High Court · Decided 28 September 2022
Credit Suisse AG v Owner of the Vessel “CHLOE V”
Feedback & support[2022] SGHCR 9 · Case no. HC/ADM 102 of 2021HC/SUM 2171 of 2022 · 33 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
Background
- [2]
[2] The claimant bank is, and was, at all material times the mortgagee of the “CHLOE V” in connection with a loan facility extended by the claimant to the defendant pursuant to a Facilities Agreement dated 26 June 2019 (and as subsequently amended and supplemented on 30 August 2019 and 23 January 2020).
- [3]
[3] On 18 September 2021, the claimant commenced ADM 102 in the General Division of the High Court and obtained a warrant for the arrest of the vessel in Singapore. The action was pursued on the ground that six events of default had occurred under the Facilities Agreement in the period from 14 May 2021 to 14 September 2021. These events of default included the defendant’s failure to:
(a) remedy a security shortfall to maintain the “minimum security value” required under the Facilities Agreement, following two valuations of the vessel carried out on 29 June 2021;
(b) top up the credit balance in the defendant’s “minimum liquidity” account maintained with the claimant to a higher requisite amount in accordance with the Facilities Agreement, after the vessel became off-charter in May 2021;
(c) make payment of various other sums due and owing under the Facilities Agreement; and
(d) procure the release, within ten days in accordance with the Facilities Agreement, of the vessel from an earlier arrest initiated by the vessel’s previous charterer, Koch Shipping Pte Ltd (“Koch”), in High Court Admiralty Suit No 64 of 2021 (“ADM 64”).
- [4]
[4] The defendant entered its appearance in ADM 102 on 29 September 2021, and on 8 October 2021 the claimant’s Statement of Claim was filed and served. This was followed by the defendant’s filing and service of its Defence and Counterclaim on 4 November 2021, and the claimant’s filing and service of its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim on 18 November 2021.
- [6]
[6] On 30 December 2021, the claimant brought an application seeking summary judgment on its claim in ADM 102. The application was granted by an Assistant Registrar (“the AR”) on 21 March 2022 following a hearing on the same day. The defendant filed a Registrar’s Appeal against the AR’s decision on 4 April 2022. The appeal was heard by the Judge on 26 April 2022, and on 18 May 2022 the Judge delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal. To my understanding, no further appeal has been filed by the defendant following the Judge’s decision affirming the grant of the summary judgment. This leaves the defendant’s counterclaim in ADM 102 outstanding and pending in the proceedings.
- [8]
[8] Judgment was reserved and I now render my decision on the application with my reasons.
Analysis
Ancillary issue concerning the applicability of the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (2020 Rev Ed)
- [9]
[9] In the course of oral submissions in the application, it came to my knowledge that the Facilities Agreement carries a jurisdiction agreement by way of clause 44.1, as follows:
- [10]
[10] Clause 44.1 of the Facilities Agreement appears to be an asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clause not uncommonly adopted in international loan and financing agreements. It subjects the defendant in the present case to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England if it wished to pursue legal proceedings against the claimant, but not the same vis-à-vis the claimant in respect of any legal proceedings that the claimant would pursue against the defendant.
- [14]
[14] The claimant’s justifications in this regard are summarised as follows:
(a) First, clause 44.1 does not designate “the courts, or one or more specific courts, of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other court” (emphasis added) for the purposes of hearing any dispute arising out of the Facilities Agreement. Read as a whole, clause 44.1 admits of the possibility of having more than just the courts of one State having jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Facilities Agreement, depending on whether it is the claimant or the defendant who is pursuing legal proceedings against the other.
(b) Second, the Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention (2013) published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (“the Hague Convention Explanatory Report”), as well as Singapore’s Report of the Law Reform Committee on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005, reveal that asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clauses were not intended to be included within the scope of the Hague Convention.
- [15]
[15] The claimant also highlights that the English Court of Appeal in a 2020 decision (ie, Etihad Airways PJSC v Flöther [2022] QB 303 (“Etihad Airways (EWCA)”) has opined in dicta that the Hague Convention “should probably be interpreted as not applying to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses” (see Etihad Airways (EWCA) at [85]). This dicta in Etihad Airways (EWCA) takes precedence over two prior English High Court dicta decisions suggesting otherwise (see Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc [2017] 1 WLR 3497 at [36]-[39] and [74] (“Commerzbank AG”); Etihad Airways PJSC v Flöther [2020] QB 793 at [183]-[184] and [215]-[217] (“Etihad Airways (EWHC)”).
- [16]
[16] After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clauses are indeed not intended to fall within the scope of the Hague Convention (and therefore the CCAA). Although, as the English High Court decisions in Commerzbank AG and Etihad Airways (EWHC) suggest, the wording in the definition of “exclusive choice of court agreements” in Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention may potentially include asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clauses (see Commerzbank AG at [74]; Etihad Airways (EWHC) at [215]), I am mindful that the interpretation of international instruments (including treaties) is not to be undertaken by reference only to the text, important as no doubt it is (see, eg, The “Sahand” and other applications [2011] 2 SLR 1093 at [66]). In this connection, the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), 1155 UNTS 331 (“VCLT”) in the interpretation of treaties is not alien to the Singapore courts (see, eg, Re Gearing, Matthew Peter QC [2020] 3 SLR 1106 at [40]). Article 32 of the VCLT provides that:
- [17]
[17] I find no difficulty regarding the Hague Convention Explanatory Report as an instructive supplementary means of interpreting Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention, having previously considered it to be a useful guide in relation to a case concerning the application of the Hague Convention for the purpose of the enforcement of an English judgment in Singapore (see Ermgassen & Co Ltd v Sixcap Financials Pte Ltd [2018] SGHCR 8). Paragraphs 105 and 106 of the Hague Convention Explanatory Report are germane to the present case:
- [18]
[18] In Etihad Airways (EWCA) at [85]-[86], Henderson LJ (with whom Hickinbottom and Newey LJJ agreed) similarly opined the following (in dicta):
- [20]
[20] Given the above analysis, it suffices for me to leave the issue concerning the applicability of the Hague Convention (and the CCAA) to asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clauses as determined. Any secondary issues raised (eg, whether section 12 of the CCAA may be invoked by the court on its own motion) are strictly speaking not necessary for my determination given the conclusion I have reached, and thus best left to be decided in a future case.
- [21]
[21] For completeness, I also highlight that the claimant has not advanced any alternative argument seeking a stay of the defendant’s counterclaim under general law.
Application for security for costs in respect of the defendant’s counterclaim
Jurisdictional threshold
- [24]
[24] As between the parties, it is not disputed that:
(a) The defendant is not ordinarily resident in Singapore. It is common ground that the defendant is a corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. This is confirmed by Mr Alexandros Lamprinakis in paragraph 6 of his 3rd affidavit filed in the proceedings on behalf of the defendant. Mr Lamprinakis is the in-house legal counsel of the manager of the vessel and agent for the defendant. Counsel for the defendant also confirmed in oral submissions that the defendant is not ordinarily resident in Singapore.
- [26]
[26] For completeness, I highlight that in relation to the applicability of section 388 of the Companies Act, counsel for the defendant has expressed doubt in his oral submissions whether the defendant is a “corporation” for the purposes of that provision. Section 388 provides:
- [27]
[27] With respect, this doubt is misconceived and can be resolved readily by reference to the definition of “corporation” in section 4(1) of the Companies Act, where the term is stated to mean “any body corporate formed or incorporated or existing in Singapore or outside Singapore and includes any foreign company…” (emphasis added), subject to certain exclusions which do not apply in the present case.
Discretion as to whether security for costs should be ordered
Whether defendant’s counterclaim will be stifled
- [31]
[31] The defendant’s submission in this regard is, by and large, encapsulated in its witness Mr Lamprinakis’ averments in paragraphs 11-12 of his 3rd affidavit:
- [32]
[32] In this connection, the quality of the defendant’s counterclaim has been described by the defendant as “bona fide … with a reasonable prospect of success”, “plausible” and “not without merit”. The defendant also places reliance on aspects of the Judge’s oral judgment in the summary judgment proceedings mentioned earlier (see [6] above), where the Judge reportedly expressed the view that the defendant’s counterclaim “does not at this stage appear to be implausible”.
- [33]
[33] It is useful to give more context to the defendant’s counterclaim in this regard. As mentioned earlier, ADM 102 was commenced by the claimant claiming that events of default had occurred under the Facilities Agreement (see [3] above). In response, the defendant claims that it had been prevented by the claimant from entering into a fresh charterparty with Koch in respect of the vessel. According to the defendant, Koch had requested the issuance of a letter of quiet enjoyment in respect of the vessel (“LQE”) from the claimant as a condition for the renewal of the charterparty, but the claimant declined to do so even though it knew or ought to have known that the only realistic and/or practicable way for the defendant to generate income and continue performing its obligations under the Facilities Agreement was to charter the vessel to Koch under the new charterparty. The defendant claims, in particular, that the claimant was in breach of an implied obligation to act reasonably, rationally and in good faith when exercising its discretion whether to withhold any approval which it may give under the Facilities Agreement.
- [34]
[34] Returning to the application before me, the claimant contends, on the other hand, that the defendant’s counterclaim is not genuine to begin with, because of “a high degree of success” in its defence to the counterclaim. Chief among the arguments made in support of this contention are as follows:
(a) At or around the time when Koch requested the LQE, the defendant’s controller (identified as one Mr Ghassan Ghandour) protested the request by way of an email sent to Koch’s representative, stating inter alia that the request was “unreasonable”, “unnecessary” and “untimely” because a LQE was not previously requested under the earlier charterparty and that “Koch knew that financing was already in place and [the claimant] had absolutely no obligation under the existing finance documents to agree to limit their rights under a [LQE]”.
(b) When the vessel was first arrested by Koch in ADM 64, Mr Lamprinakis provided affidavit evidence in support of the defendant’s challenge against that arrest, stating that there had been no LQE issued under the earlier charterparty of the vessel and this was “rightly so” because Koch “knew that [the claimant] would not accede to such a request”.
These are argued to be inconsistent with the position now taken by the defendant in ADM 102.
- [35]
[35] In my judgment, I am not convinced on the arguments presented before me that the defendant’s counterclaim can be said to be ingenuine or likely to fail at the outset. Wedged between the requestor and requestee of the LQE both of whom were the key bargain holders at the material time in the negotiation for a fresh charterparty of the vessel, the positions taken by the defendant when dealing with Koch and the claimant separately at the various times might not be so unfathomable from a commercial perspective. I am also mindful of the principle that the court is generally not required to embark on a detailed examination of the merits of the case, notwithstanding that the strength or weakness of the claim advanced by the party against whom security is sought may be a relevant factor for consideration (see Ong Jane Rebecca v Pricewaterhousecoopers and others [2009] 2 SLR(R) 796 at [22]-[23]). But more importantly, I note that the Judge in the earlier summary judgment proceedings has expressed the view that “on a prima facie basis, [the defendant] has done enough to raise a counterclaim which has some plausibility and which has some connection to [the claimant’s] claim”, even though the Judge ultimately found it insufficient to justify on further grounds granting the defendant unconditional leave to defend the claimant’s claim or ordering a partial stay of execution of the summary judgment pending the determination of the counterclaim. The Judge also held that several issues arising out of the defendant’s counterclaim “cannot be decided simply based on the available affidavit evidence”.
(a) The past behaviour of the party against whom security was sought in refusing to comply with a number of costs orders.
(b) The ability of the same party in mustering third-party resources to pay for counsel and other court charges to continue with the court proceedings (including engaging an expert to prepare an expert report for an interlocutory application).
- [41]
[41] I pause briefly at this juncture to mention that the counsel for the defendant contends in his submissions that the release of the “ALPHA” was brought about by virtue of the actual owner of “ALPHA”, and not the defendant, providing the necessary security for that release. However, I find this contention to be lacking in merit as it is wholly inconsistent with the evidence given by the defendant’s own witness Mr Lamprinakis just outlined in the above paragraph. For the record, the following was what Mr Lamprinakis deposed to in his affidavit:
- [42]
[42] That is not all. After the “CHLOE V” was released from ADM 64 and re-arrested in ADM 102, the defendant further appears to continue to be able to maintain its ability to muster the wherewithal to fund its litigation needs in Singapore, namely its defence against the summary judgment proceedings in ADM 102 and the prosecution of its own counterclaim in the same action. These steps in the litigation were taken by the defendant under full legal representation. Moreover, just as the claimant had engaged an experienced Queen’s Counsel to give expert opinion in the summary judgment proceedings, so too did the defendant. This was to address English law which has been put into issue by the defendant’s counterclaim alleging the claimant’s breach of an implied obligation to act reasonably, rationally and in good faith when exercising its discretion whether to withhold any approval which it may give under the Facilities Agreement (see [33] above).
- [43]
[43] Putting all these factors together, the picture that emerges is one which is – much like in the case of Frantonios Marine – quite significantly at odds with the defendant’s apparent lack of funds and assets. The factors demonstrate that the defendant, with the help of its controller(s) and/or shareholder(s), is capable of marshalling the financial means, when desired, to pursue and/or safeguard its dispute resolution interests in connection with the vessel “CHLOE V”. I do not say this lightly, for there has been evidence drawn to my attention indicating that the defendant is in fact backed by controller(s) and/or shareholder(s) ready to inject substantial funds into the defendant so long as the defendant can be kept commercially viable. The defendant’s attempted rebuttal in this regard that “the ultimate shareholders of the Defendant did not offer the Defendant financial support unconditionally” and that “[t]he shareholders would have been prepared to invest additional funds in the Defendant only if the Defendant had entered into the New Koch Charterparty [which did not happen because of the claimant’s refusal to issue the LQE]”, strikes me as self-serving.
Whether there is a close overlap between the claim and the counterclaim
- [47]
[47] The defendant submits that its counterclaim arises out of the subject matter of the main claim in the action and does not amount to a separate cause of action. In support, the defendant alluded to certain remarks made by the Judge in the earlier summary judgment proceedings, in particular where the Judge observed that the defendant’s counterclaim was prima facie plausible and “has some connection” to the claimant’s claim in the action.
- [48]
[48] Having perused the Judge’s notes of evidence in the summary judgment proceedings, I am not convinced that the Judge’s observation that the defendant’s counterclaim has “some connection” to the claimant’s claim is equivalent to a finding that a close overlap exists between the two. I offer three reasons for this:
(a) First, the proceedings before the Judge was not one concerning an application for security for costs. As mentioned, the proceedings before the Judge was in the nature of an application seeking summary judgment in respect of the claimant’s claim. Considerations relevant to the principles applicable to a security for costs application were therefore strictly speaking not in issue before the Judge. The remarks made by the Judge in the summary proceedings must therefore be viewed in the proper context.
(b) Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Judge’s remarks in the summary judgment proceedings do foreshadow the determination of questions now to be addressed in the claimant’s security for costs application, it seems rather a stretch and indeed a strain to regard a counterclaim said to have some connection to a claim as ipso facto having a close overlap with the claim.
No special circumstances against the ordering of security for costs
Quantum of security for costs
- [53]
[53] It is well established that the court has complete discretion in the amount of the security to be provided, and will decide the appropriate sum on the basis of the circumstances of the case (see Prof Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice 2017 (LexisNexis, 2017) at para 23/2/2).
(a) Legal costs for general/specific discovery up to exchange of affidavits of evidence-in-chief – S$150,000.
(b) Legal costs for setting down and trial – S$260,000, on the basis of an estimated 9-days trial involving five witnesses (of which two are proposed as factual witnesses and three are proposed as experts) each for the claimant and the defendant.
(c) Legal costs for trial closing submissions – S$30,000.
(d) Disbursements – S$111,477, which include, among other things, S$40,000 for an English law expert, S$30,000 for a ship broker expert witness and S$30,000 for a ship finance expert witness.
- [55]
[55] The claimant avers that the defendant’s counterclaim raises complex issues requiring not only English law expert opinion, but also ship broker and ship finance experts to testify on industry practices relating to LQEs.
(a) Pre-trial work (which includes pleadings, discovery and affidavits of evidence-in-chief) – S$30,000 to S$90,000.
(b) Trial (daily tariff) – S$6,000 to S$18,000.
(c) Post-trial work (not including work carried out after judgment is obtained, such as enforcement proceedings) – Up to S$35,000.
- [60]
[60] In relation to the number of trial days to be factored into the assessment, I am not convinced at this point that the trial of the counterclaim necessitates a full 9-days trial as contended by the claimant. On the other hand, the defendant’s 3-days estimate strikes me as too tight considering the possibility of a mix of factual and expert witnesses totalling ten witnesses in all for both parties. In my view, a 6-days trial is a safer and more moderate estimate to adopt for current purposes, and I presume for the time being that not every witness called to the stand will invariably require more than half a day each for his or her oral evidence and cross-examination. There has also been no suggestion that any witness may require language interpretation and translation services during the trial.
- [61]
[61] Applying the foregoing analysis, I have therefore arrived at the following estimated amounts:
(a) S$72,000 for pre-trial work (which includes pleadings, discovery and affidavits of evidence-in-chief).
(b) S$86,400 for trial estimated to last for six days.
(c) S$24,500 for post-trial work (not including work carried out after judgment is obtained, such as enforcement proceedings).
- [62]
[62] This leaves me to consider the estimated disbursements to be factored in. As mentioned, the claimant submits S$111,477, which includes S$40,000 for English law expert fees and S$30,000 each for a ship broker expert witness and a ship finance expert witness (see [54(d)] above). The defendant contends that the claimant’s estimated figures for the ship broker and ship finance experts are unsupported by documents (see [56] above). I agree with the defendant. The claimant’s submission of an aggregate of S$60,000 for the engagement of both ship broker and ship finance experts appears to be a bare estimate. This contrasts with the claimant’s submission of an estimated S$40,000 for engaging its English law expert, where details concerning the expert’s hourly rate are disclosed. I thus find it appropriate for present purposes to cap the estimated disbursements relating to the claimant’s engagement of its ship broker and ship finance experts at S$15,000 per expert. This brings the claimant’s estimated disbursements down to S$81,477.
Conclusion
- [65]
[65] As prayed for by the claimant, the defendant is to furnish the said security either by payment into court or by providing a first-class banker’s guarantee in favour of the claimant and on wording satisfactory to the claimant.