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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Feb 2021

High Court

Fu Yuan Construction Pte Ltd v Fab-5 Pte Ltd

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[2021] SGHCR 2Case no. Originating Summons No 620 of 2020 (Summons No 5045 of 2020 and Summons No 5046 of 2020)20 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] These proceedings concern two applications before the court, namely:

  3. [2] The oral hearing for both SUM 5045 and SUM 5046 was conducted on 23 December 2020, at the end of which the court reserved judgment. I now render the court’s judgment on these applications with the grounds included.

  4. Background to the applications

  5. [3] On 29 May 2020, the plaintiff lodged an adjudication application under the SOPA against the defendant in respect of a progress payment claim for sub-contracted works carried out by the plaintiff for the defendant (the main contractor) in a building and construction project. On 16 June 2020, the adjudicator issued an adjudication determination in favour of the plaintiff. The principal sum of money (including GST) that the defendant was required to pay pursuant to the adjudication determination was $906,976.22. The plaintiff served the adjudication determination on the defendant via registered post on 17 June 2020.

  6. [7] On 18 November 2020, the plaintiff filed SUM 5045 seeking the striking out of SUM 3558, on grounds that:

  7. [8] On the same day, the defendant filed SUM 5046, seeking the following prayers:

  8. (1) the joinder of the defendant as a party to SUM 3295;

  9. (3) an extension of time “for such security to be paid into court”;

  10. (4) the adjournment of the hearing of SUM 3295 to after the determination of SUM 3558;

  11. (5) costs; and

  12. (6) such further and other relief as the court deems fit.

  13. The parties’ cases

  14. SUM 5045

  15. [11] The defendant’s case in resisting the striking out application can essentially be summarised as follows:

  16. SUM 5046

  17. (b) where the judgment has been obtained by fraud;

  18. Issues to be determined

  19. The court’s analysis

  20. SUM 5045 – plaintiff’s application to strike out SUM 3558

  21. The court’s inherent power to strike out a summons under Order 92 Rule 4

  22. [23] The High Court in Chee Siok Chin further held (at [35]) that:

  23. The defendant’s failure to bring SUM 3558 within the 14-day timeline stipulated in Order 95 Rule 2(4)

  24. [28] This court is unable to accept the defendant’s interpretation of the 14-day timeline in the rule, with the reasons as follows. Firstly, the defendant cites no authority in support of its interpretation. Secondly, and more importantly, in Citiwall Safety Glass Pte Ltd v Mansource Interior Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 797 where the Court of Appeal summarised the scheme of the statutory provisions governing the enforcement of adjudication determinations, it was explained (at [29(d)]-[29(e)]) that:

  25. [29] With the analysis above, the question now turns on whether the defendant’s breach of the 14-day timeline constitutes an abuse of process of the court. In Chee Siok Chin (at [34]), the High Court held that the instances of abuse of process can be systematically classified into the following four categories:

  26. (a) proceedings which involve a deception on the court, or are fictitious or constitute a mere sham;

  27. (b) proceedings where the process of the court is not being fairly or honestly used but is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way;

  28. (c) proceedings which are manifestly groundless or without foundation or which serve no useful purpose;

  29. (d) multiple or successive proceedings which cause or are likely to cause improper vexation or oppression.

  30. [30] Based on the above classification, a breach of a procedural rule does not, in and of itself, amount to abuse of process. Were it to be the case, one would imagine that the High Court would have expressly stated so in Chee Siok Chin. In any case, the discernible touchstone of abuse of process common across all the four categories above is the improper use of court proceedings and procedures, and not a mere default in complying with a procedural rule. This is also consistent with a relatively oft-cited observation made in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 (per Lord Diplock, who delivered the leading judgment of the House of Lords) that the court’s inherent power to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process is one:

  31. Lord Diplock’s characterisation of such distinctive feature of abuse of process has been recognised and accepted in our local case law (see, eg, Goh Nellie v Goh Lian Teck and others [2007] 1 SLR(R) 453 at [20]).

  32. [31] Thus, in a situation such as in the present case where the defendant’s offending conduct is in the nature of a default of a procedural rule stipulated in the Rules of Court, the court would be remiss in its judgment if it were to make a quantum leap and equate such default as amounting to an abuse of process of the court. The defendant, in bringing SUM 3558 out of time, has but committed a default of a procedural rule, in contrast to an abuse of process as envisaged by legal doctrine.

  33. The defendant’s failure to furnish security in respect of SUM 3558

  34. [33] For completeness, section 27(5) of the SOPA provides that:

  35. [36] As explained by Professor Jeffrey Pinsler in Singapore Court Practice 2017 (LexisNexis, 2017 Ed) at para 49/1/1:

  36. [38] Given the above analysis, the defendant’s assertion in the present case of a potential “double security” is thus a false and erroneous characterisation. Having said that, however, the inquiry which still remains to be answered is whether the defendant’s failure to furnish the security amounts to an abuse of process of the court. It is to this inquiry that I now turn.

  37. [39] In FT Plumbing Construction Pte Ltd v Authentic Builder Pte Ltd and another matter [2018] SGHCR 3 (“FT Plumbing”), an adjudication debtor commenced, inter alia, a suit against the adjudication creditor when the latter sought to enforce an adjudication determination as a judgment debt. The purpose of the suit was to seek a final determination of the dispute between the parties. The adjudication creditor, in response, applied for a stay of the suit, alleging that the adjudication debtor’s commencement of the suit amounted to an abuse of process as the adjudication debtor had not made any payment of the adjudicated amount. In reviewing the case law in Singapore and Australia, an Assistant Registrar concluded (at [51]) that:

  38. [40] This court finds this statement of the law in FT Plumbing to be mutatis mutandis applicable in cases such as the present one, considering that both FT Plumbing and the present case involve and engage, to a large extent, the same principle and policy considerations underpinning the doctrine of “temporary finality” of adjudication determinations in the SOPA regime (see, eg, Vinod Kumar Ramgopal Didwania v Hauslab Design & Build Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 890 at [30], and W Y Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 380 at [59]).

  39. [43] The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the defendant has failed to prove that it did not have access to additional funds for putting up the security, and submits that the defendant is “more likely than not” to have the financial means to do so, given that:

  40. (b) an ACRA search on the defendant reveals that it has a paid-up capital of at least $1 million;

  41. (c) while it would have been easy for the defendant to adduce audited accounts or bank statements to provide that it did not have the financial means to raise additional funds, the defendant has deliberately chosen not to do so; and

  42. (d) based on the defendant’s OCBC bank account statements which have been tendered before the court, there were several substantial incoming funds during the period between August 2020 and December 2020 which the defendant has failed to account for.

  43. (a) Firstly, apart from OCBC, no other bank has been made known by the evidence to be maintaining an account for the defendant. While as mentioned before there was another separate garnishee proceedings taken out by the plaintiff against another bank as the garnishee, that garnishee proceeding had since been withdrawn after the bank indicated that it did not maintain any account with the defendant (see [42] above).

  44. SUM 5046 – defendant’s application to set aside the provisional garnishee order in SUM 3295

  45. The applicable principles

  46. (b) where the judgment has been obtained by fraud;

  47. Whether the provisional garnishee order should be set aside

  48. [49] As such, the remaining contentions to be evaluated are as follows:

  49. (b) the defendant’s contention of “severe prejudice” if its application in SUM 3558 is struck out for want of the required security.

  50. [52] Thirdly, the defendant’s clarification in oral submissions that the true underlying purpose of SUM 5046 is to bring about a ‘re-arrangement’ of the manner in which its OCBC bank funds are presently held (see [12] above) belies any genuine prejudice that the defendant is seeking to assert. On the contrary, the defendant’s attempt in SUM 5046, at its very core, strikes the court as an exercise motivated not by what the defendant considers to be in the interests of justice between the parties, but by what it considers to be convenient having regard to its own interests. On a related note, it should also be highlighted that the defendant, in an attempt during the course of the hearing to convince the court to consider a deferment of the garnishee show cause proceedings in SUM 3295 until SUM 3558 has been disposed of (see also prayer (4) at [8] above), had made a completely bald and unsubstantiated submission that it might not (in the event that SUM 3558 is allowed) be able to fully recover from the plaintiff the funds that are subjected by SUM 3295. The fact that the defendant would resort to such a patently unsupportable argument in court adds the view that the defendant’s purpose underlying SUM 5046 is not just self-serving but also a desperate one.

  51. [53] Having regard to the circumstances as well as the foregoing reasons, this court thus considers that the defendant’s application in SUM 5046 is tantamount to a frivolous one for which no litigant should have a licence to pursue (see Harmonious Coretrades (CA) at [40], cited at [47] above).

  52. Conclusion

  53. (a) SUM 5045 is dismissed; and