High Court · Decided 30 July 2020
O’Laughlin Industries Co Ltd and another v Tan Thiam Hock and others
Feedback & support[2020] SGHCR 6 · Case no. High Court — Suit No 1174 of 2016 (Summonses Nos 1762 and 1763 of 2020) Scott Tan AR 24, 28 July 2020 · 9 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [4]
[4] Mr Nicholas Narayanan, counsel for the Plaintiffs, submits that there is. He contends that because this paragraph of the IJ was (a) entered into by consent, (b) provides for a severance of the parties’ joint tenancy, (c) specifies the sale price of the property, and (d) states that the sale shall take place “immediately”, there is no need for any further agreement to be concluded and the Fifth Defendant’s liability to pay the First Defendant the “balance sale proceeds” has already accrued. Unsurprisingly, Mr Chandra Mohan K Nair, counsel for the First and Fifth Defendants, submits to the contrary. He maintains that until and unless the First Defendant’s 30% interest in the Property is actually sold to the Fifth Defendant, the Fifth Defendant is under no obligation to pay the First Defendant anything and there is no “debt” that can be garnished.
Background
- [7]
[7] The First Defendant has substantially admitted to the various acts of wrongdoing alleged against him and sought in his defence only to exonerate the rest of the defendants from liability by claiming that he had acted alone at all times. Interim judgment was therefore entered against him and the Fourth Defendant on 27 February 2019 for the liquidated sum of approximately US$1.68m, with damages for the unliquidated claims to be assessed. The trial against the rest of the defendants is presently ongoing.
- [8]
[8] The present suit (Suit No 1174 of 2016) was commenced on 3 November 2016. About three weeks after that, on 23 November 2016, the Fifth Defendant initiated divorce proceedings against the First Defendant. As the matter was uncontested, it proceeded briskly and, as noted at [3] above, the IJ was granted on 23 December 2016. Paragraph 3 of the IJ contained a number of consent orders which largely reproduced the terms of a “Matrimonial Settlement Agreement” which the First and Fifth Defendant concluded on 22 November 2016, a day before the divorce proceedings were initiated. One of these orders is para 3(c), which deals with the Property (see [2] above).
- [11]
[11] The Plaintiffs took the view that the conclusion of these agreements and the lodging of the caveats breached the terms of the Injunction so they commenced committal proceedings against the First and Fifth Defendants, arguing that the net effect of these agreements was a diminution of the amount due to the First Defendant from the Fifth Defendant (and, consequently, a reduction in the amount available for garnishment). Their position was that the sum payable to the First Defendant should instead be calculated on the basis that the sale was to have taken place on 23 March 2017, when the IJ was made final, instead of the date of the completion specified in the SPA (which would result in a decrease in the refund due to the First Defendant’s CPF account). The Plaintiffs eventually withdrew their application for committal on terms that the First and Fifth Defendants would rescind the two agreements and the Fifth Defendant would withdraw the caveats she had filed. All of this was done by 5 March 2020, and the Plaintiffs filed the present applications on 20 April 2020.
The Law: “Debt Due or Accruing Due”
- [15]
[15] Brett MR explained that a debt could be payable now (in which case it would be a “debt owing”), or it might be payable only on some future date (making it a “debt accruing”), but there must be a crystallised obligation of payment (at 524). Without that, there is nothing to attach. He therefore dismissed the application, reasoning that because the trustees had yet to receive the income from the property, there was no obligation of disbursement and so there was no “debt” to speak of. At 525-526, he put the point as follows:
- [16]
[16] Lindley LJ’s definition of a debt as a “sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation” has been widely applied around the Commonwealth (see, eg, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Regina v Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, ex parte New Cross Building Society [1984] 2 WLR 370 at 399A per Sir John Donaldson MR, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Shanti Prasad Jain v Director of Enforcement Foreign Exchange Regulation Act AIR 1962 SC 1764 (“Shanti Prasad Jain”), and the decision of the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Cheong Heng Loong Goldsmiths (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Capital Insurance Bhd and another appeal [2004] 1 MLJ 353 at [34] per Gopal Sri Ram JCA). This definition is the reason why contingent debts, which do not exist until and unless the contingency that triggers their creation occurs, cannot be garnished. The line between a contingent debt, which has no present existence, and a “debt accruing”, which is a subsisting obligation to pay a sum in respect of a liquidated money demand, albeit sometime in the future, which can be garnished can sometimes be fine (see, eg, the decision of the High Court in Lim Boon Kwee (trading as B K Lim & Co) v Impexital SRL (Sembawang Multiplex Joint Venture, garnishee) [1998] 1 SLR(R) 757 (“Lim Boon Kwee”) at [15]-[18]), but it is conceptually intelligible and has long been upheld by the courts.
- [18]
[18] At [62] of Société Eram, Lord Hoffmann put the point as follows:
Analysis: Is There an Attachable Debt?
- [21]
[21] When SUM 1762 is considered in light of the foregoing authorities, I think that the result should be clear. Paragraph 3(c)(2) of the IJ provides that the First Defendant’s interest in the Property “shall be sold” to the Fifth Defendant. The expression “sale” is one of common everyday use and it refers to “a transfer of the absolute title in the property for a certain agreed price … a contract between two parties, one of whom acquires thereby a property in the thing sold, and the other parts with it for a valuable consideration” (see Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief) (Thomson Reuters, 11th Ed, 2019). This understanding is reflected at para 3(c)(2)(iii) of the IJ, which provides that the “[First Defendant] shall receive from the [Fifth Defendant] the balance of the sale price after the deductions”. The expression “sale price” makes it clear that what we are concerned with is the payment of a sum of money in consideration for the transfer of property, and not an outright payment, without more. If there is no sale, then there is, ipso facto, no obligation of payment. We are dealing, in other words, with a contingent debt.
Conclusion
- [30]
[30] In closing, I express my gratitude to Mr Narayanan and Mr Mohan for their submissions, which greatly assisted me in the preparation of this judgment.
Scott TanAssistant Registrar