High Court · Decided 15 June 2023
Guanghua SS Holdings Ltd v Lim Yew Cheng and another
Feedback & support[2023] SGHCR 7 · Case no. Originating Application No 302 of 2022 (Summons No 3123 of 2022)
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] This application raised both legal and evidential issues that required nuanced analysis. The first legal issue was the circumstances under which a claimant would have to first attempt to serve a notice of registration of a foreign judgment on a defendant out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service. This issue turned on the factual question of whether the Claimant knew or should have known that D1 was residing in Beijing in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) at the time SUM 2727 was made. The second legal issue was whether a notice of registration could be served by substituted service out of jurisdiction under the new Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), as the ROC 2021 was silent on this point.
- [3]
[3] After hearing the parties’ submissions, I dismissed D1’s application and provided my brief reasons orally. I now provide the full grounds of my decision.
Facts
The parties
- [4]
[4] The Claimant was a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. D1 and D2 were Singapore citizens. D2 was D1’s son. It was undisputed that, according to D1’s “People Profile” registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (“ACRA”), D1’s place of residence was at Gallop Road in Singapore (“Gallop Road Address”). D2’s place of residence was in the Balmoral Hills condominium in Singapore (“Balmoral Hills Address”).
Procedural history
The Hong Kong Suit
- [5]
[5] In Action No 1972 of 2020 (“HK Suit”), the Claimant brought a claim at the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance against the Defendants for liabilities arising from guarantees which the Defendants provided to the Claimant. On 15 June 2021, the Claimant applied for summary judgment against the Defendants. On 20 April 2022, the court delivered the HK Judgment and granted summary judgment in favour of the Claimant.
OA 302: The application to register the HK Judgment
- [7]
[7] As there were two defendants, two separate notices of registration were issued for each defendant: the notice of registration for D2 was dated 15 July 2022 (“D2 notice of registration”) while the Notice of Registration for D1 was dated 20 July 2022. I shall refer to the two notices of registration collectively as the “Notices of Registration”.
Attempts to personally serve D1
(a) on Wednesday, 20 July 2022, at or about 8.10pm, upon the process server’s arrival, he was informed by D1’s domestic helper that D1 was not in; and
(b) on Thursday, 21 July 2022, at or about 7.50pm, upon the process server’s arrival, he was informed by a Chinese woman claiming to be D1’s wife that D1 was in the PRC and she did not know when he would be back.
SUM 2718 and SUM 2727: The substituted service applications
- [10]
[10] On 22 July 2022, the Claimant filed Summons No 2718 of 2022 (“SUM 2718”) and SUM 2727 to serve the respective Notices of Registration on D2 and D1 respectively, as well as any other documents to be filed in OA 302 which were required to be served personally (collectively, the “Registration Papers”), by way of substituted service in the following methods:
(a) sending a copy of the Registration Papers (i) by registered post to the Hong Kong address of Sidley Austin LLP (“Sidley Austin HK”), who were the Defendants’ counsel in the HK Suit, and (ii) by email to Sidley Austin HK; or
(b) sending a copy of the Registration Papers by registered post to the Balmoral Hills Address and the Gallop Road Address.
SUM 3123: The present application to set aside the Registration Order
- [13]
[13] On 23 August 2022, D1 filed the present application pursuant to O 3 r 2(8) and O 60 r 9 of the ROC 2021 and s 5(1)(c) of REFJA.
- [14]
[14] Through the affidavits filed for the present application, it became known that D1 had been solely residing in the China World Hotel in Beijing since 8 February 2020, and that D1 had a lease with the China World Hotel which ran from 1 April 2018 to 1 April 2023. It was undisputed that the Claimant did not attempt to effect service on D1 in the PRC before attempting to personally serve on D1 at the Gallop Road Address or before making the application in SUM 2727.
The parties’ cases
Preliminary observations
- [18]
[18] Before delving into the issues proper, it first bears highlighting a few preliminary observations at the outset to set the context for this case.
(d) Test of “impracticality”: Fourth, O 7 r 7(1) of the ROC 2021 provided that, if a document was required to be served personally and it was “impractical to serve it personally, a party may apply to serve it by substituted service” [emphasis added]. While it was not clear from the text of the ROC 2021 that the test for substituted service under O 7 r 7 applied (as I shall explain at [44] below), both parties accepted and applied the test of “impracticality” under O 7 r 7(1) to determine if the Claimant was permitted to apply for substituted service in this case. Therefore, I also considered the application on this basis.
Issues to be determined
- [19]
[19] Bearing in mind the foregoing points, the parties’ submissions raised the following issues to be determined in this application.
- [20]
[20] I will first outline the applicable legal principles before turning to my analysis of the issues.
Applicable legal principles
Service requirements under the revoked Rules of Court
- [21]
[21] Before delving into the requirements of service under the ROC 2021, it was important to first consider the key requirements of service under the revoked Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”). This provided the context to consider the changes that had been effected by ROC 2021.
Personal service within Singapore (Order 10)
Substituted service within Singapore (O 62 r 5)
Service out of Singapore (Order 11)
- [24]
[24] Where a defendant had left Singapore before an originating process was issued against him, the plaintiff had to first seek leave under O 11 r 1 of the ROC 2014 to serve the originating process on the defendant out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service (see the High Court’s decision in Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665 (“Consistel”) at [30]). I shall refer to this as the “default rule in Consistel”. This default rule was subject to at least two exceptions: (a) when the defendant left the country in anticipation that legal proceedings will be initiated against him, and (b) when a defendant was constantly moving from country to country such that it was impossible to serve the document on him personally (Consistel at [35]). I shall refer to both of these situations as the “Consistel exceptions to service out”. The methods to serve a document out of jurisdiction were outlined in O 11 rr 3 and 4 of the ROC 2014 (see the High Court’s decision in Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v PT Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi TBK and another [2015] 4 SLR 625 (“Humpuss”) at [58]). Service out of jurisdiction must not be effected in a manner which was contrary to the law of the foreign country (O 11 r 3(2), ROC 2014).
Substituted service out of Singapore (O 11 r 3 and O 62 r 5)
- [25]
[25] However, where it was “impracticable for any reason” to serve a document personally on a defendant situated out of Singapore, the document may be served on the defendant by substituted service out of jurisdiction (Petroval SA v Stainby Overseas Ltd and others [2008] 3 SLR(R) 856 (“Petroval”) at [26]). Substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible under the ROC 2014 because O 11 r 3 (which sets out the alternative modes of service of originating process out of jurisdiction) explicitly stated that the provision on substituted service – O 62 r 5 – “shall apply in relation to the service of an originating process out of Singapore” [emphasis added]. In other words, it was expressly stated in the ROC 2014 that substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible.
- [26]
[26] Crucially, where a defendant had left Singapore before an originating process was issued against him, the plaintiff had to first seek leave to serve the originating process on the defendant out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service (Consistel at [30]). Substituted service out of Singapore must be effected in a manner which was in accordance with the law of the country in which service is effected (O 11 r 3(3), ROC 2014).
Order for registration and notice of registration (O 67 rr 5 and 7)
Service requirements under the ROC 2021
Service in Singapore (Order 7)
Substituted service within Singapore (O 7 r 7)
- [31]
[31] O 7 r 7 was the only provision in the ROC 2021 that governed substituted service. That provision provided:
- [34]
[34] The second noticeable difference between O 7 r 7 of ROC 2021 and O 62 r 5 of ROC 2014 was that the former used the test of “effectiveness” to determine if a method of substituted service should be permitted, as O 7 r 7(2) stated that the method of substituted service must be “effective in bringing the document to the notice of the person to be served” [emphasis added]. On the other hand, O 62 r 5(3) phrases the test more generally by stating substituted service of a document “is effected by taking such steps as the Court may direct to bring the document to the notice of the person to be served” [emphasis added]. Again, it did not appear that the tests were meant to be different in substance, and neither party contended otherwise.
Service out of Singapore (Order 8)
- [35]
[35] Under O 8 r 1(1) of the ROC 2021, service of an originating process or other court document out of Singapore may only be permitted if the court’s prior approval had been given:
- [36]
[36] O 8 r 2 outlined the general methods of service out of Singapore that may apply regardless of the foreign jurisdiction the defendant was situated in, as follows:
Substituted service out of Singapore
- [37]
[37] The next question was whether substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible under the ROC 2021. As alluded to earlier, the text of the ROC 2021 did not clearly permit this, unlike ROC 2014. None of the provisions in O 8 rr 1–8 of the ROC 2021 provided for substituted service. Unlike the ROC 2014 (see [25] above), none of the provisions in O 8 rr 1 to 8 of the ROC 2021 expressly stated that the provision on substituted service – O 7 r 7 – “shall apply” to service out of jurisdiction. Consequently, on the face of the text of Orders 7 and 8 of the ROC 2021, O 7 r 7 did not seem to apply to service out of jurisdiction.
- [38]
[38] On 21 October 2022, which was after the parties had filed their written submissions in this case, Lee Seiu Kin J delivered His Honour’s grounds of decision in Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264 (“Janesh”). In that case, Lee J held that substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible under the ROC 2021. Lee J’s reasons may be summarised as follows.
(a) First, O 8 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021, which outlined the methods of service out of jurisdiction, did not prescribe a closed list as to how service of a document could be effected out of Singapore, given that, first, O 8 r 2(1) omitted the use of imperative language, and merely stated that service “may” be effected out of Singapore “in the following manner”; and, second, the word “or” was not used between O 8 r 2(1)(e) and O 8 r 2(1)(f), unlike other provisions of the ROC 2021 such as O 6 r 1(3) (Janesh at [87] and [88]). This line of reasoning suggested that the court in Janesh considered that substituted service out of jurisdiction flowed from O 8 r 2(1), and not O 7 r 7. I will return to this point later at [44] below.
(b) Second, the ROC 2021 “was not intended to drastically change the regime relating to jurisdiction in general” or the regime relating to “the service of originating processes or other court documents out of Singapore”. Rather, “the intention was to simplify things, for example, by obviating the need for a claimant to scrutinise a list of cases in which service out of Singapore is permissible” (Janesh at [89]). This was evident from the observations made by the drafters of the ROC 2021 in the CJC Report, which stated:
The power of the court to allow substituted service out of jurisdiction was “one of considerable vintage”, having been expressed in O 62 r 5 of the ROC 2014. If “the drafters of ROC 2021 had intended to curtail the court’s power in such a radical fashion, there would have been express and specific language to that effect” (Janesh at [90]).
- [39]
[39] As such, following Janesh, substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible under O 8 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021. Following Consistel, where a defendant had left Singapore before the originating process was issued, a claimant would have to first seek permission to serve the originating process out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service out of jurisdiction.
Order for registration and notice of registration (O 60 rr 5 and 7)
- [43]
[43] Service of a notice of registration out of Singapore is “permissible without permission” (O 60 r 7(2), ROC 2021).
Does O 7 r 7 apply to substituted service out of jurisdiction under O 8 r 2(1)?
(a) First, did the test of “impracticality” under O 7 r 7(1) apply to determine if substituted service out of jurisdiction under O 8 r 2(1) should be allowed?
(b) Second, did the test of “effectiveness” under O 7 r 7(2) of the ROC 2021 apply to determine the method of substituted service out of jurisdiction under O 8 r 2(1)?
(c) Third, did the requirement to “apply” for the court’s permission under O 7 r 7(1) apply to a party seeking to serve a notice of registration by substituted service out of jurisdiction under O 60 r 7(2) of the ROC 2021, even though O 60 r 7(2) of the ROC 2021 stated that service of a notice of registration out of Singapore is “permissible without permission” [emphasis added] and that the methods to serve the notice of registration out of jurisdiction were found in O 8 r 2(1)?
- [45]
[45] There was no need for me to reach a firm view in this case.
(a) Regarding the test of impracticality under O 7 r 7(1), both parties in this case applied this test to the present application. Therefore, I need not say anymore about this issue and proceeded on this basis.
Summary of applicable principles under the ROC 2021
(b) Service of notice of registration in Singapore: On the other hand, a notice of registration must be “served personally” on the judgment debtor “unless the Court otherwise orders” (O 60 r 7(1), ROC 2021) (see [42] above). This meant that a notice of registration may be served by way of substituted service within Singapore.
- [47]
[47] Having set out the applicable statutory framework and legal principles, I now turn to the issues raised by the parties’ submissions.
Issue 1: Should the Substituted Service Order be set aside?
Sub-Issue 1: Did the Claimant need to attempt to serve the Notice of Registration on D1 personally in the PRC before resorting to substituted service?
Parties’ submissions
- [50]
[50] On the other hand, the Claimant submitted that it had proved that it was “impractical” to serve D1 personally in the PRC. At the time when SUM 2727 was made, although the Claimant knew that D1 spent a significant time in Beijing and that D1 would stay in the China World Hotel when D1 was there, the Claimant did not know the exact whereabouts of D1’s residence in Beijing, including which specific room in the China World Hotel D1 stayed in, or even when and for how long D1 would be in the PRC. The Claimant relied on the following facts for this submission. First, D1 was an international businessman who appeared to maintain dual residence in Singapore and the PRC. Second, the China World Hotel was, by its nature as a hotel, an impermanent and temporary address. There was also no way for the Claimant to find out the specific room in the hotel which D1 stayed in. Third, D1 had provided at least two other addresses as his address in other official documents. Fourth, D1’s visa in the PRC appeared to be temporary.
- [51]
[51] To consider whether it was justified for the Claimant not to attempt service out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service, a careful scrutiny of the evidence needed to be undertaken. After having done so, I found that the Claimant’s submission was supported by the evidence.
Did the Claimant know that D1 resided solely in the PRC?
- [52]
[52] The first important point to note was that the court had to consider what the Claimant knew or would have known had it made the proper enquiries at the time when SUM 2727 was made, not what the evidence showed by the time the present application was heard before me. In this regard, the Claimant’s affidavit filed in support of SUM 2727 stated as follows:
- [53]
[53] The Claimant’s explanation in the affidavit filed in support of SUM 2727 showed that the following key facts were what were known to the Claimant at the time SUM 2727 was made.
(b) Second, it was also undisputed that, when the Claimant’s process server sought to effect personal service on D1’s registered residential address in Singapore, neither D1’s domestic helper nor his wife informed the process server that D1 did not reside there or had moved to the PRC or overseas. Rather, D1’s domestic helper informed that D1 was not in, while D1’s wife informed that, while D1 was in the PRC (on 21 July 2022), she was unsure when he would be back in Singapore (see [9] above).
(c) Third, D1’s registered residential address in Singapore was also where his family – his wife – resided in.
(d) Fourth, whenever D1 was in the PRC, he would stay at a hotel (the China World Hotel).
(e) Fifth, while the Claimant knew that D1 “spent significant time in the PRC, during which he would stay at [the] China World Hotel”, and “may [thus] be located there” [emphasis added], the Claimant did not know where D1’s specific place of residence in the PRC was (or which room in the China World Hotel D1 stayed in, if he was staying there), how long he will continue to be in the PRC, and when he will return to Singapore.
(f) Sixth, there was no way for the Claimant to find out D1’s specific place of residence in the PRC, including which specific room in the China World Hotel he stayed in.
- [54]
[54] The foregoing facts led to the clear conclusion that, based on the objective evidence, what the Claimant knew or would have known at the time SUM 2727 was made was that D1’s main place of residence appeared to be in Singapore, although D1 would also spend significant time in the PRC. I agreed with the Claimant’s counsel, Mr Jason Teo (“Mr Teo”), that the objective evidence showed the Claimant that D1 seemed to maintain dual residence in Singapore and the PRC. This was because D1’s official registered address was the Gallop Road Address in Singapore, and D1’s wife also resided there. D1’s wife and domestic helper also did not inform the Claimant’s process server that D1 did not stay in the Gallop Road Address or that he had moved to the PRC. The fact that D1 stayed in a hotel whenever he was in the PRC would have also reinforced the inference that D1’s residence in the PRC was temporary, subject to possible change at any time, and that his main place of residence was in accordance with what he registered with ACRA in his People Profile – the Gallop Road Address.
- [55]
[55] Second, in addition to the foregoing facts that were disclosed in SUM 2727, the additional facts highlighted by Mr Teo further bolstered the conclusion that D1 seemed to be constantly moving between Singapore and the PRC, and did not seem to have a permanent place of residence in the PRC.
(a) First, D1 had provided at least two other addresses in his official documents. D1 did not provide the China World Hotel as his address in the contracts underlying the dispute in the HK Suit. Instead, in these contracts, D1 provided a “c/o” address in Guangzhou as his address. Separately, in the HK Suit, D1 stated yet another different address in Beijing (in Hanwei Plaza) in his affidavits.
(b) Second, according to D1’s own registration document with the China World Hotel, D1’s visa type in the PRC also did not appear to be long term as it was stated to be “valid until” only 7 October 2022. Tellingly, this same registration document even stated the Gallop Road Address as D1’s address.
- [56]
[56] In these circumstances, it was permissible for the Claimant to first attempt to serve D1 personally in Singapore, and then apply for substituted service within and out of Singapore, because the circumstances of the case would have led the Claimant to the conclusion that D1 was constantly moving from country to country such that it was impossible to serve the Notice of Registration on D1 personally. This was one of the two Consistel exceptions to service out (see [24] above).
- [57]
[57] This exception also made complete sense when applied to the unique facts of this case. It was undisputed that, if D1 was to be served in the PRC, that would have to be done via O 8 r 2(1)(b) of the ROC 2021, that is, according to manner provided by the Civil Procedure Convention governing service in the PRC (which was the Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters between the PRC and the Republic of Singapore (“Sino-Singapore Treaty”)). There were two ways to effect service under the Sino-Singapore Treaty, namely, by:
(a) a Request for Service in the form specified by the Sino-Singapore Treaty by the Supreme Court of Singapore to the Ministry of Justice of the PRC, which will, after its review, effect service through the PRC court system according to the applicable internal laws of the PRC; or
(b) service made by the Singapore Embassy in Beijing to D1 at his residence in Beijing.
- [58]
[58] However, I agreed with the Claimant that there were at least two difficulties with this in this case.
(a) First, the Claimant did not know the specific room in the China World Hotel where D1 stayed in. As the Claimant pointed out in its affidavit, this was a critical requirement for both methods of service under the Sino-Singapore Treaty, because they would require the Claimant to state the complete address of the party to be served in the PRC in the respective specified forms. If the address was incomplete, service will not be effected. This was plain from Article 8 of the Sino-Singapore Treaty:
(b) Second, and more importantly, service under the Sino-Singapore Treaty might take several months before the documents were actually served on D1. Bearing in mind the key facts highlighted at [53] above, it would have been completely impractical to serve D1 in the PRC when he had so many different addresses (even within the PRC itself) and it was unclear for how long he would stay in the China World Hotel. While D1 sought to submit that his residence in the China World Hotel was not temporary, it was very telling that his lease with the China World Hotel began from 1 April 2018, but D1 had, on his own evidence, only been residing exclusively in the PRC since 8 February 2020. In other words, for almost two years from 1 April 2018 to 7 February 2020, D1 did not always reside in the PRC. This amply showed that he constantly moved from place to place (between Singapore and the PRC, and, even within the PRC, among different addresses), and explained why he had registered and used so many different addresses. Consequently, even if the Claimant somehow discovered D1’s specific room number in the China World Hotel, by the time service was attempted on D1 via the method under the Sino-Singapore Treaty months later, D1 might not even have been living there in the specific hotel room anymore.
D1’s meetings with the Claimant’s representative in the PRC
- [60]
[60] To this, Mr Teo made the following submissions:
(a) The mere fact that D1 and Mr Liu regularly met in Beijing and in the café of the hotel where D1 was residing in would only have led the Claimant to the inference that he was residing in the PRC at the times when they met; it would not have reasonably led the Claimant to the inference that D1, who was an international businessman, had fully moved to the PRC since February 2020 and was solely residing there.
(b) Even though D1 and Mr Liu regularly met, it would have been impractical to require Mr Liu – or even any other one of the Claimant’s representatives – to directly ask D1 for his room number, because this would either give D1 advanced notice that the Claimant intended to effect service on D1 (and thus risk D1 moving so as to avoid being served) or it would have required the Claimant to deceive D1 as to the purpose for enquiring about D1’s hotel room number. The Claimant submitted that such deception should not be the standard of behaviour that should be expected of applicants for substituted service.
(b) If the initial attempts to serve personally at a defendant’s last known address failed because the defendant was momentarily and coincidentally not at the address during the attempts to serve personally, the ROC 2021 and SupCt PD 2021 did not require the applicant to prove that he had attempted to ask the defendant for a time when the defendant will be available at the address to be served.
- [62]
[62] The foregoing positions were not novel, as the same procedures existed under paras 33(2) and 33(6) of the SupCt PD 2013 (to be read with the ROC 2014). Therefore, it was simply not a requirement that the Claimant had to directly ask D1 what his room number in the China World Hotel was, or whether he was residing in the PRC on a non-temporary basis, such that he could be served there. Had that been the case, I agreed with the Claimant that it would have risked D1 leaving and moving to a different address to delay being served. This was a real possibility in this case, bearing in mind that the objective evidence showed that D1 himself had at least one other address in Beijing in Hanwei Plaza (see [55(a)] above). Thus, I was unable to agree with D1 that the mere fact that he had been regularly meeting Mr Liu in Beijing meant that the Claimant knew or should have known D1’s address in Beijing or that he was solely residing in Beijing.
Delivery of mooncakes to China World Hotel
- [63]
[63] D1 also relied on the fact that the Claimant had been delivering mooncakes to the China World Hotel for D1 annually. The Claimant’s evidence was that the mooncakes were arranged by the Claimant to be delivered by a courier to the concierge of the China World Hotel. The hotel made its own arrangements to deliver the mooncakes to D1’s room.
- [64]
[64] The affidavits filed by the parties clearly showed that the Claimant did not know the room number of D1 in the China World Hotel. The Claimant fully disclosed in SUM 2727 that it knew that, when D1 stayed in the PRC, D1 would stay in the China World Hotel (see [52] above). Therefore, the mere fact that the Claimant had been sending mooncakes to D1 annually at the China World Hotel address did not assist D1.
Caselaw relied upon by D1
- [65]
[65] I next turn to the caselaw relied upon by D1. As aforementioned at [51] above, D1 relied on Consistel to submit that the Claimant should have attempted to serve D1 in the PRC first before resorting to substituted service. However, as aforementioned at [56] above, one of the Consistel exceptions to service out applied in this case. Furthermore, Consistel could be distinguished from the present case. In Consistel, the first respondent was a Singapore citizen whose registered address on his NRIC was in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) (Consistel at [4]). The second respondent was the first respondent’s wife who was a Singapore permanent resident. When the appellants attempted to serve the writ of summons personally on the respondents, the attempts were made at a flat in Singapore (the “Flat”) which did not even belong to the respondents or their family members, but instead belonged to the respondents’ friend (Consistel at [13]), and where the respondents would only stay at whenever they were in Singapore (Consistel at [6]). When the attempts of personal service were made, there was no response on the first attempt when the process server knocked on the door of the Flat (Consistel at [7]). On the second attempt, the respondents’ friend informed that the respondents did not reside at the Flat (Consistel at [8]). All these facts would have clearly led the appellants in Consistel to the conclusion that the respondents in that case did not reside in Singapore, and that they resided in the UAE.
- [67]
[67] D1 also relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd and another appeal [2014] 3 SLR 381 (“Burgundy”) to submit that substituted service should not be effected within one jurisdiction as a shortcut to serve documents on a defendant who resided in another jurisdiction. However, Burgundy could also be distinguished. In that case, one of the issues before the court was whether leave should be granted to serve examination of judgment debtor (“EJD”) documents on the directors of a Philippines company out of jurisdiction. In that case, the company directors were resident in the Philippines and were not party to the main Suit (which was between the Philippines company and another company that was listed on the New York Stock Exchange). The further question which the court had to consider was whether the documents could be served on the company directors by substituted service on the company’s lawyers in Singapore. D1 relied on the Court of Appeal’s observation that “upholding this novel mode of substituted service could pave the way for parties to use this as a shortcut to serve documents on foreign persons who hold senior positions in a company by serving the documents on the company’s lawyers instead” (Burgundy at [115]).
- [70]
[70] D1 also cited various English cases for the proposition that substituted service was the exception rather than the norm, especially when there was a bilateral convention between the originating jurisdiction and the foreign country where service was to be effected. These cases which D1 cited were Cecil and others v Bayat and others [2011] 1 WLR 3086, Knauf UK GmbH v British Gypsum Ltd and another [2002] 1 WLR 907, and Marashen Ltd v Kenvett Ltd (Ivanchenko, third party) [2018] 1 WLR 288. None of these cases dealt with the situation in this case where one of the Consistel exceptions to service out applied. Consequently, I found that these cases did not assist D1.
Conclusion
Sub-Issue 2: Did the Substituted Service Order provide an impermissible “shortcut” to circumvent O 8 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021?
- [74]
[74] The only substantive difference between the provisions on service under the ROC 2014 and the ROC 2021 was that, under the ROC 2021, the provision on the methods of service out of jurisdiction (O 8 r 2(1), ROC 2021) did not expressly state that the provision on substituted service (O 7 r 7, ROC 2021) “shall apply” in relation to service out of jurisdiction. Therefore, O 8 r 2(1) was silent on whether a defendant could be served out of jurisdiction by way of substituted service. On the other hand, under the ROC 2014, the provision on the methods of service out of jurisdiction (O 11 r 3(1), ROC 2014) did expressly state that the provision on substituted service (O 62 r 5, ROC 2014) “shall apply”.
Sub-Issue 3: Was there a lack of full and frank disclosure of all material facts in SUM 2727?
Parties’ submissions
- [78]
[78] The crux of D1’s submission here is that the Claimant did not disclose the following three facts:
(a) D1 had been solely resident in the PRC since February 2020;
(b) Mr Liu was regularly meeting D1, including at the Aria Café in the China World Hotel, and the Claimant had been delivering mooncakes to the China World Hotel for D1; and
- [79]
[79] The pertinent facts that the Claimant disclosed in its supporting affidavit in SUM 2727 have been extracted at [52] above. The Claimant submitted that it did not breach its duty of full and frank disclosure, as it had made it clear to the court that D1 may be located in the PRC.
Applicable legal principles
- [80]
[80] SUM 2727 was an application “without notice” (which was known as an “ex parte” application under the ROC 2014), as it did not need to be served on anyone (O 1 r 3(1), ROC 2021). It was trite that, in any application without notice, the applicant had a duty to give full and frank disclosure of all material facts known to him and those facts which he would have known had he made proper inquiries. “Material facts” were those that were material for the court to know in dealing with the application, and the extent of the inquiries depended on the facts and circumstances of the case (Tay Long Kee Impex Pte Ltd v Tan Beng Huwah (trading as Sin Kwang Wah) [2000] 1 SLR(R) 786 (“Tay Long Kee Impex”) at [21]).
Analysis
- [82]
[82] Regarding the first fact at [78(a)] above, besides bare assertions on affidavit, D1 had not proved why the Claimant knew or would have known that D1 had been solely resident in the PRC. Instead, as I had already found, the evidence supported the Claimant’s assertions that, at the time SUM 2727 was made, it did not know D1’s exact whereabouts and for how long D1 would remain in the PRC.
- [83]
[83] It also followed that the second fact at [78(b)] above was not a material fact that needed to be disclosed. This was because the fact that D1 and Mr Liu had been meeting in Beijing did not mean that Mr Liu knew that D1 was fully resident in the PRC when SUM 2727 was filed, or D1’s room number in the China World Hotel.
Summary of findings
(d) The Claimant did not breach its duty to give full and frank disclosure of all material facts in SUM 2727.
Issue 2: Was the Notice of Registration validly served in accordance with PRC law?
Parties’ submissions
Applicable legal principles
- [92]
[92] In determining whether a method of service was contrary to the laws of the relevant foreign country, an important distinction was to be drawn between a manner of service not specifically provided for by foreign law and service which was positively contrary to foreign law. The former would not be contrary to the law of the foreign jurisdiction at all (Humpuss at [86]). Accordingly, in Humpuss, Steven Chong J (as His Honour then was) found that the fact that there were no laws governing the service of foreign originating processes on Indonesian individuals or legal entities in Indonesia was fatal to the defendant’s case that service of the foreign process had to be carried out by the Indonesian court bailiff. As a result, service of the writ by private means at the defendants’ registered address in Indonesia was permissible (Humpuss at [71]–[72]). Similarly, in Petroval at [26], Tay Yong Kwang J (as His Honour then was) observed that the pertinent question in that case was whether Swiss law prohibited service “outside [Switzerland] on Swiss residents”.
Analysis
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