UTS v UTT

[1] The Plaintiff (“Wife”) was born in 1948, and turns 71 this year. The Defendant (“Husband”) was born in 1939, and turns 80 this year. They (collectively “Parties”) were married in 1973 in Singapore, and have three children. The eldest daughter was born in 1975 and the second daughter was born in 1977. They and their families now live in Europe and North America, respectively. The youngest son was born in 1987 and now lives in Singapore.

[2] The Parties started leading separate lives in 2012, including sleeping in separate bedrooms. They were then married for around 39 years. In August 2017, the Wife filed for divorce on the basis of four years’ separation, and Interim Judgment was granted in April 2018 on an uncontested basis, some 44 years into the marriage. The ancillary matters were adjourned to chambers.

[3] The contested ancillary matters to be decided are the division of the matrimonial assets (which include the matrimonial home) and maintenance for the Wife.

[4] The power of the court to divide matrimonial assets, and the matters that it has to have regard to are set out in s 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“WC”). These matters include those which are relevant for the assessment of maintenance for the wife set out in s 114 of the WC.

[5] The Parties submitted that the matrimonial assets should be pooled and divided. Since this is not a case where there are multiple classes of assets to which the parties had made different contributions (the Husband was responsible for acquiring the assets as the Wife did not work), the “global assessment methodology” is the appropriate methodology to be used here. This involves the identification, assessment, division and apportionment of these assets: NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 (“NK v NL”) at [31].

[6] Generally, the default date for the identification of matrimonial assets is at the date of the Interim Judgment (ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [31]), and the assessment of their values is at the date of the ancillary matters hearing: TND v TNC and another appeal [2017] SGCA 34 at [19]–[20]. The Parties do not seek to depart from the default dates.

[7] The Parties have signed a joint summary of relevant information, which they updated on 4 January 2019. This summary sets out all their assets which are jointly or individually owned. Since this was tendered after the hearing before me, I consider it to reflect the Parties’ latest positions. While there is no dispute as to whether any asset is a matrimonial asset, the values of some of the assets are disputed. I will deal with these in turn.

[8] The matrimonial assets with agreed values are set out in the table below:

S/No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

[9] Set out in the table below are assets where the values are disputed by the Parties:

S/No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

[10] I will deal with these in turn.

[11] The Husband values the car at $35,000 while the Wife values it at $28,000. Since neither party has tendered any documentary evidence to substantiate their positions, and as their positions are not poles apart, I will adopt the average value of $31,500.

[12] The Husband values the car at $10,000 while the Wife has not taken a position on the value of this car, even though she appears to disagree with the Husband’s valuation. In the absence of any other evidence, I adopt the Husband’s value of $10,000.

[13] The parties agree that the market value of this membership is $190,000. However, the Husband submits that this is not a “true representation of the value of the membership”; the transfer fee payable to the country club ($32,100) in the event of a transfer of this membership should be deducted to arrive at an accurate value of this membership. The Wife disagrees and submits that the transfer fee should not be deducted since the Husband wishes to retain the membership.

[14] The Husband cites two cases in support of his submissions, the first of which is Wee Beng Choo v Er Sye King [2003] SGDC 57, where the district judge deducted the transfer fee from the values of the club memberships: at [26]. However, it is unclear from the judgment whether the deduction of the transfer fee was in dispute in that case. The second case is the decision of the High Court in Fong Wai Har v Seah Boon Chai and another [2016] SGHCF 4, where the judicial commissioner accepted the husband’s argument “that the transfer fee … ought to be deducted from [the country club’s valuation], given that any transfer would necessarily incur that expense”: at [11]. However, it is unclear from the judgment whether the husband was seeking to retain the country club membership.

[15] In the present case, the Husband has stated unequivocally that he is “unwilling to sell the [country club] membership as it is [his] main source of entertainment and exercise”. The Wife does not object to the Husband’s retention of his membership. Since the Husband does not wish to transfer the membership to someone else, I see no reason to deduct the transfer fee from the value of the membership.

[17] The Wife values this membership at $6,666 while the Husband values this membership at $4,333. The difference between the values of this asset given by the Parties is again the transfer fees. For the same reasons given in ascertaining the value of the Singapore country club membership, I hold that the value of this asset is $6,666.

[18] This is an insurance policy taken out in the Wife’s name. The Wife values it at $33,000 while the Husband values it at $34,764.99. The Wife’s valuation is based solely on the participating assured sum, and the Husband’s valuation consists of that as well as the total guaranteed bonus as at 31 December 2016 and the 2017 guaranteed bonus.

[19] In my judgment, the bonuses should not be included in the value of the policy. When valuing insurance policies, the courts generally take the surrender value of the policies as the date of the ancillary matters hearing, or any other date agreed by the parties. In other words, the courts do not take into account any increase in the value of policies after the divorce proceedings. Returning to the facts of this case, the bonuses which the Husband has included are payable on claims or maturity only. These are events which may or may not happen in the future; in other words, the bonuses do not represent the present value of the policy. Accordingly, I adopt the Wife’s value of $33,000.

[20] This is another insurance policy taken out in the Wife’s name. The Wife adopts the net cash surrender value of $26,156.37. The Husband adopts the indicative current value of $32,709.34. It appears from a statement that the indicative current value is payable only upon the Wife’s death. For the reasons set out in the previous paragraph, I adopt the Wife’s value of $26,156.37.

[21] The Husband adopts the value of $73,226.47 while the Wife adopts the value of $70,084.12. The difference is attributable to the Wife’s exclusion of certain accounts which she claims she does not operate, and which she submits should be listed under the Husband’s assets. Besides the relatively small difference between the two values, as will become apparent below, it is not necessary to determine each party’s precise direct financial contributions. Thus, it is also unnecessary to determine whether the difference in value should be under the Husband’s or the Wife’s name. I will adopt the Husband’s value of $73,226.47.

[22] In summary, for the assets with disputed values, I set out in the table below the values which the Wife and Husband submitted, and the values which I have found:

[23] The total value of the pool of matrimonial assets is $7,218,468.60, as set out below:

[8] above.

[22] above.

-

[24] In ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”) the Court of Appeal laid out a structured approach for the division of matrimonial assets. That structured approach was succinctly summarised in TIT v TIU [2016] 3 SLR 1137 at [21] as follows:

[25] However, in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”), the Court of Appeal cautioned that the structured approach in ANJ V ANK should not be applied to single-income marriages: at [46]. This is because the working spouse would be “accorded 100% (or close to 100%) of direct contributions” and would “also be accorded a substantial percentage under Step 2 solely on the basis of his or her indirect financial contributions … even if he or she made little or no non-financial contributions”. The non-working spouse is therefore “doubly and (severely) disadvantaged”: at [44]. Thus, in single income marriages, the court should tend towards equal division. In UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921, it was clarified that a single-income marriage includes a marriage where one party was primarily the breadwinner and the other primarily the homemaker.

[27] In my judgment, the present case involves a quintessential long single income marriage. The Parties were married for 39 years before they started leading separate lives: [2] above. The Wife was a homemaker throughout the entire marriage. The Husband’s career took him to many countries: between 1973 and 1980, he was posted to Indonesia, Africa and the United States of America. The Wife followed him overseas, where the children spent their initial years. I recognise that it was not easy for the Wife to care for young children, especially when the family was living in Khartoum, Sudan from 1975 to 1978, when the daughters were still babies. There, the family experienced times of food and petrol shortages. As the Husband accepted, it was a difficult posting which he contemplated abandoning when he first arrived. I also note that that was before a time where one could easily communicate across borders with smart devices and social media. Thus, the Wife’s efforts in caring for the family, particularly in the early years of the marriage, were substantial. This was all the more the case as she did not always have domestic help. On the other hand, I accept that the Husband played his part at home whenever he could. However, the reality was that a substantial proportion of time was spent on his career. Nevertheless, it was through his efforts that the Parties were able to amass more than $7 million worth of assets.

[28] Although each party attempted to accentuate their contributions while downplaying that of the other party, this marriage is in my judgment “an equal partnership of different efforts”. Applying the approach in TNL v TNK, I am of the view that the pool of assets should be divided equally. Each party is therefore entitled to $3,609,234.30 worth of assets.

[29] The Wife appears to suggest on affidavit that the Husband’s belated disclosure of certain assets shows that he had failed to make full and frank disclosure of his assets. She also suggests that the Husband may be earning undeclared income. However, she did not request this court to draw an adverse inference against the Husband in her written submissions or at the hearing before me.

[30] In any event, I would have declined to do so. Mere suspicion is not enough to ground an adverse inference: BOR v BOS and another appeal [2018] SGCA 78 at [75]. Belated disclosures alone are also insufficient, because “parties to a functioning marriage do not keep records of their transactions with a view to building a case should a divorce occur”: TXW v TXX [2017] 4 SLR 799 at [46].

[31] The Parties should work out the consequential orders. If they are able to agree on the consequential orders, they may send a draft to the court for approval, indicating their consent, before extracting the orders. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Parties wish to sell the matrimonial home, any refund to Parties’ respective CPF accounts required under the relevant CPF provisions shall be made by each Party from his or her own share of the net proceeds of sale. The Parties are to have liberty to apply within three months of the date of this judgment in the event that they require further directions on the sale of the matrimonial home.

[33] Nevertheless, s 114(2) must be applied in a “commonsense holistic manner that takes into account the new realities that flow from the breakdown of a marriage”: at [16].

[34] In the present case, the Husband turns 80 this year and has been retired for around 20 years. Although he remains a consultant for what appears to be a building company, a document printed with the company’s letterhead and signed by a manager from the company confirms that the Husband receives no salary and only CPF contribution of around $150 a month. The Wife does not challenge the authenticity of this document. And while the Husband also receives dividends of about a few thousand dollars a year from the shares which he owns, his present income is relatively insubstantial compared to the assets which the Parties have amassed. I also note that the Wife will receive $3,609,234.30 worth of assets. In my view, this is sufficient for her to live comfortably, especially since, on her own evidence, her expenses amount to $3,000 a month.

[36] However, this is not consistent with the purpose of maintenance, which is financial preservation. Indeed, the High Court has recognised that “maintenance is based on need and not on parties’ contributions to the marriage”: BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 at [55].

(a) the Wife is to make payment for the reimbursement claims for the months of April 2018 to September 2018;

(b) the Parties continue to share household expenses equally between them as per their previous agreement up until the sale of matrimonial home; and

(c) such sums shall be deducted from the Wife’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home should the Wife fail to make the reimbursement payments.

[39] Although the Parties’ marriage was not always smooth-sailing, their efforts led them to raise three children (all of whom excelled in sports at the national level) while amassing considerable wealth. I hope that what the Parties will understand from this judgment on how the matrimonial assets are divided would provide both of them with some measure of closure, and enable them to enjoy their golden years without further acrimony.