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Grounds publishedDecided 13 Oct 2020

Family Division of the High Court

VIG v VIH

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[2020] SGHCF 16Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 4694 of 2017

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff (“Husband”) and the defendant (“Wife”) (collectively “the parties”) were married on 1 October 2005 in France. They have two daughters, born in 2006 and 2016 respectively (I refer to the older child as “Child A”, and the younger child as “Child B”, and collectively as “the Children”). The parties separated in March 2017 and the Husband filed a writ for divorce on 9 October 2017. Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 26 January 2018, on the ground that the Wife has behaved in such a way that the Husband cannot reasonably be expected to live with her, and vice versa. This ended a marriage of 12 years.

  3. Background facts

  4. [3] The Husband is 47 years old this year. He is a French national and a Singaporean Permanent Resident. At the time of the ancillary matters (“AM”) hearings, he was the non-executive chairman of Company [X], which he had founded in 2009 and in which he was previously the Chief Executive Officer. He has been working throughout the marriage. 95% of the shares in Company [X] were sold to a buyer in 2017, for US$17m. Under certain clauses of the Share Purchase Agreement (“SPA”), he also obtained a further pay-out of US$3m for meeting certain targets. Some other entitlements under the SPA are the subject of dispute.

  5. [4] The Wife is 46 years old this year. She is a Singaporean national. At the time of the AM hearings, she was a homemaker. However, prior to that, she was working as a lawyer. She worked for about a year while in France, and also worked from 2009 to 2013 in Singapore.

  6. [5] The parties were married in France in 2005 and lived there from 2005 to early 2009. In early 2009, the Wife moved to Singapore with Child A first, followed by the Husband. At first, they rented a condominium unit in Bishan, then moved to Ang Mo Kio, before renting an apartment near Orchard Road in 2014 (“the Orchard unit”). The Husband left the Orchard unit in March 2017, while the Wife and Children remained there until June 2019, when they moved to an apartment near Newton (“the Newton unit”). While these various units were rented, the Husband had also purchased a property near Tanglin (“the Tanglin property”) in 2013 in his sole name. The parties also own a property in France (“the French property”) which they had purchased in 2006.

  7. Division of matrimonial assets

  8. [8] I first consider the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets under s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“WC”).

  9. [9] There are two methodologies of dividing matrimonial assets, as set out in NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 (“NK”) at [31]–[33]: the global assessment methodology and the classification methodology. The global assessment methodology comprises four distinct steps: identification, valuation, division and apportionment (of the matrimonial assets). On the other hand, the classification methodology first divides the matrimonial assets into separate classes before applying the four steps above in relation to each class of assets.

  10. [10] Both the Husband and the Wife accepted that the global assessment methodology should be applied in the present case. As I see no reason to apply the classification methodology in this case, I will adopt the global assessment methodology.

  11. Identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets

  12. Operative dates for identification and valuation

  13. [11] The starting position for the date of the identification of matrimonial assets is the IJ date, ie, 26 January 2018 (ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 (“ARY”) at [31]). Both parties accepted that the IJ date is the appropriate operative date for identification of the matrimonial assets and there is no reason for me to depart from this.

  14. [12] As for valuation of the matrimonial assets, the default position is that they should be valued at the date of the first AM hearing, ie, 23 October 2019: TDT v TDS and another appeal and another matter [2016] 4 SLR 145 (“TDT”) at [50]. The Husband did not, in fact, dispute this. The argument that he proposed was narrower and focused on the bank and CPF accounts, arguing that those assets should be valued at the IJ date because “the [matrimonial assets] are the moneys and not the bank and CPF accounts themselves”: BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 at [4]. The Wife’s argument appears to have focused on the fact that many of the portfolios identified by the Husband above consisted not just of bank accounts, but various holdings in unit trusts, shares, and securities.

  15. [13] I agree with the Husband that the bank and CPF accounts should be valued as of the IJ date. The assets are not the accounts themselves, but the moneys in the accounts. Money is, in that sense, distinct from the other categories of assets, because its “value” is, for the purposes of the division exercise, simply the amount of money that is available.

  16. [14] Originally, a significant dispute between the parties was in relation to the valuation of various portfolios that the Husband had kept his assets in. These were referred to as the “UOB Portfolio”, “Indosuez Portfolio”, “UBS Portfolio”, and “DBS Portfolio”. The same issue arose in relation to the parties’ Joint DBS Account No ending in 9686 (“DBS Account 9686”). These are mixed portfolios, in that they include bank accounts and various investment assets. As a matter of principle, therefore, I considered that the IJ date ought to be used to value the bank accounts and their balances, while the AM date ought to be used to value the assets. As there was little information concerning the latter, I had asked the Husband to provide documents for the valuation of the assets at the AM date and to correspond with the Wife accordingly. Subsequently, counsel from both sides came to an amicable agreement on how these portfolios were to be treated. As indicated in a letter dated 20 August 2020 to the court, parties agreed to use the IJ date to value the above portfolios and DBS Account 9686. As such, I have treated these assets as agreed assets with agreed valuations, utilising the undisputed documentary evidence to arrive at the value of these assets closest the IJ date, with the exception of the UOB Portfolio, in respect of which the Wife had raised other objections and sought an adverse inference to be drawn for allegedly dissipated assets. I treat the UOB Portfolio under the section on agreed assets with disputed valuations.

  17. [15] I deal with the identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets in the following categories: (a) agreed assets with agreed valuations; (b) agreed assets with disputed valuations; and (c) disputed assets.

  18. Exchange rates

  19. [16] Where there are foreign currencies involved, I adopt the exchange rates employed by the parties as follows:

  20. (a) €1 = S$1.51967; and

  21. (b) US$1 = S$1.37506.

  22. Agreed assets with agreed valuations

  23. [17] The agreed assets with agreed valuations are set out in the table below (the values listed throughout this Judgment are the nett values of the property unless otherwise stated). I have included in the table the agreed deductions from the Husband’s assets (whether because they are agreed liabilities or because the parties have agreed to exclude them from the pool of matrimonial assets), but have excluded from it the declared assets that are valued at S$0, and as these do not figure in the division exercise, I do not refer to them throughout this Judgment.

  24. [18] I note for completeness that the parties have agreed to exclude two POSB accounts that are jointly held by the Husband and Child A, and by the Husband and Child B respectively. I do not deal with these further.

  25. Agreed assets with disputed valuations

  26. [19] The assets agreed to be matrimonial assets, but with disputed valuations, are set out as follows, together with the court’s conclusions on valuation:

  27. (1) Joint Palatine Account

  28. [20] Given that this is a bank account, I adopt the Husband’s valuation of €760.40 (~ S$1,155.56), being the balance of the account closest to the IJ date, as the appropriate valuation.

  29. (2) Security deposit

  30. [21] The security deposit for the Orchard unit tenancy, which was paid by the parties before the breakdown of the marriage, is a matrimonial asset, as it should be returned to both parties. It has since been returned to the Wife’s bank accounts after the IJ date, which means that it has not been accounted for in the above valuations. As such, I add this sum of S$27,609.00 the pool of matrimonial assets for division.

  31. (3) POSB Account 8146

  32. [22] Taking the IJ date as the operative date of valuation, I find that there was S$7,388.68 in the account as of the IJ date and use this as the valuation accordingly.

  33. (4) UOB Portfolio

  34. [24] Based on the Statements of Account provided by the Husband, the total value of the deposits and investments in the UOB Portfolio was S$24,267,316.01 as of 30 December 2017, and was S$6,317,384.29 as of 31 January 2018. That is a difference of S$17,949,931.72. The vast majority of the decrease was in the deposits held in the UOB accounts. In January 2018, the Husband claimed to have made the following transfers:

  35. (a) US$4,500,000.00 (~S$5,953,500.00) and €3,765,000.00 (~S$6,080,475.00) from the UOB Portfolio to UBS; and

  36. (b) US$4,500,000.00 (~S$5,953,500.00) from the UOB Portfolio to Indosuez.

  37. [25] I find this to be supported by the documentary evidence. The statements from the UOB accounts show two transfers of US$4,500,000 on 17 January 2018 from one account, and a single transfer of €3,765,000 on the same day from another account. This is also consistent with the payment orders exhibited by the Husband, which are dated 16 January 2018. The statements for January 2018 in the Indosuez Portfolio show a sum of US$4,500,000 being credited on 17 January 2018 and then split into two separate Indosuez accounts on 18 January 2018, from which point the moneys were used to purchase various assets or make certain subscriptions. The UBS Portfolio statement of assets as of 31 January 2018 also shows new investments to the value of approximating US$4,500,000 and €3,765,000. I am therefore satisfied that there was no dissipation of assets and there is no need to add assets back into the pool. The assets are sufficiently accounted for above in the Indosuez and UBS Portfolios.

  38. [26] As noted above at [14], the parties have agreed to use the IJ date for the valuation of this asset. Hence, I take the value of the UOB Portfolio as at 31 January 2018, being the date closest to the IJ date, which gives a value of S$6,317,384.29.

  39. (5) Husband’s CPF Accounts

  40. [27] As I have decided that the operative date for valuation is the IJ date, I take the balance of the CPF Accounts closest to the IJ date as the valuation. Hence, I value the CPF Ordinary Account at S$55,690.91, the CPF Medisave Account at S$47,039.63, and the CPF Special Account at S$42,605.67.

  41. Disputed assets and liabilities

  42. [28] The parties dispute whether the following assets and liabilities should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. I set out their positions, together with the court’s conclusion, on each of these assets below.

  43. (1) The French and Tanglin properties

  44. [29] It is not disputed that the French and Tanglin properties would constitute matrimonial assets under s 112(10) WC. The dispute arises, however, because the Wife claimed that the properties should be held on trust for the Children, whereas the Husband argued that they should be divided as matrimonial assets.

  45. [32] It is in the context of ss 112(3) and (4) WC that s 112(5) provides a list of orders that the court may make (without prejudice to the generality of those previous provisions), including s 112(5)(d):

  46. [37] Having decided that the French and Tanglin properties are to be added to the pool of matrimonial assets, I turn to their valuations. The parties have agreed to value the Tanglin property at S$2,750,759.80, which is the net value of the property. However, there is a dispute over the net value of the French property. The joint valuation showed that the value of the property as €550,000.00. The Husband urged the court to deduct the loan that was repaid by a lump sum after the IJ date, such that the net value of the property would be €385,927.69. The Wife proposed that the gross value of the property be used, since the loan has been completely repaid. As the loan was repaid after the IJ date but before the AM date, and as I have valued the bank accounts at the IJ date, I decide to deduct the loan that was repaid, because that amount would be adequately accounted for in valuation of the bank accounts. Otherwise, there would be a double-counting of the amount in the bank account at the IJ date and of the amount used to pay off the debt by the AM date. Therefore, I adopt the Husband’s valuation of €385,927.69 (being €550,000 - €164,072.31 ), which is converted to S$586,482.73.

  47. (2) Car

  48. [38] The parties had initially agreed to include a car valued at S$273,000.00 as a matrimonial asset to be divided. The car was later traded in and the sum of S$205,000.00 was given to the Wife in September 2020. At this point, a dispute arose as to whether the Husband, in seeking the Wife’s agreement for the trade-in, had agreed to exclude the proceeds from the pool of matrimonial assets. No affidavits were filed, but screenshots of messages were presented as part of correspondence from the parties. Having considered the material before me, I do not find that the Husband had agreed to exclude the proceeds from the pool of matrimonial assets – his statement that the proceeds were the Wife’s assets can be understood to refer to the fact that the car was always to be treated as an asset in her name for the purposes of division. In any case, as noted above, the principle for identification is that the assets should be identified at the date of the IJ. Therefore, I find that the car should be considered as part of the pool. As for the sum of the proceeds, it was agreed between parties that the Wife received S$205,000.00. I use this sum as the valuation of the car as I consider it to be the better approximation of the value of the car as of the AM hearing date.

  49. (3) Loans owing to the Wife’s sister

  50. [39] The Wife argued that her debt of S$601,424.35 owing to her sister should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets. She contended that this loan was taken from her sister as she had to support the family, pay for legal fees, and to pay her rent. The Husband disputed this, on the basis that the debt was purely the Wife’s and was taken after the IJ date.

  51. (4) Shares in Company [X]

  52. [41] There are two sets of shares in Company [X] that are the subject of dispute: one set of 2,500 ordinary shares that the Company [X]’s buyer would issue to the Husband if the 2018 KPIs are met (which I refer to as the “2018 KPI Shares”) and one set of 2,974 ordinary shares that are conditional on the 2019 KPIs being met (the “2019 KPI Shares”). The KPIs for both sets of shares were essentially (1) meeting a certain level of consolidated income less expenses, and (2) meeting a certain number of monthly active users for the application developed by Company [X].

  53. [42] The Wife argued that the shares in Company [X] which will be issued to the Husband upon the KPIs being met should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. This was so because the SPA under which the 95% of shares in Company [X] was sold was executed during the marriage. The sale was therefore done during the marriage and any consideration from the sale should be considered a matrimonial asset. The Wife cited cl 3.1 of the SPA, which defined the consideration as follows:

  54. [43] The Wife pointed out that cl 5 includes cl 5.4, which provides for the 2018 KPI Shares and 2019 KPI Shares under cl 5.4.1(ii) and cl 5.4.1(iii) respectively. Similarly, the adjustment of US$3m which the Husband received under cl 5.4.1(i) was not disputed by the Husband to be matrimonial assets, and therefore, the same logic should apply to the 2018 and 2019 KPI shares. In any event, the 2018 and 2019 KPI Shares could be analogised to an entitlement for vesting of shares in the future, analogous to an unvested stock option, which has been treated as a matrimonial asset in Chan Teck Hock David v Leong Mei Chuan [2002] 1 SLR(R) 76 (“Chan Teck Hock”) and AFS v AFU [2011] 3 SLR 275 (“AFS”). I note here that AFS did not deal with the question of whether stock options should be treated as matrimonial assets as such, but was concerned with the identification of direct and indirect contributions towards the acquisition of shares and moneys which had been funded by the exercise of a previously granted stock option: AFS at [52]. Hence, I do not address this case further.

  55. [44] I first consider the Wife’s argument that the shares under cl 5.4.1(ii) and cl 5.4.1(iii) should be treated as consideration for the purchase of the Husband’s 95% share in Company [X]. The Wife’s argument appears to be that since Company [X] was founded during the marriage, the shares held by the Husband were all matrimonial assets, and the consideration for the sale of the shares should be included into the pool as matrimonial assets as well. In my judgment, the 2018 and 2019 KPI Shares should not be included as matrimonial assets on this basis.

  56. [45] In the first place, I note that the wording of cl 3.1 of the SPA is ambiguous as it refers to the entirety of cl 5, but only cl 5.3 and cl 5.4.1(i) refer to any adjustment to the consideration. Clause 5.3 refers to this in the heading, while cl 5.4.1(i) includes the sentence: “For the avoidance of doubt, the payment of such US$3,000,000 to the Seller [ie, the Husband] shall be regarded as an adjustment to the Consideration”. In contrast, there is no such reference in cll 5.4.1(ii) and (iii). In other words, it is not entirely clear from the wording of the contract whether everything in cl 5 is intended to be an adjustment to the consideration, or whether it is only specific clauses within cl 5 that should have that effect. As the buyer of the shares has clarified in a response to a letter from the Husband’s solicitors (requested by the court), cll 5.4.1(ii) and 5.4.1(iii) were not intended to be consideration for the purchase of the Husband’s shares, but were intended to be “performance incentives” for the Husband. For the purposes of these proceedings, I prefer the buyer’s interpretation, since the buyer is a third-party at arm’s length and this interpretation accords with the absence of reference to adjustment to consideration in cll 5.4.1(ii) and (iii) (in contrast to cl 5.4.1(i)).

  57. [46] In any case, in my view, the Wife’s argument is not entirely accurate as it is not the entire consideration that should automatically be treated as matrimonial assets. The concept of consideration is not entirely equivalent to the concept of sale price. In other words, there may be payments that are promised as part of the consideration for the sale of the shares which are not intended to be part of the sale price of the shares -– the payments are “consideration” for the shares in the sense of deriving contractual force from the sale, but are not meant to reflect the value of the shares directly. This is so in the present case.

  58. [47] Having decided that the entitlement to the 2018 and 2019 KPI Shares should not be matrimonial assets simply on the basis of the SPA, I deal next with the Wife’s argument that the Husband’s entitlement to the 2018 and 2019 KPI Shares should be treated as stock options and included as matrimonial assets accordingly. The Court of Appeal in Chan Teck Hock ([43] supra) at [28]-[29] held that unvested stock options, ie, “a contract to grant an option upon fulfilment of a condition”, were choses in action that could be treated as matrimonial assets under s 112(10) WC. By analogy, I accept that in principle, the contractual entitlement to shares upon fulfilment of certain conditions could be treated as matrimonial assets. However, the question is whether the specific entitlements in question should be considered matrimonial assets. For that question, the Court of Appeal’s further guidance in Chan Teck Hock at [37] is instructive:

  59. [48] In other words, after identifying unvested stock options as “assets” that could fall within s 112(10) WC, the Court of Appeal went on to determine to what extent they could be treated as matrimonial assets. Given that the condition for vesting the stock options in that case turned on the length of service, the Court of Appeal determined that only the proportion of the stock options that could be attributed to the period of service performed during the marriage could be treated as matrimonial assets. Hence, Chan Teck Hock does not stand for the broad proposition that all entitlements to shares (ie, the contractual right to have shares or a share option in the future) obtained during the marriage would automatically be treated as matrimonial assets. Instead, the court has to consider the nature of the conditions upon which the relevant party would become entitled to the share option or, in this case, the shares.

  60. [49] In the present case, the 2018 and 2019 KPI Shares are conditional on certain conditions being met for Fiscal 2018 (“FY 2018”) and Fiscal 2019 (“FY 2019”) respectively. Clause 1.1 defines FY 2018 as the fiscal year ending 31 December 2018 and FY 2019 as the fiscal year ending 31 December 2019. The IJ date was 26 January 2018. Hence, it is clear that the 2019 KPI Shares were conditional on work done and targets achieved after the marriage had ended. There is no basis for including any of the entitlements to the 2019 KPI Shares as matrimonial assets. The same is not true for the 2018 KPI Shares, since around a month of work, from 1 to 26 January 2018, would have arguably contributed to the achievement of the 2018 KPIs. While it is not certain that there is a linear relationship between the time spent working and the achievement of the KPIs, a proportion based on time is a suitable estimate as a matter of determining the proportion of the entitlement to be treated as matrimonial assets. Taking a broad-brush approach to estimating the portion of the 2018 KPI Shares that should be treated as matrimonial assets, I take the fraction of , being one month out of 12. Estimating the value of the 2018 KPI Shares according to the value of shares as purchased under the SPA (on the adjusted consideration of US$20,000,000, and taking the proportion of that attributable to work done before the IJ, I arrive at the following calculation:

  61. US$97,465.89

  62. Converting this based on the agreed currency exchange rate used by both parties, this gives the sum of S$134,021.44. Therefore, the share of the 2018 KPI Shares that are treated as matrimonial assets would be worth S$134,021.44.

  63. (5) Expenses relating to Company [X]

  64. [50] The Husband had incurred expenses for professional fees relating to the sale of Company [X]. In particular, he paid a sum of S$137,492.26 in November 2018 to bankers who assisted with the sale of Company [X]. He argued that these sums should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets, since the US$3m that was earned (which has been included in the pool) should be netted against these expenses. The Wife argued that they should not be deducted, as the fees were paid after the IJ date. The Husband responded that the quantum of fees payable was based on what the Husband received from the sale.

  65. [51] I agree with the Husband that these sums should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets as these were expenses related to the US$3m which has been added into the pool of matrimonial assets. While the specific payment in question was paid after the IJ date, the fees were in fact incurred before the IJ date, since the services were obtained for the sale of Company [X] earlier. The later payment was apparently due to the arrangement that the quantum of the fees would be conditional on the amount earned, and so an adjustment was made to account for the additional US$3m paid to the Husband. It would be more appropriate to treat these expenses together with the assets earned under the SPA. I therefore deduct the sum of S$137,943.26 from the pool of matrimonial assets.

  66. (6) Bonuses to staff of Company [X]

  67. [52] In October 2018, the Husband decided to pay bonuses to the staff of Company [X] in appreciation of their efforts which enabled the US$3m to be earned under cl 5.4.1.(i) of the SPA. He argued that the sums should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets, while the Wife argued that there was no such need.

  68. [53] Given that the payments were made after the IJ date, and they were gratuitous and not part of any contract, I decide not to deduct these sums from the pool of matrimonial assets. These payments were not mandated and were given out of the Husband’s goodwill. While the efforts of the staff contributed to the US$3m pay-out under cl 5.4.1(i) of the SPA, the bonuses were not required under the SPA or any other contract. As such, these should be treated as gifts made by the Husband after the IJ date out of his funds. Given that I have decided to value the bank accounts at the IJ date, it follows that these payments to the staff are out of the Husband’s “own” assets and it is not necessary to address them further in the division exercise.

  69. (7) Loan to Husband’s sister

  70. [54] The Husband had loaned €25,000 (~ S$37,991.95) to his sister on 9 February 2018. As this is after the IJ date, and given that I have chosen to value the bank accounts as of the IJ date, I do not see any reason to add this sum back into the pool of matrimonial assets as this would already be accounted for.

  71. (8) Gift to Husband’s niece

  72. [55] On 26 November 2017, the Husband gave his niece €15,000.00 to assist her in purchasing a property. The Wife argued that this sum should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. I agree with the Wife. As the Court of Appeal stated in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [24]:

  73. [56] In this case, the writ was filed on 9 October 2017. The gift to the niece was on 26 November 2017, after the writ was filed. This clearly was a period of time where divorce proceedings were imminent. The Wife had a putative interest in the funds and did not agree to the transfer, and even though the transfer was intended to benefit a relative, that does not prevent the sum from being returned to the pool. The sum of €15,000.00 is a substantial sum and is not a “daily, run-of-the-mill expense[]”: TNL at [24]. Therefore, I return the sum of €15,000.00 (~ S$22,795.05) to the pool of matrimonial assets, and will later treat this amount as an advance to the Husband.

  74. Summary of matrimonial assets

  75. [57] I summarise the pool of matrimonial assets in the following table:

  76. Adjustment for losses arising from the COVID-19 pandemic

  77. [58] Before the AM could be resolved in this case, the COVID-19 pandemic substantially affected the value of certain assets held by the Husband. In a letter to the court dated 8 April 2020, the Husband set out the various losses suffered as follows:

  78. [59] I refer to this sum as the “COVID-19 Losses”. This sum was not disputed by the Wife. As I have adopted the IJ date for the valuation of these assets, and the depreciation above was calculated from that date, the figures are logical and consistent with my findings above. Following discussions between the parties, it was agreed that the Wife would bear her share of the COVID-19 Losses. The parties updated the court by way of letter on 26 May 2020 that the parties had agreed to a mechanism by which the COVID-19 could be shared. On 18 September 2020, the parties confirmed that they had agreed to the following terms:

  79. [60] What remains to be dealt with is the apportionment of the COVID-19 Losses, which would be the same as the ratio of division of the matrimonial assets. I now turn to that issue.

  80. Division of matrimonial assets

  81. [61] Having identified and valued the pool of matrimonial assets, the question is how the assets should be divided. The Husband advocated using the structured approach found in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) while the Wife argued that the approach in TNL ([55] supra) was more appropriate as the marriage should be characterised as a single-income marriage. This was a marriage of 12 years, in which the Wife had worked for approximately five to six years (around one year in France and between 2009 and 2013 in Singapore). The question is whether the facts of this case suggest that the approach in TNL should apply instead of the structured approach.

  82. [62] In addressing this issue, I take guidance from the High Court Family Division’s decision in UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921 (“UBM”) at [48]–[50]:

  83. [63] Hence, it is not the case that as soon as one spouse works any amount of time that the marriage cannot be treated as a “Single-Income Marriage” and that the structured approach in ANJ must apply. In my view, the present case falls within the scope of a “Single-Income Marriage” even though the Wife had worked for slightly under half of the marriage. The most significant factor, in my view, is that the Wife was a homemaker in the period when the Husband was working in Company [X]. This same period saw a massive increase in the wealth of the family arising from that company, which dwarfed any contributions that the Wife had made financially to the marriage. Even though she had worked earlier, it is clear from the calculations put forward by both parties that between 96% and 99% of the direct financial contributions would have been made by the Husband, and the indirect financial contributions would also be tilted significantly in the Husband’s favour. Taking a look at the balance of responsibilities and contributions between the Husband and the Wife in this particular case, it was artificial to treat this as a dual-income marriage, since the income of each was so disparate, the Wife’s income being a small fraction of the Husband’s income, and considering that the Wife had worked for only part of the marriage.

  84. [64] I derive further support for this conclusion from the Court of Appeal’s reasons for not applying the structured approach in certain cases. In TNL at [44], the Court of Appeal noted that since the structured approach gave recognition to financial contributions under both direct and indirect contributions, the “non-working spouse is, in this sense, doubly (and severely) disadvantaged”. This would apply to a case where one party has earned significantly more overall in such a way that the financial contribution of the other party becomes almost negligible. At [45], the Court of Appeal recognised that if the structured approach was used and adjustments sought to be made to reflect the “mutual respect … for spousal contributions, whether in the economic or homemaking spheres” (citing ANJ at [18]):

  85. [65] In a recent judgment, the Court of Appeal has noted that for short marriages (apparently without distinguishing between single- or dual-income marriages), the structured approach in ANJ ([61] supra) should apply: USB v USA [2020] SGCA 57 at [37]. That case dealt with a marriage of five years. The present marriage of 12 years was not short, but neither was it long. Rather than to focus simply on the length of the marriage, and in recognition of the factors in the present case identified above, I was of the view that the structured approach was not appropriate in the present case.

  86. [66] However, I recognise that the disagreements over whether ANJ or TNL ([55] supra) should apply are not, in the final analysis, the most important issue, since the aim, regardless of the approach taken, is to arrive at a just and equitable division of assets. Regardless of which approach was used, I would not be surprised if the results were similar.

  87. Direct financial contributions

  88. [67] The parties are agreed that the Husband had provided the vast majority of direct financial contributions to the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband assessed his contributions at between 96% to 99%, and the Wife adopted the figure of 96% in her submissions. While these numerical values are not required under TNL, and should not take on inordinate weight, I state them here as helpful guides for characterising the overall financial situation in the marriage.

  89. Indirect contributions

  90. [68] Turning to the indirect financial contributions, I note that there is no need to assign a numerical value to the indirect contributions. I make the following observations on the parties’ respective contributions:

  91. (a) In terms of the indirect financial contributions, given the Husband’s overall earnings, and the less time that the Wife spent working, the majority of the expenses would have been financed by the Husband.

  92. (b) The Wife was the primary caregiver for the two Children. She was the one in charge of their daily care, their feeding, cleaning, playing, and education. It is, however, not disputed that the Husband did play his part in the Children’s upbringing – he was involved in Child [A]’s education and activities, and also in taking care of Child [B].

  93. (c) The Wife had made sacrifices in her career to take care of the Children as she left her job in 2013 to become a full-time homemaker: see ARY ([11] supra) at [61].

  94. (d) While the parties had hired domestic helpers, I agree with the Wife that this does not necessarily reduce the Wife’s contribution to the marriage. At the same time, it is also true that having domestic helpers would tend to relieve the burden of some aspects of the family’s upkeep and maintenance.

  95. (e) I recognise that Company [X] was not a “family business”, and that the Wife never worked for the Company. At the same time, I acknowledge that in a marriage where one spouse is involved in building a business, the other spouse may give indirect support. This is part of the principle that the marriage is a partnership.

  96. Adjustments for adverse inferences

  97. [69] The Wife further argued that adjustments should be made to the division to account for the loans and gifts to the Husband’s family members, and the bonuses given to the staff of Company [X]. As I have already addressed them at [52]–[56] above, there is no need to account for them again by adjusting the division of the matrimonial assets.

  98. Final division ratio

  99. [70] I note that the Court of Appeal in BOR v BOS and another appeal [2018] SGCA 78 at [113] observed that in “moderately lengthy marriages” in the range of 15 to 18 years, the courts have awarded the homemaker about 35% to 40% of the matrimonial assets. The Court of Appeal also noted (at [113]) that “[f]or marriages of shorter duration (around 10–15 years), the trend appears to be towards awarding the non-income earning party about 25% to 35% of the matrimonial pool”, citing UGG v UGH (m.w.) [2017] SGHCF 25 and ABX v ABY and others [2014] 2 SLR 969.

  100. [71] The primary factor that I consider important is that the bulk of the matrimonial assets was earned by the Husband’s efforts at building up Company [X]. Even in the structured approach of ANJ ([61] supra), after accounting for the direct and indirect contributions, the Court of Appeal recognised (at [27(b)]) that “[i]f the pool of assets available for division is extraordinarily large and all of that was accrued by one party’s exceptional efforts, direct contributions are likely to command greater weight as against indirect contributions”. While there is no need to specify the ratios and adjustments when not using the structured approach, I find that the same logic is compelling when addressing an exceptionally large pool of assets which are largely the result of one party’s efforts.

  101. [72] The Wife argued that a division of 50:50 between the parties would be just and equitable. In my view, this failed to account for the assets that the Husband had earned by his work with Company [X]. She further argued that “it has always been the parties’ understanding” that “the matrimonial assets will be shared in equally”, and that this was the prevailing outcome in French family law. She alleged that the Husband had promised that the assets would be split equally. Apparently, the Husband also promised in 2009 that when he was setting up his business, the Wife would bear 50% of the liability if it failed, but would share in 50% of the success.

  102. [73] While I recognise that the agreement of parties is a factor for the court to consider under s 112(2)(e) WC, the Wife’s argument faced significant difficulties in this case. The evidence concerning the agreement was very weak and consisted purely of her own assertions. There was no document evidencing any such agreement. Even if there were some agreement against the backdrop of French family law, the assertion that equal division was the likely outcome in France was not proved by any expert evidence. When it came to the alleged 2009 agreement in Singapore, there is, once again, no evidence of that agreement. I do not give this weight in my determination of the appropriate ratio.

  103. [74] The Husband’s argument that he should be awarded 81.75% of the assets, with the Wife receiving 18.25%, went too far the other way and failed to reflect the Wife’s indirect contributions to the marriage, recognising the principle of the marriage as a partnership: ANJ at [17].

  104. [75] Having regard to the assets in this case, and the fact that the Wife was the primary caregiver of the Children, but recognising also that this was a marriage of a short-to-moderate length and the Husband was also involved in the Children’s lives, I decide that an appropriate division is 70:30 in favour of the Husband, on a broad-brush approach. In arriving at this determination, I found the High Court Family Division’s comments in UBM ([62] supra) at [60] particularly helpful:

  105. Apportionment of the pool of matrimonial assets

  106. [76] The total value of the pool of matrimonial assets is S$36,830,541.81. Based on the ratio of 70:30 in favour of the Husband, the Husband is entitled to S$25,781,379.27 and the Wife is entitled to S$11,049,162.54.

  107. [77] I first deduct the advances that each party has already received. The Husband is treated as having received an advance of S$22,795.05 (see [56] above), the value of the gift that he had given to his niece. The Wife had received an advance of S$100,000.00 which was paid by Husband to Wife in December 2018, after the IJ date. Their respective remaining entitlements are therefore S$25,758,584.22 (being S$25,781,379.27 - S$22,795.05) and S$10,949,162.54 (being S$11,049,162.54 – S$100,000.00). The Wife has a total of S$624,884.46 in her name. To make up for her share of the matrimonial assets, the Husband should pay to the Wife the sum of S$10,324,278.08 (being S$10,949,162.54 - S$624,884.46). At the same time, the Wife should relinquish all her rights to the joint assets listed above.

  108. [78] In addition to that, according to the parties’ agreement on the COVID-19 Losses, the sum of S$2,773,920.11 is to be divided in the ratio of 70:30 as well. The Wife is therefore to bear S$832,176.03. This sum is to be dealt with in the manner described at [59] above according to the parties’ agreement.

  109. Custody and care and control of the Children

  110. [79] In making orders for custody, and care and control, the paramount consideration for the court is the child’s welfare: see s 125(2) WC and TAU v TAT [2018] SGHCF 11 at [10]. As the High Court noted in Tan Siew Kee v Chua Ah Boey [1987] SLR(R) 725 at [12], “welfare”:

  111. Custody

  112. [81] Apart from the overall custody of the Children, however, the Wife also sought two specific custody-related orders, pertaining to Child [B]’s schooling and the religion of the Children. The power of the court to grant such additional orders is found in s 126(1) WC, and s 126(2)(a) WC (which provides a list of specific orders without prejudice to the general power under s 126(1) WC) makes specific reference to the manner of the child’s education and the religion in which he or she is to be brought up.

  113. Order for Child [B]’s schooling

  114. Order for religious upbringing

  115. Care and control and access

  116. Should shared care and control be granted?

  117. [88] In my judgment, shared care and control is not suitable. As the High Court Family Division recognised in TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089 (“TAU v TAT”) at [12], the court has to consider “factors such as that particular child’s needs at that stage of life, the extent to which the parents are able to co-operate within such an arrangement, and whether it is easy for that child, bearing in mind his or her age and personality, to live in two homes within one week.” The following factors weighed on my mind in the present case:

  118. (a) Both children were either of schooling or near schooling age. Given this, it seemed to me that greater stability in their home lives would be in their interest, to enable them to settle down well after school and be prepared for the next day’s activities. Having them shuttle between different living situations after school does not appear to be conducive to their welfare.

  119. (b) The parties have shown themselves to have a fraught relationship and there is a real risk that a shared care and control arrangement would be unworkable. This is especially so given the multiple allegations and complaints made by each party about the other.

  120. Who should be granted care and control?

  121. [89] In my judgment, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the Wife should be granted care and control of the Children, with access given to the Husband.

  122. [90] I do not find that the Wife’s OCD is such as to prevent her from being the primary caretaker for the Children. I take guidance from the evidence tendered on behalf of the Wife, which show that having OCD does not, in and of itself, impair the Wife’s capacity to be a parent.

  123. (a) The psychologist who had been treating the Wife since August 2016 tendered an affidavit and report dated 21 November 2017 stating that the Wife’s condition was “Moderate”, and that individuals with OCD “do not pose a danger to others, including children, just because of their condition.” Specifically, the psychologist observed that the Wife had a “caring and loving relationship” with Child [B] (based on primary observation), and that the Wife actively sought advice on how to ensure that her condition did not negatively impact Child [A]. In a supplementary affidavit and report dated 10 August 2018, the psychologist also observed that the Wife “makes an active effort not to restrict [the Children’s] behaviour or to impose her fears on them. She is conscious of putting their needs before her own, and has typically been most successful at resisting OCD-related behaviour when the [Children] have been involved.”

  124. (b) A psychiatrist also gave his opinion concerning the Wife’s condition. He examined the Wife on three dates and interviewed the Wife’s sister as well. In his report dated 21 August 2018, he concluded that her condition was of “mild severity”. She was observed to be “sensitive about her children’s emotional wellbeing and reiterated her wish to prioritise their needs and best interests.” He concluded, “[h]aving evaluated [the Wife’s] OCD (severity and symptoms) and its effect on her well-being, functioning, and quality of life, it is my opinion that her current OCD symptoms have not seriously impaired her self-care and child-rearing capacities.”

  125. [91] The Husband’s various allegations about the Wife’s outbursts and difficulty coping were, in my view, not ultimately probative, as they captured specific instances rather than showing her overall conduct. Further, as the psychologist noted, these could have been influenced by the breakdown of the relationship between the Wife and Husband, or lack of trust between her and her domestic helpers.

  126. [92] Given that I have not found that the Wife’s OCD was such as to render her unfit to be the primary caretaker, I conclude that the Wife should be granted care and control. I note here that just as I did not place much weight on the Wife’s OCD, I also did not rely on the allegations that she made against the Husband concerning his panic attacks. The Wife has always been the primary caretaker for both Children since their birth. She would be most prepared to take on the responsibility of caring for the Children after the divorce. Further, this means that there would be familiarity and regularity in the Children’s lives if the Wife is granted care and control. This is significant as it would minimise the disruption caused by the divorce.

  127. Access

  128. [93] It is clear that there was no reason against granting the Husband unsupervised access to the Children. In the event that the Wife was granted care and control, the Husband indicated that he was satisfied with the access granted in the interim orders with variations as follows:

  129. (a) ORC 4982/2018 as varied by the High Court is to continue, save that the weekend access should begin on Thursday 7am instead of Friday 7am.

  130. (b) FC/ORC 2703/2019, which varied ORC 4982/2018 concerning holiday access, was to stand save that religious public holidays were to be spent with the parent of that religion, and such holidays will not be covered by the provision that public holidays falling during school holidays are not to be covered in the public holiday arrangements.

  131. [94] The Wife made the following points in submissions:

  132. (a) First, weekend access was to be varied such that the Husband would have access every other week, from Friday after Child [A]’s school day ends to Sunday 8.30pm. During the weeks that the Husband does not have weekend access, he is to have access on an additional weekday evening from 5pm to 9pm before that weekend.

  133. (c) Third, the Wife was agreeable to have the Children spend any religious holidays with the parent of that religion, and that the Children will spend Mother’s Day and the Wife’s birthday with the Wife, and Father’s Day and the Husband’s birthday with the Husband.

  134. (d) Fourth, in the event of any overseas travel, the Husband shall bring both Children on the trip.

  135. [97] At the hearing on 18 September 2020, the parties also agreed that the interim orders made concerning electronic access and handover arrangements to continue, and for the parties to keep each other informed of what the school communicates to each party about the children. I accordingly make orders reflecting this agreement.

  136. (a) There be joint custody of the two (2) children of the marriage, namely, [Child A] and [Child B] to both the Husband and the Wife.

  137. (b) That care and control of the two (2) children is granted to the Wife.

  138. (c) Subject to (d)–(f), that the Husband shall have access to the children as follows:-

  139. (i) Every Tuesday evening from 5.00pm to 9.00pm.

  140. (ii) Every other week, every Friday from 12.00pm to Sunday 8.00pm (“weekend access”). In weeks where the Husband does not have weekend access, he shall have access on a weekday evening of his choice, subject to the Wife’s agreement (which shall not be unreasonably withheld), from 5.00pm to 9.00pm in the five (5) days prior to or after the weekend in which he does not have weekend access. For the avoidance of doubt, the Children will spend the first weekend after the release of this judgment with the Husband.

  141. (iii) Subject to (vi), half of each of the school holidays, with parties to discuss and agree on specific dates, save that the Husband shall not have access for a continuous period of more than 14 days. Parties are to endeavour to agree on increasing this limit as soon as appropriate for the Children. Such access is to start at 9.00am of the first day of each period and end at 9.00pm on the last day of each period.

  142. (iv) For public holidays, alternate public holidays from 9.00am to 9.00pm. Where a public holiday falls within a school holiday, it is not to be counted as part of the school holiday in (iii) above.

  143. (v) Notwithstanding (i) to (iv) above, the Children shall spend Muslim public holidays (viz, Hari Raya Puasa and Hari Raya Haji) with the Wife, and shall spend Catholic public holidays (viz, Christmas and Easter) with the Husband. They shall also spend Mother’s Day and the Wife’s birthday with the Wife, and Father’s Day and the Husband’s birthday with the Husband. Such access is to commence at 9.00am and end at 9.00pm. These days are not to be considered for the purposes of (iii) or (iv) above.

  144. (vi) Any other period as may be agreed between the parties.

  145. (vii) Parties are at liberty to adjust the holiday schedule (ie, any access under (iii)–(v)) by mutual agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, this does not preclude the parties from coming to any other mutual agreement for any of the access granted to the Husband.

  146. (viii) The Husband shall pick up and drop off the Children at the Wife’s residence or some other mutually agreed location.

  147. (ix) Where applicable, the Husband is to ensure that the Children attend school and their scheduled classes when they are with him.

  148. (d) Either parent who intends to travel with the Children shall provide an itinerary at least seven (7) days in advance.

  149. (e) Parties are to have reasonable electronic access to the Children, subject to the Children’s schedules, when they are with the other parent.

  150. (f) Parties are to keep each other informed and updated about what the school or any other educational institution communicates to either party about the Children.

  151. (g) Parties are not to speak to the Children about the court proceedings or speak about the court proceedings in the presence of the Children.

  152. (h) Parties are not to photograph, document or record videos of the Children for the purposes of use or reference in court.

  153. Maintenance

  154. Wife

  155. [99] Section 114(1) WC sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when ordering maintenance. The guiding principle behind the grant of maintenance is that of financial preservation: Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 at [12].

  156. Children

  157. [101] The Wife sought maintenance for the Children as well.

  158. [102] I first consider the claimed monthly expenses of each child. The Wife claimed that Child [A] required S$7,298.43 per month, while Child [B] required S$5,385.75 per month. The breakdown of these expenses is tabulated as follows:

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