High Court · Decided 9 April 2024
Sundar Venkatachalam v Bharathi d/o Subbiah (Official Assignee, non-party)
Feedback & support[2024] SGHCR 6 · Case no. Bankruptcy No 222 of 2023 · 48 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [3]
[3] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I dismiss the defendant’s application for the following reasons.
Factual background and procedural history
The parties
- [4]
[4] The claimant creditor, Mr Sundar Venkatachalam, is an Indian national.
- [5]
[5] The defendant debtor, Ms Bharathi d/o Subbiah, is a Singapore citizen. The defendant is the secretary of Sareka F&B Trading Pte Ltd (“Sareka F&B”), a company in the business of operating restaurants and catering. One Mr Karuppaiah s/o Shamugam Pillai @ Balasubbu s/o Shamugam Pillai (“Mr Karuppaiah”) is the director of Sareka F&B.
- [6]
[6] It is apposite to set out briefly the background leading to the present application.
The judgment debt
- [7]
[7] On 9 July 2022, the claimant commenced an action against Sareka F&B, the defendant and Mr Karuppaiah vide MC/OC 1291/2022 (“OC 1291”).
- [8]
[8] In OC 1291, the claimant alleged that the defendants therein had failed to honour their contractual obligations pursuant to an investment agreement and personal guarantee dated 25 July 2019 (the “Agreement”). Under the terms of the Agreement, the claimant agreed to invest $30,000 in Sareka F&B. In return, Sareka F&B was to pay the claimant $2,250 per month for 24 months for an aggregate sum of $54,000 and the defendant and Mr Karuppaiah, being personal guarantors of the payments, would be personally liable for any default in Sareka F&B’s payments. However, Sareka F&B made only two monthly payments totalling $4,500.
- [9]
[9] On 15 July 2022, the claimant’s process server personally served a copy of OC 1291 and the accompanying Statement of Claim on the defendants to OC 1291. In particular, these documents were served personally on the defendant at her registered address (the “Residential Address”).
- [10]
[10] On 2 August 2022, the defendants to OC 1291 having failed to file and serve a Notice of Intention to Contest or Not Contest the Originating Claim, the claimant applied for and was granted judgment in default against the defendants in the following terms vide MC/JUD 3596/2022 (“JUD 3596”):
- [11]
[11] On 7 August 2022, a few days after JUD 3596 had been granted, Mr Mohan Singh s/o Gurdial Singh of Messrs S K Kumar Law Practice LLP (“S K Kumar LLP”) filed a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor to act for the defendant in OC 1291. No application was taken to set aside JUD 3596.
The bankruptcy proceedings
- [12]
[12] On 9 October 2022, the claimant’s process server attended at the defendant’s Residential Address and attempted to serve a statutory demand based on the judgment debt arising out of JUD 3596 (the “Statutory Demand”). Upon arrival, the process server was informed by an individual who identified herself as the defendant’s roommate that the defendant was not presently in and instead directed the process server to a separate address where the defendant was purportedly working (the “Office Address”). The process server thereafter attended at the Office Address and personally served the Statutory Demand on the defendant. There was no response forthcoming from the defendant after.
- [13]
[13] On 25 January 2023, the claimant proceeded to file HC/B 222/2023 (the “Bankruptcy Application”), seeking for the defendant to be made a bankrupt.
- [14]
[14] On 6 February 2023, the claimant’s process server attended at the defendant’s Office Address and personally served on the defendant a sealed copy of the Bankruptcy Application together with a copy of the affidavit supporting the Bankruptcy Application. The Affidavit of Non-Satisfaction filed on 20 February 2023 stated that the debt due and owing by the defendant to the claimant as of the date of the Bankruptcy Application (ie, 25 January 2023) was $52,283.54, which remained wholly unsatisfied. This sum was in turn premised on the judgment debt arising out of JUD 3596, as stated at [12] above.
- [15]
[15] At the first hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 23 February 2023, the defendant was absent and unrepresented by counsel. Counsel for the claimant informed the court that the virtual hearing details for the hearing had been sent to the defendant by way of Certificate of Posting on 16 February 2023 to the defendant’s Office Address. That being the first hearing, the learned Assistant Registrar (“AR”) adjourned the Bankruptcy Application to 9 March 2023 and directed the claimant to personally serve the Form of Notice of Adjournment on the defendant by personal service by no later than 2 March 2023.
- [16]
[16] On 7 March 2023, Mr Manickavasagam s/o R M Karuppiah Pillai (“Mr Manickavasagam”) of Manicka & Co filed a Notice of Appointment of Solicitor to act for defendant in the Bankruptcy Application.
- [18]
[18] On 22 March 2023, the eve of the third hearing of the Bankruptcy Application, the defendant took out an application vide HC/SUM 803/2022 (“SUM 803”) seeking (a) an extension of time to set aside the Statutory Demand; and (b) for the Statutory Demand to be set aside accordingly. The affidavit filed by the defendant in support of SUM 803 stated that S K Kumar LLP did not inform her of the status of OC 1291 and that this only came to her attention when she received the Statutory Demand on 9 October 2022. Further, the affidavit in support of SUM 703 stated that the claimant had “no legal basis as this was an investment agreement whereby due to the poor business climate due to the Covid 19 situation the business (Sareka F&B Trading Pte Ltd) failed”. Although not specifically mentioned, this was presumably a reference to the Agreement (see [8] above).
- [21]
[21] At the fourth hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 27 April 2023, Mr Manickavasagam updated the court that SUM 803 had been withdrawn. He stated that he had been “instructed to ask for DRS” as the defendant “qualifies for DRS”. The AR thus adjourned the Bankruptcy Application for the department of the Official Assignee to consider the defendant’s suitability for the Debt Repayment Scheme (“DRS”). I shall as shorthand, refer to department of the Official Assignee, which is part of the broader Ministry of Law’s Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office, as the Official Assignee.
- [22]
[22] By way of a letter dated 9 October 2023, the Official Assignee determined the defendant to be unsuitable for the DRS (the “Notice of Unsuitability”). The reason given for such determination was that the defendant had failed to file her Statement of Affairs, Income & Expenditure Statement, as well as the Debt Repayment Proposal “despite reminders and is deemed to be not interested in DRS”. The “Chronology of Correspondence” annexed to the letter sets out the events leading up to the Official Assignee’s issuance of the Notice of Unsuitability as follows:
(a) On 28 April 2023, the Official Assignee sent a notice to the defendant at the Residential Address to file her Statement of Affairs.
(b) On 26 May 2023, the Official Assignee sent another reminder to the defendant to file her Statement of Affairs.
(c) On 22 September 2023, the Official Assignee sent a final reminder to the defendant to file her Statement of Affairs, along with a pre-unsuitability letter.
- [23]
[23] At the fifth hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 12 October 2023, Mr Manickavasagam sought an adjournment of two weeks. It bears reproducing the request made by Mr Manickavasagam as set out in the Certified Transcript of the hearing, the significance of which I shall elaborate on below:
The defendant takes out the present application
- [24]
[24] On 25 October 2023, the defendant took out the present application vide HC/SUM 3297/2023, seeking the following orders:
(b) that costs of the application be provided for by Manicka & Co to the defendant due to its negligence as a former solicitor for the defendant.
- [26]
[26] At the first hearing of the application before me on 1 December 2023, Mr Manickavasagam sought permission to file an affidavit to address the allegations levied against him in the defendant’s affidavit. I explained to the defendant, who was acting in person, that owing to the allegations made in her affidavits, she could have been understood to have impliedly waived her legal privilege with Manicka & Co, such that Mr Manickavasagam may conceivably disclose instructions, communications and other documents pertaining to the Bankruptcy Application. She acknowledged this and had no objections to Mr Manickavasagam filing a reply affidavit. I therefore granted permission for Mr Manickavasagam to file an affidavit, as well as for the claimant and the defendant to file further affidavits in reply, should they choose to do so. Mr Jeffrey Yip (“Mr Yip”), who appeared on behalf of the Official Assignee, confirmed that the Official Assignee would be taking no position on the present application, highlighting that it had filed an affidavit to assist the court by providing a chronology of the Official Assignee’s correspondence with the defendant leading up to the issuance of the Notice of Unsuitability for the DRS (see [22] above).
- [27]
[27] The second hearing of the application proceeded on 16 February 2024 with the defendant, Mr Ang, Mr Manickavasagam and Mr Yip addressing the court. I reserved judgment.
The parties’ arguments
- [28]
[28] I begin by summarising the parties’ respective arguments.
- [29]
[29] The defendant’s affidavit in support of the present application was somewhat meandering, but at the very least, the following core points may be gathered:
(a) Sometime in August 2022, the defendant had been referred to S K Kumar LLP to obtain representation for among other matters, OC 1291. At S K Kumar LLP’s office, she then met one Mr Joseph Fernandez (“Mr Fernandez”), whom she assumed was either part of the legal team at or at least employed by S K Kumar LLP. She shared information with him on the legal matters she intended for Mr S K Kumar to handle on her behalf and exchanged numbers with Mr Fernandez as he had assured her that if Mr S K Kumar was unavailable, she could contact him directly with regard to her legal matters.
(b) The defendant was unable to get hold of Mr S K Kumar and subsequently corresponded with Mr Fernandez to seek an update on her pending cases, to which Mr Fernandez informed her that (i) he was not in the employ of S K Kumar LLP; (ii) Mr S K Kumar had been disbarred and would not be able to act for her; and (iii) he would introduce her to Mr Manickavasagam to handle her various legal matters, which later included the Bankruptcy Application. Thereafter, Mr Fernandez informed her through a telephone conversation that he would get Manicka & Co to take over her pending cases from S K Kumar LLP and that he would be forwarding her case files to Mr Manickavasagam.
(c) Mr Fernandez acted like a representative from Manicka & Co and the defendant corresponded through him rather than directly to Mr Manickavasagam. Mr Fernandez attended to the defendant’s queries, answered her calls, and received direct payments from her but did not issue any receipts for such payment. She was misled to believe that Mr Fernandez would assist and handle her legal matters based on trust and his assurances whenever she called him for an update on the proceedings.
(d) The defendant had never met with Mr Manickavasagam in person, did not sign any warrant to act or letter of engagement with Manicka & Co and did not receive any legal advice or updates on the status of the Bankruptcy Application. Mr Manickavasagam therefore acted negligently.
(e) The defendant did not receive any letters, emails or any form of correspondence, including telephone calls from the Official Assignee either at her Residential Address, her email address or to her mobile number at any time.
- [32]
[32] Mr Manickavasagam seeks to disabuse the notion that he acted negligently in his conduct of the Bankruptcy Application. He says that at all times, he had obtained instructions from the defendant through Mr Fernandez. This is because Mr Fernandez had informed him that the defendant should not be disturbed. Mr Manickavasagam studied the defendant’s case and informed Mr Fernandez that she was eligible for the DRS and should be able to be placed on the DRS. His only mandate, as communicated to him by Mr Fernandez, was to place the defendant on the DRS. And he did so: once the defendant had been referred to the Official Assignee to determine her suitability for the DRS, he no longer had control over the matter as it would be the Official Assignee corresponding with the defendant and not him. Further, despite his request to the defendant to attend the hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 12 October 2023, she chose not to attend to persuade the court to grant an adjournment.
- [33]
[33] The Official Assignee takes no position on the present application (see [26] above).
My decision
Is there is a free-standing power to set aside a bankruptcy order?
- [37]
[37] The starting point must be the IRDA, which is omnibus legislation that is the source of the court’s insolvency jurisdiction. The IRDA, which came into effect on 30 July 2020, consolidated personal and corporate insolvency laws into a single statute. Senior Minister of State for Law, Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai explained the objective of the IRDA as follows (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report 1 October 2018) vol 94):
- [38]
[38] Under s 3 of the IRDA, the General Division of the High Court is conferred jurisdiction in corporate insolvency, winding up, individual insolvency and bankruptcy matters. In turn, s 5(a) read with s 2 of the IRDA provides that the Registrar of the Supreme Court, which “includes a Deputy Registrar or an Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court”, has all the powers and jurisdiction of the General Division of the High Court. Hence, bankruptcy applications, which are governed by the provisions contained in Part 16 of the IRDA, are generally heard by ARs at first instance.
- [41]
[41] However, the Rules do not generally apply to proceedings under the IRDA, pursuant to the First Column of O 1 r 2(11) of the Rules. The Third Column of O 1 r 2(11) of the Rules specifies that only O 25 r 6 (which concerns hearing fees payable for winding up applications), O 28 (which concerns the electronic filing service) and Parts 3 and 4 of the Fourth Schedule read with O 25 of the Rules (which concerns service provision and search fees) shall continue to apply to proceedings under the IRDA. In addition, O 1 r 2(12) of the Rules preserves the applicability of the appellate procedure and mechanisms of the Rules to proceedings under the IRDA (ie, O 18 and O 19 of the Rules, as may be applicable). Hence, the broad powers granted to the court under O 3 r 2(8) are not applicable to proceedings under the IRDA, although certain grounds under the common law that mirror these grounds may continue to be applicable, as explained below.
- [42]
[42] Accordingly, what is clear is that the following statutory avenues are available to an aggrieved debtor who has been adjudged a bankrupt:
The applicable legal principles in an annulment application
- [54]
[54] The relevant ground to consider, for present purposes, is s 392(1)(a) of the IRDA. This involves a two-step assessment (Tang Yong Kiat Rickie v Singesinga Sdn Bhd (transferee to part of the assets of United Merchant Finance Bhd) and others [2014] SGHCR 6 (“Tang Yong Kiat Rickie”) at [13]):
The onus lies on the bankrupt to satisfy the court that he or she ought not to have been made a bankrupt (Kala Anandarajah et al, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths Asia, 1999) (“Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia”) at p 399, citing Re Amos William Dawe [1980] 1 MLJ 200).
The bankruptcy order was properly made
- [60]
[60] I turn then to the two key contentions raised by the defendant, as highlighted at [30] above, as the basis for the present application. Neither in my view, pass muster.
The defendant’s application to set aside the Statutory Demand in SUM 803 was bound to fail
- [61]
[61] The first plank of the defendant’s complaint is that she did not give any instructions to Mr Manickavasagam to file and withdraw SUM 803.
(b) More salient is the latter argument, because implicit in it is the suggestion that had SUM 803 not been withdrawn, there would have been a possibility that the Statutory Demand underpinning the Bankruptcy Application would have been set aside. The defendant might therefore have entirely avoided the prospect of being adjudged a bankrupt. I put to one side the contradiction inherent in this argument, in so far as the defendant’s complaint appears to take umbrage with the withdrawal of an application that she claims she had never authorised in the first place.
- [63]
[63] With due respect, I bear considerable misgivings as to the veracity of Mr Manickavasagam’s explanation. There is no contemporaneous documentary evidence to support Mr Manickavasagam’s assertion that Mr Fernandez in fact gave him such an instruction. But more telling is the manner in which Mr Manickavasagam conducted himself at the hearing of SUM 803 on 26 April 2023. The Certified Transcript of that hearing is illuminating and I reproduce it here (with Mr Manickavasagam abbreviated to “DC”):
It is difficult to understand that if Mr Manickavasagam was so instructed to withdraw the application, he did not begin the hearing by informing the court that he was instructed to do so. Surely this would have been the intuitive thing to do. In fact, he went so far as to agree with the AR that the defendant’s main contention was for JUD 3596 to be set aside. It was only upon being questioned by the AR, being directed to the relevant authorities and being asked whether he intended to proceed with the application that Mr Manickavasagam suddenly stated that he would be withdrawing the application.
- [64]
[64] That being said, whether the defendant had in fact given instructions for Mr Manickavasagam to withdraw SUM 803 appears to me to be irrelevant for the purposes of the present application. In my view, irrespective of whether SUM 803 was wrongly withdrawn (or more accurately, withdrawn without due authority), SUM 803 was bound to fail in any event. It would have had no material impact on the Bankruptcy Application. I elaborate on both prayers sought in SUM 803.
- [65]
[65] First, in so far as the prayer for an extension of time to set aside the Statutory Demand is concerned, I am skeptical whether this would have been granted.
- [66]
[66] The Court of Appeal’s decision in Koh Kim Teck v Shook Lin & Bok LLP [2021] 1 SLR 596 (“Koh Kim Teck”) is instructive. The factors that a court ought to take into consideration when deciding whether to grant an extension of time to file an application to set aside a Statutory Demand are: (a) the period of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the grounds for setting aside the Statutory Demand; and (d) the prejudice that might result from an extension of time (Koh Kim Teck at [51], citing Rafat Ali Rizvi v Ing Bank NV Hong Kong Branch [2011] SGHC 114 at [32]). Further, while the threshold to grant an extension of time for a debtor to apply to set aside a statutory demand may not be a particularly high one, “the test is, at the same time, not an empty one” and necessarily fact-specific (Koh Kim Teck at [52]).
- [67]
[67] The operative provision is Rule 67(2)(b) of the PIR, which provides that an application to set aside a Statutory Demand is to be made within 14 days of service. As the Statutory Demand was served personally on the defendant on 9 October 2022 (see [12] above), the deadline for her to file an application would have been 23 October 2022. SUM 803 was taken out only on 22 March 2023, close to some five months after the statutory deadline. This was a substantial delay. In Koh Kim Teck, the court opined that “while the application was brought less than two weeks out of time, this [did] not mean that an extension of time should necessarily be granted” (at [52]). Here, no explanation was given by the defendant (or Mr Manickavasagam, who was on record as counsel for the defendant at the time) why close to five months had elapsed before any action was taken. The defendant was clearly put on notice after being personally served the Statutory Demand on 9 October 2022, which stated in clear terms that an application to set aside ought to be taken out within 14 days. The import of the Statutory Demand was clearly not lost on her. By the defendant’s own admission, she had quickly called Mr Fernandez to inform him of the Statutory Demand. As for the grounds to set aside the Statutory Demand, the only ground stated in the affidavit in support of SUM 803 was that the claimant had “no legal basis” as the Agreement was entered into during the COVID-19 pandemic (see [18] above). It is unclear what this was meant to imply, but as I explain below at [69], this is not a valid ground to set aside the Statutory Demand.
- [68]
[68] Second, in so far as the substantive prayer for the Statutory Demand to be set aside is concerned, I am likewise of the view that this was entirely without merit. I say so for broadly the same reasons that were highlighted by the AR at the hearing of SUM 803 (see [63] above).
- [70]
[70] Paragraph 160(2) is worded similar to the previous iteration of paragraph 144(2) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions (1 January 2013 release). The latter provision was considered by the High Court in Tan Hup Yuan Patrick v The Griffin Coal Mining Co Pty Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 221 (“Tan Hup Yuan Patrick”). In that case, the parties had entered into a consent judgment that was made pursuant to a settlement agreement for the discontinuance of legal proceedings based on an alleged breach of a deed of guarantee by the plaintiff. The defendants issued a statutory demand when the plaintiff failed to pay the sums due under the judgment. The plaintiff applied to set aside the statutory demand, arguing among other things, that the defendants had assigned to another party its interests under the guarantee and the defendants were therefore not entitled to enter judgment against the plaintiff. The AR dismissed the plaintiff’s application. The High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the plaintiff was impermissibly asking for the court to go behind the consent judgment and inquire into the validity of the debt, namely, whether the debt was indeed owed to the defendants. Woo Bih Li J (as he then was) observed thus (Tan Hup Yuan Patrick at [15]):
Tan Hup Yuan Patrick was subsequently affirmed by the Edmund Leow JC in Lim Poh Yeoh (alias Lim Aster) v TS Ong Construction Pte Ltd [2016] 5 SLR 272 at [69].
- [72]
[72] As such, it was not open to the defendant to attempt to set aside the Statutory Demand by seeking to challenge the validity of the debt incurred as a result of JUD 3596 before a court exercising its bankruptcy jurisdiction. SUM 803 was however an attempt to do exactly that: to impugn the validity of the Agreement and in turn the basis of JUD 3596. The application was a fruitless one. A review of the relevant provision and authorities above make this plain as a pikestaff. The appropriate recourse would have been for the defendant to apply to set aside JUD 3596 instead.
The defendant was properly notified of the correspondence from the Official Assignee
- [73]
[73] The second plank of the defendant’s allegation is that she did not at any time receive any letters, emails, or any form of correspondence, including telephone calls, from the Official Assignee regarding the DRS assessment either at her Residential Address, her email address or her mobile number. Presumably, this meant that she had no opportunity to respond to the Official Assignee’s request for documents in its determination of her suitability for the DRS.
- [74]
[74] With respect, in my judgment, the defendant’s assertion lacks credibility and I reject it. I have three reasons.
- [75]
[75] First, it is undisputed that the Residential Address is the defendant’s registered address and that she continues to reside there till date. The Official Assignee has filed an affidavit affirming that all notices and correspondence were sent to the Residential Address seeking the defendant’s submission for the relevant documents to determine her suitability for the DRS (see [22] above). The Official Assignee had never contacted the defendant through her email address or her mobile number. The defendant has proffered no cogent basis for her assertion that she had not received the correspondence from the Official Assignee.
- [77]
[77] Third, and relatedly, I agree with the claimant’s reliance on the representation made by Mr Manickavasagam to the court at the fifth hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 12 October 2023 that the defendant was in communication with the Official Assignee and that she would respond to the Official Assignee’s request for documents (see [23] above). This belies the defendant’s assertion that she never received any correspondence from the Official Assignee. In my view, this is supported by a series of WhatsApp messages in a group chat that involved Mr Fernandez, Mr Manickavasagam, the defendant and her husband, one Mr Sudhan. The following were exhibited by Mr Manickavasagam in his affidavit:
I pause here to point out that on the face of these messages, it is unclear when and from whom these messages were sent, as they were all forwarded into a separate chat with a common timestamp of 3.17pm. The identities of the senders of the messages were annotated by Mr Manickavasagam in the exhibits to his affidavit. When I questioned Mr Manickavasagam at the hearing as to why screenshots were not lifted directly from the WhatsApp chat group, he provided no satisfactory response, save to say that he had provided all the documentary evidence within his possession and that he had nothing to hide. Nevertheless, from the context above, it is apparent that the series of messages concerned the possibility of Mr Manickavasagam seeking an adjournment of the hearing scheduled the following day on 12 October 2023. He did make this request, which was denied by the court (see [23] above). Crucially, Mr Fernandez had stated that the “DRS is pending approval subject to some documents”. There is no suggestion from either the defendant or her husband that this was inaccurate. So too, is the message that “documents are pending”. The defendant did not challenge that these messages were in fact sent by either her or her husband or suggested that these messages were false. In my view, it is telling that the defendant conspicuously failed to exhibit these messages in any of her three affidavits filed in the present application. Overall, I accept that this is evidence that the defendant did in fact receive the notices and correspondence from the Official Assignee regarding her assessment for the DRS, but failed to respond by the stipulated deadline. What Mr Manickavasagam conveyed to the court at the hearing on 12 October 2023 was consistent with this series of messages.
- [78]
[78] One further point should be noted. I sought Mr Manickavasagam’s clarification on whether he had informed either Mr Fernandez or the defendant of the directions given by the court for the Bankruptcy Application to be adjourned pending the Official Assignee’s determination of the defendant’s suitability for the DRS at the hearing on 27 April 2023 (see [21] above). He stated that he had informed Mr Fernandez of the same. While this is not an averment contained his affidavit, it does, at least on the materials before me, appear consistent with Mr Fernandez’s message to Mr Manickavasagam to inform him to seek a “short adjournment to finalise their DRS” (see [77] above). By the time of the WhatsApp exchanges on 11 October 2023, the Notice of Unsuitability had already been issued by the Official Assignee (see [22] above), yet Mr Manickavasagam made no mention of this. This meant that the defendant was labouring under the misimpression that she remained suitable for the DRS. Mr Manickavasagam candidly states that he had was unaware of the Notice of Unsuitability despite the message sent in the e-Litigation system on 9 October 2023 due to an oversight on his part. This is admittedly, an unfortunate state of affairs. However, it remains the fact that the Official Assignee had sent correspondence to the defendant’s Residential Address. These documents were addressed to the defendant. Ultimately, it remained incumbent on her to provide the documents sought by the Official Assignee timeously. She did not do so.
Conclusion
- [83]
[83] Before I conclude, I wish to point out that in the course of these proceedings, the defendant called into question the following three aspects of Mr Manickavasagam’s conduct:
(a) First, that she did not sign any warrant to act or letter of engagement with Manicka & Co.
(b) Second, that throughout the conduct of the Bankruptcy Application and SUM 708, Mr Manickavasagam did not keep any attendance notes of the defendant’s instructions.
(c) Third, that Mr Manickavasagam obtained instructions from the defendant through Mr Fernandez, as an intermediary, and that he failed to contact her directly, save for the one occasion on 10 October 2023 on which Mr Manickavasagam reached out to the defendant via phone call to inform her of the upcoming hearing of the Bankruptcy Application on 12 October 2023 and to implore her to attend that hearing (see [32] above). In effect, Mr Fernandez acted as a conduit. Mr Manickavasagam himself described the “modus operandi” in the following terms: Mr Fernandez was to inform him of “what [the defendant] wants” and he would correspondingly provide updates to Mr Fernandez.
Mr Manickavasagam did not dispute these allegations against him. Nevertheless, for the reasons set out above, these allegations do not impact the substantive merits of the present application.
- [84]
[84] For completeness, I should add that the defendant has since lodged a police report against Mr Fernanadez and Mr Manickavasagam. She has also filed a complaint to the Law Society of Singapore regarding Mr Manickavasagam’s conduct. As investigations are still ongoing and shall necessarily run its course, I shall say nothing further on this and will leave these aspects of Mr Manickavasagam’s conduct to be dealt with in the appropriate forum.
- [86]
[86] In closing, I wish to record my appreciation to counsel for the claimant, Mr Ang Wee Tiong, for his able assistance to the court. His submissions were thorough yet measured, especially bearing in mind that the defendant was acting in person.