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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Aug 2025

High Court

GLAS SAS (London Branch) v European TopSoho Sàrl and another

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[2025] SGHCR 29Case no. Originating Summons No 1193 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] Such an application to stay proceedings when there is lis alibi pendens is not unfamiliar to a court and certainly, after the initiating party is made to elect the jurisdiction in which it seeks to pursue its claims. Less frequent however, is when a party to the stayed proceedings later returns to the court seeking to lift the stay. This infrequency is perhaps unsurprising. It rarely arises in practice because once proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction run their course and a judgment is obtained, enforcement proceedings, whether in the jurisdiction that rendered the judgment or otherwise, will likely ensue if the judgment is left unsatisfied. Put otherwise, it is usually of fairly limited utility for a party to resume proceedings in the jurisdiction where the stay was granted. But what happens when, for one reason or the other, the foreign judgment obtained is incapable of being recognised or enforced such that the party is compelled to continue the proceedings previously stayed? Does the court possess the power to lift the stay previously granted? And if it does, under what circumstances should the court exercise its power to lift the stay?

  3. [3] These, in a nutshell, are the questions presented here.

  4. [4] In March 2022, I granted, on the applicant’s application, a stay of proceedings in HC/OS 1193/2021 (“OS 1193”), having accepted that there was a lis alibi pendens. At that time, the applicant had elected to pursue its claims in the Commercial Division of the English High Court, where proceedings were already afoot. The claims there substantially mirrored the claim in OS 1193, the latter of which is based on an alleged transaction at an undervalue pursuant to s 438 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Act 40 of 2018) (“IRDA”). The English court later rendered judgment on certain claims. Returning to the Singapore court, the applicant filed two applications in OS 1193:

  5. (a) First, by HC/SUM 3121/2024, the applicant sought to lift the stay previously imposed on OS 1193 (the “Lifting Application”). The first respondent supported the application while the second respondent contested the application.

  6. (b) Second, by HC/SUM 3120/2024, the applicant sought to join the non-party, J.P. Morgan Chase N.A. Singapore (“JPM”), as a respondent to OS 1193 (the “Joinder Application”). JPM contested the application.

  7. [6] In summary, I accepted the applicant’s submission that there was a legitimate basis to lift the case management stay that had previously been imposed and that the operative basis of the stay – a duplication of proceedings – had since ceased. Further, I was satisfied that it would be just and convenient for JPM to be joined as a party to the proceedings. In my view, that did not amount to an impermissible attempt to circumvent the normal enforcement process.

  8. [7] Alongside the oral remarks delivered then, I indicated to the parties that I would provide my full grounds of decision in due course. This, I now do.

  9. Factual background and procedural history

  10. [8] The dispute between the parties arises from the first respondent’s alleged default to repay €250m of secured exchangeable bonds bearing a coupon of 4% per annum (“Bonds”) that it had issued.

  11. The parties

  12. [9] The applicant, GLAS SAS (London Branch), is the London branch of a company incorporated in France. Among other things, the applicant provides trustee and loan administration services as well as a range of institutional debt administration to domestic and international debt funds.

  13. [10] The first respondent, European TopSoho Sàrl, is a company incorporated in Luxembourg. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ruyi International Fashion (China) Limited (“Ruyi International”), which is in turn ultimately owned by Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co., Ltd (“Shandong Ruyi”), a company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and headquartered in Shandong province. A key representative is Ms Qiu Chenran (“Ms Qiu”), who is the first respondent’s manager. She also serves as Vice-President of Ruyi International. I elaborate on Ms Qiu’s involvement in the litigation below.

  14. [11] The second respondent, Dynamic Treasure Group Limited, is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It was founded by Ms Qiu sometime in April 2017. As of 9 December 2021, it appeared that the director and shareholder of the second respondent was Grendall International Holding Ltd and Precious Pearl Candy Holding Limited respectively, with Ms Qiu being the ultimate beneficial owner of the second respondent.

  15. [12] For reasons that will become apparent later, it is necessary to rehearse some of the procedural history leading up to the present applications.

  16. The execution of the Deed and the issuance of the Bonds

  17. [13] On 21 September 2018, the first respondent, Forever Winner International Development Limited (“Forever Winner”) and BNP Paribas Trust Corporation UK Limited (“BNP”) executed a trust deed (“Deed”). The Deed also contained various terms and conditions (“T&Cs”). The Deed constituted the Bonds (see [8] above).

  18. [14] I highlight several key terms of the Deed and the nature of the transaction as between the relevant stakeholders:

  19. (a) The first respondent was the issuer of the Bonds. The Bonds had a maturity date of 21 September 2021.

  20. (b) Forever Winner was the guarantor of the Bonds. It guaranteed the due and punctual payment by the first respondent in respect of the Bonds.

  21. (d) Prior to the maturity date of the Bonds, the first respondent held 28,028,126 shares in SMCP S.A. (“SMCP”) that were secured in favour of the Bondholders (the “Pledged Shares”). The Pledged Shares were held in an identified security account with BNP Paribas Securities Services (London Branch). The first respondent further held 12,016,939 shares in SMCP that were not secured in favour of the Bondholders (the “Unpledged Shares”). The Unpledged Shares, which represent an approximately 16% stake in SMCP, were beneficially owned by the first respondent and did not comprise part of the security under the Deed. The first respondent’s only substantial asset is its shareholding in SMCP.

  22. SMCP is a company incorporated in France. It is in the business of accessible luxury fashion, with a presence in some 43 countries. SMCP’s shares are publicly tradeable and listed on the Euronext Paris Exchange.

  23. [15] On 24 December 2020, a majority of the Bondholders passed a written resolution resolving that the applicant be appointed as trustee for the Bondholders and for BNP to be replaced. On the same day, the applicant and BNP entered into a deed of appointment, under which BNP appointed the applicant as trustee for the Bondholders and BNP consequently retired from its position as trustee. This is how the applicant came to be part of the dispute. In effect, the applicant, as trustee for the Bondholders, acts in the interests of and on behalf of the Bondholders.

  24. [16] By 21 September 2021, the maturity date of the Bonds, the first respondent did not redeem the Bonds in full in cash at their principal amount. The first respondent also did not pay the requisite interest on the Bonds. By the applicant’s account, these constituted defaults under the T&Cs. The following day, the applicant delivered a written notice to the first respondent setting out the various defaults and notified the first respondent that it had five business days from the receipt of the written notice to remedy the outstanding defaults. The first respondent did not do so.

  25. [17] On 4 October 2021, the applicant served a default notice (“Notice”) on the first respondent, reiterating that various defaults under the Deed and the T&Cs had occurred and were continuing. As a result of the first respondent’s failure to remedy the defaults as specified in the Notice, the acceleration date occurred on 19 October 2021 and the Bonds outstanding became immediately due and payable.

  26. [18] As the value of the Pledged Shares, which the applicant has already taken possession of, falls below the total sum due under the Bonds, the litigation between the parties has focussed on the Unpledged Shares.

  27. The bankruptcy petition in Luxembourg and the transfer of the Unpledged Shares

  28. [19] On 22 October 2021, the applicant, acting on the instructions of the ad hoc group of a majority of Bondholders pursuant to the terms of the Deed and T&Cs, served a bankruptcy petition (assignation en faillite) on the first defendant. The applicant filed the bankruptcy petition in the District Court of Luxembourg on 9 November 2021. While the bankruptcy petition was denied initially on 26 November 2021, the Luxembourg Court of Appeal later declared the first respondent bankrupt on 28 February 2023 and appointed Ms Valérie Kopéra as curator (the “Curator”) of the first respondent. Mr Max Maillet subsequently replaced Ms Kopéra as Curator. The Curator performs a role akin to that of a liquidator or trustee-in-bankruptcy and discharges her duties under the supervision of a Luxembourg judge, Mr Änder Prost. For all intents and purposes, the Curator is in charge of the first respondent’s conduct of legal proceedings.

  29. [20] On 4 November 2021, SMCP issued a press release stating that the trustee (ie, the applicant) had taken possession of the Pledged Shares and that the first respondent had disposed of the Unpledged Shares. Neither the identity of the party to whom the Unpledged Shares were disposed nor the consideration for their disposal, if any, was disclosed in the press release.

  30. [21] On 13 November 2021, the first respondent issued a press release stating, among other things, that the disposal of the Unpledged Shares “was made by [the first respondent] pursuant to its obligations under a financial arrangement with an undisclosed third party”.

  31. [22] Following proceedings commenced by the applicant in the Paris Commercial Court, several details emerged regarding the transfer of the Unpledged Shares:

  32. (a) Prior to the transfer, the Unpledged Shares were held by BNP Paribas Securities Services Paris (“BNPSS”). BNPSS was the holder of SMCP’s share register and the manager of SMCP’s shareholder accounts, in which the shares were held in pure registered form.

  33. (b) The first respondent transferred the Unpledged Shares to the second respondent on 27 October 2021 for a purchase price of €1. BNPSS disclosed a copy of a Share Sale Agreement dated 22 October 2021 (“Share Agreement”), which BNPSS understood as the instrument by which the transfer occurred. While not entirely clear, this is presumably what was referred to by the first respondent as “a financial arrangement” in its press release on 13 November 2021 (see [21] above).

  34. (c) The second respondent received the Unpledged Shares in a pure registered account managed by BNPSS. The Unpledged Shares were converted into bearer form on 3 November 2021 on instruction from the second respondent.

  35. (d) Upon the conversion of the Unpledged Shares into bearer form, they were transferred by the second respondent to its custodian, JPM.

  36. With the disclosure of the above information, the applicant’s solicitors wrote to JPM to request that it refrain from effecting any further transfer or disposal of the Unpledged Shares.

  37. The applicant commences proceedings in England and Singapore

  38. [23] During this time, the applicant took out various legal proceedings in England and in Singapore. I begin with the former.

  39. Proceedings in England

  40. [24] On 10 November 2021, the applicant commenced proceedings in the Commercial Division of the English High Court, pursuing the following claims:

  41. (a) First, a claim in debt against the first respondent for outstanding sums due and payable under the Bonds and a deferred fee letter dated 17 June 2021 (the “UK Debt Claim”).

  42. (b) Second, a claim against the first and second respondents for relief under s 423 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45), seeking damages and a transfer of the Unpledged Shares from the second respondent back to the first respondent (the “s 423 UKIA Claim”).

  43. (c) Third, a claim against the respondents and Ms Qiu for unlawful means conspiracy in relation to the transfer of the Unpledged Shares (the “UK Conspiracy Claim”).

  44. Proceedings in Singapore

  45. [25] On 18 November 2021, the applicant commenced HC/S 941/2021 (“Suit 941”) against the respondents. Broadly, Suit 941 involved the following claims, mirroring closely those brought in the English High Court:

  46. (a) First, a claim against the first respondent for outstanding sums due and payable under the Bonds and a deferred fee letter dated 17 June 2021 (the “SG Debt Claim”).

  47. (b) Second, a claim against the first and second respondents for relief under s 438 of the IRDA, seeking a transfer of the Unpledged Shares from the second respondent back to the first respondent; in the alternative, payment of a sum from the second respondent for a sum equivalent to the benefit it had received from the transfer of the Unpledged Shares (the “s 438 IRDA Claim”).

  48. (c) Third, a claim against the first and second respondents for unlawful means conspiracy in relation to the transfer of the Unpledged Shares (the “SG Conspiracy Claim”).

  49. The applicant concurrently applied for a Mareva injunction against the respondents vide HC/SUM 5272/2021 (“SUM 5272”).

  50. [26] On 19 November 2021, Pang Khang Chau J heard SUM 5272 on an urgent ex parte basis. Pang J granted a Mareva injunction prohibiting the respondents from disposing of assets up to the value of €138.2m in Singapore, including the Unpledged Shares held in the second respondent’s account with JPM (the “Injunction”). The Injunction was made on the applicant’s undertaking that it would file an originating summons in respect of the s 438 IRDA Claim (instead of it being pursued in Suit 941 as part of a writ action). Pursuant to that undertaking and to regularise the procedural defect identified by the court, the applicant took out OS 1193 on the same day. The Injunction was to be treated as having been granted as part of both Suit 941 and OS 1193. This was the context in which OS 1193 came to be filed.

  51. [27] The applicant informed JPM of the Injunction. JPM confirmed that it had put in place internal measures freezing the second respondent’s account, including freezing the Unpledged Shares. To date, the Unpledged Shares remain held in the second respondent’s account maintained by JPM.

  52. The applicant applies to stay OS 1193 and elects to proceed in the English High Court

  53. [28] On 14 December 2021, the applicant filed HC/SUM 5759/2021 (“SUM 5759”), seeking a stay of OS 1193 on lis alibi pendens grounds. Neither of the respondents objected to the applications. Neither of the respondents filed any written submissions for the applications. And neither of the respondents submitted that OS 1193 ought to be discontinued instead of being stayed. SUM 5759 hence proceeded on an uncontested basis.

  54. Developments in the English proceedings after the stay of OS 1193

  55. [30] There were several developments following the stay of OS 1193, most notably of the proceedings in England, which I now set out in some detail.

  56. [31] On 23 February 2022, the applicant applied for summary judgment in respect of the UK Debt Claim for the sum of approximately €263m.

  57. [32] On 27 October 2022, Mr Simon Salzedo KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, granted summary judgment in terms of the UK Debt Claim against the first respondent, save for the claim in respect of the deferred fee letter dated 17 June 2021 (see [24(a)] above).

  58. [33] On 29 August 2023, the applicant filed an application to amend its pleadings and made a further application for summary judgment in respect of the s 423 UKIA Claim, the UK Conspiracy Claim and the UK Debt Claim, in so far as it pertained to the deferred fee letter dated 17 June 2021.

  59. [34] By this time, the Luxembourg court had appointed the Curator over the first respondent (see [19] above). The Curator had, following certain investigations, concluded that the first respondent ought not to advance the positive case pleaded in its Defence and would not actively resist the applicant’s claims in the English proceedings. Among other things, this was because the Curator took the view that Ms Qiu had no authority to enter into the Share Agreement and there was no resolution passed by the first respondent or delegation of power by the board granting Ms Qiu such a power.

  60. [36] On 9 and 12 April 2024, the applicant filed additional applications to amend its pleadings and for summary judgment on the s 423 UKIA Claim. This was done on the basis that, among other things, neither the first nor second respondent had a real prospect of successfully defending these claims, consistent with the Curator’s indication to withdraw the first respondent’s Defence (see [34] above).

  61. The second respondent applied for permission to appeal against Knowles J’s decision.

  62. [40] Despite the English Summary Judgment, the second respondent did not transfer the Unpledged Shares – or strictly, the bearer share certificates – to the first respondent (see [22] above). This inactivity was the impetus for the applicant’s present applications.

  63. The applicant takes out the present set of applications

  64. [41] On 23 October 2024, the applicant took out the Lifting Application and the Joinder Application.

  65. [42] Before me, Mr Keith Han appeared as lead counsel for the applicant, Mr Ngo Wei Shing appeared as lead counsel for the first respondent, Mr Jordan Tan appeared as instructed lead counsel for the second respondent and Ms Lee May Ling appeared as lead counsel for JPM.

  66. The parties’ arguments

  67. [43] I summarise the parties’ respective arguments on the Lifting Application and the Joinder Application.

  68. [44] On the Lifting Application:

  69. (b) The first respondent supported the application, deeming it as a necessary step to obtain the orders in OS 1193, ie, for the second respondent to return to it the Unpledged Shares. The reason for its support is that the first respondent was now controlled by the Curator and had since taken the position that the Sale Agreement was a sham and not binding as Ms Qiu had no authority to enter into the Sale Agreement (see [22(b)] above).

  70. (c) The second respondent’s riposte was that this was not the appropriate juncture for the stay of OS 1193 to be lifted for two key reasons. This was because (i) first, there remained ongoing proceedings in England that remained lis alibi pendens; and (ii) second, there also remained ongoing enforcement proceedings in Singapore in respect of an arbitral award (“Award”) rendered in favour of Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Limited Partnership) (“Xinbo”), which was the culmination of arbitral proceedings (the “Arbitration”) between the first respondent, Xinbo and Shandong Ruyi (see [10] above). I trace the circumstances leading to Award as well as the subsequent enforcement proceedings related to the Award in greater detail at [97] to [105] below.

  71. [45] On the Joinder Application:

  72. (c) The first and second respondents took no position on the Joinder Application and did not make any substantive arguments.

  73. [46] I consider the applications in turn.

  74. My decision on the Lifting Application

  75. [47] It would be helpful to understand the context in which the Lifting Application was brought.

  76. [49] The legal impediment to this course is that the English Summary Judgment was not capable of recognition and enforcement in Singapore as a foreign judgment, either at common law or by statute. This is because it was not a money judgment. I explain.

  77. [50] A foreign judgment is enforceable at common law, by way of a plaintiff commencing a fresh action to claim the judgment sum as a debt (Giant Light Metal Technology (Kunshan) Co Ltd v Aksa Far East Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 545 (“Giant Light Metal”) at [62], citing Adrian Briggs and Peter Rees QC, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa London, 5th Ed, 2009) at para 7.70). An in personam foreign judgment that is final and conclusive, and which is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, may be enforced by an action for the amount due under it (Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Place Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129 at [14]). Only foreign judgments for a fixed sum of money can be enforced since the “proper action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment was an action in assumpsit”, such that “an action for the enforcement of non-money foreign judgments cannot be countenanced” (Giant Light Metal at [63]). By the by, it is strictly a misnomer that the common law is said to allow for the enforcement of foreign judgments because any judgment enforced in Singapore under the common law is ultimately one given by the Singapore courts (Giant Light Metal at [60]), so any use of the term is simply a shorthand.

  78. [51] A foreign judgment is also enforceable under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (“REFJA”), which is based on and was intended to replace the common law action on a foreign judgment (Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp (formerly known as Merck & Co, Inc) v Merck KGaA (formerly known as E Merck) [2021] 1 SLR 1102 (“Merck”) at [37]). The REFJA was amended in 2019 to encompass certain Commonwealth judgments that were previously the remit of the now revoked Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921 (2020 Rev Ed). So too, did the amendments broaden the scope of the types of foreign judgments that could be registered under the REFJA, namely, non-money judgments. But this came with limitations.

  79. [54] With that background in mind, I move to the question of when a court should lift a case management stay imposed when there has been a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens shown, with an attendant election by a plaintiff to pursue proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.

  80. When should a court lift a case management stay granted when a plaintiff has been put to forum election owing to a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens

  81. [55] To answer the question of when a case management stay should be lifted, it requires me to first consider when such a stay will be granted on a lis alibi pendens grounds. The predicate to lifting a stay is, after all, a subsisting stay that is in place. I shall start my analysis there.

  82. Lis alibi pendens and the doctrine of forum election

  83. [56] The Singapore court may be asked to stay proceedings pending before it is when there are simultaneous proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction between the same parties and involving the same or similar issues. When this occurs, the foreign proceedings are considered lis alibi pendens. Here, a lis simply refers to a cause of action. In this regard, the concept of lis alibi pendens is concerned with ascertaining not just a multiplicity of proceedings but rather a duplicity of proceedings. These are distinct. The latter necessarily encompasses the former. But a multiplicity of proceedings itself imports no guarantee of a duplicity of proceedings, which requires a scrutiny of whether the issues involved are the same or at least substantially similar.

  84. [57] The concept of lis alibi pendens and the doctrine of forum election were considered by the Court of Appeal in Virsagi Management (S) Pte Ltd v Welltech Construction Pte Ltd and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 1097 (“Virsagi”). The following six points may be distilled from Virsagi and from the various cases both preceding and subsequent to it.

  85. [59] Second, is the nature of a lis alibi pendens. A lis alibi pendens may arise in two broad situations (Virsagi at [27], citing Yusen Air & Sea Service (S) Pte Ltd v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [1999] 2 SLR(R) 955 (“Yusen”) at [16] and J D McClean, “Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion” (1969) 18 ICLQ 931 at 934):

  86. (a) The common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation, ie, when the same plaintiff sues the same defendant in Singapore and in the foreign jurisdiction.

  87. (b) The reversed parties lis alibi pendens situation, ie, when the plaintiff sues the defendant in Singapore and the defendant sues the plaintiff in the foreign jurisdiction or vice versa.

  88. [60] Third, is the effect of a lis alibi pendens, and specifically how it affects the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings seised in Singapore. A lis alibi pendens “operates as a fact to which our rules on private international law accord legal significance by reference to two (and only two separate legal doctrines)”, that being the doctrine of forum election and the doctrine of forum non conveniens (Virsagi at [29] and [41]). Demonstrating a lis alibi pendens is hence not an end to itself, but rather a means through which a party will seek a desired outcome in either set of proceedings mounted. Various avenues to address a lis alibi pendens are available to the court. This includes staying the proceedings before it, restraining the foreign proceedings by way of an anti-suit injunction or requiring the plaintiff to elect which proceedings to pursue. The effect of a lis alibi pendens in a given case turns on the type of lis alibi pendens, as identified above at [59]:

  89. (a) On one hand, the doctrine of forum election arises “only in a common plaintiff [lis alibi pendens] situation” [emphasis in original] (Virsagi at [30]). In other words, establishing a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens is the sine qua non for the doctrine of forum election to be invoked. Once that is successfully shown, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to justify the continuance of the concurrent proceedings by showing very unusual circumstances (Virsagi at [30]–[31], citing Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2009) (“Halsbury’s) at para 75.094; Ang Ming Chuang v Singapore Airlines Ltd (Civil Aeronautics Administration, third party) [2005] 1 SLR(R) 409 at [9]). If the plaintiff is unable to do so, it comes to a crossroad: it has to elect whether it wishes to pursue its claims in Singapore or in the foreign jurisdiction. When a plaintiff is put to such election, “any questions regarding which forum is the more appropriate, or natural, forum for the dispute to be tried are irrelevant” (Virsagi at [30]). Rather, the doctrine of forum election operates as a “mechanism of case management” (Virsagi at [37]).

  90. (i) Procedurally, a defendant may apply to the court to compel a plaintiff to elect the jurisdiction in which to proceed with its claims (Yusen at [27]; Transtech Electronics Pte Ltd v Choe Jerry [1998] 1 SLR(R) 1014 at [16]). As a matter of prudent practice however, when faced with a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens, a defendant is well-advised to first request the plaintiff to voluntarily elect the jurisdiction in which to pursue its proceedings. This may obviate the need for a formal application, which may instead needlessly incur time, judicial resources and escalate costs (see Joel Lee Tye Beng, Leow Wei Xiang Joel and Marcus Teo Wei Ren, “Conflict of Laws” (2021) 22 SAL Ann Rev 268 at para 12.27). For example, if a plaintiff elects to continue proceedings in Singapore (and the defendant has no objections to this course of action), the court will enjoin the plaintiff to stop all foreign proceedings by way of an injunction (Virsagi at [35]). In this respect, plaintiff can evince its election either expressly or by its conduct. Doubtless, the straightforward way to do so is to simply make an affirmative and express election addressed to both the court and the defendant. This will ensure the plaintiff’s election is clear and indeed, be placed on record. While election may be evinced by a party’s conduct, it ought to be borne in mind that in the absence of an affirmative election, “the mere commencement of one set of proceedings does not per se amount to an election to proceed in that jurisdiction” and the “lack of diligence per se does not amount to an election” (Yusen at [42]).

  91. (ii) Nevertheless, a defendant is not confined only to apply to court to compel a plaintiff to elect. If a defendant wishes for the plaintiff to have the proceedings proceed in Singapore instead of the foreign jurisdiction (and the plaintiff disagrees with this course of action), it may apply for an anti-suit injunction to restrain the plaintiff from continuing proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction (Yusen at [34]). Whether an anti-suit injunction should be granted involves a multi-factorial enquiry (PT Karya Indo Batam v Wang Zhenwen and others (Wang Zhenwen and others, third parties) [2021] 5 SLR 1381 (“PT Karya”) at [18]). Unlike the forum of doctrine election, an anti-suit injunction may be granted in both a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation or a reversed parties lis alibi pendens situation. To this extent, a lis alibi pendens can be probative of whether the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive behavior, which is one of the relevant factors that the court considers. The court will consider all the circumstances of the case, including the manner in which the proceedings were commenced, the presence of oppressive foreign procedures and bad faith in the conduct of the proceedings (UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503 at [128]; Koh Kay Yew v Inno-Pacific Holdings Ltd [1997] 2 SLR(R) 148 (“Koh Kay Yew”) at [19])). As a starting point, an applicant seeking an anti-suit injunction bears the burden of proving that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive (PT Karya at [48]). That said, it has been held that “in an application for an anti-suit injunction, where the applicant can show the existence of a lis alibi pendens, the burden of proof would shift to the respondent to prove the existence of very unusual circumstances showing that the concurrent proceedings are not vexatious or oppressive, to displace the prima facie finding that the concurrent proceedings are vexatious or oppressive” (PT Karya at [56]). This, in substance, mirrors the approach when the doctrine of forum election applies, which is justified on the basis that the “common plaintiff [lis alibi pendens] situation carries the same undesirable consequences in both the legal contexts of forum election and the granting of anti-suit injunctions” (PT Karya at [56]).

  92. (b) On the other hand, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can apply in both a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation and a reversed parties lis alibi pendens situation (Virsagi at [38]). In a reversed parties situation, the doctrine of forum non conveniens “is the only way a lis alibi pendens can have any legal significance for the purposes of jurisdiction” [emphasis added] (Virsagi at [38]). It has been observed that “lis alibi pendens used to be a separate ground for the staying of proceedings” (Joel Lee Tye Beng, “Conflict of Laws” (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 133 at 134). But this position has changed and indeed, was put beyond doubt by the Court of Appeal in Virsagi. With the development of the common law, lis alibi pendens (or more accurately, just a lis pendens) gradually became a factor taken into account as part of the two-stage test as set out in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”) to determine whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens applied. The weight to be accorded to a lis pendens as part of the Spiliada test depends on the circumstances of each case, including the degree to which the respective proceedings have advanced and the degree of overlap of issues (see Manharlal Trikamdas Mody v Sumikin Bussan International (H.K.) Ltd. [2014] 3 SLR 1161 at [132]). There is no requirement however that there must be a strict lis alibi pendens in the sense that the proceedings involve the same parties and same or similar issues (Virsagi at [39]–[40], citing Halsbury’s at para 75.094). This means that a lis pendens can suffice for the purposes of it being taken into consideration as a factor in determining the more appropriate forum. That said, little or no weight will be accorded to the fact of multiple proceedings if the foreign proceedings have only been commenced for strategic reasons to demonstrate the existence of a competing jurisdiction and bolster the case of a more appropriate forum elsewhere (Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi (North) Sdn Bhd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 814 at [63]). Given that the existence of a lis pendens is never dispositive of the issue of the natural forum, it is important to note that an invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens need not wait until proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction have commenced (unlike the doctrine of forum election).

  93. [61] Fourth, is the rationale for a plaintiff to be made to elect a forum in a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation. To allow both sets of proceedings to proceed in tandem would mean that “[n]ot only would the same issue be litigated twice but there would also be the risk of having two different results, each conflicting with the other” (Koh Kay Yew at [22]). An election will mitigate considerably the distinct risk of inconsistent findings. Further, the court’s intervention is justified on the basis that “it is unfair or unconscionable for the defendant to have to fight the same battle twice” and such conduct may be regarded as a “vexatious harassing of the opposite party” (PT Sandipala Arthaputra v STMicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2015] 5 SLR 873 at [112]). To require the same parties to engage in multiple sets of proceedings on both fronts simultaneously is generally undesirable. The doctrine of forum election functions as a mechanism to “prevent the inherent abuse of the different judicial systems in different jurisdictions” (Koh Kay Yew at [22]).

  94. [62] Fifth, is the interplay between the concept of lis alibi pendens, the doctrine of forum election and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. While the doctrine of forum election and forum non conveniens “do not operate in any way on a conceptual level”, they can “operate alongside each other” and “practically speaking, it is perhaps inevitable that the two doctrines will interface with one another” (Virsagi at [34]). This interplay has been touched upon at [60] above but one further observation is pertinent. Because the doctrines are conceptually distinct, a defendant is permitted to object on cumulative bases that a plaintiff should be made to elect between proceedings it has commenced and that if the plaintiff has decided to elected in Singapore, these proceedings should nevertheless be stayed in favour of foreign proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens (Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 (“Rappo”) at [65]). As a practical matter, it would be prudent for a court, when faced with such cumulative objections, to determine first whether Singapore is forum non conveniens. An affirmative finding would put an end to the inquiry. Only if the court determines the foreign jurisdiction is not clearly the more appropriate forum compared to Singapore that the plaintiff would then be put to an election between the proceedings, provided that there is a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens (Rappo at [67]).

  95. (a) The English position is strict and appears to adopt dismissal as a default position, with a stay being warranted only in exceptional circumstances (Yusen at [32], citing Smart P.S.J, “Lis Alibi Pendens: Staying or Discontinuing English Proceedings” (1990) LMCLQ 326 at 329; see also Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Company (No. 5) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 533). As an aside, should a plaintiff fail to make an election despite there being a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens, the defendant is at liberty to strike out one set of proceedings (Ledra Fisheries Ltd v Turner [2003] EWCA 1049 at [12]).

  96. [64] Belbana N.V v APL Co Pte Ltd and another [2014] SGHCR 17 (“Belbana”) provides a useful illustration of the principles outlined above. In that case, the parties entered into a contract for the defendants to ship bananas from Ecuador to Belgium. Disputes arose, with the plaintiff alleging that the defendants had breached their duties in the stowing, handling, custody, care and discharge of the cargoes. The plaintiff commenced two sets of proceedings against the defendants, first in Belgium and later in Singapore. The defendants applied to challenge the jurisdiction of the Belgian court but their application was dismissed. The parties then took out cross-applications before the Singapore court, both with the common purpose of holding a set of proceedings in abeyance. The plaintiff applied to stay the Singapore proceedings while the defendant applied to compel the plaintiff to elect between the proceedings on the basis that the proceedings in Belgium were lis alibi pendens.

  97. [65] The learned Assistant Registrar Paul Tan held that there was a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation, such that there was a distinct risk of inconsistent decisions should the actions in Belgium and Singapore proceed concurrently (Belbana at [18] and [35]). There was an identity of parties and the nature of reliefs. Moreover, it was clear that both sets of proceedings involved similar causes of action, specifically alleged breach of contractual duties. The court correspondingly put the plaintiff to an election and the plaintiff elected to pursue its claim in the Belgian courts. However, the parties disagreed on the consequence of the election. The plaintiff argued that the Singapore proceedings should be stayed but the defendants contended that the Singapore proceedings ought to be discontinued.

  98. The court has a discretionary power to lift a stay previously granted after a plaintiff’s election to proceed in a foreign jurisdiction

  99. [68] I turn now to the issue of whether the court has the power to lift a stay imposed as a result of the plaintiff’s election to pursue proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction because of a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens.

  100. [69] In my judgment, there is no question of the court’s power to lift a stay. I say this for two related reasons.

  101. [70] The first is to do with the inherent nature of a stay: a “stay is suspensory only, and is conceptually distinct from a dismissal or discontinuance”. This means that “the court granting a stay remains seised of the proceedings and may in principle lift the stay at a later date” (Rotary Engineering Ltd and others v Kioumji & Eslim Law Firm and another and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 907 (“Rotary Engineering”) at [24], citing Rofa Sport Management AG v DHL International (UK) Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 902 at 911).

  102. [71] To similar effect is the Court of Appeal’s emphasis in Bi Xiaoqiong of the temporary nature of a stay, such that it envisages there to be something left to be done in the action, be it the determination of the action on the merits or a discontinuance of the action itself (at [107]):

  103. [72] The second is to do with the particular nature of the stay imposed. Where a plaintiff elects to pursue proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction in a common plaintiff lis alibi pendens situation, a case management stay is imposed in respect of the proceedings in Singapore. This contrasts with a stay grounded on forum non conveniens in that the court in ordering a case management stay does not consider whether Singapore is the natural forum (see Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR(R) 345 at [35(a)]). Virsagi says much the same (at [32]):

  104. Given that the court’s power to grant a case management stay is sited in its inherent powers to manage its internal processes, that same power must enable the court to lift the stay.

  105. [73] The existence of the court’s power to lift a case management stay finds further support in the High Court’s observations in Gulf Hibiscus Ltd v Rex International Holding Ltd and another [2019] SGHC 15, in which Aidan Xu @ Aedit Abdullah J held that the court does not become functus officio after imposing a case management stay (at [25]):

  106. [74] In this vein, there are many circumstances in which a court may exercise its discretion to lift a stay. Most commonly, this may be due to a material change in circumstances. In the context of a stay granted on forum non conveniens grounds for example, it has been observed that a plaintiff may seek to lift a stay where the other jurisdiction is not willing to take jurisdiction for some reason (Rotary Engineering at [24]). The key point to draw from this is that whether a stay should be lifted is ultimately an exercise of the court’s discretion.

  107. A prospective applicant seeking to lift a stay should provide cogent reasons

  108. I explain why these are material considerations.

  109. [76] In respect of (a) and (b), the court is clearly empowered to lift a stay previously made where the premise of the stay no longer holds (Sia Chin Sun v Yong Wai Poh (Sia Tze Ming, non-party) [2019] 3 SLR 1168 at [40]). As alluded to at [74] above, in the context of a stay granted on forum non conveniens grounds, the court’s discretion to lift such a stay is exercised only when there are exceptional circumstances striking at the very basis on which the stay was granted, for example, if the premise on which the stay was granted turns out to be mistaken (Rotary at [25]). It is apposite to consider here the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Xitrans Finance Ltd v Rappo, Tania and another matter [2023] SGCA 22 (“Xitrans”) and The “Sea Justice” [2024] 1 SLR 1118 (“The Sea Justice”), both of which touched upon the issue of lifting a forum non conveniens stay.

  110. [81] Guidance may be drawn from those cases to the extent that they stand for the uncontroversial proposition that in determining whether a stay should be lifted, the court should determine as an anterior question, the basis upon which the stay was initially granted and thereafter, whether that basis still holds or has since fallen away. In the context of a stay granted because of a plaintiff’s election to pursue proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, this means in practical terms that the court will have to determine whether there remains a lis alibi pendens vis-à-vis the Singapore proceedings that have been stayed. Of course, how the foreign proceedings may cease to be a lis alibi pendens can arise in myriad situations, such as the foreign court’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the dispute, as alluded to in Belbana (see [66] above) or more straightforwardly, by the foreign court’s conclusive determination of the dispute. Each case will turn on its own facts.

  111. [82] To that however, I propose one caveat. That is the threshold that an applicant seeking to lift a stay granted as a result of forum election has to meet. As the cases above have held, it is incumbent on a party seeking to lift a forum non conveniens stay to demonstrate exceptional circumstances (see [76] above). While not expressly stated, that high threshold is justified on the basis that the court, in ordering such a stay, has done so because of its finding that there is some available forum other than Singapore that is clearly or more distinctly appropriate to try the action. The court does not come to such a conclusion lightly; it arrives at this only after undertaking a multi-factorial analysis that establishes the forum with the closest connection to the material elements of dispute before it decides to decline jurisdiction (see [60(b)] above). This is why that the forum non conveniens inquiry is described as “often a complicated and unpredictable exercise” (CXG and another v CXI and others [2024] 3 SLR 1282 at [66]). It should come as no surprise that given the gravity of a court’s decision to decline jurisdiction, any subsequent decision to lift a stay granted on that basis requires exceptional circumstances. In comparison, the nature of the stay arising from forum election is not analogous. It is a case management stay. And in deciding whether such a stay is imposed, the court is not concerned with questions of the more appropriate, or natural, forum for the dispute to be tried in (see [60(a)] and [72] above). This animating concern in does not feature in lifting a case management stay. So, while it remains imperative that an applicant seeking to lift a stay granted as a result of forum election establish that the basis of the stay has since fallen away, the same degree of exceptionality as required in the case of lifting a forum non conveniens stay may not be required.

  112. [83] There is yet another distinguishing feature, which segues into (c) and (d). A plaintiff’s election to pursue claims in a certain jurisdiction is necessarily a considered one, not only because the choice of jurisdiction often informs a party’s litigation strategy, but more importantly because it also carries with it certain legal consequences. This point was touched upon in Belbana (see [64]–[66] above). As mentioned above, the plaintiff there had elected to pursue its claims against the defendant in the Belgian court. The Singapore court then granted a stay of the proceedings before it. In deciding if a stay (as opposed to a discontinuance) was the proper course, an issue of concern was whether a plaintiff, having elected to proceed in the Belgian courts, could then seek to lift the stay imposed on the Singapore proceedings and re-litigate the merits of the action should the Belgian court not rule in its favour. AR Tan answered this in the negative, observing as follows (Belbana at [40]):

  113. [85] What this means is that once a plaintiff has elected to pursue its claims in a particular jurisdiction for such claims to be conclusively determined on its merits in that jurisdiction, it should be held to that election. A plaintiff should not thereafter be allowed to approbate and reprobate by seeking to resile from its election. There are two points in time that the issue of approbation and reprobation may conceivably arise:

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