Family Division of the High Court · Decided 23 June 2021
VJM v VJL and another appeal
Feedback & support[2021] SGHCF 16 · Case no. District Court Appeal (Family Division) No 55 of 2020 · 26 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] The Mother and Father were married in the US in November 2012. The Father commenced divorce proceedings on 5 July 2018, at which time the Mother was 42 years old and the Father was 49 years old. The Mother was the appellant in HCF/DCA 55/2020 and the respondent in HCF/DCA 56/2020. The Father was the appellant in HCF/DCA 56/2020 and the respondent in HCF/DCA 55/2020. I will address the issues in both appeals together.
Custody: Joint or Sole
- [5]
[5] I did not think that the DJ erred in granting joint custody. The Court of Appeal held in the seminal decision of CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 (“CX v CY”) at [26]:
- [6]
[6] The practical effect of ‘joint custody’ is that both parents must consult each other on matters of importance, including those relating to the permanent immigration status and the education of N. Each parent should consider with an open mind the inputs of the other, to reach the best decisions for N. There should not at this time be restrictions that exclude the Father from involvement in such matters. To have the court decide now to exclude the Father from the child’s life in significant matters, when the parents are still in high conflict and in litigation, does not place the child in the best position. The parents may use therapeutic or mediation support to assist them if necessary; the court’s intervention, while available, should remain the last resort.
Relocation of the child
- [8]
[8] At the hearing, the Father expressed his views that Singapore is a safe country, and a great place to live and to raise a child. I accepted that when the family was intact, Singapore was the choice of the family’s residence, but this is no longer the case. Serious conflicts have arisen leading to a divorce, and one party wishes to live in Singapore, but the other party does not. This difficulty is one of the unfortunate consequences of the breakdown of the globalised family.
- [9]
[9] One of the strongest factors in favour of relocation in the present case is the family’s lack of connection to Singapore. There are similarities between the present case and UYK v UYJ [2020] 5 SLR 772 (“UYK v UYJ”), where relocation was allowed. In UYK v UYJ, the High Court held at [61]:
…the parties did not have any permanent immigration status in Singapore. The Father was staying in Singapore on an Employment Pass, while the Mother was in Singapore on a short term visa. .... [the child] was in Singapore on a Dependent’s Pass linked to the Father’s Employment Pass. The Mother submitted that the Father has not shown whether he intended to stay in Singapore permanently, and that he has shown a propensity for moving between countries for personal reasons such as tax benefits. The Father stated in response that he had made efforts to integrate into Singapore. The pertinent point here is that neither party had any roots in Singapore, or any secure basis on which to remain here in the longer term.
- [10]
[10] In the present case, the Mother moved to Singapore to join the Father in 2013. Their child N, who holds both American and British citizenship, was born on 22 March 2017; he is a young child. The Father is a British citizen while the Mother is an American citizen – neither party holds any permanent residence status in Singapore. The whole family has no roots nor permanent immigration status in Singapore.
- [11]
[11] The Father highlighted that relocation will result in the child’s loss of relationship with him. I agreed that some loss in relationship will arise when parent and child are in different countries, separated by physical distance. However, in UYK v UYJ, I had remarked (at [64]):
We must not forget that the loss of relationship in such situations is an unfortunate consequence of family breakdown. If the parents’ desired countries of residence do not coincide and neither parent makes a “sacrifice”, a child would, inevitably, be physically separated from one parent. Good access arrangements can mitigate the loss of time and relationship with the left-behind parent. These may comprise physical access which will involve international travel as well as virtual access. Understanding these perspectives should lead us to appreciate that the loss of relationship is a result of the parents being unable to agree on a common country of residence, and if one parent is willing to live in the country chosen by the other, the loss of relationship will not be an issue – such an option remains open even now to the present parties. The willingness and ability of both parents to support substantial access will also mitigate the trauma of such a loss for the child.
Care and Control: Shared care or Sole care
- [14]
[14] The Father’s submissions on this issue alluded to the psychological effects of granting sole care and control to the Mother, which he claimed caused her to treat “the Father as less of a parent”. He also submitted that an “inclusive view”, which in brief, refers to both parents sharing substantially in caring for the child, serves the child’s welfare and is consistent with “therapeutic justice”. He suggested in his Appellant’s Case that an “exclusive view” encompasses views that shared care is “unworkable where the parties have a bitter relationship”, that shared care “is overly disruptive to a child’s life” as it may involve “uprooting the child every 3-4 days” or that shared care “is not suitable when parents have markedly different parenting styles”. To require parents to agree on “every day-to-day decision relating to the child” for shared care is also an “exclusive view”, in his submission. He submitted that the court should reject the exclusive view and instead adopt an “inclusive view” which upholds shared care and control.
- [15]
[15] First, let me clarify that these submissions on the “inclusive view” and “exclusive view” are the Father’s descriptions and are not found in the law. I emphasise that the paramount substantive consideration in the present appeals is the welfare of the child – this is the established legal principle. I do not accept the Father’s suggestion that the factors (or views) raised above (at [14]) are “exclusive” in character, that is, that they necessarily have the effect of going against the welfare of the child by excluding a parent from parenting. Instead, they are factors which are clearly relevant when a court considers what living arrangements are in the child’s best interests. Established law does not contradict the Father’s submission that cooperative and shared parenting is in the welfare of the child. On the contrary, with the clear guidance of the Court of Appeal in CX v CY that joint parenting is in the child’s welfare, the courts endeavour to reach orders which promote joint parenting. The more difficult and practical question is what living arrangements support the maximum involvement of both parents in the child’s life. The factors described by the Father should not be seen as exclusive; instead they are a few of many considerations that assist the court in addressing this difficult practical question.
- [16]
[16] I have pointed out in TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089 (“TAU v TAT”) that (at [12]):
…The ideal state is understandably for a child to be in an intact family where he or she lives with and is lovingly cared for jointly by both parents. Yet, upon the breakdown of a marriage, this is simply no longer fully achievable. The family justice system nevertheless aspires to achieve the ideal state of affairs for the child, or the closest to it possible. But to ignore the realities, including the parental conflict, the parties’ emotional baggage and the new dynamics of the various relationships, and impose in all situations a modified version of the perceived ideal (such as equal-time shared parenting or shared care and control) can do more harm than good. Thus in considering whether shared care and control would be in the child’s welfare, the court will have to consider factors such as that particular child’s needs at that stage of life, the extent to which the parents are able to co-operate within such an arrangement, and whether it is easy for that child, bearing in mind his or her age and personality, to live in two homes within one week.
- [17]
[17] I accept that a parent will need sufficient amounts of regular and frequent time with the child to build a strong relationship with the child. Equally important is how the time is spent with the child. If there is sufficient time with the child for the care or access period to be meaningful, then a strong parent can do much to bond and create many positive memories with the child. To be clear, ‘sufficient’ time is not equivalent to mathematically equal time between parents.
- [18]
[18] Our law adopts the legal constructs of ‘custody’, ‘care and control’ and ‘access’, which are used to support families in which the child’s parents have separated. As ‘custody’ refers to the decision-making authority and responsibility in major aspects of the child’s life, ‘custody’ is not directly dependent on having physical time with the child. In contrast, ‘care and control’ involves physical time with the child, caregiving, and the residence of the child with the parent as well as that parent’s decision-making responsibility over day-to-day matters. The High Court has explained in TAU v TAT at [11]:
- [19]
[19] To do away with ‘access’ and call any arrangement in which a child spends some time with both parents a ‘shared care and control’ arrangement does not fit into the current law. The court applies the law; it does not make law. If the use of ‘sole care and control’ to one parent and ‘access’ to the other causes any of the negative psychological effects alleged by the Father, the roots of any such potential effects may need to be addressed by legislative reform. The court and lawyers can also emphasise to the parties that both parents are equal parents with equal parental responsibility in the eyes of the law.
- [20]
[20] I had made it clear in TAU v TAT that “shared care and control is different from joint custody; the former relates to the child living with both parents, while the latter is about joint decision-making over major decisions affecting the child” (TAU v TAT at [11]). The legal concept that upholds the equal parental responsibility and importance of both parents to the child is ‘joint custody’. Joint custody requires both parents to recognise and respect each other’s joint and equal role in supporting, guiding and making major decisions for their child. Joint custody assures the child that both her parents continue to be equally present and important in her life. It would be erroneous and unhelpful to co-parenting for the parent with sole care and control to hold the view that he or she is the better or more important parent. Given that it is accepted that joint parenting is in the child’s welfare, it seems ironic that a parent who thinks himself or herself the stronger and better parent would undermine the other parent’s involvement in their child’s life, for a truly strong parent is one who actively supports the child in having a close relationship with the other parent. This ensures that the child does not suffer the ‘conflict of loyalty’ of being caught between two parents jealous of each other’s relationship with her.
I noted that on the facts of that case, significant changes had occurred over the years:
It might well be that the future holds new needs for that child, and further adjustments in living arrangements will be required to meet those needs. Should that come to pass, the appropriate way forward would be for the parents, who know their child best and love her most deeply, to work out these parenting matters. They can reach out for therapeutic support or mediation services if they would like assistance.
Challenge to DJ’s reliance on report
- [24]
[24] The Father in his appeal also challenged the DJ’s finding that the Mother is a suitable caregiver to N while he is not.
- [25]
[25] The DJ had set out the parties’ allegations against each other with regard to each party’s suitability to parent N (GD at [10]):
- [26]
[26] The DJ appointed a psychologist I shall refer to as ‘Dr A’, to prepare a report “on the specific issue of whether the Father’s sexual habits/lifestyle would affect his ability to be N’s caregiver and whether it would have any adverse effect on N in the time spent with the Father” (GD at [12]). The DJ referred to the report prepared by Dr A in her reasons for her decision.
- [27]
[27] In his appeal, the Father submitted that “the DJ’s interpretation of and complete reliance on [Dr A]’s findings … is in error”. He argued that the DJ “did not give sufficient weight to [Dr A]’s conclusion that the Father is not a sexual deviant or addict and is in fact suitable for caregiving responsibilities”, “erred in finding that there is a real risk of harm to [N] by [N] being exposed to the wrong values and behaviour in the Father’s care”, “completely misinterpreted [Dr A]’s recommendations in finding that the Father needs to be supervised in his care for [N]”, and “did not give due consideration to the Father’s caregiving for [N]”.
Access
- [31]
[31] I accept that should the Father relocate to the US in future, there may be reason to vary the DJ’s access orders, which were made on the basis that the Father remained in Singapore. However, given the current lack of clarity on whether the Father can and will relocate to the US and where he will reside if he does relocate, it is not appropriate to make orders based on speculations of future living arrangements. Should the Father relocate, and if the parties themselves are unable to resolve access arrangements, the appropriate application can be made to the Family Court.
(a) Video access once a day, for up to half an hour each time.
(b) Twice a year in the US, for up to 10 continuous days each time, including overnight and overseas access.
(c) Additionally, no more than two further access periods per year, for up to 5 continuous days each time, including overnight access.
(d) Once a year in the Father’s country of residence, for up to 10 continuous days each time, including overnight access. The Mother is to accompany N to the Father’s country of residence and shall hand over N to the Father for his access. The Mother is to bear the costs of travel for herself and N to the Father’s country of residence.
(e) The Father shall inform the Mother at least three weeks in advance of his intended trip(s) to the US, and the Mother shall reply within a week with N’s school or activity schedule during the proposed access period. The Father shall take into account N’s school and activity schedule during his proposed access period and is responsible for bringing N to and from any school or extracurricular activities during his access period.
(g) No third party who is not a family member is to be present during the Father’s access and the Father must be with N at all times during his access.
- [36]
[36] The Father also sought restrictions on N’s travels, while the Mother’s counsel submitted that there is no necessity for these restrictions. I agreed with the Mother’s counsel; these are parenting issues in which the court ought to be slow to intervene. The parents must discharge their parental responsibility to safeguard N’s wellbeing.
- [37]
[37] The Mother also appealed against aspects of the DJ’s access orders. Her counsel submitted that overnight access should be conducted in an “environment of accountability and supervision”. I was of the view that the Father should have the space to carry out bonding time and discharge his parental responsibility without the proposed restrictions.
The child’s passports
- [41]
[41] The Father cited two cases where each parent held one of the child’s passports or important documents. I noted that he described the parents in those cases as having shared care and control. I found it consistent with case precedents for the parent with care and control to hold the child’s passports. In this case, the Mother has sole care and control of N and she will hold the passports.
Orders on counselling
Maintenance of former spouse
- [44]
[44] Maintenance for a former wife is not compensation for loss of employment, or compensation for income one might have had the opportunity to earn. Maintenance for a former wife is based on the need for financial preservation and evening out economic inequities arising from the role one has taken on during the marriage.
- [47]
[47] I considered the DJ’s reasoning and found no error in the exercise of her discretion in apportioning the share each parent should bear of N’s expenses. The DJ explained that she had taken into account the Mother’s earning capacity, even though she may have been unemployed at that time. The Mother also has other substantial financial resources.
Expenses
- [49]
[49] This is not the forum for the enforcement of promises. Looking instead at the matter holistically, the question is whether it is reasonable for the Mother or the Father or both to bear these relocation expenses. The Mother sought to adduce further evidence on her expenses related to the relocation. I noted that the Mother was the party who wished to relocate with N and she was not without financial resources. I did not think the DJ was in error in this respect. I therefore did not make further orders on payment of one-off relocation expenses.
Appeal on Costs
Conclusion and costs of appeals
- [53]
[53] I therefore dismissed both appeals, save for the different orders I have stated above. All other orders were affirmed.