Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 2 Apr 2025

High Court

L’Oreal and another v Shopee Singapore Pte Ltd

Feedback & support

[2025] SGHCR 2Case no. Originating Application No 305 of 2024 (Summons No 165 of 2025)26 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. Background

  3. [3] The applicants are L’Oreal and La Roche-Posay Laboratoire Dermatologique (collectively, the “Applicants”). The Applicants are incorporated in France. The Applicants are part of a group of companies that manufactures and supplies perfumes, cosmetics and haircare products. The Applicants gave evidence that they are, at all material times, registered proprietors of certain valid and subsisting trademarks in Singapore (collectively the “Registered Marks”).

  4. [4] The Respondent is Shopee Singapore Private Limited (the “Respondent”). The Respondent is incorporated in Singapore. The Respondent operates an online platform (the “Shopee Platform”) which allows for the sale of goods between buyers and sellers (collectively, the “users”). The Respondent gave evidence that the users are independent individuals or businesses not associated with the Respondent in any way.

  5. [5] On 1 April 2024, the Applicants filed HC/OA 305/2024 (“OA 305”) seeking pre-action production of information and documents relating to 18 users (referred to in OA 305 as “Sellers”) of the Shopee Platform. The Applicants asserted that these Sellers had, without the Applicants’ consent, advertised and offered for sale various cosmetic products (the “Offending Goods”) under signs that are identical and/or similar to one or more of the Registered Marks, with the Offending Goods being goods that are identical and/or similar to the goods claimed by one or more of the Registered Marks. In other words, the Applicants alleged that counterfeit goods that infringe the Applicants’ trademarks are being sold on the Shopee Platform. Through OA 305, the Applicants hope to gather sufficient information about the Sellers to commence legal proceedings in Singapore against them for their alleged infringement of the Applicants’ intellectual property rights.

  6. (a) the full names and/or any other known aliases of the Sellers;

  7. (b) the Sellers’ personal identification and/or business registration numbers;

  8. (c) the Sellers’ residential addresses, registered business addresses, any other business addresses and/or addresses for service; and

  9. (d) the Sellers’ e-mail addresses and telephone / contact numbers.

  10. [8] On 14 January 2025, the Applicants filed SUM 165, alleging that the information in the Disclosure Affidavit was incomplete and inadequate and seeking remedies to address these alleged deficiencies. In SUM 165, the Applicants pray for:

  11. Issues to be determined

  12. [9] The issues to be determined are as follows:

  13. (c) depending on the answer to issue (b), whether this court ought to restrain the Respondent and persons related to it from disclosing to the Sellers any information relating to the present proceedings; and

  14. (d) whether the Applicants ought to be given permission to inform the MHA of the alleged shortcomings of the Respondent’s identity verification processes for sellers operating on the Shopee Platform.

  15. Issue 1: Whether there was full compliance with information production order

  16. Parties’ cases

  17. Applicants’ case

  18. [12] The Applicants submit that case law concerning pre-action / non-party interrogatories under O 26A of the Rules of Court 2014 is generally relevant in deciding applications for pre-action production of information under the present O 11 r 11 of the Rules of Court 2021. In particular, the Applicants submit that the case law on Norwich Pharmacal orders (refer to Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 208 at [24] for the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the remedy set out in Norwich Pharmacal Co and Others v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 (“Norwich Pharmacal”)) under the Rules of Court 2014 remain generally applicable. The Applicants argue that, having regard to the case law on when an answer to interrogatories is deemed insufficient, the Respondent’s response to ORC 3108 is insufficient.

  19. Respondent’s case

  20. [14] Moreover, in rebuttal against the Applicants’ argument that the Respondent never defended OA 305 on the basis that it did not have possession or control of the Allegedly Outstanding Information (see [11] above), the Respondents contend that it has never taken the position that it had the Allegedly Outstanding Information, and that it was not obliged to verify or state whether the requested information was in its possession or control prior to ORC 3108.

  21. Law

  22. [18] I agree that the “plain and obvious” standard is the appropriate standard to apply in relation to assessment of the adequacy of disclosures made pursuant to orders made under O 11 r 11 of the Rules of Court 2021. However, I would caution against a wholesale and unqualified application of the dicta at [32] of Lutfi to orders for the production of information and not documents. Lutfi was a case concerning the production of documents, and so were the two later cases which referred to Lutfi, namely Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co, Ltd and another [2024] SGHC 308 (“Wuhu”) and Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC (on behalf of Cachet Special Opportunities SP) v Feng Shi and others [2024] SGHC 327. There has thus been limited opportunity for the courts to opine on the application of the Lutfi test to orders to produce information.

  23. [19] I observe at the outset that the dicta at [32] of Lutfi does not map cleanly onto the issue of information disclosure. Lutfi at [32] speaks of whether it is plain and obvious that “the requested documents: (a) must exist or have existed; (b) must be or have been in the respondent’s possession or control; or (c) are not protected from production” [emphasis added]. The concepts of possession and control, however, are concepts that apply most straightforwardly to tangible property (ie, documents, in this context), and not information. Thus, in Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd [2015] QB 41 at [19] and [23], the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that it was not possible for a person to exercise physical control over information, which is intangible in nature, and, more broadly, that information is not itself a physical object capable of possession independently of the medium in which it is held. Indeed, in O 11 of the Rules of Court 2021, the concept of “possession or control” is tied only to documents, and not information (see O 11 rr 2(1), 2(4), 3(1), 3(2), 4, and 6 of the Rules of Court 2021).

  24. (b) If he does not have the information but is able to obtain it, he must do so, but he is not bound to obtain the information of anyone except his employees or agents.

  25. (c) If this information can be obtained from documents which are in his possession or control, then he is expected to provide that information.

  26. (d) He is also bound to provide information which is within the personal knowledge of his employees or agents unless the information was not acquired in the course of employment or agency respectively. That is, the party is required to exercise his best efforts in providing information which his employees or agents have acquired in their capacity as such employees or agents. This duty extends to former employees and agents (unless they ceased being such a considerable time ago) from whom enquiries can still be made.

  27. (e) A party may have to provide information known by another person where the party is responsible for that person acquiring that knowledge.

  28. (a) the requested documents which have not been produced:

  29. (i) must exist or have existed;

  30. (ii) must be or have been in the respondent’s possession or control; or

  31. (iii) are not protected from production; and/or

  32. (b) the requested information which has not been disclosed:

  33. (i) is within the respondent’s knowledge and belief;

  34. (ii) is information that the respondent is bound to obtain, having regard to the principles summarised at [21] above;

  35. (iv) is not protected from production.

  36. [26] In addition, the dicta of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lyell v Kennedy (No. 3) (1884) 27 Ch D 1 (“Lyell”) at 15 is also germane for present purposes. Cotton LJ there held that, in relation to interrogatories, a party interrogated can refer to the whole of his affidavit in answer to show that his answer is sufficient, and is not confined to that part of the affidavit which purports to deal with a particular interrogatory. In my judgment, when assessing the adequacy of the Respondent’s compliance with ORC 3108, I ought to consider the Disclosure Affidavit as a whole and not simply focus on each answer or each piece of information given in isolation.

  37. Decision

  38. [27] In my judgment, the Respondent had complied with ORC 3108.

  39. [33] I turn to the Applicants’ contention that the Respondent had implemented the Verification Process on the Shopee Platform which, according to the Applicants, must have resulted in the Respondent collecting the Allegedly Outstanding Information from the Sellers (see [11] above). In my view, this contention is unsustainable in view of the Applicants’ concession in their affidavit that the Verification Process may not have been applied to all the Sellers. This is because the Respondent implemented the Verification Process for existing sellers on the Shopee Platform in phases starting from 16 October 2023, and the Sellers are existing sellers that had been operating on the Shopee Platform since at least August 2023. It is thus not plain and obvious that the Allegedly Outstanding Information is within the Respondent’s knowledge and ought to have been disclosed.

  40. Issue 2: Whether further information and/or explanations ought to be furnished

  41. Parties’ cases

  42. Applicants’ case

  43. [37] The Applicants contend that if the information provided in the Disclosure Affidavit on the Sellers was obtained using the Verification Process, this will suggest that the relevant Sellers had submitted fraudulent or doctored documents and/or information. In such a case, the Applicants say that they will then consider applying for production of the relevant Sellers’ bank or financial information to discover the Sellers’ true identities.

  44. Respondent’s case

  45. [40] In rebuttal against the Applicants’ complaints that the information provided in the Disclosure Affidavit concerning most of the Sellers was “missing, bogus and/or unreliable, such that the Applicants are unable to file legal actions against the relevant Sellers and/or serve the originating process” (see [36] above), the Respondent argues that O 11 r 11(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 does not require a non-party to produce accurate, reliable and actionable identity information to enable the requesting party to commence proceedings and serve the originating process. Moreover, the Respondent asserts that it is untrue that the Applicants are unable to file legal actions against the Sellers or serve the originating process on them as the Applicants have sufficient information to do so. The Respondent points out that the Applicants can still bring a claim against the Sellers by identification through their pseudonyms, using the Sellers’ shop usernames on the Shopee Platform and providing a description which is sufficiently certain to identify those who are included and those who are not. In relation to personal service, the Respondent submits that it is premature and speculative to claim that the Applicants are unable to effect personal service on the Sellers based abroad when: (a) the Applicants have not even filed the originating process against the Sellers; and (b) the Applicants have not even attempted personal service. The Respondent further notes that even if personal service may be impracticable or impossible, the Applicants can apply for substituted service on the Sellers, such as through registered post to the Sellers’ addresses, the Sellers’ e-mail addresses (which were provided by the Respondent) or through the Shopee Platform’s chat function.

  46. [41] The Respondent submits that the Applicants’ prayers for further information and/or explanations are self-serving attempts to shift the burden of time and resources onto the Respondent, solely for the Applicants’ convenience, and granting such a request would set a detrimental precedent of imposing an undue burden on non-parties against whom pre-action production of documents and information is sought.

  47. Decision

  48. [47] At the hearing, the Applicants’ counsel replied to the Respondent’s arguments on the investigation reports. The Applicants’ counsel argued that there is nothing definitive to suggest that Seller 9 is located at the address provided by the Respondent. Counsel flagged that this is a problem as the process of personal service on persons in China, where Seller 9 is allegedly located, is time-consuming, and it would be a waste of time and effort to go through this process only to discover that the relevant Seller is not located at the address supplied. The Applicants’ counsel highlighted Seller 5, for whom the geographical address provided by the Respondent was visited by investigators hired by the Applicants and found to be occupied by what appears to be an unrelated entity. The Applicants’ counsel’s conclusion was that as Seller 5 cannot be located at the address, it would not serve any purpose to send court papers by registered post to this location.

  49. Issue 3: Whether the non-disclosure order ought to be granted

  50. Parties’ cases

  51. Applicants’ case

  52. Respondent’s case

  53. Decision

  54. Issue 4: Whether permission should be given to notify authorities

  55. Parties’ cases

  56. Applicants’ case

  57. [56] The Applicants further pray for a lifting of the Riddick undertaking, which provides that the Applicants, as parties entitled to the discovery of documents or information, impliedly undertake to the court that they will use those documents or information for the conduct of their case and for no other purpose unless the other party consents or the court’s approval is obtained. The Applicants seek the court’s permission to inform the MHA of any failure and/or inability of the Respondent to verify the identities of sellers operating on the Shopee Platform against government-issued documentation. The Applicants contend that the failure and/or inability of the Respondent to verify the identities of sellers against government-issued documentation raises sufficiently serious public safety concerns which is an important factor in favour of lifting the Riddick undertaking to allow the MHA to be notified of this point. Specifically, the Applicants highlight the importance of user verification in combating e-commerce scams and public messaging from the MHA apparently praising the Respondent for fully implementing user verification against government-issued documentation for all sellers on the Shopee Platform. The Applicants assert that the MHA’s public messaging appears inconsistent with the allegedly deficient information provided by the Respondent for most of the Sellers, and that it is important and in the public interest that the MHA is informed of this point.

  58. Respondent’s case

  59. Law

  60. [58] The Court of Appeal in Lim Suk Ling Priscilla and another v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and another and another appeal and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 912 (“Lim Suk Ling Priscilla”) provided important guidance on the appropriate test for determining whether a party ought to be released from the Riddick undertaking. In summary:

  61. (a) In determining whether a party ought to be released from its Riddick undertaking, a balancing of interests test is to be adopted: Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [45].

  62. (b) In applying this test, the court will engage in a multifactorial balancing exercise, and permission to be released from the Riddick undertaking will be granted if, in all the circumstances of the case, the interests advanced for the extraneous use of the disclosed documents outweigh the interests that are protected by the Riddick undertaking. Factors such as injustice (or lack thereof) to the disclosing party and the privileges which may be asserted are relevant factors which will feature in the balancing exercise. The weight to be accorded to such factors is necessarily fact-specific: Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [46], [47] and [69].

  63. (c) Non-exhaustive factors which have been raised in favour of lifting the Riddick undertaking include: (i) countervailing legislative policy; (ii) support of related proceedings; (iii) investigation and prosecution of criminal offence(s); (iv) public safety concerns; and (v) international comity: Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [71].

  64. (d) The factors in favour of granting leave are then to be balanced against the interests sought to be protected by the Riddick undertaking, namely the public interest in encouraging full disclosure and the disclosing party’s privacy interests. Other factors which may militate against the grant of leave include: (i) injustice or prejudice to the disclosing party; (ii) improper purpose for which leave is sought; and (iii) whether the disclosing party may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, and whether such privilege has been waived in the circumstances: Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [72].

  65. [59] Given that the Applicants have focused on public safety concerns as the key reason for their application to lift the Riddick undertaking, it is helpful to reproduce the Court of Appeal’s guidance at [71(c)] and [71(d)] of Lim Suk Ling Priscilla on public safety concerns and the closely related factor of the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences:

  66. Decision

  67. [60] In my judgment, there is no reason to lift the Riddick undertaking in this case. The interests advanced for the extraneous use of the disclosed information do not outweigh the interests that are protected by the Riddick undertaking.

  68. [61] The infringement of intellectual property rights is no doubt a serious matter, but I am not convinced that the public safety concerns raised are at the level of seriousness of “paedophilia”, “a plan to commit heinous crimes against an identifiable person or group o[f] persons” or “a threat of ‘immediate and serious danger’” (see Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [71(d)]). I clarify here that I am certainly not saying that only very serious public safety concerns can form the basis of a strong case for lifting the Riddick undertaking. However, in carrying out a multifactorial balancing exercise and assigning due weight to various factors, the court must inevitably evaluate the relative weightiness of each of the factors. I have no doubt that a serious public safety concern such as “a plan to commit heinous crimes against an identifiable person or group o[f] persons” raises more weighty public safety concerns than an allegation that the Respondent had failed to verify the identities of certain Sellers against Government-issued documentation, which creates risks of e-commerce scams.

  69. [62] Taking reference from the guidance in Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [71(c)]) which concerns the related factor of the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, I also consider as relevant the cogency of the evidence to be adduced in support of the complaint to the MHA. The Applicants premised their submission concerning the need to inform the MHA on their allegation that the Respondent had provided “missing, bogus and/or unreliable” information for “most of the Sellers”. As explained above at [48], I am unpersuaded that the Respondent provided “missing, bogus and/or unreliable” information in response to ORC 3108.

  70. [63] In addition, the court in Lim Suk Ling Priscilla at [71(c)]) also noted “whether civil remedies are available” as a relevant consideration. In this regard, I consider that the underlying principle behind this idea of the availability of civil remedies operates on the present facts in a manner that weakens the Applicants’ case. If consumers on the Shopee Platform have truly been placed at risk of harm (eg, through falling victim to an e-commerce scam, or purchasing products that are revealed to be counterfeits when the consumer takes delivery of their purchase), those consumers are better placed to personally make the relevant reports to the authorities. Those consumers would have personally experienced the harm and would have all the facts on hand. In my view, the availability of an alternative remedy aside from the Applicants making a complaint to the MHA, which is for consumers themselves to make reports if they have truly been placed at risk of harm, is a relevant factor in the multifactorial balancing exercise.

  71. [64] Thus, on the whole, I consider the case in favour of granting permission to lift the Riddick undertaking to be fairly weak.

  72. Conclusion

  73. [67] In summary, I have decided that:

  74. (e) the interests advanced for the extraneous use of the disclosed information do not outweigh the interests protected by the Riddick undertaking (see [66] above).

  75. [68] I therefore dismiss SUM 165.