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Grounds publishedDecided 4 Jun 2021

Family Division of the High Court

VOC v VO D

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[2021] SGHCF 14Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 3470 of 2018 (Summons No 96 of 2021)10 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] Summons 96 of 2021 (“SUM 96”) is an application by the defendant husband (the “husband”) for a stay of execution of certain orders made by JC Tan Puay Boon (“JC Tan”) on 28 January 2021 and 22 February 2021 in HCF/DT 3470/2018, pending the determination of the husband’s appeal against those orders.

  2. [2] The parties were married on 3 January 2015. Their son, who was born in November 2015, will be 6 years old this year. The plaintiff wife (the “wife”) is 36 years old this year and is a dentist at a private clinic. The husband is presently 37 years old and is acting Chief Executive Officer and a managing director of Company [X], a publicly listed company operating a business related to the oil and gas sector. At the start of the marriage, the parties lived together in a property at Third Avenue in Bukit Timah (the “Property”), which the husband owns jointly with his mother and brother. The wife and child moved out of the Property after 28 September 2017, and the wife filed for divorce on 25 July 2018. An Interim Judgment was granted on 25 January 2019, and a Final Judgment was granted on 8 March 2021.

  3. [3] On 28 January and 22 February 2021, JC Tan made, inter alia, the following orders:

  4. [4] JC Tan held that the total pool of matrimonial assets was worth S$5,416,252.84. He valued the wife’s assets at S$333,430.65 and the husband’s assets at S$5,082,822.19. He decided that the husband’s assets included:

  5. (a) The husband’s 1/3 share of the Property, which JC Tan valued at S$1,744,000.00;

  6. (b) Dividends of S$2,073,247.27 from shares in Company [Y], which the husband received when he was a shareholder from August 2016 to March 2019 (“Y Dividends”);

  7. (c) S$48,815.93 the husband transferred to his father in December 2017/January 2018 (“Father’s Money”);

  8. (d) S$105,000.00 withdrawn by the husband from his Standard Chartered Bank Account from 13 October 2017 to 30 October 2018 (“Bank Account Money”); and

  9. (e) S$128,518.72 spent by the husband on wine from November 2017 to June 2018 (“Wine Money”).

  10. (collectively, the “Disputed Assets”)

  11. (b) Tokio Marine Insurance Policy (“TM Policy”): The husband paid a premium of S$1,385,434.80 in September 2014 for this policy. Taking into account the outstanding loan he took to pay the premium, he will make a “huge loss” if he surrenders the policy now, as he will receive the net value of only S$320,003.18. He would also lose the death benefit of S$10,000,000.00 under the policy and the benefits that have accrued under the policy since its purchase.

  12. [11] As for the husband’s claim that he will not be able to pay S$3,000.00 for the child’s monthly maintenance due to Company [X]’s restructuring proposal, counsel submits that this is “completely speculative”. This supposed deferment of salary is merely a proposal made by Company [X]. There is no guarantee that the proposal will indeed be accepted on those terms and there is no fixed period prescribed for the deferment of income as it is “contingent on the company reaching certain milestones”. Even if the husband will not receive any income for the next three years, it is his responsibility to seek alternative employment commensurate with his earning capacity. In any event, he continues to draw a monthly salary of USD1,300 from his other role as a director of Company [Z], and his spending habits are not consistent with that of a man “concerned about being able to meet his future financial obligations”.

  13. [13] Rule 700 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 830/2014) (“FJR”), which concerns stays of execution, is derived from O 45 r 11 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (see FJR, Table of Derivations). The principles concerning a stay of execution pending appeal are set out in Strandore Invest A/S and others v Soh Kim Wat [2010] SGHC 174 (“Strandore”) at [7] and [10], and I summarise them as follows:

  14. (a) As a general proposition, the court does not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of his litigation pending an appeal. There is no difference whether the judgment appealed against was made on a summary basis or after a full trial.

  15. (b) When a party is exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory. Thus, a stay will be granted if it can be shown by affidavit that, if the damages and costs are paid, there is no reasonable probability of getting them back if the appeal succeeds.

  16. (c) An appellant must show special circumstances before the court will grant a stay. The likelihood of success is not, by itself, sufficient. The special circumstances must be circumstances which go to the enforcement of the judgment and not to its validity or correctness.

  17. [14] The husband has to show that there are special circumstances justifying a stay of execution of the judgment. In this case, there was no suggestion that the wife was impecunious, such that any money paid over to her would be irrecoverable if the husband succeeds on appeal (Strandore at [13]). In fact, the husband says that the wife earns a “high income”.

  18. [16] Second, I also note that the husband’s counsel says he has filed an application for leave to adduce fresh evidence in relation to the Disputed Assets, to show that he did not receive Y Dividends. In my judgment, this, if anything, casts doubt on the likelihood of the husband’s success, as it depends on whether the appellate court will allow the fresh evidence to be adduced (Lee Sian Hee (trading as Lee Sian Hee Pork Trader) v Oh Kheng Soon (trading as Ban Hon Trading Enterprise) [1991] 2 SLR(R) 869 at [9]).

  19. [20] Next, I consider the husband’s claim that he will soon have no more salary and therefore cannot afford to pay monthly maintenance for the child. I agree with the wife’s counsel that this claim is “completely speculative”. It depends on whether the restructuring proposal is approved and when Company [X] achieves the objectives in the proposal. Even if the husband is no longer paid a salary at Company [X], he is young and healthy, and capable of taking on another job. In addition, the wife has pointed out that the husband also earns a monthly salary of USD1,300 from Company [Z], as evidenced in the husband’s bank statements in his affidavit. Thus, it is not correct that he will have no income at all even if the restructuring proposal is approved.

  20. [21] The husband’s counsel also submitted that the husband’s non-payment of the child’s maintenance would not impact the child’s welfare as the wife is able to afford the child’s expenses, and the husband will continue to contribute to the child’s other expenses. This argument is beside the point. The husband’s counsel is really saying that the wife does not need the husband to assist her in maintaining the child, but this contradicts JC Tan’s decision that the wife requires S$3,000.00 maintenance for the child, and that is an issue to be determined on appeal. Therefore, this is a circumstance that goes to the validity or correctness of JC Tan’s judgment, rather than its enforcement (Strandore at [10]), and it does not justify a stay of execution.