Family Division of the High Court · Decided 9 January 2025
WZF v WZG
Feedback & support[2025] SGHCF 1 · Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 1420 of 2023
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] The unique nature of marriage, as an institution, manifests itself within the legal process in a myriad of ways. In general litigation, the doctrine of marital communications privilege – a privilege that clothes communications between spouses with immunity from disclosure and which finds legislative expression in s 124 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) – seeks to uphold the sanctity of communications within a marriage, and to ensure that “relationships between spouses ought not to be disrupted” (Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 2023) at [15.051]). Even when the relationship between spouses has been disrupted such that the marriage must come to an end, the law still seeks to blunt the tensions inherent in the court process by sensibly adopting a therapeutic justice approach to matrimonial matters and eschewing cross-examination on the premise that an overtly adversarial approach to matrimonial proceedings possesses a “[tendency] to prolong and exacerbate the bitterness between the parties” (USB v USA and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”) at [45]).
- [2]
[2] In the context of such constraints, the parties’ duties of disclosure in divorce proceedings take on an outsized significance (USB at [46]). This is because the court’s power to properly dispense justice in these circumstances rests fundamentally “upon parties’ compliance with their duty of disclosure and respect for the processes of the [c]ourt” (TVJ v TVK [2017] SGHCF 1 at [66]). As such, the impact of flagrant and intentional non-disclosure of assets cannot be understated. It represents a fraud not just on the court, but on all of the parties involved in the litigation and the wider justice system. As noted in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Leitch v Novac [2020] 150 OR (3d) 587 (at [44]):
- [3]
[3] For those reasons, the court should take extra pains in a case where it is self-evident that such a fraud is being perpetuated to ensure that the implications of concealment of assets (in the division process) are visited exclusively on the offending party. As noted in the decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Cunha v da Cunha [1994] BCJ No 2573 (“Cunha”) (at [12]), “not only is it a matter of doing justice in any particular case, it is also a matter of general interest. The system should not give offence to the honourable litigant by treating the dishonourable litigant the same”.
- [4]
[4] On the present facts, the question that this court must resolve is how it can best facilitate justice in a case where one party plays by the rules, and the other tries all ways and means to shield from the court’s view the millions of dollars of assets that they indisputably possess via the painting of an utterly unbelievable picture of a net financial worth of just tens of thousands of dollars. Using the language in Cunha (at [12]), what tools in the judicial toolbox ought to be utilised in the process of division so as to do right by, and “not give offence to”, the “honourable litigant”?
Background
- [5]
[5] The plaintiff (the “Wife”) is a 38-year-old Malaysian citizen and the defendant (the “Husband”) is a 39-year-old Australian citizen. The parties were married in June 2015 in Australia. The Wife has been working and residing in Singapore since 2015 to date, and is a holder of an employment pass. Previously, the Husband was holding a dependant’s pass tagged to the Wife’s employment pass. There is no evidence before the court in relation to the Husband’s current immigration status within Singapore.
- [6]
[6] The parties have one child (the “Child”), born sometime in 2018. The Child is presently six years old and is an Australian citizen. The Child is presently attending a child care in Singapore and is due to enrol soon in a school at the primary one level.
The parties’ cases
- [10]
[10] With respect to the division of matrimonial assets, the dispute lies in the identification and valuation of the pool of assets. In gist, the Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband for his non-disclosure of his key assets. Most significantly, the Wife adduced a document which shows that the Husband’s paid up share capital of an Indonesian company is worth at least S$10m. The parties also dispute the applicable ratios for their direct and indirect contributions to the marriage, but otherwise agree that the overall division of the matrimonial assets should be 50:50. However, as I will explain later, this agreement between the parties is premised on an erroneous computation of the suggested ratio of the direct contribution between the parties on the Wife’s part.
- [12]
[12] Finally, for spousal maintenance, the Wife seeks maintenance of S$2,150 per month, for a limited period of 12 months. The sum of S$2,150 is derived by taking the value of half of the monthly rental of the Premises. The Husband argues that no spousal maintenance is payable because the Wife is fully capable of maintaining herself.
Issues to be determined
- [13]
[13] The issues that arise for my determination are as follows:
Custody, care and control
Care and control to the Wife
- [14]
[14] The parties are ad idem that the Wife should have care and control of the Child, though they take divergent positions on the questions of custody and access. Since the parties are not in dispute in relation to care and control, I would only briefly note that it is common for the court to grant consent orders on care and control when parties are in agreement for these arrangements (VLI v VLJ [2022] 5 SLR 301 at [14]). In any event, on the facts, given that the Wife has been the main caregiver hitherto for the Child, it is clear to me that care and control ought to be given to the Wife.
Joint custody
(a) That the Husband is essentially an uninvolved parent who would not be able to make decisions for the Child. He has neglected to play a role in the Child’s life so far by virtue of, inter alia, his failure to provide financially for the Child since moving out in 2022, the infrequent attempts he has made to spend time with the Child, and his apparent hectic travel schedule which meant that he was often away from the Child. As such, the Husband allegedly “ha[s] no regard” or “interest in the [C]hild’s well-being”. Given the Husband’s absence from the Child’s life, he would not even be in a position to make an informed decision about the Child’s well-being.
(c) The Wife also claims that information on the Husband’s whereabouts has “been very scarce and vague”, such that she has no confirmation as to where the Husband is based exactly. For instance, according to the Wife, while the Husband’s solicitors have previously represented that the Husband is residing in Malaysia, he appears to still hold a Singapore address and his affidavit was affirmed under a Singaporean address. The Husband’s “uncertain presence in Singapore” or elsewhere and the “very likely … diminish[ing]” of the Husband’s involvement in the Child’s life only accentuate the problem that the Wife may not be able to seek the Husband’s timely consent for decisions in relation to the Child.
- [16]
[16] On the other hand, the Husband seeks joint custody of the Child. While he notes some of the allegations made by the wife that he has, inter alia, been a relatively uninvolved parent, refused to co-operate to renew the Child’s passport, given flavoured or cold juices to the Child causing the Child to be sick on that occasion, or not given the Child gifts on special occasions, he contends that these do not amount to exceptional circumstances that would militate against the imposition of joint custody. In the hearing before me, counsel for the Husband accepted that the Husband has not been the most pro-active in relation to the Child, but emphasised that the Husband is ready to co-operate and take the Child’s best interests into account, despite the parties’ history of acrimony.
- [18]
[18] In this connection, I note that sole custody orders are generally only made in exceptional cases, such as where there is some evidence of abuse, whether physical, emotional or sexual, or where the relationship of the parties is such that co-operation is impossible even after avenues such as mediation and counselling have been explored and the lack of co-operation is harmful to the child (CX at [38]). In particular, the court should be careful to make sure that applications for custody, care and access are not weaponised as “tools to control the other spouse or to hurt that spouse” (VDZ v VEA [2020] 2 SLR 858 at [76], citing Debbie Ong J (as she then was), Presiding Judge of the Family Justice Courts, “Today is A New Day”, speech at FJC Workplan 2020 (21 May 2020) at [65]).
Put another way, the Wife is perfectly entitled to make decisions in emergencies or where time is of the essence where the Husband is missing for some unknown reason (or, where necessary, to apply to the court to do so). However, I struggle to see how that might be the case on these facts as there is simply no evidence to suggest that the Husband has any intention to go completely off the radar, and it would be impossible for me to infer this possibility on the back of a single instance where his reply to a request (in relation to the Passport Incident) was less than expedient.
No veto power to be granted to the Wife
- [22]
[22] In the alternative, if the court is minded to grant joint custody, the Wife contends that she should “be granted a veto power, wherein if in respect of major decisions, if the parties are unable to agree and there is a deadlock on discussions on major matters relating to the [C]hild”, then the Wife can decide the matter. In my view, such a “veto power” or the sole discretion to make decisions should generally not be sought recourse to, except where it is clear that the parties would have very serious difficulties in working with each other. In VZJ (at [13]), in relation to the wife’s proposal that she be given sole discretion to decide issues relating to the child’s education, the court there found that such a proposal necessarily “requires that the [h]usband be excluded from the decision-making process in respect of an important custodial matter with long-term implications for the [c]hild’s welfare”, and that “[s]uch a proposal is inconsistent with the very idea of joint custody and would not be conducive to the welfare of the child” [emphasis added]. Moreover, as the court there also observed (VZJ at [18]) and which is squarely applicable to the present circumstances:
- [23]
[23] To my mind, a “veto power” serves to significantly alter the dynamics of the relationship between the two parents, and this may often have the effect of serving as a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the party who may be vetoed. As I explained to parties during the course of oral submissions, a veto power would have the tendency of trivialising the role of the parent who has no such power. A veto power effectively makes the point that one party’s word is law, and the other party’s word may be ignored: when one party holds the power to unilaterally block decisions or actions, it diminishes the autonomy and agency of the other party while simultaneously making the wielding party unamenable to meaningful discussion since they retain the trump card of vetoing anything the other party says. In my judgment, there is also a symbolic reason for the rejection of liberal granting of such requests for veto power. At its core, a marriage is about working towards common goals. Even when the parties’ marriage has ended, the common goal of ensuring that the child flourishes remains fully intact. In that sense, the parties must continue to see each other as common partners in that enterprise, even if they no longer are common partners in matrimony. A veto power necessarily, even if unintentionally, shifts the dynamic towards a hierarchy since one party’s word necessarily is the final authority and effectively relegates the other to being a subordinate rather than an equal contributor.
Access
(a) The Husband shall be granted video call access to the Child twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 8pm for 15 minutes.
(b) Commencing on 1 February 2023, the Husband is granted an hour of access every Saturday, to be supervised by either the Wife, her mother or father, from 5pm to 6pm.
(c) With effect from 1 March to 30 June 2023, access in the manner set out in (b) above shall be increased from one hour to two hours. With effect from 1 March 2023, for supervised access, the Husband is at liberty to bring one family member along for access.
(d) With effect from 1 July to 30 September 2023, access in the manner set out in (b) above shall be increased from two hours to four hours, from 2pm to 6pm on Saturday. The Wife, her mother or her father, “shall be at liberty to leave the access venue as [they] deem fit”, ie, access may potentially be unsupervised from 1 July 2023.
(e) Supervised access shall take place at one of five prescribed venues, or any other venue that is agreed by both parties.
(f) Parties shall review the access arrangements after 30 September 2023 with a view to either continue the current access arrangements or explore alternative access arrangements (the “Review Clause”).
(g) In the event the Child is unwell or unable to make the access, the Wife shall notify the Husband at his personal email address at least one day in advance or at the earliest possible timing. The Husband shall be entitled to make up access on a mutually agreed time and date.
- [29]
[29] I turn to the law. In APE v APF [2015] SGHC 17, Tan Siong Thye J (at [32]) observed that unsupervised access should be the norm, save in exceptional circumstances such as the following: (a) serious welfare concerns such as violence or inappropriate parenting; (b) the child has been estranged from the parent and the parent-child relationship is in need of serious repair; or (c) factors that make it difficult for unsupervised access to be effectively implemented (eg, where the relationship between the parents is so acrimonious that the custodial parent frustrates the effectiveness of unsupervised access orders and unsupervised access cannot occur without detriment to the child).
- [31]
[31] Nonetheless, in light of the Husband’s track record, I accept the Wife’s point that the Husband has not made good his assertion that he wishes to spend more time with the Child. Even if I accept the Husband’s claim that the Wife was difficult to contact, for large swathes of time, there is a paucity of evidence to show that the Husband initiated any access to the Child. To my mind, the relatively liberal access presently sought by the Husband for 12 hours a week, as compared to the two hours of weekly access that have typically occurred between the Husband and the Child (or even less, since access does not even take place regularly every week), would be unwise for the Child’s well-being as this would be a sudden and very significant variation from the current arrangement. I find it premature at this juncture to speak of much more extensive periods of access for the Husband, much less the request for school holidays to be divided equally. This is something that can be considered in future, assuming the father-child bond has been strengthened. In this regard, the Wife rightfully accepts that the Review Clause (see above at [25(f)]) should remain, such that parties may review the access arrangements after a particular date.
- [34]
[34] For those reasons, I am of the view that the Husband ought to be granted access to the Child in the following manner:
(a) Video call access to the Child twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 8pm for 15 minutes. The Wife shall provide the Husband the mobile phone numbers for the video call access.
(b) Four hours of unsupervised access every Saturday from 2pm to 6pm, commencing from the date of this judgment, at the Husband’s venue of choice. The Husband shall inform the Wife of his venue of choice for the access, if such information is requested by the Wife. Pick up and drop off of the Child shall be at a venue to be agreed between the parties or, if the parties are unable to agree, outside the residence of the Wife or her parents.
(c) In the event the Child is unwell or unable to make access, the Wife shall notify the Husband at his personal email address at least one day in advance or at the earliest possible timing. The Husband shall be entitled to make-up access. The parties are to mutually agree on an appropriate time and date for make-up access.
(d) The parties shall review the access arrangements after 30 July 2025 with a view to either continue the current access arrangements or to explore alternative access arrangements.
Division of matrimonial assets
- [35]
[35] I now consider the appropriate division of the matrimonial assets. The parties are in agreement that the date for ascertaining the pool of assets is the date of the interim judgment, while the date for determining the value of the assets is the date of the ancillary matters hearing. The parties largely do not dispute the conversion rate to be applied to foreign currencies, save that the Husband’s position is that RM1 is equivalent to S$0.305, while the Wife’s position is that RM1 is equivalent to S$0.303. Nonetheless, counsel for the Wife confirmed that they are not disputing the values which have already been converted to the local currency that feature in the joint summary prepared by the parties, so, in that sense, nothing turns on this specific difference in position between the parties.
Joint assets
- [36]
[36] It is undisputed that the parties only have one Australian bank account jointly under their names. The parties do not dispute this item being in the matrimonial pool, its valuation at S$780.10, nor the fact that this should be equally credited to both parties.
Assets under the Husband’s name
The Husband’s failure to make full and frank disclosure
- [38]
[38] The Wife took out a discovery application on 23 April 2024, in which she sought a variety of documents. As helpfully summarised by the learned Assistant Registrar in WZF v WZG [2024] SGFC 46, the discovery application by the Wife sought the following, amongst others:
(a) The statements in relation to the Husband’s various bank accounts. For three bank accounts, the Wife sought the bank statements for the period from January 2022 to late 2022 or early 2023, which are from before the writ of divorce was filed in March 2023. The Wife also sought disclosure of the statements in relation to six other bank accounts owned by the Husband. The Wife highlighted that the Husband had contradictorily asserted there were no such bank accounts, while also simultaneously insisting that these (apparently non-existent) bank accounts were closed.
(b) The Husband’s income tax statements in Singapore and in Australia. While the Husband asserted that he was self-employed and earning S$7,500 a month, he did not disclose any documentary evidence to support this.
(c) The audited financial statements or unaudited profit and loss statements of companies that the Husband owns in various jurisdictions, from 2020 to date.
(d) Documents pertaining to the assets and value of a family trust in the Husband’s name (the “Family Trust Account”).
(e) The surrender value of an endowment fund held by the Husband for the Child (the “Endowment Fund”).
(f) The Husband’s superannuation account in Australia.
(1) Australian superannuation account
(2) Bank accounts
- [42]
[42] As noted above, the Husband initially only disclosed three bank accounts. After a request for discovery was made, the Husband made limited disclosure of three more bank accounts. However, of these six accounts that have been disclosed thus far, the statements provided for three of them were incomplete.
(3) Endowment Fund
(4) Family Trust Account
- [47]
[47] In any event, I struggle with any contention on the part of the Husband that the Family Trust Account would have no assets of significant value in it. It defies common sense and logic that the Husband would have gone through the lengthy and somewhat complicated process of setting up a family trust with him as the singular beneficiary, engaged the use of a law firm to draft what is, on its face, a very comprehensive trust deed (spanning over 30 pages of terms and conditions), and even put in place sophisticated auditing frameworks within the trust deed such as a requirement for annual accounts to be prepared, only to then leave it entirely dormant with no end-game in sight. The fact that the accounts in question either were not prepared (in contravention of the requirements of the trust) or simply are hidden from view is a further indicator that the Husband’s aim is to surreptitiously keep the likely sizeable pool of assets into that account shielded fully from public view. When I questioned counsel for the Husband regarding the above reality, counsel demurred from providing any meaningful response and merely stated that this trust instrument is the only document he has in his possession, and that he would leave it to the court to draw the necessary inferences given his client’s articulated position.
(5) Income tax statements
- [48]
[48] In relation to his income tax statements, the Husband’s position is that he has not made any tax filing in Singapore or Australia from 2020 till date. No document is produced to support the Husband’s assertion that his monthly salary is indeed S$7,500. I outline this at this juncture to provide a complete picture of the Husband’s pattern of conduct in hiding his net worth and assets in these proceedings, though this particular point regarding the Husband’s income will be most relevant when I discuss the issue of child maintenance at a later point.
(6) Insurance policies
(7) Interest in various companies
- [50]
[50] I now turn to the final, and perhaps most significant, bucket of potential assets under the Husband’s name. It is clear that key to understanding the actual asset value of the Husband is his role in a group of companies called the [W] Group (the “Group”), and the value of his shareholdings in it. It speaks volumes of his lack of credibility that the Husband did not even disclose initially any interest in a swathe of companies, including: (a) his shareholding or interest in multiple entities based in at least four jurisdictions within the [W] Group; (b) his directorship and 25% shareholding in an Australian company [X]; and (c) his interest in a Singaporean company [Y] as a result of his role as co-founder and managing director therein; and (d) his interest in another Singaporean company [Z] by virtue of his position as its director of commercial operations.
- [51]
[51] For all intents and purposes, it is clear that the Group appears to be a well-resourced group, which the Husband oversees as a director. The Wife, through her own industry, was able to pull out the company documents from some of the many jurisdictions that the Group operates in – an impressive list including Australia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Czech Republic. For avoidance of any doubt, these entities within the [W] Group are distinct from companies [X], [Y] and [Z]. Based on those documents, they provide a glimpse of what appears to be a very vivid picture of the Group’s successful business:
(b) The records for the Indonesian entity of the Group reveal that the company had a paid-up capital of 150bn Indonesian Rupiah, or about S$12m, and that the Husband is a majority shareholder (holding over 80% of the shares) of the company. Significantly, the Husband does not dispute the authenticity of these documents, meaning that he accepts that he had pumped in equity value of over S$10m in that company.
(c) For the Australian entity of the Group, the Husband was receiving monthly payments of A$2,500 to A$10,000 between June and November 2023 from the company, though there is no evidence as to what these payments were for.
- [53]
[53] Counsel for the Husband argued that the information regarding the Group’s value in these jurisdictions was not specifically requested by the Wife. In my mind, this is absurd on two fronts: first, many of the Assistant Registrar’s orders were in fact to obtain documentation that would allow the court to estimate the value of the companies in question (ie, to effectively value the company), and second, given that only the Husband knows what is in the company and would have access to the necessary records, it is for the Husband to provide cogent evidence of what the valuation of these entities are. To expect the Wife to do so, or to hunt for documents that the Husband would be in ready possession of or which he could easily obtain, is obviously perverse since she would not know the inner workings of any part of the Group.
- [54]
[54] In any event, as I informed counsel for the Husband during the hearing, the Husband’s explanations about the valuations to be accorded to the various assets often do not accord to logic. If in fact these companies were earning a pittance as he seems wont to suggest, then no time at all would be required for his accountants to produce audited accounts categorically proving that fact since there would be very little or nothing for the accountants to compute or study. If, as the Husband contends, the accountants require six months to produce these accounts, then that only proves the Wife’s point that these companies in question are likely big, complex, high-revenue yielding operations which are extremely valuable. Of course, it is debatable how much precisely they might be worth. Nonetheless, the point remains that if it is in fact the case that many months are required for the accounts to be completed for these companies, this categorically puts paid to the Husband’s claim that such companies and/or his shares in them are worthless. Despite this obvious fact, the Husband incredulously claims that the court should ascribe these companies within the [W] Group collectively a value of zero dollars.
- [55]
[55] In a similar vein, the Husband does not provide any relevant information regarding his interest in companies [X], [Y] or [Z] and how these assets should be valued, beyond insisting against the face of the evidence that he is not a director and/or shareholder of these companies. As the Wife points out, these assertions fly in the face of the Husband’s work history as publicised on his own LinkedIn profile and other documentary evidence such as company letters. When I questioned counsel for the Husband as to the viability of his client’s insistent position that all these companies are worth nothing, counsel concedes that he is in a fix to answer the court’s questions as he has duties to his client and that “the facts speak for themselves”, and he ultimately leaves it to the court to draw the necessary inferences.
- [56]
[56] The very fact that the Husband demurs from providing any corroborative evidence of the value of the companies in question whatsoever necessarily requires the court to assume that any statements he produces would be especially damaging to his narrative in which he paints himself effectively as a man of very modest means. With the greatest of respect, it should be painfully obvious that a man of very modest means does not run a multi-jurisdictional corporation in which he is able to contribute to the equity of the company to the tune of millions of dollars, nor does such a person hire lawyers to set up elaborate trust accounts which require annual accounts and in which he is the singular beneficiary, only to elect to put nothing in these accounts.
Adverse inference drawn against the Husband
- [60]
[60] There is, to my mind, much wisdom in the approach adopted in WRX. In divorce proceedings, where the court is confident that one party is intentionally under-declaring or concealing assets to a significant extent, there is no reason why the court should not be able to employ both approaches to achieve a fair result. I acknowledge that, in practical terms, this may potentially leave the non-disclosing party worse off than if they had just been transparent from the outset. However, this is precisely the point – the consequences of hiding assets should be sufficiently severe that it encourages and fully incentivises parties to give full and frank disclosure. The Court of Appeal in UZN rightly observed that the objective of drawing an adverse inference is to “counter the effects of non-disclosure of assets” (at [29]). In the fog of non-information perpetrated by the non-disclosing party, the court must be cautious not to perversely allow those who game the system to benefit from such actions. In a sense, the use of both the quantification and uplift approaches simultaneously, as the Appellate Division of the High Court did in WRX, reinforces the underlying principle that any such dishonesty or unfair gamesmanship by either party would result in deeply adverse consequences, thereby allowing for some broad level of equity between the parties and, in particular, to do right to the party that had been honest, and that played by the rules, from the get-go.
- [61]
[61] In making this point, I accept that the nature of therapeutic justice is such that the court should not demand that parties engage in a speculative exercise of seeking adverse inferences to be drawn against the other on spurious grounds of less than ideal record-keeping that will inevitably delay the healing process (UZN at [21]), or that an adverse inference should be drawn simply on the basis of suspicions (UTS v UTT [2019] SGHCF 8 at [30]) or subjective (self-interested) claims regarding the other side’s apparent worth (O’Connor Rosamund Monica v Potter Derek John [2011] 3 SLR 294 at [37]). Nonetheless, the court must balance this with the fact that it should never sit idly by while parties seek to perpetuate a fraud on the court. The court’s power to draw an adverse inference and give effect to that inference is precisely to “counter the effects of non-disclosure of assets which diminishes the value of the matrimonial pool and thereby places those assets out of the reach of the other party for the purposes of division under s 112 of the [Charter]” (UZN at [29]). In this regard, I entirely agree with the forceful sentiment expressed in Cunha (at [9]) that such non-disclosure represents the “cancer of matrimonial property litigation”. Much like dealing with cancer, there is merit in appropriate cases to taking aggressive approaches to cure such ills. In my view, the approach taken in WRX does precisely that.
- [62]
[62] Indeed, the facts of the present case illustrates the dilemma that may come up if the court is forced to elect one option to the exclusion of the other. If forced to choose between applying the uplift approach and quantification approach to the exclusion of the other, it is clear that the preferred option of the two (in that it would cause less injustice) would be the quantification approach. This is because the limitation inherent in the uplift approach is that where one party is assessed to be intentionally shielding an inordinate amount of assets from the view of the court (relative to what is in fact disclosed), the uplift approach would never meaningfully allow for a fair division of assets. That is obviously the case here: on the assumption I award 100% of the declared assets to the Wife, ie, the maximum award I could conceivably grant under the uplift approach, the likely award of around S$100,000 would hardly do justice if, in fact, as is very likely, the non-declared assets are worth millions of dollars. It is therefore clear to me that the better approach to take here would be the quantification approach. There are also sound reasons, in principle, as to why, in most cases, the quantification approach is conceptually preferred to the uplift approach (Tan Ming Ren, “Honesty is the Best Policy: Adverse Inferences and Non-Disclosure of Matrimonial Assets” [2021] Sing JLS 394 at 400).
- [63]
[63] Nonetheless, even as it represents the better of the two approaches in cases like this one, the quantification approach itself cannot fully resolve the dilemma that arises in this case and, if employed on its own, would still possess a tendency to result in a likely undervaluation of the assets. Typically, the court would have to seek recourse to an adverse inference precisely because there are obvious markers that one party has intentionally underdeclared his or her assets and/or shielded them from the court’s view. In that sense, in most of these cases, the court would not be equipped to engage in a forensic analysis of what a fair estimate for the value of that asset would be, since the very point of the strategy adopted by the non-cooperating party is to deprive the court of any meaningful way to ascertain the assets’ actual worth. This makes the application of the quantification approach understandably problematic to an extent. As will be elaborated upon later, for some of the assets in question such as the value of the Indonesian entity of the Group, there are, at least, some proxies upon which to divine some valuation that would not be entirely arbitrary. For others such as the Australian entity of the Group, the absence of even a single data point for valuation means any attempted valuation would be arbitrary and uninformed and would amount to nothing more than plucking a number out of thin fair and then randomly assigning it as the value of the entity in question. This would be an entirely artificial and poor way to determine the value of a matrimonial asset.
- [65]
[65] With the above in mind, I turn to the valuation of the Indonesian entity in the Group. Based on the company profile produced by the Wife, the Husband appears to own 80% of the shareholding in the Indonesian entity, wherein the total “paid up capital” in the form of “cash funds” is 150bn Indonesian Rupiah or around S$12m. As such, according to the Wife, the Husband’s shareholding translates to approximately S$10,054,716 in value. For completeness, I note that this value differs from the value that would have been obtained if the parties’ agreed exchange rate (1 Indonesian Rupiah is equivalent to S$0.000084) was applied to 80% of 150bn Indonesia Rupiah, namely, S$10,080,000. Since the difference between these two values is marginal relative to the total sum of about S$10m, I will assume the Wife’s proposed valuation of the Husband’s interest in the Indonesian entity in [W] to be S$10,054,716, which is also the same value that features in the Wife’s written submissions.
- [66]
[66] The Wife’s position is that paid up capital is necessarily what the shareholder, ie, the Husband, paid for the shares. In response, the Husband’s position is that the value of the shares is not equivalent to the amount that was paid for the shares. While I agree with the Husband’s reasoning, the paid up capital of the company serves as a useful (and the only) starting point for assessing its value in the absence of any detailed financial information. After all, the paid up capital represents the nominal value of the shares issued by the company and reflects the value of the initial equity investment. While this is admittedly not always or even commonly co-related with the shares’ actual present value (which incorporates a multitude of other factors), it represents a sensible base line and, is, in any event, the only available relevant proxy for the value of the Husband’s shares in the company. Of course, it may very well be, as the Husband asserts, that it is no longer a fair reflection of the current market value, or that he bought the shares at a different price. However, in the present circumstances, given that the Husband is intentionally not furnishing any data point to the court for its consideration, the Wife’s representation of the value of the paid-up capital owned by the Husband represents the only meaningful proxy available.
- [67]
[67] The Husband also objects to this manner of valuation of the assets in the Indonesian entity of the Group, claiming that there is no evidence to support such a proposed valuation and there is therefore nothing for the court to meaningfully value. The inference that he seems to be urging the court to make is that it runs the very significant risk of overvaluing if it engages in such an exercise of linking equity placed into the company with its actual value. When the issue is seen through theoretical lenses, there may be some merit to such a concern. This is especially so if the point of the division exercise really is to divide the “material gains of the marital partnership” (USB at [27], and see also Leong Wai Kum, “Definition of Property as Matrimonial Asset Through the Lens of Therapeutic Justice” [2024] SAL Prac 4 at [31]) and once one takes into account the possibility or risk that some of the value of the companies might have accrued pre-marriage (or indeed, post-marriage). This must be so because, based on the evidence before me, at least some of the companies were founded before or after the marriage, such as the Czech entity in [W]. Be that as it may, the Wife points out, and this does not appear to be disputed by the Husband, at least the Indonesian and Singaporean entities (in the [W] Group and also the Singaporean entity in [Y]) appear to have been set up during the course of their marriage. Based on a search on the Australian Business Register, it also appears that the Australian company [X] was active from November 2021, ie, from during the marriage.
- [68]
[68] Nonetheless, even if the valuation of the Husband’s assets does involve an elevated value, he only has himself to blame for this predicament. In a room full of shadows, the one who casts a light must necessarily lead the way. The Wife’s attempt at valuation was, even if based on a deeply flawed proxy, at least bona fide and an educated (if still much less than perfect) guess at divining the actual value of the Indonesian entity of the Group using the only meaningful proxy available to her. In stark contrast, the Husband claims, without any evidence, that the Group across its many jurisdictions is worth nothing. The Husband did not disclose any valuation documents, which only he would have immediate access to since he is the only and/or majority shareholder of some of those companies. In the absence of any financial records, whether audited or otherwise, which support the Husband’s odd contention (ie, the contention that the entire conglomerate is worth nothing) is an assertion that I have little hesitation in rejecting outright.
- [69]
[69] The suggestion that the Group is collectively worth nothing is also especially difficult to reconcile with the millions in equity he initially seemingly pumped into the Group, as evidenced by the documents produced by the Wife vis-à-vis the Indonesian entity of the Group. Indeed, much as it seems to me that the Husband is making up his salary as he went along, it is similarly clear that he is disingenuous about the value of the Group and his other related shareholdings so as to shield their true value. I stress again that there is a real possibility that the Wife has overvalued the company or that the actual gains during marriage may be much more conservative (since, if the true facts were known, it may be that only a relatively small proportion of the Husband’s shareholdings in the Group could be said to be matrimonial assets in the technical sense). However, given that the Husband is clearly intentionally shielding the necessary information from the court, he should quite rightfully take the risk of such overvaluation. In fact, I parenthetically note that there is also the converse possibility that even the significant valuation suggested by the Wife may be conservative and represent an understatement of the value of the equity of all the companies in question.
- [70]
[70] I turn back to the facts. While I am able to ascribe a value (albeit imprecise) to the Indonesian entity of the Group, I am unable to do so with the Husband’s interests in the other entities in the [W] Group and beyond. Given the Husband’s clear attempts to obfuscate his actual net worth, there is simply no meaningful proxy that is even remotely rational upon which to actually ascribe a notional value to these assets in question. One thing however is certain: these assets were not likely to be de minimis in value. As an example, although ostensibly capitalised to the tune of just S$8, the Singaporean entity of the Group made an income of S$120,000 in one particular year (see above at [51(a)]). That is not a small sum by any length of the imagination, and it leaves me with little doubt that the other entities in the Group are themselves substantial. This makes it important to ensure that some steps are taken to mitigate against such a wanton act of non-disclosure.
- [71]
[71] For the reasons set out above, I accepted in toto the Wife’s assessment of the value of the matrimonial pool (to the extent I was able to arrive at any meaningful estimate for the valuation via the use of a proxy). Applying the quantification approach, I return S$10,054,716 to the pool, which corresponds to the paid up share capital of the Husband’s shareholding in the Indonesian entity of the Group.
Assets under the Wife’s name
- [72]
[72] The Wife’s assets mainly comprise her bank accounts and two insurance policies. The value of her two bank accounts (S$32,999.87) and the value of the insurance policy ending with 852 (S$2,206.85) are not disputed.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.