Singapore International Commercial Court · Decided 8 January 2025
Marketlend Pty Ltd and another v QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC(I) 1 · Case no. Originating Application No 16 of 2023
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] It is important to note that although Novita was and is the original named insured under the Policy and the so-called seller that conducted the Alleged Trades of various commodities, the present claims are not brought by Novita itself. Instead, they are brought by the first claimant, Marketlend Pty Ltd (“Marketlend”) and the second claimant, Australian Executor Trustees Limited (“AETL”).
- [3]
[3] Marketlend is an Australian company founded in 2014 by Mr Leo Anthony Tyndall (“Mr Tyndall”) which provides an online platform that connects investors with businesses, typically small and medium-sized enterprises which require financing. So far as the present case is concerned, Marketlend had extended financing to Novita by way of a Debtor Finance Facility dated 9 August 2019 (the “Facility”). Marketlend contends (but QBE disputes) that it is entitled to make a claim under the Policy pursuant to a power of attorney (the “Power of Attorney”) granted to it by Novita as stipulated in Schedule 4C to the Facility.
- [4]
[4] The present proceedings were originally brought in the name of Marketlend alone pursuant to the Power of Attorney. Following service of the Statement of Claim dated 22 November 2022 and the Defence dated 13 December 2022, a third-party notice dated 28 March 2023 was issued against Novita. However, Novita did not enter an appearance and has played no part in the present proceedings. No one from Novita has provided an affidavit or witness statement or given evidence in this trial in support of the claims now advanced. Indeed, Novita’s ex-director, Mr Jitendrakumar Trivedi Vyomesh (“Mr Trivedi”), has refused to cooperate with the claimants. On 27 March 2024, Novita was placed into liquidation.
- [6]
[6] In total, the claimants bring eight separate claims in respect of eight separate Alleged Trades between Novita, as so-called seller, and various so-called buyers (“Alleged Buyers”) as summarised in the table below. I say “so-called” because it is an important part of QBE’s case that all these Alleged Trades were not “genuine physical trades” but, on the contrary, were “fictitious”. Indeed, it is QBE’s case that there is no admissible evidence in these proceedings of any sale and/or shipment of goods by Novita to its Alleged Buyers and that (to use the words of QBE’s counsel) Novita’s Alleged Trades have been “pulled out of thin air”.
- [7]
[7] The following table summarises the claims advanced by the claimants and the amounts claimed in respect of each Alleged Trade.
In addition, the claimants claim interest and costs.
- [9]
[9] QBE denies liability for all of these claims on the basis of various defences which broadly fall under the following four main heads.
- [10]
[10] First, QBE submits that Marketlend has no standing to claim under the Policy and/or, in breach of clause 2 of the QBE Trade Credit – Selective (AP) Trade Credit Insurance Policy Wording (“Policy Wording”), Novita effected an assignment of the rights and benefits under the Policy in favour of Marketlend without the written consent of QBE with the result that, as stipulated in that clause, QBE is entitled “...to avoid liability under the Policy.”
- [11]
[11] Second, QBE submits that it was entitled to avoid and has validly avoided the Policy on grounds of (a) material non-disclosures/misrepresentation; (b) (alleged) assignment of the Policy without QBE’s prior written consent (this overlaps with the first issue above); and/or (c) pursuit of claims known to be false or fraudulent.
- [12]
[12] Third, QBE submits that certain conditions precedent for liability under the Policy have not been satisfied. In particular, QBE submits that: (a) the insured parties have failed to provide relevant information and documents requested by QBE; (b) Novita failed to disclose material facts to QBE; and (c) Novita failed to notify QBE of a Notifiable Event and/or an Event of Insolvency (as defined in the Policy).
- [13]
[13] Fourth, QBE submits that, on the evidence, the claimants cannot prove the existence of an Insured Debt (as defined in the Policy) because they cannot conceivably show that Novita sold and shipped goods to its Alleged Buyers; and that despite QBE’s repeated requests, no evidence has been produced of Novita having purchased the goods it purportedly sold to its Alleged Buyers; nor any evidence of the transmission of original bills of lading from Novita to its Alleged Buyers; nor any alternative explanation of how Novita was involved in the sales chain for the goods, such that its Alleged Buyers could have taken exclusive physical control of and/or been required to “accept” the goods (as QBE submits is required for a “shipment” under the Policy).
- [14]
[14] To be clear, QBE does not dispute that various shipments evidenced by the bills of lading did in fact take place as is confirmed by a series of reports, viz, the Lloyds Intelligence Report (“LIR”) and International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) Reports. However, those bills of lading do not name Novita as the shipper, consignee or otherwise and, according to QBE, there is no evidence or at least no credible evidence that Novita acted as an intermediate seller or buyer in the chain between the original shipper/seller and end receiver.
- [15]
[15] Moreover, in respect of at least two of the Alleged Trades viz, the Alleged Sealoud Contract and the Alleged NSJ Contract, QBE submits that there is credible positive evidence that the underlying goods were in fact traded by other parties without the involvement at all of Novita or its Alleged Buyers; and that it must necessarily follow that Novita’s Alleged Trades must have been fictitious. Thus, QBE says that in fact:
(a) As to the Alleged Sealoud Contract, the relevant trade did not in fact involve Novita at all but involved a chain from PT Timah TBK (“PT Timah”) (the shipper under the bill of lading) – Indometal (London) Limited (“Indometal”) – Viant Pte Ltd (“Viant”) – Ningbo Zhichen Trading Co. Ltd (“Ningbo”) (the notify party under the bill of lading).
(b) As to the Alleged NSJ Contract, the relevant trade did not involve Novita at all but involved a chain from Grainexport SA (“Grainexport”) (ie, the trading arm of the shipper under the bill of lading, LLC “UGC YUG”) – Ameropa AG (“Ameropa”) – ETG Commodities Limited (“ETG”) (ie, a company in the same corporate group as the notify party under the bill of lading, ETC Agro (Pty) Ltd).
- [16]
[16] In support of its case under this head, QBE also relies on other evidence which it contends demonstrates that Novita and the majority of its Alleged Buyers had connections to a money laundering scheme.
The Evidence
- [17]
[17] In the course of the trial, the parties served affidavits or witness statements from the following witnesses, all of whom gave oral evidence in Court:
(a) On behalf of the claimants, Mr Tyndall, the founder, one of the directors and CEO of Marketlend. His responsibilities include creating key business processes, managing Marketlend’s operations and making all significant business decisions for the company.
(b) On behalf of QBE:
(i) Mr James Evans (“Mr Evans”) (Head of Trade Finance Solutions), who gave evidence on the underwriting of the Policy.
(ii) Mr Ki Hsien Ling (“Mr Ki” or “Mr Ling”) (Commercial Underwriter), who also gave evidence on the underwriting of the Policy.
(iii) Mr Joseph Smart (“Mr Smart”) (ex-General Counsel, Head of Risk Compliance and Legal, Asia for the QBE Insurance Group) who gave evidence regarding the investigation of the claims.
(iv) Mr Bruno Vickers (“Mr Vickers”) (Managing Director of J S Held (“JSH”), an expert services firm). Mr Vickers heads JSH’s Global Investigations practice in Singapore and produced two reports setting out (among other things) details of the connections between Novita, its Alleged Buyers and an Indian businessman Yalamanchilli Satyanarayana Chowdary (popularly known as and henceforth referred to as “Mr Sujana”).
(v) Ms Samantha Geok Leng Lim (“Ms Lim”). She is currently a director of Viant and gave evidence by video concerning the shipment of the tin ingots under BL No OOLU2642654180 dated 29 June 2020 ie, the Alleged Sealoud Contract.
(vi) Ms Maria Eugenia Gomez (“Ms Gomez”). She is the Head of Trade Operation in Africa for ETG and also gave evidence by video concerning the shipment of Russian Milling Wheat which is the subject of the Alleged NSJ Contract.
- [18]
[18] In support of their respective cases, the parties also sought to rely on certain written statements as well as certain other documents which were at least in part the subject of objection on grounds that the former were inadmissible in evidence and that the latter were not “authentic” and/or were, in any event, inadmissible as to the truth of their contents. I heard the parties’ submissions with regard to such objections on the fourth day of the trial. So far as relevant, I deal with the status of such evidence later in this Judgment.
- [19]
[19] As regards expert evidence, the parties originally agreed to call expert evidence from an underwriting expert and two commodities experts: one for the trading of wheat and soybeans (collectively, referred to as “agri”) and another for the trading of tin. A list of issues for these experts was also agreed.
- [20]
[20] However, in the event, the claimants elected not to call an underwriting expert; and have led evidence from a single commodities expert, Mr Mahajan Anuj Amritsagar (“Mr Mahajan”), whose focus appears to be steel trading. Mr Mahajan produced three reports, the first dated 20 June 2024 and two supplemental reports dated 12 August 2024, one addressing agri and the other tin trades.
- [21]
[21] For its part, QBE, led evidence from an underwriting expert, Mr Edward Brittenham (“Mr Brittenham”), who produced a report dated 20 June 2024. QBE also relies on the evidence of an agri trading expert, Mr Paul Bloemendal (“Mr Bloemendal”), who produced two reports dated 20 June 2024 and 12 August 2024; and a tin trading expert, Mr Frederic Delforge, who also produced two reports dated 20 June 2024 and 12 August 2024. Mr Bloemendal and Mr Delforge also produced joint statements with Mr Mahajan dated 18 July 2024 and 24 July 2024 respectively.
Background to and issuance of the Policy
- [22]
[22] Negotiations with regard to the issuance of the Policy were carried out on behalf of Novita by its TCI broker, Chief Trade Credit Pty Ltd (“Chief”) whose joint managing director was Uta Lucky (“Mr Uta”).
- [23]
[23] The claimants tendered no oral evidence regarding the background to and issuance of the Policy. However, this was the subject of evidence from QBE’s witnesses and, save as indicated below, was largely uncontroversial. The following is a summary which is based in part on the evidence of Mr Evans, Mr Ki and Mr Smart and which I have, to a large extent, borrowed from the parties’ opening submissions.
- [24]
[24] QBE’s underwriting of TCI policies was divided into commercial underwriting and risk underwriting. As explained by Mr Ki and Mr Evans, the commercial underwriters determined the policy structure including the premium, policy period, deductibles, and played a front-facing role with the brokers, receiving information from them and communicating QBE’s decisions to them. The risk underwriters on the other hand decided credit limits for insured buyers largely by reference to their financial standing. Mr Ki explained the commercial underwriting aspect of the Policy and Mr Evans focused more on risk underwriting.
- [25]
[25] At the material time, Mr Ki was the Commercial Underwriting Manager, Asia for QBE. He took the lead for QBE in relation to commercial underwriting of the proposed cover for Novita, while others took the lead on risk underwriting. It was Mr Ki’s evidence that TCI is intended to cover payment default in relation to physical trading and not in relation to financial instruments generally which may be covered by other forms of insurance (such as non-payment insurance). He described QBE’s commercial underwriting processes and the matters it considered in reaching the conclusion to offer cover to Novita and on what terms. It was his evidence that Novita made positive representations that the business for which cover was being sought was physical trading (as opposed to paper trading) but that QBE had no need to test this fact since physical trading is the premise for TCI cover and an underwriter’s task when considering cover is to assess the risk of non-payment on trade in goods not whether the underlying business of the proposed insured is in fact something altogether different, ie, something akin to financing or financial arbitraging. He explained using the analogy of travel insurance – when an insured seeks travel insurance, the insurer investigates the risks associated with travel but does not investigate whether the insured is in fact going to travel as travel is the premise for travel insurance coverage.
- [26]
[26] Mr Evans was, at the material time, the Head of Trade Credit, Asia for QBE and had oversight of both the commercial and risk underwriting teams. He was not actively involved in the issue of the Initial Policy (as referred to below) but was very much involved in the issue of the Policy. Mr Evans also gave an introduction to QBE’s underwriting of TCI cover. He explained that TCI is concerned with non-payment in relation to trading in physical goods not financial instruments. He identified that as the premise for consideration of the Policy. Mr Evans also explained the key risk underwriting considerations for TCI policies, clarifying that credit limits for buyers are primarily assessed by reference to their financial standing (as gleaned from their financial statements and third-party credit reports), and the location of the buyers and broad internet searches on them. When COVID-19 started impacting trade flows, the risk underwriting also included calls with proposed buyers to assess their business performance, liquidity and outlook.
- [27]
[27] So far as the present case is concerned, it is common ground that Marketlend provided financial accommodation to Novita by way of the Facility dated 9 August 2019 referred to above.
- [28]
[28] Shortly thereafter, Novita, through its brokers, Chief, approached QBE Australia in August 2019 seeking to obtain TCI coverage. Initial discussions followed with commercial terms and indicative credit limits for identified buyers being proposed subject to provision of further information. To formalise matters, Novita gave notice that Chief was its authorised broker on 12 September 2019.
- [29]
[29] Around mid-September 2019, Chief provided certain information on behalf of Novita to QBE including a copy of a PowerPoint Presentation on Novita’s business (the “PowerPoint”) that described Novita as an “established trading company” and included what QBE contended were the following material representations as to Novita’s business:
(a) Novita “[f]acilitates long and short term supply chain solutions – ensuring customers have a steady supply of product they need to continue with the smooth day-to-day running of their operation”.
(b) Novita “[s]pecialises in physical movements of goods from their place of origin to markets where they are in demand”.
(c) A description of Novita’s business model that “[e]nd product is exported to final destination based on buyer(s) requirement”, with “export financing go[ing] towards liquidation of import financing”.
(d) Novita’s “Key Management” included a Mr Boopalan Senthilkumar (Head of Trade Operations), whose role included “ensuring our supply chain logistics and execution of trade contracts are delivered in a timely fashion”.
[emphasis in original removed, emphasis in italics added]
- [30]
[30] On 11 October 2019, Chief submitted to QBE a QBE Trade Credit Insurance Proposal form duly completed on behalf of Novita (the “Proposal Form”). which described Novita’s business as “general commodities trading”.
- [31]
[31] On 4 November 2019, Policy documents were executed and issued for QBE Trade Credit Policy no SG-75224 in favour of Novita (the “Initial Policy”). This policy was ultimately terminated on account of Novita not then being able to obtain funding for its trading activities.
- [32]
[32] The matters which I have described above were uncontroversial. However, in passing, I note that it is QBE’s case that these statements in the PowerPoint and the Proposal Form constituted material representations which induced QBE to enter into the Policy Pty Ltd and were untrue, thereby entitling QBE to avoid the Policy as referred to below. In particular, the evidence of Mr Ki and Mr Evans was that they would not have underwritten the Policy or recommended any of their colleagues to issue the Policy if they had known that:
(a) Novita was in the business of conducting trades and/or seeking coverage for trades which did not involve original bills of lading or any reliable means to verify the possession and physical transmission of commodities to and from its trading counterparts, which were solely for the purposes of financing or were otherwise not genuine physical trades of commodities; and
(b) Novita had links to Mr Sujana and/or companies owned by Sujana or his close relatives (collectively, the “Sujana Group”).
So far as relevant, I consider this part of QBE’s case later in this Judgment.
- [33]
[33] In passing, I also note that as part of Mr Tyndall’s commentary on the underwriting process, his evidence was that he was not aware of any due diligence carried out by QBE on the operational aspects of the trades between Novita and the proposed insured buyers, and that he considered this position “unsurprising” since, according to Mr Tyndall, “...QBE was undertaking the risk of the Insured Buyer’s payment default and by issuing the Policy, QBE was satisfied following its own due diligence with the financial standing of each of the Insured Buyers up to the specified limits” [emphasis in original]. This was, in effect, consistent with the evidence of QBE’s witnesses as well as QBE’s submission that as a TCI underwriter, QBE did not and did not have to investigate the operational aspects of the trades, but only assessed the risk of the insured buyers’ default by reference to their financial standing. In that latter regard, I should mention that it was the claimants’ case that prior to issuance of the Policy, QBE did perform, as part of its own standard procedures, a credit risk assessment in respect of the Alleged Buyers which, as reflected in QBE’s own internal documentation, demonstrated that, at least at the date of each risk assessment, QBE was well aware that each of the Alleged Buyers did not carry any “inventory”. Although this was relied upon by the claimants, it did not seem to me to undermine QBE’s case that the Policy only covered genuine physical trades.
- [34]
[34] In the following year, between 21 May 2020 to 9 June 2020, Chief and QBE negotiated an extension of the Initial Policy.
- [35]
[35] By emails from Mr Uta to QBE on 19 June 2020, 26 June 2020 and 1 July 2020, Mr Uta informed QBE that Marketlend was funding Novita and that AETL was a trustee for an affiliate of Marketlend. Further, in Mr Uta’s 26 June email, he informed QBE that rather than acting as loss payee or under a full proceeds assignment, Marketlend had opted for a banker's endorsement, on the basis that this would provide “better protection to the lender [ie, Marketlend] than the other forms of the policy being assigned”.
- [36]
[36] On 29 June 2020, QBE confirmed that it was “on risk” with Novita with effect from 1 June 2020.
- [37]
[37] In passing, I note that it was during the period between 1 June 2020 and 15 July 2020 that the Alleged Trades which are the subject of the present claims against QBE were allegedly made.
- [38]
[38] By an email dated 15 July 2020, QBE sent a copy of the schedule for the Policy which replaced the Initial Policy and serves as the basis of the present claims (the “Policy Schedule”). The Policy is numbered SG-78300, dated 14 July 2020 and provides for a policy period of 1 June 2020 to 31 May 2021. To be clear, although described as a “schedule”, it was common ground that this document in effect constituted the Policy together with the QBE Trade Credit – Selective (AP) Trade Credit Insurance Policy Wording (the “Policy Wording”) and the Banker’s Endorsement entered into between AETL (as the “Bank”), Novita (as the “Non-Bank Insured”) and QBE. It is also common ground that QBE subsequently received the full premium of US$630,000.
- [39]
[39] By an email dated 17 July 2020 Marketlend informed Chief that it required certain amendments to be made to the Banker's Endorsement which it had received and requested that these amendments be conveyed to QBE as soon as possible.
- [40]
[40] By an email dated 20 July 2020, Mr Uta requested QBE to allow access for Marketlend as “Joint Insured – The Bank”.
- [41]
[41] By an email from Mr Uta to Marketlend on 20 July 2020, Mr Uta requested the “names and email addresses of the recipients” be notified should QBE make any changes to the terms of the Insurance Policy, such as the credit limit endorsements. On 6 August 2020, QBE granted such access to the email addresses provided by Marketlend to Mr Uta.
- [42]
[42] Meanwhile, by an email to Mr Uta on 17 July 2020, Marketlend stated that it required certain amendments to be made to QBE's Banker’s Endorsement which it had received, and requested that these amendments be conveyed to QBE as soon as possible.
- [43]
[43] By an email from QBE to Mr Uta on 24 July 2020, the final, amended version of the Banker’s Endorsement which included the terms requested by Marketlend was sent to Mr Uta.
- [44]
[44] By an email on 23 October 2020, Mr Uta informed QBE that owing to the difficulties of dealing with Novita, Marketlend would be exercising its rights under the Banker’s Endorsement as Joint Insured and would be notifying QBE accordingly. QBE did not object to this.
- [45]
[45] In support of its case, the claimants highlight that QBE is a large and sophisticated trade credit insurer; and that, as such, it would have conducted and did in fact conduct its own due diligence prior to underwriting the trades. This is evidenced both prior to the entry into the Policy, and the continuous and ongoing due diligence which QBE conducted. Thus, prior to the entry into and throughout the lifespan of the Policy, QBE had frequently conducted its own due diligence on the Insured Buyers, as would be expected of any insurer entering into such policies. In summary, the claimants submitted that all QBE was interested in was the financial ability of the Insured Buyers as that was what they were covering under the Policy. Thus, as stated by Mr Evans, QBE accepts that “the only risk [they] are taking under a TCI policy is the credit risk of the buyers created from deferred payment terms in relation to the goods delivered to them”. The claimants cite the following examples of the due diligence exercised by QBE:
(a) Throughout 2019 and 2020, QBE independently conducted internal credit risks assessments on the Insured Buyers in the form of Credit Risk Forms, generated by Tinubu Square’s Grams Reports (“Credit Risk Reports”), for the purposes of determining whether to grant or revise a credit limit in respect of an Insured Buyer. The Credit Risk Reports included an assessment of the Insured Buyer's aggregate limit and summaries of their financial statements. For instance, the Credit Risk Report for Green Trees dated 1 November 2019 had an aggregate limit of “USD 6,000k” and observed that Green Trees had “[r]evenue noted increase y/o/y from USD 176.0 mn to USD 255.19 mill at FYE 2018”, “sound creditor turnover” and a “[s]ound financial profile”. In the Credit Risk Report for Green Trees dated 10 January 2020, the aggregate limit went up to “USD 7,000k”.
(b) On 13 November 2019, QBE requested for the “incorporation certificate” of Crown Beec from Mr Uta, as QBE had records suggesting that Crown Beec was inactive. Mr Uta responded on 14 November 2019 with Crown Beec's financial information company registration papers, which QBE was content with and confirmed that the “limit [for Crown Beec] has been approved within the system”.
(c) On 13 April 2020, QBE requested Mr Uta to arrange a call between Novita and another insured buyer, Green Trees, or with Green Trees directly, assuming Novita was comfortable with that, for the purposes of its “annual review on Green Trees”.
(d) On 1 June 2020, QBE had informed Mr Uta that regarding Sealoud, QBE would not require a call as they had recently had one.
(e) Even after the Policy had been entered into, QBE undertook its own monitoring of the Insured Buyers. For instance, on 21 August 2020, QBE asked Mr Uta to help coordinate calls with Yeskey and NSJ Trading to “better understanding what they are seeing and how they are managing through the current challenging environment”.
(f) Mr Uta also provided frequent updates to QBE on the status of Novita and its trades under the Policy, which was met with praise from QBE for Chief's mitigation efforts, which it considered “really prudent”.
(g) On 18 December 2020, Mr Uta provided QBE with an update on how the COVID-19 pandemic had affected the cashflow of the Insured Buyers and Chief’s “strategy to manage our Insured clients [and] Insured Debts”. Specifically, the email also informed QBE that it was “working with Novita and their Insured Buyers to progress further”.
(h) On 21 December 2020, QBE responded to Mr Uta's email, thanking him for the “really comprehensive” email and that it was a “really prudent approach to managing the risks involved”.
(i) On 4 February 2021, Mr Uta informed QBE that certain of the Insured Buyers had “failed to meet payments by due dates” and that there had been “no further trading”, but that Chief would continue to work with the Insured Buyers “to work out repayment plans as a means to mitigate any Insured Losses”.
The Policy
- [46]
[46] The Policy comprises:
- [47]
[47] The relevant parts of the Policy Wording are as follows:
(a) The cover provided under the Policy is as follows:
with the following definitions:
The Policy Wording also includes the following definitions of “Insolvency” and “Protracted Default” (with the Protracted Default Period being fixed at 180 days in the Policy Schedule):
(b) Clause 1 provides as follows:
(c) Clause 2 provides:
(d) Clause 8 provides as follows:
(e) Clause 10 provides as follows:
(f) Clause 13 provides as follows:
The governing law and country of issue as set out in the Policy Schedule is Singapore.
(g) The policy period was from 1 June 2020 to 31 May 2021.
The Claims
- [48]
[48] As explained by Mr Tyndall, Marketlend’s standard credit management processes include reminding third party buyers of the payments due 15 days before the due date for payment, both by letter and by telephone. In addition, again as explained by Mr Tyndall, in or about July 2020, one of Marketlend's compliance officers, Ms Claire Yu (“Ms CY”), also contacted what is said to have been an authorised representative of each of the Alleged Buyers by telephone to confirm the details of each of the outstanding invoices. Consistent with the standard process which Mr Tyndall had put in place, these calls were carried out on a recorded line. Audio recordings of the calls made by Ms CY, together with certified transcripts were produced in evidence by Mr Tyndall (“CY’s conversations”) and heavily relied upon by the claimants in support of their case that the trades were genuine and not fictitious. In particular, the claimants submitted that in the course of these conversations, each of the Alleged Buyers (by their authorised representative) confirmed that the relevant invoices were correct, valid and not in dispute. I set out below the content of one of those transcripts which is typical of those conversations:
It is important to note that Ms CY did not submit a formal affidavit or witness statement and was not called to give oral evidence. I consider further below the evidential status of Ms CY’s conversations and what weight, if any, to be ascribed to them. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that QBE’s position was that Ms CY’s conversations were inadmissible in evidence as to the truth of what was stated by the individuals who spoke to Ms CY; and that, in any event, even if Ms CY’s conversations are admissible in evidence, what Ms CY may have been told by these individuals does not necessarily show that the Alleged Trades were genuine.
- [50]
[50] Meanwhile and following the expiry of the relevant default periods under the Policy, the correspondence adduced in evidence by Mr Tyndall shows Marketlend chasing towards the end of 2020 and early 2021 for sums said to be due from the Alleged Buyers. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the relevant correspondence save to note the evidence of Mr Tyndall (which I accept) that the outbreak of the pandemic in the early part of 2020 and subsequent period severely impacted financial and commodity markets; and that, in some cases at least, responses received from at least some of the Alleged Buyers to Marketlend’s demands complain about liquidity difficulties allegedly caused, at least in part, thereby.
- [51]
[51] In the event, no moneys were ever received from any of the Alleged Buyers.
- [52]
[52] On 9 March 2021, AETL submitted seven further claim forms in respect of the seven further Alleged Trades on the basis that there had been a relevant “Protracted Default” as defined in the Policy.
- [53]
[53] Thereafter, between 16 April 2021 and 31 August 2022, QBE and Marketlend entered into lengthy correspondence in respect of the claims in the course of which QBE pressed for further documents and information in support of the claims. It is unnecessary to set out the details of these exchanges save to note that: (a) QBE’s position was that the coincidental timing of the series of defaults across all the Alleged Buyers was unusual and warranted further investigation of the claims; and (b) in response, Marketlend did provide certain documents, notably copies of the alleged sale contracts and bills of lading together with copies of invoices and packing lists; vessel movement reports for the bills of lading in the form of the LIR and IMB Reports; and transcripts of Ms CY’s conversations.
- [54]
[54] However, QBE’s position was and remains that important documentation relating to the Alleged Trades remains outstanding viz:
- [55]
[55] Meanwhile, Marketlend took steps and initiated various legal proceedings in different jurisdictions against the Alleged Buyers to seek recovery of amounts allegedly due under the alleged sale contracts. In summary, the relevant legal proceedings were as follows:
- [56]
[56] For present purposes, it is unnecessary to set out the details of these steps save to note that, according to Mr Tyndall, none of the Alleged Buyers defended the legal proceedings brought against them. Further, although Marketlend obtained judgment and/or winding-up orders against all the Alleged Buyers, the actions taken by Marketlend have not resulted in the recovery of any money.
- [57]
[57] The claimants submitted that the fact they had obtained judgment and/or winding up orders against the Alleged Buyers as referred to above was itself relevant evidence supporting their claims in the present case. I do not accept that submission. Given that none of the Alleged Buyers participated in any of the proceedings which were brought against them, the judgments and/or winding up orders made by the other courts say nothing as to whether the Alleged Trades were genuine or not. In any event, QBE was not party to those other proceedings.
- [58]
[58] In light of what QBE considered were important gaps in the information provided as well as QBE’s own inquiries, QBE declined to accept the claims. By way of letters dated 4 April 2023 and 21 April 2023, QBE also gave notice avoiding the Policy. QBE conveyed further grounds for avoidance of the Policy to the claimants by way of its pleadings in these proceedings (which were also notified to Novita by way of a letter from the claimants’ lawyers to Novita dated 12 August 2024).
The Issues
(a) Issue 1: Does Marketlend have standing to claim under the Policy and/or has there been a breach of Clause 2 of the Policy Wording (prohibition of any assignment without the written consent of QBE) and, if so, what is the effect of such breach?
(b) Issue 2: Has there been a failure of a condition precedent to any claim under the Policy by reason of the failure by the Insured to provide documents and/or information requested by QBE?
(c) Issue 3: Is there proof (on a balance of probabilities) of one or more Insured Debts under the Policy?
(d) Issue 4: Has there been any other breach of a condition precedent to the right to claim under the Policy?
(e) Issue 5: Was QBE entitled to avoid the Policy?
Issue 1: (a) Does Marketlend have standing to claim under the Policy and/or (b) has there been a breach of Clause 2 of the Policy Wording (prohibition on assignment without QBE’s consent) and, if so, what is the effect of such breach?
- [60]
[60] Issue 1(a) is, in my view, straightforward. The starting point is that it is common ground that, unlike AETL, Marketlend is not a named insured. Rather, as pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim, it is Marketlend’s case that Novita executed a power of attorney on 9 August 2019 in its favour (the “Power of Attorney”) and that Marketlend is therefore authorised to act on behalf of Novita in all matters including to bring the present claim with AETL.
- [61]
[61] In response, QBE pleaded in paragraph 5 of its Defence as follows:
On its face, the first sentence of this paragraph would seem to accept that Marketlend was authorised by the terms of the Power of Attorney to act on behalf of Novita to bring the present proceedings – although it is not easy to understand how that first sentence is consistent with the second sentence which asserts that the Power of Attorney does not give Marketlend the “standing/right” to pursue the present claims. Be that as it may, there is no doubt (indeed it is common ground) that Novita did indeed execute a document which was attached as a schedule to the Facility entitled “Schedule 4C: General Security Deed & Power of Attorney (Hong Kong Law)” dated 9 August 2019 (“Schedule 4C”) and which provided in material part as follows:
I consider clause 1(b) below. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Marketlend does not rely on any purported assignment as stipulated in clause 1(b) to assert its entitlement to pursue the present claims. Rather, as I understood and consistent with its pleaded case, Marketlend relied on the Power of Attorney granted by Novita as stipulated above in clause 20 as well as the terms of clause 29 which expressly stipulates for the manner in which Marketlend may exercise the powers of an attorney on behalf of Novita.
- [62]
[62] In my view, the Power of Attorney as contained in Schedule 4C does, on its face, give Marketlend the power to bring the present proceedings in its own name. Ultimately, at the very end of the last day of the hearing, the defendant’s counsel accepted that he had no answer to that:
On this basis, I would hold the answer to issue 1(a) is: Yes.
- [63]
[63] I turn then to issue 1(b). In summary, although Marketlend does not itself seek to assert the existence of any assignment pursuant to clause 1(b) of Schedule 4C, it is QBE’s case that that clause operates as an assignment of the “right, title and interest” in and to the present Policy; that such assignment was made without the written consent of QBE; that this constituted a breach of clause 2 of the Policy Wording; and that, in accordance with the express terms of that latter clause, QBE was and therefore is entitled “...to avoid liability under the Policy”.
- [64]
[64] In passing, it is important to note that the wording of clause 2 is not that QBE would, in the case of an assignment made without QBE’s consent, be entitled to avoid the Policy itself – but rather that QBE would be entitled to avoid “...liability under [the] Policy...”
- [65]
[65] At one stage, I had thought that this distinction might be important. In particular, I had thought that Marketlend’s position was that if there were an assignment made in favour of Marketlend without QBE’s written consent, then QBE would only be entitled to avoid liability as against Marketlend – leaving unaffected AETL’s right to claim as a joint insured. However, in the course of opening submissions, the claimants’ counsel conceded that if clause 2 were triggered by reason of an assignment in favour of Marketlend made without QBE’s written consent, the effect would be that QBE would be entitled to avoid liability as against both Marketlend and AETL.
- [66]
[66] Here, it is QBE’s case that it did not at any time give its written consent to the assignment in clause 1(b) of Schedule 4C, whether by way of consent to the assignee, to the form of the assignment, or in any other way; that there was therefore a breach of clause 2 of the Policy Wording; that; and that it necessarily follows that QBE was and is entitled to avoid liability under the Policy as against both claimants.
- [67]
[67] To be clear, Marketlend did not contend that QBE had given its consent to the assignment in Schedule 4C at the time it was executed in August 2019 or at any time prior to the execution of the Policy. Instead, Marketlend relied on four main points which I address in turn.
- [68]
[68] First, as pleaded, it was Marketlend’s case that the effect of clause 1(b) of Schedule 4C was that there was never any assignment in fact but that in that document Novita had “merely” agreed to assign rights at some stage in the future which never happened, although Marketlend did not appear to pursue this argument at trial. In any event, I do not accept that submission. The wording of clause 1(b) is plain viz, it provides, in effect, that Novita both agrees to and does in fact assign its rights, under policies of insurance in which it was to have an interest at any time and, further, it had charged all of its rights in respect of present and after-acquired property. As submitted by QBE, the effect of clause 1(b) was that upon Novita acquiring rights under the Policy, these were assigned without more to Marketlend.
- [69]
[69] Second, Marketlend submitted that there was no breach of clause 2 of the Policy Wording because it does not apply to assignments made before the Policy was entered into but applied only to assignments made after the Policy incepted. I do not accept that submission. To my mind, there is nothing in that clause to suggest that it is so restricted. Further, as submitted by QBE, Novita could not and did not assign its rights under the Policy before such rights existed. The effect of clause 1(b) was that such rights were assigned immediately upon the execution of the Policy. Relatedly, Marketlend submitted that there is an implied term that clause 2 of the Policy did not apply to existing assignments of, or agreements to assign, the Policy. Again, I do not accept that submission. It is trite law that a term will only be implied in fact if it is “necessary” to do so to make the contract work (see eg, Panwah Steel Pte Ltd v Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 571 at [8]). I see no such necessity here to justify the implication of the alleged term.
- [70]
[70] Third, Marketlend submitted that QBE had provided the requisite consent in writing to the assignment. In support of that submission, Marketlend relied upon various exchanges in June and July 2020 between Chief and QBE as referred to in [35] and [39]−[42] above.
- [71]
[71] In summary, Marketlend submitted that it is thus clear that QBE was, at all relevant times, kept informed of Marketlend’s role as funder, and more critically, that Novita would only be able to pay the premiums under the Policy if Marketlend funded it; and that QBE’s case that it did not consent to the assignment should therefore be rejected.
- [72]
[72] I am prepared to accept that QBE was well aware of Marketlend’s general role. However, I do not consider that any of the factual matters relied upon by Marketlend as summarised above amount to the giving of consent – let alone written consent – to any assignment of the Policy in favour of Marketlend. In particular:
(a) The email dated 24 July 2020 from Chief to QBE requesting that Marketlend personnel be provided access to QBE’s trade credit portal in relation to the Policy is equally consistent with AETL being represented by Marketlend. Indeed, although Marketlend was in discussions with QBE in relation to a potential assignment, those discussions culminated in Marketlend requesting, and QBE agreeing to, the Bankers’ Endorsement with AETL.
(b) The email dated 24 July 2020 from QBE to Chief simply stated in material part: “[t]o avoid ambiguity: the Banker's Endorsement [serial number] under the policy attached to Insured, Novita… policy schedule, recognises the parties involved in the facility agreement”. There is nothing in that email to suggest that QBE was somehow aware that Marketlend (rather than AETL) was the lender under the facility agreement with Novita at the time. As far as QBE was concerned, it had no reason to believe that the lender under the facility was Marketlend, and not AETL (ie, the party that Marketlend proposed as a joint insured via the Banker’s Endorsement).
(c) The email dated 26 June 2020 from Chief to QBE, stated in material part: “as you are aware that Marketlend is funding the above Insureds on the back of the Insured Buyers that are covered by QBE. Rather than acting as the Loss Payee under a Full Proceeds Assignment, Marketlend has opted for QBE's banker's endorsement. This endorsements [sic] provides better protection to the lender [rather] than the other forms of the policy being assigned”. This email likewise is consistent with Marketlend proposing AETL (not itself) as the joint insured under the Policy (as in fact happened); and the parties attempting to agree on the terms of a possible assignment. There is nothing in this email, which in any way suggests that in addition to the Banker’s Endorsement under discussion, Marketlend was also proposing some free-standing assignment in its favour, still less that QBE was somehow consenting to it. Rather, as submitted by QBE, the converse is true: the email (and the draft banker’s endorsement attached to it) make it clear that the identity of the assignee under the then contemplated assignment and the form of any such assignment had to be agreed by QBE. Mr Ki explained during his cross-examination that he could not even confirm whether this email contemplates the policy being assigned to Marketlend. For present purposes, what is ultimately important is that a Banker’s Endorsement in favour of AETL was concluded.
(d) The email dated 25 November 2020 from Chief to QBE stated in material part: “Further to our meeting last week with Marketlend, please find attached their letters in respect of their request to act their role under the Bankers Endorsement of the respective policies”. What was attached were two letters from AETL (not Marketlend), only one of which is relevant to the Policy – which confirmed that AETL had paid the outstanding premium under the Policy. There is nothing in this email or the attachments constituting any written consent by QBE to any assignment of the Policy in favour of Marketlend.
(e) The email dated 24 March 2021 from QBE to Marketlend set out a “summary of estimated Protracted Default dates which are based on the information you have provided us to date”, and added that “[a]t this early stage we have focussed only on the minimisation of a potential loss, and have not assessed whether all the terms and conditions of the Policy have been complied with. All of our rights are hereby expressly reserved”. Again, this email does not, in my view, assist Marketlend.
- [73]
[73] Fourth, Marketlend submitted that QBE is estopped from relying on clause 2 of the Policy as it had a good working relationship with Marketlend for eight years prior to this suit; that QBE was, or would have been, aware of the implications of Marketlend's role as funder, being familiar with Marketlend's modus operandi; and that QBE’s current allegations are simply inconsistent with the parties' prior conduct and relationship. Again, I am prepared to accept that QBE had a good working relationship with Marketlend over a number of years. However, in my view, that falls far short of a representation by QBE that it consented, or at least would not object to the assignment of the Policy in favour of Marketlend. The parties’ conduct seems to me to be consistent with the decision to make AETL a joint insured with Novita and the correspondence which culminated in the issuance of the Banker’s Endorsement.
- [74]
[74] For all these reasons, it is my conclusion that there was an assignment of the Policy in favour of Marketlend; that such assignment constituted a breach of clause 2 of the Policy; that QBE is therefore entitled to avoid liability under the Policy as against Marketlend; and that, given the concession made by the claimants’ counsel, QBE is also entitled to avoid liability under the Policy as against AETL.
- [75]
[75] That conclusion is fatal to the claims brought by both claimants in this suit, such that it is strictly unnecessary to consider the further issues in this case. However, in case I am wrong, I turn to consider the further issues.
Issue 2: Has there been a failure of a condition precedent to any claim under the Policy by reason of the failure by the Insured to provide documents and/or information requested by QBE?
- [76]
[76] The Policy Wording stipulates:
Here, it is QBE’s case that there has been a number of failures by the insured parties to meet the terms and conditions of the Policy with regard to (a) provision of information/co-operation; (b) disclosure of material facts; and (c) notification of “Notifiable Events”. To be clear, it is QBE’s case that any single failure is fatal to the present claims. I propose to deal with the first of these alleged failures below. I deal later in this Judgment with the second and third of these alleged failures after I have considered Issue 4.
- [77]
[77] Under this head, QBE relied upon:
(a) Conditions 10(b) and (c) of the Policy Wording which I have already quoted above (at [47(e)]) and which (in summary) entitled QBE to request and required the Insured to provide certain documentation and information; and
(b) Condition 8 of the Policy dealing with “Claims” which provides that it is a condition precedent to the payment of any claim by QBE under the Policy that the Insured “co-operate fully with the Insurer” (see [47(d)]). Notwithstanding the generality of the words, QBE accepted that, as a matter of construction, this condition precedent is concerned with the Insured’s co-operation in relation to the investigation and handling of claims.
- [78]
[78] In summary, QBE submitted that, in breach of these provisions and after submitting the claims, the Insured(s) failed to provide QBE with the documents QBE reasonably required to investigate and assess the validity of the present claims. As stated above, although QBE was provided with some documentation, it was QBE’s case that there remained – and still remains − much documentation or information which QBE had requested but which had not been provided. According to QBE, this documentation or information was − and still remains − reasonably required to verify compliance with the terms of the Policy. In particular, QBE submitted that this documentation or information was and is all within the scope of what QBE was entitled to request under the stated provisions of the Policy to satisfy itself as to the validity of the claims.
- [79]
[79] This was disputed by the claimants on two main grounds.
- [80]
[80] First, it was submitted by the claimants that there is nothing in the Policy which specifically requires the provision of the documentation or information that QBE had requested and remains outstanding. It is fair to say that the Policy does not specify particular classes of documents still less any particular document to be provided by the Insured in support of any claim. However, the wording of Clauses 10(b) and (c) is of wide scope. In particular, at the request of QBE, I read Clause 10(b) as imposing an obligation on the Insured to provide any documents in its possession or control relating to or connected with: (a) the Policy; or (b) the obligations of the Insured; or (c) any transactions between the Insured and any Insured Buyer. At the request of QBE, Clause 10(c) imposes a similar (albeit not identical) obligation on the Insured to, upon request, supply QBE with “any information in its possession or take any reasonable steps to obtain for [QBE] any information or the sight of any documents in the possession of any third party relating to or connected with this Policy or any transaction between the Insured and the Insured Buyer”. It is important to note that the documents or information that QBE is entitled to request and that the Insured is obliged to provide or supply includes but is not limited to documents or information relating only to the particular sale contract between the Insured and the Insured Buyer.
- [81]
[81] Second, as reflected in the protracted correspondence between QBE and Marketlend, Marketlend’s position was that the documentation/information requested by QBE is, in any event, unnecessary – or at least not reasonably necessary – for the purpose of QBE assessing the validity of the claims and therefore does not fall within the scope of either Clause 10(b) or 10(c); and that remains Marketlend’s submission.
- [82]
[82] As to such submission, I am prepared to assume in favour of the claimants that despite the apparent wide wording of both Clause 10(b) or 10(c), QBE would not be entitled to insist on the provision of documents or information which was not reasonably necessary for the purpose of enabling QBE to assess the validity of claims. However, contrary to the claimants’ submission, it seems to me that in the circumstances of the present case, a significant part of the documentation or information requested by QBE was reasonably necessary if not essential to enable QBE to carry out that exercise.
- [83]
[83] In broad terms, the documents or information which, according to QBE, it had requested but which had not been provided fall into two groups, viz: (a) the documents or information relating to Novita’s inward purchases (ie, in which Novita acted as the buyer) which, for convenience, I will refer to as the “upstream material”; and (b) the documents or information relating to the Alleged Trades between Novita (as seller) and the Alleged Buyers which I will refer to as the “downstream material”. For context, QBE argues that it needed both the upstream and downstream material to verify if Novita ever came into possession of, and subsequently sold, physical goods, which goes towards the question of whether the Alleged Trades in fact took place with respect to underlying physical goods. This has a bearing on the validity of the Alleged Trades and is a point I return to later.
- [84]
[84] The upstream material includes Novita’s inward purchase contracts, invoices, proof of payment to Novita’s suppliers; packing lists for Novita’s purchase leg; certificates of origin, certificates of weight, certificates of quality, export certificates and customs documentation and cargo manifests at the point of loading. The claimants submitted that the provision of this upstream material either:
(a) did not fall within either clause 10(b) or 10(c) of the Policy Wording because they all related to contracts not with the Alleged Buyers but with other third parties and that therefore they were not documents “...relating to or connected with the Policy or the obligations of the Insured or any transactions between the Insured and any Insured Buyer” within the scope of clause 10(b) or documents “...relating to or connected with this Policy or any transaction between the Insured and the Insured Buyer” within the scope of clause 10(c); or
(b) was not reasonably necessary to enable QBE to assess the validity of the present claims.
I certainly see some force in what is stated in sub-paragraph (a); and, to the extent that there is any uncertainty as to the scope of clauses 10(b) and 10(c), I suppose that there is an argument that they should be construed against QBE. I have much more doubt about the claimants’ further submission in sub-paragraph (b). Indeed, my tentative view is that even if the upstream material did not fall with clause 10(b) or (c), there was an obligation to provide such material at the request of QBE as part of the duty to cooperate as stipulated in clause 8. Notwithstanding, I am prepared to assume in favour of the claimants that there was no breach in failing to provide the upstream material.
- [85]
[85] However, the position with regard to the downstream material is, at least in part, different. As requested by QBE, that downstream material includes evidence of negotiation and/or structuring of trades between Novita and the Alleged Buyers, along with cover correspondence in relation to “the transmission of the executed [Alleged Sale Contracts]”, invoices, bills of lading and shipping documents from Novita to the Alleged Buyers. I have some doubts as to whether evidence of negotiation and/or structuring of trades between Novita and the Alleged Buyers would fall within clause 10(b) or (c); and I am also not sure what is meant by the reference to the “transmission” of the Alleged Sale Contracts.
- [86]
[86] However, in my view, it is plain that cover correspondence in relation to the transmission of the invoices, bills of lading and shipping documents from Novita to the Alleged Buyers would fall within both those clauses. Although it may perhaps be debatable whether these documents can properly be said to “relate to” or “be connected” with the Policy, there is, in my view, no doubt that they do relate to or are connected with Novita’s obligations or the particular transactions between itself and the Alleged Buyers. After all, clauses 10(b) and 10(c) are worded disjunctively (see [47(e)] above). Moreover, it is, in my view, equally plain that these documents are reasonably necessary if not essential to enable QBE to assess the validity of the claims. Insofar as may be necessary, I also consider that that there was an obligation to provide these documents to QBE as part of the duty to co-operate specified in clause 8 of the Policy Wording.
- [88]
[88] However, whether any such steps would have borne fruit is, at best, uncertain. In any event, it is, as I say, unnecessary to consider this aspect further. Moreover, to be clear, the fact that the fault in failing properly to respond to QBE’s requests lies with Novita not the claimants is irrelevant. Equally, the fact that Marketlend has used reasonable efforts to obtain and provide the documentation or information reasonably requested albeit without success is also no answer to QBE’s case in relation to clauses 10(b) and 10(c).
- [89]
[89] For these reasons, it is my conclusion that there has been a significant failure to comply with the terms of clause 10(b), 10(c) and/or 8 of the Policy Wording and that, given that compliance with such provisions is a condition precedent to any liability of QBE under the Policy, it follows that QBE is not liable and that the claimants’ claims must be rejected.
- [90]
[90] In light of that conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining issues in this case. However, once again, in case I am wrong, I turn to consider the other issues.
Issue 3: Is there proof (on a balance of probabilities) of one or more Insured Debts under the Policy?
- [91]
[91] The claimants submit that the evidence shows the existence of an Insured Debt with regard to each of the Alleged Trades. In support of that submission, the claimants rely in particular upon: (a) copies of the Alleged Sale Contracts together with copies of the alleged invoices and packing lists (the “transaction documents”); (b) the copies of the bills of lading; (c) the LIR and IMB Reports; (d) the so-called Sealoud ledger; and (e) Ms CY’s conversations which, according to the claimants constitute acknowledgements by each of the Alleged Buyers of the relevant Insured Debt.
- [92]
[92] This is hotly disputed by QBE. In summary, QBE disputes the authenticity of the transaction documents and/or submits that they and the other documents referred to in the preceding paragraph are inadmissible as to the truth of their contents and/or submits that, even if strictly admissible, the claimants fail to satisfy the burden of proof which lies on them to show, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of any of the alleged Insured Debts. Further, QBE submits that, in the light of all the evidence, the Court should positively find that the Alleged Trades are not genuine physical trades but are “fictitious”. For one or more of these reasons, QBE submits that the claims should all be rejected.
“Genuine Physical Trades”
- [93]
[93] As to these submissions, I start by considering QBE’s fundamental submission that, as a matter of construction, the Policy only covers what QBE’s counsel described as “genuine physical trades”. There was much debate during the trial as to what this phrase really meant. As repeatedly pointed out by the claimants, that phrase is not a defined term in the Policy Wording nor does that phrase appear anywhere in the body of the Policy; nor is it a term of art. However, QBE submitted that it was simply a convenient phrase to describe what Mr Evans said in evidence and what QBE submitted was the “premise” of the cover provided by the Policy.
- [94]
[94] In broad terms and simply as a matter of language, I would ordinarily understand that phrase to mean no more than that the underlying trade was not fictitious or simply a “paper” trade but one which was in respect of and related to an actual physical shipment of goods. To that extent, I have no difficulty myself using the phrase “genuine physical trade” in that sense.
- [95]
[95] Unfortunately, the debate which has arisen in this case with regard to this phrase is due in large part to the definition adopted by QBE in para 3.2 of its Defence where it is pleaded “for the avoidance of doubt...” the phrase “genuine physical trade” means “a trade where transmission of title to and possession of the underlying Goods can be demonstrated”. That definition found its way into a number of the witness statements and experts reports as well as QBE’s opening written submissions (where it was stated, for example, at para 55: “[a]n “Insured Debt” under the Policy therefore requires an insured to be able to demonstrate a transmission of title to and possession of the underlying goods”). To my mind, that definition has given rise to much unnecessary debate and confusion in the course of the trial.
- [96]
[96] The main focus of that debate was the reference to the need to demonstrate transmission of “possession” of the underlying goods. In particular, it is obvious to anyone who knows anything about international trade, that whenever there is, for example, a chain of sale contracts, although the intermediate seller/buyer may obtain what is often referred to as “constructive” possession of the goods by the receipt of original bills of lading, it will not normally obtain actual physical possession of the goods. Further, as recognised by QBE itself in its written opening submissions and confirmed by QBE’s own experts, parties may agree what was referred to as a “substitute document work-around” ie, a document by-pass or circle trade; and, of course, even the end receiver may obtain actual possession of the goods from the carrier without the original bills of lading against a letter of indemnity acceptable to the carrier.
- [97]
[97] In my view, this whole debate was somewhat arid and ultimately a side-show to the real issues in this case which must be considered by reference to the terms of the Policy Wording which I have already quoted above in relevant part. In short and at the risk of repetition:
(a) It is common ground that that the Policy obliged QBE to indemnify the Insured up to the Insured Percentage “...of the Insured Loss in the event of an Insured Buyer failing by reason of a Claimable Event to pay the Insured an Insured Debt...” [emphasis added]
(b) “Insured Loss” is in turn defined at p7 of the Policy Wording as follows:
(c) “Insured Buyer” means “any person or entity carrying on business with the Insured… and who is included in this Policy by a Credit Limit Endorsement…”
(d) “Insured Debt” is defined at p 6 of the Policy Wording as follows:
(e) “Shipped” is defined at p 7 of the Policy Wording in the following terms:
- [98]
[98] Accordingly, QBE submitted, and I readily accept, that on a plain reading, an “Insured Debt” under the Policy requires an actual physical sale and shipment of goods by Novita to its insured buyers. I also readily accept that a sale entails the transfer of title to goods from a seller to a buyer. Equally, it seems plain to me that such sale must be “genuine”, not “fictitious”. To that extent, the phrase “genuine physical sale” is, in my view, one which is useful to describe in broad terms the type of transaction covered by the Policy. It follows in my view that as a matter of construction of the Policy, the essential issue is whether there was one or more relevant genuine physical trade(s) in the sense stated above.
- [99]
[99] So far as may be relevant, I readily accept QBE’s submission that that construction is supported by the following:
(a) The evidence of both Mr Ki and Mr Evans that Novita held itself out as being in the business of conducting genuine physical trades, and not merely financing arrangements; that that was the business it was looking to cover its exposure for; and that there was never any indication that Novita would be engaged in any other form of activity. Mr Ki and Mr Evans both explained (and I accept) that, had they been informed that Novita would not be engaging in physical trading, they would not have underwritten TCI cover; and that there is a different insurance product, non-payment insurance which can be used to cover the risk of non-payments regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.
(b) Relevant parts of the PowerPoint Presentation and the Proposal Form which I have already summarised above (at [29]) which indicated that Novita was seeking cover for losses incurred in its physical trading of commodities.
(c) The only underwriting expert in the proceedings, Mr Brittenham confirmed that in his experience “TCI coverage is only available for receivables arising from an underlying commercial sale of physical goods between independent companies”; and “[p]urely financing transactions have a different risk profile from trade transactions covered by TCI as, amongst other things, there are no physical goods that can be liquidated for cash in such transactions”.
(d) Mr Bloemendal confirmed that the pattern of trading required by the term “Shipped” in the Policy indicates that physical rather than paper trading was required.
- [100]
[100] In my view, none of the above is surprising in any way at all; and, at the end of the day, I did not understand the claimants’ counsel to disagree with the analysis which I have outlined above.
- [101]
[101] So, against that explanation, it is then necessary to consider whether the claimants have, on the evidence, established on a balance of probabilities the existence of one or more relevant genuine physical trades and that any one or more of the eight Alleged Trades are, in truth, genuine sales of physical goods by Novita to each of the Insured Buyers.
- [102]
[102] I have already summarised the evidence relied upon by the claimants in support of its case (at [91] above). As to that evidence, there is no dispute with regard to the evidential status of the bills of lading or the LIR and IMB Reports. On that basis, I accept what is stated in those documents. In summary, they show, and I accept, that physical goods as described in the bills of lading were duly shipped on board the various vessels and transported to the various destination ports. However, that evidence does not even begin to show that Novita was itself involved in shipping those goods at the port of loading or otherwise involved as an intermediate buyer/seller in the purchase in or onward sale of the goods to the respective Alleged Buyers.
- [103]
[103] On behalf of the claimants, it was submitted that the mere fact that Novita came to have possession of these documents including copies of the bills of lading and was able to hand them over to Marketlend strongly supports their case that the Alleged Trades must be genuine. In support of that submission, the claimants relied upon the evidence of their expert, Mr Mahajan that “[c]opies of original BLs are not easily obtained by an uninvolved party without the acquiescence or involvement of a holder of that Original BL” [emphasis added]. Thus, the claimants asked rhetorically: if the Alleged Trades were not genuine, how else did Novita come to have possession of these documents? In the ordinary course, I see some force in that submission. However, there is no evidence here as to how Novita did come to have possession of these documents. It is one of the many missing parts of the jigsaw.
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