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Grounds publishedDecided 8 Mar 2023
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Family Division of the High Court

CXR v CXQ

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[2023] SGHCF 10Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 806 of 2020

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Background facts

  2. [1] The plaintiff (the “Wife”) and the defendant (the “Husband”) were married on 12 February 2011. The Interim Judgment of Divorce (“IJ”) was granted on 30 November 2020 and the ancillary matters (“AM”) were heard over two mornings on 11 and 12 May 2022.

  3. [2] This was a marriage that lasted 9 years and 9 months. The Wife was a director and head of Marine Insurance at [Company A] who earned about $48,635 per month (net income). The Husband was unemployed at the time of the AM hearing; he drew a gross rental income of $2,938 per month. He was last employed as an investment banker with [Company B]. Based on the Husband’s Notice of Assessment dated 6 May 2019, for income earned in 2018, his last drawn monthly salary was approximately $36,494 with bonuses.

  4. [3] The parties have one child, C, who was 11 years of age at the time of the AM hearing. C was diagnosed with refractory frontal lobe epilepsy at age three. In 2018, he underwent frontal lobe lesionectomy in a hospital in the United Kingdom. He met the criteria for four comorbid neurodevelopment disorders: moderate to severe specific learning disorder with impairment in reading, writing and mathematics, and mild to moderate attention and hyperactivity disorder.

  5. [4] After the AM hearing in May 2022, the parties were directed on 20 June 2022 to file further documents with respect to specified assets listed in their joint summary of relevant information (“Joint Summary”) by 27 June 2022. On 11 August 2022, pursuant to a request by the Husband, both parties were directed to file further written submissions on issues relating to the child by 1 September 2022.

  6. [5] I highlighted to both parties that the Joint Summary that they had submitted is a key document which I would use as a summary of their latest submissions on their respective positions. I made it clear that the positions stated therein would represent their final positions and would be used in reaching my decision.

  7. Custody, care and control

  8. [7] As I had not yet delivered the AM decision on custody, care and control at the time all these other applications were filed, I thought it important to hear from both parties the significance of the new applications filed after the AM hearing. I fixed a hearing on 26 September 2022. As my decision in respect of the AM would be final, including decisions relating to the custody, care and control of the child, my AM orders would render the interim applications for custody, care and control moot. At the hearing on 26 September 2022, both parties indicated that C’s latest neuropsychological report by Mr R of KKH dated 25 August 2022 (“KKH Report”) should be admitted. I took into account this report in reaching the final AM decision. I was of the view that as the conflict between the parties was escalating, it was important that I delivered the AM orders as soon as is practicable to provide the parties with some finality, rather than hold off the decisions until after the PPO applications have been heard, as requested by the Husband. This was fair and in the interests of C, as the broad allegations relating to the PPO application that the Husband has highlighted at the hearing were largely already reflected in the submissions for the AM. As my AM orders on custody, care and control were final, no orders were made for SUM 269 and SUM 270.

  9. Custody

  10. [9] The Wife submitted that she should have sole custody of C, but that she will obtain the Husband’s consent on matters pertaining to whether C is to be hospitalised, whether a non-emergency surgical procedure is to be performed on C and on matters pertaining to religion. On matters concerning education and therapy (including but not limited to occupational therapy, therapy concerning C’s academic needs and the like), the Wife submitted that she shall have the final say, but shall nevertheless consult with the Husband and inform him of her decision. The Wife submitted that co-parenting is impossible as the Husband is constantly diminishing her as C’s mother and making allegations against her in front of C, and that the acrimony in the present case goes beyond the usual acrimony of bickering parties. The Wife’s position was that C requires a structured, consistent and regular support system and routine supported by professional educators and specialist therapists. She further pointed out that the Husband adopts a very different position in respect of C’s therapy, as he believes that there are better ways to help him recover and give better progress. She pointed out that C’s education and therapy were the primary sources of conflict between the parties. She submitted that her position is aligned with the medical professionals’ recommendations, and she had arranged for and paid for all of C’s therapists.

  11. [11] I recognised that the parties’ differing opinions as to what education and therapy arrangements would be best for C had been a major source of much conflict. Ultimately, the type and frequency of C’s therapy are parenting decisions, which should be made by the parents themselves. Parents know their child best and have their own personal aspirations for their children. They, not the court, are best placed to make these parenting decisions. However, despite this reality, because the parties are unable to reach an arrangement and the marital conflict continues to escalate, the court will step in (as the last resort) to help the parties move on. The principle that guides the court in making its decision on custody, care and control is that the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Having regard to the KKH Report, I accepted that C would benefit from specialist educational therapy. I further noted that, unfortunately, the triangulation of therapists into the conflict has also affected C’s opportunity to receive the therapy that he may need.

  12. [13] Both parents must also acknowledge their weaknesses. This requires both parties to have a truly open and humble spirit. The Wife was very focused on ensuring that C receives different kinds of therapy and may be less attuned to C’s other needs, such as having more resting space between therapy sessions and classes. More is not always better. While she had made efforts to try to teach C herself, particularly during the period of Covid-19 restrictions, this had also caused her much anxiety and stress, which may have resulted in her negative reactions in C’s presence. The Husband was aggrieved by the marital breakdown, and this may in turn have caused him to be lacking in the necessary insights in his parenting of C. He opposed the Wife’s efforts in arranging for therapy and may not have sufficiently appreciated that some of the therapy arranged could afford C a structured, collaborative and supportive care environment.

  13. [14] It is in C’s interests to have the care and support of both parents as substantially as possible even though the parents will be in separate households. I was of the view that both parents should be granted joint custody. Parties should work together to make joint decisions pertaining to C’s healthcare and further medical treatment, where required. In the event of deadlock pertaining to matters relating to C’s academic education arrangements for reading, writing and math, the Wife may make the final decision. In the event of deadlock pertaining to matters relating to C’s extra-curricular arrangements and other therapy including occupational and play therapy, the Husband may make the final decision. Having said this, I cautioned the parties not to approach the matter as if each had sole control over the areas I have stated, for this is at core a joint custody arrangement which may involve both parents discussing, considering each other’s views, compromising and deciding with C’s interests at the forefront. Clearly the parties must carefully consider how the sum total of all the sessions (whether academic, therapeutic or sports) affect C. I reiterated that C would benefit most from having a stable and predictable environment. C would also not benefit from having his schedule packed with different therapy sessions, classes or extracurricular activities – on this point, the parties should take guidance from the KKH Report which highlighted that C needs “breathing room” between and within activities.

  14. Care and control

  15. [16] The Husband submitted that he should have care and control of C. He submitted that he was C’s primary caregiver and is sensitive to C’s medical, educational and emotional needs. He further submitted that if the Wife is granted care and control, she will continue alienating C from the Husband. He pointed to the career break that he took from November 2013 to September 2014, when he was made redundant from his previous role at [Company F] and took the opportunity to play a more active role at home. He also pointed to the Wife’s career which requires long hours and a significant amount of travelling, and that with the lifting of Covid-19 restrictions, it is only a matter of time before the Wife has to resume her frequent work trips and will have to return to the office. On caring for C’s medical needs, the Husband also submitted that he had spent many hours researching on C’s medical condition and has been the primary point of contact with C’s therapists and teachers. He also submitted that the Wife has a harsher parenting style which is incompatible for their child who has medical conditions and developmental delays. He also submitted that if the Wife has care and control of C, she will intensify her efforts to enmesh C and isolate C from him.

  16. [17] The Wife submitted that she should have sole care and control of C. She had been the parent who was involved in C’s day-to-day life and scheduling, she had been dedicated to ensuring C gets the support that he needs, and C is her priority. She had also been supporting him not just with his academic, therapy and medical needs, but also emotionally. The Husband did not deprioritise his career, had never been C’s primary caregiver, was not a stay-home parent and exaggerated the degree to which he focuses on C. She further explained that the Husband was not involved in C’s day-to-day needs, and was unfamiliar with C’s schedule.

  17. [18] I was acutely cognisant of the parties’ acrimonious relationship and their present inability to co-parent effectively. I was equally aware that both parents love C dearly and had been giving their best efforts to care for him and help him cope with his medical condition and learning disabilities, albeit in their own ways. As C was living with both parents in the matrimonial home, he was accustomed to the arrangements and was close to, and dependent on both parents. While there were difficulties in cooperating on matters relating to C in the past few years, the parties were also able to sort out many care aspects including having C travel with his father. C has had the physical presence and care of both parents in his life even after the marriage had broken down. In the circumstances, I was of the view that parties should share care and control of C, but it is crucial that they must have in place a clear routine and structure that would enable C to have a stable and predictable arrangement. This arrangement placed the best interests of C at the forefront.

  18. [19] I made the following orders:

  19. (a) The Wife is to have care and control of C from 8.00pm on Saturdays to 8.00pm on Wednesdays. The Husband is to have care and control of C from 8.00pm on Wednesdays to 8.00pm on Saturdays. The parties can mutually agree to adjust these care periods.

  20. (b) The Husband and Wife are to co-operate in facilitating C’s attendance of educational or other therapeutic sessions if they fall during that parent’s care and control time.

  21. (c) When it comes to special days, such as birthdays, public holidays and school holidays, parties are to mutually agree on the care arrangements to be made. They have shared care and control and so these special days should be shared in that spirit. The parties were reminded to exercise flexibility and graciousness in making the necessary arrangements during these special days.

  22. (d) If either party wishes to bring C overseas, they are to notify the other party with at least four weeks’ prior notice in writing, with the details of the dates of travel, travel itinerary, flight and/or transport details, accommodation details, persons accompanying on the trip and contact details whilst C is abroad.

  23. (e) If either party brings C overseas, the other party is to have liberal video call access to C.

  24. (f) Parties may vary the care arrangement by mutual agreement.

  25. Division of assets

  26. [20] As a general position, all matrimonial assets and liabilities should be identified at the time of the IJ and valued at the time of the AM hearing. It is noted that the balances in bank and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts are to be taken at the time of the IJ, as the matrimonial assets are the moneys in the accounts and not the bank and CPF accounts themselves. Thus, in general, available values as close to the AM hearing date as possible will be used. Nevertheless, where parties have specifically agreed to use a value for the asset or liability as at a different date, I adopted that value instead. In this case, the parties agreed that, in general, the date for ascertaining the pool of assets is the IJ date and the date for valuing those assets is the date of the AM hearing (or closest to this date).

  27. [21] The parties agreed to the following exchange rates in valuing their assets: 1 SGD = 0.5736 GBP; 1 SGD = 0.6807 EUR; 1 SGD = 0.6977 CHF; 1 SGD = 0.7271 USD. In this decision, “$” refers to the Singapore dollar. I have used only whole dollar values in assigning values; the values in cents are dropped as they are de minimis in light of the large total value of the assets.

  28. The pool of matrimonial assets and liabilities

  29. Undisputed matrimonial assets and liabilities

  30. [22] The parties agreed on the following matrimonial assets and liabilities, as well as their values, as tabulated:

  31. 1.

  32. Wife’s Name

  33. 2.

  34. 3.

  35. 4.

  36. 5.

  37. 6.

  38. 7.

  39. 8.

  40. 9.

  41. 10.

  42. 11.

  43. 12.

  44. 13.

  45. 14.

  46. 15.

  47. 1.

  48. Husband’s Name

  49. 2.

  50. 3.

  51. 4.

  52. 5.

  53. 6.

  54. 7.

  55. 8.

  56. 9.

  57. 10.

  58. 11.

  59. 12.

  60. 13.

  61. 14.

  62. 15.

  63. 16.

  64. 17.

  65. 18.

  66. 19.

  67. 20.

  68. 21.

  69. 22.

  70. 23.

  71. 24.

  72. 25.

  73. 26.

  74. 27.

  75. 28.

  76. 29.

  77. Disputed matrimonial assets

  78. [23] The parties disputed a number of the assets held in their respective names.

  79. (A) The UK Apartment (Joint Summary S/N 3)

  80. [24] The Husband submitted that the property in the UK (the “UK Apartment”) was purchased prior to the marriage on 5 July 2010. The purchase price was GBP367,500. He submitted that in accordance with USB v USA and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB v USA”), the UK Apartment was partially paid for during the marriage, and thus only the proportion of the value of the asset that was acquired during the marriage should go into the pool. The Husband submitted that the payments he made towards the UK Apartment before the marriage totalled GBP124,900 (= $217,748). During the marriage, he paid mortgage instalments and the loan redemption amount, totalling GBP303,665 (= $529,402).

  81. [25] The Wife agreed that the UK Apartment was acquired before the parties’ marriage was registered. She contended that she and C resided in the apartment from February 2011 to November 2012 and that it was therefore a matrimonial home. The Wife pointed to TNC v TND [2016] 3 SLR 1172 (“TNC v TND”) at [18], where it was found that residence in a property for 15 months was sufficient to constitute ordinary use of shelter for the purpose of a matrimonial asset. Further, she submitted that the Husband should not deduct the payments which he made before the marriage, as this property was improved by her, who made indirect contributions. She submitted that she had made indirect financial/non-financial contributions to the house, including paying for the utilities and other works, making contributions towards renovation works, doing the cleaning, laundry, cooking and ironing, paying for the furniture, fittings and decorations and paying for the groceries. The parties also had a cleaner who came in once a week (for about 2 to 3 hours) to iron the clothes and do some general housework. As more than 10 years have passed since the Wife stayed in the UK Apartment, she did not have receipts to show that she made payments. The Wife also pointed out that the Husband retains the rental income derived from the UK Apartment.

  82. [26] Section 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”) provides the court the ancillary power, upon a grant of divorce, to divide the matrimonial economic gains of the marriage. Assets acquired during marriage by either party’s efforts are quintessential matrimonial assets subject to division. Assets acquired before the marriage may be subject to the division exercise if they were substantially improved during the marriage by the other spouse or by both spouses, or if they were ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or their children while residing together for purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, etc. On the latter, such “use” must be relatively prolonged rather than casual (USB v USA at [24]). Once transformed, the entire asset is included into the pool of assets to be divided (USB v USA at [19(b)].

  83. [27] I noted that in the present case, the parties had stayed in the property for a total of 21 months. C, who was born in the UK, spent almost the full first year of his life in the UK Apartment. As stated in TNC v TND at [18], an example of a casual residence would include staying in a property for no more than 21 days out of 14 years of marriage (Ryan Neil John v Berger Rosaline [2000] 3 SLR(R) 647 at [60]). In the circumstances, I found that the UK Apartment was ordinarily used by both parties for shelter and therefore constituted a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a)(i) of the Women’s Charter. I noted that the Husband also made about 70% of the payments towards the UK Apartment during the marriage. The full value of this asset was included in the pool of matrimonial assets.

  84. (B) Standard Chartered FCY$AVER Account No. Ending 774 (Joint Summary S/N 8) (“the 774 account”)

  85. [29] The Wife thus submitted that the Husband was liable for the sum of the sale proceeds that he had received from the sale of the [Company A] shares amounting to $59,525 and the sum of $48,000 paid by the Wife to the Husband for the purposes of C’s surgery.

  86. (C) Fidelity International Investments

  87. (I) Husband’s Fidelity International Investments (Joint Summary S/N 26 and 27)

  88. [33] The Wife, in her reply submissions, agreed that the Husband acquired the Fidelity International Account and the investments therein before the marriage.

  89. [34] As parties agreed that these investments were pre-marital assets, I excluded the Fidelity International Investments from the pool.

  90. (II) Fidelity Investment ISA Account Ending 0271 (Joint Summary S/N 66)

  91. [35] The Wife submitted that, notwithstanding the Joint Summary, the Husband’s evidence concerning his Fidelity Account gave rise to a real probability that the Wife’s Fidelity Account was opened around the same time. The Husband stated that he “opened, funded and managed [the Wife’s] Fidelity account”, which strongly indicated that the Wife’s Fidelity Account was opened and funded before the parties were married and while the parties were residing together in the UK. The Wife pointed to the fact that the Husband opened his Fidelity Account in April 2009 to take advantage of an ISA allowance in a tax year and that the Wife did not declare her Fidelity Account until the Husband reminded her of it and provided the account reference details. On balance, the Wife submitted that it was probable that the Husband opened the Wife’s Fidelity Account in April 2009.

  92. [36] I noted that the Wife had not adduced any documentation or evidence in support of her new claim that her Fidelity Account was opened around the same time as that of the Husband’s. Without more, I was not able to determine that the Wife’s Fidelity Account was opened and funded in or around April 2009. I did not exclude the Wife’s Fidelity Account from the pool.

  93. (III) Sterling Individual Savings Account Ending 300 (Joint Summary S/N 28, 29, 30 and 31)

  94. [37] The Husband submitted that the Sterling Individual Savings Account Ending 300 and the investments therein were pre-marital assets which were not liable for division. He submitted that he had opened this account in 2010 prior to the marriage, and made deposits on 2 February 2010, 22 February 2010 and 8 March 2010. Thereafter, he did not deposit any fresh funds throughout the duration of the marriage. The Wife submitted that there was no clear evidence to indicate that the Sterling Individual Savings Account was acquired before marriage.

  95. [38] There was evidence to show that the monies deposited in the Sterling Individual Savings Account Ending 300 were pre-marital assets. The Husband adduced a full transaction history for Plan Ending 300, which showed two “transfer in” deposits: the first made on 22 February 2010 of GBP820 and the second made on 8 March 2010 of GBP14,060. While there were subsequent transactions labelled as “merge (in)” and “merge (out)”, the Husband pointed to a list of definitions which explained that this occurred as a result of either a fund closure, or a new version of a fund becoming available, and in either of those events, the transactions would automatically occur. Apart from the “merge (in)” and “merge (out)” transactions, which the Husband had explained was automatically generated, there was no deposit of fresh funds throughout the account during the duration of the marriage. I thus found that the monies in the Sterling Individual Savings Account Ending 300 were pre-marital assets which were not included in the pool for division.

  96. (D) Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Joint Summary S/N 49)

  97. [39] The Husband submitted that the full value of his tax liability to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HRMC”), which was $143,828, should be taken into account in asset division. He explained that in or around 2009, the Husband worked as a contractor for an umbrella company in London, which had a non-standard way of paying its employees that was later investigated by HRMC. A class-action group comprising of current and ex-contractors directly affected by the existing and proposed legislative changes granting HMRC wide-ranging powers (the “Class Action Group”), was thus representing the Husband in arriving at a tax analysis and consequent settlement with HMRC. The total amount of the Husband’s liabilities was thus dependent on the outcome of the appeal. The Husband’s liability consisted of the following components:

  98. (a) HMRC Assessments in respect of tax years 2009–2010 and 2008–2009. The assessment for these two years amounted to GBP42,399. Depending on the outcome of the appeal, there would be considerable interest and penalties with the potential liability exceeding GBP50,000.

  99. (b) Submission of tax returns from 2010–2011 through to 2019–2020. The liability was in the region of GBP1,000 to GBP2,000. However, HMRC might raise amendments and assessments to tax returns increasing the liability by GBP32,500 plus interest and penalties.

  100. (c) Further tax returns that remained outstanding from 2006–2007 and 2005–2006. As the Husband was an employee with no additional income at that time, there were no liabilities that should exist.

  101. [40] The Husband first became aware of these liabilities when he moved to Singapore sometime in 2012 and 2013, during the marriage. The Husband thus submitted that he had incurred this liability during the marriage, and thus the full liability of GBP82,500 ($143,828) should be included in the division.

  102. [41] I noted that the Husband included speculative amounts in the calculation of his liabilities. Notwithstanding the outcome of the Class Action Group’s appeal which had not yet been finalised at the time of the hearing, the Husband then had a liability of approximately GBP44,399 ($77,404). As explained in WAS v WAT [2022] SGHCF 7 at [46], liabilities should be taken into account as s 112 of the Women’s Charter concerns a division of the parties’ net matrimonial assets. As such, debts proven to exist at the time of divorce should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets, which would result in a reduction of the total value of the pool of assets.

  103. [42] During the hearing, the Husband stated that he could have paid off the debt during the marriage but he did not, as he held that off for the benefit of the family. Due to the non-payment of the debt, he was able to purchase the house. While the Husband may have made the decision not to pay off his debts for the benefit of the marriage, I accepted the Wife’s arguments that the Husband had taken into account speculative debts. As such, only the debt of $77,404 was deducted against the Husband’s direct contributions.

  104. (E) Loans owed to the Husband’s Father (Joint Summary S/N 52A)

  105. (F) The Matrimonial Home (Joint Summary S/N 53)

  106. [45] The parties purchased the Matrimonial Home in July 2016. Since then, the parties and C lived in the property until the Husband moved out in January 2023. Both parties viewed this as the Matrimonial Home.

  107. [46] The Husband appointed a licensed appraiser and Associate Director (Valuation & Advisory) at Cushman & Wakefield, who inspected the property on 25 April 2022 and opined that the market value of the Matrimonial Home was $3.95 million. The Husband’s valuer valued the property using the Comparison Method, by considering sales of similar properties in the same development or in the vicinity. The Wife engaged one Mr [N] to carry out a valuation of the Matrimonial Home on 22 April 2022, and he estimated that the market value was $3.6 million. The Wife’s valuer valued the property using the Direct Comparison Method, on an as-is basis, with vacant possession and free from all encumbrances. The Husband subsequently also received a valuation report from Knight Frank on 29 April 2022, which, similar to the valuation done by Cushman & Wakefield, valued the Matrimonial Home at $3.95 million.

  108. [47] Given that there were two independent valuation reports with the same valuation of $3.95 million, I accepted the Husband’s valuation of $3.95 million for the Matrimonial Home.

  109. (G) Wife’s [Company A] Stock Options (Joint Summary S/N 60)

  110. [48] The Wife submitted that her [Company A] stock options were valued at $213,876 as of 11 January 2021. She further submitted that although she had been allocated stocks which had not yet vested, there was no certainty that the stocks will eventually be vested in her and the making of the supposition at this juncture would be premature.

  111. [49] The Husband submitted that the Wife had undervalued her [Company A] stock options. He submitted that a pro-rated portion of the Wife’s instruments which have been allocated but had not been vested should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband submitted that a more accurate representation of her stock options was as follows:

  112. S/No

  113. Description

  114. Value as at 11 January 2021

  115. A.

  116. Allocated stock options

  117. $319,908

  118. B.

  119. Vested stock options

  120. $213,876

  121. [50] At the time of the AM hearing, the Wife had been allocated four types of instruments from [Company A] which had not been vested. They were as follows:

  122. (a) 72.56810 Restricted Share Units (“RSUs”) under the Global Share Participation Plan (“GSPP”), valued at $9,145.

  123. (b) 206 Performance Share Units (“PSUs”) under the Leadership Performance Plan (“LPP”) valued at $25,960.

  124. (c) 45 RSUs under the LPP, valued at $5,671.

  125. (d) $65,255 in cash under the Value Alignment incentive (“VAI”).

  126. [53] In David Chan, the court dealt with 3 categories of stock options: (1) those vested in and exercised by the party by the date of the decree nisi with profits made ("first category stock options"); (2) those vested in the party but not yet exercised on the date of the decree nisi ("second category stock options"); and (3) those not vested in the party on the date of the decree nisi ("third category stock options").

  127. [54] I noted that the disputed stock options were stock options which were not yet vested in the Wife on the date of the IJ. In respect of agreements that give an employee the right to subscribe to shares, subject to continued service with the company for a specified future period, the Court of Appeal in David Chan said that such stock options are a “chose in action” and are considered matrimonial assets (David Chan at [29]). For stock options that are not yet vested in the employee at the date of the IJ, the Court of Appeal said that the “time rule” may be applied to determine what portion of the stock options was earned before the IJ date, ie the portion that should be attributed as reflecting the gains of the marriage (David Chan at [37]):

  128. [55] As the different instruments from [Company A] would vest in the Wife in different circumstances, I analysed them separately.

  129. (I) RSUs under the GSPP

  130. [57] Under the GSPP, the Wife had the opportunity to buy [Company A] shares and at the end of the three-year plan cycle, receive a 30% match on the number of shares [Company A] owns, provided that she was still employed by [Company A]. As such, the stock option might or might not be granted, depending on whether the Wife was still employed by [Company A]. The Husband proposed that, on a broad-brush approach, half of the value of the RSUs should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets to be divided.

  131. [58] I noted that two RSUs were allocated on 9 December 2020, after the date of IJ. The rest of the RSUs were allocated periodically from 9 July 2018 to 11 November 2020 and vest at different dates, either on 7 June 2021 or 7 June 2023. The remaining value of the RSUs, excluding those allocated after the date of IJ, under the GSPP is thus $8,649. Given that there were two three-year plan cycles that had been taken into account, I would consider the RSUs vesting in 2021 and those vesting in 2023 separately.

  132. [59] For the RSUs that vested on 7 June 2021, I noted that these were awarded for services rendered from July 2018 to 7 June 2021. As such, these would include the Wife’s services rendered prior to the date of IJ. The total value of RSUs that vest on 7 June 2021 is $7,215. Applying the “time rule”, my calculation was thus as follows:

  133. Since these shares had already been vested on 7 June 2021, I included the relevant proportion, being $5,772, in the pool.

  134. [60] For the RSUs that vest in June 2023, these were awarded for services rendered from 9 July 2020 to 7 June 2023. The total value of RSUs that vest on 7 June 2023 is $1,433. Applying the “time rule”, my calculation was thus as follows:

  135. [61] The relevant proportion of the value of RSUs that vest on 7 June 2023 is to be added in the pool of matrimonial assets on an “if as and when” basis, to take into account that the option might not be exercised by the Wife.

  136. (II) PSUs and RSUs under the LPP

  137. [62] The purpose of the LPP was to provide an incentive for [Company A]’s senior management to create sustainable company performance over the long term. The vesting and performance measurement period was that of three years. The total estimated value of the PSUs and RSUs that had been vested in the Wife was $31,631.

  138. [63] I used the Husband’s application of the “time rule” approach in calculating the amount to be included in the matrimonial pool.

  139. [64] Since the 209 RSUs had already been vested on 31 March 2022, I added the relevant proportion of the value of these shares, being $10,011, into the pool. For the relevant proportion of the 108 RSUs which are to be vested on 31 March 2023, this is to be added on an “if as and when” basis.

  140. (III) Cash under the VAI

  141. [65] The purpose of the VAI was to defer a portion of the API and introduce a time component to performance-based, variable compensation. At the end of the deferral period, the VAI would be settled in cash.

  142. [66] I agreed with the Husband’s application of the “time rule” approach in calculating the amount to be included in the matrimonial pool.

  143. Since some shares had already been vested on 31 March 2021 and 31 March 2022, I added the relevant proportion of the value of these shares, being $25,544, into the pool. For the shares to be vested on 31 March 2023, this was to be added on an “if as and when” basis.

  144. [67] I included in the pool of matrimonial assets the relevant proportion of the value of the shares that have been vested. The total value of the shares to be added into the matrimonial pool was thus $41,327.

  145. (H) [Company C] Shares (Joint Summary S/N 65)

  146. [68] The Wife submitted that the [Company C] Shares were acquired before the marriage and therefore should not be included in the matrimonial pool. The Husband submitted that the shares as of 9 April 2021 were valued at $20,133 and should be in the matrimonial pool.

  147. [69] The Wife adduced two documents: a share certificate showing that 164 [Company C] Group Holdings Limited (“GHL”) shares were allocated to her on 10 July 2007, and her dividend payment notification dated 31 December 2020 from her 61 units of ordinary shares in [Company D]. The Wife explained that the discrepancy in the Company’s name arose as GHL changed its name to [Company C] Holdings Public Limited Company (“HPLC”) subsequently merged with [Company E] to form [Company D]. The GHL shares were substituted (one-to-one) with HPLC shares, and when the merger occurred, every 2.6490 HPLC shares were consolidated into 1 [Company D] share. As such, the Wife’s 164 HPLC ordinary shares were consolidated into 61 [Company D] ordinary shares.

  148. [70] Having considered the Wife’s explanations for the discrepancy in the unit of shares as reflected in the share certificate and the dividend payment notification, I was satisfied that the [Company C] Shares were acquired before the marriage. Accordingly, the [Company C] Shares were not included in the matrimonial pool.

  149. (I) [Company C] Pension Scheme (Joint Summary S/N 67)

  150. [71] The Wife submitted that only a pro-rated amount of her [Company C] Pension Scheme should be included in the pool for division. She submitted that she was employed by [Company C] from 2001 to 2015. From August 2005 to September 2012, she was employed by [Company C] in the UK. From 2001 to 14 August 2005 and from 24 September 2012 to 2015, she was employed by [Company C] in Singapore. The [Company C] Pension Scheme was only operative when the Wife was employed by [Company C] in the UK. Of the period of 84 months that she was employed in the UK, she was married for 19 months. The Wife thus submitted that the computation of the Pension Scheme should be $133,321. She further submitted that the spouse is only a beneficiary of the scheme upon the Wife’s death and there was no current benefit.

  151. [72] The Husband submitted that the [Company C] Pension Scheme was a cornerstone of his financial planning for the family due to the security that it provided, and thus he did not make any effort to secure any other retirement vehicle to substitute it. He submitted that the documents clearly indicates that he is a beneficiary of the scheme on her death and up until their death. As such, the unique benefits of a pension that provided security as a constant source of income until death were attributable to both the Wife and Husband. He thus submitted that the total amount of the Pension Scheme should be in the pool of assets for division.

  152. [73] In my view, the [Company C] Pension was a matrimonial asset, notwithstanding that the amount accrued had not yet been paid to the Wife. The Wife’s entitlement to the [Company C] Pension was in itself a chose in action, which fell within the definition of “matrimonial assets” under s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter.

  153. [74] However, I noted that the [Company C] Pension provides that:

  154. [75] It thus seemed that the Husband’s ability to benefit from the [Company C] Pension Scheme is contingent on the death of the Wife.

  155. [77] Further, I noted the Husband’s submissions that the pay-outs from the [Company C] Pension Scheme was non-linear and therefore it would not be fair to simply pro-rate 19 months of 84 months of the [Company C] Pension Scheme. However, the exact multiplier to be used was unclear, as the forecast of the final amount of the Pension was “not a guarantee” and “[did] not include any increase due to inflation”. It followed that the total amount of accrued pension to be added to the pool of matrimonial assets cannot be precisely ascertained. I was thus constrained to pro-rating 19 months of 84 months of the [Company C] Pension Scheme, which was $133,321.

  156. (J) Wife’s Insurance Policies (Joint Summary S/N 71)

  157. [78] The Husband submitted that the Wife took up four insurance policies when parties’ relationship had broken down, right before the divorce proceedings were commenced. The Husband submitted that even though the policies have zero surrender value, they may still be sold on a secondary market for value. The Wife had expended matrimonial funds on these policies without the Husband’s consent, and the total premiums paid for the policies from the time of inception to the time of interim judgment should be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets.

  158. S/No

  159. Policy description

  160. Policy Inception Date

  161. Monthly premium

  162. Cash / surrender value

  163. 1

  164. Aviva MyProtector Legacy Policy No. Ending 0811 (“Aviva 0811”)

  165. [10] July 2019

  166. 2,411

  167. No surrender value for the first 2 years

  168. 2

  169. Aviva MyCare Plus Policy No. Ending 4962 (“Aviva 4962”)

  170. [25] July 2019

  171. 1,144

  172. No surrender value

  173. 3

  174. Aviva MyWealthPlan Policy No. Ending 1317 (“Aviva 1317”)

  175. [10] August 2019

  176. 2,071

  177. 6,946

  178. 4

  179. NTUC Income Policy No. Ending 4200 (“NTUC 4200”)

  180. [12] July 2020

  181. 2,576

  182. No surrender value for first year

  183. [79] The Wife submitted that the cash value of the Aviva 1317 policy, amounting to $6,946, should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets, but she did not include the rest of the policies as there were no surrender values at the time of the IJ. The Wife’s counsel at the hearing also explained that these insurance policies were taken out for C’s benefit.

  184. [80] The Court of Appeal in UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN v UZM”) at [68] explained that where “there are indeed sums expended or given away especially nearer to the time when divorce is imminent … it may be possible to view such acts as wrongful dissipation carried out with the intention of depleting the matrimonial pool”. However, whether there is such wrongful dissipation of assets depends on the evidence and facts of the particular case. In the case of TNL v TNK and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”), what constitutes a substantial sum is a question of fact, but it is not intended to include daily, run-of-the-mill expenses (at [24]).

  185. [81] I noted that the divorce was imminent when the Wife took up the various insurance policies that she had. The parties had started sleeping in separate rooms after coming back from their UK trip in end 2018, and the writ for divorce was filed on 20 February 2020. I further noted that the spending on the insurance policies is substantial, and these were not “run-of-the-mill expenses” as stated by the dicta in TNL v TNK. Although there were no surrender values for the Aviva 0811, Aviva 4962 and NTUC 4200 policies, the Wife had spent a hefty amount on the monthly premiums for these policies. In my view, the amount spent on the monthly premiums up to the date of the IJ should be added back into the pool. This amounted to $83,685.

  186. (K) Wife’s Credit Card Liabilities (Joint Summary S/N 74, 75 and 76)

  187. [82] The Wife urged the court to deduct liabilities that she had incurred on her credit card from the pool of matrimonial assets. These included credit card debts for her AMEX Credit Card amounting to $15,214, her OCBC Credit Card amounting to $4,404 and her UOB Credit Card amounting to $2,061. The Wife submitted that the outstanding liabilities on the Wife’s credit cards were ordinarily incurred expenses which benefit the family as per s 112(2)(b) of the Women’s Charter. Furthermore, in comparison to the other months, the amounts appearing on the statements were not out of the ordinary. The Wife’s counsel stated at the hearing that the credit card liabilities have yet to be paid.

  188. [83] The Husband submitted that these liabilities should not be taken into account in determining the pool of matrimonial assets as she incurred these liabilities after the commencement of divorce proceedings, and the liabilities were not incurred for the benefit of the marriage.

  189. [84] I noted that the Wife’s OCBC Credit Card debt was due on 24 February 2021, and her UOB Credit Card debt was due on 8 March 2021. These were recent debts that were incurred after the date of IJ and I excluded them accordingly. The Wife’s AMEX Credit Card debt was due on 11 February 2020. However, as this was some months before the date of IJ, the debt has likely already been paid up. I thus also excluded this debt from the pool.

  190. (L) Wife’s Luxury Goods (Joint Summary S/N 77)

  191. [85] The Husband submitted that the Wife’s luxury goods, valued at approximately $119,000, should be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. The Husband further submitted that the luxury goods were interspousal gifts which were not de minimis and therefore should be included into the pool of assets. The Wife submitted that the luxury goods were not valued at $119,000 and in any event, this would be contrary to the Husband’s broad-brush approach. She also submitted that the engagement ring ($30,000) and the Bottega bag ($8,000) were gifted by the Husband to the Wife before the marriage and were to be excluded.

  192. [86] The Husband submitted that the luxury goods were valued in the UK for insurance purposes, however there was a lack of evidence of this valuation.

  193. [87] In my view, the engagement ring and the Bottega bag gifted 15 years ago were pre-marital assets and therefore should be excluded from the pool for division. The Christian Louboutin work heels that were purchased at $3,000 had also become worn out, and therefore should be excluded from the pool for division. The remaining luxury goods valued at $78,000 were put into the pool for division.

  194. The total pool of matrimonial assets and liabilities

  195. [88] The net value of the pool of MAs liable for division was $4,648,511, as set out in the table below.

  196. 1.

  197. Wife’s Name

  198. 2.

  199. 3.

  200. 4.

  201. 5.

  202. 6.

  203. 7.

  204. 8.

  205. 9.

  206. 10.

  207. 11.

  208. 12.

  209. 13.

  210. 14.

  211. 15.

  212. 16.

  213. 17.

  214. 18.

  215. 19.

  216. 20.

  217. 21.

  218. 1.

  219. Husband’s Name

  220. 2.

  221. 3.

  222. 4.

  223. 5.

  224. 6.

  225. 7.

  226. 8.

  227. 9.

  228. 10.

  229. 11.

  230. 12.

  231. 13.

  232. 14.

  233. 15.

  234. 16.

  235. 17.

  236. 18.

  237. 19.

  238. 20.

  239. 21.

  240. 22.

  241. 23.

  242. 24.

  243. 25.

  244. 26.

  245. 27.

  246. 28.

  247. 29.

  248. 30.

  249. 31.

  250. Proportions of division

  251. [89] In ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”), the Court of Appeal set out a structured approach for the division of MAs. The structured approach is applicable to this dual-income marriage.

  252. Direct Contribution Ratio

  253. (1) Agreed Direct Contributions

  254. [90] The Husband and Wife agreed that the assets in each of their sole names should be taken as that party’s direct contributions, except for the Matrimonial Home, POSB Account No. Ending 225 and the Wife’s luxury goods. During the hearing, the parties agreed that the Husband’s direct contributions to the Volkswagen Golf A7 is $125,300.

  255. [91] I summarised the agreed direct contributions as follows:

  256. S/N

  257. Asset

  258. Husband’s contribution ($)

  259. Wife’s contribution ($)

  260. 1.

  261. DBS Savings Account No. Ending 024

  262. 0

  263. 115,496

  264. 2.

  265. DBS eMulti-Currency Account No. Ending 484

  266. 0

  267. 9,507

  268. 3.

  269. DBS Multiplier Account No. Ending 523

  270. 0

  271. 2,804

  272. 4.

  273. DBS SRS Account No. Ending 223

  274. 0

  275. 4,833

  276. 5.

  277. [Company A] (Stock Options)

  278. 0

  279. 41,327

  280. 6.

  281. ABERDEEN STANDARD INVESTMENTS: Aberdeen Standard Thailand Equity Fund SGD

  282. 0

  283. 4,120

  284. 7.

  285. FIRST STATE INVESTMENT: First State Dividend Advantage Class A

  286. 0

  287. 14,709

  288. 8.

  289. FIRST STATE INVESTMENT: First State Regional India Fund

  290. 0

  291. 4,233

  292. 9.

  293. DBS: AB FCP Global High Yield

  294. 0

  295. 5,467

  296. 10.

  297. Fidelity Investment ISA Account Ending 271

  298. 59,090

  299. 0

  300. 11.

  301. CPF Ordinary

  302. 0

  303. 266,360

  304. 12.

  305. CPF Medisave

  306. 0

  307. 61,102

  308. 13.

  309. CPF Special

  310. 0

  311. 185,062

  312. 14.

  313. PRUCASH policy No. Ending 526

  314. 0

  315. 21,000

  316. 15.

  317. PRULIFE policy No. Ending 159

  318. 0

  319. 51,000

  320. 16.

  321. DBS Savings Account No. Ending 279

  322. 10,001

  323. 0

  324. 17.

  325. DBS SRS Account No. Ending 223

  326. 21,602

  327. 0

  328. 18.

  329. HSBC Current Account

  330. 6,573

  331. 0

  332. 19.

  333. Standard Chartered 774 Account

  334. 6,037

  335. 0

  336. 20.

  337. Standard Chartered USD High Account No. Ending 535

  338. 1,980

  339. 0

  340. 21.

  341. Standard Chartered FCY$AVER Account No. Ending 721

  342. 1,689

  343. 0

  344. 22.

  345. Standard Chartered FCY$AVER Account No. Ending 378

  346. 1,870

  347. 0

  348. 23.

  349. Standard Chartered BONUS$AVER Account No. Ending 838

  350. 908

  351. 0

  352. 24.

  353. Standard Chartered Cheque and Save Account No. Ending 430

  354. 13,328

  355. 0

  356. 25.

  357. NatWest Account No. Ending 081

  358. 146,672

  359. 0

  360. 26.

  361. NatWest Account No. Ending 113

  362. 16

  363. 0

  364. 27.

  365. NatWest Account No. Ending 638

  366. 5

  367. 0

  368. 28.

  369. NatWest Account No. Ending 566 (Joint Account with C)

  370. 329

  371. 0

  372. 29.

  373. HSBC UK Account No. Ending 561 (Joint Account with C)

  374. 90

  375. 0

  376. 30.

  377. Clydesdale bank Account No. Ending 090

  378. 333

  379. 0

  380. 31.

  381. Standard Chartered Investment Fund / Portfolio Account No. Ending 101: FSSA Dividend Advantage Fund

  382. 60,194

  383. 0

  384. 32.

  385. Standard Chartered Investment Fund / Portfolio Account No. Ending 101: LIONGLOBAL VIETNAM FUND

  386. 18,145

  387. 0

  388. 33.

  389. Standard Chartered Investment Fund / Portfolio Account No. Ending 101: SCHRODER ISF ASIAN DIVIDEND MAXIMISER A

  390. 59,663

  391. 0

  392. 34.

  393. DBS SRS Investment Account No. Ending 223: FID GLB DIV FUND A-MINCOME SGD

  394. 5,974

  395. 0

  396. 35.

  397. DBS SRS Investment Account No. Ending 223: FSSA DIV ADVANTAGE A(QDIST)

  398. 16,197

  399. 0

  400. 36.

  401. Singapore Savings Bonds

  402. 41,500

  403. 0

  404. 37.

  405. Halifax Instant ISA Saver Account No. Ending 066

  406. 181

  407. 0

  408. 38.

  409. Halifax Junior Cash ISA Account No. Ending 969

  410. 6,479

  411. 0

  412. 39.

  413. CPF Ordinary

  414. 70,781

  415. 0

  416. 40.

  417. CPF Special

  418. 178,641

  419. 0

  420. 41.

  421. CPF Medisave

  422. 59,552

  423. 0

  424. 42.

  425. Volkswagen Golf A7

  426. 125,300

  427. 0

  428. 43.

  429. Wines stored with Uncorked Ltd

  430. 7,588

  431. 0

  432. 44.

  433. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

  434. -77,404

  435. 0

  436. 45.

  437. Money due to Husband’s mother

  438. -43,584

  439. 0

  440. Sub-total of agreed direct contributions

  441. 799,730

  442. 787,020

  443. (2) Disputed Direct Contributions

  444. [92] Based on my findings on the division above, the parties disputed their direct contributions to the Matrimonial Home and POSB Account No. Ending 225 (Joint Account with C), which were both in the Wife’s sole name.

  445. (A) The Matrimonial Home

  446. [93] The Husband submitted that in the Wife’s tabulation of the parties’ direct financial contributions, the Wife did not include the Husband’s contributions to the renovation and furniture. The Husband submitted that a more accurate depiction of the parties’ direct financial contributions was as follows:

  447. S/N

  448. Description

  449. Husband’s contribution ($)

  450. Wife’s contribution ($)

  451. 1.

  452. CPF

  453. 0

  454. 108,000

  455. 2.

  456. Cash (option fee)

  457. 29,000

  458. 0

  459. 3.

  460. Cash (down payment)

  461. 116,000

  462. 436,414.68

  463. 4.

  464. Cash (stamp duty)

  465. 81,600

  466. 0

  467. 5.

  468. Cash (conveyancing fees)

  469. 3,500

  470. 0

  471. 6.

  472. Cash (mortgage payments)

  473. 0

  474. 370,596.60

  475. 7.

  476. Renovation

  477. 14,295

  478. 0

  479. 8.

  480. Husband’s further contributions to renovations

  481. 150,000

  482. 0

  483. 9.

  484. Husband’s transfers to the Wife to pay for the mortgage instalments

  485. 35,000

  486. 0

  487. Total

  488. 429,395

  489. 915,011

  490. [95] As emphasised by the Court of Appeal in UYQ v UYP [2020] 1 SLR 551 (“UYQ v UYP”) at [2], it is an impossible exercise to attempt to take into account every detailed record of transactions or acts during the marriage. I noted that, as the Husband submitted, at the time when the purchases were made, the Husband treated the family’s finances as fully fungible as there was no anticipated reason for him to track his spending. Attempting to dredge up every record is futile because human memory is fallible, and also constitutes an exercise in obfuscation when viewed against the tendency for parties to try to locate every detail in their favour in the aftermath of a broken marriage. A mechanistic, overly-arithmetical application of the structured approach in ANJ v ANK must therefore be assiduously avoided (UYQ v UYP at [2]–[3]). The focus ought to be on the major details as opposed to every conceivable detail (UYQ v UYP at [4]).

  491. [97] In respect of direct contributions, I took into account the major items, such as the contributions towards the renovation and the large purchases made to make the home liveable. For the other large purchases, I noted that the Wife did not dispute most of the items. I therefore included them, with the exception of the fish tank, Harvey Norman purchases and wine fridge.

  492. [98] Similarly, for items towards which both parties had contributed, it would not accord with the broad-brush approach to mechanistically determine a fine-tooth combed ratio for the parties’ contributions to each item. Having reviewed the evidence and submissions, I accepted that both parties made contributions towards the lighting, electrician and building work and painting. I also noted that in respect of transfers made to the Wife, the Wife accepted that $41,000 was transferred to her, but this was because she had made substantial withdrawals to purchase the Matrimonial Home. I therefore excluded these items in determining the ratio of direct contributions towards the Matrimonial Home.

  493. [99] In summary, I found the parties’ contributions in respect of the Matrimonial Home to be as follows:

  494. S/N

  495. Description

  496. Husband’s contribution ($)

  497. Wife’s contribution ($)

  498. 1.

  499. CPF

  500. 0

  501. 108,000

  502. 2.

  503. Purchase (option to purchase, deposit, stamp duty, conveyancing fees, mortgage payments)

  504. 230,100

  505. 807,011

  506. 3.

  507. Renovation

  508. 14,295

  509. 0

  510. 4.

  511. Other large purchases

  512. 13,881

  513. 4,705

  514. Total

  515. 258,276

  516. 919,716

  517. Proportion of net value ($1,960,805)

  518. 429,908

  519. 1,530,896

  520. (B) POSB Account No. ENDING 225 (Joint Account with C)

  521. [100] The Wife submitted that the direct financial contributions of the monies in her POSB Account No. Ending 225 (“Wife’s joint account with C”) amounting to $21,432 should be attributed to her. However, the Husband submitted that the Wife had not adduced evidence to prove that she had contributed monies into this account. Instead, he submitted that all the monies in this account were mostly C’s “red packet” money. The Husband instead submitted that the direct financial contribution to the monies in this account should be attributed equally to the parties.

  522. [101] In my view, given the state of the evidence, it was fair that the monies in this account be attributed equally between the parties for the purpose of attributing direct contributions.

  523. (3) Conclusion on the Direct Contribution Ratio

  524. [102] In conclusion, I found that the direct contribution ratio of the parties is as follows:

  525. I noted that if and when the remaining [Company A] stock options that have yet to vest do indeed vest in the future, then, it followed logically that the direct contribution ratio could change. This would entail a direct contribution ratio that could fluctuate as the shares vest in future. In my view, a broad-brush approach in assigning direct contributions should be taken especially as the asset pool includes some stock options that have not yet been vested. The direct contribution ratio was reached in broad strokes and should not change even when more shares vest in future. In view of the foregoing, I found that the direct contribution ratio is 45:55, with the Wife having contributed the larger share.

  526. Indirect Contribution Ratio

  527. [103] The Wife’s position was that the indirect contribution ratio should be 70:30 in her favour. Her counsel submitted that the Wife has paid for the bulk of C’s expenses and has made extremely significant indirect financial contributions throughout the marriage. I summarised the Wife’s arguments as follows:

  528. (a) The Wife paid for C’s therapy, enrichment classes and school fees (except for C’s school fees, which were mostly paid for by the Husband). In total, the Wife submitted that she has paid $181,375.

  529. (b) The Wife paid for most of the family’s groceries, whereas the Husband currently pays for his own groceries only. Further, the Wife fully paid for C’s supplements.

  530. (c) The Wife paid for the utilities, property tax, upkeep and gardening services of the Matrimonial Home. The Husband did not dispute that the utilities and the property tax were paid solely by the Wife.

  531. (d) The Wife paid for the rent of the home in which they stayed from 2014. The rent was $5,600 a month.

  532. (e) The Wife paid for the majority of the expenses relating to the family’s helper. While the Husband has transferred $50 to the helper four times and bought her a phone, the rest of the helper’s expenses were solely borne by the Wife.

  533. (f) The Wife made all payments for C’s medical expenses, unless the Husband brought C for consultations or helped to collect his medicine. The Wife also submitted that the Husband did not pay a single cent for C’s surgery in the UK but instead profited off it.

  534. [104] In terms of the Wife’s indirect non-financial contributions, the Wife submitted that she has been in charge of C’s day-to-day activities. She scheduled his therapy session, took charge of his schedule during school breaks and signed him up for camps. While the Husband contributed by assisting with signing C up for camps (after the breakdown of the marriage), the Wife did the bulk of the planning. In respect of the UK Apartment, the Wife did all the cleaning, laundry, cooking and ironing. She was also the sole carer for C when he was born and was on maternity leave for eight months. In respect of the Matrimonial Home, the Wife submitted that she was the main caregiver to C. She also managed and supervised the helper.

  535. [105] The Husband’s position was that the indirect contribution ratio should be 65:35 in his favour. His counsel submitted that his indirect non-financial contributions included supporting the Wife while she was pregnant with C, playing an active role in entertaining the Wife’s friends and family when they visited the parties and checking on C frequently when he was at nursery, as he started nursery in the same building where the Husband worked.

  536. [106] Furthermore, the Husband submitted that he had always been C’s primary caregiver since C was an infant. The Husband planned C’s birthday parties and was the primary caregiver whenever the Wife travelled for work. The Husband was made redundant from work from November 2013 to September 2014 and took the opportunity to play the role of a stay-at-home father. He also submitted that he had taken the lead in relation to C’s medical condition and conducted research relating to his medical condition, wrote directly to neurologists around the world to seek their input and even made a solo trip to the UK in 2018 to meet a surgeon ahead of C’s surgery. Following this, he took the lead in planning the trip to the UK in 2018 so that C could undergo brain surgery. He then handled the follow-up with the doctors, the insurance claims and liaised directly with C’s therapists. Since 2019, the Husband had been a stay-at-home father and thus has continued to be C’s primary caregiver. From 2016 until the pandemic in 2020, the Wife had travelled more extensively for work. The Husband thus brought C out for meals, activities and put C to bed when the Wife is not around.

  537. [107] In my view, in respect of the parties’ indirect financial contributions, after reviewing the affidavits and submissions, I found that both parties worked together to pay for the family’s expenses. I thought that both parties had contributed towards C’s school and therapy expenses, with the Husband contributing more to the former and the Wife contributing more to the latter. The Husband contributed more for C’s school fees, which the Wife estimated to be about $150,000. The Wife contributed more to C’s therapy, which she estimated to be about $181,375. I also noted that the Husband was made redundant in 2019 and the Wife should accordingly be given credit for her indirect financial contributions after this point.

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