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Grounds publishedDecided 25 Jul 2025

Singapore International Commercial Court

Hulley Enterprises Ltd and others v The Russian Federation

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[2025] SGHC(I) 19Case no. Originating Application No 5 of 2025 (High Court (General Division) Summons No 286 of 2025)

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  1. Introduction

  2. [3] The underlying arbitration proceedings were commenced in 2004, the Claimants relying upon the provisional application of the arbitration mechanism in Art 26 of the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty (17 December 1994), 2080 UNTS 95 (entered into force 16 April 1998) (the “ECT” or the “Treaty”). The Claimants were, directly or indirectly, the majority shareholders in OAO Yukos Oil Company (“Yukos Oil”) from 1999 until its liquidation in 2007. Yukos Oil was a major oil producer in Russia. The Claimants sought compensation from the Russian Federation for breaches of Art 13 of the ECT, alleging that the Federation had expropriated and failed to protect their investments in Yukos Oil . In three interim awards given on 30 November 2009 (the “Interim Awards”), the Tribunal rejected a number of the Federation’s preliminary defences to those claims, including defences relating to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. In its Final Awards, the Tribunal rejected the Russian Federation’s remaining jurisdictional and substantive defences and found that the Russian Federation had, as neatly summarised by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in its decision of 5 November 2021 (at para 3.1):

  3. [4] Following the issue of the Final Awards, the Russian Federation sought to set aside the Interim and Final Awards in proceedings commenced on 10 November 2014 in the District Court of The Hague. Accepting the Russian Federation’s argument that the arbitration procedures in Art 26 did not apply provisionally under the terms of Art 45 of the ECT because those procedures were inconsistent with Russian law, the District Court set aside the Interim and Final Awards.

  4. [5] The Claimants appealed to The Hague Court of Appeal. By its final judgment delivered on 18 February 2020, that court quashed the judgment of The Hague District Court and dismissed the underlying application of the Russian Federation to set aside the awards.

  5. [6] The Russian Federation filed an appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands; such an appeal is concerned with whether there have been any errors of law by the lower court and whether the decision of the lower court was sufficiently reasoned. By its judgment delivered on 5 November 2021, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands rejected grounds for cassation 2 to 5, which dealt with the four arguments relied on by the Russian Federation in the Dutch Courts below, and in the present application.

  6. [7] The Claimants rely on the decisions of The Hague Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of the Netherlands as having finally and conclusively dismissed each of the four arguments of the Russian Federation, and as giving rise under Singapore law to issue estoppels, which preclude the same legal and factual issues from being raised and argued by the Russian Federation before this court in answer to the Claimants’ case that the Russian Federation had agreed in writing to submit the dispute which has arisen to arbitration.

  7. The Russian Federation’s application

  8. [8] The Claimants’ proceeding in HC/OA 465/2024 (“OA 465”), seeking the grant of leave to enforce the Final Awards, was commenced in the General Division on 14 May 2024.

  9. [9] On 4 February 2025, the Russian Federation filed HC/SUM 286/2025 (“SUM 286”) seeking the following substantive relief:

  10. (a) A declaration that Russia is immune from the jurisdiction of the Singapore Courts pursuant to s 3(1) of the SIA;

  11. [10] On 10 March 2025, OA 465 was transferred from the General Division to the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) and assigned case number SIC/OA 5/2025 (“OA 5”). On 20 March 2025, this court fixed the Russian Federation’s SUM 286 for hearing on 25 April 2025, with 26–27 May 2025 to be held in reserve.

  12. [11] On 23 April 2025, this court directed in relation to SUM 286 that it would first hear oral argument on the issues described in para (a) below, the parties having “broadly agreed” that the issues arising for determination in SUM 286 are as set out in paras (a) to (c) below:

  13. (a) The “Preliminary Issues”: Whether Russia is precluded by operation of transnational issue estoppel and/or the Primacy Principle as defined in The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56 (“Deutsche Telekom (CA)”) from litigating matters concerning the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which Russia had unsuccessfully raised before The Hague Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of the Netherlands (the “Dutch Appellate Courts”).

  14. (b) The “Immunity Issues”: Whether Russia is immune from the Singapore court’s jurisdiction by reason that it had not “agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration” under s 11 of the SIA, on the following grounds:

  15. (i) Russia only provisionally applied the ECT; which provisional application never extended to the dispute resolution mechanism pursuant to which the arbitrations were ostensibly commenced;

  16. (ii) Russia never agreed to arbitrate any disputes with the Claimants, who are neither protected “Investors” nor made protected “Investments” within the meaning of the ECT; and/or

  17. (iii) The arbitrations dealt with “Taxation Measures”, which are carved out from protection under the ECT, and if it were to be found that the arbitrations dealt with “Taxes”, the Tribunal in any event side-stepped the preconditional referral mechanism under the ECT.

  18. (c) The “Postliminary Issue”: In the event that Russia does not succeed in the Preliminary Issues or the Immunity Issues, whether it is entitled to directions for the filing of challenges against the enforcement of the Final Awards on the merits.

  19. [12] At the conclusion of oral argument on the Preliminary Issues on 25 April 2025, this court reserved its decision on the Preliminary Issues, and vacated the hearing dates reserved in late May.

  20. Our Decision on the Preliminary Issues

  21. [13] In relation to the Preliminary Issues, we are satisfied that the Russian Federation is precluded from arguing otherwise than that it agreed in writing to submit its dispute with each of the Claimants to arbitration and that the proceedings brought by the Claimants to enforce the Final Awards against the Russian Federation relate to arbitrations which are the subject of that agreement. That is because the legal and factual issues which are determinative of that question are the subject of final and conclusive decisions on the merits by the Dutch Appellate Courts, and accordingly give rise to issue estoppels under Singapore law which preclude the Russian Federation from contending otherwise before this court. In so holding, we have applied the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Deutsche Telekom (CA), and on the basis that its ratio decidendi includes that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel applies in the circumstances (relevantly described in [4], [96] and [102] of the majority judgment in Deutsche Telekom (CA)), and notwithstanding that the question of the Russian Federation’s state immunity is determined by the application of that doctrine. Our reasons for so concluding follow.

  22. Background

  23. The State Immunity Act 1979

  24. [14] It is convenient to start with a consideration of the SIA. The Russian Federation seeks a declaration that it is immune from the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts pursuant to s 3(1) of the SIA. That section provides:

  25. [15] The “immunity conferred by this section” (s 3(2) of the SIA) is a general immunity subject to the exceptions in ss 4–13 of the SIA. The following exception in s 11 of the SIA is headed “Arbitrations”:

  26. [16] The SIA was modelled on the State Immunity Act 1978 (c 33) (UK) (the “State Immunity Act 1978 (UK)” or “the UK Act”) and is in substantially the same terms. Section 3 in Part 2 of the SIA corresponds with s 1 in Part 1 of the UK Act. The UK Act in turn was largely modelled on the European Convention on State Immunity (16 May 1972), Eur TS No 74 (entered into force 11 June 1976).

  27. [17] The position in the UK before 1978 is summarised by Lord Sumption JSC in a judgment agreed in by the other members of the UK Supreme Court in Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others intervening) [2019] AC 777 (“Benkharbouche”) at [8]–[10]:

  28. [18] In Playa Larga (Owners Of Cargo lately laden on board) v I Congreso Del Partido (Owners) [1983] 1 AC 244 (“I Congreso Del Partido”), Lord Wilberforce (at 261–262) described the English common law applying before the commencement of the UK Act as including the “restrictive” doctrine under which “a state has no absolute immunity as regards commercial or trading transactions”, with the question “where immunity begins and ends” remaining to be determined. With respect to the limitation which had been engrafted upon the principle of immunity of States, he continued (at 262):

  29. [19] In Alcom Ltd v Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580 (“Alcom Ltd”), Lord Diplock (at 597–598) observed that the provisions of the UK Act:

  30. [20] Section 3(1) of the SIA restates in statutory form the general principle of absolute immunity, but makes that principle subject to wide-ranging exceptions in the subsequent sections of Part 2 of the SIA. Whereas, under the common law, an act was classified as being of a private law nature principally by reference to its juridical character, under the SIA, the exceptions describe with various degrees of specificity the acts which are to be treated as of a private law nature. There is no issue as to the construction of the exception in s 11(1) of the SIA. The only issue between the parties is whether there was such an agreement by the Russian Federation with respect to the Claimants’ disputed claim. That is a mixed question of fact and law. If the exception is satisfied, the immunity does not apply to proceedings which “relate” to any arbitration which is the outcome of such an agreement.

  31. [21] In describing the exemption from immunity as being with respect to proceedings in the Singapore courts “which relate to the arbitration”, s 11(1) of the SIA is not to be understood as excluding proceedings relating to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, and no argument to that effect was made – see Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Government of the Republic of Lithuania (No 2) [2007] QB 886 at [117], [121], [123]; and General Dynamics United Kingdom v State of Libya [2022] AC 318 at [183] (Lords Stephens and Briggs JJSC). Thus, the exception in s 11(1) may be engaged in relation to an arbitration where Singapore is the arbitral seat, or in relation to a foreign seated arbitration where the award is sought to be enforced in Singapore, as in Deutsche Telekom (CA) and the present case.

  32. [22] In Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2011] AC 763 (“Dallah Real Estate”), Lord Collins uncontroversially observed at [98]:

  33. [24] Section 3(2) of the SIA requires the court to give effect to the immunity which it confers. That provision re-enacts the common law duty of a court to determine immunity, if necessary, of its own motion, because if immunity exists, or is conferred, in the absence of an applicable exception, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter in relation to which it is asked to exercise its adjudicative authority or jurisdiction (see Mighell v Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149 at 162–163 (Kay LJ); and Hazel Fox CMG QC and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2013) at pp 174, 229–230).

  34. [25] In Fang and others v Attorney General 26 ITELR 273, Lords Hamlin and Stephens and Lady Rose JJSC said (at [170]):

  35. [26] In Zu Sayn-Wittgenstein-Sayn v HM Juan Carlos de Borbón y Borbón [2023] 1 WLR 1162, Simler LJ (with whom King and Popplewell LJJ agreed) observed with respect to the equivalent UK provisions (at [21]–[22]):

  36. [27] Referring to the passage in J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1989] Ch 72 cited above, the English Court of Appeal (Males, Popplewell and Phillips LJJ) in London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Kingdom of Spain [2022] 1 WLR 3434 emphasised (at [54]):

  37. [29] Notwithstanding the form of the declaration sought by the Russian Federation, it is not controversial that the burden is upon the Claimants to persuade this court that on the balance of probabilities, the exception in s 11(1) is satisfied. That exception describes a private law arrangement to refer to arbitration a dispute arising between two or more parties, one of which is a State. Such an agreement is the source of an arbitral tribunal’s authority to decide a dispute within its scope. If the exception is held to be satisfied, the State has no immunity from the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts in proceedings which “relate” to the arbitration. The issue that arises when an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is challenged before an enforcement court falls to be resolved in adversarial proceedings to which the State and the entity seeking to uphold and enforce the agreement or foreign arbitral award are parties. From that non-state entity’s perspective, the purpose of the exception in s 11(1) is to enable it to enforce a foreign arbitration agreement and any award against the State party in Singapore.

  38. [30] To assist an understanding of the respective arguments made by the parties, it is useful first to describe briefly the relevant provisions of the ECT, and then to summarise the arguments made by the Russian Federation before the Tribunal and the Dutch Courts and the outcomes of each of them. These reasons then refer to earlier proceedings before the English Courts in relation to the enforcement of the Final Awards. Having done so, they consider and deal with the arguments made to this court with respect to the determination of the Preliminary Issues. At that point specific attention is directed to the decision in Deutsche Telekom (CA) and the extent to which that decision binds this court with respect to the application of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel in the circumstances of this case.

  39. The Energy Charter Treaty

  40. [31] The ECT was opened for signature in December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998. Russia was a signatory, having signed the treaty on 17 December 1994. However, it never ratified the ECT and on 20 August 2009 notified the designated ECT Depositary of its intention not to do so. It followed that Art 45(1) of the ECT applied to the Russian Federation as a “signatory” and required that it:

  41. [32] Article 26 is an investor-state dispute settlement provision which allows an investor from one contracting State party to the ECT to bring a claim against another contracting State party in which the investor has made an investment. Such dispute settlement provisions were introduced to reduce the political risks related to rapidly increasing foreign investment by making commitments of host States in investment treaties more easily enforceable. As to the development of multilateral treaties such as the ECT, see Rudolf Dolzer, Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2022) at pp 18–19.

  42. [33] Article 26 of the ECT provides:

  43. [34] There follow provisions which permit an investor to submit an unresolved dispute to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) or a sole arbitrator or to an ad hoc arbitration established under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. A State party’s consent given in accordance with Art 26(3)(a) of the Treaty, together with the written consent of the relevant investor to one of those particular forms of arbitration, are agreed to satisfy the requirement for an “agreement in writing” between the relevant investor and State for the purposes of Art II of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (10 June 1958), 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) (the “New York Convention”).

  44. [35] The provisions of Part III of the ECT include Arts 10 and 13. Article 10(1) provides that Investments of Investors of other contracting States are to enjoy “the most constant protection and security”. Article 13 provides that Investments of Investors “shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation”, except in particular circumstances. Before the Tribunal, each Claimant alleged conduct, including by the seizure of its shares in Yukos Oil, the making of additional tax assessments over the years 2000–2004, the sale of Yuganskneftegaz (a subsidiary of Yukos Oil) at a sham auction, and the initiation of Yukos Oil’s bankruptcy, which together constituted an expropriation of its investments in breach of Art 13 of the ECT.

  45. The Russian Federation’s proceedings before the Dutch seat courts

  46. [36] The four arguments summarised below are outlined in both the Russian Federation and the Claimants’ written submissions before this court. Each argument is relied upon by the Russian Federation in support of its case that the exception under s 11 of the SIA is not engaged. That exception from immunity is not satisfied unless there is an agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration and the dispute which is said to have arisen is within the scope of that agreement. As to the four arguments made by the Russian Federation, each was said to have the consequence that there was no valid arbitration agreement – the first on the basis that the arbitration clause (Art 26 of the ECT) was not engaged, the second and third on the basis that the dispute pressed by the Claimants was not within the scope of the asserted Art 26 agreement to refer to arbitration, and the fourth on the basis that a condition to the Tribunal’s continuing jurisdiction or mandate to hear and determine that dispute was not complied with.

  47. Article 45 Argument

  48. [37] Before the Tribunal, the Russian Federation contended: (a) that the “limitation” to provisional application in Art 45 of the ECT had to be considered with respect to the particular provision sought to be applied; and (b) that the limitation applied to Art 26 of the ECT because Russian law does not permit disputes about the exercise of public law powers, such as in the assessment of taxation, to be arbitrated. The Claimants contended that Art 26 was to be applied provisionally unless the principle of provisional application per se was inconsistent with Russian law.

  49. [38] The Russian Federation’s argument was dismissed by the Tribunal, accepted by The Hague District Court, and rejected by The Hague Court of Appeal. Before The Hague Court of Appeal, the Claimants put an alternative argument that Art 45 obliged a State signatory to apply the treaty provisionally, except insofar as the provisional application of one or more of its articles was inconsistent with Russian law, in the sense that it precluded that provisional application. The Hague Court of Appeal accepted this interpretation and held that the provisional application of Art 26 was not inconsistent with any Russian law; and that The Hague District Court was wrong to decide otherwise. In addition, and assuming the correctness of the interpretation contended for by the Russian Federation, The Hague Court of Appeal also held that Art 26 was not inconsistent with Russian law.

  50. [39] The Supreme Court of the Netherlands agreed with The Hague Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Art 45. It also rejected aspects of the Russian Federation’s interpretation of Art 45.

  51. Investor/Investment Argument

  52. [40] The Russian Federation argued that the Claimants were not genuine foreign “Investors” and had not made genuine foreign “Investments” within the meaning of Arts 1(6) and 1(7) of the ECT, because they were companies owned and controlled by Russian nationals and did not contribute foreign capital into the territory of Russia.

  53. [41] The Tribunal rejected this argument, finding that the Claimants qualified as Investors and that they owned an Investment protected by the ECT. This argument was not considered by The Hague District Court. The Hague Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Tribunal that these provisions did not “preclude its jurisdiction”. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that The Hague Court of Appeal was correct in its interpretation of the definitions of Investor and Investment.

  54. Article 21 Purported Jurisdiction Argument

  55. [42] The Russian Federation argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction with respect to disputes about claims as to taxation measures, pursuant to Art 21(1) of the ECT, and that such claims were not brought back within the scope of the ECT by Art 21(5) of the ECT. The Tribunal held that Art 21(1) did not apply to exclude the dispute as that article only applied to bona fide taxation measures and not to the Russian Federation’s tax assessments, which, it held, were designed mainly to impose massive liabilities.

  56. [43] This argument was not considered by The Hague District Court. The Hague Court of Appeal affirmed the Tribunal’s findings as to the taxation matters not being bona fide; and held that Art 21 of the ECT did not affect the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. These findings were not challenged by the Russian Federation in its cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.

  57. Article 21 Mandate Argument

  58. [44] This argument was first made in The Hague Court of Appeal. The Russian Federation argued that even if the claims concerning tax and tax measures were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, Art 21(5) of the ECT obliged the Tribunal to refer “the issue of whether the tax is an appropriation” to the relevant “Competent Tax Authority”, and compliance with that obligation was said to be a precondition to the Tribunal’s continuing authority to deal with the claim that Art 13 of the ECT had been breached.

  59. [45] The Hague Court of Appeal held that the failure of the Tribunal to refer this issue to the Russian tax authorities was not “sufficiently serious to justify setting aside the arbitral award” for reason that it “has not become plausible that the Russian Federation has suffered any disadvantage as a result of this failure”. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the failure to refer the dispute to the tax authorities was not sufficiently serious to justify annulment of the Final Awards did not “demonstrate an incorrect interpretation of the law, is not incomprehensible and is not based on insufficient grounds”.

  60. The final dismissal of the Russian Federation’s four arguments as to jurisdiction

  61. [46] The Hague Court of Appeal concluded:

  62. [47] The Supreme Court of the Netherlands held:

  63. Proceedings before the English Courts

  64. [50] On 30 January 2015, the Claimants commenced proceedings under ss 66 and 101(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), for leave to enforce the three Final Awards. At that time, The Hague District Court had not delivered its judgment quashing the Interim and Final Awards. In September 2015, the Russian Federation filed an application contesting the jurisdiction of the English Courts on the basis that it was immune from jurisdiction in respect of any proceedings which related to the three arbitrations because it had not “agreed in writing to submit” the relevant disputes to arbitration (State Immunity Act 1978 (UK), ss 1 and 9).

  65. [51] On 8 June 2016, the Claimants’ enforcement proceedings were stayed by consent. Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on 5 November 2021, that stay was lifted to allow the determination of the following questions formulated as arising under Russian Federation’s “jurisdiction application”:

  66. (a) Issue 1: Whether and to what extent the Russian Federation is, by reason of certain judgments of the Dutch Courts, precluded from re-arguing the question of whether it has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration the disputes that are subject of the Awards.

  67. (b) Issue 2: Whether, if the answer to Issue 1 is that the Russian Federation is so precluded from re-arguing the relevant question, the jurisdiction application ought to be dismissed forthwith.

  68. [52] These issues were determined by Mrs Justice Cockerill on 1 November 2023 (Hulley Enterprises Ltd and others v the Russian Federation [2024] KB 208 (“Hulley (EWHC)”). In answer to Issue 1, she concluded that by reason of the judgments of the Dutch Courts, the Russian Federation was precluded from re-arguing the question of whether it had agreed in writing to submit to arbitration the disputes that are the subject of the relevant awards (Hulley (EWHC) at [120]). This answer meant that the Russian Federation did not have immunity because the court was satisfied that the exception from immunity in s 9 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) was made out in the Claimants’ favour and applied to the enforcement proceedings. Accordingly, the question posed in Issue 2 was to be answered “Yes”: Hulley (EWHC) at [121]–[123].

  69. The Russian Federation’s Argument

  70. [55] The Russian Federation contends that the question for this court is whether the doctrine of “transnational issue estoppel [should] apply to the question of whether Russia is immune from the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts”. The “Arbitration” exception to immunity in s 11(1) of the SIA is engaged if the court is satisfied that the State “has agreed in writing to submit” a relevant dispute to arbitration, which is potentially a mixed question of fact and law. The resolution of this issue does not involve a challenge to or enquiry into any act of sovereignty or governmental act of that State. Rather, it focuses solely upon whether there was such a commercial or private law arrangement.

  71. [56] First, it is said that neither of the two Commonwealth decisions in which transnational issue estoppel has been applied to issues of state immunity is binding on this court. Those decisions are Deutsche Telekom (CA) and Hulley (EWCA). With respect to Deutsche Telekom (CA), it is said that as the Singapore Court of Appeal did not “expressly” consider whether transnational issue estoppel should apply to the determination of issues of state immunity, that decision does not in that respect, bind this court. As to the decision in Hulley (EWCA), it does not bind this court. Furthermore, it was (at the time of oral argument) under appeal, and the Russian Federation contends that the English Court of Appeal did not consider, or did not properly appreciate, the arguments made on its behalf.

  72. [57] Secondly, it is submitted that where immunity is claimed by a State, the court determining that claim must consider it de novo. Where immunity is claimed in respect of proceedings brought in Singapore to enforce a foreign arbitral award, it is contended this requires that the court undertake a “fresh examination of the matter” “as if the original [hearing] had not taken place” and proceed on the basis that the arbitral tribunal’s own view of its jurisdiction “has no legal or evidential value before a court that has to determine that question”. These statements are principally from decisions addressing the nature of the “appeal” conducted in an application under s 10 of the IAA, following a ruling on jurisdiction by an arbitral tribunal and in circumstances where the seat of the arbitration is Singapore. It is also submitted that a de novo assessment cannot include a determination of a question of immunity from jurisdiction by giving effect to a transnational issue estoppel.

  73. [58] Thirdly, it is said that giving effect to a transnational issue estoppel “impermissibly enlarges the statutorily limited jurisdiction of the Singapore courts”. In support of this proposition, it is said that an “estoppel cannot be invoked to enlarge or confer upon the Court jurisdiction”, and that if the Claimants’ reliance on a transnational issue estoppel is upheld “the Singapore Court’s jurisdiction in these proceedings will rest solely on an estoppel against Russia”.

  74. [59] Fourthly, it is submitted that Singapore and the Singapore courts are “obligated under international law to give effect to state immunity” and that this obligation “trumps the public policy imperative behind transnational issue estoppel”; an unstated premise being that the obligation to “give effect” requires more than the making of findings based upon an issue estoppel arising under Singapore law. It is said that applying the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel to resolve the legal/factual question which arises under s 11(1) of the SIA is to leave that determination “simply to how a foreign court (even if it is the seat court) had decided the question”, in circumstances where Singapore “has to independently determine the question of state immunity”. It is also said that the “policy imperatives” behind the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel cannot “absolve the Singapore courts of ensuring that its domestic legislation is interpreted/applied in a manner which is consistent with its international law obligations”. In this context, reference is made to other types of proceeding where estoppel per rem judicatam has a limited or no application. They include childcare and custody proceedings, money lending and usury proceedings and in the context of public law and judicial review.

  75. [60] Each of these arguments is made in support of the proposition that “transnational issue estoppel cannot and should not apply to the question of state immunity”. The last three proceed on the basis that the ratio of Deutsche Telekom (CA) does not include that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can apply notwithstanding that a question of state immunity arising under the SIA is or may be determined by its application. As such, those three arguments do not arise for determination if this court is bound by that decision in that respect.

  76. The Claimants’ Argument

  77. [61] The Claimants refer to and rely on the decisions in Deutsche Telekom (CA), as well as Hulley (EWCA). First, it is submitted that the ratio decidendi of Deutsche Telekom (CA) includes that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can apply to determine a question of state immunity which turns on whether the exception to immunity in s 11(1) of the SIA is engaged. It is submitted that if the requirements for the application of that doctrine, as summarised in Deutsche Telekom (CA), are satisfied and if it is demonstrated that none of the exceptions to the application of that doctrine as recognised in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp (formerly known as Merck & Co, Inc) v Merck KGaA (formerly known as E Merck) [2021] 1 SLR 1102 (“Merck Sharp”) arise or apply, this court must give effect to the transnational issue estoppels which arise with the result that the Russian Federation’s claim to immunity from jurisdiction in respect of proceedings which relate to the arbitrations and Final Awards must be dismissed.

  78. [62] Secondly, the following responsive submissions are made to the three further arguments of the Russian Federation: (a) that this court must decide the immunity question for itself does not preclude the application of a transnational issue estoppel; (b) that the application of such an estoppel does not “enlarge the statutory jurisdiction” of the Singapore courts; and (c) that there are no policy considerations which arise against the application of that doctrine and no other qualifications or “special circumstances” which would render that doctrine inapplicable in the present case.

  79. The decision in Deutsche Telekom (CA)

  80. [63] The principal and first question for this court in addressing the Preliminary Issues is whether the ratio of the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Telekom (CA) includes that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can apply to the determination of issues of state immunity arising under the SIA. If that is part of the ratio, an issue remains as to whether a court in the position of this court may depart from that decision of a higher court in the same judicial hierarchy on the basis that the argument made by the Russian Federation was not made to the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Telekom (CA).

  81. The decision at first instance of the SICC

  82. [64] Deutsche Telekom commenced an arbitration against the Republic of India. Geneva was the seat of that arbitration. The tribunal dismissed India’s objections to its jurisdiction and found it liable. India made two applications to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The first sought to set aside an interim award on the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. That application was dismissed in December 2018. The second sought to “revise and annul” the interim and final awards, including on the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. That second application was dismissed in March 2023 (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [16]–[21]).

  83. [66] At no point in the argument before the SICC, did India contend that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel could not apply because the legal/factual issue to which it was ultimately directed was whether the exception from immunity in s 11(1) of the SIA was engaged.

  84. The decision on appeal

  85. [67] The judgment of the majority, with whom Mance IJ agreed (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [193]–[197]) in relation to the application of the issue estoppel doctrine, formulated the “threshold” question before that court as being whether India was precluded from making arguments that had been made before and determined by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (as the relevant seat court) (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [58]).

  86. [69] Deutsche Telekom’s primary argument was that the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court gave rise to an enforceable issue estoppel in the subsequent Singapore proceedings in respect of the factual and legal issues to be resolved by the SICC. In the alternative, it relied on the proposition that a decision of the seat court on matters that go to the validity of the award would typically enjoy primacy in the scheme of international commercial arbitration, referring to that proposition as the “Primacy Principle” (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [50]). Having concluded that the requirements for transnational issue estoppel were satisfied, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to decide upon the application of that principle (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [4], [120], [131], [176] and [179]). However, the principle was the subject of discussion in the judgment of the majority (at [103]–[130]), and in the observations of Mance IJ (at [199]–[221]).

  87. [70] In response, India accepted that an enforcement court, such as the Singapore court, would be bound by a final and conclusive decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (as seat court) on issues relating to the award’s validity, including those as to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, if the elements of transnational issue estoppel were met (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [47]). It submitted that the decisions of the Swiss Courts did not satisfy those requirements because Swiss law did not accord “res judicata effect to the relevant factual findings and legal reasons” of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (at [49]).

  88. [71] In addressing the “threshold” question, the court focused on the application of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel in the context of international commercial arbitration where the issue as to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction which had been decided by the seat courts was subsequently raised before an enforcement court. In such a case, the applicable provisions of the IAA include ss 29 and 31.

  89. [72] At [4], [96] and [102] of Deutsche Telekom (CA), the majority’s conclusion was summarised:

  90. [74] At [155]–[178] of Deutsche Telekom (CA), the court addressed whether the requirements for issue estoppel were met in that case. Those requirements were as formulated in Merck Sharp (at [39]–[40]). They are summarised and referred to as involving a “three-step framework” (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [64]):

  91. [75] The respects in which these requirements have been applied by the English Courts were considered further in Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [88]–[90]. The majority judgment noted that under English law a transnational issue estoppel which otherwise satisfies these requirements will not arise where the foreign judgment is regarded by the English Court as “perverse in the sense that the law of the foreign country that was applied in and formed the basis of the foreign judgment is at variance with generally accepted doctrines of private international law” (at [93]–[95]).

  92. [76] As to the requirement that the foreign judgment be capable of being recognised (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [64](a)), the possible grounds of jurisdiction of the seat court include the commencement of proceedings before that court, as India did (see Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [65]), and as the Russian Federation did in the present case; and the “defences to recognition” include that the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud, was contrary to the public policy of the domestic law of the recognising forum, or that it would involve the enforcement of some foreign revenue, penal or other public laws, either directly or through recognition of the foreign judgment (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [66]). As to these defences, see also Peter R Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments (Oxford University Press, 2001) at paras 2.08–2.09.

  93. [77] The majority judgment also made observations as to the approach to be taken when determining whether the three requirements (summarised in Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [64]) are satisfied in circumstances where the issue estoppel arises from the judgment of a foreign court, thereby engaging questions of international comity (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [67]).

  94. [78] The majority then observed that in this context, a balance is to be struck between competing considerations of comity and the forum court’s constitutional role as the guardian of the rule of law within its jurisdiction. It continued at [68]:

  95. [79] In Merck Sharp (at [33]), the Court of Appeal acknowledged the competing considerations of comity and reciprocal respect among courts of independent jurisdictions, which underlie the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel, as well as the constitutional role of the recognising court in overseeing the administration of justice and safeguarding the rule of law within its jurisdiction. In doing so, the court accepted that its constitutional role may pull in the opposite direction “given the possibility of error in a foreign determination and the reality that the rule of law is not always understood and applied consistently across jurisdictions”.

  96. [80] The Arnold exception (see [78] above) as formulated in The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1104 (“RBS”) permits a party to reopen the determination of that issue in subsequent proceedings where there are “special circumstances” (RBS at [190]). In Merck Sharp, the court emphasised (at [62]) that in RBS, a narrow perspective of the Arnold exception had been adopted in the context of domestic issue estoppel which included, as one of the cumulative requirements to be met before that exception could apply, that “the decision must be shown to be clearly wrong” and for the relevant error to have stemmed from the fact that some point of fact or law was not taken or argued and could not reasonably have been taken or argued before the first domestic court. In Merck Sharp at [65], the Court of Appeal did not express any concluded view as to how the Arnold exception might be applied in the context of a transnational issue estoppel.

  97. [81] At [69] of Deutsche Telekom (CA), the majority set out four “important considerations”, which it then described as “helpful signposts that guide the court’s analysis in the context of transnational issue estoppel” (at [70]):

  98. [82] The first, third and fourth of these “considerations” are an important part of the “first step” inquiry formulated in Merck Sharp, and the second consideration informs the “third” of those steps (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [70]).

  99. [83] Those observations follow reference to the earlier observations of the court in Merck Sharp at [33]–[34] and to the position under the law of the UK as summarised by the English Court of Appeal in Good Challenger Navegante SA v MetalExportImport SA [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 (“The Good Challenger”) (at [50]–[64]).

  100. [84] A difficulty which must be confronted in the context of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel is the satisfaction of the “conclusiveness” principle, which, in the context of the recognition of a foreign judgment, requires that the judgment cannot be questioned on its merits in another jurisdiction once it has been recognised under that jurisdiction’s conflict of laws rules. See Godard and another v Gray and another (1870) LR 6 QB 139; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 (“Carl Zeiss”) at 917 (Lord Reid); Merck Sharp at [63]; and The Good Challenger at [55]–[57] (Clark LJ, Rimer and Mentell LJJ agreeing).

  101. [85] Finally, in Merck Sharp, the issue as to the “outer limits” of transnational issue estoppel was “left open” because that issue did not squarely arise in that case (see Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [71]). Nevertheless, in Merck Sharp (at [54]–[58]), the court proposed some limitations which could potentially apply. They are set out in Deutsche Telekom (CA) as follows (at [177]):

  102. [86] The majority judgment in Deutsche Telekom (CA) considered whether the requirements for transnational issue estoppel as laid down in Merck Sharp had been satisfied (at [155]–[176]). It concluded they were, and that conclusion was “sufficient to dispose of the appeal” (at [176]). Nevertheless, the court considered whether any of the “potential limitations” or exceptions suggested in Merck Sharp were present. Having described the four potential limitations extracted above, the court concluded that none of them applied in that case (at [178]).

  103. Disposition

  104. Is the decision in Deutsche Telekom (CA) binding authority for the proposition that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can be applied to a question of state immunity arising under the State Immunity Act?

  105. [87] The Russian Federation contends that Deutsche Telekom (CA) is not binding authority for the proposition that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can be applied to questions of state immunity arising under ss 3(1) and 11(1) of the SIA.

  106. [88] Professor Cross in Rupert Cross & J W Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, 4th Ed, 1991) (“Cross & Harris”) describes (at p 72) the ratio decidendi of a case as “any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him”. As Kirby J said in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 at [56], such a binding rule should be derived from:

  107. [89] The Claimants contend that Deutsche Telekom (CA) decided that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can be applied by an enforcement court in the context of international commercial arbitration to preclude a party from relitigating points that were previously raised and determined before the seat courts, including where a related question of a State party’s immunity under the SIA turns on the application of that doctrine.

  108. [90] In oral argument, the Russian Federation relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Regina (Kadhim) v Brent London Borough Council Housing Benefit Review Board [2001] QB 955 (“Kadhim”) (at [33]) in support of a principle stated in fairly general terms, “that a subsequent court is not bound by a proposition of law assumed by an earlier court that was not the subject of argument before or consideration by that court”.

  109. [91] This qualification to the principle of stare decisis only arises for consideration if the proposition contended for by the Claimants is part of the ratio decidendi of Deutsche Telekom (CA).

  110. [94] The court dismissed the appeal (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [188]). Ultimately, it did so because India was precluded from relitigating the jurisdictional issues it raised and relied on before the SICC, and in its appeal from the SICC’s judgment.

  111. [95] The court gave effect to the issue estoppels arising in relation to each of India’s four arguments by accepting that as between the parties the issues of law and fact which they raised had been finally determined in accordance with the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.

  112. [96] That was not controversial. As Lord Shaw said in Hoysted and others v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 37 CLR 290 in relation to an estoppel with respect to an issue of fact, the legal quality of the fact as well as the fact itself must be taken as finally and conclusively established in favour of the party having the benefit of the estoppel (at 299):

  113. [97] In Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, Diplock LJ, having noted that “the concept of estoppel inter partes […] was developed under and is consistent only with the adversary system of legal procedure”, continued (at 196–197):

  114. [98] It followed that the exception from immunity in s 11(1) of the SIA was satisfied by reason of the facts and matters decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which as between the parties finally and conclusively established those facts and matters as contended for by Deutsche Telekom.

  115. [99] The court’s reasoning for rejecting the first of the two arguments relied on by India (see Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [38]–[39]) was that the question of state immunity and the satisfaction or otherwise of the exception in s 11(1) could and should be addressed by giving effect to the claimed issue estoppel. Accordingly, part of the ratio of the decision was that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can apply in the context of international commercial arbitration where its effect is to prevent the parties to a prior decision of a seat court from relitigating points that have been previously raised and decided, and notwithstanding that the application of that doctrine is determinative of a question of state immunity under the SIA.

  116. [100] In Deutsche Telekom (CA), it was not argued by India that any different principle or proposition might apply. The question which remains is whether any exception to the stare decisis doctrine in relation to “decisions without argument” applies. In substance, the Russian Federation contends that it does, with the result that this court would not be bound to follow that part of the ratio of that decision.

  117. [101] Professor Cross and Ms Harris, in their treatment of exceptions to the stare decisis doctrine, address “decisions without argument” and conclude (Cross & Harris at p 161):

  118. [102] The cases supporting the existence of such an exception include Eaton Baker and another v The Queen [1975] AC 774 (Lord Diplock at 788); National Enterprises Ltd v Racal Communications Ltd [1975] Ch 397 (Russell LJ at 406); and the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Markisic v Commonwealth of Australia and another (2007) 69 NSWLR 737 at [56].

  119. [103] In Kadhim, Buxton LJ, writing for the court, said of the exception (at [38]):

  120. [104] In Regina v Charles [1976] 1 WLR 248, Bridge LJ emphasised the limited circumstances in which this exception might be applied (at 258):

  121. [105] The reasons in Deutsche Telekom (CA) show that the Court of Appeal appreciated that the doctrine of issue estoppel was relied upon to determine the immunity question. They also show that in directing itself as to the applicable domestic law principles to be applied (see Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [96]–[102]), the court did not regard the existence of the immunity question as constituting an obstacle to its conclusion that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel could be applied as part of the law of Singapore (and characterised as procedural for the purposes of conflict of laws, as to which see Merck Sharp at [55]) in adversarial litigation to answer the question whether there was a valid arbitration agreement.

  122. [106] The following matters lead to that conclusion. The relief sought by India was to set aside the grant of leave. The “starting point” of its argument was an entitlement to state immunity because the exception in s 11(1) was not engaged (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [38]). Whether that was so depended on the court being satisfied as to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. The claimant relied upon the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel as finally and conclusively establishing in its favour the legal and factual issues on which that fact, and accordingly the absence of that immunity, turned.

  123. [107] The doctrine of issue estoppel was applied as part of the law of Singapore. It was not a legal attribute of the foreign judgment: Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [38], citing Merck Sharp at [41] and Carl Zeiss at 919.

  124. [108] The court in Deutsche Telekom (CA) held (at [97]) that this doctrine was available to be applied in domestic enforcement proceedings in respect of a foreign arbitral award and, more specifically, in the determination of the legal and factual issues upon which the claimed immunity from jurisdiction turned.

  125. [109] India had accepted that an enforcement court in the position of the SICC would be bound by a seat court decision if the elements of transnational issue estoppel were met (Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [47]). That acceptance extended to the resolution of the legal and factual issues with respect to the application of the exception in s 11(1) of the SIA. There was no further or separate question to be answered or discretion to be exercised. If the exception in s 11(1) was satisfied, s 3(1) of the SIA applied according to its terms.

  126. [110] Thus, the court in Deutsche Telekom (CA) saw no obstacle in the way of the application of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel in circumstances where under the provisions of the SIA, the claim to immunity turned on the existence of an arbitration agreement between a State and non-state party. That claim did not involve or turn on any “challenge to or enquiry into any act of sovereignty, or governmental act of that state” (cf I Congreso Del Partido at 262, see [18] above). Rather, the question as to the existence of such an agreement, which also arose in relation to India’s application under ss 31(2)(b) and 31(2)(d) of the IAA, was to be dealt with according to Singapore law, both substantive and procedural.

  127. [111] For these reasons, this court must follow the decision in Deutsche Telekom (CA) as holding that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel applies in the context of international commercial arbitration, and notwithstanding that the question of the Russian Federation’s state immunity under the SIA is determined by the application of that doctrine.

  128. Are the requirements for the application of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel satisfied?

  129. [112] The requirements to be satisfied for the application of the estoppel are extracted at [74] above. The relevant decisions giving rise to the estoppel as relied on in the present case are those of The Hague Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. It is not disputed that these decisions were final and conclusive and on the merits. Consistent with that being the position, Mrs Justice Cockerill’s decision that these requirements had been satisfied was not challenged by the Russian Federation in the appeal in Hulley (EWCA) (at [52]).

  130. [113] It is accepted that the Dutch Courts had jurisdiction over the Russian Federation, it having invoked the jurisdiction of those seat courts by commencing and prosecuting its proceedings to set aside the Interim and Final Awards. And it is not suggested that there are any defences to recognition of those judgments in Singapore.

  131. [114] The parties to the Dutch proceedings and those in this court are the same and, most significantly, it is accepted that the subject matter of the issue estoppels and the issues raised in determining whether the exception in s 11(1) of the SIA is engaged, are the same. It is not suggested that the issue whether the Russian Federation had “agreed in writing” to submit its dispute with the Claimants to arbitration was not addressed in those terms by the Dutch Courts. In particular, and in the light of the Russian Federation’s submission that an estoppel might enlarge the court’s jurisdiction in respect of proceedings “which relate to the arbitration”, it is not said that the Dutch Courts addressed a different question from that required to be addressed by the language of this exception. For example, those courts might have addressed the question whether a conventional estoppel between the parties had the same or substantially the same legal effect as a written agreement and was sufficient to satisfy the exception. If that had been the position, the Dutch Courts’ decisions made on that basis would not have given rise to an estoppel with respect to the determination of an issue raised by the language of s 11 of the SIA.

  132. [115] In Merck Sharp, the Singapore Court of Appeal suggested that there may be exceptions which define the “outer boundaries” of the circumstances in which the transnational issue estoppel doctrine might be applied (see [85]–[86] above). In relation to those suggested limitations, the Russian Federation emphasises that they are not fixed or immutable or closed. More significantly, it identifies two matters which it submits fall to be considered in this context, and either as suggested exceptions within the categories described in Merck Sharp or as otherwise arising because of the question of state immunity.

  133. [116] The first is whether, because state immunity involves international law obligations, the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel cannot be applied to such an issue which the court must decide for itself and on a de novo basis. It is suggested that this first matter would or at least might have fallen within category (a) as formulated in Deutsche Telekom (CA) (see [85] above), as a matter which the forum court ought to determine for itself.

  134. [117] The second is that there is a risk that the application of the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel will confer “jurisdiction on the Court which it otherwise might not have”. It is suggested that this matter may not fit within any of categories (a) to (d) as formulated in Deutsche Telekom (CA), and requires separate consideration.

  135. [118] Each of these arguments might equally have been made in Deutsche Telekom (CA) and necessarily in support of the contention that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel could have no application where the ultimate question involves an issue of state immunity. In relation to that contention, we regard ourselves as bound by the holding of the Singapore Court of Appeal that the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can be applied in circumstances such as those arising in the present case.

  136. [119] Furthermore, we consider that the Russian Federation’s arguments in relation to these two matters, and as to there being other reasons why the Singapore courts should not apply that doctrine to any question relating to state immunity, to be without substance. These various arguments are dealt with below.

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