High Court · Decided 30 January 2023
TA Private Capital Security Agent Ltd and another v UD Trading Group Holding Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2023] SGHCR 1 · Case no. Suit No 624 of 2020 (Summons No 2377 of 2022)
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This was the plaintiffs’ application to strike out the entirety of the defences of the first and second defendant (“D1” and “D2” respectively) in HC/S 624/2020 (“Suit 624”) and for there to be judgment against D1 for the sum of USD 63,303,806.66 (the “USD 63.3m sum”). The plaintiff’s case was that D1’s liability for the USD 63.3m sum arose from a contract titled “Guarantee”, which was entered into between D1 and D2 on 15 April 2019 (the “Guarantee”). Under clauses 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the Guarantee, D1 guaranteed the payment of monies by its subsidiaries to D2 for the supply of metal and metal products by D2 to D1’s subsidiaries. Under clause 3.2 of the Guarantee, D1 “irrevocably and unconditionally” provided a “separate and independent” obligation, as “sole or principal debtor”, to pay D2 “on demand” any amounts not recoverable on the footing of a guarantee. The present claim was brought by the plaintiffs instead of D2 because the latter had purportedly assigned its rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not bring any claims against D2.
- [2]
[2] Central to this application was the plaintiffs’ prayer for a declaration that the Guarantee was an “on demand performance guarantee”. The nature of the Guarantee was a key issue because, under an on demand performance guarantee, the obligor (in this case, D1) is (a) liable as a primary debtor to the obligee (in this case, the plaintiffs), (b) the obligor’s liability is not affected by the validity of the underlying obligation, and (c) the obligor’s liability to pay is triggered upon a simple demand by the obligee. On the other hand, if the Guarantee were a simple guarantee, (a) the guarantor would be liable as a secondary debtor, such that its liability would be contingent upon the principal debtor’s failure to perform its underlying obligation guaranteed by the guarantor, and (b) the guarantor would not be liable if the underlying obligation were void, unenforceable, or ceased to exist.
- [3]
[3] This was relevant in the present case because D1 did not challenge the validity of the Guarantee. Nor did D1 deny that the USD 63.3m sum was owed by its subsidiaries to D2. Instead, D1’s defence hinged on two securities – referred to as the “GEM Security” and the “Hangji Security” at [10(c)] below – that were not related to the Guarantee or the underlying obligations guaranteed. Rather, these two securities were pledged by D1’s subsidiaries to the plaintiffs under a separate loan agreement. D1’s defence was that the plaintiffs’ improper enforcement of these securities resulted in there being no outstanding sums owed under the Guarantee. Alternatively, D1 submitted that it can set off the two securities against the USD 63.3m sum. The defendants also sought to challenge the assignment of D2’s rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs.
- [4]
[4] It was well established that the threshold for striking out is high, and pleadings should not be struck out except in plain and obvious cases (see the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [18]). When a court is faced with a USD 63.3 million claim and numerous defences raised by the defendants, the instinctive response may be to quickly conclude that the matter was not a “plain and obvious” one for the defences to be struck out. However, there was no general principle that a large claim must necessarily proceed to trial, or that a multi-pronged defence, even if baseless, should not be struck out. When a court is reviewing a striking out application, the court’s duty is not to simply undertake a quantitative exercise to determine if the size of the claim is large or if the number of defences are high. The court’s duty is to review the parties’ cases, even on a summary basis, to determine if the pleadings are so clearly unmeritorious that they raise no triable issue and ought to be struck out.
- [5]
[5] In this case, having reviewed the parties’ pleadings and submissions, I agreed with the plaintiffs that this case was a straightforward claim brought against D1 to claim for liabilities owed under the clear terms of the Guarantee. As the plaintiffs rightly pointed out, the parties’ submissions were only lengthy because the defendants took a blunderbuss approach to their defences. Upon a review of the parties’ pleaded cases, I found that the defendants’ defences were wholly contrary to the plain text of the relevant contracts. Consequently, I struck out the defendants’ defences and granted judgment in the USD 63.3m sum in favour of the plaintiffs against D1. As the defendants have appealed against my decision, I now set out the detailed grounds of my decision.
Background facts
Parties
- [6]
[6] I first set out the relevant parties and key facts. The second plaintiff, Transasia Private Capital Limited (“P2”), is a company incorporated in Hong Kong. P2 is a fund manager that managed Asian Trade Finance Fund 2 (“ATFF2”). P1 is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and is the security agent for P2.
- [7]
[7] D1 is a company incorporated in Singapore while D2 is a company incorporated in Ontario, Canada. D1 is in the business of trading metals. D1’s subsidiaries that were relevant to this application were UIL Commodities DMCC, UIL Hong Kong Limited (“UIL HK”), and UIL Singapore Pte Ltd (“UIL SG”), and UIL Malaysia Limited (“UIL MY”) (collectively, the “UIL Subsidiaries”). I shall refer to D1 and the UIL Subsidiaries collectively as the “UD Group”. D2 sold metal and metal products to the UIL Subsidiaries.
- [8]
[8] D2 was originally named the third plaintiff in Suit 624 by the plaintiffs. After D2 brought an application in HC/SUM 3114/2021 for leave to discontinue or stay Suit 624, an Assistant Registrar granted D2 leave to discontinue the suit as the third plaintiff but required D2 to be the second defendant therein. It was on this basis that D2 filed a defence to the suit to respond to the plaintiffs’ pleadings, even though the plaintiffs did not bring any substantive claim against D2 in the suit.
- [9]
[9] D2’s metal suppliers which were relevant to this application are Triton Metallix Pte Ltd (“Triton”) and API International FZC (“API”) (collectively, the “Metal Suppliers”).
Three loans
- [10]
[10] There were three relevant loan arrangements raised by the parties:
(a) ATFF2 Loan between P2 and D2: The first loan arrangement was an uncommitted revolving trade finance facility of up to USD 60 million provided by P2 to D2, which was entered into on 24 May 2019 and set out in a facility agreement (the “Facility Agreement”). The plaintiffs referred to this as the ATFF2-Rutmet Loan in their submissions while D1 referred to it as the ATFF2-Rutmet FA in its submissions. I shall refer to this loan arrangement as the “ATFF2 Loan”.
(b) ATFF1 Loan between D2 and Cantrust (Far East) Limited: The second loan arrangement was raised by D2. This was a facility agreement dated 28 June 2017 and entered into between D2 and Cantrust (Far East) Limited (“Cantrust”), the trustee of the Asian Trade Finance Fund. I shall refer to this loan arrangement as the “ATFF1 Loan”. Cantrust’s rights and obligations under the ATFF1 Loan were subsequently transferred to P2 pursuant to a declaration of trust dated 30 May 2014 between Cantrust and P2.
(c) UD Loan between plaintiffs and two of D1’s subsidiaries: The third loan arrangement was raised by D1. This was a loan arrangement provided by the plaintiffs to UIL MY and UIL SG under two separate facility agreements. D1 referred to this as the SBD-UDTG Facility in its defence. The plaintiffs and D1 referred to this as the UD Loan in their written submissions. I shall refer to this as the “UD Loan”. For the UD Loan, the UD Group provided security in the form of, among others, (i) a pledge of 2,030,500 shares in Hangji Global Limited (“Hangji”), a company listed on a subsidiary market of the Cyprus Stock Exchange (“Hangji Security”); (ii) a pledge of all shares in Gympie Eldorado Mining Pty Ltd, an Australian company (“GEM Security”); and (iii) a pledge of all shares in certain UD Group companies.
The ATFF2 Loan and the contracts underlying the Guarantee
- [11]
[11] D2 had obtained financing from P2 via the ATFF2 Loan so that D2 could buy metal from the Metal Suppliers and sell the metal to the UIL Subsidiaries. Therefore, after the ATFF2 Loan was provided, D2 entered into sales contracts with three of the UIL Subsidiaries – UIL Commodities DMCC, UIL HK, and UIL SG (“Operating Companies”) – to supply them with, among others, copper cathodes (the “Contracts”). Pursuant to the Contracts, D2 issued commercial invoices to the Operating Companies (the “Invoices”). The Invoices contained a notice stating that D2 had assigned, by way of security in favour of P1, all of D2’s rights under the Contracts.
The Guarantee between D1 and D2
- [12]
[12] On 15 April 2019, D1 provided the Guarantee to D2 to guarantee the Operating Companies’ liabilities to D2 under the Contracts. The reason why D1 provided the Guarantee to D2 was not agreed by the parties. According to D2’s pleaded defence, D1 provided the Guarantee because Export Development Canada (“EDC”), an insurance provider, had initially declined to grant trade credit insurance to UD Group. EDC’s initial refusal to insure the UD Group in turn caused P2 to be unwilling to grant financing to D2 via the ATFF2 Loan. As a result, the parties – P2, the defendants, and EDC – negotiated, and EDC eventually agreed to extend the insurance to the UD Group on two conditions: (a) that UD Group’s principal, Mr Prateek Vijay Gupta, guarantee the Operating Companies’ liabilities to D2 up to a limit of USD 30 million, and (b) that D1 guarantee the Operating Companies’ liabilities to D2. According to D2, it was for this reason that D1 provided the Guarantee to D2, which consequently caused EDC to provide the insurance to the UD Group, and P2 to provide the ATFF2 Loan to D2. On the other hand, the plaintiffs denied this, and simply stated that D1 provided the Guarantee to guarantee the Operating Companies’ performance under the Contracts.
Assignment of the Contracts, Invoices and Guarantee from D2 to the plaintiffs
Security Deed, General Security Agreement, and Forbearance Agreement
- [13]
[13] On 22 November 2019, three agreements were entered into between D2 and the plaintiffs:
(a) a security deed between P1 and D2 (the “SD”);
(b) a general security agreement between P1 and D2 (the “GSA”);
(c) a forbearance agreement between the plaintiffs and D2 (“Forbearance Agreement”), whereby P2 agreed to forbear from suing D2 for monies disbursed under the ATFF2 Loan.
- [14]
[14] It was the plaintiffs’ pleaded case that the SD was executed by D2 to assign its rights under the Contracts, Invoices and the Guarantee to P2, and the GSA was executed by D2 to assign its rights under the Contracts, Invoices and the Guarantee to P1. The plaintiffs pleaded that the SD and GSA were additional security provided by D2 after D2 had defaulted on its repayment obligations to P2 under the ATFF2 Loan. Consequently, the SD and GSA were executed as conditions precedent to the Forbearance Agreement, and the SD and GSA were not executed as conditions precedent to the ATFF2 Loan.
Notices of assignments of the Contracts and Guarantee from D2 to the plaintiffs
- [15]
[15] The plaintiffs pleaded that notices of assignment were served by D2 on the respective Operating Companies to give notice to them that D2 had assigned all its rights under the Invoices and Contract to the plaintiffs (the “Contract Assignments”). Similarly, notices of assignment were served by the plaintiffs – in their capacities as legal or equitable assignees of D2 – on D1 to give notice to D1 that D2 had assigned all of its rights and benefits under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs. These latter notices of assignment were contained within the letters of demand sent by the plaintiffs to D1 between 11 October 2019 and 24 January 2020 (see [19] below).
Power of Attorney
Amounts owed
- [17]
[17] Between 16 September 2019 and 30 December 2019, D2 defaulted on its payments to P2 under the ATFF2 Loan. As of 8 January 2020, the total amount owed by D2 to P2 was USD 54,209,809.43 (“D2’s Outstanding Amount”), which remains unpaid to date. Separately, various amounts of monies owed under the Contracts also fell due and remained outstanding from the Operating Companies to D2 (“Operating Companies’ Outstanding Amount”).
Plaintiffs’ demand on Operating Companies to pay under the Contracts
- [18]
[18] Between 6 December 2019 and 17 January 2020, the plaintiffs made various demands pursuant to the Contract Assignments for the Operating Companies to make payment of the Operating Companies’ Outstanding Amount to the plaintiffs for the satisfaction of D2’s Outstanding Amount. However, the Operating Companies did not make payment of the Operating Companies’ Outstanding Amount to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ demand on D1 to pay under the Guarantee
- [19]
[19] Subsequently, between 11 October 2019 and 24 January 2020, the plaintiffs issued various letters of demand under the Guarantee in their own capacities as assignees, or alternatively in their capacities as D2’s attorneys under the POAs, for D1 to make payment of the Operating Companies’ Outstanding Amount to the plaintiffs for the satisfaction of D2’s Outstanding Amount. On 24 January 2020, the plaintiffs sent a letter of demand to D1 (“Letter of Demand”) and demanded that D1 pay the plaintiffs the Operating Companies’ Outstanding Amount, which stood at the USD 63.3m sum as of 24 January 2020, by 31 January 2020. However, D1 has not made payment to date.
Summary of contractual relationships
- [20]
[20] In summary, D2 used the funds provided by P2 via the ATFF2 Loan to pay the Metal Suppliers for metal and metal products which D2 would then sell to the Operating Companies under the Contracts. D1, as the Operating Companies’ parent company, provided the Guarantee to D2 to guarantee the Operating Companies’ payment to D2 under the Contracts. D2 then allegedly assigned its rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs via the SD and GSA. The plaintiffs then issued the Letter of Demand to D1 on 24 January 2020 to seek payment from D1 under the Guarantee for the Operating Companies’ liabilities under the Contracts.
Parties’ pleaded cases in the Suit
Plaintiffs’ statement of claim
- [21]
[21] The plaintiffs pleaded that, as legal or equitable assignees of the Assignments, or as attorneys under the POAs pursuant to the SD and GSA, D2 had assigned its rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs. Consequently, D1 was liable to pay the USD 63.3m sum which the Operating Companies owed D2 under the Contracts and Invoices.
D1’s defence
- [22]
[22] D1’s defence was not that it had already paid the USD 63.3m sum, whether in full or in part. D1 did not challenge the validity of the Guarantee or the Contracts. D1 also did not bring any counterclaims against the plaintiffs. Instead, D1’s defence centred on other ancillary issues. While D1’s defence was not organised in a structured manner, its defences can be grouped into three broad issues.
Hangji Security and GEM Security
- [23]
[23] The first set of defences concerned the Hangji Security and GEM Security. This defence was referred to as the “Cross-Collaterization Theory” in the plaintiffs’ submissions. This defence had two alternative limbs. I shall refer to the two alternative limbs collectively as the “Hangji and GEM Securities Defence”.
(1) No amount owed under the Guarantee
- [24]
[24] First, D1 claimed that no money was outstanding under the Guarantee because the plaintiffs already had the benefit of the GEM Security and the Hangji Security to satisfy the plaintiffs’ claim under the Guarantee. The logic of this defence seemingly flowed in this manner. The value of the Hangji Security was estimated to be approximately USD 42 million, while the value of the GEM Security was estimated to be between USD 38.5 million and USD 65.8 million. It was allegedly agreed between the plaintiffs and D1 that the GEM Security and/or Hangji Security would “ostensibly” be in respect of the UD Loan but that they would also serve as security for the ATFF2 Loan. While all amounts owing under the UD Loan had been settled, the plaintiffs failed to release the Hangji Security and/or had enforced the GEM Security for purported defaults under the UD Loan. Given that there was no basis to enforce the GEM Security for defaults under the UD Loan, the plaintiffs’ alleged improper enforcement of the GEM Security “suffices to satisfy” the plaintiffs’ claims against D1 under the Guarantee, with the result that there were no outstanding sums owed by D1 to the plaintiffs under the Guarantee.
(2) Set off
- [25]
[25] Alternatively, even if the GEM Security and Hangji Security were not intended as security for the ATFF2 Loan, D1 pleaded that it can set off the USD 63.3m sum claimed under the Guarantee against the value of the GEM Security and/or Hangji Security.
Assignment of D2’s rights under the Guarantee
- [26]
[26] The second set of defences pertained to D1’s challenge of the assignment of D2’s rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs. This was on two main bases.
(a) D1 denied that the letters of demand between 11 October 2019 and 24 January 2020 were valid notices of assignment. D1 pleaded that it was a requirement under clause 12.3 of the Guarantee that D2 provide D1 with a notice of the assignment, but no such notice was provided.
(b) D1 also pleaded that D2 was seeking in proceedings in Ontario to discharge the Forbearance Agreement, the GSA, the SD, and the POAs.
Clause 6 of ATFF2 Loan
D2’s defence
- [28]
[28] D2’s defence sought to challenge the assignment of its rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs. This was on the following basis. D2 allegedly agreed with the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs would, instead of remitting the monies drawn down under the ATFF1 Loan to Cantrust and that under the ATFF2 Loan to D2, remit the monies directly to the Metal Suppliers to pay for the supply of metal and metal products purchased by D2 (the “alleged Payment Agreement”), but the plaintiffs did not do so. The plaintiffs allegedly thereby breached the facility agreements under the ATFF1 Loan and ATFF2 Loan.
- [29]
[29] Under the terms of the Forbearance Agreement, P2 agreed to forbear from exercising its rights and remedies in respect of a debt owed by UIL HK, which became due upon UIL HK being wound up by the High Court of Hong Kong on or around 2 September 2019 (the “UIL HK Debt”). The failure to pay this purported debt amounted to an “Event of Default” under the terms of the ATFF2 Loan. In exchange for P2’s forbearance, D2 agreed to, among other things, enter into the GSA and execute the SD. However, in proceedings in Ontario brought by the Metal Suppliers against D2, the Metal Suppliers claimed that they have not received any payment for the sale of metals and metal products to D2, which payments should have, according to D2, been received directly from the plaintiffs. This meant that no UIL HK Debt was due and owing, as no such monies had been paid by the plaintiffs to the Metal Suppliers to finance D2’s purchase of metals and/or metal products from the Metal Suppliers that were sold to UIL HK. There was therefore no reason for the plaintiffs and D2 to have entered the Forbearance Agreement and, consequently, no reason for D2 to have entered the GSA with the plaintiffs or to have executed the SD in their favour. D2’s defence was referred to as the “Non-Payment Theory” in the plaintiffs’ submissions.
Brief procedural history
- [30]
[30] Suit 624 was commenced on 9 July 2020. Some 2.5 years later, the matter had still not been heard at trial. This was because the progress of Suit 624 was delayed by multiple interlocutory applications brought by the defendants seeking to stay Suit 624. The defendants have also brought various proceedings in Ontario, including the following:
(a) Ontario proceedings brought by D1: D1 commenced proceedings against the plaintiffs on 12 August 2020, shortly after Suit 624 was commenced, to seek to claim against the plaintiffs for the alleged loss caused to D1 and/or its subsidiaries by the plaintiff’s alleged improper enforcement of the GEM Security and/or Hangji Security, and a declaration that no amounts were owed under the Guarantee. This was referred to as the Ontario UD Action by D1 in its submissions. However, this action has been permanently stayed.
(b) Ontario proceedings brought by D2: D2 commenced proceedings against the plaintiffs on 14 December 2020 to seek a declaration that the commencement of Suit 624 under the “power of attorney delivered under the Forbearance Agreement” was “not properly authorized”. This was referred to as the Rutmet Ontario Proceedings by the defendants in their submissions, and as the Ontario Rutmet Action by the plaintiffs in their submissions. I shall refer to it as the “D2 Ontario Proceedings”. As was noted by Justice Gilmore in a judgment in Ontario, D2 was prosecuting its claim in the D2 Ontario Proceedings at a “glacial” pace. This was also noted by the Appellate Division of the High Court in UD Trading Group Holding Pte Ltd v TA Private Capital Security Agent Limited and another [2022] SGHC(A) 3 (“UD Trading Group (AD)”) at [47(b)].
Parties’ submissions in this application
- [32]
[32] In this application, the plaintiffs’ principal submission was that the Guarantee was an on demand performance guarantee, which meant that D1 was liable upon the simple demand to pay issued by the plaintiffs on 24 January 2020. Alternatively, the plaintiffs submitted that D1’s and D2’s defences should be struck out because they were irrelevant, frivolous, inherently incredible and obviously unsustainable.
- [33]
[33] D1 submitted that the Guarantee was not an on demand performance guarantee, and that its defences were arguable. D2 also submitted that its defence was reasonable and not irrelevant, frivolous, or vexatious. D2 did not make any submissions regarding the nature of the Guarantee.
Applicable legal principles
- [34]
[34] The plaintiffs brought the present application under O 14 r 12 and O 18 r 19 of the revoked Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”). Therefore, I first set out the applicable principles under these provisions.
O 14 r 12
- [35]
[35] It first bears highlighting that the defendants did not dispute that this court could determine the nature of the Guarantee in this application. This flows from O 14 r 12, which provided as follows:
- [36]
[36] The mere fact that a question raises a complex question of law is also not a bar to summary determination (TMT Asia Ltd v BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) [2015] 2 SLR 540 at [33] per Judith Prakash J (as Her Honour then was)). Indeed, as the plaintiffs pointed out, courts have routinely determined the question of whether a contract of suretyship is an on demand performance guarantee in interlocutory applications (see, for instance, Master Marine AS v Labroy Offshore Ltd and others [2012] 3 SLR 125 (“Master Marine”), where the Singapore Court of Appeal interpreted whether the contract in question was on demand performance guarantee in deciding whether to grant an interim injunction; and IIG Capital LLC v Van Der Merwe and another [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 1173 (“IIG Capital”), Wuhan Guoyu Logistics Group Co Ltd v Emporiki Bank of Greece SA [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1191 (“Wuhan Guoyu Logistics”), and Bitumen Invest AS v Richmond Mercantile Ltd FZC [2016] EWHC 2957 (Comm) (“Bitumen”), where the English Court of Appeal (in IIG Capital and Wuhan Guoyu Logistics) and the English High Court (in Bitumen) respectively considered that the contracts in question were on demand performance guarantees and granted summary judgment).
O 18 r 19
- [37]
[37] I next briefly set out the applicable principles on striking out under O 18 r 19(1) of the ROC 2014, which the parties generally did not dispute. That provision stated as follows:
- [38]
[38] The plaintiffs relied on all four limbs of O 18 r 19(1). Under O 18 r 19(1)(a), pleadings may be struck out if they disclose no reasonable cause of action. A reasonable cause of action is one with some chance of success, when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered: Madan Mohan Singh v Attorney-General [2015] 2 SLR 1085 at [20], citing The “Tokai Maru” [1998] 2 SLR(R) 646 at [44]. This follows from O 18 r 19(2), which provided that “[n]o evidence shall be admissible on an application under” O 18 r 19(1)(a).
- [39]
[39] Under O 18 r 19(1)(b), pleadings may be struck out if they are “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”. Allegations that are made needlessly and not related to the relief sought may be considered scandalous (Singapore Civil Procedure 2021 vol I (Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) (“Civil Procedure”) at para 18/19/11, citing Brooking v Maudslay (1886) 55 L.T. 343). A claim can be “frivolous or vexatious” if it is “plainly or obviously unsustainable”. An action is legally unsustainable if “it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks”. An action is factually unsustainable if it is “possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance”, for example, if it is “clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based” (The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 at [32]–[33] and [39]).
- [40]
[40] O 18 r 19(1)(c) contemplates unnecessary pleadings that tend to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action (Civil Procedure at para 18/19/13, citing Knowles v Roberts (1888) 38 Ch D 263 at 270).
- [41]
[41] Under O 18 r 19(1)(d) and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, pleadings may be struck out if they are an abuse of the court process. This could include: (a) proceedings which involve a deception on the court or constitute a mere sham; (b) proceedings where the process of the court is not being fairly or honestly used, but is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose; or (c) proceedings which are manifestly groundless, are without foundation, or serve no useful purpose (Chee Siok Chin and others v Minister for Home Affairs and another [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at [34] and [36]).
- [42]
[42] Finally, the following guidance from Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail [1992] 1 MLJ 400, endorsed by Judith Prakash J (as Her Honour then was) in M2B World Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Matsumura Akihiko [2015] 1 SLR 325 at [19], is also instructive:
- [43]
[43] While M2B concerned summary judgment, the general principle espoused in the foregoing extract is equally applicable to a striking out application, as both types of applications concerned interlocutory applications seeking to summarily dispose of a claim. This was especially so in the present case, as the plaintiffs sought to strike out the entirety of the defendants’ defences and to enter judgment against D1.
Issues
- [44]
[44] Accordingly, the following issues arose for this court’s determination:
(a) First, was the Guarantee an on demand performance guarantee? If so, D1 was liable to the plaintiffs upon a simple demand to pay, and D1’s Hangji and GEM Securities Defence and the Clause 6 Defence would be irrelevant and should be struck out.
(b) Second, if the Guarantee was a simple guarantee, was D1’s other defences – namely, the Hangji and GEM Securities Defence and the Clause 6 Defence – liable to be struck out?
(c) Third, were the defendants’ defences regarding the assignment of D2’s rights under the Guarantee to the plaintiffs liable to be struck out?
Issue 1: Was the Guarantee an on demand performance guarantee?
- [45]
[45] I first turn to the issue of whether the Guarantee was an on demand performance guarantee.
Governing law
- [46]
[46] A preliminary issue was the governing law of the Guarantee, as clause 18.1 of the Guarantee provided that the Guarantee was governed by Ontario law. In this regard, it was well established that, where foreign law was not proven or not pleaded, the law of the forum applied by default (Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [43]). This is a rule of convenience which the courts may utilise unless it is unjust and inconvenient to do so (D’Oz International Pte Ltd v PSB Corp Pte Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 267 at [25]). There may therefore be situations where the court may refuse to presume that the content of the foreign law is the same as that of the law of the forum in the absence of proof of foreign law. Case law from other jurisdictions has considered the following as possibilities: where it is not in the interest of justice to apply the law of the forum to the issue; where the foreign law is not based on the common law; where it is inherently improbable that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum; and where fairness requires that the law of the forum should not apply (see the English High Court’s decision in Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd and others [2006] All ER (D) 378 at [428]). None of these applied to the present case.
- [47]
[47] In this case, the plaintiffs submitted that Singapore law applied, as the defendants did not plead or prove Ontario law on any aspect of the Guarantee other than the issue of set-off. The plaintiffs also submitted that, in any event, Singapore law and Ontario law, as another common law jurisdiction, were not materially different on the law of on demand performance guarantees. I agreed with the plaintiffs. Indeed, both parties cited and relied on Singapore law to make submissions on the Guarantee’s nature. As such, I will first turn to consider whether the Guarantee was an on demand performance guarantee under Singapore law.
Principles on contractual interpretation
- [48]
[48] As the determination of the nature of the Guarantee would depend on an interpretation of its terms, it is first appropriate to set out the applicable principles on contractual interpretation in Singapore. In this regard, the following principles are well established (see the Court of Appeal’s summary of the principles in Leiman, Ricardo and another v Noble Resources Ltd and another [2020] 2 SLR 386 at [59]):
(a) The starting point is that one looks to the text that the parties have used.
(b) At the same time, it is permissible to have regard to the relevant context as long as the relevant contextual points are clear, obvious and known to both parties. The court has regard to the relevant context because it then places itself in “the best possible position to ascertain the parties’ objective intentions by interpreting the expressions used by the parties in the [contract] in their proper context”.
(c) The meaning ascribed to the terms of the contract must be one which the expressions used by the parties can reasonably bear.
- [49]
[49] Therefore, to determine the nature of the Guarantee, the text of the Guarantee was paramount. In this regard, the court should not excessively focus on particular phrases or words; the “emphasis is on the document as a whole” (see the Court of Appeal’s decision in Master Marine at [41(c)], citing Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 at [131]).
Distinction between guarantees, indemnities, and on demand performance guarantees
- [50]
[50] With the general principles on contractual interpretation in mind, I now turn to the law pertaining to on demand performance guarantees. An on demand performance guarantee has also been referred to as a “first demand performance bond” (Master Marine at [25]), “first demand performance guarantee” (Master Marine at [30]), “demand guarantee”, or “first demand guarantee”. For ease of reference, I will adopt the term “on demand performance guarantee” here. One of the earlier and clearer statements on the law of on demand performance guarantees can be found in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Marubeni Hong Kong and South China Ltd v Mongolian Government [2005] 1 WLR 2497 (“Marubeni”) at [22] (per Carnwath LJ), citing Chitty on Contracts (H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 29th Ed, 2004) at para 44-014:
- [51]
[51] Therefore, an on demand performance guarantee is a contractual undertaking by a person, usually a bank, insurer, or similar commercial provider, to pay a specified amount of money to a third party on the occurrence of a stated event, usually the non-fulfilment of a contractual obligation by a principal debtor to that third party (see also the English High Court’s decision in Vossloh Aktiengesellschaft v Alpha Trains (UK) Ltd [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 307 (“Vossloh”) at [28]; and Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millett, Law of Guarantees (Sweet and Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2015) (“Andrews and Millett”) at para 1-016). An on demand performance guarantee is akin to letters of credit (Master Marine at [26]; Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [27], citing Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159 at 171; Andrews and Millett at para 16-001). Under a confirmed letter of credit, an issuing bank and a confirming bank are obliged to pay the beneficiary against a complying presentation of documents (see Kuvera Resources Pte Ltd v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA [2022] SGHC 213 at [51]).
- [52]
[52] Furthermore, an on demand performance guarantee is a “stringent” contract of indemnity (see also Vossloh at [28]; and Andrews and Millett at para 1-016). To that extent, the term “on demand performance guarantee” is a misnomer. Therefore, it was first crucial to understand the difference between a guarantee and an indemnity.
- [53]
[53] Guarantees and indemnities are two types of contracts of suretyship. Under a contract of guarantee (which are also known as “see to it” guarantees (see Master Marine at [29])), which is entered into between a guarantor and a creditor, the guarantor guarantees the performance of the obligation of a third party – the principal debtor – to the creditor. On the other hand, under a contract of indemnity, a party (the obligor) undertakes directly to the beneficiary (the obligee) that the obligor would perform a certain obligation. This indemnity obligation is usually given as security for the performance of an obligation by another party (Vossloh at [25]).
- [54]
[54] It is well established that there are two principal differences between a guarantee and an indemnity (see Vossloh at [22] to [26]).
(a) Secondary liability: First, a guarantor’s obligation under a guarantee is a secondary one, in the sense that it is contingent upon the principal debtor’s continuing liability and ultimately the principal debtor’s default. The guarantor is not liable unless and until the principal debtor has failed to perform his obligation (Master Marine at [29]). On the other hand, under a contract of indemnity, the liability of the giver of the indemnity is a primary one, and is not dependent upon the principal debtor’s default.
(b) Principle of co-extensiveness: Second, the fact that the guarantor’s obligation is secondary means that, if the underlying obligation is void, unenforceable, or ceases to exist, the guarantor is also discharged from his obligation under the guarantee. This is known as the principle of co-extensiveness, as the guarantor’s liability is “co-extensive” with the principal debtor’s liability. On the other hand, the fact that liability under an indemnity is a primary one means that the principle of co-extensiveness does not apply to a contract of indemnity, and the giver of an indemnity is liable to the creditor even if the underlying obligation between the principal debtor and the creditor is void, unenforceable, or ceases to exist.
- [55]
[55] An example of an indemnity can be found in the case of Clement v Clement [1995] Lexis Citation 4562 (“Clement”). In that case, the son stated in a letter that he would “guarantee” to his parents a company’s payment of retirement benefits. The “guarantee” provided as such:
- [56]
[56] While the letter used the phrase “guarantee”, the English Court of Appeal in Clement held that the promise contained in the letter was in substance an indemnity as it “imposed an obligation independent of the continuation of the Company's liability under the Agreement to pay the Plaintiffs’ pensions if and to the extent that the Company did not do so.”
- [57]
[57] What, then, was the difference between an on demand performance guarantee and a simple indemnity? The case law and textbooks did not clearly spell this out. Nevertheless, it appeared that one difference was that, under an on demand performance guarantee, liability is triggered upon a simple “demand” by the obligee to pay, usually upon a presentation of one or more documents as stipulated in the contract, without reference to the actual existence of the facts which those documents assert (see Master Marine at [27]; Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corp (2016) 339 ALR 200 at [2] per Robert French CJ).
- [58]
[58] Furthermore, under the common law, the English courts have devised evidential presumptions of fact to determine if a document is an on demand performance guarantee or not.
(a) The English Court of Appeal has held in Marubeni at [30] that, in a transaction outside the banking context, the absence of language expressly indicating the creation of an on demand performance guarantee created a strong presumption against the existence of such an obligation (the “Marubeni presumption”).
(b) Conversely, English Court of Appeal has also held in Gold Coast Ltd v Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 617 at [16] (and reaffirmed in Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [26] to [28]) that the existence of four factors listed in the textbook, Paget’s Law of Banking, gave rise to a presumption that the document in question will be construed as an on demand performance guarantee (“Paget presumption”). These four factors, which I shall refer to collectively as the “Paget factors”, are where the instrument (a) relates to an underlying transaction between the parties in different jurisdictions, (b) is issued by a bank, (c) contains an undertaking to pay “on demand” (with or without the words “first” and/or “written”) and (d) does not contain clauses excluding or limiting the defences available to a guarantor.
- [59]
[59] The parties did not cite to me a Singapore case which has endorsed either the Marubeni presumption or the Paget presumption. I did not need to decide if the Paget presumption applied in this case, as not all the Paget factors were present (since the Guarantee was not issued by a bank). I also did not need to decide if the Marubeni presumption applied in this case – as I will explain in more detail below, even if it did, I would have found that the presumption was rebutted in this case (see [96] below).
- [60]
[60] For completeness, it also bears briefly mentioning the “conditional performance bond”, which is contrasted with the “first demand performance bond” or “unconditional performance bond” (which are terms that have been used to refer to an on demand performance guarantee (see [50] above)). A “conditional performance bond” is conditioned on breach and/or actual loss. However, a conditional performance bond is not a guarantee, as the bond issuer’s liability to honour payment on the bond is a primary, rather than secondary, one (Master Marine at [29]). An on demand performance guarantee may also be drafted in such a way that a demand can be made subject to the fulfilment of various conditions (Master Marine at [31]), but this does not detract from the primary liability of the obligor of the on demand performance guarantee.
- [61]
[61] Finally, it was also important to note that a contract may not solely be either a guarantee, an indemnity, or an on demand performance guarantee. In the modern commercial world, as highlighted by Andrews and Millet at para 1-015, “[a] more common approach, if the language of the contract permits it, is to treat the contract as giving rise to separate enforceable obligations of indemnity and guarantee” [emphasis added].
Cases with on demand performance guarantees
- [62]
[62] At this juncture, it is helpful to refer to specific examples of contracts that have been held to be on demand performance guarantees. There are four notable cases in this regard, two of which were not in the banking context (so the Marubeni presumption was found to have rebutted in those cases).
IIG Capital
- [63]
[63] The first case of IIG Capital is the most notable case outside the banking context where a contract was held to be an on demand performance guarantee. In that case, Mr and Mrs Van Der Merwe were directors of a company which received financial assistance from the claimant New York entity. Mr and Mrs Van Der Merwe each entered into a document described as a “guarantee” with the claimant. The relevant clauses of the “guarantee” provided as such:
(a) by clause 2.1 of the contract, the guarantor (Mr or Mrs Van Der Merwe) agreed “as principal obligor … not merely as surety” that “if … the Guaranteed Moneys are not paid in full on their due date … [the guarantor] will immediately upon demand unconditionally pay to the Lender the Guaranteed Moneys which have not been so paid” [emphasis added] (IIG Capital at [31]);
(b) the guaranteed moneys were defined as “all moneys and liabilities … which are now or may at any time hereafter be due, owing, payable, or expressed to be due, owing or payable, to the Lender from or by the Borrower” [emphasis added] (IIG Capital at [31]);
(c) clause 4.2 further provided that a “certificate in writing signed by a duly authorised officer … stating the amount at any particular time due and payable by the Guarantor … shall, save for manifest error, be conclusive and binding on the Guarantor for the purposes hereof” [emphasis added] (IIG Capital at [32]).
- [65]
[65] Turning to the text of the contract, Waller LJ first held that the obligation to pay monies (a) “expressed to be due” (b) “upon demand” (c) “unconditionally” (d) as “principal obligor not merely as surety” indicated that the Van Der Merwes “were taking on something more than a secondary obligation” (IIG Capital at [31]). Second, Waller LJ also held that clause 4.2 put “the matter beyond doubt” as, “[a]part from manifest error, the Van Der Merwes ha[d] bound themselves to pay on demand as primary obligor the amount stated in a certificate pursuant to cl 4.2” (IIG Capital at [32]). Therefore, any presumption against the finding of an on demand performance guarantee due to the non-banking context was “clearly rebutted” by the language used in the contract (IIG Capital at [32]).
Bitumen
- [66]
[66] I next turn to the English case of Bitumen, which is another case outside the banking context. In that case, the claimant, the owner a vessel, entered into a contract titled “Deed of Guarantee” with the defendant, the parent company of the bareboat charterer of the vessel, for the defendant to guarantee the performance of the bareboat charterer’s payment obligations to the claimant. The claimant applied for summary judgment against the defendant in respect of sums alleged to be due under a deed of guarantee. The relevant clauses of the deed provided as follows (Bitumen at [19]):
- [67]
[67] Sir Jeremy Cooke, sitting as a Judge of the English High Court, gave summary judgment to the claimant. Sir Jeremy held as follows:
(a) The “key feature of the Deed of Guarantee appear[ed] in paragraph C” of the clause, as the “trigger for payment is the issue of a demand by the Owners for an amount certified by them, by written notice, as due as a consequence of [the principal debtor] failing to fulfil its obligations under the Charter” (Bitumen at [22]). The “certification of any amount as due as a consequence of non-fulfilment of [the principal debtor’s] obligations must go, inevitably, to liability since, otherwise, the certification of sums as due is meaningless” (Bitumen at [23]).
(b) The foregoing point is reinforced by the terms of paragraph D of the clause, which led to the conclusion that “[p]ayments which are certified by the [claimant] as due as a consequence of non-fulfilment of obligations by [the principal debtor] under the Charter fall to be paid, with no defence available of any kind” [emphasis added] (Bitumen at [24]).
(c) The “unconditional and irrevocable wording in the first line of paragraph A [did] not really take the matter any further save to emphasise the nature of the obligation undertaken”, but, “looking at the clause as a whole, there can … be no doubt as to the objective intention of the parties which was that, absent fraud which is not alleged here, payment should become due in the circumstances set out in paragraphs C and D upon the certification made in accordance with their terms” (Bitumen at [30]).
- [68]
[68] Therefore, Sir Jeremy Cooke held that “the clear objective intention of the instrument is that payment should be triggered upon certification in accordance with paragraph C and that there should be no room for defence to such a certification by reason of the terms of paragraph D, absent fraud”. Once the demand was made in accordance with paragraph C, the defendant was liable to pay the sums certified without any deduction of any kind (Bitumen at [26]).
Wuhan Guoyu Logistics
- [69]
[69] The next English case is Wuhan Guoyu Logistics, which was within a banking context. In that case, the defendant bank issued a payment guarantee to the claimants to guarantee certain payments by the buyer owed under a shipbuilding contract between the claimants and the buyer. The payment guarantee provided (see Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [12]):
(a) First, Longmore LJ noted that, while there were six factors in the contract that could be said to favour a conclusion that the document was a traditional guarantee, and four factors in the contract that could be said to lead to the opposite conclusion that the document was an on demand performance guarantee, it “would be obviously absurd to say that there are six pointers in favour of the former and only four pointers in favour of the latter and it must therefore be the former”, as the law “does not permit boxes to be ticked in this way” (Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [25]).
(b) Second, Longmore LJ reaffirmed the Paget presumption (see [58(b)] above).
(c) Third, Longmore LJ also cited Paget’s Law of Banking for the observation that an on demand performance guarantee “can hardly avoid making reference to the obligation for whose performance the guarantee is security”, as “[a] bare promise to pay on demand without any reference to the principal’s obligation would leave the principal even more exposed in the event of a fraudulent demand because there would be room for argument as to which obligations were being secured” (Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [26]).
- [71]
[71] On the facts of that case, the first three Paget factors were present. While the fourth Paget factor was absent, the English Court of Appeal nevertheless held that the Paget presumption applied and that the contract was an on demand performance guarantee (Wuhan Guoyu Logistics at [28] and [31]).
Master Marine
- [72]
[72] I now turn to a Singapore case, Master Marine. In that case, the appellant and the first respondent entered into an agreement for the former to purchase and the latter to construct an offshore elevating rig (the “Rig”). The appellant paid the purchase price in instalments prior to delivery in exchange for the first respondent procuring “Refund Guarantees” from the second to fourth respondents (the “Banks”) as security. All the Refund Guarantees provided that the appellant could make the following written demands on the Banks for repayment of their advances (Master Marine at [4]):
(a) Clause 3(b) provided that an “Initial Demand” must be made in written form “stating that the Contract is cancelled or rescinded by the Owner in accordance with the Contract, which statement shall be final and conclusive” [emphasis added by the Court of Appeal] (Master Marine at [45]).
(b) The first paragraph of the proviso to clause 3 provided that a “Deferred Demand” must be made if the rescission was disputed, arbitrated and an award was granted in the appellant’s favour.
(c) The third paragraph of the proviso to clause 3 (the “New Demand Clause”) provided that a “New Demand” must be made if either there was delay in the delivery of the Rig or the arbitration could not reasonably be expected to conclude 30 Singapore banking days before the expiry date of the subsisting Refund Guarantees, and the first respondent failed to furnish a replacement/extended guarantee 14 Singapore banking days before the expiry date of the subsisting Refund Guarantees. The New Demand Clause provided that “[the Banks] shall pay the [the appellant] the said sum claimed under the New Demand immediately upon our receipt of the New Demand irrespective of whether or not the claim under the New Demand is disputed by the Builder or has been referred to arbitration or there is an arbitration claim pending” [emphasis added by the Court of Appeal] (Master Marine at [45]).
- [73]
[73] The Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding its label, the Refund Guarantees constituted “first demand performance bonds” (which are also known as on demand performance guarantees (see [50] above)):
(a) The essence of a guarantee was predication on actual breach by the creditor. However, the emphasised portion of clause 3(b) of the Refund Guarantees (at [72(a)] above) made clear that the Banks were not to investigate the accuracy of the appellant’s assertion of breach. Such was the characteristic hallmark of a first demand performance bond: immediate payment eschewing any manner of delving into the merits of the underlying dispute (Master Marine at [45]).
(b) Under the New Demand Clause, payment will be made whether or not the appellant was right to say there was a valid rescission (Master Marine at [45]).
Cases with simple guarantees
- [74]
[74] On the other hand, D1 placed emphasis on two English cases where the courts held that the contracts in question were not on demand performance guarantees.
Vossloh
- [75]
[75] The first case is the English High Court’s decision in Vossloh. In that case, which was in a non-banking context, the claimant provided guarantees to the defendant in respect of the obligations of the claimant’s subsidiary under a master purchase agreement. Specifically, the contracts provided:
- [76]
[76] Sir William Blackburne, sitting as Judge of the English High Court, held that the contracts were simple guarantees and were not on demand performance guarantees. Sir William’s reasoning was as follows.
(a) Clause 2 was premised upon the establishment of a failure of performance (including a failure of payment) under a relevant document (Vossloh at [53]). Clauses 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) were framed in the “classic language of guarantee”, that is, “of a secondary obligation triggered upon proof of a breach of obligation by the principal” (Vossloh at [44]) or “premised upon a failure of observance or performance of an underlying obligation (in the case of sub-clause (a)) or of punctual payment under an underlying obligation (in the case of sub-clause (b)) by a guaranteed party under a relevant document” (Vossloh at [46]).
(b) Clauses 2.1(d) and 2.1(e) were worded as primary obligations. Clause 2.1(c), although not prefaced by the expression “guarantee” (as clauses 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) were) had “the appearance of a secondary obligation” as it was “premised upon a default in payment by ‘a Guaranteed Party’” – the obligation was “to make good on demand any Secured Obligations which have not been paid at the time such demand [by the claimant] is made” (Vossloh at [44]).
(c) The opening words of clause 2 were not effective to convert into purely primary obligations what were otherwise secondary in nature (Vossloh at [45]).
(d) Clause 3.1 did not lend support to the case that the contract was an on demand performance guarantee (Vossloh at [47]).
(e) Clause 6 also did not lend support to the case that the contract was an on demand performance guarantee. Clauses 6.1–6.3 contained provisions one would expect to find in a guarantee. The “pay now, argue later” terms of clause 6.4 pointed to the existence of a secondary rather than to a primary liability. The clause assumed that the claimant may raise defences which the guaranteed party could have raised if the demand had been addressed to it, but, if the claimant’s liability were primary, the fact that the guaranteed party had or may have a defence to the demand would be immaterial (Vossloh at [48]).
(f) Clause 11.2 was a “conclusive evidence provision” of a kind “commonly seen in guarantees” (Vossloh at [50]). It also assumed that there was a breach of the obligation. Its reference to the certificate “setting forth the amount” of the secured obligation constituting “conclusive evidence … against the Guarantor in the absence of any manifest error” did not go to the existence of the breach (that is, liability). Instead, it went only to the quantum of liability (Vossloh at [50]). In other words, Sir William held that clause 11.2 did not prevent the guarantor from denying liability. Sir William further held that such conclusive evidence provisions should be strictly construed and any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the guarantor (Vossloh at [50] and [51]).
(g) As the case was outside the banking context, Sir William held that the Marubeni presumption against construing the contract as an on demand performance guarantee was not rebutted (Vossloh at [53]).
Carey Value
- [77]
[77] The second English case which D1 relied on is Carey Value Added, S.L. v Grupo Urvasco, S.A. [2010] EWHC 1905 (Comm) (“Carey Value”). The relevant terms of the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity in that case provided as follows (see Carey Value at [25] and [39]):
(a) Clause 2.1(a) provided: “[The defendant] irrevocably and unconditionally … guarantees to [the claimant] punctual and complete performance by the Obligors [Grupo Hotelero Urvasco] of the Guaranteed Obligations”.
(b) Clause 2.1(c) provided: “[The defendant] irrevocably and unconditionally … undertakes with [the claimant] to be responsible as primary obligor for any failure by an Obligor to perform, discharge or fulfil for whatever reason any of the Guaranteed Obligations when due and promptly on demand by [the claimant] …”
(c) Clause 2.1(d) provided: “[The defendant] irrevocably and unconditionally … undertakes with [the claimant] to indemnify any of them immediately on demand against any cost, loss or liability suffered and expenses incurred by [the claimant] …”
(d) Clause 20.6 provided: “Any certification or determination by [the claimant] of a rate or amount under any Transaction Document or this deed is, in the absence of manifest error, conclusive evidence of the matters to which it relates.”
- [78]
[78] Blair J dismissed the application for summary judgment. Blair J distinguished IIG Capital and held as follows:
(a) The language of primary and secondary liability is routinely found in the same contracts, and is not in itself a guide to the content of the liability, and the mere incorporation of a principal debtor clause will not usually suffice in itself to determine the nature of the contract (Carey Value at [22]).
(b) The use of the words “expressed to be” in the definition of “Guaranteed Monies” in IIG Capital (see [63(b)] above) meant that the definition in IIG Capital was “appreciably wider than the definition of ‘Guaranteed Obligations’” in Carey Value (Carey Value at [36]).
(c) By clause 2.1(c) of the Deed of Guarantee and Indemnity, the defendant undertook to be responsible as primary obligor for any failure of Grupo Hotelero Urvasco to discharge any of the Guaranteed Obligations when due. This “tend[ed] to suggest that the guarantor’s liability is the same as that of the borrower” (Carey Value at [37]).
(d) The language of clause 2.1(d) appeared to be the language of co-extensive liability, and was not indicative of the unqualified liability which arises under an on demand performance guarantee (Carey Value at [37]).
(e) The conclusive evidence clause in IIG Capital stated that the certificate was as to the “amount at any particular time due and payable”. Those words were missing from clause 20.6. There was a major difference between a certificate as to “amount” and a certificate as to “amount due and payable”. Therefore, clause 20.6 only referred to the amount advanced, and not the amount due (Carey Value at [40]).
Summary of the interpretive approach
- [79]
[79] The foregoing outline of the caselaw shows that the courts’ approach to interpreting contracts of suretyships is consistent with the principles outlined at [48] above.
(a) First, it was important to bear in mind that labels were not necessarily helpful and might even serve to distract. It has been consistently held that the form and label used to describe a contract of suretyship (whether as guarantee, indemnity, or as an on demand performance guarantee) was not conclusive as to the nature of the contract in substance. The core issue was what was the nature of D1’s obligations under the Guarantee: was the liability primary or secondary; did the principle of co-extensiveness apply; and was D1’s liability to pay triggered upon a simple demand by the obligee under the Guarantee?
(b) Second, when interpreting a contract of suretyship, the text of the contract was paramount.
(c) Third, to interpret the nature of the obligations under the contract, the contractual clauses cannot be read in isolation. The document as a whole had to be interpreted, and the court should not be simply undertaking a quantitative, box-ticking exercise to determine the number of factors in favour or against the interpretation of the document as an on demand performance guarantee (see [70(a)] above).
(d) Fourth, while there was a “strong presumption” under the common law against the existence of an on demand performance guarantee outside the banking context if the contract did not expressly label it as an on demand performance guarantee, one must be careful not to overstate the effect of that presumption. Ultimately, an evidential presumption of fact simply shifts the burden of proof to another party to rebut the presumed fact. Bearing in mind that the form used to label the contract of suretyship is not itself conclusive as to the nature of the obligation in substance, and that every case turns on its own facts, the court ultimately has to construe the text of the contractual clauses as a whole to determine the nature of the obligor’s obligations under the contract. This was evident in the cases of IIG Capital and Bitumen.
Application to the present case
- [80]
[80] With the applicable principles in mind, I now turn to the Guarantee in this case.
The clauses in the Guarantee
- [81]
[81] The relevant clauses of the Guarantee provided as follows:
(a) Obligations: Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 provided:
(b) Conclusive evidence clause: Clause 9.1 provided:
(c) Set off: Clause 7.3 of the Guarantee provided:
Parties’ submissions
- [82]
[82] The plaintiffs’ instructed counsel, Mr Chan Leng Sun SC, submitted that the Guarantee was an on demand performance guarantee because the foregoing provisions were similar to the clauses in the cases of IIG Capital and Bitumen, and the courts held in those cases that the contracts in question were on demand performance guarantees. D1’s instructed counsel, Mr Kenneth Tan SC (“Mr Tan SC”), submitted that the clauses and structure of the Guarantee showed that the Guarantee was not an on demand performance guarantee because D1’s liability was dependent on the Operating Companies’ breach of their payment obligations under the Contracts.
Analysis
- [83]
[83] In my judgment, bearing in mind that parties can and do draft modern contracts in such a way that they can contain separate enforceable obligations (see [61] above), I found that the Guarantee contained an obligation of a simple guarantee (under clauses 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) with a separate enforceable obligation of an on demand performance guarantee (under clause 3.2).
- [84]
[84] First, it was clear that the obligation under clauses 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 was that of a guarantee rather than an indemnity. This was because D1’s liability to pay under clause 3.1.2 was only triggered “if and whenever the Borrower fails to pay on the due date any sum whatsoever due and payable under or pursuant to the Materials Contract” [emphasis added]. This was a clear stipulation that D1’s liability was contingent on the Operating Companies’ default on their obligations under the Contracts when those obligations became “due and payable”. This meant that D1’s liability under clauses 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 was secondary and the principle of co-extensiveness applied.
- [85]
[85] On the other hand, clause 3.2, when read together with clauses 9.1 and 7.3, clearly indicated that it gave rise to a separate and independent obligation under an on demand performance guarantee. This was for the following reasons.
(1) Clause 3.2
- [86]
[86] Under clause 3.2, it was significant that D1 (a) “irrevocably and unconditionally” agreed to provide a (b) “separate and independent” obligation to pay the obligee (c) “as sole or principal debtor”, and this liability was triggered (d) “on demand” (e) if “any amounts hereby guaranteed are not recoverable on the footing of a guarantee” [emphasis added]. All these factors were indicators that D1’s obligation to pay under clause 3.2 was a primary one that was not subject to the principle of co-extensiveness.
- [87]
[87] D1 submitted that clause 3.2 was not an on demand performance guarantee because it only applied “if any amounts hereby guaranteed are not recoverable on the footing of a guarantee” (the “Phrase”), which indicated that D1 would not be liable under clause 3.2 unless the Operating Companies’ breach of their payment obligations under the Contracts was first established. With respect, I was unable to agree with this submission. In my judgment, it was clear that the Phrase was specifying the stated event that triggered liability under clause 3.2: this stated event was when there were amounts owed under the Guarantee that were not recoverable on the footing of a guarantee. This stated event addressed the principle of co-extensiveness directly to state that it did not apply. Therefore, for any amounts that were recoverable on the footing of a guarantee, D1’s liability would fall under clauses 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. For any amounts that were not recoverable by way of a guarantee (if, for instance, the underlying Contracts were unenforceable or void), then D1 would be liable as a primary debtor by reason of clause 3.2. Therefore, rather than being inconsistent with the nature of on demand performance guarantee, the Phrase expressly indicated that clause 3.2 was intended as one.
- [88]
[88] It was important to bear in mind that liability under all contracts of suretyship, including on demand performance guarantees, will invariably only be triggered after an underlying obligation has been breached. This was recognised by the English High Court in Vossloh itself, a case heavily relied upon by D1, where Sir William Blackburne stated that liability under an on demand performance guarantee was triggered on the occurrence of a stated event that was usually “the non-fulfilment of a contractual obligation by the principal to that third party” (see [51] above). Indeed, this was the case for the contractual clauses in IIG Capital and Bitumen: in IIG Capital, the clause stated that the obligor was liable to pay on demand “if … the Guaranteed Moneys are not paid in full on their due date” [emphasis added] (see [63(a)] above); in Bitumen, the relevant clause stated that the obligor had to pay on demand any amount certified by the vessel owners to be due to the owners “as a consequence of the Charterers not having fulfilled their obligations under the Charter” [emphasis added] (see paragraph C of the clause extracted at [66] above).
- [89]
[89] Therefore, the key determining factor was not whether the Guarantee envisioned an underlying obligation that had been breached; what was critical was whether D1’s liability under the Guarantee was contingent on the principal debtor’s default of the underlying obligation (see also Vossloh at [44] (see [76(a)] above)). Clause 3.2 was not contingent on such a default, so the clause did not indicate secondary liability on D1’s part.
- [90]
[90] However, there was also a contractual clause in Vossloh – clause 2.1(d) – that was similar to clause 3.2 in this case (see [75] above). Therefore, clause 3.2 alone was not sufficient to indicate the presence of an obligation of an on demand performance guarantee. As such, I turned to the other clauses in the Guarantee.
(2) Clause 9.1
- [91]
[91] Clause 9.1 stated clearly that a “certificate or determination by the Vendor as to the moneys and liabilities for the time being due, owing or incurred to the Vendor by the Operating Companies … shall (save in case of manifest error) for all purpose be conclusive and binding upon the Guarantee” [emphasis added]. In the cases of IIG Capital and Bitumen, the presence of clauses similar to clause 9.1 led to the courts’ findings that the contracts in those cases were on demand performance guarantees (see [65] and [67(a)] above). In IIG Capital, the English Court of Appeal held that the existence of a similar clause had put “the matter beyond doubt” as, “[a]part from manifest error, the [obligors] ha[d] bound themselves to pay on demand as primary obligor the amount stated in a certificate” (see [65] above). In Bitumen, while the clause in that case was worded differently from clause 9.1, it nevertheless provided that the guarantor would pay on demand “any amount certified by Owners by written notice to be due to the Owners …” [emphasis added] (see paragraph C of the clause at [66] above). Sir Jeremy Cooke found that the “certification of any amount as due as a consequence of non-fulfilment of [the principal debtor’s] obligations must go, inevitably, to liability” [emphasis added] (see [67(a)] above).
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