Family Division of the High Court · Decided 31 December 2020
VMO v VMP
Feedback & support[2020] SGHCF 23 · Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 146 of 2017
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff (“Husband”) and the defendant (“Wife”) (collectively “the parties”) were married in Australia. Their marriage was solemnised on 26 January 2002 and registered on 4 February 2002. They have one son (“the Child”) who was born in 2010. The parties began living separately from 2012 onwards and the Husband filed a writ of divorce on 13 January 2017. Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 23 February 2018. It brought to an end a marriage of 16 years.
Background facts
- [3]
[3] The Husband is 47 years old this year. He is an Australian citizen. He has been working for various entities related to a firm, [X], for most of his career. He became a partner in the Singapore firm of [X], [X] LLP, in 2007 and continues to work there. [X] LLP performs accountancy as well as consulting services.
- [4]
[4] The Wife is 45 years old this year, and is also an Australian citizen. She is legally-trained, and is currently a full-time homemaker.
- [5]
[5] Soon after getting married in Australia in 2002, the parties moved to Tokyo, Japan. The Husband was already working for [X] in Australia and moved to Tokyo as part of an international placement as a senior manager in Tokyo. The Wife worked as an associate at a bank there. After two years, they moved to Singapore, where the Husband began working for [X] LLP. The Wife was offered a position with the bank she had worked for in Japan, but she chose to work for a law firm instead. Subsequently, she left the law firm and began working for another bank. However, due to the working conditions and to assist their attempts at conceiving a child, the Wife resigned from her job in 2008. In 2010, she tried to start a business, Company [Y], in 2010, selling bags, but this business did not ultimately succeed and stopped trading in early 2016. Company [Y] was a loss-making business and the Wife did not receive income from the business at any point.
- [6]
[6] From 2004 to 2007, the parties lived in rented units. In 2007, they purchased a property in Bukit Timah (“the Bukit Timah Property”) as their matrimonial home, which was registered in the Wife’s name. Their Child was born in July 2010.
- [7]
[7] In 2012, the Wife discovered that the Husband had committed adultery and the parties then separated. The Husband moved out of the Bukit Timah Property in July 2012 and lived apart from the Wife and Child. It was not until 13 January 2017, however, that the Husband filed the writ of divorce, with IJ being granted on 23 February 2018. As noted above, the parties consented to a number of orders that were recorded with the IJ. I summarise the key consent orders on maintenance as follows:
(a) The Husband is to pay the Wife a lump sum as maintenance for herself at S$17,500.00 per month for the next five years, amounting to a total of S$1,050,000.00.
(b) The Husband is to pay (i) a lump sum of S$180,000.00 as maintenance for the Child; (ii) periodic payments of $3,000.00 per month from 2023 onwards until the Child reaches 21 years of age or until he obtains an undergraduate degree or equivalent, whichever is later, which shall be made in lump sum payments of S$36,000.00 per year starting from 1 February 2023; and (iii) direct payments to various third parties for expenses like school fees, therapy and lessons.
Appointment of expert
- [8]
[8] Before turning to the substance of the dispute, I make some observations on the evidence provided by way of a report by AAG Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd (“AAG”). AAG was appointed as a joint expert to provide forensic investigation of the parties’ finances for the purpose of the AM hearings. Although AAG’s report was presented to court without an accompanying affidavit from AAG or its representative, neither party has raised any issue about the admissibility of the report. The report defined its “Scope of Works” as follows:
- [9]
[9] The Wife raised various complaints about AAG’s report. First, the Wife alleged that AAG had failed to comply with the “Scope of Works” by failing to make the inquiries that were relevant to its task, specifically in failing to investigate or determine whether the Husband had misused or misapplied matrimonial assets or whether the Husband’s expenditure was reasonable. Second, AAG had failed to respond to the concerns that she had raised through her counsel’s letters. AAG had purportedly failed to analyse the Husband’s credit card expenditures and the nature of the expenses, and omitted to trace all of the Husband’s earnings. Third, the Wife also claimed that there were various errors and gaps in AAG’s approach to its task. Hence, she submitted that the report should be “given little weight, if at all”. It bears noting that the Wife’s complaints do not appear to be directed at the accuracy of the figures extracted and summarised by AAG.
- [10]
[10] I accept that the AAG report did not provide as much by way of analysis and conclusions as the parties may have hoped. But in that regard, the report was also largely neutral and did not aid either the Husband or the Wife significantly. In any event, the role of experts in courts is not to decide for the court. The questions of whether any of the grounds for drawing an adverse inference or returning assets to the pool of matrimonial assets have been made out in this case are for the court to answer. In the present case, I rely on the AAG report only insofar as it communicated figures and facts extracted from the bank and financial statements provided by the parties to AAG. Neither party has raised concerns about the accuracy of these figures, let alone showed that these figures were wrong. I therefore rely on the AAG report as a useful summary of these facts for my consideration.
Division of matrimonial assets
- [11]
[11] I first consider the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets under s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“WC”).
- [12]
[12] There are two methodologies of dividing matrimonial assets, as set out in NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 (“NK”) at [31]–[33]: the global assessment methodology and the classification methodology. The global assessment methodology comprises four distinct steps: identification, valuation, division and apportionment (of the matrimonial assets). On the other hand, the classification methodology first divides the matrimonial assets into separate classes before applying the four steps above in relation to each class of assets. Both the Husband and the Wife accepted that the global assessment methodology should apply in this case. As I see no reason to apply the classification methodology, I will adopt the global assessment methodology accordingly.
Dissipations and non-disclosure
- [13]
[13] A number of the arguments in this case relate to alleged dissipations, unreasonably incurred expenses, and adverse inferences drawn on the basis of non-disclosure. As these issues touch on a number of steps in the division exercise and also concern a number of different assets, it is convenient for me to deal with these concepts at the outset. The Court of Appeal has given guidance on these issues in the recent decision of UZN v UZM [2020] SGCA 109 (“UZN”) which was handed down on 30 October 2020. I summarise the Court’s guidance as follows:
(a) The court’s duty is “to ensure that the matrimonial pool reflects the full extent of the material gains of the marital partnership”: UZN at [59].
(b) One means of doing so is to draw adverse inferences against a party who has failed to make full and frank disclosure of assets. The drawing of an adverse inference is based on the notion that “there is concealment of matrimonial assets which should be included for a fair division under s 112 of the Women’s Charter”: UZN at [61].
(c) Another conceptually different means of ensuring that the matrimonial pool reflects the material gains of the marriage is to add the values of certain assets into the pool on the basis that a party has expended substantial sums when divorce proceedings are imminent: UZN at [62]. This is based on the dicta in TNL v TNK and another appeal and another matter [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [24] (which the Court of Appeal referred to as the “TNL dicta”).
(d) Further distinct from either of these two approaches is the wrongful dissipation provision in s 132(1) WC. It is distinct from the TNL dicta as the latter does not require “culpability” – the expenditure may be for entirely innocent reasons: UZN at [65]. It is distinct from adverse inference for non-disclosure because the latter is concerned with disclosure, whereas wrongful dissipation is concerned with the act of dissipation itself. The Court of Appeal recognised the possibility of drawing adverse inferences based on concealment of assets or wrongful dissipation, based on conduct even prior to when divorce proceedings are imminent: UZN at [66]. However, this would generally be difficult to justify – “it is difficult to believe that the parties would have intended to withdraw assets for the purpose of concealing or putting them out of reach of the other spouse during a time when their marital relationship was still functioning”: UZN at [66]. Since this is a matter of proof, the possibility remains open nevertheless, but the facts must justify such an approach.
(e) These categories may overlap – one party may expend money in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of the TNL dicta and also amount to wrongful dissipation, while also failing to disclose the movement of these assets, thereby justifying an adverse inference. These categories are, however, also conceptually distinct: see UZN at [68].
(f) In general, therefore, the position in relation to expenditure of assets by one party can be summarised as follows (UZN at [70]):
- [14]
[14] With this guidance from the Court of Appeal, it is necessary to consider the specific bases for each party’s contentions. As the parties did not have the benefit of this guidance during the AM hearings or submissions, it may be necessary to attempt a reconstruction of their cases according to the Court of Appeal’s descriptions of these different ways of ensuring that the pool of matrimonial assets accurately reflects what was earned and obtained during the marriage. I deal with these issues as and when they arise in the following discussion.
Identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets
Operative dates for identification and valuation
- [15]
[15] The operative date for the identification of the matrimonial assets was a matter of some dispute between the parties. The Husband argued that this was an appropriate case to use the date on which the parties had agreed that they would be able to date other people outside of the marriage, ie, 23 September 2013, which I will refer to as the “purported date of separation”.
- [16]
[16] Both parties acknowledged that the starting position is that the IJ date is the starting point: ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 (“ARY”) at [31]. In that case, the Court of Appeal held at [31]:
- [17]
[17] The Court of Appeal gave essentially three justifications for this starting point. First, the IJ is what puts a substantial end to the marriage contract such that the parties are taken no longer to intend to jointly accumulate matrimonial assets: ARY at [32], citing AJR v AJS [2010] 4 SLR 617 at [4]. In other words, the IJ “put[s] an end to the whole content of the marriage contract, leaving only the shell, that is, the technical bond” (Fender v St John-Mildmay [1936] 1 KB 111 at 115–117, cited in ARY at [32]). Second, division could well occur at the same time as the IJ if all the relevant material is before the court at the time: ARY at [33]. Third, adopting a starting point of the IJ date allows the parties to arrange their financial affairs and to know when they are treated as “having moved into a different phase in their lives”: ARY at [34]. Relatedly, it would enable counsel to better advise their clients.
- [18]
[18] In the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, the IJ date is not simply a starting point from which the court should readily depart. The justifications stated above suggest that the IJ date should generally be used as the operative date, and the discretion to depart from that date is there to “ensure that justice is done in every case”: ARY at [35]. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the court should depart from the starting point only in “deserving cases”, where there are “cogent reasons” to do so, and that the court should “exercise care when it decides to depart from the starting point” and should provide reasons when doing so: ARY at [34]–[36].
- [19]
[19] The authorities have also provided the following further guidance as to how the court should assess an argument that the starting point of the IJ date should be departed from:
(a) First, the court should pay attention to the relationship between the parties after the purported date of separation. Continued involvement and provision would suggest the existence of a “continuous (albeit clearly attenuated) relationship” [emphasis in original] between the parties: Oh Choon v Lee Siew Lin [2014] 1 SLR 629 (“Oh Choon”) at [14], cited by ARY at [39]. This relationship would then only be brought to an end with the IJ, and there would be no reason to depart from the IJ date as a starting point.
(b) Second, the court should distinguish between exceptional features that would warrant a departure from the starting point and “the ordinary factual concomitants of a failed marriage”: ARY at [40].
(c) Third, the court should be mindful of the fact that using the IJ date would enable the court to better account for any continuing contributions (direct or indirect) made by the parties to the marriage: TEG v TEH and another matter [2015] SGHCF 8 (“TEG”) at [24].
(d) Finally, underlying many of these factors is a recognition that marriage continues to be a legal union even if the relationship has disintegrated: ARY at [40]; TQU v TQT [2020] SGCA 8 (“TQU”) at [38]. In this regard, the use of the IJ date as the starting point is already a concession to the fact that, in reality, at the time of the IJ only the “technical bond” of marriage remains (see [17] above), while the actual bond of marriage is severed only upon final judgment. It is therefore not appropriate to push the operative date back even further than the IJ date simply on the basis that the relationship has fallen apart while the legal union remains. Some other exceptional circumstance must exist to justify using the date of separation as the operative date for identification of the matrimonial assets.
- [20]
[20] Having identified these factors, I turn to the Husband’s argument in this case. The Husband emphasised that he had moved out of the matrimonial home on 8 July 2012. By January 2013, he had moved into his own leased apartment. In September 2013, the parties came to an agreement that they would be able to date other people, and agreed in writing that they would wait for six months before introducing new partners to the Child. The parties then, in fact, dated other people – the Husband dated someone in 2014, and then in 2015, and has remained in the latter relationship to date. Further, the Husband began crediting his salary into a separate account in October 2015. The Husband described the Wife’s conduct in that period as “retaliatory” and that “there was nothing left to the marriage”.
- [21]
[21] The Husband disagreed with the Wife’s claim that they continued to have conjugal relations. As for the occasional meals and trips, the Husband explained that he wished to maintain “cordial relations” with the Wife and that, despite the marriage being over, he wanted to take care of the Wife. Further, the Husband wished to spend time with the Child, and so went on one trip overseas and also spent time with the Wife and Child on festive and special occasions. He attributed the delay in filing the writ of divorce to the Wife, since he claimed to have been engaging in negotiations for an uncontested divorce for a whole year “before he finally had no choice” but to file the writ in January 2017.
- [22]
[22] The Wife argued that the parties maintained a relationship even after the purported date of separation. In particular, the Husband continued to express his love for the Wife and his remorse for his adultery, they had gone to see marriage counsellors, the Wife remained uneasy about the Husband seeing other people romantically, the Husband continued to send gifts and they had meals together, they occasionally engaged in conjugal relations, they vacationed together and spent special occasions together, and the Husband continued to support the Wife and Child financially, as well as supporting the Wife’s application for a Dependent’s Pass. She also argued that she continued to make indirect contributions to the marriage after the Husband moved out of the matrimonial home.
- [23]
[23] Having considered the parties’ arguments, I am of the view that there is no reason to depart from the IJ date as the operative date for identification.
- [24]
[24] It appears that the Husband and Wife were largely in agreement as to the facts of how they conducted themselves after the Husband left the matrimonial home in 2012 – the Husband did continue to provide for the Wife and Child, they did spend time during holidays and special occasions together, and they had meals together. The Husband also spent a few days a week with the Child and some weekends. However, they disagreed about the significance of these acts. In addition, they also disagreed over the facts concerning whether they continued to have conjugal relations and their attitude towards each party seeing other people romantically. Nevertheless, even if I assume these facts in favour of the Husband (ie, that they did not continue to have conjugal relations and they had agreed that they would be able to date other people), I do not find that it is necessary to depart from the starting point in the interests of justice.
- [25]
[25] First, the Husband clearly continued to support the Wife and Child even after the purported date of separation: see Oh Choon ([19(a)] supra) at [12].
- [26]
[26] Second, the Husband was involved in their lives and continued to be a presence. They spent time together as a family during special occasions, and the Husband took care of the Child for a few days a week. Even if the relationship between the Husband and Wife was no longer as close as it once was, there existed some relationship between them.
- [27]
[27] Third, whatever their decisions in relation to dating other people, it did not undermine the fact that they remained legally married and no attempts were made to dissolve that legal union. It was a marriage, even if it was a marriage between two people who had grown distant and who contemplated that they might become romantically or sexually involved with other people. Taken together with the facts that the Husband continued to provide and was present for some of their family life, I find that there was an ongoing, if attenuated, relationship: see Oh Choon at [12]. Indeed, even in a case as extreme as TQU ([19(d)] supra) where the marriage had broken down in 2001, and the Wife had already applied without success for divorce twice in 2001 and 2010 before the IJ was finally granted pursuant to a third application in 2016, the Court of Appeal did not consider it appropriate to depart from the starting point: see TQU at [4] and [38].
- [28]
[28] Although it was suggested to me that TQU could be distinguished, I do not find the factors raised by the Husband’s counsel to be weighty. It was first suggested that TQU could be distinguished because the wife in TQU had returned to the family home after making the first divorce application: see TQU at [8]. However, I find that the mere fact that the Husband never returned to the matrimonial home in this case to be less important than the fact that he continued to provide for the family and to spend time with the Wife and Child. Counsel for the Husband then suggested that the fact that the two divorce applications were dismissed in TQU meant either that the husband had contested the divorce or that the court had found that there was no basis for the divorce, whereas in this case, both parties clearly wanted to end the relationship. Even assuming that this distinction between the cases exists, I do not accept it as material. The mere fact that both parties “want[ed] out” of the marriage, even if true, must be weighed against the fact that no steps were taken to end the legal union and that they did continue to maintain some form of a family life, no matter how limited, disjointed, and unhappy. There, as here, the parties remained in a “legal albeit unhappy union” that was grounded in some reality: see TQU at [38].
- [29]
[29] I clarify here that I do not understand the Court of Appeal in TQU at [38] to mean that as long as the legal union is subsisting, there is no possibility of departing from the starting point, and that it is irrelevant to consider the factual union (in distinction to the legal union). There is nothing in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that suggests this absolute position, which would also be contradictory to the position taken in ARY ([16] supra). First, there are factors other than the breakdown of the factual union that may render it appropriate to depart from the starting point. One such situation is where one party “incurs a large amount of expenditure from having ‘indulged in certain vices’ such that the matrimonial assets have been ‘unfairly or unjustly depleted by the unacceptable actions of that party’”: ARY at [35]. The fact that the legal union subsists would not prevent the court from departing from the starting point where the facts justify it. Second, there may be instances where the extent of the breakdown of the factual union justifies a departure from the starting point. There are differing degrees of breakdown to which the court must remain sensitive. There may be cases where the relationship between parties has absolutely come to an end before the IJ, eg, where one party disappears completely, such that anything done by the parties cannot be attributed to the existence of a familial or matrimonial relationship. However – and this is related to the point below – where the relationship has broken down but there still remains a connection between the parties and some semblance of family life, the existence of the legal union would suggest that the marriage does subsist and the appropriate date for identification would remain the IJ date, when that legal union is brought to a (tentative) end. While the court retains the “flexibility to ensure that justice is done in every case”: ARY at [35], what TQU does suggest is that the court should not readily depart from the starting point. To do so would undermine the three justifications identified by the Court of Appeal in ARY (summarised at [17] above).
- [30]
[30] Fourth, the various facts emphasised by the Husband appear to me to be the “ordinary factual concomitants of a failed marriage”: see ARY at [40]. That one party moved out, grew distant, participated in family life in a limited way, and began seeing other people romantically appears, unfortunately, to be a reality in many relationships that have broken down. There is nothing so exceptional in this case that would warrant a departure from the usual starting point. Even the allegations that the Wife was smearing the Husband’s reputation do not, in my view, constitute exceptional circumstances, since bad blood and even enmity can certainly exist between parties in a marriage. Finally, as the Wife continued to take care of the Child, I find that it is more appropriate to take the operative date as the IJ date to better account holistically for the contributions of the parties to the marriage: TEG ([19(c)] supra) at [24]. Therefore, having considered all of these factors, I conclude that there is no reason to depart from the starting point, and find that the operative date of identification should be the IJ date, ie, 23 February 2018.
- [31]
[31] Given what I have heard of the parties’ arguments, I find it necessary to remind parties that the selection of the operative date of identification is not intended, in most cases, to either reward or punish one or the other of the parties to the marriage. The concern, rather, is to achieve fairness between the parties. Further, the complexity of interpersonal relationships means that the court should be slow to assume that certain decisions would or would not have the effect of incentivising good conduct or disincentivising bad conduct. Finally, I observe that it is realistic for the court to acknowledge that relationships can both improve and disintegrate over time. The court should be cautious of dividing the relationship with an artificially clear line where one does not exist. Remaining with the IJ date as the operative date of identification serves to avoid this risk as it centres the exercise on a clearly identified juridical act that demarcates a break in the parties’ relationship.
- [32]
[32] I turn then to consider the operative date for valuing the matrimonial assets. The Husband argued that the “latest available date” should be used for valuation, but appeared to have agreed with the Wife that some of the assets should be valued as of 23 February 2018, ie, the IJ date. The Wife submitted that the court should value the assets as at the date of the AM hearing, unless the parties have otherwise agreed in relation to particular assets.
- [33]
[33] The default position is that the matrimonial assets should be valued at the date of the first AM hearing, ie 15 January 2020: TDT v TDS and another appeal and another matter [2016] 4 SLR 145 (“TDT”) at [50]. I see no reason in principle to depart from this starting point. Where the parties have arrived at agreed valuations at the earlier IJ date, however, or proposed a choice between the purported date of separation and the IJ date, I choose not to disturb their agreement and will use the agreed valuations at the IJ date. I also note that because of how the parties have been content to run their cases, the evidence of valuations was largely focused on valuation as of the IJ date rather than as of the AM date. As such, given the state of evidence and how the parties have chosen to advance their claims, it is necessary to use the IJ date for many of the assets in this case.
- [34]
[34] Further, I observe that the date of valuation for assets like bank and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts should be the IJ date. As the High Court Family Division held, “the [matrimonial assets] are the moneys and not the bank and CPF accounts themselves”: BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 at [4]. It follows that the value of these accounts is in fact identical to the amount of money identified to be present at the IJ date.
Exchange rates
- [35]
[35] The parties have agreed to utilise the exchange rate of US$1.00 = S$1.13 for the purposes of these AM proceedings, for the assets denominated in US dollars. For assets denominated in Australian dollars, the exchange rate used is A$1.00 = S$0.96. Where, however, the sums involve past figures, I simply take the parties’ own calculation of the equivalent currencies for the purposes of valuation, in the absence of any dispute.
Agreed assets with agreed valuations or for which the dispute over valuation is solely over the operative date
- [36]
[36] There are a number of assets whose inclusion into the pool of matrimonial assets is not disputed. Further, of those assets, the dispute over the valuation of some of these assets turned only on which date was used as the operative date for identification or valuation. For these assets, the parties agreed to use either the purported date of separation or the IJ date. As between the two, I find that the latter is more appropriate. Hence, these valuations can be easily determined and I deal with them summarily in the table below:
- [37]
[37] For completeness, I note that the parties are not disputing that the BMW Car was sold in 2016 and therefore would not be a matrimonial asset as of the IJ date. They have also agreed between themselves to exclude some personal effects like jewellery. I do not include these in the table above or in the subsequent analysis.
Agreed asset with valuation disputed on other grounds
- [38]
[38] Of the assets agreed to be matrimonial assets, a dispute arose over the valuation of the [X] LLP Capital Account. This was one of two accounts that the Husband, as a partner of [X] LLP, maintained, the other being the [X] LLP Current Account addressed later below. The [X] LLP Capital Account consisted of the Husband’s capital contributions to the partnership.
Disputed assets and liabilities
- [40]
[40] I turn to the remaining assets and liabilities. These are subject to dispute over their inclusion in the matrimonial pool. I deal first with the Wife’s assets and liabilities before turning to the Husband’s.
(1) Wife’s assets and liabilities
(A) Friends Provident International policy
- [41]
[41] The Friends Provident International (“FPI”) policy was a policy held in the Wife’s name. The Wife surrendered the policy in October 2017, and the evidence present before the court shows that the Wife thereby incurred a surrender penalty of US$16,800.53 and obtained the surrender value of US$38,807.10. The surrender value was transferred to her account, DBS 7629. The Wife claimed that she needed to surrender the policy because the Husband had restricted her access to funds. First, she alleged, the Husband had transferred S$705,350.00 from the parties’ joint account to his CitiGold Account ending in 1015 (for which, see below at [84]). Second, in early 2016, the Husband imposed a S$10,000.00 monthly credit limit on the Wife’s Citibank supplementary Visa credit card (“the Citibank Supplementary Card”). She had raised concerns about her expenses to the Husband at around that time, for example, by way of an email dated 7 March 2016. As a result of the Husband’s actions, she had to obtain a loan from her parents to pay off various debts and expenses. In addition, she had to surrender the FPI policy for herself and the Child’s expenses. The surrender value has since been applied towards her and the Child’s expenses.
- [42]
[42] The Husband argued that this sum should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets as the Wife should not have incurred the surrender penalty at the time. Further, the surrender value should be returned to the pool as well because it was spent on legal fees, which expense should not be borne by the Husband.
- [43]
[43] In my judgment, this is an appropriate case in which to return the surrender penalty to the pool of matrimonial assets. In this case, the writ of divorce was already filed in January 2017. The surrender of the FPI policy was in October 2017, after the filing of the writ. In this regard, the Court of Appeal held in TNL ([13(c)] supra) at [24]:
- [44]
[44] Although the FPI policy was in the Wife’s name, both the Husband and the Wife were the lives assured under the policy. I also agree with the Husband that there were other options available to the Wife, and that her unilateral decision to surrender the FPI policy at that time resulted in a reduction of the pool of matrimonial assets available for division. While I recognise that the Wife may have felt that she needed to surrender the policy at that time, I also note that the correspondence with the Husband concerning her expenses which the Wife referred to was earlier in 2016. The Wife has not pointed to any contemporaneous correspondence around the time of the surrender of the FPI policy in which the issue of expenses was discussed. Further, as the Husband has highlighted, even though the credit limit was reduced from S$40,000.00 to S$10,000.00 in early 2016, the credit card statements show that the Wife did not regularly reach beyond S$10,000.00. In all the circumstances, I do not think that the loss of US$16,800.53 was reasonably incurred. Given that the surrender occurred after the filing of the writ of divorce, I find that this sum should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets.
- [45]
[45] As for the balance of the surrender value, however, I disagree with the Husband that it needs to be added into the pool of matrimonial assets. I do not find that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the surrender value was not used for her expenses. The table referred to in the forensic accountant’s report (at Appendix 7C) is of limited utility as it does not show the balance of the account and the other transactions. Finally, although the sum taken as a whole is significant, it is more accurate to see this as one withdrawal that is then spent on various purchases and payments. None of those purchases and payments has been shown by the Husband to be substantial within the meaning of the TNL dicta. Where, however, there is evidence of specific sums that should be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets, I deal with these apart from the FPI policy, since the payments could have come from other sources. I deal specifically with the Husband’s contention concerning legal fees below at [100]–[103].
- [46]
[46] Therefore, I choose to add S$18,984.60 (being US$16,800.53 at the agreed exchange rate) into the pool of matrimonial assets. I will treat this sum as an advance to the Wife in coming to the appropriate apportionment.
(B) Loan for Company [Y]
- [47]
[47] Various shareholder loans were given to the Wife’s business, Company [Y]. The Husband argued that of these loans, a sum of S$300,000.00 should be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets. In effect, he argued that Company [Y] ought to have been wound up earlier – if the Wife had done so, they would have saved S$200,000.00 to S$300,000.00. Since she did not, the sum should be returned to the pool of assets as a loss that should not have been incurred. I note that while the Husband also raised an allegation of a breach of the obligation to make full and frank disclosure, those allegations pertained to the Wife’s failure to provide information about Company [Y]’s business before matrimonial proceedings were brought. His real concern was with the expenditure of matrimonial assets for the sake of Company [Y] without his consent. As the Court of Appeal has clarified in UZN ([13] supra) at [68], the concepts of non-disclosure and dissipation are conceptually distinct. I deal with this issue on the basis of whether the sums expended for Company [Y] should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets.
- [48]
[48] The last injections of money into Company [Y] occurred in 2016, and Company [Y] has lain dormant since then. I note that the Husband had already commenced negotiations with the Wife throughout 2016 to reach an agreement on an uncontested divorce. Further, in 2015, when the Wife disclosed the extent of the losses suffered by Company [Y] to the Husband, the Husband asked the Wife to shut the business down to avoid incurring further losses and debts. The Wife went on, however, to inject S$64,000.00 and S$22,000.00 into Company [Y] in 2015 and 2016 respectively.
- [49]
[49] In my judgment, the amounts injected into Company [Y] in 2016 by the Wife should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets and treated as an advance to the Wife out of her share of the pool. In 2016, the divorce proceedings were imminent given the existing negotiations. This also came after the Husband made clear that the decision to continue Company [Y]’s business was her “solo” decision. Her business decisions in 2016 were therefore unilateral, and expended resources that the Husband could claim a putative interest in. Given that Company [Y] is now dormant, I prefer to treat the money as expended rather than being the subject of a loan (which would be treated as an existing asset held by the Wife against Company [Y]). This, in my view, is the only realistic option.
- [50]
[50] However, I do not see a basis in principle for returning money expended before 2016 into the pool of matrimonial assets. Although the parties were separated, divorce proceedings were not yet imminent. That there was on-going disagreement between the Husband and the Wife over Company [Y] is not, in and of itself, sufficient to suggest that the funds put into the company should be returned. Losses incurred by one party to the marriage are generally to be borne by the couple. This follows from the fact that marriage is “in part an economic union in which each spouse’s financial well-being is entwined with the other”: ATT v ATS [2012] 2 SLR 859 (“ATT”) at [11]. There, the Court of Appeal held at [11]–[12]:
- [51]
[51] This must be considered together with the recent pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in UZN ([13] supra) at [70]:
- [52]
[52] In other words, losses incurred by one spouse should generally be borne by both parties to the marriage. Losses, however, can take different forms in different cases, and what form the loss takes in a particular case may affect how it is treated. In the present case, the dispute is over sums expended in a loss-making enterprise, which the Husband wants to be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. This is not a case where there is a debt and the question is who should bear it and in what proportions. Where the issue is whether sums of money should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets, the court is guided by the authorities at two levels: (a) whether there is a reason to depart from the usual principle that the family should bear the loss together: see ATT; and (b) if so, whether the sum of money should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets: see UZN. According to UZN, it is only if the divorce proceedings are imminent that sums of money should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. Otherwise, if (a) is answered in the affirmative but divorce proceedings are not imminent, the court deals with the issue in terms of contributions rather than identification of assets.
- [53]
[53] Hence, in this case, given my finding that the divorce proceedings were imminent in 2016, I choose only to return the sum injected into Company [Y]’s business by the Wife in 2016, ie, S$22,000.00, to the pool of matrimonial assets.
(C) Credit card debts
- [54]
[54] The Wife urged the court to deduct liabilities that she had incurred from the pool of matrimonial assets. These were a credit card debt for her HSBC Credit Card No ending in 3723 (“HSBC Card 3723”) and a personal loan in SCB CreditOne Account No ending in 4318 (“SCB Account 4318”), with debts of S$27,894.16 and S$34,365.08 as of the IJ date respectively. The Husband argued that the Wife should be made to bear these liabilities herself. In substance, his argument was that the Wife should not have incurred these liabilities, and, as such, these liabilities should not be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets.
- [55]
[55] In my view, the principles to apply to such an argument are the same as those found in TNL ([13(c)] supra) at [24]. A decision not to allow liabilities to be deducted from the matrimonial assets is, in substance, the same as a decision to return sums expended into the pool of matrimonial assets. The only difference is whether the expenses were paid for up-front with cash, or whether credit was used for the purchases.
- [56]
[56] In relation to HSBC Card 3723, the transactions worth more than S$1,000.00 were helpfully extracted in the report by AAG. In my view, there was nothing so exceptional in any of these transactions such that the amounts should be borne by the Wife herself. Although there was expenditure for luxury goods and apparel, as well as travel, around 2016 and 2017, I do not find that any of these are “substantial” in the manner referred to in the TNL dicta, especially given the lifestyle to which the Husband and Wife were accustomed to. I therefore find that it is appropriate to include this liability in the pool of matrimonial assets, as this sum would otherwise have had to been paid by cash. In relation to SCB Account 4318, I take the same approach as the Husband’s arguments in relation to this account were largely the same. I also include this liability in the pool of matrimonial assets. Therefore, I account for these two liabilities in arriving at the value of the pool of matrimonial assets.
(D) Loan from family
- [57]
[57] The Wife’s parents had provided money to her by way of various bank transfers through the years. The Wife argued that these were loans that she had to repay, and asked for these sums to be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband argued instead that these were gifts that did not have to be repaid, and asked that these sums not be deducted from the pool.
- [58]
[58] These sums were provided before the IJ date. I summarise the transfers made by the Wife’s parents to her as follows:
- [59]
[59] As this alleged loan involves non-parties, I first consider the appropriate approach to take. The Husband urged the court to disregard the alleged loan on the basis that the Wife’s parents are strangers to the matrimonial proceedings, citing UTL v UTM [2019] SGHCF 10 (“UTL”) at [53]. In that case, the husband had alleged that the wife had borrowed money from his mother, and that the loans were still outstanding and should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets. The wife’s main contention was that any money taken from the husband’s mother had already been repaid: UTL at [52]. The dispute, therefore, was whether the wife still owed money to the husband’s mother, which was an issue primarily to be determined between the wife and the husband’s mother, not between the wife and the husband. The High Court Family Division was therefore the view that the alleged loan should not be dealt with in the matrimonial proceedings, and declined to deduct the loan amount from the pool of matrimonial assets: UTL at [53]. It bears noting that in UTL, the argument does not appear to have been that the loans were to be considered as matrimonial liabilities, but that the outstanding sums should be deducted from the pool as some kind of set-off. Such an argument clearly could not be sustained if the alleged creditor was not a party to the proceedings. In my view, UTL can be distinguished given the particular nature of the argument run by the husband in that case. In the present instance, the Wife argued instead that the loans from her parents were in the nature of debts incurred for her expenses, and that the debts should be borne by both parties.
- [61]
[61] I therefore proceed to consider if the transfers should be treated as gifts or as loans, rather than to disregard the issue entirely. In my judgment, there is insufficient evidence to show that the transfers were intended as loans. The Wife has referred to two letters from the Wife’s mother, one dated 15 May 2019 and one dated 19 November 2019. She has also pointed to a WhatsApp conversation with her mother dated 6 February 2017 in which she thanked her mother for “lending [her] the money”. In my view, the evidence was not sufficiently clear to show that all of the sums transferred were intended as loans. First, the only relatively contemporaneous evidence was dated 6 February 2017. However, the message in that instance did not discuss any details of the loan arrangement, and in the context, it is possible that the word “lending” was used loosely. In any event, that message only pertained to one out of 11 transfers. Even if it is accepted that this sum was a loan, this did not indicate that the rest of the transfers were also loans. Second, the other evidence concerning the details of the loan arrangement are not contemporaneous and can only be found in the letters in May and November 2019. It is also worth noting that the 15 May 2019 letter did not contain any details as to the loan arrangement, which details are suddenly present in the 19 November 2019 letter. This did not inspire confidence that there was a loan arrangement from the outset.
- [62]
[62] Therefore, I do not deduct the alleged loan amount from the pool of matrimonial assets. Further, while gifts are not to be treated as matrimonial assets under s 112(10) WC, there is no evidence that the sums in the various accounts were derived from these sums transferred by the Wife’s parents.
(2) Husband’s assets and liabilities
(A) Airline Miles
- [63]
[63] The Wife claimed that the “miles” that the Husband had earned in the frequent flyer program (“Airline Miles”) were matrimonial assets that should be divided. Based on a document disclosed by the Husband, he had 177,851 Airline Miles as of 19 June 2019. The Husband argued that he did not have access to the exact number of miles as of the IJ date and that there was no evidence as to when they were accumulated. His position was that they should be disregarded as the Wife already had enjoyed the benefit of the miles redeemed at an earlier period. Both parties appeared to proceed on the assumption that Airline Miles amounted to assets that could be divided.
- [66]
[66] The Court of Appeal has observed in Chan Teck Hock David v Leong Mei Chuan [2002] 1 SLR(R) 76 (“Chan Teck Hock”) at [17] that:
While the term is broad, it still must refer to an “asset”. It is not entirely clear to me that points in a loyalty programme, even though governed by contract, which secure concessions and discounts towards purchases when used, can be treated as assets. There is also the question of how the term “assets”, as it is used in s 112(10) WC, relates to “property”. A decision on this point may have implications for whether other things (to use a neutral term) like points in a loyalty programme or virtual objects like items in video games (which may have a real-world monetary value) may or may not fall within the scope of matrimonial assets. However, as this is not necessary in this case given my conclusion above, I do not come to a decision on this question.
(B) [X] LLP Current Account
- [67]
[67] As noted above, the Husband, as a partner of [X] LLP, maintained two accounts with [X] LLP, a Capital Account and a Current Account. The dispute in relation to the [X] LLP Current Account is whether the sum recorded in the Current Account as the Husband’s profit share is a matrimonial asset to be divided. The Wife’s argument was that the balance of the Current Account represents the undisbursed amounts to which the Husband remains entitled, and is therefore a matrimonial asset that can be divided. In particular, she sought a division of the balance of the Current Account as of 30 June 2017, valued at S$588,192.00. The Husband disagreed and claimed that the Current Account was a merely notional account (in his words, “a mere statement”) and that it did not represent any assets. When the Current Account was in credit, these amounts would have been paid to the Husband as earnings or drawings, and when the Current Account was in debit, that sum represents over-drawings by the Husband which would have to be repaid or set-off. Hence, since the amounts have been disbursed, accounting for the Current Account in addition to the Husband’s other assets would be double counting.
- [68]
[68] To support his argument, the Husband tendered a letter from [X] LLP dated 9 July 2020 which sets out the working definition of “Current Account” as follows:
- [69]
[69] Insofar as the Wife was claiming the balance of the Current Account as of 30 June 2017, I agree with the Husband that this claim must fail entirely. The balance of the Current Account as of that date was clearly all withdrawn by 23 February 2018, ie, the IJ date. Those sums would be accounted for in identifying the assets as of 23 February 2018, and there is no basis for further adding the balance as of 30 June 2017 into the pool of matrimonial assets. This would constitute double counting.
- [70]
[70] The more accurate submission on the evidence would be that the balance of the Current Account as of 30 June 2018 (or at least a part thereof), which has not yet been disbursed to the Husband as of the IJ date, should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. I proceed to consider whether that balance should treated as matrimonial assets. I deal with this issue in two parts. First, I determine the significance of the balance of the Current Account. Second, in that light, I consider what part of that should be treated as a matrimonial asset to be divided.
- [71]
[71] In my view, the balance of the Current Account as of 30 June 2018 represents the Husband’s entitlement to be paid that sum in the following year by way of drawings from the Current Account.
- [72]
[72] First, this can be seen from the various Current Account statements tendered by the Husband. I summarise these statements from Financial Year (“FY”) 2013 to FY 2018. Based on these statements, the FYs are taken as 1 July of one year to 30 June of the following year, hence, eg, FY 2018 is from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018.
- [73]
[73] I make a few observations about these statements. First, at the end of each FY, the balance is carried over as the opening balance of the next FY. Second, the drawings from the current account are taken out of that opening balance, but always exceed that opening balance, leading to a debit in the balance prior to the addition of the profit for that FY. Third, the profit share for that FY (after various adjustments, for example, for tax) is added to that balance, resulting in the closing balance for the FY, and the cycle continues again to the following FY. In effect, what happens in each FY is that the profit share for that FY is “split” between making up for the deficit after the drawings in that FY and then being drawn down in the following FY, before being depleted and then running the Current Account into a deficit again.
- [74]
[74] Taking FY 2018 for illustration, the opening balance was S$588,192.00. The drawings from the Current Account for 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 totalled S$1,121,149.00, leaving a deficit of S$532,957.00. When the profit share for FY 2018 was added (and other adjustments made), that brought the Current Account into credit again, and the balance as of 30 June 2018 (including profit share and adjustments) was S$711,895.00. Based on the practice shown in the statements, that sum would then be drawn down from 1 July 2018 onwards. The total profit share for FY 2018 (after adjustments) was therefore split between (a) paying down the deficit of S$532,957.00; and (b) a balance of S$711,895.00 which is drawn down from 1 July 2018 onwards.
- [75]
[75] Furthermore, the profit share stated is the profit share for that FY, meaning that it is the share of profits generated from 1 July of the prior calendar year to 30 June of the present calendar year. In other words, it was a profit already earned in that FY which was then disbursed in the following year after making up for any deficit in the Current Account. This is in contrast to a “salary”, strictly speaking – the Husband as a partner appears, on the evidence, to share in the partnership’s profit, which can only be determined retrospectively after the profit has been earned.
- [76]
[76] Second, this is consistent with the letter from [X] LLP tendered by the Husband. The fact that it is a “notional” account does not mean that there is no real entitlement to the money. “Notional” merely means that there is no direct correspondence to any particular money in any given bank account. It is an account kept independently of any particular asset, but which records a real entitlement to money. The letter also states that it records the allocation of net profits – these profits have already been earned in that FY and are then shared among the partners. The balance is then drawn down monthly in the following FY (ie, the prevailing practice), and the profits cannot be accessed in any way other than through this prevailing practice. In other words, the net profit is to be drawn down by the partner in the following FY. This is consistent with my description of the Current Account above.
- [77]
[77] It follows that the balance as of 30 June 2018 represents the Husband’s entitlement to the profits of the partnership as of that date. In other words, this is money that he had already earned because it was generated in that FY. It is not a prospective prediction of future profits, or simply an expression of future income. I therefore do not accept the Husband’s claim that these sums are simply “income” to be earned in the future.
- [78]
[78] I turn then to the second step in this analysis, which is to consider what part of the Current Account should be treated as matrimonial assets. I draw an analogy to the treatment of stock options by the Court of Appeal in Chan Teck Hock ([66] supra). In that case, the Court held that unvested stock options, ie, “a contract to grant an option upon fulfilment of a condition”, were choses in action that could be treated as matrimonial assets under s 112(10) WC. In the present case, the entitlement to the profit share is even more clearly an asset, as it exists as a right that the Husband has to that share as a partner. In Chan Teck Hock, while one category of stock options had already vested as of the date of the decree nisi (ie, the IJ date), there were some that had not yet vested in the husband as of that date. Similarly, in the present case, the profit share for FY 2018 had not yet “vested” in the Husband as it was only included in the Current Account at the end of FY 2018, whereas the IJ date was in February 2018. The question in both Chan Teck Hock and the present case is how to deal with the “unvested” entitlement. The Court of Appeal in Chan Teck Hock took the following approach (at [37]):
- [79]
[79] In my view, a similar approach can be taken to the Husband’s share in the FY 2018 profit. It would be inappropriate for the whole of that share to be treated as matrimonial assets as what the Husband earned for his work after February 2018 (ie, the month of the IJ date) would not be correctly identified as matrimonial assets based on the operative date of identification. At the same time, it is not possible to identify, on the evidence, how exactly the profit share was earned that year. Therefore, I choose to make a broad estimation in terms of months – assuming a constant earning of the profit share throughout the year, I identify only that part of the profit share that can be attributed to work done before February 2018 as matrimonial assets. Further, as there were various adjustments made to the profit share before it was added to the Current Account, I use the sum of S$1,244,852.00, being the net profit share indicated in the relevant statement which already incorporates those adjustments, .
- [80]
[80] I first determine what portion of the net FY 2018 profit share can be attributed (approximately) to work done between July 2017 and February 2018 (including February 2018 itself as the IJ date was towards the end of that month). The portion of the FY 2018 profit share that can be attributed to work done prior to the IJ date would be , as seven months of work was done before the IJ date. Multiplying that by the FY 2018 profit share, S$1,244,852.00, gives S$726,163.67.
- [81]
[81] I then deduct from that sum the amount that has already been paid out in 2017–2018 up to the IJ date. This would leave the amount of the profit share that is a matrimonial asset and has not yet been paid out and accounted for in the other assets as of the IJ date. For this, I consider the drawings in FY 2018 in detail, as tabulated:
The opening balance as of 1 July 2017 was S$588,192.00. Up to and including the January 2018 drawing, the Husband had withdrawn a total of S$634,418.00. That left a deficit of S$46,226.00 (being S$634,418.00 − S$588,192.00). This sum, together with all the subsequent drawings, would have been paid out of the Husband’s share of the FY 2018 profit. Specifically, as of the IJ date, the sum of S$143,572.00 (being the sums of the remainders for January and February 2018, S$46,226.00 + S$97,346.00) would already have been paid out. The Husband’s share of the FY 2018 profits earned up to February 2018 that remain to be paid out would therefore be S$582,591.67 (being S$726,163.67 − S$143,572.00).
- [82]
[82] I therefore add the sum of S$582,591.67 to the pool of matrimonial assets, being the Husband’s share of the FY 2018 profits that have not yet been paid out and which can, on the approach I have taken, be approximately attributed to his work up to the IJ date.
(C) [X] Services LLP Current and Capital Accounts
- [83]
[83] The Wife had initially contended that the Husband had two other current and capital accounts with another partnership of which he was partner, [X] Services LLP. However, the Wife subsequently withdrew this contention and no longer pursued it before me. I therefore do not need to say anything more about this. It also follows that the Wife’s submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband for failing to disclose these accounts was no longer pursued.
(D) CitiGold Account No ending in 1015
- [84]
[84] The Husband had opened a CitiGold Account No ending in 1015 (“CitiGold 1015”) in March 2014. The dispute over whether this account should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets turned entirely on the operative date of identification. As I have held that the operative date is the IJ date, CitiGold 1015 is clearly a part of the pool of matrimonial assets. As this is a bank account, I also value it at the IJ date. The balance as of 23 February 2018 was S$27,974.95, which I take to be the value of this account.
(E) Jaguar Car/Volkswagen Car
- [85]
[85] The Husband had owned the Jaguar Car which he purchased on 28 September 2016. This car was later sold in January 2019 when the Husband purchased the Volkswagen Car. The Husband argued that neither of these were matrimonial assets as they were purchased after the purported date of separation. The Wife argued that the Jaguar Car was an asset as it was purchased before the IJ date and was owned by the Husband as of the IJ date, and the Volkswagen Car was an asset as well as it was purchased with funds from the pool of matrimonial assets, even if it had been purchased after the IJ date.
- [86]
[86] I agree with the Wife that the Jaguar Car should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. It was purchased before the IJ date and was owned by the Husband as of the IJ date. It was agreed by the parties that the gross value of the Jaguar Car as of the IJ date was S$186,000.00, and the Wife identified S$108,173.32 as being due under the car loan which was used to finance the purchase of the Jaguar Car as of 21 January 2019. Deducting the outstanding loan amount from the gross value gives S$77,826.68 and I value the Jaguar Car accordingly as it is the valuation supported by the best evidence and the parties’ agreement even if it is not the AM date (see [33] above).
- [87]
[87] The Volkwagen Car, however, is not a matrimonial asset. It was purchased after the IJ date. Although it would likely have been funded by what were matrimonial assets, to include it in the pool would double count the value of the Jaguar Car that was converted into sale proceeds, as well as any cash used that would have been found in the bank accounts valued as of the IJ date. Therefore, I could not accept Wife’s argument that it should be added because the Husband would have used matrimonial assets to purchase the car.
(F) Various shares
- [88]
[88] The Husband owned shares in three companies: Company [A], Company [B], and Company [C].
- [89]
[89] The Husband had purchased 100,000 shares in Company [A] on 3 November 2016 for S$100,000.00. The parties’ dispute over the inclusion of these shares was based entirely on the operative date of identification. Since I have found that the IJ date is the operative date, it follows that these shares are matrimonial assets to be divided. As for the valuation of the shares, the Husband has tendered evidence to show that, as of May 2019, Company [A] was planning on selling its intellectual property, with no funds left over for the shareholders of the company. Counsel for the Wife conceded before me that the shares in Company [A] were “actually worth nothing”. I am satisfied that the shares in Company [A] should be valued at S$0.00.
- [90]
[90] The Wife’s argument, however, is that the sums used to purchase the 100,000 shares in Company [A] should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets as it constituted an expenditure under TNL ([13(c)] supra). The Wife characterised this as a “gamble” that the Husband took on his own accord without consulting with the Wife. I do not accept that argument. As counsel for the Wife candidly accepted, if the investment had turned a profit, the Wife would naturally have sought a share of the profits. This was not simply an expenditure, but an investment – the Husband expected a return on his investment, and any increase in the value of the shares would be shared between the Husband and the Wife. Taking reference from ATT ([50] supra) at [11]–[12], I choose not to add back the sum expended for these shares into the pool of matrimonial assets. I clarify that this decision is fact-specific, and, in an appropriate case, the court may choose to add back in the sums spent on a purported investment when the divorce proceedings are imminent.
- [91]
[91] The Husband had purchased 1,777 shares in Company [B] on 22 December 2016. Similar to the shares in Company [A], since I have found that the operative date for inclusion is the IJ date, it follows that these shares are matrimonial assets. The parties have agreed on a valuation of S$100,000.00 for these shares, being the sum invested into that company. I therefore value the 1,777 shares in Company [B] at S$100,000.00.
- [92]
[92] As for the shares in Company [C], these were purchased in September 2018, after the IJ date. Therefore, I do not treat these as matrimonial assets.
(G) SCB BonusSaver Account
- [93]
[93] The Husband had a SCB BonusSaver Account No ending in 2554 (“SCB 2554”). The account was opened in November 2017. Given that this was before the IJ date, I find that this account is a matrimonial asset.
- [95]
[95] The parties have agreed to take the sum of S$330,000.00 which was paid out to the Wife as the starting point for the value of SCB 2554. They have then deducted the loan amount of S$244,801.00, leaving S$85,199.00 which the Husband admits came from his income. Although the Husband had initially raised the argument that the Wife would already have received the benefit of the sum by way of maintenance, before me, counsel for the Husband agreed with the Wife’s counsel that the only issue was the operative date of identification. If the court was with the Wife that the operative date was the IJ date, then the sum of S$85,199.00 should be included in the pool of assets. Given the parties’ agreement on this approach, and given my finding that the operative date was the IJ date, it follows that SCB 2554 valued at S$85,199.00 is a matrimonial asset to be divided.
(H) Artworks
- [96]
[96] Apart from the artwork in the Wife’s possession, the Husband also had some pieces of artwork in his possession. Again, a significant issue here was the operative date of identification – the Husband argued that of the artwork in his possession, he only had S$840.00 worth of that artwork as of the purported date of separation. As I have found that the operative date of identification is the IJ date, however, I cannot accept that submission. Further, there is no evidence that any of the artwork was purchased after the IJ date. As such, I accept the Wife’s contention that the Husband had S$77,763.00 worth of artwork in his possession that constitute matrimonial assets, as being the valuation of these assets best supported by the evidence.
(I) SCB Personal Loan
- [97]
[97] As I have noted above at [39], the Husband contended that a loan he had taken from SCB for S$95,000.00 should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets as that money had been used in relation to the [X] LLP Capital Account. In effect, it was a transfer into the Capital Account and if the Wife claimed the value of that account, she also had to recognise the loan. The Wife’s contention was, in effect, that the Husband had a variety of ways to finance the payment into the Capital Account, and as it was not appropriate for him to have incurred the loan, the Wife should not have to share in that burden.
- [98]
[98] Given that the loan from SCB was used to top up the Capital Account, I find that the outstanding loan amount should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets. As counsel for the Husband noted, the loan simply meant that there was a deferred payment of the sum into the Capital Account. If the whole of the value of the Capital Account is to be added to the pool, it would only be just for the loan which was used to finance part of the Capital Account to be deducted from the pool. The Husband identified the outstanding loan amount as of the IJ date as S$69,896.25. I therefore deduct this outstanding sum from the pool of matrimonial assets.
Alleged dissipations and adverse inferences
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