High Court · Decided 10 November 2023
Singapore Asia Trust Company Pte Ltd v Avium Origins Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2023] SGHCR 18 · Case no. Originating Application No 643 of 2023 and Originating Application No 643 of 2023 (Summons No 2720 of 2023)
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
Background
- [3]
[3] The first respondent, Avium Origins Pte Ltd (“AOPL”) is the owner and operator of the “Avium Metaverse”, which is an ecosystem of brands, business and entities working collaboratively in the development of, among other things, intellectual property and non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”). The second respondent, Avant Talents Sdn Bhd (“ATSB”) is an agency representing E-sports individuals and teams and is responsible for managing an E-sports team known as the “Geek Fam”.
The Services Agreement and the Escrow Agreement
- [4]
[4] In October 2022, AOPL and ATSB entered into a Collaboration and Exclusive Services Agreement (“the Services Agreement”) for the development and setting up of a decentralised e-sports organisation (“DEO”). Under the Services Agreement, ATSB was responsible for the operational strategy and the management of E-sports talent teams which were to be on-boarded to the DEO, and in particular, ATSB was to on-board the Geek Fam E-sports team to the DEO. On the other hand, AOPL was to set up an escrow account and maintain therein a minimum balance of US$300,000. The minimum balance was later amended by agreement to US$200,000, and the remaining US$100,000 represented a top up that would be triggered on certain conditions, the terms of which are immaterial for present purposes. Clause 8.2.4 of the Services Agreement provided for AOPL to maintain the escrow account and escrow amount “up till the date of the DEO’s first NFT launch, after which, the provisions of which Clause 8.3 shall apply”.
- [5]
[5] A literal reading of clause 8.3 suggests that it contemplates a situation where the DEO’s first NFT launch has taken place, and it provides for different arrangements that can be had in respect of the escrow monies, depending on the revenue level achieved by the DEO’s first NFT launch. If the revenue was US$1.6m or more, then AOPL would be entitled pursuant to clause 8.3.1 of the Services Agreement to close the escrow account and deal with the escrow monies as it wished. Different scenarios were provided for in the event that the revenue came in less than US$1.6m: (a) if the revenue came between US$1.2m and US$1.6m, the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith with a view towards maintaining the continuity of the business venture; (b) if the revenue came in between US$400,000 and US$1.2m, then the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith on how to make up for the shortfall to achieve the targeted revenue, and failing mutual agreement, ATSB had two options, one of which was to terminate the Services Agreement and draw down on the escrow monies pursuant to clause 8.3.2(b)(i) of the Services Agreement; and (c) if the revenue came in below US$400,000, parties would not be required to negotiate in good faith unlike in the previous scenario, and instead ATSB could avail itself of either of two options, one of which was similarly to terminate the Services Agreement and draw down on the escrow monies pursuant to clause 8.3.2(c)(i) of the Services Agreement.
The Release Instructions issued to SATC
- [7]
[7] It does not appear to be in dispute that the DEO’s first NFT launch never took place. AOPL states that this was a result of a drop in NFT trading volumes and prices since January 2023, and so the launch would not have been commercially viable.
- [8]
[8] On 6 April 2023 at 12.05pm, in an e-mail in which AOPL’s Director Nathanael Lim (“NL”) was copied, ATSB sent SATC a Release Instruction (“the 6 Apr Release Instruction”). According to the Escrow Agreement, any Release Instructions issued by ATSB had to be in the form of Appendix 2 of the Escrow Agreement. For present purposes, I need only produce the following portions of Appendix 2:
- [9]
[9] The mention in Appendix 2 of clauses 8.3.2(b)(i) and 8.3.2(c)(i) are references to the corresponding clauses in the Services Agreement, which set out the respective options ATSB had to terminate the Services Agreement and draw down on the escrow monies in the event the revenue from the DEO’s first NFT launch came in between US$400,000 and US$1.2m or below US$400,000 (see [5] above). The 6 Apr Release Instruction is identical with the form in Appendix 2 save that it omits paragraph (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 entirely. Instead of what is reproduced above, that part of the 6 Apr Release Instruction states:
- [10]
[10] Shortly after the above e-mail, at 12.12pm, ATSB’s director Lim Keat Kuang (“LKK”), who was also the authorised signatory for ATSB under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, replied to the e-mail chain and confirmed that the 6 Apr Release Instruction had been signed by him. Subsequently, at 3.21pm, SATC acknowledged receipt of the 6 Apr Release Instruction and asked for an amended Release Instruction with ATSB’s clarification on paragraph (a)(ii) of Appendix 2, which had been omitted from the 6 Apr Release Instruction. Later that day, at 5.08pm, ATSB replied, stating:
- [11]
[11] The Release Instruction attached in this e-mail at 5.08pm essentially reproduces paragraph (a) of Appendix 2, save that for sub-paragraph (a)(ii), instead of being omitted entirely as it had been previously, it is now reproduced with a strikethrough across the entirety of the paragraph. It is not in dispute that this version of the 6 Apr Release Instruction is taken to have superseded its previous version, and I therefore also refer to it as the 6 Apr Release Instruction.
- [12]
[12] Later at 5.51pm, SATC acknowledged receipt of ATSB’s Release Instructions, stating:
- [13]
[13] Early in the morning the next day, on 7 April 2023 at 1.49am, NL replied to the e-mail chain, stating, among other things:
- [14]
[14] Later that day, at 10.31pm, AOPL sent SATC (by the same e-mail chain) a Release Instruction (“the 7 Apr Release Instruction”). According to the Escrow Agreement, any Release Instructions issued by AOPL had to be in the form of Appendix 3 of the Escrow Agreement. The preamble and administrative sections of Appendix 3 are identical to those in Appendix 2, and only the contents in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Appendix 3 are distinct, which I reproduce below:
- [15]
[15] For ease of discussion, in the remainder of this judgment, I will refer to the part of Appendix 3 that I have quoted above and emphasised in italics, which requires AOPL to specify either clause 8.3.1 or 8.3.2(b)(ii) of the Services Agreement as the basis of the drawdown, as “para (a)(i)” of Appendix 3.
- [16]
[16] The mention of clauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2(b)(ii) are similarly references to the corresponding clauses in the Services Agreement. As mentioned earlier, clause 8.3.1 provided that AOPL could close the escrow account and draw down the escrow monies if revenue from the DEO’s first NFT launch came in above US$1.6m (see [5] above). Clause 8.3.2(b)(ii) on the other hand was the second of the two options ATSB had in the event that the revenue level from the DEO’s first NFT launch came between US$400,000 and US$1.2m. Under that option, if no mutual agreement could be reached between AOPL and ATSB on the means or measures to make up the shortfall to achieve the targeted revenue of US$1.6m, instead of terminating the Services Agreement and drawing down on the escrow monies pursuant to clause 8.3.2(b)(i) (see also [5] above), ATSB could agree to the continuity of the collaboration and instead utilise the revenue raised from the DEO’s first NFT launch for its monthly expenses. Although clause 8.3.2(b)(ii) does not state so explicitly, when it is read against clause 8.3.2(c)(ii), it would appear that if ATSB elected for the option in clause 8.3.2(b)(ii), ATSB would have no entitlement to draw down on the escrow monies as it was now entitled to utilise the revenue from the DEO’s first NFT launch instead, and accordingly, AOPL would be entitled to close down the escrow account and obtain a refund of the escrow monies.
- [17]
[17] The 7 Apr Release Instruction was identical with the form provided for in Appendix 3, save for the section in para (a)(i). Instead of what is reproduced above, it states:
- [18]
[18] In the e-mail sent on 7 April 2023 at 10.31pm, AOPL also informed ATSB that it disagreed that ATSB had the right to draw down on the escrow monies, and that the conditions on which the attempted drawdown in the 6 Apr Release Instruction is based was not provided for in the Services Agreement and contrary to it. AOPL further stated, in a section of the e-mail addressed to SATC, that it disagreed with the 6 Apr Release Instruction on the basis that the conditions of the Services Agreement have not been met, and it brought to SATC’s attention the 7 Apr Release Instruction.
- [19]
[19] On Monday, 10 April 2023 10.24am, SATC replied to the e-mail chain addressing both AOPL and ATSB and stated:
Subsequent developments
- [20]
[20] On 24 May 2023, ATSB’s then-solicitors wrote to AOPL, alleging that AOPL was in breach of the Services Agreement. Then, on 9 June 2023, AOPL’s solicitors wrote to ATSB, denying ATSB’s allegations that it had acted in breach of the Services Agreement, and stating that it was in fact ATSB that had acted in repudiatory breach of the Services Agreement and AOPL was thereby terminating the Services Agreement. There appears to have been no reply by ATSB to AOPL’s letter of 9 June 2023.
- [21]
[21] On 16 June 2023, ATSB issued a letter of demand to SATC, stating that their failure and/or refusal to pay the escrow monies notwithstanding having confirmed receipt of the 6 Apr Release Instruction constituted a breach of clauses 1.4.2(a) and 1.10 of the Escrow Agreement. In that letter, ATSB further stated that it was incorrect for SATC to take the position that there were “conflicting” Release Instructions because, at the time the 6 Apr Release Instruction had been received by SATC, there were no other valid Release Instructions received under the Escrow Agreement, and any subsequent Release Instructions that SATC received from other parties were incapable of giving rise to “conflicting” Release Instructions. ATSB demanded that SATC pay to it the escrow monies within seven days.
- [22]
[22] On 18 June 2023, AOPL wrote to SATC reiterating the position that it had stated earlier, namely, that ATSB had no basis for drawing down on the escrow monies. AOPL further stated in the letter that the 6 Apr Release Instruction was invalid because they were not “substantially in the form set out in Appendix 2 to the Escrow Agreement”. AOPL further asked that SATC, by 23 June 2023 (a) confirm that it would not make payment of the escrow monies to ATSB and (b) that it makes payment of the escrow monies to AOPL, because clause 8.2.4 of the Services Agreement (see [4] above) was “no longer applicable” and AOPL intended to close the escrow account and have the escrow monies returned to it, in line with the 7 Apr Release Instruction.
- [23]
[23] On 19 June 2023, SATC’s solicitors wrote to both AOPL and ATSB, reiterating that it had received conflicting Release Instructions concerning the release of the escrow monies, and that the Escrow Agreement was silent on the mechanism and/or priority that would apply in the event that SATC received conflicting Release Instructions or where one party took the position that the other had no basis to issue a Release Instruction. SATC asked that the dispute relating to the escrow monies be resolved between AOPL and ATSB, and stated that if AOPL and ATSB were unable to resolve their dispute, it would take out an application for interpleader relief to determine who the escrow monies were to be paid to.
- [24]
[24] Subsequently, the parties came to an agreement that SATC would not take any further action in connection with the escrow monies until the conclusion of a without prejudice meeting between ATSB and AOPL for the resolution of the dispute. It appears that this meeting came to naught. On 28 June 2023, ATSB’s solicitors wrote to AOPL, responding to the 9 June 2023 letter from AOPL’s solicitors (see [20] above). In that letter, among other things, ATSB denied that it had acted in repudiatory breach of the Services Agreement and stated that it was in fact AOPL who had acted in repudiatory breach. ATSB further stated that it “accepts [AOPL’s] repudiatory breach of the [Services Agreement] and hereby terminates the [Services Agreement]”. In the meantime, SATC filed OA 643 on 27 June 2023. OA 643 was served on AOPL on 6 July 2023, and served on ATSB on 3 July 2023.
- [25]
[25] On 7 July 2023, ATSB commenced an arbitration against AOPL in respect of the dispute under the Services Agreement in the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”). These arbitral proceedings have been conducted in accordance with the SIAC’s Expedited Procedure and were ongoing at the time of the hearing before me.
- [26]
[26] It would appear, from ATSB’s Notice of Arbitration (“NOA”) and AOPL’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration (“RNOA”), that one of the issues in the arbitration is whether ATSB or AOPL was entitled to draw down on the escrow monies. In the NOA, ATSB disputes that it had acted in repudiatory breach of the Services Agreement by its attempted drawdown on the escrow monies (as AOPL alleged) because it had been “entitled” to draw down on the escrow monies, since AOPL failed to launch the DEO and consequently the Target Revenue specified in the Services Agreement had not been achieved. This was obviously disputed by AOPL in the RNOA. AOPL also states in the RNOA that, since the Services Agreement has been terminated before the DEO’s first NFT launch, it was entitled to close the escrow account and draw down on the escrow monies, because the account need only be maintained up until the date of the DEO’s first NFT launch.
- [27]
[27] Subsequent to the commencement of arbitration, AOPL’s solicitors wrote to ATSB’s and SATC’s respective solicitors, proposing that OA 643 be stayed pending the determination this issue of entitlement to the escrow monies in the arbitration. SATC’s solicitors replied, stating that it had no objections. However, ATSB’s solicitors objected to the stay, on the basis that the issue of AOPL or ATSB’s entitlement to the escrow monies was not an issue to be determined in OA 643, because the court has not yet determined that SATC has satisfied the conditions for interpleader relief.
- [28]
[28] The final piece of this procedural history is HC/SUM 2720/2023 (“SUM 2720”), which has been placed before me together with OA 643. SUM 2720 is an application by AOPL for two extracts in LKK’s affidavits filed in support of ATSB in OA 643 to be expunged on the basis that they attract without prejudice privilege. Those extracts (“the Offending Extracts) are contained in e-mails sent by NL on two occasions to officers/representatives of ATSB in an e-mail chain where SATC was copied. The first was sent on Friday, 6 April 2023 at 2.12am (“the 6 Apr E-mail”). In terms of chronology, the 6 Apr E-mail was sent before the e-mail containing the 6 Apr Release Instruction was sent, and after ATSB had sent an e-mail on 5 April 2023 attaching a Release Instruction seeking to draw down on the escrow monies. I should add that this Release Instruction in the e-mail on 5 April 2023 is distinct from the 6 Apr Release Instruction and is also not the basis on which ATSB relies in seeking payment of the escrow monies. Briefly, in the Offending Extracts of the 6 Apr E-mail, NL proposed that ATSB could nevertheless be entitled to the escrow monies on the basis that ATSB and AOPL terminated the Services Agreement and in full and final settlement of all claims and liabilities under the Services Agreement. The second of the Offending Extracts is contained in an e-mail sent on 7 April 2023 at 1.49am (“the 7 Apr E-mail”). In terms of chronology, the 7 Apr E-mail preceded AOPL’s e-mail later that day which contained the 7 Apr Release Instruction. Briefly, in the Offending Extracts of the 7 Apr E-mail, NL asked if any disbursement of the escrow monies that ATSB had been seeking (by way of the 6 Apr Release Instruction) was in pursuit of a termination of the Services Agreements on the terms he had previously suggested in the 6 Apr E-mail.
The applicable principles
- [29]
[29] Before turning to the parties’ submissions, I set out the legal principles relating to the applications before me.
Interpleader relief
- [30]
[30] As the High Court explained in Precious Shipping ([2] above) (at [17]), the court’s power to grant interpleader relief is statutorily conferred by s 18(2) of the Supreme Court Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the SCJA”) read with para 4 of the First Schedule to the SCJA (see also Perry, Tamar and another v Esculier, Jacques Henri Georges and another and another matter [2022] 1 SLR 107 at [33]). Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule provides for two circumstances in which the court has the power to grant interpleader relief, of which only the first is relevant to OA 643:
- [31]
[31] The High Court in Precious Shipping considered the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”). The relevant provision in the ROC 2014 concerning interpleader proceedings was O 17 (see Precious Shipping at [19]), in which r 1 substantially reproduces para 4 of the First Schedule to the SCJA, r 3 sets out the manner in which an application for interpleader relief is to be made, and r 5 sets out the powers of the court hearing an application for interpleader relief, the relevant parts of which I reproduce below:
- [32]
[32] Having considered the structure of O 17 of the ROC 2014, the High Court in Precious Shipping (at [20]) held that an application for interpleader relief proceeds in two stages:
(a) At “stage 1”, the court ascertains if the statutory preconditions for the grant of interpleader relief have been satisfied.
(b) If the conditions precedent in stage 1 are met, then the inquiry moves to “stage 2”, where the court will decide what consequential orders ought to follow. Even if the statutory conditions precedent have been met, the court has the discretion whether or not to grant interpleader relief, and where it decides to grant interpleader relief, it may make one of the three orders provided for in O 17 r 5.
- [33]
[33] The provisions in the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) relating to interpleader relief, set out in O 13 r 10, are shorter. I reproduce the relevant portions of O 13 r 10 below:
- [34]
[34] Comparing O 13 r 10 of the ROC 2021 and O 17 of the ROC 2014, I make three observations.
(a) First, O 13 r 10(1) sets out the requirements that must be satisfied by an applicant for interpleader relief, and it largely reproduces what is required by the statutory preconditions in para 4 of the First Schedule to the SCJA, and the formal requirements that were previously contained in O 17 r 3 of the ROC 2014.
(b) Secondly, it appears that, unlike O 17 r 5 of the ROC 2014, O 13 r 10 of the ROC 2021 is not prescriptive of the type of orders that the court may make when hearing an interpleader application. O 13 r 10 is silent on the types of orders that the court may make when hearing an interpleader application, and merely provides for the court’s powers to “decide on the conflicting claims” or “give directions regarding the hearing of the conflicting claims” at the case conference fixed for the interpleader application (see also Cavinder Bull SC gen ed, Singapore Civil Procedure (2022) Volume I (Sweet & Maxwell, 2022) at para 13/10/25).
(c) Thirdly, in my view, notwithstanding the difference in wording between O 13 r 10 of the ROC 2021 and O 17 of the ROC 2014, the two-stage analysis set out in Precious Shipping will still apply in the context of O 13 r 10. Because the court’s powers to grant interpleader relief are statutorily conferred (see Precious Shipping at [18]), the court can only be in a position to consider whether to grant interpleader relief in the exercise of its discretion and what consequential orders if it grants interpleader relief (ie, stage 2) where it has been satisfied that the conditions precedent for exercising those statutorily conferred powers have been met (ie, stage 1). I therefore respectfully adopt the two-stage analysis in Precious Shipping for the purposes of OA 643.
- [35]
[35] I now consider the requirements under stage 1 in greater detail. Apart from the formal requirements set out in O 13 r 10(1) of the ROC 2021 relating to what must be contained in the supporting affidavit for the interpleader application, which have been complied with by SATC in this case, based on the statutory preconditions in para 4 of First Schedule to the SCJA, the conditions precedent that must be met before interpleader relief can be granted are: (a) the applicant must be under a liability for any debt, money, goods or chattels; (b) the applicant expects to be sued by at least two persons; and (c) there are adverse claims for the debt, money goods or chattels from the persons whom the applicant expects will bring suit (see Precious Shipping at [27]). The burden of proving that these preconditions have been met fall on the applicant for interpleader relief (see Precious Shipping at [28]).
- [37]
[37] In Precious Shipping, with reference to O 17 of the ROC 2014, the High Court held that if the conditions precedent in stage 1 are not satisfied, the court must dismiss the interpleader application, and it has no powers to summarily determine the merits of the competing claims and grant judgment pursuant to that determination (see Precious Shipping at [87] and [91]). The court explained that there was no such general power of summary determination, for two reasons. First, the powers of the court to summarily determine claims as part of the interpleader process is specifically provided for under O 17 r 5(2) of the ROC 2014, and the statutory scheme imposes specific and clear constraints on the court’s power of summary determination, which cannot be invoked in a case that does not even pass muster under stage 1 (see Precious Shipping at [92]). Secondly, as a matter of principle, any such power of summary determination exercised even when the conditions precedent for interpleader relief have not been satisfied would fall outside the scope of the interpleader process, the objective of which is to allow the court to determine the incidence of liability, and not for the determination of liability (see Precious Shipping at [93]–[94]).
Without prejudice privilege
- [38]
[38] “Without prejudice” privilege is a rule affecting the admissibility of evidence and it is founded on the public policy of encouraging litigants to settle their differences rather than litigate them to a finish (see Sin Lian Heng Construction Pte Ltd v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 433 (“Sin Lian Heng”) at [8]). Therefore, statements or correspondence exchanged in negotiations for the settlement of disputes are subject to without prejudice privilege because if they were otherwise admissible in evidence and subject to discovery in subsequent proceedings, parties would be discouraged from making concessions to settle (see Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd and another [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807 (“Mariwu”) at [23]).
- [39]
[39] “Without prejudice” privilege finds expression in s 23 of the Evidence Act 1997 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Evidence Act”) (see Mariwu at [24]). In cases where the communication is expressly stated to be made “without prejudice”, save for exceptional situations, it will not be admissible (see s 23(1)(a) of the Evidence Act). Where no such express condition has been imposed, the court examines the surrounding circumstances in which the communication was made and ascertains whether they were such that the court may infer an agreement to the effect that evidence of this communication should not be given (see s 23(1)(b) of the Evidence Act), the classic example of which would be where the parties were in fact seeking to settle a dispute at the material time when the communications were exchanged (see Sin Lian Heng at [12]). There are accordingly two requirements that must be satisfied before “without prejudice” can be invoked: (a) the communication must be an admission; and (b) there must be a dispute which the parties are trying to settle (see Sin Lian Heng at [13]; see also Cytec Industries Pte Ltd v APP Chemicals International (Mau) Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 769 at [17]).
The submissions
OA 643
- [40]
[40] SATC submits that the conditions precedent for the grant of interpleader relief are satisfied in this case because ATSB and AOPL’s respective claims to the escrow monies, made pursuant to the 6 Apr Release Instruction and the 7 Apr Release Instruction (collectively, “the Release Instructions”), each have a prima facie basis. Interpleader relief is necessary because the Escrow Agreement is silent on: (a) what it means for a Release Instruction to be “substantially in the form” of Appendix 2 or Appendix 3; and (b) the mechanism that is to be applied to determine how escrow monies are to be disbursed where SATC receives conflicting Release Instructions, as in the present case. SATC also reiterates that, in accordance with the requirement that the competing claims need only have a prima facie basis, interpleader relief ought to be granted so long as ATSB and AOPL’s competing claims are not bound to fail. SATC also adds that it takes no position on what consequential orders should be made in the event the court found that it was entitled to interpleader relief.
- [41]
[41] Both AOPL and ATSB argue that the conditions precedent for the grant of interpleader relief are not satisfied, but for different reasons. For AOPL, it argues that there can be no competing claims because ATSB plainly had no claim to the escrow monies. First, the 6 Apr Release Instruction, which completely omitted para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2, is not “substantially in the form” of Appendix 2. AOPL argues that it is necessary for ATSB to specify, as part of para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2, whether it was relying on clause 8.3.2(b)(i) or 8.3.2(c)(i) (see [5] above) in drawing down on the escrow monies. Secondly, at the time 6 Apr Release Instruction was issued, ATSB plainly had no basis to claim the escrow monies. As clauses 8.3.2(b)(i) and 8.3.2(c)(i) of the Services Agreement make clear, ATSB would only become entitled to the escrow monies where the first DEO NFT launch had taken place, the Target Revenue fell below US$1.6m, and ATSB consequently exercised its right to terminate Services Agreement after satisfying the other requirements therein. The Services Agreement was however not terminated at the time the 6 Apr Release Instruction was issued, and there would have been no basis whatsoever for ATSB to have issued the 6 Apr Release Instruction.
- [43]
[43] For ATSB, it argues that there can be no competing claims because only its claim to the escrow monies is valid, and AOPL can have no claim to the escrow monies. First, the 6 Apr Release Instruction is valid and “substantially in the form” of Appendix 2. ATSB points to the fact that SATC had acknowledged the receipt of the 6 Apr Release Instruction at the material time, which shows that SATC too accepted the validity of the 6 Apr Release Instruction. Secondly, under the Escrow Agreement, SATC was obliged to pay out upon receipt of the first valid Release Instruction, and so once SATC received the 6 Apr Release Instruction, any subsequent Release Instruction issued (such as the 7 Apr Release Instruction) is ineffective. ATSB also disagrees with AOPL’s submissions that it (ATSB) had no entitlement to the escrow monies because the underlying conditions in the Services Agreement (namely, clauses 8.3.2(b)(i) or 8.3.2(c)(i)) have not been satisfied, because under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, SATC is simply obliged to pay the escrow monies on receipt of valid Release Instructions, and SATC is not obliged to inquire into whether the conditions of the Services Agreement were satisfied before deciding to make payment.
SUM 2720
- [45]
[45] In their written submissions, AOPL and ATSB each made several arguments in connection with SUM 2720, but I surmised from their oral submissions that the following represent the gist of their respective positions.
- [46]
[46] AOPL argues that the Offending Extracts should be expunged because: (a) first, NL’s e-mails were sent at a time when the parties were already in dispute over whether ATSB had been entitled to draw down on the escrow monies, and so they arose in the course of negotiations to resolve a dispute; and (b) secondly, NL’s e-mails clearly contained an admission against AOPL’s interests aimed at inviting negotiations for settlement because NL stated that, notwithstanding the Services Agreement not providing for the draw down of the escrow monies in the given circumstances, ATSB could nevertheless draw down on those monies in full and final settlement of all claims under the Services Agreement. Although AOPL in its written submissions did not specifically frame the dispute over ATSB’s entitlement to draw down on the escrow monies as one arising under the Services Agreement, it is clear from the 6 Apr E-mail and the 7 Apr E-mail that NL raised objections about ATSB’s drawdown because the conditions in the Services Agreement had not been satisfied. Therefore, the dispute identified by AOPL, to which the 6 Apr E-mail and the 7 Apr E-mail relate, must be a dispute over ATSB’s entitlement at that time to draw down on the escrow monies under the terms of the Services Agreement.
- [47]
[47] Anticipating ATSB’s argument that any dispute to which NL’s e-mails relate is one in respect of the Services Agreement and not the Escrow Agreement (see [48] below), AOPL argues that any distinction maintained between the Services Agreement and the Escrow Agreement cannot be correct because no bright line should be drawn between the two – the forms in both Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 of the Services Agreement make express reference to clauses of the Services Agreement. In determining if the Release Instructions were valid under the Escrow Agreement and thus gave rise to valid claims to the escrow monies, one necessarily had to look at the terms of the Services Agreement and understand how it works.
- [48]
[48] ATSB raises the following in response. First and foremost, the Offending Extracts cannot attract without prejudice privilege for the purposes of OA 643, because the purported admissions in the Offending Extracts arise out of the Services Agreement and OA 643 only concerns a dispute under the Escrow Agreement as distinct from the Services Agreement. Secondly, at the time the 6 Apr E-mail and the 7 Apr E-mail containing the Offending Extracts were sent by NL, there was no dispute between the parties over ATSB’s entitlement to draw down on the escrow monies under the Services Agreement. This is because in both of those e-mails, NL did not dispute ATSB’s entitlement to the escrow monies, and instead, he was proposing a ground for ATSB to draw down on the escrow monies (in respect of the 6 Apr E-mail) and trying to understand the basis in the Services Agreement pursuant to which ATSB was seeking to draw down on the escrow monies (in respect of the 7 Apr E-mail). Any such dispute only arose after AOPL issued the 7 Apr Release Instruction, and therefore the Offending Extracts, which are contained in e-mails sent before the e-mail attaching the 7 Apr Release Instruction, do not attract without prejudice privilege. Finally, even if the Offending Extracts had been exchanged in continuation of earlier negotiations that separately involved only ATSB and AOPL, the Offending Extracts would have been sent on an “open basis” in the 6 Apr E-mail and 7 Apr E-mail since SATC was also copied in those e-mails. ATSB says that NL had precisely copied SATC in those e-mails containing the Offending Extracts to apprise SATC of the situation between the parties so that SATC would not act on any Release Instruction issued by ATSB, and in these circumstances, the Offending Extracts cannot attract without prejudice privilege.
The issues in OA 643
- [49]
[49] The submissions pertaining to (a) whether the 7 Apr Release Instruction is ineffective because the Escrow Agreement obliged SATC to pay out on receipt of the first valid Release Instruction (see [43] above) and (b) whether the 6 Apr Release Instruction is ineffective because at the time when it was issued ATSB had no claim to the escrow monies because the underlying conditions of the Services Agreement had not been fulfilled (see [41] above), deal with the issue of whether AOPL and ATSB (respectively) have a claim to the escrow monies, in addition to the claim that the other party asserts. In other words, they are directed at the issue of whether there exist competing claims. These issues are therefore to be dealt with in considering the second of the three conditions precedent in the analysis under stage 1 (ie, SATC’s expectation to be sued by two or more persons).
- [50]
[50] However, the issue of whether the Release Instructions are “substantially in the form” (which I hereafter refer to as a question of its validity) raises some difficulty. In part, this difficulty arises because SATC has chosen to not take a position on whether either or both of the Release Instructions are valid for the purposes of clause 1.4 of the EA. This is apparent from various parts of SATC’s submissions, where it argued that interpleader relief is necessary because the Escrow Agreement is silent on what constitutes a valid Release Instruction, and that the validity of the 6 Apr Release Instruction and the 7 Apr Release Instruction had to be determined under stage 2. I cite the following two examples:
(a) In its written submissions, SATC argues that both ATSB and AOPL raised prima facie competing claims which have to be fully investigated before any determination can be made as to the party entitled to the escrow monies, and one of those issues that had to be investigated is whether their respective Release Instructions “had been validly issued”.
(b) In oral submissions, SATC explains that it had come to the court for interpleader relief because the Escrow Agreement is silent on what “substantially in the form” means and it has received two sets of Release Instructions that were not identical to the form in Appendix 2 or 3, which raised the question on whether they are “substantially in the form”.
- [51]
[51] When I clarified with counsel for SATC whether SATC is taking a position on the validity of either or both of the Release Instructions for the purposes of OA 643, counsel submitted that any issue pertaining to the validity of the Release Instructions would only come up for determination in deciding whether AOPL or ATSB had a better claim to the escrow monies (ie, stage 2), and does not arise for consideration in determining if SATC was entitled to interpleader relief (ie, stage 1). Counsel submitted that, for SATC to be entitled to interpleader relief, it suffices that the Release Instructions could not be “dismiss[ed] … out of hand”, in other words, that they are not inarguably bad or non-complaint with the Escrow Agreement. The other parties to OA 643 take a slightly different view, but they do not object to SATC’s position per se. ATSB argues that the issue of what constitutes a valid Release Instruction is not before the court for the purposes of stage 1, but that was on account of its submission that it had been implicit in SATC’s submission about there being conflicting Release Instructions that SATC must also have accepted that both the Release Instructions were valid”, and further, SATC had already accepted the 6 Apr Release Instruction as being valid by acknowledging its receipt at the material time. AOPL argues that the validity issue has to be determined by the court as part of stage 1, and the question of whether either or both of the Release Instructions are valid cannot be contingent on the position that SATC has taken whether for the purposes of OA 643 or previously where it had acknowledged receipt of the 6 Apr Release Instruction.
- [52]
[52] The validity of the Release Instructions ultimately goes towards whether ATSB or AOPL even have a claim to the escrow monies at all, and so it can be viewed as a factor affecting the merits of their respective alleged claims. However, given that the Escrow Agreement was and is still in effect, and the only possible trigger in this case for SATC’s obligation to pay the escrow monies under the Escrow Agreement is the receipt of a valid Release Instruction (see [6] above), if there are no valid Release Instructions at all, then how would SATC’s obligation to pay the escrow monies have been engaged in the first place? If that obligation is not engaged, then how can SATC be liable to either or both parties for the escrow monies? I therefore need to consider if SATC’s position has been correctly taken. Accordingly, before turning to the analysis in stage 1 and stage 2 (if it arises) proper, there is a threshold question of whether the issue of the validity of the Release Instructions should be considered as part of the analysis in stage 1 in determining if the conditions precedent for grant of interpleader relief have been satisfied.
- [53]
[53] Accordingly, the following issues arise for determination in OA 643:
(a) Whether the issue of the validity of the Release Instructions is to be considered in determining if the conditions precedent for grant of interpleader relief have been satisfied under stage 1?
(b) In the light of the above, whether the conditions precedent for grant of interpleader relief have been satisfied? In particular, are there competing claims in the light of the arguments that ATSB and/or AOPL have respectively made? If so, should interpleader relief be granted and if so, what consequential orders ought the court make as part of stage 2?
Whether the issue of the validity of the Release Instructions is to be considered in determining if SATC is entitled to interpleader relief
- [54]
[54] As stated in Precious Shipping ([2] above) (at [27]), there are three conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the court’s power to grant interpleader relief can be engaged, derived from para 4(a) of the First Schedule to the SCJA: (a) the applicant is under a liability for the subject matter of the proceedings; (b) he expects to be sued by at least two persons; and (c) the claims from those persons whom the applicant expects to bring suit must be “adverse” (see also [35] above).
What does the statutory precondition of “liability” mean?
- [56]
[56] Accordingly, for the court to be satisfied that the conditions for the grant of interpleader relief are satisfied and for the applicant to be entitled to interpleader relief, there must be no question that the applicant is liable in respect of the subject matter of the interpleader proceedings. Not only is a lesser standard (eg, where there is a good arguable case that the applicant is liable) contrary to the statutory wording in para 4(a) of the First Schedule to the SCJA, it would also encourage “flighty and skittish” applicants to utilise the interpleader procedure as an avenue for determining if their obligation to others have been engaged and relieve themselves from making that assessment. As the High Court cautioned in Precious Shipping (at [33]), albeit in a different context:
(a) In Precious Shipping, there were two back-to-back contracts under which sellers agreed to supply bunkers to purchasers for use in their vessels, and to do so, the sellers contracted with physical suppliers for those bunkers. The purchasers took delivery of the bunkers and consumed them, but the physical suppliers received no payment from the sellers who were subsequently placed in voluntary liquidation, and the purchasers were also put on notice by the physical suppliers and consequently did not make payment to the sellers. The purchasers sought interpleader relief as to who the payment of the purchase price should be made. On the facts of that case, however, there was no question that the purchasers were liable for the purchase price of the bunkers, because the bunkers had been stemmed and consumed (see Precious Shipping at [2]). The court eventually dismissed the application for interpleader relief on the basis that the physical suppliers, who lacked any contractual privity with the purchasers, did not even have a prima facie claim to the purchase price, and in any event, the physical suppliers’ claims, all of which were maintained on non-contractual grounds, were not “adverse” to those of the sellers (see Precious Shipping at [84]).
(b) In Development Bank of Singapore Ltd v Eng Keong Realty Pte Ltd and another [1990] 1 SLR(R) 265, the applicant for interpleader relief had issued a guarantee of $170,000, on an application by the second defendant for the benefit of the first defendant. The second defendant had put up a fixed deposit of the same amount to secure the facility, which was to expire on 14 April 1988. Under the guarantee, the first defendant was entitled to demand payment on the guarantee if it was called upon to pay for any alienation of State land to extend a road to serve a development to be built on land that it had purchased from the second defendant. Under the terms of the guarantee, any such written demand would constitute sufficient evidence that the monies claimed by the demand were due and payable by the applicant without enquiry. In accordance with the terms of the guarantee, the first defendant made a written demand on 12 April 1988. There was no question before the court that the applicant was entitled to interpleader relief, and the court proceeded to find that the second defendant was entitled to the monies. Similarly, in this case, there was no question before the court that the applicant was liable on the sum of $170,000, which it either had to pay out pursuant to the written demand, or as a debt that was repayable to the second defendant, its customer.
(c) In IMC Shipping Company Pte Ltd v Viking Offshore & Marine AS and another [1998] SGHC 168, the applicant had been paid $450,000 by one “Ohna”. This represented the share capital that one “Viking” had to contribute under the terms of a shareholders’ agreement for a joint venture company “SDI”. Viking was a 30% shareholder in SDI. Subsequently, the shareholders of SDI decided to reduce its share capital rather significantly, and consequently, the amount of contribution required by Viking was reduced to $3,000. The remainder of the monies (which was $420,000 less other sums which the applicant was entitled to deduct) therefore had to be refunded, and the question was whether it was to be repaid to Ohna or Viking. The court found that applicant was entitled to interpleader relief. It held that there was no doubt that the applicant was liable for the remaining sum as a debt, because that represented excess money that the applicant was obliged to repay (at [8]).
- [58]
[58] Therefore, an applicant seeking interpleader relief must show that it is liable in respect of the subject matter of the interpleader proceedings, for example, by admitting to the relevant legal obligation which it says is engaged in the circumstances of the case, the performance of which one of the named respondents to the interpleader application is entitled to call upon, and the incidence of which it seeks to be determined by the application for interpleader relief. Of course, the applicant’s admission of liability (if any) is not conclusive per se because ultimately, the court must be independently satisfied that the applicant is indeed liable as such before it can find that the conditions precedent for grant of interpleader relief have been satisfied. Put another way, that the applicant is liable in respect of the subject matter of the interpleader proceedings is something which the court must be satisfied of, as part of the requirements under stage 1.
- [59]
[59] The satisfaction of this condition precedent (existence of liability) is therefore quite different from the second condition precedent (expectation to be sued by two or more persons). In respect of the second condition precedent, as the High Court held in Precious Shipping (at [34]), the applicant need only demonstrate it faces a genuine threat of multiple proceedings by showing that the competing claims have a prima facie basis, that is, they have an objective basis in law and fact, a threshold that can be met so long as the evidence led in support of the claims (which is assumed to be true) is not inherently incredible or out of all common sense or reason. This test of a prima facie case does not apply to the first condition precedent. The High Court in Precious Shipping did not extend the prima facie test to the first condition precedent, and it is apparent that the court only held it applicable to the second condition precedent (see Precious Shipping at [29]–[34]). That the test of a prima facie case does not apply to the first condition precedent also squares with principle. A prima facie standard makes sense in the context of the second condition precedent because the court, in deciding whether to grant interpleader relief, does not have to be satisfied of the merits of the competing claims. As the statutory wording in para 4(a) of the First Schedule to the SCJA suggests, the applicant’s entitlement to interpleader relief is not contingent on the strength of the competing claims asserted because the applicant need only show an expectation to be sued by 2 or more persons. On the other hand, the existence of liability on the applicant’s part is the very foundation of interpleader relief and it goes to the heart of whether the applicant is entitled to interpleader relief. The court must therefore be satisfied that such liability exists, and no lesser standard can suffice.
- [60]
[60] For completeness, I add that the third condition precedent (adverse claims) will also be something that the court must be satisfied with, in similar fashion to the first condition precedent (existence of liability). In other words, the court must similarly be satisfied that the competing claims (which need only be shown on a prima facie basis) are adverse in nature. This is because the existence of adverse claims similarly affects the entitlement of the applicant to interpleader relief, as the language of para 4(a) of the First Schedule to the SCJA makes clear. Also, in interpleader proceedings, the court does not resolve competing claims in the abstract, and that exercise is undertaken with the sole object of determining the incidence of the applicant’s liability. If the claims are not adverse to each other, any resolution of the competing claims on their merits will not occasion the outcome of determining the incidence of liability, and that defeats the purpose for which interpleader proceedings have been brought in the first place. I respectfully add that this view is also consistent with the reasoning of the High Court in Precious Shipping, where it held that the claims of the physical suppliers, none of which were founded upon a contractual right to be paid the price of the bunkers under the purchaser-seller contract, were not adverse to the sellers’ claims, which were simple claims for the contractual price for the bunkers due under those contracts (see Precious Shipping at [81]–[83]).
Whether the validity of the Release Instructions affects SATC’s liability for the escrow monies
- [63]
[63] I also disagree with SATC’s submission that this validity issue need only be determined on a prima facie basis, and that it sufficed for the court to find that the Release Instructions cannot be thrown out of hand, ie, that they are not inarguably non-compliant with the terms of the Escrow Agreement. The only consequence arising from such a finding is that the court cannot conclude that the Release Instructions are invalid and/or that SATC’s payment obligation under clause 1.4 of the Escrow Agreement has not been engaged. This, however, can only imply a possibility that SATC has become liable to pay out the escrow monies under the Escrow Agreement. That is not sufficient – for SATC to be entitled to interpleader relief, the court must be satisfied that SATC has become liable to pay the escrow monies under the Escrow Agreement. In any case, for the reasons I have explained earlier, the test of a prima facie case does not apply to the first condition precedent (existence of liability). Hence, even if SATC’s liability can be shown to exist on a prima facie basis, that is neither here nor there for the purposes of stage 1.
Are the conditions precedent for the grant of interpleader relief satisfied?
- [65]
[65] I now turn to consider stage 1 proper, which raises the following questions:
(a) First, what constitutes a valid Release Instruction for the purposes of clause 1.4 of the Escrow Agreement, and in the light of that, whether either or both of the Release Instructions are valid?
(b) If so, secondly, in the light of the arguments that AOPL and ATSB have respectively raised, whether there exist competing claims?
(c) If so, thirdly, whether these claims are adverse to each other?
Whether either or both of the Release Instructions are valid
- [66]
[66] To determine this issue, I have to consider what constitutes a valid Release Instruction for the purposes of clause 1.4 of the Escrow Agreement – in other words, what is a Release Instruction that is “substantially in the form” of Appendix 2 or Appendix 3 of the Escrow Agreement? The requirements of Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 of the Escrow Agreement, and the Release Instructions which AOPL and ATSB respectively issued, have been set out earlier (see [8]–[17] above).
- [67]
[67] AOPL submits that for a Release Instruction to be “substantially in the form”, it has to specify, as stated in para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 and para (a)(i) of Appendix 3, the relevant clause in the Services Agreement on which a party relies in issuing a Release Instruction and seeking payment of the escrow monies. Accordingly, the 6 Apr Release Instruction is invalid because it omitted entirely para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 and therefore failed to specify the clause in the Services Agreement that ATSB relied on for the drawdown. Counsel for AOPL fairly pointed out that, if I agreed with him on this submission, then the 7 Apr Release Instruction is similarly invalid because it also omitted para (a)(i) of Appendix 3 and did not specify the relevant clause in the Services Agreement on which AOPL relied for the drawdown. On the other hand, ATSB submits that a valid Release Instruction is one that contains “substantially what is set out or required in Appendix 2”, among other formal requirements specified in clause 1.4 of the Escrow Agreement. This, however, does not require para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 to be stated, and so the 6 Apr Release Instruction is valid. Counsel for ATSB submits that the words “delete one as appropriate” in the context of Appendix 2 means that the issuing party can just state either para (a)(i) of Appendix 2 or para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2, and so the omission of para (a)(ii) does not affect the validity of a Release Instruction based on Appendix 2. ATSB also places great emphasis on the fact that SATC had initially acknowledged the receipt of the 6 Apr Release Instructions and confirmed that it was making the necessary arrangements to effect payment of the escrow monies to ATSB. According to ATSB, this shows that SATC had been satisfied that the 6 Apr Release Instruction met the formal requirements under the Escrow Agreement.
- [68]
[68] Consistent with its position that the validity of the Release Instructions is not an issue arising for determination in deciding if SATC is entitled to interpleader relief, SATC also does not take a position on what constitutes a valid Release Instruction for the purposes of the Escrow Agreement. I have some difficulties with this. If SATC is coming to court seeking interpleader relief, surely it must be SATC’s position that its liability under the Escrow Agreement has been triggered, and correspondingly, that it has received a valid Release Instruction. That being the case, SATC should be able to – and indeed, ought to – take a position on what, in its view, constitutes a valid Release Instruction for the purposes of the Escrow Agreement. Of course, SATC’s subjective view of this matter would not per se be conclusive of what constitutes a valid Release Instruction under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, but at the very least, it would shed some light on the contractual intentions of the parties to the Escrow Agreement and in particular on what they perceive of the form that a Release Instruction that is “substantially in the form” of Appendix 2 or Appendix 3 should take.
- [69]
[69] In this case, it is not in dispute that, save for the part of para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 (in respect of the 6 Apr Release Instruction) and para (a)(i) of Appendix 3 (in respect of the 7 Apr Release Instruction), the Release Instructions are for all intents and purposes formally compliant with what is required under the Escrow Agreement. Accordingly, the only issue that has to be decided is whether a Release Instruction that is “substantially in the form” is one which requires the following: (a) first, para (a)(ii) of Appendix 2 or para (a)(i) of Appendix 3 be properly set out in a Release Instruction; and (b) secondly, the relevant clause (not clauses) of the Services Agreement pursuant to which the drawdown was made, the options relating to which are provided for in para (a)(ii) or para (a)(i) itself, also be specified in that field. In my judgment, this must be answered in the affirmative, for the two reasons that follow.
- [70]
[70] First, such an interpretation of “substantially in the form” is consistent with the objective of the Escrow Agreement and the commercial function undertaken by SATC as an escrow agent. As a starting point, I accept that the Escrow Agreement and the Services Agreement are independent and separate contracts. It is however important to recognise that the Escrow Agreement does not exist in abstract, and its performance is meant to facilitate the parties’ commercial relationship under the Services Agreement. SATC is obviously aware of the commercial relationship between ATSB and AOPL, pursuant to which the Escrow Agreement had been entered into and the escrow account set up – for example, recital (A) of the Escrow Agreement makes reference to the Services Agreement. SATC would therefore know that the deposit of monies into the escrow account by AOPL had taken place pursuant to the terms of the Services Agreement, and correspondingly, any withdrawal of monies from the escrow account, while strictly speaking governed by the terms of the Escrow Agreement, takes place in parallel with developments under the Services Agreement.
- [71]
[71] I also accept that SATC is not required to independently inquire into whether the underlying conditions in the Services Agreement have been met when deciding whether to act upon any Release Instructions it receives. SATC is entitled to assume, on the basis of a Release Instruction it has received, that the underlying conditions for drawdown in the Services Agreement have been met. This is provided for in clause 1.6 of the Escrow Agreement, which states that a party who issues a Release Instruction to draw down on the escrow account also “warrants, represents and undertakes” that the conditions of the Service Agreement have been met and that it is entitled under the terms of the Services Agreement to the drawdown. Similarly, there is nothing in clause 1.4 of the Escrow Agreement which requires SATC to scrutinise a Release Instruction it receives beyond the formal requirements set out in clause 1.4. Clause 1.17 makes this even clearer by specifying that, in respect of any payment made pursuant to a valid Release Instruction, it is “conclusively presumed” that the amounts paid are in fact due and payable to the relevant party and “in no circumstances” does SATC have an obligation to inquire into whether the amount paid is in fact due and payable. Indeed, it would appear that SATC has little time if any to make inquiries as to substance – clause 1.10 of the Services Agreement provides that the escrow agent will upon receipt of valid Release Instructions use reasonable endeavours to submit to the bank payment instructions “on the same day”.
- [72]
[72] However, it is one thing to say that the Escrow Agreement and Services Agreement are independent contracts and that SATC need make no independent inquiry with respect to the satisfaction of the conditions in Services Agreement, but quite another to also say that SATC, before acting on a Release Instruction received, need not be satisfied that the drawdown is taking place pursuant to the Services Agreement. This, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that SATC comes to be obliged to act on any drawdown, even if it had been initiated independently of developments relating to the Services Agreement. That will be a commercially absurd result because the Services Agreement is the very foundation of the Escrow Agreement’s existence.
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