute were well above the market price. They were not cross-examined to suggest otherwise, though Mr Shimazaki, when asked, said that a price two or three times the market price or anything conspicuous might be noticed. A price over market price by US$10 a barrel should have been conspicuous.

  63. [45] In deciding whether or not to enter into a transaction, Mr Shimazaki set out in his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) four criteria which he said should be met when assessing its acceptability, namely:

  64. (a) whether PPT had previously transacted with the counterparty and there were no issues;

  65. (b) whether the transaction was on a back-to-back basis;

  66. (c) whether PPT’s bank had agreed to finance the transaction and the bank had sufficient facilities to finance the deal; and

  67. (d) whether PPT would receive payment based on a letter of credit issued by the counterparty’s bank, and the counterparty bank was approved by PPT’s bank.

  68. [46] The basis of such trading, on Ms Yano’s evidence, was always pre-structured back-to-back deals brought to them by someone who required a “sleeve” or “front”, which meant that PPT would be interposed between two other parties which, for one of a number of reasons, did not wish to deal directly with one another. The three reasons given for PPT’s involvement, as set out in Ms Yano’s AEIC, were:

  69. (a) to assist buyers and sellers who do not have sufficient credit facilities, such as letters of credit, to deal with each other;

  70. (b) to facilitate a company wishing to remain low profile and needing an intermediary to shield their identity; and

  71. (c) to fill any payment gap, for example, if payment for a cargo is required within ten days of the bill of lading date but the buyer is only able to make payment within 60 days of bill of lading date.

  72. [47] Whilst the terminology is not of importance, it seems that the phrase “credit sleeve” was applied by some to pre-structured transactions even where there was no obvious credit assistance and where the term “front” or “sleeve” would seem more appropriate. PPT was a “facilitator” or “go-between”. The evidence of both Mr Shimazaki and Ms Yano was that PPT did not ask why it was being asked to act as a go-between. Ms Yano’s evidence, which was based on her direct knowledge, was that PPT would not know which of the three reasons outlined at [45] above were applicable, save that in some cases, such as an approach by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, it was always for credit assistance. There was no reason to ask why a request was being made for PPT’s assistance in such pre-structured deals and she expressed the view that competitors for such deals did not make any enquiry either. Ms Yano said that, if Zenrock approached PPT, she would assume that what was sought was a “credit sleeve” without being told or asking. If any approach was made, PPT would assume that it was for one or more of the three reasons outlined above and that a go-between was needed for the transaction to go ahead. The parties might have various reasons that they did not want others to know. The main concern of PPT was the profit margin.

  73. [48] At para 61 of his affidavit filed for the interlocutory proceedings, Mr Shimazaki had stated (“Mr Shimazaki’s Interlocutory Affidavit”):

  74. [49] In his oral evidence, Mr Shimazaki stated that this happened often and PPT was involved in such transactions, but did not accept that this was the usual procedure, despite the terms of that affidavit. Ms Yano’s evidence was to much the same effect. When asked how many times she had, in her experience of pre-structured deals, ever come across a party who had insisted upon receipt of the original shipping documents before payment, she said “barely any time”. Mr Uehara, whose experience was limited, agreed that in back-to-back transactions, most of the time PPT would not receive the original bills of lading. It thus appeared that it was PPT’s usual practice to deal in commercial invoices and letters of indemnity rather than original shipping documents and that they would not often see such documents if delivery of the cargo to the end purchaser had been achieved without issues arising, which would ordinarily be the case. Indeed, in a WhatsApp chat with Ms Yano on 27 April 2020, Mr Lai said that in every case when dealing with West Africa or even Oman, Zenrock never used original bills of lading unless buying directly from the producer.

  75. [52] Mr Lai approached Mr Uehara on Friday, 27 March 2020 to seek PPT’s involvement in a transaction, where a chain was envisaged by Mr Lai consisting of SOCAR-Zenrock-PPT-Trafigura-Zenrock-TOTSA. Specifically, the approach to Mr Uehara was in relation to the Zenrock -PPT-Trafigura part of the chain. The relevant prior exchange on WhatsApp that day is as follows:

  76. [53] An email followed from Mr Lai to Mr Uehara that evening setting out the sale terms of the Zenrock- PPT-Trafigura deal. The sale terms between PPT and Trafigura were dictated by Zenrock, without any communication whatsoever between PPT and Trafigura. It was a pre-structured deal, the only negotiable elements being the amount of margin that PPT would obtain and the credit terms in its “in and out” transactions. Mr Uehara’s evidence was that he understood that PPT was being approached because Trafigura and Zenrock could not deal directly with each other, but he was not given any reason for PPT’s involvement and did not ask. The reason for PPT’s involvement was not as important to him as the terms proposed and he did not think that he would be told the reason even if he had asked. Mr Uehara, in the WhatsApp exchange, not only thanked Mr Lai for “giving us this chance” but said “you always help us, we can do something for you”.

  77. [54] It was on Tuesday, 31 March 2020 that Mr Lai sent a “revised credit terms proposal” for the proposed deal. No prices were given but Zenrock was prepared to give PPT open credit for payment ten calendar days after the bill of lading date whilst providing for Trafigura to pay PPT by letter of credit on the same day. In a WhatsApp exchange that followed, Mr Uehara expressed his concern that those terms required payment to be made on the same date and said that PPT wished to receive payment from Trafigura one day before having to pay Zenrock. Mr Uehara asked if this could be considered or whether an open standby letter of credit would be acceptable. Mr Lai’s response was in the following terms:

  78. [55] CACIB relies on this WhatsApp exchange to show: that PPT knew that the proposed transaction (and other similar transactions) would come under enhanced scrutiny by the banks; that Zenrock was saying that it should be kept secret; that Mr Uehara should check the position with others in the trading team; and that PPT should come forward with a suggestion as to participants in the chain of buyers and sellers that would be acceptable to it and its bank, which could then be the subject of agreement. Mr Uehara did not accept that this was what was being said but it is hard to see what other construction can properly be put upon the words used. It is also interesting to note that Mr Lai described this as a “financing deal” though at that stage there was no difference in the credit period in the two legs of the transaction. It was Mr Uehara’s following request for a one-day difference in the payment dates and for Trafigura to open its letter of credit in favour of PPT by 2 April 2020 which was then taken up by Zenrock with Trafigura.

  79. [56] Mr Lai then asked Mr Uehara to send a counteroffer with the conditions that PPT was comfortable and to suggest “the fee” in an email. This resulted in an amendment to the terms previously set out by Zenrock with a one-day difference in the dates of payment and a request in the email asking Mr Lai how much “commission” would be payable.

  80. [57] Mr Uehara said that he was very keen to do the deal both because it increased the volume of trades carried out by PPT and because he wished positively to respond to a request from an important client. Significantly on the following day, Wednesday, 1 April 2020, the following WhatsApp exchange took place between Mr Lai and Mr Uehara:

  81. [58] The nature of the proposed reciprocal trade was clearly appreciated by Mr Uehara, but his evidence was that it was not the case that Mr Lai commonly suggested such deals and he could not recall whether there had been any previous suggestion or whether this was the first time that this had happened.

  82. [59] Zenrock informed Mr Cazals of CACIB that day (on 1 April 2020) of a potential transaction with Trafigura and TOTSA for which Mr Lai sought CACIB’s support. This was for the same cargo that had been the subject of discussion between Mr Lai and Mr Uehara (ie, the Cargo). The transaction outlined was one in which Zenrock was to purchase from Trafigura and on-sell to TOTSA. CACIB was thus being asked to finance the purchase by Zenrock of the same cargo from Trafigura in the lower half of the chain, without being informed about the top half which consisted of the purchase by Trafigura from PPT and the purchase by PPT from Zenrock, let alone the purchase by Zenrock from SOCAR that was financed by ING. The transaction involved the purchase and on-sale of the Cargo with laycan on 4–5 April 2020. As such, it is clear now that the Cargo to be sold by Zenrock to PPT and then by PPT to Trafigura was to have been on-sold by Trafigura back to Zenrock and then by Zenrock to TOTSA. Prices were not given but the credit period was 60 days for each of the last two legs with a difference in pricing.

  83. [60] It was also on 1 April 2020 that Mr Lai sent Mr Uehara a proposed deal recap which, for the first time, set out prices of Platt’s plus US$3.00 per barrel for the PPT purchase and US$3.03 per barrel for PPT’s sale, thus giving PPT a commission of US$0.03 per barrel. Mr Uehara’s evidence was that he did not check the market price of the product and did not know of a way in which to check it. So far as he was concerned, market price was not a factor in any decision to be taken by PPT as to whether or not to conclude a deal of this kind. What was important to him was the margin and the fact that the buyer from PPT was to pay by letter of credit.

  84. [61] Significantly, on the same day, in an email sent at 6.15pm, Mr Lai, responding to PPT’s requirement for a letter of credit from Trafigura by 2 April 2020 (which Mr Uehara had communicated to Mr Lai in an earlier email), told Mr Uehara and Ms Yano that:

  85. [62] It must have been clear to both Mr Uehara and Ms Yano, if they had not appreciated it before, that Trafigura was selling the same cargo to Zenrock which Trafigura was purchasing from PPT, which in turn was buying it from Zenrock in the proposed deal, though Ms Yano maintained she was not aware of the circular nature of the transactions at the time. It was not clear from Mr Uehara’s initial answers in cross-examination whether he accepted that he appreciated it at the material time, although he accepted that he now knew it be the case. In later answers, he said that he did not focus on the reference to a letter of credit from Zenrock in favour of Trafigura, since his concern was with the letter of credit that had to be opened by Trafigura in favour of PPT. With such a short email and a reason being supplied for the delay in the Trafigura letter of credit, I find it impossible to believe that they did not both appreciate it at the time. The delay in the provision of the Trafigura-PPT letter of credit was due to delay in the provision of a letter of credit by Zenrock to Trafigura and there could be no other reason for the existence of a Zenrock letter of credit other than a sale by Trafigura to Zenrock. The email was not only sent to Ms Yano and Mr Uehara but also to Mr Nozomu Iwashiro, the third trader at PPT. Moreover, the evidence of PPT’s witnesses was that the trading team discussed with one another the limited business which they did do (see [42] above).

  86. [63] The point is driven home by further WhatsApp exchanges on the following day, 2 April 2020, in which Mr Lai says the following:

  87. [64] Mr Uehara’s response was to say that PPT was thinking of using BOC and understood that “both of you will use [CACIB]”. Whilst he said in evidence that he did not understand that Mr Lai did not want PPT to use CACIB for the reasons given, it is impossible to understand Mr Lai’s request in any other way. Mr Uehara said that it did not make sense because CACIB would eventually see the whole chain and he did not see any problem with both parties using CACIB. Of course, CACIB would only see the whole chain if endorsed bills of lading came down the chain in a sequence of endorsements, but it does not seem, in the light of the evidence referred to above, that PPT, including Mr Uehara, even with his limited experience ever expected the original bills of lading to come down the chain (see [49] above). Looking at it now, he said it might be that Zenrock did want to hide the chain, but he did not understand that at the time. That answer is not credible.

  88. [65] Zenrock was obviously concerned to hide the round-tripping nature of the transaction from CACIB. As Zenrock was using CACIB for the Trafigura-Zenrock leg, and Trafigura apparently planned to use CACIB for the PPT-Trafigura leg, Zenrock was keen to ensure that PPT should not also use CACIB to finance the Zenrock-PPT leg of the transaction in the top half of the chain, of which CACIB was to be kept ignorant. If PPT had used CACIB for financing its purchase, both the top and bottom halves of the chain would become visible to CACIB.

  89. [66] On 2 April 2020, at 10.13am, Zenrock provided CACIB with the Fabricated Zenrock-TOTSA Sale Contract, with the price of Platt’s plus US$3.60. This was in response to CACIB’s request on the previous day for copies of the sale and purchase contracts and the letter of credit application text. Zenrock stated that it would provide the purchase contract with the letter of credit draft as soon as possible.

  90. [67] About 30 minutes after the above exchange, it became clear that Trafigura’s participation would make it impossible to execute the round-tripping of the Cargo. Trafigura made it clear that it was only prepared to accept original bills of lading or a letter of indemnity which was countersigned by PPT’s bank, but PPT could not find a bank that was prepared to do this. Trafigura was not prepared to accept a letter of indemnity signed only by PPT without the security of an additional bank as signatory, whether under a letter of credit or for payment by telegraphic transfer (“TT”) (which appeared to PPT to be an unusual requirement), but Trafigura would apparently have been prepared to accept a letter of indemnity from Itochu without that additional security. WhatsApp exchanges on 2 April 2020 show discussion of changes in the chain of buyers and sellers which might circumvent the problem of which Zenrock was undoubtedly aware, if Trafigura could not be the purchaser from PPT, namely who would bridge the two halves of the chain and sell on to Zenrock. Suggestions were made that Glencore might replace Trafigura, or Itochu might come between PPT and Trafigura in the chain. This demonstrates that Mr Uehara must have understood the chain to be fluid and that Zenrock could pre-structure deals involving a number of different participants and supports the conclusion that he was aware of the round-tripping.

  91. [68] In his WhatsApp exchange with Mr Lai, Mr Uehara stated that the nomination of the loading vessel and documentary instructions had been received by PPT from Trafigura, which PPT was thinking of passing to Zenrock nonetheless even though the chain of buyers and sellers would eventually be changed. That exchange makes plain Mr Uehara’s knowledge of Zenrock’s position as both seller and buyer.

  92. [69] In the course of the exchanges, PPT asked who was Zenrock’s supplier and received the following answer:

  93. [70] This too only seems explicable in the context of discussion of how the chain could be made to work with Zenrock as both a seller up the chain from PPT and a buyer further down. If it bought from SOCAR and would sell to PPT which would on-sell to Trafigura, how could it be expected to know of an ultimate buyer at all, unless it was itself buying further down in the chain? Of course, Zenrock might well not know the ultimate buyer if all the deals in which it was involved were F.O.B. transactions because the ultimate purchaser would take the cargo from the ship (as ultimately happened in China) with presumably a C.I.F. or D.E.S. purchase. In actual fact, as it was selling back to TOTSA, it may be inferred that TOTSA was selling on different terms to the refining company in China.

  94. [71] The other possible options of using Glencore or Itochu, came to nothing because it appears that Glencore, like Trafigura, required a countersigned letter of indemnity (which could not be provided) and Itochu later informed Mr Lai that it could not participate in the deal.

  95. [72] In the middle of the afternoon of 2 April 2020, in a further WhatsApp exchange, Mr Lai told Mr Uehara that Trafigura would have to be removed. Mr Uehara’s response was to say “OMG. Take away Trafi, then who will be our buyer? That’s the problem?” Mr Uehara explained this in cross-examination as being his concern at the loss of his buyer in a pre-structured back-to-back transaction. The difficulty about such an explanation is that, within two minutes of that response and four minutes after Mr Lai’s statement that Trafigura would have to be removed, Mr Lai sent Mr Uehara an email with a replacement transaction which not only did not involve Trafigura, but changed Zenrock’s position as a seller to PPT to being that of a buyer from PPT. The “in and out” transaction for PPT involved Shandong as its seller and Zenrock as its purchaser. Mr Lai was proposing, virtually instantaneously with the removal of Trafigura as a buyer, a new seller who had not previously featured at all in the discussions. How long before he had been contemplating this and when he first contacted Shandong is unknown. Shandong had not been mentioned to Mr Uehara at any previous time in the documentary record, but his evidence was that he was not surprised by the suddenness of this new proposal because he understood Mr Lai to be exploring different possibilities, whether involving Trafigura, Glencore or Itochu or otherwise. As far as he was concerned, it was a new deal which was proposed which he had to consider from scratch.

  96. [73] There is no doubt at all that it was exactly the same cargo (ie, the Cargo) that was the subject of the potential new back-to-back transaction. Mr Uehara said that he understood it to be a completely new transaction and did not assume that Zenrock was still purchasing the cargo from SOCAR and was therefore a seller higher up the chain to Shandong as well as the buyer from PPT. He did not think about who was replacing whom in the previous transaction because this was a new transaction, and he did not think about any connection between the two. He saw them as completely separate. In the light of the other material, however, I consider that Mr Uehara must have appreciated that, as he had been previously told, SOCAR was still selling to Zenrock and that the new pre-structured back-to-back trade in which PPT was to be involved formed part of that chain in which Zenrock was now to be the buyer from PPT.

  97. [74] The removal of Trafigura from the position between PPT and Zenrock, (Zenrock’s position as buyer from Trafigura having been revealed to Mr Uehara by the email at 6.15pm on 1 April 2020 from Mr Lai (see [61] above)), left PPT selling directly to Zenrock but now with Shandong replacing Zenrock as PPT’s seller, so that Zenrock did not appear as PPT’s immediate seller and immediate buyer. Mr Uehara’s evidence that his focus that time was on the identity of the immediate seller to PPT and its immediate buyer provides no explanation. The fact that he identified the identity of the buyer from PPT as “the problem” in the terms in which he did is not explicable simply on the basis of concern about the absence of a buyer in a pre-structured back-to-back deal organised by Zenrock. Whatever the reasons Zenrock might have for wanting PPT to act as a go-between, PPT was not going to be left exposed by Zenrock on a purchase from Zenrock without a corresponding purchaser from PPT. Furthermore, the most obvious reasons for the interposition of PPT between Zenrock and Trafigura, namely some sort of problem which prevented them dealing directly, obviously did not apply if Trafigura was to fall out of the picture. It should have been obvious that there was a round-tripping chain which had to be constituted in such a way that Zenrock did not appear as the immediate seller to, and the immediate purchaser from, any one entity and so that the structure of the financing arrangements between the parties should not reveal to any individual financing bank the presence of Zenrock in more than one place in the chain. It was Mr Uehara’s evidence however that he did not understand that Zenrock was putting Shandong in between itself and PPT up the chain and then purchasing directly from PPT in place of Trafigura, which I do not find credible.

  98. [76] The WhatsApp exchanges between Mr Lai and Mr Uehara also show Mr Lai’s concern about the identity of the bank to be used by PPT. At this point Mr Lai’s concern appears to centre on the use by PPT of a bank which did not require a countersignature by another bank on the seller’s letter of indemnity, which would now be given by Shandong to PPT and/or its bank. Mr Uehara said that he saw nothing odd about this because the Trafigura deal had come to nothing because of Trafigura’s insistence on a countersigned letter of indemnity. As BOC was content with a letter of indemnity from Shandong, that point did not arise so far as Mr Uehara was concerned. He had no idea whether or not Shandong would be in a position to obtain a bank countersignature to any letter of indemnity issued by it. Mr Uehara also said in the WhatsApp exchange to Mr Lai that it would be much smoother if BOC was used by both PPT and Zenrock, but Mr Lai replied that Zenrock had to use CACIB.

  99. [77] In the afternoon of 2 April 2020, Mr Lai also sent a follow-up email to Mr Uehara, which attached Shandong’s business profile and annual report so that PPT could carry out its know-your-client review. Shandong responded by sending an audit report, Shandong’s certificate confirming its incorporation and its ACRA business profile (I note, however, that it was not until 6 April 2020 that Shandong requested PPT’s information of a similar nature).

  100. [78] On that same day (2 April 2020), shortly after, Trafigura confirmed that the deal with it was cancelled. Within a matter of minutes, at 5.42pm (Singapore time), Mr Lai sent “finalised deal recaps” for the Shandong-PPT-Zenrock transactions with prices of Platt’s plus US$3.05 and US$3.24 per barrel, giving PPT a commission/margin of US$0.19 per barrel. Payment was to be by letter of credit on both legs but with a ten-day period for payment following the bill of lading date on the Shandong leg and a 60-day period on the Zenrock leg. Mr Uehara did not check those prices against the market price at the time.

  101. [79] That evening, Shandong sent a recap of its leg of the deal with PPT in the terms set out in Mr Lai’s email to Mr Uehara and Mr Uehara confirmed that recap shortly thereafter to Shandong, as well as sending to Zenrock a deal recap of the PPT-Zenrock sale which Mr Lai then confirmed.

  102. [80] On the same day, 2 April 2020, Zenrock sent TOTSA the CACIB NOA and sought acknowledgement by signature on the notice itself. Zenrock also asked Mr Cazals whether, after obtaining TOTSA’s acknowledgement of the CACIB NOA, CACIB would be prepared to support a purchase by Zenrock from PPT in place of Trafigura. So far as CACIB was concerned, instead of buying from Trafigura, Zenrock was now buying from PPT. It was, however, wholly unaware that in the preceding version of the transaction, Zenrock was to sell to PPT first before it sold to Trafigura which was then to sell to Zenrock for its on-sale to TOTSA. Once again, on the new version of the transaction whereby PPT was to sell to Zenrock which would on-sell to TOTSA, CACIB was not being told about the top half of the chain where Zenrock was purchasing from SOCAR and selling to Shandong which in turn was on-selling to PPT. Mr Cazals replied, saying that the change “should be acceptable” as long as the TOTSA Receivable was assigned to CACIB.

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